Tag Archives: 2nd amendment

When ‘Danger is My Business,’ 2nd Amendment Offers Scant Protection – Update for June 9, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HOME IS WHERE THE GUN IS

Curtis Squire had his home searched after a shooting occurred nearby. Police did not find the gun used in the crime, but they did find a different gun. Curtis, who had previous state convictions for conspiracy to possess and distribution of heroin, was charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a gun, a violation of  18 USC § 922(g)(1).

Curtis argued that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the 2nd Amendment as applied to him, because keeping a gun at home for self-defense was different than taking it out in public, and the history of gun legislation in America recognized as much. He also argued that a drug offense was not inherently violent and was not the kind of crime punished in colonial days by gun confiscation.

Last week, the 5th Circuit disagreed, admitting that Curt’s argument was “novel” but disposing of it nonetheless because what Curtis was convicted of doing – drug dealing – was inherently a dangerous undertaking.

The Circuit held:

[T]he home-based distinction [Squire] attempts to draw within our Nation’s historical tradition is mugged by the reality that our historical laws support his disarmament, even in the special confines of his home. While the Constitution safeguards the core right to keep and bear [arms] inside the home, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625-28 (2008), it does not dislocate the government’s regulatory power to strip certain groups of this right, “Congress is entitled to make categorical judgments,” Vidal v. Elster, 602 U.S. 286, 319 (2024) (Barrett, J., concurring in part), including a values-based policy judgment that convicted drug traffickers, such as Squire—whose conviction involved an “inherently dangerous activity,” United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308, 317 (5th Cir. 2025) —may be disarmed under § 922(g)(1) consistent with our historical tradition. That conclusion does not rest upon an “individualized assessment” that Squire is “dangerous,” based on some amorphous understanding of the word. See id. at 318; see also United States v. Mitchell, 160 F.4th 169, 187 (5th Cir. 2025) (“Rahimi did not sweepingly proclaim that ‘dangerousness’ is the new standard for Second Amendment challenges.”). Nor does it reflect a freewheeling judicial balancing of rights and safety. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 26 (2022) (explaining the “Constitution demands” that courts jettison “interest balancing” in favor of history and tradition). Instead, Squire’s dangerousness is premised solely on his drug trafficking offense, which places him in “a class of dangerous felons that our regulatory tradition permits legislatures to disarm.” Kimble, 142 F.4th at 318 (emphasis added).

United States v. Squire, Case No. 25-30324, 2026 U.S.App. LEXIS 15873 (5th Cir., June 2, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Some Odds and Ends – Update for June 4, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NOTES FROM ALL OVER

Gunning for Restoration:  Fourteen months ago, the Dept of Justice restored rights to several people prohibited by 18 USC § 922(g) from owning guns (including actor Mel Gibson). DOJ announced that it was planning a program to restore firearms rights for nonviolent offenders. A rulemaking proceeding followed, with a comment period that ended seven months ago.

Last Thursday, the DOJ announced a new batch of rights restorations. However, it was limited to just four people, and the DOJ backdated it to the tenure of former Attorney General Pam Bondi. The announcement said nothing about the DOJ’s plan to standardize the rights restoration process.

Gun law and policy newsletter The Reload reported last week that “Thursday’s filing shows little progress, but it does connect to one of the overarching issues with the DOJ’s rights restoration approach. That’s because of the four men former AG Bondi picked, one had filed a Second Amendment lawsuit challenging his firearms prohibition.”

The Reload, Analysis: Where is DOJ’s Gun Rights Restoration Plan? (May 29, 2026)

Who Can Trust DOJ?  A jaw-dropping mea culpa played out in federal district court in Chicago last week, as the US Attorney himself appeared before US District Judge April Perry to apologize for what The New York Times called a “remarkable list of grand jury errors in a case that was dismissed against four Democratic activists about to face trial for impeding the police during a protest last fall at a suburban immigration detention facility.”

The Assistant US Attorney handling the grand jury talked to jurors outside of the courtroom, coaching them to indict. The government dismissed several grand jurors deemed insufficiently willing to approve the indictment. Then, the AUSA doctored the grand jury transcripts to hide what he had done.

The Times said, “[T]he mistakes also pointed to a more important problem: As Mr. Trump has demanded more and more charges against those he perceives as his opponents, prosecutors have felt pressure to push weak cases through grand juries. And that, in turn, has led to an erosion in faith in the Justice Department by both the grand jurors themselves and the judges considering the cases.”

“Your sole goal is to do justice. Your client is justice itself,” Judge Perry told the US attorney. “I do believe deeply in the presumption of regularity and that most government attorneys are doing the best they can to do the right thing. That trust has been broken.”

The New York Times, As Trump Politicizes Justice Dept., Prosecutors Struggle With Grand Juries (May 26, 2026)

Free the Weed: In a May 22 letter to President Donald Trump and Pardon Czar Alice Marie Johnson, 28 Democratic senators and representatives, along with Bernie Sanders (I-VT), asked the administration to pardon everyone in federal prison for non-violent marijuana crimes.

The letter notes that the Administration’s decision to move marijuana from Schedule I under the Controlled Substances Act to Schedule III “does not provide relief for anyone currently in federal prison from a marijuana conviction.” The letter observed that the Sentencing Commission estimates that about 3,000 people are serving time for pot trafficking offenses.

The legislators wrote, “The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is plagued by capacity issues, both overcrowded 7 and understaffed.8 While it won’t solve the structural issues that have led us here, we believe that commuting the sentences of people with marijuana offenses would both address the overly harsh sentences while simultaneously allowing BOP to focus resources where they are needed most.”

Letter to Donald Trump (May 22, 2026)

Sentencing Commission Quick Facts Released: The US Sentencing Commission regularly releases “Quick Facts,” short data documents that make for an interesting read as they fulfill the USSC’s goal of giving “readers basic facts about a single area of federal crime in an easy-to-read, two-page format.”

The Commission has issued a spate of new “Quick Facts” publications based on its latest Fiscal Year data.  The newest set of postings by the USSC on the “Quick Facts” page covering a range of offenses and offenders, including Guidelines Career Offenders, illegal reentry, alien smuggling, drug trafficking (including separate publications focused on fentanyl, fentanyl analogue and methamphetamine trafficking), theft and fraud, healthcare fraud, money laundering and government benefits fraud.

USSC, Quick Facts (May 19, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Supremes Still Dodging § 922(g)(1) Constitutionality – Update for April 16, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

922(g) CONSTITUTIONALITY STILL UNSETTLED

The Supreme Court last month denied certiorari to a dozen pending 18 USC § 922(g)(1) petitions for review filed by people who argued that the statute – which prohibits possession of guns by a variety of different classes of people from wife-beaters to dopers to ex-felons – violates the 2nd Amendment as applied to them. These included what I thought was the best felon-in-possession case before it, Vincent v. United States.

The Vincent petitioner had a felony bad-check charge from 15 years before, but had since beaten her substance abuse, obtained a master’s degree and opened her own substance abuse counseling clinic. The 10th Circuit held that § 922(g)(1) constitutionally prevented her from owning a gun. After multiple relistings, SCOTUS decided it would not use Vincent to address the limitations of § 922(g)(1).

Last week, SCOTUSBlog reviewed the status of Supreme Court gun litigation. With respect to § 922(g)(1), it noted that “Justice Amy Coney Barrett is already on record opining that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to individuals convicted of non-violent crimes. After all, the historical tradition recognized in Rahimi extends only to dangerous individuals.” Several lower courts have agreed.

There is a well-developed circuit split on the question. However, the justices seem to be opting to see how the lower courts decide cases in the wake of whatever guidance it will provide when it decides Hemani in the next 75 days.  

The government has been selective about seeking SCOTUS review in the felon cases it has lost in the lower courts, such as largely limiting itself to decisions involving drug use (most likely to be affected by the decision in Hemani). The United States has also argued that the court should await the results of a DOJ rulemaking to provide a process for ex-felons – such as President Trump – to win back their gun rights. But 2nd Amendment advocates argue that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to nondangerous felons, and a program that bestows gun rights on people the government deems deserving turns a constitutional right into a privilege.

Two weeks ago, the 7th Circuit ruled in two separate cases that 18 USC § 922(g)(1) was not unconstitutional on its face or as applied to a defendant. The Court cited a long list of cases from other circuits finding § 922(g) was consistent with the 2nd Amendment, and said, “It is enough to cite the decisions we have mentioned, plus United States v. Watson, which is being released contemporaneously. Watson and the decisions in other circuits say all that is necessary. As in Watson, we reserve decision on as-applied challenges by persons whose felony convictions do not suggest that firearms would be dangerous in their hands. Some courts of appeals allow such challenges; some do not; in this circuit the issue is open. For a person such as Prince, however, once the general validity of § 922(g)(1) has been established, there is nothing more to say.”

SCOTUSBlog, The who, what, and where of gun control (April 7, 2026)

United States v. Hemani, Case No. 24-1234 (argued March 2, 2026)

United States v. Prince, Case No. 23-3155, 2026 U.S.App. LEXIS 9596 (7th Cir. April 2, 2026)

United States v. Watson, Case No. 24-2432, 2026 U.S.App. LEXIS 9597 (7th Cir. April 2, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Bo, Beer and Beatdowns: ‘How Dangerous is 922(g)(1) Defendant? – Update for March 23, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

6th CIRCUIT EXPANDS ABILITY TO CHALLENGE FELON-IN-POSSESSION CONSTITUTIONALITY

Bo Hostettler is not a quick learner.  After doing 48 months in prison for being a felon in possession of a gun, a violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1), Bo got caught while on supervised release with, you guessed it, a gun.

Charged again as a felon in possession, Bo argued that 922(g)(1) violated his 2nd Amendment rights, both on its face and as applied to his circumstances. His District Court agreed and dismissed the charges.

The Government appealed to the 6th Circuit. While the appeal was pending, the Circuit re-examined its 2nd Amendment jurisprudence in light of Bruen and Rahimi. The result of that was United States v. Williams, a 2024 decision in which the 6th upheld § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality  “on its face and as applied to dangerous people. However, we explained that when the government disarms people on a class-wide basis, like it does for felons under § 922(g)(1), individuals must have a reasonable opportunity to prove that they don’t fit the class-wide generalization.”

The Williams court focused on the defendant’s prior convictions for aggravated robbery and attempted murder as “most probative of the defendant’s dangerousness... because they require violence against another person [and] provide at least strong evidence that the individual is dangerous. But even where a defendant has committed those types of crimes, we recognized that 922(g)(1) might be susceptible to an as-applied challenge depending on the unique circumstances of the offenses committed.”

In Bo’s case, the 6th said, the burden lies with him to show he is not dangerous. The district court must consider hisentire criminal history,  not just his felony convictions; and the fact that he was caught with a gun while on supervised release is “potentially relevant.”

The government argued that Bo’s criminal history recited in his Presentence Report was sufficient to prove Bo was dangerous. But the Circuit said that the PSR criminal history contained no information about the underlying circumstances or details of his criminal conduct in those convictions. “Without that information,” the 6th held, “the district court was unable to make the ‘individualized assessment of dangerousness’ that our precedent requires.”

The Circuit remanded Bo’s case to the district court ‘to engage in the requisite factfinding,’ where Bo will have the opportunity to essentially retry all of his prior convictions – misdemeanor and felony – to prove his lack of dangerousness.

Still, this case is important, because the Circuit has provided defendants a roadmap to prove lack of dangerousness, and that map suggests that mere labels – such as “theft” or “assault” yield to the facts of the offense. 

I recall an out-of-town man visiting my hometown about 30 years ago who had the bad luck to be black while enjoying a beer in one of our seedier establishments. Five not-so-black patrons who had consumed too much beer and not enough lessons in racial tolerance harassed him, finally calling him out back to teach him a lesson.

Sadly for the harassers, the black patron was a Marine Corps Force Recon veteran. All five tough guys were whimpering on the ground by the time the police arrived.

Our local prosecutor, understanding that the black out-of-towner did not vote in county elections, but the families of the five attackers did, charged the Marine vet with five counts of assault. The vet finally pled to one Ohio 5th-degree felony assault and got no prison time.

He also undoubtedly never came to this county again.

Hostettler seems to suggest that if the veteran wanted to own a gun, defending himself in a three-to-one contest (if you’re thinking ‘five-to-one’, see this) should be the kind of facts that convince the court that the Marine just wanted to drink his beer.

United States v. Hostettler, Case No 24-3403, 2026 USAppLEXIS 8328 (6th Cir. March 20, 2026)

United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024)

~ Thomas L. Root

8th Circuit Remands ‘As Applied’ 2A Drug/Gun Case – Update for February 12, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DOPER WITH GUN GETS A 2ND AMENDMENT RE-DO, 8TH SAYS

Alexander Wesley Ledvina was caught high on marijuana with a gun in his car. He admitted he had previously bought guns at the same time he was using weed and coke, but on the ATF forms he had filled out, Alex had denied being a drug abuser.

Alex was convicted of violating 18 USC § 1001 by lying on a government form and violating 18 USC § 922g)(3) by being a drug user in possession of a gun. He appealed, arguing that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him by not defining the term “unlawful user” of drugs, and the statute that it violated the 2nd Amendment both facially and as applied to him.

Last week, the 8th Circuit gave Alex half a loaf. While § 922(g)(3) as applied to Alex was not unconstitutionally vague, Alex’s challenge that § 922(g)(3) as applied to him violated the 2nd Amendment required a remand to the district court.

In United States v. Cooper, the 8th previously identified “at least two situations when § 922(g)(3) is consistent with the 2nd Amendment” – when drug use (1) made a defendant act like someone who is both mentally ill and dangerous, or (2) would cause a defendant to induce terror, or pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others with a firearm. “Without more,” the 8th held, “drug use generally or marijuana use specifically does not automatically extinguish a person’s 2nd Amendment right.”

The Circuit remanded Alex’s case for the district judge to consider the Cooper factors as they might apply to our weed-smoking defendant.

United States v. Ledvina, Case No. 24-2441, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 3743 (8th Cir. Feb 6, 2026)

United States v. Cooper, 127 F.4th 1092 (8th Cir. 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

Medical Malpractice, Drunk Judges, Armed Dopers – Update for February 5, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ARE THESE SHORTS LEGAL?

Some legal case shorts from the last week:

(1)  BOP Pays Out on Inmate Death from Medical Malpractice –  George Thacker reported to FCI Edgefield camp for a 33-month sentence on December 9, 2022. On Christmas Day, he was so doubled over in pain that he could hardly walk. Instead of performing an exam or medical tests, health services staff gave him ibuprofen and sent him back to his unit.

George died the next day from complications due to a perforated duodenal ulcer and peptic ulcer disease. George’s daughter (who is executor of George’s estate) hired legal counsel and sued the BOP under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging medical malpractice.

Last week, George’s daughter and the US Attorney for South Carolina reached an agreement for the government to pay $750,000 to settle the claim. A petition was filed Tuesday seeking the court’s final approval on the settlement.

Motion to Approve Settlement and Legal Fees, Docket Entry 28, Wesolowski v. United States, Case No 6:25-cv-6675 (January 27, 2026)

Chattanooga Times Free Press, $750K settlement pending in former Rhea County executive’s 2022 death (January 29, 2026)

(2)     Will He Recommend RDAP for Himself? – U.S. District Judge Thomas Ludington (Eastern District of Michigan) goes to trial at the end of this month on a charge that he crashed a car while “super drunk” near his northern Michigan vacation home.

Last October, Judge Ludington, allegedly crashed his 2019 Cadillac CT6 into two traffic signs near Petoskey, disabling his Caddy and triggering at least one airbag.

He was charged on counts of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating with a high blood-alcohol content. The “super drunk charge” is punishable by up to 180 days in jail, a $700 fine, 360 hours of community service, and vehicle immobilization. In Michigan, a person is considered drunk with a blood-alcohol level hits 0.08. A person is considered super drunk when BAC hits 0.17. 

mLive, Federal Bay City judge charged in ‘super drunk’ crash in northern Michigan (January 27, 2026)

(3) 5th Circuit declares § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to defendant Charles Hembree was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) because of a single prior felony conviction for simple possession of methamphetamine. On appeal, Chuck argued that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to his situation.

Last week, the 5th Circuit agreed that convicting Chuck of § 922(g)(1) violated the 2nd Amendment. The Circuit ruled that there was no historical evidence that people possessing contraband that didn’t pose a danger to others were prohibiting from owning guns.

The 5th held that for possessing something prohibited to trigger prohibition on possessing a gun, the item had to be a weapon or something similar that harmed or could harm other people.

United States v. Hembree, Case No 24-60436, 2026 U.S.App. LEXIS 2051 (5th Cir. January 27, 2026)

 

~ Thomas L. Root

March Will Bring Cherry Blossoms and Supreme Court Arguments – Update for January 5, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS SCHEDULES ARGUMENT ON TWO CRIMINAL CASES OF NOTE

The Supreme Court has issued its February oral argument schedule, including two cases of substantial interest to federal defendants and prisoners.

The two arguments actually fall the first week of March, not in February… but then this is the Supreme Court, where the last week of next June will still be “October Term 2025.” Nevertheless, we can be confident that before the cherry blossoms bloom along the Tidal Basin, we may have some idea of the high court’s thinking on two consequential criminal cases now before it.

The cases:  First, the one not getting much press but arguably the more important of the two is Hunter v. United States, a case that asks whether a federal appeals court properly dismissed a Texas man’s appeal of a mandatory-medication condition when he had waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement, but the judge who imposed the condition told him that he had a right to appeal.

The importance is this: Something like 94% of federal criminal cases end in guilty pleas, and virtually all of those pleas are entered pursuant to a written plea agreement between the defendant and the government. And virtually all of those agreements have the defendant agreeing to waive his or her rights to appeal, to file post-conviction attacks on their conviction and sentences, and to give up other rights – such as to seek compassionate release or even bring a Freedom of Information Act request for records from the government.

The Hunter issues before the Supreme Court include what, if any, are the permissible exceptions to waiver in a plea agreement, now generally recognized as only being claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. A second issue is whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he or she has a right to appeal and the government does not object.

The Supreme Court case getting more attention is United States v. Hemani, in which the government is challenging a 5th Circuit ruling that 18 USC § 922(g)(3) – that prohibits an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance from possessing a gun – violates the 2nd Amendment as applied to the defendant. Mr. Hemani was a regular marijuana user but was not high while in physical possession of his handgun.`

Law Professor Joel Johnson, a former Supreme Court litigator with the Dept of Justice, recently argued in a SCOTUSBlog post that the Supreme Court could easily dispose of the Hemani case by relying on the rule of lenity instead of the 2ndAmendment. He said, “If the court decides that the law applies only to people who are armed while intoxicated, the 2nd Amendment concerns largely vanish. There is stronger historical support for disarming someone who is high – and thus not of sound mind – than there is for disarming someone who happened to smoke a joint last weekend but is no longer impaired.”

Also in a SCOTUSBlog post, NYU Law Professor Danial Harawa argued for a revival of the rule of lenity:

Congress has enacted thousands of criminal laws, many written broadly and enforced aggressively. With an overly bloated criminal code, lenity should function as a meaningful check – a reminder that punishment must rest on clear legislative authorization… At bottom, the rule of lenity is about who bears the risk of uncertainty in the criminal law. For most of the court’s history, that risk fell on the government. When Congress failed to speak clearly, defendants were entitled to the benefit of the doubt. If it wanted, Congress could rewrite the law to clarify its reach. There is no cost for congressional imprecision, however, and thus no real need for Congress to legislate carefully and clearly. When lenity is weakened, the cost of ambiguity shifts from the government to defendants, and the result is more defendants. Given the pedigree and importance of this rule, the Supreme Court needs to resolve when the rule applies sooner rather than later.

Second Amendment advocates and scholars hope that Hemeni will advance the 2nd Amendment debate begun by Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi. But even if it does not, it may provide some enduring guidance on the rule of lenity, an issue of less sexiness but perhaps more import to criminal law.

SCOTUSblog, Court announces it will hear case on gun rights among several others in February sitting  (January 2, 2026)

Hunter v. United States, Case No. 24-1063 (oral argument set for March 3, 2026)

United States v. Hemani, Case No, 24-1234 (oral argument set for March 2, 2026)

SCOTUSblog, An off-ramp for the court’s next big gun case (December 18, 2025)

SCOTUSblog, Reviving Lenity (December 26, 2025)

~ Thomas  L. Root

Another Circuit Invalidates Felon-in-Possession in Nonviolent Case – Updatebfor January 2, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

5TH CIRCUIT HOLDS 922(g)(1) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO NONVIOLENT FELON

Ed Cockerham pled guilty for the Mississippi felony of failing to pay child support. He was sentenced to five years of probation, but he could have gotten up to five years in prison. He got his child support paid and was released from probation.

Subsequently, he was caught in possession of a gun, which put him in violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) based solely on the child support conviction. The district court refused to hold that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to his case. Ed appealed.

Two weeks ago, the 11th Circuit held that § 922(g)(1) violated the 2nd Amendment as applied to Ed’s Case. The Circuit observed that “historical tradition unquestionably permits the Government to disarm violent criminals… [but] history does not support the proposition that felons lose their 2nd Amendment rights solely because of their status as felons.”

In Ed’s case, he had fully paid the child support debt for which he was convicted at the time he was found in possession of a firearm. “So there’s no historical justification to disarm him at that moment,” the 5th ruled, “never mind for the rest of his life.” While other evidence suggested that Ed might be violent (he had been arrested for assault in the past), the Circuit said the 5th Circuit focuses “on the nature of the predicate offense rather than on the defendant’s broader criminal history or individual characteristics.”

The holding is consistent with the 3rd Circuit’s holding in Range v. Attorney General and the 6th Circuit’s United States v. Williams holding.  It is diametrically opposed to decisions of the 8th, 9th and 10th Circuits. The 10th Circuit case – Vincent v. United States – is on its third Supreme Court relist

United States v. Cockerham, Case No. 24-60401, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33001 (5th Cir., December 17, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

8th Circuit Affirms ‘Cookie-Cutter’ Approach to Felon Firearm Disenfranchisement – Update for September 9, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ONE AND DONE

The 8th Circuit last week underscored its hostility to any “as applied” 2nd Amendment challenge to the 18 USC § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession statute.  The Circuit affirmed its holding in United States v. Jackson that “the federal prohibition on possession of firearms by felons is constitutional as a categorical matter. There is no need for a felony-by-felony analysis, and no requirement of an individualized determination of dangerousness as to each person in the class of prohibited persons.”

In 1991, Anthony Browne was a member of the Black Gangster Disciples motorcycle gang/criminal organization. He and some other BGDs followed a rival gang member home. One of Browne’s fellow gang members shot up the place, hitting the intended victim’s mother. While Tony wasn’t the triggerman, he was convicted of committing willful injury and criminal gang participation and got 10 years in prison.

After being released from prison in 1998, Tony got a computer science degree from the University of Iowa and worked for the next 20 years as a software engineer. In 2021, the Dept of Defense granted him a security clearance as part of his job. He also earned an executive order in 2005 from the Iowa governor restoring many of his rights (but not the right to own guns). At age 52, Tony has not had a brush with the law in 34 years.

No matter, the 8th said last week. A “legislature may dispossess forcible felons as a categorical matter,” the Circuit said, and Tony’s argument that under the 2nd Amendment, he is entitled to issuance of a handgun permit unless the sheriff concludes after an individualized determination that Browne is “currently dangerous,” is nothing more than an end run around that.

Writing in The Reload, Jake Fogleman observed that “while he’s no Bryan Range or Melynda Vincent, the distance from [Tony’s] conduct that could credibly lead to him being labeled ‘dangerous’ is significant. There do not appear to be any recent indications that he poses an ongoing threat to the community. On the contrary, he has by all accounts turned his life around. Browne argued his recent history indicates he’s peaceable and, therefore, should have his rights restored. The panel disagreed… ‘Browne’s argument is inconsistent with the relevant history and this court’s conclusions in Jackson. Early American legislatures ordered disarmament and authorized punishment of death for forcible felonies and even for some non-violent offenses… [W]e conclude that the government has satisfied its burden to show that a lifetime restriction on the right of forcible felons to possess firearms, subject to a gubernatorial pardon, is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation.”

Browne v. Reynolds, Case No. 24-1952, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 22449 (8th Cir. Sept 2, 2025)

United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024)

The Reload, Analysis: Eighth Circuit Ruling Shows Thorny Legal Questions Still Surround Rights Restoration Push (September 7, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

He’s A Ramblin’ Man – Update for July 31, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

POT MAKES YOU TALK TOO MUCH

Aldo Cordova Perez led police on a merry chase when they tried a buy-bust on his drug dealing. After Aldo’s escapade was cut short by a concrete post impaling the front of his getaway car, police cuffed him… and he started to ramble.

Aldo congratulated the gendarmes on the car chase. He admired their physicality in tackling him. He told them he smoked marijuana daily, and that he had a .22 rifle on a shelf at home.

Oh, Aldo. You should know that remaining silent isn’t just a right, it’s a pretty good idea. Aldo’s freely volunteered information about his gun at home tipped the locals that they should call the Feds. The Feds ran with Aldo said, and they charged him with being an illegal drug user in possession of a gun, a violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(3).

Amazingly, the jury acquitted him on drug trafficking – the “large quantity of methamphetamine in a box on the front-passenger-seat floorboard” did not impress the jurors – but they convicted Aldo of the § 922(g)(3) offense.

Aldo appealed, arguing that § 922(g)(3) violated the 2nd Amendment as applied to the facts of his case. Last week, the 8th Circuit agreed.

Citing its decision in United States v. Cooper, the Circuit said, “[W]e have already held that without more, neither drug use generally nor marijuana use specifically automatically extinguishes an individual’s 2nd Amendment right… And the government here did not provide enough evidence to show that marijuana use alone could reasonably be seen to make any user ‘an unacceptable risk of dangerousness’ to others by merely possessing a firearm. Indeed, defining a class of drug users simply by the suggestion that they might sometimes be dangerous, without more, is insufficient for categorical disarmament…

The 8th remanded the case for the trial court to determine “either individually or categorically, and either on the trial record or, to the extent necessary, via an evidentiary hearing—whether Cordova Perez’s marijuana use: 1) caused him to ‘act like someone who is both mentally ill and dangerous’; or 2) would or did make him ‘induce terror, or pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others with a firearm.’” The Circuit said, “We believe the district court is best positioned to reassess Cordova Perez’s as-applied challenge in light of Cooper.”

United States v. Perez, Case No 24-1553, 2025 USAppLEXIS 18095 (8th Cir. July 22, 2025)

United States v. Cooper, 127 F.4th 1092 (8th Cir. 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root