Tag Archives: SCOTUS

Supremes to Decide Sentencing Factors That Apply to Supervised Release Violations – Update for October 22, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS GRANTS CERT TO SUPERVISED RELEASE CASE

The Supreme Court justices often don’t decide to grant review (certiorari or “cert”) to a case after just one Friday conference. Petitions may be “re-listed,” that is, deferred for additional consideration at the next conference.

scotus161130Generally, a re-list or two increases a cert petition’s odds of being granted. Interestingly, the odds of being granted start to fall with more than two re-lists. That was proven with yesterday’s grant of certiorari in Esteras v. United States, a case that examines what factors a court may consider in holding that a person has violated a supervised release term and ordering him or her back to prison

The supervised release statute, 18 USC § 3583(e) requires a court to consider some but not all of the 18 USC § 3553(a) sentencing factors in deciding whether to send a violator back to prison (and for how long). The statute omits reference to § 3553(a)(2)(A) — which lists the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense, as legitimate considerations when imposing an initial sentence on people.

Five courts of appeals have concluded that district courts may rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors even though they’re excluded from the list. Four other appellate have concluded that they may not. The government argues that courts can properly consider such factors and that “[a]ny modest disagreement among the courts of appeals on the question presented has no practical effect.”

The decision will be handed down by the end of next June.

Esteras v. United States, Case No 23-7483 (certiorari granted October 21, 2024)

SCOTUSBlog.com, Fourteen cases to watch from the Supreme Court’s end-of-summer “long conference” (October 10, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS Starts October 2024 Term With A Docket That Leaves Plenty of Space for New Cases – Update for October 8, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NEW SUPREME COURT TERM LEAVES PLENTY OF ROOM ON DOCKET FOR GUNS, ELECTIONS AND TRUMP

Yesterday was the first Monday in October, and everyone knows what that means. The Supreme Court’s new season, known as October Term 2024, began its nine-month run with a couple of dry-as-toast non-criminal oral arguments.

vacationSCOTUS180924At this point, there are not many cases of interest on this year’s Supreme Court docket for federal criminal law followers. But the ABA Journal last week reminded readers that “a year ago, the 2023-24 term looked like it might be relatively sleepy. But that was before the court added cases on guns, abortion medication and two matters involving former President Donald Trump and the Jan 6, 2021, riot…”

The SCOTUS news for readers of this blog was released last Friday, when the Justices announced 15 new cases they would hear this term, all coming out of last week’s annual “long conference,” the annual culling of certiorari petitions that marks the end of SCOTUS’s summer recess.

Four of the certiorari grants involved criminal law issues. The only substantive federal criminal statute case is Thompson v. United States, which asks whether 18 USC § 1014 — making a “false statement” to influence certain financial institutions and federal agencies — also prohibits making a statement that is misleading but not false.

In Barnes v. Felix, the court will consider (in the context of a civil rights suit) whether the 4th Amendment, which prohibits police from using “unreasonable” force, depends on “the totality of the circumstances” or just under the “moment of the threat.” The reasonableness of an officer’s actions for 4th Amendment purposes is a fact-intensive inquiry. The question is whether the entire encounter with the person who is later contesting the seizure is examined in gauging whether the officer’s force is appropriate or whether only what happened in the narrow window when the officer’s safety was threatened is at issue.

In Perttu v. Richards, the issue is the technical but consequential question of whether under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim.

Finally, Gutierrez v. Sanz, a capital case, deals with standing issues in conjunction with efforts by a state defendant to secure post-conviction DNA testing.

gunknot181009One issue sure to make it onto the Supreme Court docket is the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g). The leading case on the question of the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute, § 922(g)(1) – the 3rd Circuit Range v. Garland en banc decision – was remanded by SCOTUS in light of United States v. Rahimi last spring. The 3rd Circuit will hold oral argument on Range tomorrow.

So far this past summer, three circuits have grappled with Rahimi, resulting in three different approaches. Last August, the 8th Circuit held in United States v. Jackson that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional. A few weeks later, the 6th Circuit ruled in United States v. Williams that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face and as applied to “dangerous people,” but not necessarily to all felons. On Sept 18, the 5th Circuit held in United States v. Diaz that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to a defendant once convicted of stealing a car based on the fact that 18th-century laws “authoriz[ed] severe punishments for thievery and permanent disarmament in other cases.”

mario170628Meanwhile, in Greene v. Garland, a case brought against the Dept of Justice by a Pennsylvania district attorney who is a registered medical marijuana user but wants to possess a gun, DOJ attorneys argue that the nationwide ban on marijuana users owning guns is constitutional, saying it aligns with other restrictions on gun ownership by dangerous, mentally ill or intoxicated people.

The DOJ’s position makes some sense here. Everyone knows how dangerous a district attorney can be…

SCOTUSBlog.com, Justices take up “false statement” dispute and rare capital case (October 4, 2024)

Thompson v. United States, Case No. 23-1095 (certiorari granted October 4, 2024)

Barnes v. Felix, Case No. 23-1239 (certiorari granted October 4, 2024)

Perttu v. Richards, Case No. 22-1298 (certiorari granted October 4, 2024)

Gutierrez v. Sanz, Case No. 23-7808 (certiorari granted October 4, 2024)

ABA Journal, Supreme Court’s sleepy-looking docket leaves room for potentially bigger cases to come (October 3, 2024)

Marijuana Moment, DOJ Says Allowing A Pennsylvania Prosecutor Who Uses Medical Marijuana To Possess A Gun Would Be ‘Dangerous’ (October 3, 2024)

United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024)

United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024)

United States v. Diaz, Case No. 23-50452, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 23725 (5th Cir. Sep. 18, 2024)

Greene v. Garland, ECF 32, Case No 1:24-cv-21 (W.D. Pa., filed October 1, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Long Conference is Today – Update for September 30, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LONG CONFERENCE KICKS OFF SCOTUS OCTOBER 2024 TERM

longconf210706“The summer list is where petitions go to die,” Gregory G. Garre, a solicitor general in the George W. Bush administration, told the New York Times back in 2015. While the odds of getting the Supreme Court to grant review of a case are about one in a hundred, At the long conference, the rate is roughly half of that, about 0.6%.

The Court returns to the bench on October 7th to start a new term that includes cases on transgender rights, ghost guns, flavored vapes, and securities fraud. One case generating interest is Hewitt v. United States, which seeks to reverse a 5th Circuit holding that First Step Act mandatory minimum changes cannot be applied to people sentenced before the Act was passed but whose cases were remanded for resentencing after the Act became law. Federal circuit courts are split on this question.

Last week, a bipartisan group of senators led by Majority Whip Richard Durbin (D-IL), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, filed a brief in the Hewitt case. The Senators told the Court that in “designing the First Step Act, Congress sought to ensure that individuals who committed an offense before the Act was enacted, but who were not yet subject to a sentence for that offense, would benefit from Section 403. That group, as Congress conceived of it, includes both individuals facing an initial sentencing proceeding as well as individuals facing resentencing following vacatur of a prior sentence.”

The group, including Sen Charles Grassley (R-IA), Cory Booker (D-NJ), and Mike Lee (R-UT), argued that the 5th Circuit’s “reading of Section 403 is inconsistent with Congress’ intent as reflected in its chosen text.”

vacationSCOTUS180924The Dept of Justice has refused to argue in support of the 5th Circuit’s decision. The Supreme Court therefore has appointed Michael McGinley, a partner in the Dechert law firm, as a “friend of the court” to brief and argue in support of the judgment below, a practice that happens about once every term.

New York Times, Supreme Court’s End-of-Summer Conference: Where Appeals ‘Go to Die’ (August 31, 2015)

Time, The Biggest Supreme Court Cases to Watch (September 25, 2024)

Senate Judiciary Committee, Durbin, Bipartisan Group Of Senators Urge Supreme Court To Maintain Strength Of Landmark Criminal Justice Reform Provision In Hewitt v. US (September 24, 2024)

Hewitt v. United States, Case No 23-1002 (Supreme Court, oral argument pending)

SCOTUSBlog, Justices appoint former clerk to argue First Step Act cases (July 26, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Decides What Congress Really Meant on Safety Valve – Update for March 19, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

A CONSPIRACY OF DUNCES…
This website was down all day yesterday due to a dark conspiracy of the people at Bluehost, LISA’s web provider, who decided to all become incompetent at once. Not really. Incompetence has been Bluehost’s theme for years…

TEXTUALISM TAKES IT ON THE CHIN

The Supreme Court on Friday narrowly interpreted 18 USC § 3553(f), the “safety valve” provision that was rewritten as part of the First Step Act, to “den[y] thousands of inmates a chance of seeking a shorter sentence,” according to NBC News.

caterpillar240319Many Supreme Court observers believed the Court would approach Friday’s case – Pulsifer v. United States – textually. “Textualism” is the interpretation of the law based exclusively on the ordinary meaning of the legal text. You know, like “and” means “and” and not “or.”  But the Court surprised the parties and observers in more ways than one.

Justice Elana Kagan’s opinion at first blush seems to be something only your high school English teacher could love. The case concerned the “safety valve” provision, which exempts some drug defendants from mandatory minimum sentences if they meet a list of conditions. One of those (3553(f)(1)) says the defendant can’t have “more than 4 criminal history points… a prior 3-point offense… AND a prior 2-point violent offense…” (I emphasized “AND” for reasons that will become apparent).

Mark Pulsifer had a prior 3-point felony, so his sentencing judge said he was ineligible for the safety valve. Mark, however, argued that the way (f)(1) is written, a defendant is ineligible only if he fails all three conditions. That is, Mark said, he was qualified for the safety valve unless he had all three of “more than 4 criminal history points AND a prior 3-point offense AND a prior 2-point violent offense.

grammar240319The Court’s lengthy ruling was little more than an English grammar lesson. In a decision surprising for scrambling ideological alliances on the Court, liberal Justice Kagan wrote for a 6-3 majority made up of traditionally conservative justices, while conservative Neil Gorsuch was joined by two traditionally liberal justices, Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson. The holding essentially holds that in the case of the safety valve, “and” means “or.”

SCOTUSBlog.com reported that

Kagan’s acceptance of the government’s argument relies squarely on a problem of superfluity.” The opinion focused on the fact that under Pulsifer’s reading of the provision, to be ineligible a defendant would have to have a prior 3-point conviction and a prior 2-point conviction. If that were so, the first requirement – that he or she have more than 4 points – was meaningless because to meet conditions two AND three, the defendant would already have to have 5 points. “In addressing eligibility for sentencing relief, Congress specified three particular features of a defendant’s criminal history — A, B, and C,” Kagan wrote. “It would not have done so if A had no possible effect. It would then have enacted: B and C. But while that is the paragraph Pulsifer’s reading produces, it is not the paragraph Congress wrote… [I]f a defendant has a three-point offense under Subparagraph B and a two-point offense under Subparagraph C he will always have more than four criminal-history points under Subparagraph A.

In other words, if reading the plain text of a statute yields a result that seems at odds with what Congress must have intended, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of what Congress must have intended prevails.

To prove her grammatical point, Kagan cites both The Very Hungry Caterpillar and Article III of the Constitution. She notes that Article III extends the “judicial Power… to all Cases… arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties.” This, she says, plainly applies to cases arising under any one of the three listed bodies of law but does not require that the cases arise under ALL three.

and-or240319In his dissent, Gorsuch complained that the decision significantly limits the goals of the First Step Act. “Adopting the government’s preferred interpretation guarantees that thousands more people in the federal criminal justice system will be denied a chance—just a chance—at an individualized sentence. For them, the First Step Act offers no hope. Nor, it seems, is there any rule of statutory interpretation the government won’t set aside to reach that result,” Gorsuch wrote. “Ordinary meaning is its first victim. Contextual clues follow. Our traditional practice of construing penal laws strictly falls by the wayside too. Replacing all that are policy concerns we have no business considering.”

Besides dramatically limiting those eligible for a safety valve non-mandatory drug sentence, Friday’s decision dashes the hope of some seeking a zero-point retroactive Guidelines 4C.1 2-level reduction. One of the conditions to qualify for that reduction is that a “defendant did not receive an adjustment under 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 USC 848.” Some read this as being that a defendant has to have both a 3B1.1 aggravating role AND a 21 USC 848 conviction. Other courts have read this as disqualifying all defendants having either a 3B1.1 enhancement OR an 848 conviction.

The decision stamps “denied” on the 5 pct of defendants annually getting a USSC § 3B1.1 leader/organizer/manager/supervisor enhancement.

Writing in his Sentencing Policy and Law blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman observed that the Pulsifer “serves as still more evidence that SCOTUS is no longer one of the most pro-defendant sentencing appeals courts. I got in the habit of making this point for a number of years following the Apprendi/Blakely/Booker line of rulings during a time when most federal circuit courts were often consistently more pro-government on sentencing issues than SCOTUS… But we are clearly in a different time with different Justices having different perspectives on these kinds of sentencing matters.”

Pulsifer v US, Case No 22-340, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 1215 (March 15, 2024)

Reuters, US Supreme Court says thousands of drug offenders can’t seek shorter sentences (March 15, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, In notable 6-3 split, SCOTUS rules in Pulsifer that “and” means “or” for application of First Step safety valve (March 15, 2024)

SCOTUSBlog.com, Supreme Court limits “safety valve” in federal sentencing law (March 15, 2024)

NBC, Supreme Court denies ‘thousands’ of inmates a chance at shorter sentences (March 15, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Supremes Will Review Four More Criminal Cases – Update for December 19, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT ENDS YEAR WITH CRIMINAL-CASE CERTIORARI BLOWOUT

In what was probably its last certiorari grant order for 2023, the Supreme Court issued probably added four criminal cases last week.

blowout231219The highest profile case is Fischer v. United States, which arises from a defendant convicted of obstruction of Congress for the January 6th Capitol riot. He was convicted of an 18 USC § 1512(c) offense, which prohibits corruptly obstructing, influencing, or impeding “any official proceeding.” The district court dismissed the § 1512(c) charge, holding that Congress only intended it to apply to evidence tampering that obstructs an official proceeding. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision in a 2-1 opinion, ruling that “[u]nder the most natural reading of the statute,” the law “applies to all forms of corrupt obstruction of an official proceeding, other than the conduct that is already covered by” the evidence-tampering language of § 1512(b). One judge dissented that the government’s interpretation of the statute would render it “both improbably broad and unconstitutional in many of its applications.”

SCOTUS also will review a 9th Circuit ruling in favor of Danny Lee Jones, sentenced to death for two murders. A federal district court in Arizona rejected Jones’s claims that his lawyer had provided inadequate assistance, but the 9th reversed that decision, upholding its position in an order denying an en banc rehearing with ten judges dissenting.

The issue is how evidence not presented by a defense attorney because of failure to investigate should be weighed in determining Strickland v. Washington prejudice in a post-conviction proceeding. Although the issue relates to an Arizona death penalty case, the outcome could provide the first new ruling on Strickland prejudice in well over a decade.

goodpros170330In Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, the high court will consider whether a claim for malicious prosecution can proceed for a baseless criminal charge, even if there was probable cause for prosecutors to bring other criminal charges. In Snyder v. United States, the Supremes will consider whether the federal bribery statute – 18 USC § 666(a)(1)(B) – makes it a crime to accept “gratuities” — that is, payment for something a government official has already done, without any prior agreement to take those actions in exchange for payment.

The Court will rule on the cases by the end of its current term on June 30, 2024.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Four criminal cases of note in latest SCOTUS cert grants (December 13, 2023)

Fischer v. United States, Case No. 23-5572 (certiorari granted December 13, 2023)

Thornell v. Jones, Case No. 22-982 (certiorari granted December 13, 2023)

Chiaverini v. Napoleon, Case No. 23-50 (certiorari granted December 13, 2023)

Snyder v. United States, Case No. 23-108 (certiorari granted December 13, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Government Joins Petitioner In Urging SCOTUS ACCA Review – Update for November 17, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS SCOTUS REVIEW OF ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT ISSUE
May you rest in peace, Betty... stealing America's hearts did not make you ACCA-qualified.
May you rest in peace, Betty… stealing America’s hearts did not make you ACCA-qualified.

The Armed Career Criminal Act provides that if convicted felons who possess firearms in violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) have three prior convictions for serious drug offenses or crimes of violence (or a mix of the two), they are subject to a 15-year-to-life sentence, with 15 years being the mandatory minimum.  The ACCA statute, 18 USC § 924(e)(2), can only be applied if the defendant has committed the three predicate offenses on different occasions.

Up to now, circuits have been split on whether a judge or a jury had to find that the three occasions were different. Recently, a Supreme Court opinion, Wooden v. United States, established standards for deciding when offenses had been committed on “different occasions.” Now, a pending petition for certiorari asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find (or a defendant to admit) that the occasions really were different.

Surprisingly, the government agrees with the defendant that SCOTUS should hear the case:

Petitioner renews his contention that the 6th Amendment requires a jury to find (or a defendant to admit) that predicate offenses were under the ACCA. In light of this Court’s recent articulation of the standard for determining whether offenses occurred on different occasions in Wooden v United States,  the government agrees with that contention. Although the government has opposed previous petitions raising this issue, recent developments make clear that this Court’s intervention is necessary to ensure that the circuits correctly recognize defendants’ constitutional rights in this context. This case presents a suitable vehicle for deciding the issue this Term and thereby providing the timely guidance that the issue requires.

The Supreme Court considered the petition at its November 9th conference but relisted it for today’s conference. We could know Monday, but there is a decent chance that it will be relisted again.

relist230123Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, observed that Justice Clarence Thomas “has suggested that he disagrees with the entire prior-conviction exception to Sixth Amendment rights.” In the 1998 Almendarez-Torres v. United States decision, the Supremes held that a court need not have proof beyond a reasonable doubt of prior convictions. Berman suggests that Erlinger could provide the Supreme Court “an opportunity to reconsider that (historically suspect) exception altogether.”

Brief for Government, Erlinger v. United States, Case No 23-370 (October 17, 2023) 

Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360, 142 S. Ct. 1063, 1065 (2022)

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 US 224 (1998)

Sentencing Law and Policy, US Solicitor General supports SCOTUS review and application of Sixth Amendment rights for key issue for applying Armed Career Criminal Act (November 7, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Gunning for Bruen – Update for November 3, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

RAHIMI ORAL ARGUMENT NEXT WEEK IS HIGH STAKES FOR SECOND AMENDMENT

scotus161130On Tuesday, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in United States v. Rahimi, a case that will determine the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(8), the subsection of the federal firearms possession statute that bars people subject to domestic protection orders from having guns or ammo. Rahimi may well do more than that, addressing the constitutionality of all of 922(g) – including possession of guns by felons.

The Supreme Court’s 2022 New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen adopted a new originalist 2nd Amendment standard:

We hold that when the 2nd Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the 2nd Amendment’s “unqualified command.

Bruen superseded the Court’s long-standing practice of allowing the government to weigh its interest in public safety against the possibility of imposing a limitation on 2nd Amendment rights.

Since Bruen, several 922(g)-based restrictions have been declared unconstitutional. Possession of guns by people who are subject to domestic protection orders, who use controlled substances – illegal under 922(g)(3), and who have been convicted of nonviolent criminal offenses, illegal under 922(g)(1), have been held to be unconstitutional under Bruen. The government has sought certiorari on all of these decisions, suggesting to the Supreme Court that a Rahimi decision can clean them all up (and in the government’s favor).

sexualassault211014Social and public health advocates argue in essence that “validating the federal law prohibiting persons subject to domestic violence protective orders from gun possession will literally mean the difference between life or death for many victims of abuse, their family, friends, law enforcement, and the broader community,” as the Bloomberg School of Public Health puts it.

Rahimi provides the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify how lower courts should apply the new framework laid out in Bruen. This will significantly impact the continued viability of current gun laws and the ability of legislators to address what the Bloomberg School calls “the ongoing gun violence epidemic.”

But others suggest that 922(g)(8) looks “more like a political performance than a serious effort to reduce abusive behavior.” Writing in Law & Liberty, George Mason University laws professor Nelson Lund argues that nevertheless, “the government’s brief [in Rahimi] may look like little more than a Hail Mary pass aimed at persuading the Justices to revise or deceptively “clarify” the novel Bruen test. This gambit, however, could very well succeed. The Bruen holding has its roots in a dissenting opinion written by then-Judge Kavanaugh before he was promoted to the Supreme Court. His opinion was exposed to serious objections arising largely from the paucity of historical evidence that could support a viable history-and-tradition test. Bruen suffers from the same weakness, and it was clear from the start that the Court would find itself driven toward reliance on means-end analysis, although not necessarily the very deferential form that Bruen rejected.”

Mr. Rahimi fired off a few rounds at a fast-food joint when his friend's credit card was declined.
Mr. Rahimi fired off a few rounds at a fast-food joint when his friend’s credit card was declined.

Robert Leider, an assistant professor at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School in Arlington, Virginia, said at a Federalist Society forum in September that “the real legal question that everyone is interested in with Rahimi is to see how the court clarifies and applies the text, history and tradition test that it announced two terms ago in Bruen. Unquestionably, the government sought review in this case to water down the test.”

Solicitor General Elizabeth B. Prelogar took steps to expedite the review of Rahimi, citing the “substantial disruption” that invalidation of the domestic violence gun restriction would create. Meanwhile, as the American Bar Association Journal put it, Prof. Leider said the Solicitor General “slow-walked [the] cert petition in another gun case, in which the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit in June struck down the so-called felon-in-possession statute, barring those sentenced to prison for more than one year from possessing a firearm.”

That 3rd Circuit case, Range v. Atty General, involves a man convicted of food stamp fraud 25 years before who was prevented from buying a gun.

“Mr. Rahimi is the poster child for irresponsible gun possession,” Leider said. “I think the government wanted this case and not the Range welfare fraud case because this case is much easier on the judgment line.”

He’s right that Rahimi is a tough case for those hoping that Bruen may ultimately limit the proscription on nonviolent felons owning guns (such as the case in the 3rd Circuit en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General. The evidence suggests that the presence of firearms in abusive relationships increases the risk of injury and death substantially.

After seeking cert on the Range decision, the government suggested the Court sit on the petition until a decision is handed down in Rahimi.

United States v. Rahimi, Case No. 22-915 (oral argument November 7, 2023)

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. —, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022)

Johns Hopkins University, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Questions and Answers on U.S. v. Rahimi, the Major Gun Case Before the Supreme Court During its 2023–2024 Term (October 10, 2023)

American Bar Association Journal, Supreme Court takes on first major gun case since landmark ruling last year softened regulations (November 2, 2023)

Law & Liberty, Domestic Violence and the Second Amendment (November 1, 2023)

USA Today, Domestic violence abuse victims need more protections — not less stringent gun regulations (November 2, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Will SCOTUS Grant Review to Acquitted Conduct Today? – Update for January 23, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ACQUITTED CONDUCT STILL HANGING FIRE

Three weeks ago, I wrote that the Supreme Court would be deciding whether to finally take the question of whether a district court should be able to factor conduct for which a defendant was acquitted into a sentence, sort of “the jury didn’t think you did it, but I know better” approach to sentencing.

relist230123It turns out that SCOTUS now has five petitions for review before it raising the acquitted conduct issue. The principal case, McClinton v. United States, was “relisted” at the Justices’ Friday, January 6, 2023, conference for the following week’s Friday conference. On January 13, the Justices relisted the issue again for the January 20, 2023, conference. The Court will announce actions taken at the January 20th conference this morning at 9:30 Eastern time.

A “relist” occurs when the justices neither accept nor deny a petition for certiorari, but instead defer it for the next conference.

SCOTUSBlog explains that

it is almost impossible to know exactly what is happening when a particular case is relisted… One justice could be trying to pick up a fourth vote to grant review, one or more justices may want to look more closely at the case, a justice could be writing an opinion about the court’s decision to deny review, or the court could be writing an opinion to summarily reverse… the decision below.

Generally, the Supreme Court does not accept a case for review until it has been “relisted” one or more times.

Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman said last week, “More often than not, relisting is a precursor to a later denial of cert, perhaps with a dissent or separate statement being authored by one or more Justices giving their take on the Court’s decision not to grant review. But relisting is also sometimes a precursor to a later granting of cert. So, as I have said before, I am hopeful, though still more than a bit pessimistic, about the possibility of 2023 being the year for SCOTUS to take up acquitted conduct sentencing.”

SCOTUSBlog, Acquitted-conduct sentencing and “offended observer” standing (January 19, 2023)

McClinton v. United States, Case No. 21-1557 (petition for certiorari pending)

Sentencing Law and Policy, US Supreme Court relists latest cases seeking review of acquitted conduct sentencing (January 17, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS to Review Identity Theft Overreach Claim – Update for November 17, 2022

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS WILL DECIDE MEANING OF IDENTITY THEFT

The aggravated identity theft statute (18 U.S.C. § 1028A) provides in part that anyone who “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.”

Who could be opposed to that? Everyone knows what identity theft is. Computer hacking, tricking old people, credit card skimming… those bums have it coming, and § 1028A is what’s going to give it to them.

Except… as with any good federal statutory idea, there are those people who will run it into the ground. Look at the PATRIOT Act.  Everyone in Congress thought the expanded police powers were a wonderful thing, because of course law enforcement would never use those tools against Americans in plain vanilla criminal cases.  It was only the terrorists who needed to look out.

The same with identity theft.  You may think you know what identity theft is, using some other person’s identity in the process of committing another crime. David Dubin was convicted of Medicaid fraud. He was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A for aggravated identity theft, Federal prosecutors contend that Dubin’s use of his patient’s name on false Medicaid claims violated the aggravated identity statute, adding an extra two years to his one-year sentence for fraud.

Dubin’s conviction and sentence were upheld by the 5th Circuit in a very divided en banc decision, but last week, the Supreme Court granted review.

IDthief221117In an amicus brief supporting grant of certiorari, The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers complained that the 5th Circuit, “disregarding this Court’s directive, the reasoning of the majority of its sister circuits that have considered the issue, and the statute’s title and unmistakable purpose, the 5th Circuit adopted the broadest possible reading of Sec. 1028A to bring appellant’s conduct within the statute. This approach defies common sense and sanctions the ill-advised prosecutorial overreach that this Court has continually rejected.”

The case will be decided by the end of next June.

Dubin v. United States, Case No. 22-10, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 4925 (Nov. 10, 2022) (certiorari granted)

– Thomas L. Root

Butterfly Wings Don’t Beat For Innocence – Update for July 7, 2022

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE BEIJING BUTTERFLY

butterfly220707When mathematician Edward Lorenz first posited the notion that a butterfly flapping its wings in Beijing today could affect the path of a tornado in Kansas three weeks hence, his fanciful illustration became the interface with chaos theory that the average Joe and Jane could understand. Essentially, the butterfly effect is the sensitive dependence on initial conditions in which a small change in one state of a deterministic nonlinear system can result in large differences in a later state.

When a federal defendant is presented with a plea agreement and told by her lawyer that it’s the best deal she can hope for, the fine print is rarely explained. That includes Section 10(b)(1)(A)(iii) on page 12 which says something like “Defendant waives the right to challenge the conviction or sentence under 18 USC § 3742 or on any collateral attack under 28 USC § 2255 or other section, except in cases of ineffective assistance of counsel.”

pleawaiver220707And why not sign it? The defendant is under plenty of stress as she contemplates agreeing to spending a decade in prison, and a lot of that gibberish in the back of the plea agreement means a lot less to her than her attorney’s blandishments that the judge certainly won’t give her more than 48 months.

In chaos theory parlance, the appeal/collateral attack waiver is a pretty small input. Only later does the output become huge.

The Supreme Court left for vacation in time for the 4th of July. Like a fireworks display, the finale was stellar and stunning: abortion, guns, prayer, and the biggest case of all, a decision that may spell doom for the administrative state. But just like many fireworks finales, after the final glowing detonation fades, one straggler rocket goes airborne, with no light but a surprise reverberating boom.

Last Thursday, the Court released its final list of certiorari grants and denials for the term, announcing the one or two cases it will add to next term’s docket while denying a long list of petitions. One of the denials was a guy named Zenon Grzegorczyk (pronounced just the way it sounds). Zenon, a good father, wanted to murder six people whom he blamed for his divorce and for the loss of custody of his child. He hired and paid hitmen to pull it off.

hitman220707Problem was that Zenon, not being an avid news consumer, was unaware that all hitmen available for hire are undercover law enforcement officers, moonlighting for some pocket money. Thus it was in this case. Zenon was promptly charged with murder for hire (18 USC § 1958) and an 18 USC § 924(c) count for using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence.

Zenon signed a plea agreement in which, among other things, he waived any right to challenge his murder-for-hire and firearms convictions. He was sentenced to about 18 years.

A couple of years later, after the Supreme Court decided in Johnson v. United States and Sessions v. Dimaya that crimes of violence had to be accompanied by use or threat of force, Zenon filed a § 2255 motion challenging the firearms conviction. Because of his plea agreement, the District Court denied the motion, and the 7th Circuit affirmed. Zenon filed a petition for certiorari seeking Supreme Court review.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Davis that a conspiracy to commit a violent crime was not itself a violent offense that could support an 18 USC § 924(c) conviction. The government flipped its position, asking the Supreme Court to vacate the 7th Circuit’s judgment because Davis made Zenon actually innocent of the 18 USC § 924(c) conviction. The mechanism is called a “GVR,” because the Supremes grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the lower court’s decision, and remand the case for further consideration, all in one order.

judgeB160229The Supreme Court refused, denying the petition last week. Justice Kavanaugh wrote in a concurrence to the denial that “[b]ecause the 7th Circuit correctly concluded that the defendant’s unconditional guilty plea precluded any argument based on the new caselaw, this Court has no appropriate legal basis to vacate the Seventh Circuit’s judgment.”

What is notable was the spirited dissent written by Justice Sotomayor. She argued that Zenon’s case

falls comfortably within this Court’s longstanding GVR practice… The Solicitor General’s considered concession that 18 USC § 1958(a) is not a “crime of violence” under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A) is an intervening development that has triggered the Government’s agreement to forgo assertion of the procedural bar that proved decisive below. Consequently, there is surely a reasonable probability of a different result on remand: With the Government waiving the procedural bar, Grzegorczyk’s § 924(c) conviction and 5-year sentence should be vacated, and his § 1958(a) sentence reduced by at least 2 years and 7 months. Moreover, given the stakes for Grzegorczyk, as well as the Government’s express consent, this is a case where the marginal cost to judicial efficiency and finality from a remand should yield to solicitude for Grzegorczyk’s rights. “Further proceedings” are therefore “just under the circumstances,” 28 USC § 2106, and the Court should issue a GVR order.

“By denying certiorari rather than issuing a GVR order,” Justice Sotomayor fumed, “the Court allocates the full cost of the Government’s error to Grzegorczyk, who faces over 7½ extra years of incarceration as a result.”

innocent210504What this means, of course, is that actual innocence of a count of conviction will always yield to an oppressive appeal waiver signed in haste by a defendant who is understandably focused on the larger issues in her plea agreement rather than flitting butterfly of a provision, whose wingbeats seem inconsequential at the time but may later spawn a tornado of injustice.

In his concurrence, Kavanaugh suggested that if the government really felt that Zenon was entitled to relief from the five -year 924(c) sentence, “the Attorney General may recommend a pardon or commutation to the President, and the President may pardon the defendant or commute the sentence.”

Like that’s gonna happen…

Grzegorczyk v. United States, Case No. 21-5967, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3273 (June 30, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root