Tag Archives: sec 404

Resentencing the Whole Crack Defendant – Update for April 1, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

PACKAGE STORE

More than a few prisoners seeking sentence reductions under Section 404 of the First Step Act – the provision that made the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act apply retroactively to crack cocaine sentences – were denied reductions because they had other non-crack counts of conviction that weren’t covered by Section 404 and kept the sentences high.

gift211222In the case of Nathaniel Richardson, his sentence was life for crack distribution and a second life term for a 21 USC § 848 continuing criminal enterprise count. The district court found that the crack distribution count was a covered offense and reduced Nate’s life sentence to 360 months. But on the CCE count, the district court relied on 4th Circuit precedent, holding that CCEs were not covered offenses under Section 404 and left the life term intact. That life term was unchanged.

Last week, the 4th Circuit reversed, holding that the district court had the discretion to reduce both covered and noncovered offenses under Section 404 of the First Step Act “if they function as a package.”

The 4th said it has “upheld the use of the sentencing package doctrine in the habeas context, and resentencing under the First Step Act similarly provides district courts with broad discretion to fashion a remedy.” The Circuit ruled that “allowing judges to utilize the sentencing package doctrine is in line with how district judges practically sentence defendants and in accordance with the purpose of the First Step Act… The sentencing package doctrine is applicable here because where one count of a package is remanded, the district judge must be given the discretion to reconfigure the sentencing plan to ensure it remains adequate to satisfy the statutory sentencing factors.

District judges are entrusted with “enormous responsibility,” the 4th said, “and must be given adequate discretion in resentencing, especially in light of the changing landscape of new statutory schemes.”

United States v. Richardson, Case No. 22-6748, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 6618 (4th Cir., March 20, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Sentence Reduction Decisions Can’t ‘Phone It In’ – Update for October 20, 2022

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

COMPASSIONATE RELEASE AND SEC 404 DENIALS CANNOT BE ROTE

Since prisoners have been permitted to file motions for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) – generally known as “compassionate release” – and motions for application of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 under § 404 of the First Step Act, we have seen district court denials that seemed pretty summary and “cookie cutter.”

cookiecutter221020To be sure, courts have had to deal with thousands of such motions, and undoubtedly the judges detail review and preparation to their junior-most clerks. But I am reminded of a surgical procedure I had a few years ago. The surgeon dismissed my concerns with a breezy “don’t worry – yours will be my 1,500th one of these.” I responded, “Maybe so, but will be my first.”

Compassionate release and § 404 motions are like that. Joe Prisoner’s motion may be the hundredth one the court has decided, but for Joe, it’s his first.

Decisions from the 4th and 7th Circuit a week ago delivered a stark reminder to district judges that denials of such motions should give due consideration to the movant’s arguments and evidence – not necessarily to accept them –but at least to note what the prisoner said and to explain why that argument is insufficient to carry the day.

Jon Singleton, having done 14 years already for a meth conspiracy, sought compassionate release because of COVID. Jon’s district court found that he had not shown an extraordinary and compelling reason for release because he had twice refused the vaccine. The thinking is that anyone who refuses the vaccine can hardly be sincerely worried about the effects of COVID-19.  If that weren’t enough, the district court said, the seriousness of Jon’s offense one and a half decades ago made the original sentence correct.

On appeal Jon complained said the district court had it wrong. He had refused the vaccine only once, and that time he did so only because he had a history of allergic reactions to vaccines and “was denied the ability to consult with a medical professional prior to vaccination.”

mywayor221020This was hardly a novel complaint: Dr. Homer Venters, a court-appointed epidemiologist who inspected FCI Lompoc for an ACLU class-action lawsuit against the BOP over COVID, lambasted the BOP over a year ago for the agency’s “take it or take a hike” approach to administering the COVID vax. Venters told the Central District of California District Court that he was “extremely concerned” about low inmate vaccinating rates, which he attributed to prison staff not addressing inmates’ “very valid and predictable concerns” about the effects the vaccine might have on their underlying health conditions. Rather than address inmate questions, Venters testified, prison staff dismissively told the inmates to either “take the vaccine or sign a refusal form.”

Two weeks ago, the 4th Circuit sided with Jon. “Initially,” the Court said, “the district court erroneously stated that Singleton refused the vaccine twice; the record reveals that he refused the vaccine only once. Moreover, the district court failed to consider Singleton’s argument that he refused the vaccine because he had a history of a severe allergic reaction to the influenza vaccine and other medications and was denied the ability to consult with a medical professional prior to vaccination. Because the district court made a factual error and failed to consider Singleton’s individual circumstances, we conclude that the court abused its discretion…”

Jon also complained the district court failed to consider (1) his rehabilitation evidence; (2) his argument that a “time served” would constitute just punishment; (3) his low recidivism score; and (4) that due to a change in state law, one of his prior drug felonies was reduced to a misdemeanor, which would have reduced his criminal history category. The Circuit agreed: “Given the amount of time Singleton spent in prison before filing his motion and the fact that the district court did not acknowledge any of his many arguments that relied on post-sentencing conduct and circumstances, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in considering the § 3553 factors.”

Jamell Newbern was convicted of crack distribution in 2005. Because he had two qualifying prior convictions, he was sentenced as a Guidelines career offender. At the time, the district judge said he would have sentenced Jamell to the same term even if he had not been a career offender.

denied190109The District Judge had long since retired. Since 2005, one of Jamell’s two prior convictions (reckless discharge of a firearm) was held to not be a crime of violence. But the new judge on Jamell’s case reimposed the original 300-month sentence, adopting the retired judge’s position that 300 months was warranted whether or not Jamellwas a career offender or not. The new judge did not even address Jamell’s post-sentencing record.

Last week, the 7th Circuit agreed that the new judge’s adoption of the prior judge’s determination that Jamell’s conduct warranted a 300-month sentence regardless of his status as a career offender.

“But,” the 7th said, “we see things differently when it comes to the district court’s failure to respond to Newburn’s argument for relief based on his good behavior in prison. Concepcion expressly established that conduct in prison—good or bad—can be properly considered in a First Step Act motion. Newburn meaningfully emphasized his positive record in his motion. By no means was Newman making a throwaway point. To the contrary, he devoted about a full page of his motion to highlighting his clean disciplinary record, employment in prison, completion of a drug-education course, and earning a GED. Concepcion v. United States does not require a detailed explanation in response to these considerations, but we cannot be sure that the district court considered Newburn’s arguments when it provided no explanation at all.”

The Circuit said that in light of Concepcion, “it is clear that the district court’s failure to address Newburn’s good-conduct argument rises to the level of procedural error.”

United States v. Singleton, Case No 21-6798, 2022 U.S.App. LEXIS 27943 (4th Cir., Oct. 6, 2022)

Santa Barbara Independent, Doctor ‘Extremely Concerned’ About Low Vaccination Rate Among Lompoc Prisoners (May 20, 2021)

United States v. Newbern, Case No. 22-1244, 2022 U.S.App. LEXIS 28348 (7th Cir., Oct. 12, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Sentence Reduction Decisions – Two Outta Three Ain’t Bad – Update for September 8, 2022

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

Three Circuits Hand Down Late August Sentence Reduction Decisions

endofsummer220908Traditionally, not much gets done in August, and that rule applies even more to the week before Labor Day. People are returning from vacation or grabbing some extra days to tack on the long weekend, while those stuck in the office are afflicted with end-of-summer ennui.

Last week, that rule didn’t apply to three courts of appeal, all of which handed down rulings on the limits of compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) and First Step Act Section 404 sentence reductions. Two were good for prisoners; one was not.

First Circuit Punts: Al Trenkler was convicted of a car bombing 30 years ago. The jury found Al had harbored only an intent to destroy property, but the trial judge inferred from the evidence an intent to kill and imposed a life sentence. But the law required life sentences to be assigned by the jury. The error – which everyone acknowledges – has never been fixed because of procedural roadblocks too complex to be explained here.

Al filed for compassionate release 18 months ago, based on his health and COVID-19 pandemic as well as his claim that questions surrounded his guilt; the fundamental unfairness of his conviction; sentence disparity and the unlawfully-imposed life sentence.

While Al did not sufficiently persuade the district court that questions surrounding his guilt, fundamental unfairness, and co-defendant sentence disparity constituted “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for compassionate release, the court decided the sentencing error did. Noting that Al had no other avenue for relief from the sentencing error, the district court reduced his sentence from life to 41 years.

The government appealed. Last week, the 1st Circuit sent the case back to the district court.

While the appeal was pending, the 1st ruled in United States v. Ruvalcaba that while district courts may generally consider “any complex of circumstances” in deciding that a prisoner should be granted compassionate release, that doesn’t mean that “certain reasons, standing alone, may be insufficient as a matter of law when measured against the ‘extraordinary and compelling’ standard… After all, it is possible that the whole may be greater than the sum of its parts, and reasons that might not do the trick on their own may combine to constitute circumstances that warrant a finding that the reasons proposed are, in the aggregate, extraordinary and compelling.”

howdidhedothat220908In Al’s case, the Circuit said, “it is clear the district court found the sentencing error constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction. But its analytical path is susceptible to multiple interpretations when it comes to how it navigated the list of reasons Trenkler offered. On one hand, we can appreciate the possibility that the district court discarded Trenkler’s other proposed reasons one by one but… deemed the circumstances surrounding the sentencing error alone to meet the “extraordinary and compelling” criteria. But we can also see how discarding all proposed reasons except one could represent a singular reason-by-reason analysis, not a review of the individual circumstances overall. In the end, our careful review of the district court’s thorough (but pre-Ruvalcaba) decision leaves us uncertain as to whether it took a holistic approach when reviewing Trenkler’s proposed reasons and ultimately concluding that the sentencing error constituted a sufficiently extraordinary and compelling reason to grant relief.”

The 1st decided that “given the importance of the issues and the gravitas of abuse-of-discretion review, we conclude that the prudent approach is to remand to afford the district court the opportunity to reassess the motion with the benefit of Ruvalcaba’s any-complex-of-circumstances guidance.”
3rd Circuit Reverses Sec 404 Resentencing: Clifton Shields was eligible for a Fair Sentencing Act sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act. He argued that his rehabilitation and the fact that he couldn’t be found to be a career offender if he were sentenced today (because courts now looked at some predicate offenses differently than they did when he was sentenced) meant his sentence should be reduced from 360 months to time served.

The district court cut his sentence to 262 months, but refused to consider “whether under current law Shields would be considered a career offender” because it believed that “[t]he First Step Act does not permit the court to consider other statutory or sentencing guideline amendments enacted since the date the defendant committed his or her offense.” The district court held that the reduced sentence it was imposing, at the bottom of Cliff’s amended Guidelines range, reflected its consideration of those factors as well as the documents Cliff had submitted as evidence of rehabilitation.

Last week, the 3rd Circuit reversed the district court, holding that district courts are authorized to take into account, at the time of resentencing, any changed circumstances, including post-sentencing developments. Noting that the Supreme Court’s Concepcion decision last June acknowledged “the broad discretion that judges have historically exercised when imposing and modifying sentences, and acknowledged that district courts deciding Sec 404(b) motions regularly consider evidence of… unrelated, nonretroactive Guidelines amendments when raised by the parties,” the Circuit said that while a district court is not required to accept arguments about intervening changes in the law, it should “start with the benchmark Guidelines range recalculated only to the extent it adjusts for the Fair Sentencing Act and should consider Shield’s arguments that he no longer qualifies as a career offender and his renewed objections to the firearm enhancement and the drug weight… used to calculate his Guidelines range.”

2nd Circuit Outlier: Victor Orena filed for compassionate release, arguing in part that he had new evidence that called into question the validity of his conviction. The district court denied the § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion, refusing to consider the new evidence.

outlier220908In a June decision that the 2nd Circuit affirmed again last week, the appellate court upheld the denial. The Circuit ruled that when considering a motion for a § 3582(C)(1)(A)(i) sentence reduction, “a district court does not have discretion to consider new evidence proffered for the purpose of attacking the validity of the underlying conviction in its balancing of the 18 USC § 3553(a) factors. Facts and arguments that purport to undermine the validity of a federal conviction must be brought on direct appeal or pursuant to 28 USC § 2255 or 2241.”

The problem with this approach is that a district court must consider the sentencing factors of 18 USC § 3553(a), including whether the sentence reduction will still represent fair and just punishment for the offense. What the defendant ought to have been sentenced to (or what he or she would be sentenced to if sentenced today) seems like the logical starting point for determining whether the reduction being sought remains consistent with the sentencing factors.

When the Circuit is confronted with whether a district court must assume that a sentence that could not lawfully be imposed today is the starting point for measuring consistency with the sentencing factors, we might get a decision that is more like Trenkler and Shields.

United States v. Trenkler, No. 21-1441, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 24290 (1st Cir. Aug. 29, 2022)

United States v. Shields, No. 19-2717, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 24719 (3d Cir. Sep. 1, 2022)

United States v. Amato, 37 F.4th 58 (2d Cir. 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court’s Final Days Include Criminal Decisions – Update for June 20, 2022

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BIG CRIMINAL DECISIONS STILL PENDING WITH ONLY TWO WEEKS OF SCOTUS TERM LEFT

The Supreme Court held two opinion days last week, but the most-watched criminal cases – United States v. Taylor, Concepcion v. United States and Ruan v. United States – remain among the 18 opinions yet to be issued before the Court’s term ends on June 30.

scotus161130Most people expect the two “big” cases, New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen (a 2nd Amendment case) and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (the possibly-leaked abortion decision) to happen on the last day. But Taylor, which concerns whether an attempted offense that would be a “crime of violence” for application of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) – the mandatory consecutive sentence for using a gun – is a “crime of violence” if it is only attempted but not completed – has been hanging around for six months since its December argument. Concepcion, which concerns proper resentencing considerations in First Step Section 404(b) resentencing, and Ruan, which considers physician liability under 21 USC 841(a), was argued in the Court’s February sitting.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote last week in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog that “the standard and ready explanation, of course, for why decisions in Taylor and Conception may be taking a long time is because the Justices are (perhaps deeply?) divided in these cases, and so we should expect multiple (and lengthy?) opinions. And, to add a bit of spicy speculation, I am inclined to guess that the delay is also partially a function of the Justices in these cases not being divided neatly along the “standard” ideological lines.”

rules201202The only case of interest to defendants last week was Kemp v. United States. In that case, petitioner Dexter Kemp filed a 28 USC 2255 motion in 2015. The District Court dismissed the motion as untimely, and Dix did not appeal. But three years later, he sought to reopen his 2255 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (6), rules which permit a court to reopen an otherwise final judgment if certain conditions are met. A 60(b)(1) motion has to allege that a mistake was made, and must be filed within a year, Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for any other just reason can be filed at any time, but is available only when the other grounds for relief specified in the Rule don’t apply.

Dex was right that the District Court had goofed on dismissing his § 2255 motion as untimely. In a just world, his § 2255 should be reopened, and that would be that. But in the real world, it’s not that easy.

The Supreme Court held that a judge’s error of law is a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1), meaning that Dex’s motion fit under Rule 60(b)(1). Subject to the Rule’s one-year limitations period, Dex’s motion was late and had to be dismissed as untimely.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Any (spicy?) speculations about why SCOTUS has not yet decided Taylor or Conception, two little sentencing cases? (June 13, 2022)

Kemp v. United States, Case No. 21-5726, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 2835 (June 13, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Supremes Burning Midnight Oil To Finish Term – Update for June 8, 2022

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SUPREME COURT FACES HISTORIC BACKLOG IN FINAL MONTH OF TERM

The Supreme Court – waiting until the bitter end to do the largest share of its work in more than 70 years – has scheduled a rare second opinion day for today.

scotus161130At 10 am, the Court will issue one or more opinions. It still has a lot to choose from.

The court is scheduled to hand down 30 more opinions, 48% of its expected total in argued cases, as its 2021-22 term ends in slightly more than three weeks. While most people are awaiting rulings that could hold that abortion is not a constitutional right but carrying a concealed gun is, there are five decisions of particular interest to federal inmates and defendants:

• Concepcion v. United States, Case No. 20-1650. Issue: Whether, when deciding if it should “impose a reduced sentence” under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act (Fair Sentencing Act retroactivity), a district court must – or even may – consider intervening legal and factual developments.

• Ruan v. United States, Case No. 20-1410. Issue: Whether a physician charged with prescribing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice may be convicted under 21 USC § 841(a)(1) without regard to whether, in good faith, he or she “reasonably believed” or “subjectively intended” that the prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice.

• United States v. Taylor, Case No. 20-1459: Whether 18 USC § 924(c)’s “crime of violence” definition excludes attempted Hobbs Act robbery (which could end up excluding all attempted crimes of violence from being predicates for § 924(c) offenses).

• Egbert v. Boule, Case No. 21-147: Whether one can sue a federal officer under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics for First Amendment retaliation claims.

• Kemp v. United States, Case No. 21-5726: Whether F.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) authorizes relief based on a district court’s error of law.

scotussplit190627The Supreme Court typically announces opinions on Monday, but as June progresses, more second opinion days like today are likely.

Supreme Court Faces Historic Case Backlog as Fractious Term Comes to an End (June 1)

The New York Times, We preview the five biggest rulings expected from the Supreme Court in the next few weeks (June 8, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

‘Shut Up! Won’t Talk, Eh?’ No Approach to Sentence Reduction – Update for April 25, 2022

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SANDBAGGING NOT ALLOWED

nickdanger220426Reading this case, I could not help but recall a Firesign Theater “Nick Danger” skit in which the crusty private eye was interrogating a suspect, with questions delivered in machine-gun fashion: “Where were you on the night of the 14th? Shut up! Won’t talk, eh?”

OK, I’ve dated myself. Big deal. Were he a baby boomer instead of a Gen-X’er, Tydearain Smith would know what I mean.

Ty, convicted in 2008 of possession of over 5 grams of crack and brandishing a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, was partly into his 293-month sentence when he wrote a very short letter to his district court. All he wanted to know was whether he was eligible for a sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act (the retroactive Fair Sentencing Act). If so, TyHe just wanted appointment of an attorney, and did not argue he was eligible for the reduction or explain why – if he was – he should get a sentence cut.

The district court construed Ty’s pro se letter as a Section 404 motion. Without asking Ty or the government to brief the issue, the court denied the letter motion as moot, concluding that Ty was not eligible for a reduction.

tyletter220426Ty and the public defender both filed for reconsideration. The district court ordered the government to file a response to the motions for reconsideration, “including all substantive arguments.” Instead, the government, Ty and the PD jointly filed a motion asking that a briefing schedule be set so that everyone could argue all “substantive legal and factual arguments for relief.”

The court denied the joint motion and ordered the government to respond as originally directed. It did so, arguing Ty was ineligible for relief.

The district court denied the motions for reconsideration. It again concluded that Ty was ineligible for Section 404 relief because the Guidelines ranges he had faced at sentencing had not changed. But then the court alternatively ruled that, even if Ty were eligible for relief, a “further reduction [was] not warranted” because he had lied at trial, brandished a gun, stipulated to 94% pure crack, and had already benefitted from the 2011 and 2014 Guidelines two-level reductions.

Last week, the 11th Circuit reversed the case, holding that district courts cannot sandbag parties like that. Before acting on its own initiative, a court must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions. A complete denial of the opportunity to be heard on a material issue, the Circuit said, is a violation “of due process which is never harmless error.”

sandbagging_3Here, Ty did not have any chance to present arguments in support of his request for a Section 404 reduction. “The wide berth given to district courts by the First Step Act requires deferential review with respect to the ultimate exercise of discretion,” the 11th said, “but it does not speak to the process which must be provided to the parties… A party must have his day in court.”

United States v. Smith, Case No 19-13056, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 10500 (11th Cir., Apr. 19, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Details Matter, 10th Circuit Says – Update for April 8, 2022

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DISTRICT COURT PUNT BLOCKED BY 10TH CIRCUIT

In 2004, Tony Burris was sentenced to 262 months on a crack cocaine charge, the low end of his Guidelines sentencing range. After the First Step Act was passed, Tony applied for his retroactive Fair Sentencing Act reduced sentence under First Step Section 404.

ghostdope220408The government opposed the motion, arguing that Tony’s Guidelines range remained the same because the calculation should be based on the quantity of crack cocaine attributed to him in the Presentence Report (typically stratospheric) rather than the smaller amount charged in the indictment. Recognizing that the parties raised an issue that had not yet been addressed by the 10th Circuit, the district court declined to resolve it and instead held that it would deny relief to Tony regardless of the correct Guidelines calculation.

Last week, the 10th Circuit reversed, holding that the district court was obligated to calculate Tony’s revised Guidelines range before denying relief on his Section 404 motion. “A defendant’s Guidelines range is the starting point and the initial benchmark of sentencing,” the Circuit ruled, and “a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”

error161022The government argued that any error was harmless because the district court “looked at both proposed Guidelines ranges and concluded that it would deny the motion under either” one. The 10th rejected that contention, holding that while the district court may have said it would deny relief “whatever the result” of the correct Guidelines calculation, “our court has rejected the notion that district courts can insulate sentencing decisions from review by making such statements.” Here, the Circuit held, “the district court’s error, by its very nature, was not harmless; the district court’s exercise of discretion was untethered from the correct calculation of Tony’s revised Guidelines range.

United States v. Burris, Case No. 19-6122, 2022 U.S.App. LEXIS 8363 (10th Cir., Mar 30, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Freaky Friday – Update for November 12, 2021

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NEWS OF THE WEIRD

What’s Done is Done: In the 1st Circuit, Junito Melendez was denied a First Step Act § 404 sentence reduction under the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA). Junito finished his prison sentence in 2007 and got off supervised release three years later. Unfortunately, after ten years as a free man, he is now facing a new drug conspiracy charge.

goingback211112Therein lies the problem. Junito was released from his prior 109-month sentence within 15 years of the current conspiracy charge, so he faces a mandatory 10-year minimum sentence under 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(B). But if the prior sentence were to be changed consistent with the FSA, his release date would have been much earlier, and it would thus have fallen well more than 15 years before the current case. Had that been the case, he’d be facing no mandatory minimum now.

The 1st Circuit turned him down, holding that the word “release” in 21 USC § 802(57), which defines a “serious drug felony,” focuses on the “historical facts of a defendant’s sentence when determining whether § 802(57)‘s definition is met.” Regardless of what a different, shorter sentence might have yielded, the historical fact is that Junito was released in 2007. What’s more, the Circuit said, “Congress used the phrase ‘serious drug felony’ in the statute, signaling its intent for the backward-looking language of § 802(57)… to apply to the 10-year mandatory minimum.”

There just ain’t no shortening a sentence that’s already completely in the past tense.

I Should Have Been Watching Him While He Was Watching Me: Jason Sheppard, on supervised release after a drug sentence, discovered that his girlfriend had developed a cozy “personal relationship” with his probation officer, one Jeff Sciarrino. That’s one way to keep tabs on your supervisee, we suppose.

[Read the salacious details here]

Needless to say, the discovery did not enhance Jason’s relationship with his girlfriend. They broke up over her cheatin’ heart.

breakingup211112In his grief, Jason moved for early termination of supervised release under 18 USC § 3583(e), arguing that the breakup “was negatively impacting his rehabilitation, thereby undermining any utility in continued supervision.” Jason made the rather obvious claim to the district court that “the probation officer was never concerned with [his] rehabilitation and appears to use his position for his own personal interests.”

The district court denied Jason’s motion, and last week the 3rd Circuit agreed. It held the District Court acted within its discretion to conclude that  Probation Officer Sciarrino’s amorous misconduct “has little to do with whether Sheppard should continue under the supervision of a different officer.”

The Circuit criticized the District Court, however, for holding that the PO’s misconduct “actually undermines” Jason’s motion for early termination, because the upset may interfere with Jason’s mental health treatment.” The Circuit said, “the District Court’s order includes an inference that Sheppard is responsible not only for his own conduct, but also must shoulder any and all negative repercussions from the misconduct of his probation officer. This inference is improper… when evaluating a motion for early termination, a district court, particularly in the absence of holding an evidentiary hearing, may not impute a probation officer’s alleged improper actions to a defendant serving a term of supervised release, so as to justify continued (or additional) rehabilitative oversight.”

Nevertheless, the Court was not very happy with the U.S. Probation Office:

A probation officer’s communications of such a “personal” nature with an assigned defendant’s significant other are not only entirely inappropriate and unprofessional, but they also undermine the primary objective of supervised release – i.e., “to facilitate the integration of offenders back into the community rather than to punish them.” It also challenges the role of probation officers as trusted government officials who, in performing their duties, are “supposed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer…” In Sheppard’s case, his probation officer implicated Sheppard’s personal life in his own — and to such a degree that, according to Sheppard, it caused him to break up with his live-in girlfriend, with whom he considered to be in a “lifelong commitment.” If this is not the antithesis to assisting Sheppard in transitioning back into the community, and having his “welfare” in mind, we do not know what is.
supervisedleash181107In all candor, I am constrained to note that even when Probation Officers act appropriately, they provide little benefit to supervisees beyond what Probation Officer Lothario provided to Jason. Supervised release is largely a snare for the unwary supervisee, with a sorry record of violating about one of three post-release folks entrusted to the Probation Office’s care.

United States v. Melendez, Case No 20-1575, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 31858 (1st Cir., October 22, 2021)

United States v. Sheppard, Case No 20-3088, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 32722 (3d Cir., November 3, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Two Circuits Liberalize Fair Sentencing Act Reductions – Update for August 24, 2021

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TWO FAIR SENTENCING ACT CASES GO FOR THE PRISONERS

Last week saw two unsurprising but welcome Fair Sentencing Act decisions.

In the 11th Circuit, Tony Gonzalez was serving a 51-month supervised release sentence. Originally convicted in 2005, Tony served 76 months for a crack cocaine conviction. Released in 2015, he got tripped up on substance abuse during his supervised release term and was sent back to prison.

addiction210825Tony filed for a Fair Sentencing Act retroactive sentence reduction based on § 404 of the First Step Act. His district court denied him for a couple of reasons, one of which was that he wasn’t currently serving a sentence for crack cocaine, but instead for violating his supervised release.

Last week, the 11th joined the 4th and 6th Circuits “in holding that a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 404(b) of the First Step Act when the underlying crime is a covered offense within the meaning of the Act… Thus, the district court had the authority to consider his motion for a sentence reduction just as if he were serving the original custodial sentence. So Mr. Gonzalez is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act.”

Meanwhile, in the 8th Circuit, Jack Robinson – who was doing life for a crack offense in which he had been tagged for over 2 kilos of crack – had been denied a Fair Sentencing Act reduction by his district court. The district judge ruled that “Robinson would have been subject to the same mandatory life sentence had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect at the time he committed the covered offense… because the revised version of § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) provided for a mandatory life sentence if the defendant was convicted for 280 grams or more of crack cocaine and had two or more prior felony drug offense convictions,” and thus reasoned that the court was deprived “of the discretion to reduce Robinson’s sentence under the First Step Act.”

Last week, the 8th Circuit reversed. “This reasoning is contrary to the principle that the First Step Act applies to offenses, not conduct,” the Circuit said, meaning that Jack’s statutory “sentencing range under the First Step Act is dictated by the movant’s offense of conviction, not his relevant underlying conduct… Therefore, Jack’s offense of conviction — not the underlying drug quantity — determines his applicable statutory sentencing range.

life161207At his initial sentencing, Jack faced a mandatory term of life imprisonment because he was convicted and sentenced for conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of crack and because he had two prior drug felonies. “Under the Fair Sentencing Act,” the Circuit said, “the statutory sentencing range for his conspiracy to distribute 28 grams or more of crack cocaine, including his prior convictions, is now not less than 10 years and not more than life. Thus, the district court erred as a matter of law when it relied on the sentencing court’s drug quantity finding of 2.35 kilograms of crack cocaine to determine Jack’s applicable statutory sentencing range under the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act.”

United States v. Gonzalez, Case No 19-14381, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 24765 (11th Cir., August 19, 2021)

United States v. Robinson, Case No 20-1947, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 24603 (8th Cir., August 18, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

You Can’t Imagine What Never Was in Sec. 404 Resentencing, 10th Says – Update for July 1, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

COULDA, WOULDA, SHOULDA

JCoulda210701ason Broadway got caught with 488 grams of crack in 2007. He was indicted for having more than 50 grams (which triggered a 10-year statutory minimum under 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A)) and admitted to the full 48 grams in a plea deal. He got 262 months under the then-applicable Guidelines.

As you recall, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the disparity between crack and powder from a 100:1 ratio to 18:1, making the difference in sentences imposed based on the amount of drug at issue much less. But it was not until the First Step Act passed in 2018 that the Fair Sentencing Act changes could be applied retroactively to people like Jason, who had been sentenced prior to 2010.

Jason applied for a sentence reduction under First Step Section 404, arguing that his statutory mandatory minimum sentence had been reduced by the Fair Sentencing Act. But the district court turned him down, pointing out the government could have indicted him for 488 grams but did not, and he probably would have admitted to all those drugs anyway, and a jury should have convicted him if he had gone to trial (which he did not), and because Jason was a career offender, his Guideline max of “life” would not have changed.

Jason was denied on a “coulda, woulda, shoulda” analysis.

Last week, the 10th Circuit reversed. The Circuit that for the district judge to reach his conclusion, he had to assume that if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect, Jason would have been indicted for more than 280 grams (the new cutoff for the 10-year minimum sentence), and if he had been indicted for more than 280 grams he would have pled to it, and if he had pled to it he would not have made a sentencing objection to the 488 grams the government said he had possessed.

lookback210701“To impose a reduced sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time the offense was committed is inherently backward-looking,” the 10th held, “but it should not require the amount of speculation necessitated by looking to a defendant’s underlying conduct, even if stipulated. Courts are not time machines which can alter the past and see how a case would have played out had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect. We doubt Congress would have imposed such a futile role for us.”

Thus, the Circuit ruled, the District Court had to consider the statutory minimum attached to the offense of conviction (more than 50 grams) – not what could have been but never was – and should calculate Jason’s corrected Guidelines range after the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act before considering whether the sentencing factors of 18 USC § 3553(a) argued against a reduction.

United States v. Broadway, Case No. 20-1034, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 18506 (10th Cir., June 22, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root