Tag Archives: double jeopardy

Supremes Uphold Double Jeopardy 9-0 – Update for February 26, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THIS IS JEOPARDY!

Damian McElrath killed the woman who had adopted him based on his delusional belief that she was poisoning him. Georgia charged him with premeditated murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. At his trial, the jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity of premeditated murder but guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault.

jeopardy240226The 5th Amendment ban on double jeopardy – being tried twice for the same offense – should have meant that Damian’s acquittal on murder was the end of things for that charge. But the Georgia Supreme Court held that the verdicts of innocent on premeditated murder but guilty on the two lesser charges were directly contradictory.

There was no way that Damian could have the necessary state of mind to be guilty of the two lesser offenses but not have the state of mind for the greater offense, the Georgia Supreme Court held.. Thus, it concluded that the contradiction meant that the jury’s conclusion did not count as a “verdict” and Georgia could retry him, even on the premeditated murder on which he had been acquitted.

Last Wednesday, the US Supreme Court made short work of the case. Justice Jackson wrote for a unanimous Court that the fact that Damian’s

‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ verdict was accompanied by other verdicts that appeared to rest on inconsistent findings is of no moment… The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits second-guessing an acquittal for any reason… Once there has been an acquittal, our cases prohibit any speculation about the reasons for a jury’s verdict—even when there are specific jury findings that provide a factual basis for such speculation—because it is impossible for a court to be certain about the ground for the verdict without improperly delving into the jurors’ deliberations. We simply cannot know why the jury in McElrath’s case acted as it did, and the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids us to guess.”

McElrath v Georgia, Case No 22-721, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 997 (Supreme Ct., February 21, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Supremes Hold Venue Violation Permits a Retrial – Update for June 16, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NOW IT’S TIME FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY…

doublejeopardy230616Tim Smith was a hacker, code cracker, slacker... When he wasn’t hanging out with all the chatroom yakkers, the southern Alabama man liked to fish and dive in the Gulf of Mexico.

Blending his computer savvy with his angler hobby, Tim was able to hack the geographic coordinates of artificial reefs in the Gulf of Mexico from StrikeLines, an Orlando, Florida, company that sold the data to people looking for the best places to fish. Tim – who thought that StrikeLines was morally wrong to capitalize on the work of the people who built the reefs by selling their locations – made the stolen data freely available on the Internet and offered to help StrikeLines patch its website vulnerability in exchange for some data he had been unable to extract from the site about a few great deep locations for catching grouper.

Or so the Northern District of Florida jury found, holding that Tim was guilty of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 USC § 1030(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(B)(iii), for intentionally accessing a computer without authorization; for theft of trade secrets in violation of 18 USC § 1832(a)(1), and for transmitting a threat through interstate commerce with intent to extort a thing of value in violation of 18 USC § 875(d). The judge gave him 18 months.

venue230616But Tim fought back. Before trial, he argued the indictment had to be dismissed for lack of venue, citing the Constitution’s Venue Clause (Article III, § 2, clause 3), and the 6th Amendment’s Vicinage Clause. He argued that his trial in the Northern District of Florida was improper because he had accessed StrikeLines’ website from his home in the Southern District of Alabama and the servers storing StrikeLines’ data were located in the Middle District of Florida.

The judge kicked the venue question to the jury, which found that because the effects of Tim’s crime were felt at StrikeLines’ headquarters in the Northern District of Florida, venue was proper. On appeal, the 11th Circuit disagreed, holding that venue in the Northern District of Florida was improper.

But Tim’s victory was short-lived because the Circuit said Tim could be re-prosecuted in the right venue.

Tim took that issue to the Supreme Court, which yesterday agreed in a unanimous opinion that even when a venue issue is decided incorrectly by the jury, that fact does not implicate double jeopardy. Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion observed that the usual remedy for error was a new trial rather than complete dismissal of the case. The only exception the court had recognized to that rule, Alito noted, was the violation of the right to a speedy trial, which SCOTUSBlog said the court previously has categorized as “‘generically different,’ presumably because a delayed trial is hardly remedied by one still further delayed.”

Venue in a criminal trial is a procedural issue with a constitutional dimension. The Venue Clause is keyed to the location of the alleged crime, not the district where the accused resides or even the district in which he or she is located at the time of committing the crime. Thus, as the Supreme Court puts it, “the Clause does not allow variation for convenience of the accused.”

The Vicinage Clause guarantees the right to an impartial jury made up of people from the state and district “wherein the crime shall have been committed.” The Vicinage Clause “reinforces” the coverage of the Venue Clause because, in protecting the right to a jury drawn from the place where a crime occurred, it essentially mandates where a trial must be held.

The Supreme Court said a judicial decision on venue is “fundamentally different” from a jury’s general verdict of acquittal. When a jury returns a general verdict of not guilty, its decision cannot be upset by judicial speculation or inquiry into why the jury did what it did. “To conclude otherwise,” the Court said, “would impermissibly authorize judges to usurp the jury right.” Because a trial court cannot be certain about a jury’s basis for a ‘not guilty’ verdict without improperly delving into the jurors’ deliberations, “the jury holds an unreviewable power to return a verdict of not guilty even for impermissible reasons.”

innocent161024A defendant’s culpability is the touchstone for determining whether retrial is permitted under the 5th Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. When a trial ends with a finding that the defendant’s criminal culpability had not been established, retrial is prohibited. Conversely, “retrial is permissible when a trial terminates on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which the defendant is accused.” For example, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not triggered when a trial ends in juror deadlock, or with a judgment dismissing charges because of a procedural issue like preindictment delay. “In these circumstances,” the Court held, “the termination of proceedings is perfectly consistent with the possibility that the defendant is guilty of the charged offense.

The vicinage right is only one aspect of the jury-trial rights protected by the 6th Amendment, the Court said. Retrials are the appropriate remedy for violations of other jury-trial rights. “The reversal of a conviction based on a violation of the Venue or Vicinage Clauses, even when styled as a ‘judgment of acquittal’ under Rule 29, plainly does not resolve ‘the bottom-line question of ‘criminal culpability’,” the Court said. “In this case, then, the 11th Circuit’s decision that venue in the Northern District of Florida was improper did not adjudicate Smith’s culpability… [and] thus does not trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause.”

Smith v. United States, Case No. 21-1576, 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2546, at *24-25 (June 15, 2023)

SCOTUSBlog.com, Unanimous court holds that the remedy for a venue error is retrial (June 15, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Upholds Right of States and Feds to Separately Try Defendant for Same Crime – Update for June 18, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

“SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS” MAY BOTH TRY DEFENDANT AS FELON-IN-POSSESSION FOR SAME INCIDENT

The Supreme Court yesterday refused to abandon the dual-sovereignty doctrine, which permits a state to try a defendant for an offense, and then allow the federal government to try him or her for the same conduct.

nice190618Police caught Terence Gamble with a loaded handgun. He pled guilty to an Alabama felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute. He was then indicted in federal court for the same incident. Terence moved to dismiss, arguing that the federal indictment was for the same offense as the one at issue in his state conviction, thus exposing him to double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment. The District Court denied this motion, invoking the dual-sovereignty doctrine, according to which two offenses “are not the ‘same offence’ ” for double jeopardy purposes if “prosecuted by different sovereigns,” The 11th Circuit affirmed.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court upheld the “dual sovereignty” doctrine in a 7-2 opinion. In a verbal pretzel of a justification, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants from being “twice put in jeopardy” “for the same offence.” But as it was originally understood, the Court said, an “offence” is defined by a law, and each law is defined by a sovereign. Thus, where there are two sovereigns, there are two laws and, therefore, two “offences.”

The Court said Terence was trying to show from the Double Jeopardy Clause’s drafting history that Congress must have intended to bar successive prosecutions regardless of what government brought the charge. “But even if conjectures about subjective goals” of the framers of the Constitution “were allowed to inform this Court’s reading of the text, the Government’s contrary arguments on that score would prevail.”

Justice Gorsuch (a Trump appointee) and Justice Ginsberg (a Clinton appointee) dissented. Justice Ginsberg called the difference in sovereigns a “metaphysical sublety” on which a defendant’s freedom should not be frittered away. Justice Gorsuch, who for his conservative philosophy seems to be a champion of criminal justice, started his long dissent like this:

A free society does not allow its government to try the same individual for the same crime until it’s happy with the result. Unfortunately, the Court today endorses a colossal exception to this ancient rule against double jeopardy. My colleagues say that the federal government and each State are “separate sovereigns” entitled to try the same person for the same crime. So if all the might of one “sovereign” cannot succeed against the presumptively free individual, another may insist on the chance to try again. And if both manage to succeed, so much the better; they can add one punishment on top of the other. But this “separate sovereigns exception” to the bar against double jeopardy finds no meaningful support in the text of the Constitution, its original public meaning, structure, or history. Instead, the Constitution promises all Americans that they will never suffer double jeopardy. I would enforce that guarantee.

Gamble v United States, Case No. 17-646 (June 17, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root