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Sentencing Commission Announces Slate of Fall Amendments – Update for April 22, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING COMMISSION TAKES A WHACK AT ACQUITTED CONDUCT

The US Sentencing Commission last week adopted a slate of proposed amendments to the Guidelines, finally addressing the acquitted conduct issue that has bedeviled the Commission and Supreme Court for the past two years.

can230407SCOTUS sidestepped the question last year, sitting on 13 certiorari petitions raising the question of whether sentencing for acquitted conduct – that is, conduct for which a defendant has been found not guilty by a jury – is constitutional. At the prodding of the Dept of Justice – which told the Supremes that they should let the Sentencing Commission handle it only to then tell the Sentencing Commission it lacked the power to do so – SCOTUS finally denied the cert petitions last July, with several justices saying they would wait for the Sentencing Commission to address the issue.

The acquitted conduct Guidelines amendment will redefine “relevant conduct” under USSG § 1B1.3 to exclude conduct for which a defendant was acquitted in federal court. Because judges must rely on “relevant conduct” to set the Guidelines sentencing range, the change is significant.

For example, if a defendant is convicted of distributing cocaine but acquitted of selling heroin, the amount of heroin that the government said he had sold currently be factored into his Guidelines range as long as the judge found it more likely than not that he had actually sold it. The proposed amendment would prohibit counting the heroin regardless of whether the judge thought the defendant had done it or not.

“Not guilty means not guilty,” Sentencing Commission Chairman Judge Carlton W. Reeves, who sits on the Southern District of Mississippi bench, said. “By enshrining this basic fact within the federal sentencing guidelines, the Commission is taking an important step to protect the credibility of our courts and criminal justice system.”

reeves230706Commissioners were divided on whether to consider enforcing the acquitted conduct sentencing amendment retroactively. A majority voted to have the USSC staff prepare a retroactivity impact analysis, which is the initial step toward making an amendment retroactive.

Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL), chairman of the Judiciary Committee, said in a press release, applauded the Commission’s vote, noting that it came after he and Sen Charles Grassley (R-IA) introduced the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2023. The legislation would have prohibited judges from using conduct acquitted by a jury. The measure has not gained consideration the full Senate.

The Commission is allowed to grant retroactivity – which lets people already sentenced according to Guidelines that are now being amended go back to court to secure the benefit of the amendment in the form of a reduced sentence – on new defendant-friendly amendments. Ratroactivity on last fall’s criminal history amendments was vigorously opposed by some commissioners and the DOJ, which has an ex officio representative on the Commission. This time around, the Commission is considering whether to make multiple defendant-friendly changes retroactive:

• the acquitted conduct amendment;

• a change to juvenile sentences that eliminates adding 2 points for prior juvenile incarcerations of more than 60 days;

• a change to §2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(i) to provide that the 4-level enhancement gun serial number obliteration applies only if the serial number has been modified such the original number is “is rendered illegible or unrecognizable to the unaided eye;” and

• a change to Commentary in §2K2.4 to permit grouping of 922(g) gun count with drug trafficking count where the defendant has a separate 18 USC 924(c) conviction based on drug trafficking.

During the retroactivity vote, Commissioner Claire Murray – a former Trump administration DOJ official – made the obvious point that judges may also still rely on acquitted conduct at sentencing when considering the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, which courts must consider at sentencing, regardless of the Guidelines advisory sentencing range.

The bad news in the amendments was pretty much expected. For economic crimes, the recommended sentence under the guidelines increases dramatically as the amount of loss resulting from the offense increases.

shakeitoff240423As it is now written, the loss is defined in the Guidelines commentary as the higher of actual loss or intended loss. If you try to steal the Hope Diamond from the Smithsonian (value $250 million) but only get a rhinestone imitation (value $250) because the real one had been rented out to Taylor Swift for the weekend, the Smithsonian’s actual loss would be just a few bucks, but the intended loss would be a quarter billion.

In 2022, the 3rd Circuit held in United States v. Banks that the Commentary expanded the definition of loss beyond the ordinary meaning of “actual loss,” and thus, “intended loss” could not be used to set a defendant’s Guidelines. The new loss amendment moves the commentary section into the actual guideline, making sure that intended loss is included in setting the Guideline sentencing range and allowing the use of gain from the offense as a substitute for loss.

Whether the changes will become retroactive depends in part on USSC data on how many prisoners would be eligible for a reduction. If the number is too high, the Commission becomes concerned that the courts will be overwhelmed with reduction motions.

Finally, unhappy that the Commission last year adopted a new compassionate release guideline and made the criminal history guidelines retroactive on a 4-3 vote, Sen John Kennedy (R-LA) last week introduced the Consensus in Sentencing Act to require that changes to the Guidelines get at least five votes out of the seven Commissioners.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, said it “cannot be pure coincidence” that Kennedy introduced the bill the day before last week’s USSC meeting. The bill stands little chance of passing before Congress expires at the end of the year.

Reuters, US panel prohibits judges from sentencing for ‘acquitted conduct’ (April 17, 2024)

Law360, Sentencing Commission Limits Acquitted Conduct Sentencing (April 17, 2024) 

Press release, Durbin Applauds Sentencing Commission’s Unanimous Vote To Prohibit Acquitted Conduct From Being Used In Sentencing Guidelines (April 18, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Senator Kennedy introduces “Consensus in Sentencing Act” to increase USSC votes needed for guideline amendments (April 16, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

“Their Verdict Didn’t Matter”: Taming the ‘Acquitted Conduct’ Sentencing Monster – Update for March 8, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ACQUITTED CONDUCT ISSUE ARRIVES WITH A LOT OF BAGGAGE

The U.S. Sentencing Commission completed two days of hearings yesterday on what, if anything, it should do to rein in “acquitted conduct” sentencing, the Guidelines- and Supreme Court-sanctioned practice of relying on evidence that a defendant committed a crime even if a jury had found him or her not guilty of that offense.

acquitted240308Jessie Ailsworth knows what that feels like. During this week’s hearings, he told the Commission he felt relieved when he heard the jury return 28 “not guilty” verdicts in his 1996 trial for crack cocaine distribution. But Jessie said “fairness went out the window” when he got hammered with 30 years for the seven counts on which he was found guilty.

The judge based Jessie’s sentence on all of the counts in the indictment, including the 28 acquitted counts.

“I was very angry for a long time,” Jessie told the Commission. “I felt like the system failed me. I really believe that the jury did their best. They took their time, wrote notes, asked questions, and reached their verdicts. But, when I was sentenced, the court sent me to prison based on the jury’s acquittals. I felt like the system didn’t just fail me, it also failed my jury. We all knew what the jury was trying to do, and when I was sentenced, I wondered why we had even spent all those days with the jury, if at the end of it all, their verdict didn’t matter.”

Jessie was one of 15 witnesses testifying over the two days. Others included judges, probation officers and advocates. Judge Deborah Cook of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals drew a distinction between “the important distinction in the proof necessary for convicting versus sentencing… That is, so long as the defendant receives a sentence at or below the statutory maximum set by the jury’s verdict, the district court does not abridge [a] defendant’s right to jury by looking to other facts, including acquitted conduct, when sentencing within that statutory range.”

Proof140424Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Policy and the Law blog yesterday, explained how the question is stickier than either Jessie or Judge Cook might think. Prof Berman wrote that “rights directed at a balanced and thorough process — in other words, rights that support accuracy concerns or that tend to put the prosecution and defense on a more even playing field — do apply at sentencing. Rights that offer the defendant special protections — such as those that automatically resolve errors in the defendant’s favor or primarily protect the defendant’s autonomy — do not apply at sentencing. Framed only a bit differently, one might see concerns for sentencing “accuracy” to be a kind of Crime Control concern, and one that would counsel against preventing judicial consideration of acquitted conduct. But the jury trial right is fundamental to our nation’s vision of Due Process and our commitment to “defendant special protections,” and that’s surely why many are troubled by any judicial sentencing process that functionally disregards a jury’s decision to acquit on certain charges.”

Prof Berman suggests (without endorsing this outcome) that if factual accuracy is paramount at sentencing, the judge will consider acquitted conduct in all its glory. This, of course, is a slippery slope. How about evidence that the judge suppressed and the jury thus never heard? How about proffers (attorneys telling the judge what their witnesses would have said if allowed to testify)?

If due process (protecting a defendant’s rights) is the correct model, then a jury’s acquittal on any particular count is ‘game, set, match’ for sentencing. This is at the expense of accuracy and the core legal principle, first enunciated by Marcus Tullius Cicero two millennia ago, to “let the punishment fit the crime.”

The “due process” model, too, is a slippery slope. After all, “acquitted conduct” sentencing is only a concern in the 2-3% of federal prosecutions that actually go to trial. We’re talking about elephants when the issue should be all animals that are not elephants. For the overwhelming 97% of cases in which the defendant pleads guilty, the Guidelines permit sentencing on “related conduct.” Related conduct can be found by the court only by a fairly squishy “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and the government may meet that standard with hearsay evidence and fuzzy math from witnesses the defendant has no right to confront. In drug and fraud prosecutions especially, where the amount of drugs or amount of loss drives the Guidelines sentencing range, a “due process” model should demand that standards for determining facts at sentencing provide the same “reasonable doubt” and 6th Amendment right of confrontation that a defendant enjoys during the conviction phase.

Prof Berman observed that as he watched the Commission’s hearing “explore[] many of the devilish details, it was clear how acquitted conduct’s intricacies may largely explain why past Commissions have avoided these issues as a policy matter and why the US Supreme Court avoided these issues as a constitutional matter since its 1997 Watts decision.”

can230407Speaking at a symposium at Ohio State last Monday, Judge Carlton Reeves, chairman of the Sentencing Commission, said that the Commission took up acquitted conduct “out of deference to the Supreme Court” after it denied certiorari in McClinton v. United States and said, “Well maybe the Sentencing Commission ought to look at it.”

Earlier, in a Sentencing Commission news release, Judge Reeves said, “When the Supreme Court tells us to address an issue, the commission listens. From continuing the use of acquitted conduct to restricting (or even eliminating) its use in sentencing, all options are on the table.

Sentencing Commission, Public Hearing on Acquitted Conduct (March 6-7)

Sentencing Policy and the Law, USSC hearings on acquitted conduct: the devilish details amid a fundamental criminal process debate (March 6)

Kansas Reflector, Kansas man says prison sentence based on acquitted conduct was ‘ultimate betrayal’ (March 6)

– Thomas L. Root

Feb 1’s Here… Let the Prisoners Go! – Update for February 1, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

RUMOR CONTROL 101: WHAT HAPPENS ON FEBRUARY 1? (HINT: NOTHING)

nothinghere190906My inbox has been flooded in the last few weeks with people wondering what all will happen today, Thursday, February 1st. One said changes in the gun laws will go into effect. Another heard that the meth laws will change. Another explained that all criminal history points from prior state convictions will be dropped from Guidelines criminal history. A fourth heard that acquitted conduct will be banned for sentencing purposes.

Yesterday, a prisoner complained that people were saying that effective today, FSA credits could be used by everyone, not just low- and minimum- recidivism level inmates. At least this last guy recognized that the rumor was bullshit on stilts, and responded with appropriate disgust.

The plain and sad fact is that NONE OF THESE RUMORS IS TRUE. NONE. ZERO. NADA. ZIP.

Congress is not changing the federal firearms statutes this year. With methamphetamine and fentanyl flowing across the border being a hot campaign issue, no one’s changing those laws, either. Congress can’t even approve a federal budget or aid to Ukraine and Israel, or a plan to stop the border crisis. Passing legislation that benefits a portion of the 160,000 federal prisoners is not on anyone’s radar.

True, the Sentencing Commission is considering what – if anything – to do with acquitted conduct, but any change in the Guidelines is not likely to be retroactive and is 10 months away at least. And the Supremes may cause real upheaval in the federal gun laws when Rahimi is decided in the next five months.

But nothing will happen today.

timereductionfairy231003

However, tomorrow… On February 2, the Time Reduction Fairy will emerge from her den. If she sees her shadow, we’re in for another year of no criminal justice reform. The smart money, unfortunately, is that February 2 is going to be sunny.

– Thomas L. Root

Sentencing Commission Proposes Acquitted Conduct Sentencing Change – Update for December 18, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MOVING RIGHT ALONG…

USSC170511Last Thursday the U.S. Sentencing Commission acted with uncharacteristic alacrity, adopting proposed amendments for the 2024 amendment cycle about a month earlier than has been typical over the past 30 years.

The Commission proposes seven changes in Guideline policy in a 755-page release, the most anticipated of which is the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing.

The Commission proposes adopting one of three acquitted conduct options:

Option 1 would amend § 1B1.3, the “relevant conduct” Guideline, to provide that acquitted conduct is not relevant conduct for determining the guideline range. It would define “acquitted conduct” as conduct constituting an element of a charge of which the defendant has been acquitted by the court, except for conduct establishing the instant offense that was “found by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Option 2 would amend the § 1B1.3 Commentary to provide that a downward departure may be warranted if the use of acquitted conduct has a “disproportionate impact” on the guideline range.

Option 3 would amend USSG § 6A1.3 (which addresses the standard of proof required to resolve Guidelines disputes) to provide that while a “preponderance of the evidence” standard generally is sufficient, acquitted conduct should not be considered unless it is established by clear and convincing evidence.

acquitted230106The Supreme Court last June denied 13 petitions for writ of certiorari related to use of acquitted conduct in sentencing. Four Justices felt the Commission should first address the issue. US District Judge Carlton W. Reeves, chairman of the USSC, said, “When the Supreme Court tells us to address an issue, the Commission listens… [A]ll options are on the table.”

The USSC proposal also addresses counting juvenile convictions for criminal history. The Commission proposed changes that would limit the impact of those convictions on criminal history scoring and expand consideration of a defendant’s youth at sentencing.

One piece of bad news is the Commission’s proposal to undo the effects of the 2019 Supreme Court Kisor v. Willkie decision. A year ago, the 3rd Circuit relied on Kisor in United States v. Banks to hold that the loss enhancement under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1) includes only what was actually lost. The Circuit reasoned that the word “intended” appears only in the 2B1.1 commentary and not in the Guideline itself, and thus “the loss enhancement in the Guideline’s application notes impermissibly expands the word ‘loss’ to include both intended loss and actual loss.”

Sentencing for “intended loss” is the fraud equivalent of “ghost dope“:  Often, “intended loss” is what the government says it is, and that figure shoots the Guidelines sentencing range to the moon.

Banks sparked a debate on how much deference to give the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of its own Guidelines. The 3rd said the USSC lacked authority to use its commentary – which is not subject to Congressional approval before adoption – to expand the meaning of “loss” to include what was intended but did not happen.

loss210312The USSC now intends to short-circuit the Kisor v. Willkie debate (and to kneecap the Banks decision) by moving “intended loss” from the commentary into the text of 2B1.1. Because that amendment will be subject to a possible (but improbable) veto by Congress veto, the Kisor v. Willkie problem with 2B1.1 will melt as fast as snowflakes on a hot stove.

The USSC drew its proposed amendment from policy priorities adopted last August. Not making the final cut were policy priorities on career offender (and not for the first time) and methamphetamine.

The proposed amendments will be open for public comment period until February 22, 2024. A public hearing will occur after that. Final proposed amendments will be sent to Congress by May 1 to become effective next November 1, 2024.

USSC, Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (Preliminary) (December 14, 2023)

USSC, US Sentencing Commission seeks comment on proposals addressing the impact of acquitted conduct, youthful convictions, and other issues (December 14, 2023)

USSC, Public Hearing (December 14, 2023)

USSC, Federal Register Notice of Final 2023-2024 Priorities (August 24, 2023)

United States v. Banks, 55 F.4th 246 (3d Cir. 2022)

Bloomberg Law, Wall Street Fraudsters Rush to Cut Prison Terms With New Ruling (November 1, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Acquitted Conduct Rides Again on Capitol Hill – Update for November 7, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HOUSE COMMITTEE SENDS ACQUITTED CONDUCT BILL TO FULL HOUSE

The House of Representative Committee on the Judiciary last Wednesday unanimously approved the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2023 (H.R. 5430). Spearheaded by Rep. Steve Cohen (D-TN), the bipartisan measure was approved 23-0.

acquitted230106

In September, Cohen introduced the bipartisan measure with Rep Kelly Armstrong (R-ND), with Sens Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Charles Grassley (R-IA) introducing a companion bill, S.2788, in the Senate. This legislation would end the practice of judges increasing sentences based on conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted. It will now advance to the full House of Representatives for a floor vote. The Senate has yet to act on the measure.

During markup of the bill, Cohen said, “Just about every Supreme Court Justice who’s been around lately – John Paul Stevens, Anthony Kennedy, and Antonin Scalia… Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Clarence Thomas, going down to Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh have all said this needs to be changed. So with that I would ask that we… arrive at justice. People should be convicted of proven crimes and sentenced for those crimes.”

The Sentencing Commission considered prohibited acquitted conduct from being used in sentencing last winter but decided the issue needed more review. On June 30, the Supreme Court denied review on 13 different cases raising the issue.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman said in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog last week that “this notable vote committee certainly does not ensure Congress will get this bill to the desk of the President, but it should serve as a strong message to the U.S. Sentencing Commission that it should have bipartisan support for any acquitted conduct reforms it might be considering during its current amendment cycle.”

H.R. 5430, Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2023

S. 2788, Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2023

Sentencing Law and Policy, Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act receives unanimous bipartisan support in US House Judiciary Committee (November 3, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Sentencing Commission To Take Measure of BOP – Update for August 29, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

“HOW ARE WE DOING? PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING SURVEY…

It’s unlikely that the Federal Bureau of Prisons will be asking prisoners that question anytime soon. But someone might.

howwedoing230829At last week’s meeting, the U.S. Sentencing Commission said that in the coming year, it plans to assess how effective the BOP is in meeting the purposes of sentencing listed in 18 USC § 3553(a)(2). Those purposes include the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment and adequate deterrence, to protect the public and to effectively provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or other treatment.

The Commission also plans to continue review of how the guidelines treat acquitted conduct for sentencing purposes. The Supreme Court recently denied review in a baker’s-dozen cases asking it to declare the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing to be unconstitutional. Three Justices cited the ongoing USSC study of the issue as a reason to hold off.

Other Commission priorities in the coming year include studying the career offender guidelines, methamphetamine offenses, sentencing differences for cases disposed of through trial versus plea, and sentences involving youthful individuals.

badfood230829Speaking of prisoner satisfaction, inmates should not expect any help if they are unhappy with the chow. Two weeks ago, the 10th Circuit ruled that an inmate claim that the BOP was tampering with the food it served him – in violation of the 8th Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment – presented a new application of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The Circuit said that the existence of alternative remedies (the BOP’s administrative remedy route, no doubt) made a Bivens claim unavailable to the prisoner under last year’s Supreme Court decision in Egbert v. Boule.

Egbert drove a metaphorical legal stake into Bivens‘ heart, as the 10th’s decision in the prisoner food case makes clear. It’s easy enough to cluck one’s tongue over Prisoner Adams’ tainted food claim (like any prison food is edible), but a lot of serious Bivens claims died on Egbert’s hill.

US Sentencing Commission, Final Priorities for Amendment Cycle (August 24, 2023)

Adams v. Martinez, Case No 22-1425, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 21369 (10th Cir, August 16, 2023)

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 (1971)

Egbert v Boule, 142 S.Ct. 1793, 213 L.Ed.2d 54 (2022)

– Thomas L. Root

What’s Old Is New – Update for July 11, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS DENIAL OF ACQUITTED CONDUCT SENTENCING REVIEW MAKES LITTLE SENSE

As everyone knows, on June 30 the Supreme Court finally denied review to a thundering herd of petitions (13 in all) raising the constitutionality of acquitted conduct sentencing. And in so doing, the Court suggests that it’s way behind the times.

acquitted230106Acquitted conduct sentencing is the practice of using a charge of which a defendant was acquitted by a jury to enhance a sentence. The lead petitioner, Dayonta McClinton, was convicted of robbing pharmacies but acquitted of killing one of his fellow robbers in an argument over sharing proceeds. Nevertheless, the judge more than tripled his sentence from a range of 57-71 months to a sentence of 228 months because the murder was “related conduct,” despite the fact a jury said the petitioner was not guilty of killing his co-conspirator.

A careful reading of the statements issued by some Justice on the denial adds equivocation to five months of evasion.

When the Supreme Court denied review, Justice Sotomayor dissented and several other Justices issued statements. Last week, in his Sentencing Policy and the Law blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote at length about the denial of review. “It is quite obvious that objections to the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing raise constitutional issues,” he said. The certiorari petition filed by Dayonta McClinton makes this clear in its Question Presented: “Whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibit a federal court from basing a criminal defendant’s sentence on conduct for which a jury has acquitted the defendant…’ These rights are, as the Court put it in Apprendi, “constitutional protections of surpassing importance” because they define restraints on state powers and processes to impose criminal punishments.”

The statements of Justices Kavanaugh, Gorsuch and Barrett suggested these Justices voted against granting certiorari because the Sentencing Commission was considering new guidelines for acquitted-conduct sentencing. Justice Kavanaugh wrote that it is “appropriate for this Court to wait for the Sentencing Commission’s determination before the Court decides whether to grant certiorari in a case involving the use of acquitted conduct.” But as Berman observes, Kavanaugh

does not explain why it is ‘appropriate’ to leave unresolved a constitutional issue while a federal agency might address a policy issue… The Justices’ statements referencing the USSC do not account in any way for how any ‘Sentencing Commission determination’ would have any impact on the Court’s consideration of ‘constitutional protections of surpassing importance.’

Policy is policy, but constitutionality is fundamental. As Berman notes, whether acquitted conduct sentencing is constitutional has nothing to do with whether the USSC thinks that it makes policy sense to permit acquitted conduct sentencing. Obviously, the USSC once thought so (given that USSG § 1B1.3 relevant conduct sentencing has been a fixture of federal sentencing since 1988). As Berman put it, “How the USSC (or Congress) might choose to regulate sentencing law and process would not and could not resolve the array of constitutional concerns that the Supreme Court was asked to consider in McClinton. Indeed, the USSC and Congress cannot even know the full reach and limits of their powers to set forth rules concerning acquitted-conduct sentencing with constitutional matters unresolved.”

Besides, the USSC and Congress can only speak to acquitted conduct sentencing at federal sentencing, even though over 90% of sentences are handed down by state courts.

wrong160620Berman cites another problem with the Supreme Court’s punt on acquitted conduct sentencing. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent says that “the Sentencing Commission, which is responsible for the Sentencing Guidelines, has announced that it will resolve questions around acquitted conduct sentencing in the coming year.” The Kavanaugh, Gorsuch and Barrett statement says, “The Sentencing Commission is currently considering the issue.”

Neither is correct.

Berman suspects that Sotomayor’s dissent and Kavanaugh’s statement were written months ago, before the Sentencing Commission – which proposed an acquitted conduct sentencing amendment in January – withdrew its acquitted conduct sentencing proposal for further study on April 5th. What’s more, when the Commission released its proposed 2024 amendment cycle priorities last month, acquitted conduct sentencing was conspicuously absent.

“It no longer seems to be accurate to state that the Commission ‘has announced that it will resolve questions around acquitted-conduct sentencing in the coming year’” or that it is currently considering the issue, Berman wrote last week.

The Supremes seem to expect the USSC to assume the burden. The USSC, which is ill-equipped to do so, expects SCOTUS to do its job. Expect nothing from either body on acquitted conduct sentencing: you won’t be disappointed.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Inartful dodgers: constitutional concerns with acquitted conduct that only SCOTUS can address (July 4, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Inartful dodgers: did the Justices write cert denial statements in the acquitted conduct cases months ago? (July 5, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Piddles and Twiddles on Acquitted Conduct – Update for July 5, 2023

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SCOTUS KICKS ACQUITTED CONDUCT CAN DOWN THE ROAD

It seems appropriate during this Independence Day holiday to recall the musical 1776, especially where the character John Adams complained that the Continental Congress “piddled” and “twiddled” without ever solving anything.

piddle230705The delegates gathered in “foul, fetid, fuming, foggy, filthy Philadelphia” had nothing on the Supreme Court of the United States. After relisting, tabling, untabling and relisting (again and again) over five months, the Court last Friday finally denied review to the 13 pending petitions for certiorari raising the constitutionality of acquitted conduct sentencing.

Led by McClinton v. United States, the cases challenged the constitutionality of acquitted conduct sentencing, loosely defined as giving defendants “additional prison time for crimes that juries found they didn’t commit.”

In late January, the Dept. of Justice got the Supreme Court to place a hold on McClinton, promising SCOTUS that the Guidelines amendments proposed by the Sentencing Commission would fix the acquitted conduct sentencing problem. Then, DOJ showed up at the Sentencing Commission to tell it that it lacked the power to make the acquitted conduct sentencing change. When the Commission rolled out the amendments in April, it deferred action on acquitted conduct sentencing until next year.

The Supreme Court then again took up McClinton but continued to relist the petition from week to week. Relisting the petition rather than granting or denying it suggested that several Justices strongly supported granting certiorari and were trying to swing the minimum four votes needed to qualify the issue for full review.

Relisting cannot last forever. At last week’s “cleanup” conference, held at the end of every term, SCOTUS denied review to McClinton and its related petitions for certiorari. denied190109Uncharacteristically for such matters, the McClinton certiorari denial generated opinions from no fewer than five Justices. Justice Sotomayor warned that “the Court’s denial of certiorari today should not be misinterpreted. The Sentencing Commission… has announced that it will resolve questions around acquitted-conduct sentencing in the coming year. If the Commission does not act expeditiously or chooses not to act, however, this Court may need to take up the constitutional issues presented.”

Justices Kavanaugh, Gorsuch and Barrett, echoed Sotomayor: “The use of acquitted conduct to alter a defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range raises important questions. But the Sentencing Commission is currently considering the issue. It is appropriate for this Court to wait for the Sentencing Commission’s determination before the Court decides whether to grant certiorari in a case involving the use of acquitted conduct.”

Justice Alito noted that he concurred with the denial of certiorari, but staked out his position in a 6-page opinion: “[B]ecause my colleagues have laid out some of the arguments in favor of one side, I thought it appropriate to outline some of the countervailing arguments.”

can230407Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman – who filed an amicus brief supporting McClinton – wrote in his Sentencing Policy and the Law blog that “I am disappointed, but not all that surprised, that the Justices keep being content to kick this ugly-but-challenging acquitted-conduct can down the road.”

McClinton v. United States, Case No 21-1557, 2023 US LEXIS 2796 (June 30, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, In final order list of Term, Supreme Court grants cert on big new Second Amendment case and denies/punts cert on acquitted conduct cases (June 30, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Acquitted Conduct Coming Around Again at Supreme Court – Update for May 30, 2023

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IS 13 A LUCKY NUMBER FOR ACQUITTED CONDUCT?

lucky13-230530For the past five months, we’ve been watching McClinton v. United States, a petition in front of the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of acquitted-conduct sentencing.

You’d think that fact that a jury has acquitted a defendant of criminal conduct should prevent a court from taking that conduct into account at sentencing, but since United States v. Watts in 1997, as long as a defendant is convicted of any criminal offense, punishment for that offense can be enhanced to account for conduct for which a jury found the defendant not guilty.

Some state courts have held acquitted conduct sentencing to be unconstitutional, and some former Supreme Court Justices – Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg – and current Justice Clarence Thomas have condemned the practice.

McClinton and four similar petitions were relisted once in January. “Relisting” means the justices considered the petitions at a weekly conference and then deferred a decision on whether to grant review (certiorari) to the next conference. A “relist” suggests that one or several Justices support granting the petitions.

duplicity2305309In late January, the Dept of Justice got the Supreme Court to place a hold on McClinton and four other petitions by essentially assuring SCOTUS that proposed Guidelines amendments rolled out by the Sentencing Commission on January 12th – which included a proposal to ban acquitted conduct sentencing – were going to fix the problem. DOJ told the Supreme Court that “[t]his Court’s intervention” was not “necessary to address” the widespread problem of acquitted-conduct sentencing because “the Sentencing Commission could promulgate guidelines to preclude such reliance.”

You may recall that after selling the Supreme Court on tabling the acquitted conduct petitions, DOJ filed an unctuous set of comments with the Sentencing Commission a few weeks later arguing the USSC lacked authority to place restrictions on acquitted-conduct sentencing because 18 USC § 3661 bars restricting judges as to the information about the background and conduct of defendants that they can consider.

(As an aside, I note that McClinton’s counsel promptly informed the Supreme Court about DOJ’s gamesmanship in trying to torpedo McClinton because the Sentencing Commission would fix the problem at the same time it was whining to USSC that the agency lacked the legal right to do so).

The Sentencing Commission decided on April 5 not to act on acquitted conduct this year, although it said it would try to take the issue up next year. Now, maybe because of DOJ’s duplicity, the Supreme Court relisted those original five cases for a second time, to be discussed at last Thursday’s conference. And now, the five pending petitions have been joined by an additional eight cases raising the same or similar issues.

As John Elwood put it in SCOTUSBlog last week, “We’ll find out soon how lucky these 13 petitions are.” ‘Soon’ could be this morning at 9:30 am Eastern, when the results of last week’s conference are announced.

McClinton v. United States, Case No. 21-1557 (petition for certiorari pending)

SCOTUSBlog, Acquitted-conduct sentencing returns (May 24, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Catching up, yet again, with a big bunch of relisted acquitted conduct petitions pending before SCOTUS (May 24, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Guideline Amendments Adopted in Contentious USSG Love-fest – Update for April 6, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING COMMISSION ADOPTS AMENDMENTS

USSC170511The U.S. Sentencing Commission yesterday adopted proposed amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for the first time in five years, with the new “compassionate release” guidelines consuming much of the meeting and generating sharp (but collegial) disagreement.

The “compassionate release” Guideline, USSG § 1B1.13, was approved on a 4-3 vote. It updates and expands the criteria for what can qualify as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to grant compassionate release – the language in 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) – and it will give judges both more discretion and more guidance to determine when a sentence reduction is warranted.

The new categories that could make an inmate eligible for compassionate release include

• if the prisoner is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or specialized medical care not being provided by the BOP and without which he or she is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.

• if the prisoner is housed at a prison affected or at imminent risk of being affected by (an ongoing outbreak of infectious disease or an ongoing public health emergency declared by the appropriate federal, state, or local authority, and due to personal health risk factors and custodial status, he or she is at increased risk of suffering “severe medical complications or death as a result of exposure” to the outbreak.

• if the prisoner’s parent is incapacitated and the prisoner would be the only available caregiver.

• if the prisoner establishes that similar family circumstances exist involving any other immediate family member or someone whose relationship with the prisoner is similar in kind to that of an immediate family member when the prisoner would be the only available caregiver.

• if the prisoner becomes the victim of sexual assault by a corrections officer.

• if a prisoner received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, changes in the law (other than to the Guidelines) may be considered in determining whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed.

The amendments also provide that while rehabilitation is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason, it may be considered in combination with other circumstances.

compassion160208Three of the seven-member Commission disagreed sharply with the “unusually long sentence” amendment. Commissioner Candice C. Wong said, “Today’s amendment allows compassionate release to be the vehicle for applying retroactively the very reductions that Congress has said by statute should not apply retroactively.”

Commissioner Claira Boom Horn, who is a sitting US District Court Judge in Kentucky, observed that “nothing in the First Step Act – literally nothing, not text, not legislative history – indicates any intention on Congress’s part to expand the substantive criteria for granting compassionate release, much less to fundamentally change the nature of compassionate release to encompass for the first time factors other than the defendant’s personal or family circumstances. The Supreme Court tells us that Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes and it did not do so here.”

Commissioner Claire McCusker Murray said, “The seismic expansion of compassionate release promulgated today not only saddles judges with the task of interpreting a free will catch-all but also ensures a flood of motions, a flood that will then repeat anytime there is a nonretroactive change in the law. For the past several years, while the Commission lacked a quorum to implement the First Step Act, the country has experienced a natural experiment in what happens when judges have no operative guidance as to the criteria they should apply in deciding release motions. The result has been widespread disparities. In Fiscal Year 2022, for example, the most generous circuit granted 35% of compassionate release motions, the most cautious granted only 2.5%. The disparities within circuits and even within courthouses were often just as stark. We fear that with today’s dramatic vague and ultimately unlawful expansion of compassionate release that we… will expect far more of the same.”

Commissioner John Gleeson, a retired US District Court judge and Wall Street law firm partner, disagreed: “[The amendment’s] common sense guidance is fully consistent with separation of powers principles, our authority as the Sentencing Commission, and with the First Step Act. Most importantly, it will ensure that § 3582(c)(1)(A) of Title 18 of the United States Code serves one of the purposes Congress explicitly intended it to serve when that law is enacted almost 40 years ago: to provide a needed transparent judicial second look at unusually long sentences that in fairness should be reduced.”

noteasycongress221212Congress may veto one or more of the Guidelines proposals between now and November 1, 2023. That has only once before, when Congress voted down a guideline lessening the crack/cocaine disparity in 2005. Congress is pretty busy, and both the Senate and House are pretty evenly split politically, but the extent of the disagreement at the Commission gives cause for concern. If Congress does veto, it is unclear whether would focus solely on the “unusually long sentence” subsection of new § 1B1.13, or whether the entire amended Guideline would be jettisoned.

In other action, the Commission had been considering an amendment that prohibited courts from imposing longer sentences based on alleged crimes of which a defendant had been acquitted. Commission Chairman Carleton Reeves, a federal district judge from the Southern District of Mississippi, said the Commission needs more time before making a final determination on the issue.

Reuters reported that Michael P. Heiskell, President-Elect of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, said he was disappointed by the delay. “Permitting people to be sentenced based on conduct for which a jury has acquitted them is fundamentally unfair because it eviscerates the constitutional right to trial and disrespects the jury’s role,” he said in a statement.

However, the Commission’s delay may rejuvenate the McClinton v. United States petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court has been sitting on at the suggestion of the Dept of Justice, awaiting Sentencing Commission action on acquitted conduct. A Supreme Court decision that use of acquitted conduct in sentencing is unconstitutional would benefit many more people than would a prospective Guidelines change.

The USSC also adopted a criminal history amendment that eliminates “status points” (sometimes called “recency points”) – additional criminal history points assessed if the defendant committed the current crime within two years of release for a prior crime – and grants a 2-level downward adjustment to a defendant’s offense level if he or she had zero criminal history points and met other criteria.

The Commission also approved an amendment to criminal history commentary advising judges to treat prior marijuana possession offenses more leniently in the criminal history calculus, making downward adjustments for offenses now seen as lawful by many states.

The proposal doesn’t seek to remove marijuana convictions as a criminal history factor entirely, but it would revise commentary within the guidelines to “include sentences resulting from possession of marihuana offenses as an example of when a downward departure from the defendant’s criminal history may be warranted,” according to a synopsis.

usscretro230406None of the Guidelines changes is retroactive without specific Commission determination that they should be. The USSC yesterday issued a notice that it will consider, pursuant to 18 USC § 3582(c)(2) and 28 USC § 994(u), whether Guidelines changes on “status points” and the “zero criminal history points” adjustment should be retroactive, and ask for public comment on the matter.

Although the Guidelines amendments do not become effective until November, most federal circuits have declared that – while the current § 1B1.13 is not binding on district courts because it is pre-First Step – courts should consider it to express the opinion of an agency expert in sentencing. The amended § 1B1.13 has every bit of the authority that the current non-binding § 1B1.13 has, and it has the additional benefit of being evidence of current Sentencing Commission thought.

USSC, Adopted Amendments (Effective November 1, 2023) (April 5, 2023)

USSC, Issue For Comment On Retroactivity Of Criminal History Amendment (April 5, 2023)

Reuters, U.S. panel votes to expand compassionate release for prisoners (April 5, 2023)

Marijuana Moment, Federal Sentencing Commission Approves New Marijuana Guidelines For Judges To Treat Past Convictions More Leniently (April 5, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root