Tag Archives: 2nd amendment

Supremes Still Dodging § 922(g)(1) Constitutionality – Update for April 16, 2026

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

922(g) CONSTITUTIONALITY STILL UNSETTLED

The Supreme Court last month denied certiorari to a dozen pending 18 USC § 922(g)(1) petitions for review filed by people who argued that the statute – which prohibits possession of guns by a variety of different classes of people from wife-beaters to dopers to ex-felons – violates the 2nd Amendment as applied to them. These included what I thought was the best felon-in-possession case before it, Vincent v. United States.

The Vincent petitioner had a felony bad-check charge from 15 years before, but had since beaten her substance abuse, obtained a master’s degree and opened her own substance abuse counseling clinic. The 10th Circuit held that § 922(g)(1) constitutionally prevented her from owning a gun. After multiple relistings, SCOTUS decided it would not use Vincent to address the limitations of § 922(g)(1).

Last week, SCOTUSBlog reviewed the status of Supreme Court gun litigation. With respect to § 922(g)(1), it noted that “Justice Amy Coney Barrett is already on record opining that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to individuals convicted of non-violent crimes. After all, the historical tradition recognized in Rahimi extends only to dangerous individuals.” Several lower courts have agreed.

There is a well-developed circuit split on the question. However, the justices seem to be opting to see how the lower courts decide cases in the wake of whatever guidance it will provide when it decides Hemani in the next 75 days.  

The government has been selective about seeking SCOTUS review in the felon cases it has lost in the lower courts, such as largely limiting itself to decisions involving drug use (most likely to be affected by the decision in Hemani). The United States has also argued that the court should await the results of a DOJ rulemaking to provide a process for ex-felons – such as President Trump – to win back their gun rights. But 2nd Amendment advocates argue that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to nondangerous felons, and a program that bestows gun rights on people the government deems deserving turns a constitutional right into a privilege.

Two weeks ago, the 7th Circuit ruled in two separate cases that 18 USC § 922(g)(1) was not unconstitutional on its face or as applied to a defendant. The Court cited a long list of cases from other circuits finding § 922(g) was consistent with the 2nd Amendment, and said, “It is enough to cite the decisions we have mentioned, plus United States v. Watson, which is being released contemporaneously. Watson and the decisions in other circuits say all that is necessary. As in Watson, we reserve decision on as-applied challenges by persons whose felony convictions do not suggest that firearms would be dangerous in their hands. Some courts of appeals allow such challenges; some do not; in this circuit the issue is open. For a person such as Prince, however, once the general validity of § 922(g)(1) has been established, there is nothing more to say.”

SCOTUSBlog, The who, what, and where of gun control (April 7, 2026)

United States v. Hemani, Case No. 24-1234 (argued March 2, 2026)

United States v. Prince, Case No. 23-3155, 2026 U.S.App. LEXIS 9596 (7th Cir. April 2, 2026)

United States v. Watson, Case No. 24-2432, 2026 U.S.App. LEXIS 9597 (7th Cir. April 2, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Bo, Beer and Beatdowns: ‘How Dangerous is 922(g)(1) Defendant? – Update for March 23, 2026

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6th CIRCUIT EXPANDS ABILITY TO CHALLENGE FELON-IN-POSSESSION CONSTITUTIONALITY

Bo Hostettler is not a quick learner.  After doing 48 months in prison for being a felon in possession of a gun, a violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1), Bo got caught while on supervised release with, you guessed it, a gun.

Charged again as a felon in possession, Bo argued that 922(g)(1) violated his 2nd Amendment rights, both on its face and as applied to his circumstances. His District Court agreed and dismissed the charges.

The Government appealed to the 6th Circuit. While the appeal was pending, the Circuit re-examined its 2nd Amendment jurisprudence in light of Bruen and Rahimi. The result of that was United States v. Williams, a 2024 decision in which the 6th upheld § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality  “on its face and as applied to dangerous people. However, we explained that when the government disarms people on a class-wide basis, like it does for felons under § 922(g)(1), individuals must have a reasonable opportunity to prove that they don’t fit the class-wide generalization.”

The Williams court focused on the defendant’s prior convictions for aggravated robbery and attempted murder as “most probative of the defendant’s dangerousness... because they require violence against another person [and] provide at least strong evidence that the individual is dangerous. But even where a defendant has committed those types of crimes, we recognized that 922(g)(1) might be susceptible to an as-applied challenge depending on the unique circumstances of the offenses committed.”

In Bo’s case, the 6th said, the burden lies with him to show he is not dangerous. The district court must consider hisentire criminal history,  not just his felony convictions; and the fact that he was caught with a gun while on supervised release is “potentially relevant.”

The government argued that Bo’s criminal history recited in his Presentence Report was sufficient to prove Bo was dangerous. But the Circuit said that the PSR criminal history contained no information about the underlying circumstances or details of his criminal conduct in those convictions. “Without that information,” the 6th held, “the district court was unable to make the ‘individualized assessment of dangerousness’ that our precedent requires.”

The Circuit remanded Bo’s case to the district court ‘to engage in the requisite factfinding,’ where Bo will have the opportunity to essentially retry all of his prior convictions – misdemeanor and felony – to prove his lack of dangerousness.

Still, this case is important, because the Circuit has provided defendants a roadmap to prove lack of dangerousness, and that map suggests that mere labels – such as “theft” or “assault” yield to the facts of the offense. 

I recall an out-of-town man visiting my hometown about 30 years ago who had the bad luck to be black while enjoying a beer in one of our seedier establishments. Five not-so-black patrons who had consumed too much beer and not enough lessons in racial tolerance harassed him, finally calling him out back to teach him a lesson.

Sadly for the harassers, the black patron was a Marine Corps Force Recon veteran. All five tough guys were whimpering on the ground by the time the police arrived.

Our local prosecutor, understanding that the black out-of-towner did not vote in county elections, but the families of the five attackers did, charged the Marine vet with five counts of assault. The vet finally pled to one Ohio 5th-degree felony assault and got no prison time.

He also undoubtedly never came to this county again.

Hostettler seems to suggest that if the veteran wanted to own a gun, defending himself in a three-to-one contest (if you’re thinking ‘five-to-one’, see this) should be the kind of facts that convince the court that the Marine just wanted to drink his beer.

United States v. Hostettler, Case No 24-3403, 2026 USAppLEXIS 8328 (6th Cir. March 20, 2026)

United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024)

~ Thomas L. Root

8th Circuit Remands ‘As Applied’ 2A Drug/Gun Case – Update for February 12, 2026

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DOPER WITH GUN GETS A 2ND AMENDMENT RE-DO, 8TH SAYS

Alexander Wesley Ledvina was caught high on marijuana with a gun in his car. He admitted he had previously bought guns at the same time he was using weed and coke, but on the ATF forms he had filled out, Alex had denied being a drug abuser.

Alex was convicted of violating 18 USC § 1001 by lying on a government form and violating 18 USC § 922g)(3) by being a drug user in possession of a gun. He appealed, arguing that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him by not defining the term “unlawful user” of drugs, and the statute that it violated the 2nd Amendment both facially and as applied to him.

Last week, the 8th Circuit gave Alex half a loaf. While § 922(g)(3) as applied to Alex was not unconstitutionally vague, Alex’s challenge that § 922(g)(3) as applied to him violated the 2nd Amendment required a remand to the district court.

In United States v. Cooper, the 8th previously identified “at least two situations when § 922(g)(3) is consistent with the 2nd Amendment” – when drug use (1) made a defendant act like someone who is both mentally ill and dangerous, or (2) would cause a defendant to induce terror, or pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others with a firearm. “Without more,” the 8th held, “drug use generally or marijuana use specifically does not automatically extinguish a person’s 2nd Amendment right.”

The Circuit remanded Alex’s case for the district judge to consider the Cooper factors as they might apply to our weed-smoking defendant.

United States v. Ledvina, Case No. 24-2441, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 3743 (8th Cir. Feb 6, 2026)

United States v. Cooper, 127 F.4th 1092 (8th Cir. 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

Medical Malpractice, Drunk Judges, Armed Dopers – Update for February 5, 2026

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ARE THESE SHORTS LEGAL?

Some legal case shorts from the last week:

(1)  BOP Pays Out on Inmate Death from Medical Malpractice –  George Thacker reported to FCI Edgefield camp for a 33-month sentence on December 9, 2022. On Christmas Day, he was so doubled over in pain that he could hardly walk. Instead of performing an exam or medical tests, health services staff gave him ibuprofen and sent him back to his unit.

George died the next day from complications due to a perforated duodenal ulcer and peptic ulcer disease. George’s daughter (who is executor of George’s estate) hired legal counsel and sued the BOP under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging medical malpractice.

Last week, George’s daughter and the US Attorney for South Carolina reached an agreement for the government to pay $750,000 to settle the claim. A petition was filed Tuesday seeking the court’s final approval on the settlement.

Motion to Approve Settlement and Legal Fees, Docket Entry 28, Wesolowski v. United States, Case No 6:25-cv-6675 (January 27, 2026)

Chattanooga Times Free Press, $750K settlement pending in former Rhea County executive’s 2022 death (January 29, 2026)

(2)     Will He Recommend RDAP for Himself? – U.S. District Judge Thomas Ludington (Eastern District of Michigan) goes to trial at the end of this month on a charge that he crashed a car while “super drunk” near his northern Michigan vacation home.

Last October, Judge Ludington, allegedly crashed his 2019 Cadillac CT6 into two traffic signs near Petoskey, disabling his Caddy and triggering at least one airbag.

He was charged on counts of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating with a high blood-alcohol content. The “super drunk charge” is punishable by up to 180 days in jail, a $700 fine, 360 hours of community service, and vehicle immobilization. In Michigan, a person is considered drunk with a blood-alcohol level hits 0.08. A person is considered super drunk when BAC hits 0.17. 

mLive, Federal Bay City judge charged in ‘super drunk’ crash in northern Michigan (January 27, 2026)

(3) 5th Circuit declares § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to defendant – Charles Hembree was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) because of a single prior felony conviction for simple possession of methamphetamine. On appeal, Chuck argued that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to his situation.

Last week, the 5th Circuit agreed that convicting Chuck of § 922(g)(1) violated the 2nd Amendment. The Circuit ruled that there was no historical evidence that people possessing contraband that didn’t pose a danger to others were prohibiting from owning guns.

The 5th held that for possessing something prohibited to trigger prohibition on possessing a gun, the item had to be a weapon or something similar that harmed or could harm other people.

United States v. Hembree, Case No 24-60436, 2026 U.S.App. LEXIS 2051 (5th Cir. January 27, 2026)

 

~ Thomas L. Root

March Will Bring Cherry Blossoms and Supreme Court Arguments – Update for January 5, 2026

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SCOTUS SCHEDULES ARGUMENT ON TWO CRIMINAL CASES OF NOTE

The Supreme Court has issued its February oral argument schedule, including two cases of substantial interest to federal defendants and prisoners.

The two arguments actually fall the first week of March, not in February… but then this is the Supreme Court, where the last week of next June will still be “October Term 2025.” Nevertheless, we can be confident that before the cherry blossoms bloom along the Tidal Basin, we may have some idea of the high court’s thinking on two consequential criminal cases now before it.

The cases:  First, the one not getting much press but arguably the more important of the two is Hunter v. United States, a case that asks whether a federal appeals court properly dismissed a Texas man’s appeal of a mandatory-medication condition when he had waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement, but the judge who imposed the condition told him that he had a right to appeal.

The importance is this: Something like 94% of federal criminal cases end in guilty pleas, and virtually all of those pleas are entered pursuant to a written plea agreement between the defendant and the government. And virtually all of those agreements have the defendant agreeing to waive his or her rights to appeal, to file post-conviction attacks on their conviction and sentences, and to give up other rights – such as to seek compassionate release or even bring a Freedom of Information Act request for records from the government.

The Hunter issues before the Supreme Court include what, if any, are the permissible exceptions to waiver in a plea agreement, now generally recognized as only being claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. A second issue is whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he or she has a right to appeal and the government does not object.

The Supreme Court case getting more attention is United States v. Hemani, in which the government is challenging a 5th Circuit ruling that 18 USC § 922(g)(3) – that prohibits an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance from possessing a gun – violates the 2nd Amendment as applied to the defendant. Mr. Hemani was a regular marijuana user but was not high while in physical possession of his handgun.`

Law Professor Joel Johnson, a former Supreme Court litigator with the Dept of Justice, recently argued in a SCOTUSBlog post that the Supreme Court could easily dispose of the Hemani case by relying on the rule of lenity instead of the 2ndAmendment. He said, “If the court decides that the law applies only to people who are armed while intoxicated, the 2nd Amendment concerns largely vanish. There is stronger historical support for disarming someone who is high – and thus not of sound mind – than there is for disarming someone who happened to smoke a joint last weekend but is no longer impaired.”

Also in a SCOTUSBlog post, NYU Law Professor Danial Harawa argued for a revival of the rule of lenity:

Congress has enacted thousands of criminal laws, many written broadly and enforced aggressively. With an overly bloated criminal code, lenity should function as a meaningful check – a reminder that punishment must rest on clear legislative authorization… At bottom, the rule of lenity is about who bears the risk of uncertainty in the criminal law. For most of the court’s history, that risk fell on the government. When Congress failed to speak clearly, defendants were entitled to the benefit of the doubt. If it wanted, Congress could rewrite the law to clarify its reach. There is no cost for congressional imprecision, however, and thus no real need for Congress to legislate carefully and clearly. When lenity is weakened, the cost of ambiguity shifts from the government to defendants, and the result is more defendants. Given the pedigree and importance of this rule, the Supreme Court needs to resolve when the rule applies sooner rather than later.

Second Amendment advocates and scholars hope that Hemeni will advance the 2nd Amendment debate begun by Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi. But even if it does not, it may provide some enduring guidance on the rule of lenity, an issue of less sexiness but perhaps more import to criminal law.

SCOTUSblog, Court announces it will hear case on gun rights among several others in February sitting  (January 2, 2026)

Hunter v. United States, Case No. 24-1063 (oral argument set for March 3, 2026)

United States v. Hemani, Case No, 24-1234 (oral argument set for March 2, 2026)

SCOTUSblog, An off-ramp for the court’s next big gun case (December 18, 2025)

SCOTUSblog, Reviving Lenity (December 26, 2025)

~ Thomas  L. Root

Another Circuit Invalidates Felon-in-Possession in Nonviolent Case – Updatebfor January 2, 2026

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5TH CIRCUIT HOLDS 922(g)(1) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO NONVIOLENT FELON

Ed Cockerham pled guilty for the Mississippi felony of failing to pay child support. He was sentenced to five years of probation, but he could have gotten up to five years in prison. He got his child support paid and was released from probation.

Subsequently, he was caught in possession of a gun, which put him in violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) based solely on the child support conviction. The district court refused to hold that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to his case. Ed appealed.

Two weeks ago, the 11th Circuit held that § 922(g)(1) violated the 2nd Amendment as applied to Ed’s Case. The Circuit observed that “historical tradition unquestionably permits the Government to disarm violent criminals… [but] history does not support the proposition that felons lose their 2nd Amendment rights solely because of their status as felons.”

In Ed’s case, he had fully paid the child support debt for which he was convicted at the time he was found in possession of a firearm. “So there’s no historical justification to disarm him at that moment,” the 5th ruled, “never mind for the rest of his life.” While other evidence suggested that Ed might be violent (he had been arrested for assault in the past), the Circuit said the 5th Circuit focuses “on the nature of the predicate offense rather than on the defendant’s broader criminal history or individual characteristics.”

The holding is consistent with the 3rd Circuit’s holding in Range v. Attorney General and the 6th Circuit’s United States v. Williams holding.  It is diametrically opposed to decisions of the 8th, 9th and 10th Circuits. The 10th Circuit case – Vincent v. United States – is on its third Supreme Court relist. 

United States v. Cockerham, Case No. 24-60401, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33001 (5th Cir., December 17, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

8th Circuit Affirms ‘Cookie-Cutter’ Approach to Felon Firearm Disenfranchisement – Update for September 9, 2025

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ONE AND DONE

The 8th Circuit last week underscored its hostility to any “as applied” 2nd Amendment challenge to the 18 USC § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession statute.  The Circuit affirmed its holding in United States v. Jackson that “the federal prohibition on possession of firearms by felons is constitutional as a categorical matter. There is no need for a felony-by-felony analysis, and no requirement of an individualized determination of dangerousness as to each person in the class of prohibited persons.”

In 1991, Anthony Browne was a member of the Black Gangster Disciples motorcycle gang/criminal organization. He and some other BGDs followed a rival gang member home. One of Browne’s fellow gang members shot up the place, hitting the intended victim’s mother. While Tony wasn’t the triggerman, he was convicted of committing willful injury and criminal gang participation and got 10 years in prison.

After being released from prison in 1998, Tony got a computer science degree from the University of Iowa and worked for the next 20 years as a software engineer. In 2021, the Dept of Defense granted him a security clearance as part of his job. He also earned an executive order in 2005 from the Iowa governor restoring many of his rights (but not the right to own guns). At age 52, Tony has not had a brush with the law in 34 years.

No matter, the 8th said last week. A “legislature may dispossess forcible felons as a categorical matter,” the Circuit said, and Tony’s argument that under the 2nd Amendment, he is entitled to issuance of a handgun permit unless the sheriff concludes after an individualized determination that Browne is “currently dangerous,” is nothing more than an end run around that.

Writing in The Reload, Jake Fogleman observed that “while he’s no Bryan Range or Melynda Vincent, the distance from [Tony’s] conduct that could credibly lead to him being labeled ‘dangerous’ is significant. There do not appear to be any recent indications that he poses an ongoing threat to the community. On the contrary, he has by all accounts turned his life around. Browne argued his recent history indicates he’s peaceable and, therefore, should have his rights restored. The panel disagreed… ‘Browne’s argument is inconsistent with the relevant history and this court’s conclusions in Jackson. Early American legislatures ordered disarmament and authorized punishment of death for forcible felonies and even for some non-violent offenses… [W]e conclude that the government has satisfied its burden to show that a lifetime restriction on the right of forcible felons to possess firearms, subject to a gubernatorial pardon, is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation.”

Browne v. Reynolds, Case No. 24-1952, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 22449 (8th Cir. Sept 2, 2025)

United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024)

The Reload, Analysis: Eighth Circuit Ruling Shows Thorny Legal Questions Still Surround Rights Restoration Push (September 7, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

He’s A Ramblin’ Man – Update for July 31, 2025

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POT MAKES YOU TALK TOO MUCH

Aldo Cordova Perez led police on a merry chase when they tried a buy-bust on his drug dealing. After Aldo’s escapade was cut short by a concrete post impaling the front of his getaway car, police cuffed him… and he started to ramble.

Aldo congratulated the gendarmes on the car chase. He admired their physicality in tackling him. He told them he smoked marijuana daily, and that he had a .22 rifle on a shelf at home.

Oh, Aldo. You should know that remaining silent isn’t just a right, it’s a pretty good idea. Aldo’s freely volunteered information about his gun at home tipped the locals that they should call the Feds. The Feds ran with Aldo said, and they charged him with being an illegal drug user in possession of a gun, a violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(3).

Amazingly, the jury acquitted him on drug trafficking – the “large quantity of methamphetamine in a box on the front-passenger-seat floorboard” did not impress the jurors – but they convicted Aldo of the § 922(g)(3) offense.

Aldo appealed, arguing that § 922(g)(3) violated the 2nd Amendment as applied to the facts of his case. Last week, the 8th Circuit agreed.

Citing its decision in United States v. Cooper, the Circuit said, “[W]e have already held that without more, neither drug use generally nor marijuana use specifically automatically extinguishes an individual’s 2nd Amendment right… And the government here did not provide enough evidence to show that marijuana use alone could reasonably be seen to make any user ‘an unacceptable risk of dangerousness’ to others by merely possessing a firearm. Indeed, defining a class of drug users simply by the suggestion that they might sometimes be dangerous, without more, is insufficient for categorical disarmament…

The 8th remanded the case for the trial court to determine “either individually or categorically, and either on the trial record or, to the extent necessary, via an evidentiary hearing—whether Cordova Perez’s marijuana use: 1) caused him to ‘act like someone who is both mentally ill and dangerous’; or 2) would or did make him ‘induce terror, or pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others with a firearm.’” The Circuit said, “We believe the district court is best positioned to reassess Cordova Perez’s as-applied challenge in light of Cooper.”

United States v. Perez, Case No 24-1553, 2025 USAppLEXIS 18095 (8th Cir. July 22, 2025)

United States v. Cooper, 127 F.4th 1092 (8th Cir. 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

DOJ Publishes New Gun Rights Restoration Program Proposal – Update for July 22, 2025

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SPEAKING OF GUNS, AS WE ARE…

The Dept of Justice last Friday released the long-awaited proposed rules for convicted felons and other disqualified people to win restoration of their gun rights.

In March, the DOJ restored gun rights to a handful of people disqualified by 18 USC § 922(g), most famously actor and Trump supporter Mel Gibson, disqualified under 18 USC § 922(g)(9) for a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction over a decade ago. At the time, Attorney General Pam Bondi said the DOJ would be crafting a program for people covered by § 922(g) to apply for restoration of gun rights under its authority to do so granted by 18 USC § 925(c).

The DOJ’s 48-page notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) outlines the history of firearms rights restoration, the legal authority,  the policy rationale for such a program, the offenders the rule will exclude, and how applicants will be evaluated.

“For too long, countless Americans with criminal histories have been permanently disenfranchised from exercising the right to keep and bear arms—a right every bit as constitutionally enshrined as the right to vote, the right to free speech, and the right to free exercise of religion—irrespective of whether they actually pose a threat,” Bondi said in a press release. “No longer.”

The proposed rule holds that people who were fugitives from justice (§ 922(g)(2)), unlawful drug users (§ 922(g)(2)), people subject to domestic violence restraining orders (§ 922(g)(8)), and illegal immigrants (§ 922(g)(5)) would be “presumptively ineligible for relief and therefore denied relief absent extraordinary circumstances.” The proposed rule also lists individual violent felony offenses, sex crimes, and other crimes “closely associated with dangerousness,” such as threatening or stalking offenses, that would be grounds for presumptive denial.

The rule would provide that people with certain offenses, which are “less serious or indicative of violence,” can have their presumption of denial mitigated by the passage of time since the offense occurred. The proposal says that for some crimes, like drug-distribution or misdemeanor domestic violence, that “bear a more direct relationship to violence,” DOJ will consider applicants without a presumption of denial only after ten years have passed following completion of probation, parole, or supervised release period. All non-violent offenders would be required to wait five years after completing their punishment before DOJ will process their applications.

The rule states that the DOJ will reject a narrow “categorical approach” that examines only the disqualifying conviction. Instead, it will review the applicant’s history and characteristics, including his or her entire criminal history, non-charged conduct, known associations, and inquiries to local law enforcement.

The NPRM makes it fairly clear that a prime motivator for the rights restoration program is to give the Government an argument that deciding that courts need not decide the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) because an alternative gun rights restoration is in place: “As recognized by courts, a functional section 925(c) process would render much of this litigation unnecessary and ensure that individuals meeting the relevant criteria may possess firearms under federal law in a manner consistent with the Second Amendment, while still protecting public safety.”

Written comments are due October 20, 2025.

This is nothing more than an administrative band-aid. If someone like Melynda Vincent, whose 15-year-old bank fraud conviction should not have disqualified her from gun ownership under the Second Amendment, was never constitutionally stripped of her right to own a gun, then a government argument that she is entitled to jump through a protracted application hoop to win back Second Amendment rights she never lost is specious.

 

DOJ, Application for Relief from Disabilities Imposed by Federal Laws with Respect to the Acquisition, Receipt, Transfer, Shipment, Transportation, or Possession of Firearms (90 FR 34394, July 18, 2025)

DOJ, Justice Department Publishes Proposed Rule to Grant Relief to Certain Individuals Precluded from Possessing Firearms (July 18, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

Vincent Case Has Sights on SCOTUS Review – Update for July 10, 2025

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‘CAN’T IGNORE THIS ONE,’ PARTIES MAY TELL SCOTUS IN 922(g)(1) CASE

I have written before about Melynda Vincent, a woman convicted of bank fraud 15 years ago for writing some bad checks while in the throes of drug addiction. Since then, Melynda has cleaned up, graduated from a drug treatment program, earned an undergraduate degree and two graduate degrees, and founded the Utah Harm Reduction Coalition – a nonprofit organization focused on drug treatment and criminal-justice reform – as well as a mental health counseling service, Life Changes Counseling.

In February, the 10th Circuit said, “So what? You still can’t own a gun.” Melynda has filed for Supreme Court certiorari, and she has picked up both the Federal Public Defenders and the National Rifle Association as amici (filing briefs in support of her petition).

Most interesting is this: the DOJ was due to oppose her petition in June. It got an extension until July 11 and then last week asked for and got a second extension until August 11. 

It may be that DOJ, opposed to such petitions in the past but lately avoiding the issue (as in not seeking certiorari in the 3rd Circuit Range case), does not yet know what to do.

I have said before that Vincent is the best case out there to put the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) in front of the Justices. The DOJ’s position on this is something to watch closely.

Vincent v. Bondi, Case No. 24-1155 (petition for certiorari pending)

– Thomas L. Root