Tag Archives: guidelines

U.S. Sentencing Commission’s In A Hurry to Get Things Done – Update for March 27, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING COMMISSION ROCKET DOCKET

rocket190620Showing that a federal prisoner has an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason for grant of compassionate release is critical to getting a sentence reduction grant under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A). That statute also requires that any grant be consistent with “applicable policy statements” of the U.S. Sentencing Commission.

This is where it’s been sticky. The USSC has one policy statement (USSG § 1B1.13) addressing compassionate release, adopted well before the compassionate release statute was changed by the First Step Act. The same month Congress passed First Step (December 2018), the USSC lost its quorum as multiple members’ terms expired. President Trump nominated some new members a few months later, but the Senate did not approve them. That condition lasted until last spring, when President Biden nominated a complete slate of new members.

USSC2300327Without a quorum, the USSC could not modify § 1B1.13 to account for the changes that First Step made in the § 3582(c)(1)(A). Almost all courts responded by holding that the old § 1B1.13 was no longer an “applicable policy statement” and thus didn’t bind the courts. In a way, that was liberating to the people filing compassionate release motions, because courts were freed from § 1B1.13’s restrictive definition of what constituted “extraordinary and compelling” reasons.

But without a USSC policy statement moderating district court responses, compassionate release grants since 2019 have been characterized by wide disparity. In Oregon, for instance, about 62% of compassionate release filings have been granted. In the Middle District of Georgia, on the other hand, only about 1.5% have been granted.

The new USSC said last its top priority was to amend § 1B1.13, and in January, the Commission issued a draft § 1B1.13 for public comment that contained some very prisoner-friendly proposals and options. The proposed change was part of an extensive set of draft Guidelines amendments that spanned more than a hundred pages of text. The public comment period ended two weeks ago, with over 1,600 pages of comments filed on the compassionate release proposal alone.

The USSC usually rolls out its proposal Guidelines amendments by May 1st. Under 28 USC § 994(p), the amendments go to Congress, which then has 180 days to reject them. If Congress does nothing (which is almost always the case), the changes become effective.

Iminahurry230327But this new USSC is in a hurry to get things done. Last week, the Commission announced an April 5 meeting at which the final § 1B1.13 (and all of the other draft proposed amendments) will be adopted.

If the amendment package goes to Congress that same day, they could become effective as early as Monday, Oct 2nd.

USSC, Public Meeting – April 5, 2023 (March 24, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

New Day Dawning for Compassionate Release? – Update for January 17, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING COMMISSION ISSUES DRAFT COMPASSIONATE RELEASE AMENDMENTS

USSCvanwinkle230117For the first time in five years, the U.S. Sentencing Commission last week issued draft Guidelines amendments that – after public comment and a 6-month Congressional review period – will become effective in November.

The USSC’s draft amendments cover everything from the drug safety valve to extra points off for defendants with a zero criminal history score to tougher guideline numbers for gun straw purchasers. But these draft changes are of lesser interest to prisoners because nothing the Commission changes in the guidelines is retroactive unless the USSC goes through a separate amendment process to make it so.

The last time that happened was the “drug-minus-two” change in 2014. Whether any of the sentencing changes the USSC issued in draft form last week will ever make the retroactivity cut is not yet clear.

The compassionate release policy statement that the USSC rolled out, however, will have applicability for people already serving a sentence. The Guidelines applied at sentencing have been advisory for the past 18 years, but the Commission’s compassionate release policy, USSG § 1B1.13, is not: under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) – the  “compassionate release” provision of the sentencing statute – a district court must ensure any sentence reduction decision “is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
compassionlimit230117The existing compassionate release policy was written before the First Step Act passed, for an era in which only the Bureau of Prisons could bring a compassionate release motion on behalf of an inmate. Since First Step passed, most (but not all) circuit courts have ruled that § 1B1.13 is not binding because it had not been amended to include First Step changes. While that freed district courts to grant compassionate release in circumstances other than the few listed in the old § 1B1.13, it wasn’t all good.

“Commission data have indicated that in recent years — over the COVID-19 pandemic and without a Commission quorum — the district courts have granted compassionate release at varying rates,” US District Court Judge Carlton W. Reeves, Commission chairman, said at last week’s USSC meeting. “It is my sincere hope that our work… brings greater clarity to the federal courts and more uniform application of compassionate release across the country.”

According to the USSC, people in Oregon had a 62% chance of getting a compassionate release grant. People in the Middle District of Georgia had a 1.5% chance. Giving federal judges the freedom to define for themselves what justifies a sentence reduction is a great thing when it frees the jurists from unreasonably strict limitations. It’s not so great when defendants with similar histories and offenses are treated dramatically differently due to an accident of geography.

The draft § 1B1.13 amendments propose additions to circumstances justifying compassionate release that include “medical conditions that require long-term or specialized medical care, without which the defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death, that are not being provided in a timely or adequate manner; risk of being affected by a disease outbreak in prison for which the defendant is at increased risk of suffering severe medical complications or death; the incapacitation of the defendant’s parent when the defendant would be the only available caregiver; the defendant has been the victim of sexual assault or physical committed by a BOP employee or contractor; or “the defendant is serving a sentence that is inequitable in light of changes in the law.”

compassion160208The proposal also suggests a “catch-all” provision that “the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with” the other circumstances the Commission has proposed for the beefed-up  § 1B1.13

The USSC draft proposals also include a provision to amend § 1B1.3 the “relevant conduct’ provision that tends to run up sentencing ranges, “to add a new subsection (c) providing that acquitted conduct shall not be considered relevant conduct for purposes of determining the guideline range unless the conduct was admitted by the defendant during a guilty plea colloquy or was found by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt to establish, in whole or in part, the instant offense of conviction.” As noted, no one at this point knows whether this might become retroactive in the future.

Reuters, U.S. panel proposes limiting sentencing of defendants for acquitted conduct (January 12, 2023)

USSC, US Sentencing Commission Seeks Comment on Proposed Revisions to Compassionate Release, Increase in Firearms Penalties (January 12, 2023)

USSC, Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (Preliminary) (January 12, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, US Sentencing Commissions publishes proposed guideline amendments and issues for comment (January 12, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

President Packs USSC With Some Good Picks – Update for May 12, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING COMMISSION DROUGHT IS LIFTING

noquorum191016President Biden yesterday nominated a bipartisan slate of seven candidates to serve as commissioners on the U.S. Sentencing Commission. If confirmed, the nominees will revitalize the USSC, giving it its first quorum in almost four years.

The list includes U.S. District Judge Carlton W. Reeves (Southern District of Mississippi). If confirmed by the Senate, he will be the first black jurist to chair the 33-year-old commission’s history.

By statute, the Commission must be bipartisan and consist of at least three federal judges and no more than four members of each political party.

Biden’s planned nominees include three active judges and four attorneys. Of those nominees, two have experience as public defenders. Nominees also include

• Laura Mate, a former assistant federal public defender in the Western District of Washington, serves as Sentencing Resource Counsel for the Federal Public and Community Defenders in Arizona;

• Judge Luis Felipe Restrepo, appointed by President Obama to serve on the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and a former assistant federal public defender in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania;

• Claire McCusker Murray, formerly principal deputy associate attorney general in the Dept. of Justice during the Trump Administration;

• Judge Claria Horn Boom, appointed by President Trump to the U.S. District Courts for both the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky;

• Former U.S. District Judge John Gleeson (EDNY), a partner at Debevoise and Plimpton LLP, who enjoys close to rock-star status as a forward-thinking sentence reformer;

• Candice Wong, Assistant United States Attorney and Chief of the Violence Reduction and Trafficking Offenses Section in the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia.

USSC170511The Sentencing Commission has lacked a full slate of commissioners for the entirety of the Trump Administration, and has not had a quorum since the First Step Act passed in December 2018. That is why no guideline has been amended since the November 2018 amendments went into force.

Trump nominated four commissioners in August 2020, two of whom – Judges Restrepo and Boom – were renominated yesterday. Their nominations expired when the Senate did not act on them prior to the end of the 116th Congress in January 2021.

The Commission has a stack of work waiting for its attention, chief among the issues being compassionate release. Last November, the sole remaining member of the Commission at the time, Senior Judge Charles Breyer (N.D. Cal.) complained to Reuters that the lack of quorum meant the Commission could not provide guidance on how to implement compassionate release, creating a “vacuum” in which judges inconsistently decide whether inmates under the measure can secure a sentence reduction under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

“Some people were granted compassionate release for reasons that other judges found insufficient,” he said. “There was no standard. That’s a problem when you try to implement a policy on a nationwide basis.” The Commission’s outdated Guideline 1B1.13, ignored by most circuits but used as a bludgeon by others, was perhaps the primary mischief-maker, but with no quorum, the USSC has been powerless to fix things.

Don’t expect immediate miracles. The Commission normally works on a 12-month cycle, with proposed topics for amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines issued late in the year, followed by the actual amendments early in the following year, and a final slate of amendments by May 1. Under the law, the amendments take effect on November 1, unless Congress votes to veto one or all of them.

This means that the most anyone can hope for would be amendments to take effect on November 1, 2023.

progress220512Still, the slate of new commissioners would be the most defendant-friendly bunch to ever run the USSC. Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog yesterday, “Because these selections have surely been made in consultation with Senate leadership, I am reasonably hopeful that hearings and a confirmation of these nominees could proceed swiftly. (But that may be wishful thinking, as was my thinking that these needed nominees would come a lot sooner.) There is lots of work ahead for these nominees (and lots of blog posts to follow about them and their likely agenda), but for now I will be content with just a ‘Huzzah!’”

He’s right.  Its progress, however slow in coming.

Bloomberg Law, Biden Names Seven to Restock US Sentencing Commission (May 11, 2022)

The White House, President Biden Nominates Bipartisan Slate for the United States Sentencing Commission (May 11, 2022)

The White House, President Donald J. Trump Announces Intent to Nominate and Appoint Individuals to Key Administration Posts (August 12, 2021)

Reuters, U.S. sentencing panel’s last member Breyer urges Biden to revive commission (November 11, 2021)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Prez Biden finally announces a full slate of nominees to the US Sentencing Commission (May 11, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Details Matter, 10th Circuit Says – Update for April 8, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DISTRICT COURT PUNT BLOCKED BY 10TH CIRCUIT

In 2004, Tony Burris was sentenced to 262 months on a crack cocaine charge, the low end of his Guidelines sentencing range. After the First Step Act was passed, Tony applied for his retroactive Fair Sentencing Act reduced sentence under First Step Section 404.

ghostdope220408The government opposed the motion, arguing that Tony’s Guidelines range remained the same because the calculation should be based on the quantity of crack cocaine attributed to him in the Presentence Report (typically stratospheric) rather than the smaller amount charged in the indictment. Recognizing that the parties raised an issue that had not yet been addressed by the 10th Circuit, the district court declined to resolve it and instead held that it would deny relief to Tony regardless of the correct Guidelines calculation.

Last week, the 10th Circuit reversed, holding that the district court was obligated to calculate Tony’s revised Guidelines range before denying relief on his Section 404 motion. “A defendant’s Guidelines range is the starting point and the initial benchmark of sentencing,” the Circuit ruled, and “a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”

error161022The government argued that any error was harmless because the district court “looked at both proposed Guidelines ranges and concluded that it would deny the motion under either” one. The 10th rejected that contention, holding that while the district court may have said it would deny relief “whatever the result” of the correct Guidelines calculation, “our court has rejected the notion that district courts can insulate sentencing decisions from review by making such statements.” Here, the Circuit held, “the district court’s error, by its very nature, was not harmless; the district court’s exercise of discretion was untethered from the correct calculation of Tony’s revised Guidelines range.

United States v. Burris, Case No. 19-6122, 2022 U.S.App. LEXIS 8363 (10th Cir., Mar 30, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

So Who Ties Ted Cruz’s Shoes? – Update for March 30, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THREE TAKEAWAYS FROM THE JUDGE JACKSON HEARING

shoelaces220330Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson endured hours listening to stupidity spoken by power at last week’s Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on her nomination to a Supreme Court seat.

But for federal prisoners, there are three takeaways worth remembering:

First, the Republicans intend to pound on the Democrats in this year’s mid-term elections as being soft on crime.

Senate GOP leaders said in February that they’d scrutinize Jackson’s role as a former public defender, member of the Sentencing Commission, and as a district judge. But with an increase in crime making headlines this year, the Republican strategy ultimately crystallized around painting Jackson as soft on crime.

At one point, Senator Tom Cotton (R-Ark) blasted Jackson for granting compassionate release to a crack defendant who’d been hammered by a mandatory minimum. Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Josh Hawley (R-MO) both accused Jackson of “a pattern of letting child pornography offenders off the hook for their appalling crimes, both as a judge and as a policymaker,” citing seven cases where, as Hawley put it, “Jackson handed down a lenient sentence that was below what the federal guidelines recommended and below what prosecutors requested.”

bullshit220330It was all crap, of course. Judiciary Committee Chairman Richard Durbin (D-IL) pointed out that ABC News, CNN, and The Washington Post have defended Jackson’s sentencing read as being mainstream. Andrew McCarthy, a former federal prosecutor, writing in the conservative National Review, called Hawley’s claims “meritless to the point of demagoguery… Judge Jackson’s views on this matter are not only mainstream; they are correct in my view. Contrary to Hawley’s suggestion… she appears to have followed the guidelines, at the low end of the sentencing range, as most judges do.”

The “Republicans have rhetorically abandoned those reformist ways and instead have returned to their tough-on-crime roots to attack her credentials for the high court,” the Washington Post said. “Far from the party that followed Grassley, and President Donald Trump, into a new approach to crime, this week’s hearings signal a GOP that is ready to return to the days of Willie Horton.”

For anyone interested in significant criminal justice reform from this Congress, that’s bad news.

Second, Jackson has the credentials and background to be a worthy successor to Justice Breyer, whose seat she is taking. Breyer was one of the Guidelines’ creators, and was the Supreme Court’s dean of criminal sentencing. Jackson has more time as a district court judge (over 8 years) than Justice Sonia Sotomayor (6 years). None of the other seven Justices was served a day on the trial bench.  And no one on the Supreme Court other than Jackson was ever a public defender, although at least two of them are former prosecutors. On top of that, Jackson was a staff attorney for the Sentencing Commission and later one of the five commissioners, the only one at the Supreme Court to have such experience.

She responded to attacks on her below-Guidelines child porn sentences in a way that provides a glimpse into her sentencing philosophy:

pervert160728“Congress has decided what it is that a judge has to do in this and any other case when they sentence,” she said. “That statute doesn’t say look only at the guidelines and stop. That statute doesn’t say impose the highest possible penalty for this sickening and egregious crime… [Instead] the statute says [to] calculate the guidelines but also look at various aspects of this offense and impose a sentence that is ‘sufficient but not greater than necessary to promote the purposes of punishment’.”

Third, the child pornography mandatory minimums and Guidelines ranges – especially in non-contact cases – are absurdly high.

In a 2014 case involving a defendant who was caught with 1,500 child pornography images on his computer, Northern District of Ohio federal Judge James Gwin, asked the jurors what they thought an appropriate sentence would be. They recommended a prison term of 14 months – far shorter than the 5-year mandatory minimum, the 20 years demanded by prosecutors, and the 27 years recommended by the Guidelines. Taking the jurors’ view to heart, Gwin sentenced the defendant to the 5-year mandatory minimum.

Reason magazine reported that Northern District of Iowa federal Judge Mark W. Bennett “likewise found that jurors did not agree with the sentences that Hawley believes are self-evidently appropriate. ‘Every time I ever went back in the jury room and asked the jurors to write down what they thought would be an appropriate sentence,’ Bennett told The Marshall Project’s Eli Hager in 2015, ‘every time – even here, in one of the most conservative parts of Iowa… – they would recommend a sentence way below the guidelines sentence. That goes to show that the notion that the sentencing guidelines are in line with societal mores about what constitutes reasonable punishment—that’s baloney’.”

Former federal prosecutor McCarthy agreed: “But other than the fact that Congress wanted to look as though it was being tough on porn, there’s no good reason for the mandatory minimum in question — and it’s unjust in many instances.”

Jackson made a similar argument. “As it currently stands, the way that the law is written, the way that Congress has directed the Sentencing Commission, appears to be not consistent with how these crimes are committed, and therefore there is extreme disparity.”

congressbroken220330

Ohio State law professor Doug Berman wrote in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog that he has been “quite disappointed by what seemed to me to be a general failure by all of Senators on both sides of the aisle to engage thoughtfully with the deep challenges and profound humanity in any and all sentencing determinations… Critically, in federal child pornography cases, the basic facts are rarely routine, the applicable statutory law is rarely clear, and the applicable guidelines are the very opposite of helpful. In the child pornography setting, applicable statutory law is quite messy – e.g., what is the real difference between child pornography “possession” and “receipt”, how should USSC policy statements be considered here – and the applicable guidelines are widely regarded as badly broken. Those legal realities mean federal sentencing takes on extra layers of challenge in child pornography cases… But, if anything, the senators’ questions highlight Congress’ failures in erecting the sentencing structure that federal judges across the country, including Judge Jackson, operate within. Once the confirmation process is over, the Senate should fix the very system that they criticize judges for following.”

Even Judiciary Committee Chairman Durbin agrees. Last Wednesday, he said Congress was partly to blame for the outdated guidelines. “We have failed in responding to the changing circumstances,” he said, noting that at least 15 years had passed since the body reviewed the child pornography guidelines. “We should be doing our job here.”

Bloomberg Law, Crime Focus at Jackson Hearing Most Intense Since Marshall (March 23, 2022)

Sentencing Law and Policy, In praise of the continued sentencing sensibility of the National Review’s Andrew McCarthy (March 24, 2022)

Washington Post, Republicans, after years of pushing for softer criminal sentences, return to the party’s law-and-order posture in Jackson’s confirmation hearing (March 23, 2022)

Baltimore Sun, Senators questioning of Judge Jackson’s sentencing history during Supreme Court confirmation hearings reveals their own failures (March 25, 2022)

National Review, Senator Hawley’s Disingenuous Attack against Judge Jackson’s Record on Child Pornography (March 20, 2022)

Reason, Josh Hawley Absurdly Suggests That Ketanji Brown Jackson Has a Soft Spot for ‘Child Predators’ (March 18, 2022)

Wall Street Journal, Ketanji Brown Jackson Hearings Shine Spotlight on Child Pornography Law (March 25, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Havis – Not Just for Drugs Anymore, 6th Circuit Says – Update for March 12, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

6TH CIRCUIT EXPANDS HAVIS HOLDING TO FRAUD GUIDELINES

The 6th Circuit expanded its groundbreaking United States v. Havis decision to white-collar cases last week in a fraud decision that suggests a Guidelines defense for a lot of defendants.

devil180418The devil’s in the details. Most federal crimes carry a statutory penalty of from a minimum to a maximum sentence. Distributing 100 grams of powder cocaine, for example, carries a punishment of zero-to-20 years. Where precisely within that range a judge should sentence a defendant is where the Sentencing Guidelines come in.

The Guidelines consider a variety of factors in determining an offense level – such as, in our cocaine example, the quantity of drugs, whether the defendant supervised other people, lied to the authorities, had a weapon in hand while dealing the powder, entered a guilty plea, and so on. Then, the defendant gets points for prior convictions (varying – drunk driving doesn’t score like a prior bank robbery, for instance), and a sentencing range is determined from a matrix with the criminal history as the abscissa and the total offense level as the ordinate.

The Guidelines are written by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a judicial branch agency established by Congress. When a Guideline is written or amended, the provision is adopted by the Commission. Congress then has six months to either reject the change (kind of a legislative veto) or do nothing. If Congress does nothing, the Guideline provision is deemed adopted.

All of which brings us to Havis. I wrote about this decision in summer 2019 (way back before the pandemic). Each Guideline has appended to it commentary, which may be Application Notes – instructing a court on how to apply the provision – or just background. This is often useful stuff, but – unlike the Guideline itself – commentary is added by the Commission but not subject to Congressional approval.

humpty210312In Havis, the 6th Circuit was considering a particular piece of commentary attached to USSG § 4B1.2.  That Guideline defined “drug trafficking” crime in detail, but it did not specify that an attempt to commit a drug trafficking crime (or, for that matter, to conspire to commit such a crime), was included in the definition. No problem for the Commission staff – it just wrote into the commentary that attempts and conspiracies were included.

“Not so fast,” the 6th Circuit said in Havis. The Commission is not allowed to add to a Guideline definition approved by Congress with its own gloss. Sure, the definition could be expanded to include attempts and conspiracies, but to do so, it had to be approved by the Commission and subjected to Congressional oversight first.

Whew! Time for a break.  Get a cup of coffee and then let’s resume.

Last week, the 6th Circuit took up the case of Jennifer Riccardi, a postal employee who pled guilty to stealing 1,505 gift cards from the mail.

mail210312Jen worked in the Cleveland, Ohio, U.S. Postal Service distribution center (Motto: ‘Where Quality is a Slogan, and Chaos is a Lifestyle‘). In September 2017, an Ohioan mailed a $25 Starbucks gift card from Mentor, Ohio, to nearby Parma.  The card never arrived.  The sender complained to the U.S. Postal Service, which – in perhaps the only recorded instance in history – took the complaint seriously. opened an investigation. Investigators learned that supervisors at a Cleveland distribution center had been finding lots of opened mail in the processing area. Now you’d think this would have caused some puzzlement, but it did not until investigators followed the trail to Jen. When confronted, she admitted that she had been stealing mail that might contain cash or gift cards for quite some time. A search of her home uncovered over 100 pieces of mail that she had taken just that day, $42,102 in cash, and 1,505 gift cards.  The gift cards were laid out on the floor organized by the 230 or so merchants at which they could be redeemed.  Sad she hadn’t used such organizational skills at the Postal distribution center.

Most of the cards were worth about $35.00, for a total value of about $47,000. Under § 2B1.1 of the Guidelines, Jen’s offense level based on the amount of the loss, something § 2B1.1 does not define. But the Guidelines commentary to § 2B1.1 helpfully “instructs that the loss shall be not less than $500.00 for each unauthorized access device, a phrase that… covers stolen gift cards. Applying that definition, the district court pumped Jen’s loss up from $47,000 (which what the stolen cards were actually worth) to $752,500 (that is, 1,505 cards multiplied by $500.00 per card).

“So what?” you might ask. The ‘so what’ is that Jen’s Guidelines offense level depends a lot on the amount of loss.  A loss of $47,000 elevated her range by six levels. But if you pretend the loss was $752,500 – and it would really be pretending – her offense level would shoot up 14 levels. In Jen’s case, the difference was a sentencing range of 10-16 months and a range of 46-57 months. The district court gave Jen 56 months.

loss210312Based on its Havis holding, the 6th rejected the loss calculation and sentence. Havis held “guidelines commentary may only interpret, not add to, the guidelines themselves… And even if there is some ambiguity in 2B1.1’s use of the word “loss,” the commentary’s bright-line rule requiring a $500 loss amount for every gift card does not fall “within the zone of ambiguity” that exists. So this bright-line rule cannot be considered a reasonable interpretation of — as opposed to an improper expansion beyond — 2B1.1’s text.”

Ohio State University law prof Doug Berman thinks this case is a big deal. He wrote in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, “the fraud guideline is not the only one important part of the federal sentencing guideline with an intricate set of commentary instructions that might be challenged as full of ‘improper expansions.’ I sense a growing number of litigants and courts are starting to hone on potentially problematical guideline commentary and that some variation of this issue with be getting to the U.S. Supreme Court before too long. In the meantime, defense attorneys would be wise to challenge (and preserve arguments around) any application of guideline commentary that even might be viewed as ‘expansionary’.”

United States v. Riccardi, Case No 19-4232, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6163 (6th Cir. March 3, 2021)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Did a Sixth Circuit panel largely decimate the federal sentencing fraud guidelines (and perhaps many others)? (March 5)

– Thomas L. Root

1st Circuit Gives Pre-Booker Career Offenders Some Relief– Update for October 5, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NO DEFENDANT LEFT BEHIND

vagueness160110The 2015 Supreme Court decision Johnson v. United States was a landmark, holding that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague. Johnson’s reasoning led to Sessions v. Dimaya (extending Johnson to the criminal code’s general definition of “crime of violence” at 18 USC § 16(b)) and 2019’s United States v. Davis holding extending Johnson to 18 USC § 924(c), the “use or carry a firearm” statute.

But thousands of inmates who were held to be Guidelines “career offenders” because of prior crimes of violence got no relief. A Guidelines “career offender” is very different from an ACCA armed career criminal. A Guidelines career offender is someone with two prior crimes of violence or serious drug convictions (federal or state). If a defendant qualifies as a Guidelines career offender, he or she will be deemed to have the highest possible criminal history score and a Guidelines offense level that ensures a whopping sentencing range.

After Johnson, a number of Guidelines career offenders, whose status had been fixed by including some dubious prior convictions as “violent,” sought the same kind of relief that Johnson afforded armed career criminals. But in 2017 the Supremes said that Johnson did not apply to the Guidelines. Beckles v. United States held that the Guidelines were not subject to the same kind of “vagueness” challenge that worked in Johnson, because the Guidelines did not “fix the permissible range of sentences, but merely guided the exercise of discretion in choosing a sentence within the statutory range.”

This may have been so for people sentenced under the advisory Guidelines. However, back before the 2005 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker, those “advisory” Guidelines were mandatory. They did not guide a judge’s discretion. Instead, the law required a judge to sentence within the applicable Guidelines sentencing range except in very narrow circumstances, and then only if the sentencing court jumped through the many hoops the Guidelines erected.

Robber160229So, how about guys like Tony Shea, who was sentenced after a bank robbery spree as a career offender back in 1998? Tony’s prior crimes of violence were pretty shaky bases for a career offender enhancement (not that Tony didn’t have plenty of problems for his string of armed robberies, but that’s another story). Tony was looking at minimum 430 months under normal Guidelines, nothing to sneeze at, but with the career offender label, Tony’s minimum sentence shot that up to 567 months (that’s 47-plus years, or 330 dog years).

Tony filed a § 2255 motion arguing that because his Guidelines career offender sentence was mandatory, not “advisory,” the Johnson holding should apply to wipe out his career offender status.

Last Monday, the 1st Circuit agreed. The appeals court noted that while Beckles was right that advisory Guidelines guide a judge’s discretion rather than “fix the permissible range of sentences,” the pre-Booker Guidelines did much more than this. The Circuit said “when the pre-Booker Guidelines ‘bound the judge to impose a sentence within’ a prescribed range, as they ordinarily did, they necessarily “fixed the permissible range of sentences” she could impose.”

Judicial despotism... probably not a good thing.
         Judicial despotism… probably not a good thing.

“It’s easy,” the 1st said “to see why vague laws that fix sentences… violate the Due Process Clause. The… rule applied in Booker serves two main functions. First, fair notice: requiring the indictment to allege ‘every fact which is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted… enables the defendant to determine the species of offence with which he is charged in order that he may prepare his defense accordingly…” Second, “the rule also guards against the threat of ‘judicial despotism’ that could arise from ‘arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions,’ by requiring the jury to find each fact the law makes essential to his punishment.”

Only the 11th Circuit has explicitly held that Beckles does not apply to mandatory Guidelines career offender enhancements. The 5th, 8th and 10th Circuits are on the fence. This 1st Circuit decision is the first to emphatically apply Johnson to give relief to people like Tony, who is already well into his third decade of imprisonment.

Shea v. United States, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 30776 (1st Cir., September 28, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

The Short Rocket… – Update for January 27, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

What’s Mine Is Mine…

rocket-312767The presentence report is one of the most valuable documents an inmate can have access to in working on post-conviction motions, as well as on prison-related issues. It controls access to drug programs, halfway house, earned time credits… just about everything that the BOP mandates or prohibits is based on what staff can glean from the presentence report.

The BOP does not permit you to keep a copy in your legal materials, but that does not mean you cannot have one at home.

More than one prisoner has run into a prior attorney saying he or she is not allowed to provide the PSR to a defendant. That happened to Kevin Marvin, whose judge had a policy that a defendant could go over his or her PSR, but was not allowed to have a copy. Kevin’s lawyer obeyed the judge, but at sentencing, Kevin complained to the judge that he wanted a copy of his PSR. She turned him down, saying, “There is confidential information in the PSR that would be harmful” to Kevin and his family if it were made public.

Last week, the 7th Circuit ruled that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e)(2) requires a probation officer to give the PSR to “the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, and an attorney for the government at least 35 days before sentencing.” And “give” means “give—that is, transfer—the PSR to not only the defendant’s attorney, but also the defendant. Under its plain meaning, the rule cannot be satisfied by giving the PSR only to the defendant’s and government’s attorneys; the probation office also must also give the PSR to the defendant.”

The Circuit noted that a defendant’s possession of a PSR in prison could be dangerous, and suggested a district court could put reasonable limits on possession. But a blanket prohibition of a defendant possessing his or her PSR violates Rule 32(e)(2).

United States v. Melvin, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 2262 (7th Cir. Jan. 24, 2020)

I Promise to Do Whatever

New York assemblyman Nathan Silver was convicted of seven counts of Hobbs Act extortion under color of right and honest services fraud. The evidence on three of the counts was that in exchange for payments, he promised to take action favorable to the people bribing him “as the opportunity arose.”

money170419The three counts accused Nathan of taking bribes in exchange for agreeing to help out on whatever he might be able to do for the payors in the future. The Circuit said that while bribery does not “require identification of a particular act of influence, we do agree that it requires identification of a particular question or matter to be influenced. In other words, a public official must do more than just promise to take some or any official action beneficial to the payor as the opportunity to do so arises; she must promise to take official action on a particular question or matter as the opportunity to influence that same question or matter arises.”

United States v. Silver, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 1737 (2nd Cir Jan 21, 2020)

Thank You For Your Service

Three 6th Circuit Judges who never served a day of their lives in the armed forces, let alone ever got shot at, reversed a one-day sentence imposed on a defendant who showed that his child pornography offense was a result of the horrific combat PTSD he suffered from the Iraq war.

service200127The defendant’s Guidelines base offense level was 15, to which the same enhancements that affect virtually every child porn defendant were added, yielding a Guideline sentencing range of 78-87 months.

The district court rejected the enhancements, complaining that “everyone” who is brought into federal court for possessing child porn receives the same enhancements, which “makes it impossible to distinguish between individual defendants.” But the Circuit held the district court failed to consider “the retributive purposes” of the enhancements, and “its disagreement with the Guidelines cannot justify its decision to ignore the delineated enhancements.”

ptsd200127What’s more, the 6th said, the sentence was substantively unreasonable. “By focusing on the defendant’s PTSD diagnosis to the exclusion of other considerations,” the Circuit said, “the district court failed to acknowledge analogous cases within this circuit… and cast the defendant more as the victim than the perpetrator, stating that his crimes were ‘the result of his voluntary service to his community and his country’ and ‘an unintended consequence’ of his decision to serve in the Army.” Dismissing the science found to apply by the District Court, the appellate panel opined that ‘knowing possession of child pornography… is not a crime that just happens to a defendant’.”

The defendant will return to the District Court for resentencing.

United States v. Demma, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 2326 (6th Cir Jan 24, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Guidelines Are A “Disaster,” Judge Says – Update for July 3, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

JUDGE BLASTS SENTENCING REFORM ACT

Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden has taken some heat recently because he – like everyone else at the time – supported the 1994 crime control bill that so contributed to mass incarceration. But a federal judge writing in last Sunday’s Washington Post said critics should not stop with 1994.

trainwreckguidelines190703Eastern District of Wisconsin Judge Lynn Adelman wrote that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the Guidelines “have been a disaster, and a debate by lawmakers about their status is long overdue.” Partly due to the sentencing guidelines, about 20% of all people imprisoned in the world are imprisoned in the United States (which has 4.27% of the world population) “The Sentencing Reform Act, and the commission and its guidelines,” the Judge said, “contributed substantially to this inexcusable state of affairs.”

The judge noted that after the Guidelines became advisory in the 2005 United States v. Booker case, the average federal sentence increased from 28 to 50 months and, with the abolition of parole, the average time a defendant served increased from 13 to 43 months. Between 1987 and 2019, the number of federal prisoners increased from about 50,000 to 219,000 before dropping to about 180,000.

badjudge160502Even after the Guidelines became advisory instead of mandatory, Judge Adelman complained, “district court judges have largely failed to… ameliorate the harshness of the federal sentencing system.” After Booker, average sentences dropped from 47.9 months to 44 months, but the percentage of defendants receiving prison-only sentences increased from 83.3% in 2003 to 87.8% in 2018.

The Judge argues that the Sentencing Reform Act should be substantially revised. “Congress was foolish to have abolished parole,” he wrote, “and should overturn that decision.”

Washington Post, There’s another tough-on-crime law Democrats should focus their criticism on (June 30)

– Thomas L. Root

Sentencing Commission Cannot Add to Drug Offense Definition, 6th Circuit Says – Update for June 10, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NEITHER FISH NOR FOWL

fishfowl170803Everyone who paid attention in high school government class knows there are three branches of the federal government, the legislative (Congress), the executive (President and the agencies), and the judicial.

And then there’s the United States Sentencing Commission. It is part of the judicial branch, but it is part legislative, too, answering to Congress (which has the right to pass on any amendments, and veto those of which it disapproves). Legal scholars might say it’s neither fish nor fowl.

In 2017, Jim Harvey pled guilty to felon-in-possession of a firearm. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant convicted of a 18 USC 922(g)(1) offense starts with a base offense level of 14, but that level increases to 20 under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4) or (6) if he or she has a prior conviction for a “controlled substance offense.” At sentencing, the district court decided that Jim’s 17-year-old Tennessee conviction for selling or delivering cocaine was a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines.

Jim objected because the Tennessee statute criminalized both sale and delivery of cocaine. Under state law, “delivery” of drugs includes the “attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance.” Jim argued that the prior conviction was not a controlled substance offense because the Guidelines’ definition of “controlled substance offense” does not include “attempt” crimes.

Jim was right that the Guidelines themselves do not include “attempt” offenses. However, each of the Guidelines comes with its own handy commentary and application notes, helpful annotations by the Sentencing Commission to aid users in what it considers the “proper” way to apply each Guideline. The commentary at the end of USSG § 4B1.2(b), which (among other things) defines a controlled substance offense for Guidelines purposes, directs that the definition of controlled substance offense in the text necessarily includes ‘the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.’

robbank190610Not so, Jim argued. The Guidelines text itself says nothing about attempt, and the Sentencing Commission, he complained, has no power to add attempt crimes to the list of offenses in § 4B1.2(b) through its own commentary. It would be like West Publishing adding a note after the bank robbery statute saying that bank robbery includes the offense of shaking a few quarters out of your kid’s piggy bank for bus fare.

Last Thursday, the 6th Circuit agreed with Jim.

The Guidelines commentary, the Court said, “never passes through the gauntlets of congressional review or notice and comment. That is generally not a problem, the Supreme Court tells us, because such commentary has no independent legal force — it serves only to interpret the Guidelines’ text, not to replace or modify it. Courts need not accept an interpretation that is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with” the corresponding guideline.

bootstrappingBut the problem comes where the commentary does more than just interpret, but instead tries to bootstrap the Guideline into saying something more than what Congress approved. In this case, the commentary in question does not “interpret,” but rather supplements. The Commission was perfectly capable of adding “attempt” to the Guideline itself. Clearly, the 6th Circuit noted, the “Commission knows how to include attempt crimes when it wants to — in subsection (a) of the same guideline, for example, the Commission defines “crime of violence” as including offenses that have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”

To make attempt crimes a part of 4B1.2(b), the Commission did not interpret a term in the guideline itself, but instead used Application Note 1 to add an offense not listed in the Guideline. Application notes, the Court held, are to be “interpretations of, not additions to, the Guidelines themselves.” If that were not so, the institutional constraints that make the Guidelines constitutional in the first place — congressional review and notice and comment — would lose their meaning.

Jim’s case was remanded for resentencing.

United States v. Havis, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 17042 (6th Cir. June 6, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root