Tag Archives: supreme court

Supreme Court Bucks Trump Bid to Dissolve Transgender Stay – Update for October 26, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS DENIES BOP STAY OF ITS TRANSGENDER POLICY

The Supreme Court last Wednesday prevented the Federal Bureau of Prisons from denying certain gender-transition medical treatments for transgender inmates at federal prisons while the lawsuit over the issue works its way through the courts.

Two conservative justices, Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Clarence Thomas, said they would have granted the administration’s emergency request to stop the treatments while the litigation is pending.

In response to President Trump’s January 2025 Executive Order, the BOP adopted new policies to prohibit inmates from receiving the care. In March 2025, a group of inmates filed a class-action lawsuit accusing the government of failing to follow the Administrative Procedure Act before changing the prison policy, claiming that the agency provided no reasoned explanation for its decision.

The BOP adopted the policy in February, roughly one year after it issued two memoranda to implement the Executive Order that had been signed by President Donald Trump on the first day of his second term. That EO directed the Attorney General to “ensure that no Federal funds are expended for any medical procedure, treatment, or drug for the purpose of conforming an inmate’s appearance to that of the opposite sex.”

The BOP said that it adopted its February 2026 policy “independently of” Trump’s January 2025 Executive Order. In connection with the 2026 policy, the BOP also included an extensive administrative record and a 43-page memorandum in which it attributed the change from its prior policy to, among other things, “the latest scientific information.”  Its earlier policies, the BOP said, had relied on recommendations by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health, but it now deems WPATH’s standards “unreliable” and “unpersuasive.”

Finally, the BOP expressed concerns that providing access to procedures such as gender-transition surgeries could subject transgender prisoners to “attacks,” “raise fairness concerns,” and “breed resentment among other inmates.”

The lawsuit disputes the government’s argument that the treatments are not supported by the most recent science. The plaintiffs also note that prison officials in past administrations had not raised safety concerns regarding inmates receiving the care.

The Supreme Court’s denial of a stay means that, for now, as many as 1,000 federal prisoners who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria will continue to receive gender transition treatments.

New York Times, Supreme Court Blocks Trump From Denying Gender-Transition Care to Federal Prisoners (October 21, 2o26)

SCOTUSBlog, Justices leave lower court order in place preventing Trump administration from implementing transgender inmate policy (October 21, 2o26)

Washington Post, Supreme Court allows gender transition care for federal prisoners for now (October 21, 2o26)

~ Thomas L. Root

Criminal Law Busywork at Supreme Court – Update for October 22, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LAST WEEK AT THE SUPREME COURT

Maxwell v. Dinis (formerly Maxwell v. Thomas):      A few months ago, I reported on petitioner William Maxwell’s claim in the Supreme Court that he should be allowed to challenge the BOP’s refusal to place him in prerelease custody by applying his First Step Act time credits in a petition for habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2241. (The 5th Circuit ruled otherwise, holding that habeas “is not the proper vehicle” for such a claim, which instead should be brought in “a civil rights suit under Bivens”).

Since then, the Government has informed SCOTUS that it “agrees with petitioner that that holding is incorrect and has therefore filed a brief supporting vacatur of the judgment below.”  Last week, the Court granted the Government’s request for divided argument, a procedure that lets the Solicitor General use part of Bill’s argument time to make its own arguments in favor of his position.

The Court has appointed a private attorney to advocate for the side that the Government would usually argue.  An argument date has not yet been set.

Maxwell v. Dinis, Case No. 25-5930 (divided argument granted, October 13, 2026)

Beaird v. United States: Beaird asks whether a sentencing court must defer to the sentencing Guidelines commentary. The precise issue is whether the enhancement for having a gun with a “large capacity” magazine must follow the Guideline commentary defining such a magazine as being 15 rounds or more.

At oral argument last week, the Supreme Court seemed disinclined to tinker with the 33-year-old Stinson v. United States holding that Guidelines commentary that “interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” This is despite the fact that there is a substantial argument that the 2019 Kisor v. Wilkie holding – that limited the rule that courts defer to agency interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations – pretty much undid the Stinson holding.

Only Justice Neil Gorsuch seemed open to revisiting Stinson and Kisor in light of the 2025 Loper Bright holding that invalidated the rule that courts had to defer to how agencies interpreted statutes and rules.  SCOTUSBlog reported that “none of the other justices seemed particularly interested in adopting such a position.”

This is another case where the Government sided with the petitioner, arguing with Beaird that, principally because the guidelines are now advisory, Stinson–style deference to the commentary should no longer apply. As the oral argument suggested, the fact that both parties argue for one position is no guarantee that the Supremes will roll over and accept it.

SCOTUSBlog, Court unlikely to alter deference to sentencing guidelines commentary (October 16, 2026)

Beaird v. United States, Case No. 25-5343 (argued October 13, 2026)

Berry v. United States:    As anyone who ever filed a post-conviction 28 USC § 2255 motion knows, a district court denial is not appealable unless the appellate court grants a certificate of appealability (COA). A COA should be a low bar – a holding that the issue presented is reasonably debatable by judges or otherwise significant enough to let the movant continue with an appeal.

As the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys puts it, a COA is thus “the gateway to both appointment of counsel and an appeal on the merits—and by extension to a meaningful appellate process that can develop well-reasoned circuit splits on difficult legal questions.”

Corey Berry lost his § 2255 motion, and then filed an application for COA pointing out that the 11th Circuit’s holding that he had to prove his sentence did not rely on the elements clause of 18 USC § 924(c) was contrary to the holdings of seven other circuits. Thus, he said, the issue was clearly debatable. The 11th disagreed, denying his COA.

Last week, the Supreme Court granted review, focusing on whether a COA should be granted when the issue the petitioner seeks to raise on appeal has been resolved against him by binding circuit precedent but has been decided in his favor by another circuit.

It’s been a decade since SCOTUS last decided a COA case (Buck v. Davis).  A new decision that balances granting COAs of merit with appellate court efficiency is long overdue.

Berry v. United States, Case No. 25-7026 (cert. granted, October 13, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Justices Are Back From Summer Fun – Update for September 28, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TODAY IS THE MONDAY BEFORE THE MONDAY

Everyone knows that the Supreme Court begins its work year on the first Monday in October. But a convincing case can be made that it begins a week before.

Today, the last Monday in September, the Court will hold its annual “long conference,” the first meeting of the nine Justices to consider the pile of petitions seeking review that have accumulated over the three-month summer recess.

Statistically, the likelihood that such a petition for certiorari will be granted is slight, about 1.2 pct for those filed by lawyers and 0.8 pct for those filed pro se.  The odds are usually worse for those considered in the long conference. The Court itself admitted two years ago that 97 pct of the petitions are rejected “without joint discussion by the Justices.”

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, looks forward to the coming term even as he’s disappointed with the Court’s output. He notes that “11 of the 25 cases already granted for review are, by my calculation, criminal law and related… They won’t all be headline-grabbers, but 40% of the court’s docket is a very healthy chunk. And the court will surely grant some more after its Sept. 28 ‘long conference…’ [T]he Supreme Court used to decide as many as 150 cases per term. But during the 2025-26 term the justices heard argument after full briefing in only 58. According to a Federalist Society report… in 2012 Chief Justice John Roberts said that the court could hear ‘100 cases without any stress or strain, but the cases just aren’t there,’ and he ‘emphasized that circuit splits are far and away the most important consideration.’ The capacity of the justices to handle more cases is not an issue – more grants of review to provide national uniformity in criminal cases ought to be a priority.”

Sentencing Law and Policy, Gearing up for another (notable?) SCOTUS term for sentencing fans (September 15, 2026)

Pacific Legal Foundation, A Supreme Court preview: PLF cases at the long conference (September 25, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Supremes Add Rare Pro Se Habeas Petition to Fall Docket – Update for June 12, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CERTIORARI GRANTED ON USING § 2241 PETITION FOR FSA TIME CREDITS

Prisoners earning First Step Act time credits under 18 USC § 3632 use the first 365 credits to shorten their sentences.  Excess credits entitle them to more halfway house or home confinement.

A stark circuit split has developed over whether an inmate can bring a habeas corpus claim when the credits being denied to him would only give him more time in halfway house or home confinement as opposed to a shorter sentence.

Last week, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a pro se petition that will result in the Court deciding whether a claim regarding application of FSA time seeking only accelerated transfer to halfway house or home confinement can be brought in a 28 USC § 2241 habeas petition.

The case will be argued next fall.

Maxwell v. Thomas, Case No 25-5930 (cert granted June 1, 2026)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Supreme Court grants cert on process for federal prisoners to challenge time credits under First Step Act (June 1, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS Numbers Down But Odds May Not be Up – Update for May 21, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT NUMBERS AREN’T WHAT YOU MAY THINK

It has been Supreme Court gospel for decades that between 7,000 and 8,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari – that is, petitions asking the Supremes to review a case – arrive at the Court each year. The Court itself says so. SCOTUSBlog, the definitive Supreme Court fan/practitioner website does as well.  Even Georgetown Law Library’s research guide cites the number as 7,000 to 8,000.

The Court’s 2023 Code of Conduct estimates the number as “approximately 5,000 to 6,000.”  An exhibit inside the Supreme Court building states that between 5,000 and 7,000 such petitions are submitted, while the National Constitution Center puts the number at around 10,000.

They’re all wrong. The most recent year-end Supreme Court report indicates that, in the 2024-25 term, there were 3,856 petitions for review filed with the court. Of those petitions, more than half (2,527) were filed “in forma pauperis.” The remaining 1,329 were “paid” petitions.

The drop has been gradual. In 2006-07, the number peaked at 8,857, but the numbers have declined steadily since the 2013-14 term. The number dipped below 5,000 by the 2021-22 term and below 4,500 the next term.

The number of paid petitions (which make up almost all of the court’s cert grants) had declined only marginally since the early 2000s, with almost all of the decline in the IFP docket.

SCOTUSBlog reported last week that the decline is because “the IFP and paid dockets function very differently at the court. Although the paid petitions, as noted above, involve a significant investment of time and resources, IFP filings, by contrast, come from indigent litigants – often prisoners challenging their convictions or confinement conditions and representing themselves. As SCOTUSblog contributor Adam Feldman noted in a 2025 analysis, IFP petitions are typically granted “far less often” because many of these petitions raise fact-specific grievances without broader legal significance, do not present an issue on which the lower courts are divided, or revisit issues the justices have repeatedly declined to take up. Starting at the end of the 2022 term, 98.8% of IFP petitions were denied, compared to 86.0% of paid petitions. In 1946, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone observed that IFP petitions “are mostly chaff.” Justice William Brennan also considered the overwhelming majority of IFP petitions to be “unworthy of full Court review.”

One SCOTUS clerk told SCOTUSBlog that they “flip through [the IFP petitions] pretty fast.” And in a 2010 SCOTUSblog column, Kevin Russell noted that IFP petitions “tend to get buried in a sea of other, mostly meritless, pauper petitions.”

SCOTUSBlog, The Serious Decline in Petitions Before the Supreme Court (May 11, 2026)

Wendy Watson, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Selection of Petitions In Forma Pauperis (2004)

~ Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Rebuffs DOJ on Felon-In-Possession Review – Update for May 4, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SLEEPER

An under-the-radar § 922(g)(1) case may portend big changes coming in the world of 2nd Amendment and felon-in-possession.

All eyes have been on the United States v. Hemani decision, due in the next eight weeks or so. Hemani asks whether 18 USC § 922(g)(3) – which bans illegal drug abusers from having guns – violates the 2nd Amendment’s guarantee of the right to bear arms. But last week, SCOTUS quietly denied the government review of a 5th Circuit decision that held the felon-in-possession prohibition of § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to a woman with a prior drug felony.

The felon-in-possession subsection of 18 USC § 922(g) prohibits anyone convicted of a felony, no matter how petty or how long ago, from possessing a gun or ammo.

In its April 27th orders list, the Supremes declined the Dept of Justice’s request to hear United States v. Doucet. The 5th Circuit ruled last December in an unpublished decision that Briani Doucet, a Louisiana woman convicted of a § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession count based on a 2016 “attempted cultivation of marijuana” felony, should be acquitted on 2ndAmendment grounds. The DOJ had asked the Court to address its appeal after the justices issued a decision in Hemani.

None of the Supreme Court justices commented on the certiorari denial.

The Reload reported,

The denial marks a rare instance of the High Court refusing to show deference to the Justice Department in a case imperiling a federal law. It also deviates from the Court’s recent practice of holding appeals dealing with a similar subject matter to a forthcoming court decision and ordering them reconsidered once it has delivered a decision. Taken together, these departures could signal a potentially decisive ruling against the federal government’s current treatment of marijuana and firearms in Hemani.

The cert denial is all the more puzzling because SCOTUS previously denied certiorari in a case going the other way, Vincent v. Bondi, two months ago. Melynda Vincent’s petition for certiorari asked whether 18 USC § 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession provision violates the 2nd Amendment by prohibiting her from having a gun. Vincent was convicted of bank fraud 15 years ago for writing some bad checks while in the throes of drug addiction. Since then, she cleaned up, graduated from a drug treatment program, earned an undergraduate degree and two graduate degrees, and founded the Utah Harm Reduction Coalition – a nonprofit organization for drug treatment and criminal-justice reform – as well as a mental health counseling service, Life Changes Counseling.

Melynda was the poster child for rehab, but the 10th Circuit ruled that applying § 922(g)(1) to her was consistent with the 2nd Amendment. Her petition for cert was one that many observers thought would be granted, or at least certainly should be granted.

United States v. Doucet, Case No. 25-1001(certiorari denied, April 27, 2026)

United States v. Hemani, Case No. 24-1234 (argued on March 2, 2026)

The Reload, SCOTUS Turns Away Weed and Guns Case Despite DOJ Request (April 28, 2026)

Vincent v. Bondi, Case No. 24-1155 (petition for certiorari denied March 2, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Trending Now… Running Out of Lawyers and Poor People – Update for February 13, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LEGAL TRENDS YOU SHOULD KNOW

This is where current events affect federal prisoners.

Government Running Out of Troops:  Generally, federal prisoners and defendants would think that the fewer resources the government has to throw against them, the better. Whether that’s true may soon be put to the test.

The ranks of skilled litigators in US Attorneys’ offices (USAOs) nationwide – especially on the criminal side of the office – have been gutted by resignations over what many Assistant United States Attorneys complain is “efforts by senior department leaders to push career prosecutors into doing Mr. Trump’s bidding,” according to The New York Times.

The DOJ’s workforce declined by 8% between November 2024 and November 2025, according to Office of Personnel Management data. At the same time, USAOs have lost 14 pct of their employees, “a staggering one-year reduction unlike anything the department has seen in recent memory,” The Times reported that former officials said. “Worse still, the departures have hit the upper tier of prosecutors in premier offices the hardest, simply because those with the most experience were the most likely to have lucrative job prospects on the outside.”

In a little-noticed 8th Circuit filing last week, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, Daniel Rosen, says his short-staffed office has been abandoning “pressing and important priorities” to manage the flood of immigration cases stemming from Operation Metro Surge, the Trump administration’s mass deportation push in the Twin Cities, which is now ending.

Rosen said his office is buckling under the crushing weight of hundreds of emergency lawsuits filed by immigrants detained by ICE in recent weeks. He said 427 had been filed in January alone, and that the pace is expected to continue into February.

In a filing accompanying Rosen’s statement, DOJ attorneys wrote that the “crushing burden” caused by immigration cases had led US attorneys nationwide to “shift resources away from other critical priorities, including criminal matters.”

Rosen said his team of attorneys handling civil litigation is “down 50%” — a reference to a wave of resignations and departures at the start of Operation Metro Surge — and that those who remain “are appearing daily for hearings on contempt motions.”

I have been seeing an increasing number of unusually long-date requests for extension of time from USAOs to respond to prisoner § 2255 motions and compassionate release cases. At the same time (although this is very hard to quantify), it seems to me that the quality of legal scholarship in government filings has fallen.

SCOTUS Running Out of IFP Filers:  The National Law Journal reported last week that “a large pool of cases at the U.S. Supreme Court has been drying up in recent years, and experts aren’t sure why.” Appeals from indigent litigants (“in forma pauperis” or “IFP” filers) have fallen precipitously over the past several Supreme Court terms and are now at their lowest level in the 21st century.

In its most recent term, SCOTUS received around 2,500 appeals from indigent petitioners, fewer than half the number of indigent appeals from six years ago, and about a third of the number filed 20 years ago. Historically, IFP filings have accounted for the majority of annual cases filed in the Supreme Court. In the October 2006 term, for example, 7,132 IFP filings came in compared to 1,723 cases filed by paying petitioners.

“Despite this,” the NLJ said, “the Supreme Court overwhelmingly chooses to take up cases from the paid docket, rejecting all but a handful of IFP appeals each year… In the October 2006 term, for example, the court granted certiorari, or review, of 15 petitions filed by indigent litigants. By contrast, the court accepted just four in forma pauperis petitions during its most recent completed term.”

Politico, Top Minnesota prosecutor says ICE cases are sidelining ‘pressing priorities’ (February 5, 2026)

The New York Times, Demanding Support for Trump, Justice Dept. Struggles to Recruit Prosecutors (February 7, 2026)

National Law Journal, At the Supreme Court, a Stark Drop in Appeals From the Poor (January 29, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Separates 924(c) and (j) – Update for January 15, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ONE TO A CUSTOMER

Cigarettes are bad for you, whether you’re smoking them or stealing them. Dwayne Barrett found that out too late. But his campaign to stamp out smoking by robbing vendors of their tobacco products led to a Supreme Court decision yesterday on the reach of the federal criminal code’s harsh and unforgiving gun penalty statute.Dwayne and his gang – unimaginatively just called the “Crew” – committed a series of at least eight robberies in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania between August 2011 and January 2012. Their niche was knocking over convenience stores and illegal cigarette vendors, guys who sell untaxed cowboy killers smuggled from southern states at a discount because the merch is untaxed. Such people made good marks for Dwayne and his Crew because the victims can hardly file police reports.

But it’s hard to hide a heist from the authorities when someone gets killed. During one robbery, Dwayne and two other Crew members stuck up three guys selling untaxed cigarettes out of the back of a minivan. Brandishing guns, two of the Crew hijacked the minivan and drove off with one of the victims, Gamar Dafalla, still aboard. Mr. Dafalla surreptitiously threw $10,000 in sales proceeds out of the moving vehicle. Enraged by this, the Crew member shot Mr. Dafalla to death.

Dwayne was following the van in a car, so he wasn’t present when the killing occurred, but he was charged with the robbery, with tried to prevent his merchandise from being stolen.

Dwayne was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy, as well as several 18 USC § 924(c) counts for using guns to commit the robberies (crimes of violence under § 924(c)). In the case of the death of Mr. Dafalla, Dwayne was convicted of both a § 924(c) count – because his co-conspirator was using and carrying a gun during the robbery – and an 18 USC § 924(j) offense (because death resulted from the § 924(c) conduct). Thus, he was convicted under both statutes for the same act, essentially treating the gun use that caused Mr. Dafalla’s death as a basis for two separate convictions.

Dwayne was sentenced to 90 years in prison, later reduced to 50 years. Twenty of those years came from concurrent sentences on three Hobbs Act robbery counts. Twenty-five years came from a consecutive term on the § 924(j) conviction, into which the District Court – believing that § 924(c) and § 924(j) were not separate offenses that could be punished cumulatively – merged into the § 924(c) conviction.

The Second Circuit, however, rejected the District Court’s position that the Double Jeopardy Clause required it to treat § 924(c) and § 924(j) as the same offense. Although the Government regularly concedes that § 924(c) and § 924(j) overlap and may not be punished cumulatively and qualify as the same offense under the governing test laid out in Blockburger v. United States, it convinced the Circuit that the two provisions “are separate offenses for which Congress has clearly authorized cumulative punishments.”

The 5th Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” In the 1932 Blockburger decision, the Supreme Court directed reviewing courts to evaluate whether one criminal statute required proof of any element that another did not.  If no different proof was needed, double jeopardy barred additional prosecution and punishment.

While Congress may pass two different statutes directed at prohibiting the same offense, the Blockburger presumption holds that Congress ordinarily does not intend to do so. This means that courts must find evidence of Congress’s intent before finding that different statutes punish the same crime, and thus that a defendant cannot be charged or punished for violating both under Blockburger.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court sided with Dwayne and the District Court, applying the Blockburger presumption that Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both §§ 924(c) and (j) for a single act that violates both provisions. In other words, one conviction and one sentence for one violation. One to a customer.

Blockburger addresses whether multiple convictions, not just multiple sentences, are allowed by the 5th Amendment. The assumption underlying the Blockburger rule is that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes, where punishment means a criminal conviction and not simply the imposition of sentence.

When enacted, § 924(c) made it a discrete offense to use or carry a firearm in connection with a predicate federal crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. Congress later added § 924(j) to provide a different penalty scheme for § 924(c) violations that cause death. Section 924(j) has no mandatory minimums, the Supreme Court observed, but instead authorized significant maximum sentences – including the death penalty or life in prison – when the underlying violation is murder committed with a gun.

In a unanimous opinion (but for a partial concurrence by Justice Neil Gorsuch, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote that § 924’s text “suggests strongly, perhaps conclusively,” that Congress did not disavow Blockburger here. Congress included Blockburger-surmounting language twice within § 924(c) itself: It mandated that a § 924(c)(1) conviction must be “in addition to the punishment provided for” the underlying violent or drug crime and it also mandated that a conviction under § 924(c)(5)—for using or carrying armor piercing ammunition—must be “in addition to the punishment provided for” the conviction under” § 924(c)(1).

Such “in addition to” language has previously been found to be “crystal clear” evidence of a legislature’s intent to overcome Blockburger. But Congress used no similar language with respect to the interplay between subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j).

Dwayne’s case could have implications for future convictions across the country.

Gorsuch argued in his concurrence that the Court has been confusing about double jeopardy in the past. The Supreme Court has at times said the clause “protects against multiple punishments for the same offense,” he wrote, and has held that multiple convictions for the same offense constitute multiple punishments, even when secured in a single proceeding. “From this, it would seem to follow that Congress cannot authorize multiple convictions for the same offense in concurrent prosecutions. But this Court has also sometimes said that, in the concurrent-prosecution context, the Clause merely directs courts to ascertain statutory meaning accurately,” Gorsuch wrote.

He said the court will someday need to resolve that “tension.”

Barrett v. United States, Case No. 24-5774, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 433 (January 14, 2026)

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)

The National News Desk, Supreme Court limits dual charges in overlapping gun statutes (January 14, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

March Will Bring Cherry Blossoms and Supreme Court Arguments – Update for January 5, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS SCHEDULES ARGUMENT ON TWO CRIMINAL CASES OF NOTE

The Supreme Court has issued its February oral argument schedule, including two cases of substantial interest to federal defendants and prisoners.

The two arguments actually fall the first week of March, not in February… but then this is the Supreme Court, where the last week of next June will still be “October Term 2025.” Nevertheless, we can be confident that before the cherry blossoms bloom along the Tidal Basin, we may have some idea of the high court’s thinking on two consequential criminal cases now before it.

The cases:  First, the one not getting much press but arguably the more important of the two is Hunter v. United States, a case that asks whether a federal appeals court properly dismissed a Texas man’s appeal of a mandatory-medication condition when he had waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement, but the judge who imposed the condition told him that he had a right to appeal.

The importance is this: Something like 94% of federal criminal cases end in guilty pleas, and virtually all of those pleas are entered pursuant to a written plea agreement between the defendant and the government. And virtually all of those agreements have the defendant agreeing to waive his or her rights to appeal, to file post-conviction attacks on their conviction and sentences, and to give up other rights – such as to seek compassionate release or even bring a Freedom of Information Act request for records from the government.

The Hunter issues before the Supreme Court include what, if any, are the permissible exceptions to waiver in a plea agreement, now generally recognized as only being claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. A second issue is whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he or she has a right to appeal and the government does not object.

The Supreme Court case getting more attention is United States v. Hemani, in which the government is challenging a 5th Circuit ruling that 18 USC § 922(g)(3) – that prohibits an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance from possessing a gun – violates the 2nd Amendment as applied to the defendant. Mr. Hemani was a regular marijuana user but was not high while in physical possession of his handgun.`

Law Professor Joel Johnson, a former Supreme Court litigator with the Dept of Justice, recently argued in a SCOTUSBlog post that the Supreme Court could easily dispose of the Hemani case by relying on the rule of lenity instead of the 2ndAmendment. He said, “If the court decides that the law applies only to people who are armed while intoxicated, the 2nd Amendment concerns largely vanish. There is stronger historical support for disarming someone who is high – and thus not of sound mind – than there is for disarming someone who happened to smoke a joint last weekend but is no longer impaired.”

Also in a SCOTUSBlog post, NYU Law Professor Danial Harawa argued for a revival of the rule of lenity:

Congress has enacted thousands of criminal laws, many written broadly and enforced aggressively. With an overly bloated criminal code, lenity should function as a meaningful check – a reminder that punishment must rest on clear legislative authorization… At bottom, the rule of lenity is about who bears the risk of uncertainty in the criminal law. For most of the court’s history, that risk fell on the government. When Congress failed to speak clearly, defendants were entitled to the benefit of the doubt. If it wanted, Congress could rewrite the law to clarify its reach. There is no cost for congressional imprecision, however, and thus no real need for Congress to legislate carefully and clearly. When lenity is weakened, the cost of ambiguity shifts from the government to defendants, and the result is more defendants. Given the pedigree and importance of this rule, the Supreme Court needs to resolve when the rule applies sooner rather than later.

Second Amendment advocates and scholars hope that Hemeni will advance the 2nd Amendment debate begun by Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi. But even if it does not, it may provide some enduring guidance on the rule of lenity, an issue of less sexiness but perhaps more import to criminal law.

SCOTUSblog, Court announces it will hear case on gun rights among several others in February sitting  (January 2, 2026)

Hunter v. United States, Case No. 24-1063 (oral argument set for March 3, 2026)

United States v. Hemani, Case No, 24-1234 (oral argument set for March 2, 2026)

SCOTUSblog, An off-ramp for the court’s next big gun case (December 18, 2025)

SCOTUSblog, Reviving Lenity (December 26, 2025)

~ Thomas  L. Root

Meanwhile, in the Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Pile – Update for November 20, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MORE FUN WITH SCOTUS

The Supreme Court has relisted a case that asks whether sentencing decisions based on uncharged, acquitted, or dismissed conduct violate the 5th and 6th Amendments.

A “relist” means that the Court could not decide whether to hear the case at its initial conference and has relisted it to consider it again. Cases rarely get picked for review without being relisted one or more times.

In 2023, the Supreme Court relisted a group of about 10 cases asking the same question before denying review to all of them at once at the end of the term in July.

In other news, the Supreme Court will consider Melynda Vincent’s petition for certiorari that asks whether 18 USC § 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession provision violates the 2nd Amendment by prohibiting her from acquiring a gun. Vincent was convicted of bank fraud 15 years ago for writing some bad checks while in the throes of drug addiction. Since then, she cleaned up, graduated from a drug treatment program, earned an undergraduate degree and two graduate degrees, and founded the Utah Harm Reduction Coalition – a nonprofit organization for drug treatment and criminal-justice reform – and a mental health counseling service, Life Changes Counseling.

Bartunek v. United States, Case No. 25-5720 (petition for certiorari pending)

Vincent v. United States, Case No. 24-1155 (petition for certiorari pending)

~ Thomas L. Root