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3rd Circuit Doubles Down on 922(g)(1) Dangerousness – Update for October 20, 2026

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

3RD CIRCUIT REFINES RIGHTS FOR FELONS-IN-POSSESSION

The 3rd Circuit broke new ground on felon-in-possession reform with its Range v. Atty General decision two years ago. Last week, the appellate court handed down two decisions that cemented the developing standard that it is only dangerousness, not the existence of a prior felony, that permits disarming someone under 18 USC § 922(g)(1).

The Circuit upheld the § 922(g)(1) against a man with a conviction stemming from a 24-year-old carjacking but ruled that the ban could not be applied to another man based on prior drunk-driving convictions.

James Bost pled guilty to terroristic threats, criminal conspiracy, false imprisonment and simple assault in Pennsylvania state court following a 2002 carjacking. He was later indicted for being a felon in possession after police caught him with a gun. James argued that § 922(g)(1) violated the 2nd Amendment as applied to his case.

The 3rd said that people like James who were convicted of crimes demonstrating “a risk of physical violence from misusing guns can be disarmed before that risk becomes a reality.”

In a different case, the Circuit held that applying § 922(g)(1) to Edward Williams violated the 2nd Amendment. Ed had prior convictions for drunk driving in the early 2000s. One of those convictions carried a maximum sentence of 5 years, which triggered felon-in-possession (although he only did 90 days in home confinement).

The 3rd ruled that § 922(g)(1) cannot be applied to people whose prior felony offenses did not involve violence or threats indicating a risk of misusing firearms consistent with the 2nd Amendment. Nothing in Ed’s prior convictions involved conduct that suggested the public was at risk that Ed was likely to misuse guns.

One troubling argument we’re sure to see again is the Government’s claim that the case should be dismissed because Ed now can file with DOJ to have his rights restored under 18 USC § 925(c). The 3rd rejected the notion that Ed had some duty to exhaust his administrative remedy first:

The scant chance of an invitation to apply for restoration under § 925(c) does not displace our decisional duty, as Williams presents an actual controversy ripe for adjudication…The United States reasons that since Williams can patiently await discretionary relief from the Justice Department, he faces no present harm (from, say, prosecution under § 922(g)(1)). That is a curious conception of our 2nd Amendment right and one that, in any event, does not fit the facts… Nor will we dismiss Williams’s case under the administrative exhaustion doctrine. Congress has imposed no such requirement and no principles of “sound judicial discretion” support holding a constitutional right in abeyance while the Government gradually comes into compliance.

The idea that because the DOJ may decide you’re entitled to have guns again is a substitute for enforcing your constitutional rights is a dangerous notion.  Constitutional rights protect people from Government overreach. Suggesting that the 2nd Amendment depends on Government permission turns a right into a privilege that can be given or taken by bureaucratic whim.

United States v. Bost, Case No, 24-1719, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 31138 (3d Cir. October 13, 2026)

Williams v. Attorney General, Case No. 24-1091, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 31148 (3d Cir. October 13, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

First Week at the Supreme Court: Guns, Gender and Guidelines – Update for October 13, 2026

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SCOTUS GETS BACK TO WORK

This year’s Supreme Court term (known in judicial speak as “October Term 2026”) began last week with some interesting, if below-the-radar, developments.

Felon-in-Possession: Last spring, the 5th Circuit declared 18 USC § 922(g)(1) – the felon-in-possession statute – unconstitutional as applied to a defendant whose only prior felony was a state simple drug possession conviction. The Circuit ruled that there was no historical evidence that people possessing contraband that didn’t pose a danger to others were prohibited from owning guns.

The government – which usually gets its way when it wants Supreme Court review – asked SCOTUS to take up the case but hold it until it could apply its ruling in United States v. Hemani, last June’s holding that 18 USC § 922(g)(3) – the subsection that bars “habitual” drug users from having guns – violates the 2nd Amendment as applied to a Texas man who said that he smoked marijuana a few times a week.

The Hemani decision noted that it did not address the federal law “disarming individuals convicted of felonies (often including drug-related ones.”  After Hemani, Defendant Hembree urged the justices to leave the 5th Circuit’s ruling in place. “The decision in Hemani does not affect the outcome here,” he wrote in his response to the Government petition for certiorari, because it “says nothing about nonviolent felons being categorically and permanently disarmed.”

Last week, the Supremes agreed, denying the government review of the 5th Circuit decision. This means that the 5thCircuit joins the 3rd (Range v. Attorney General) and the 6th (United States v. Williams, sort of) in holding that § 922(g)(1) can violate the 2nd Amendment as applied to some people whose prior felonies don’t show dangerousness.

United States v. Hembree, 165 F.4th 909 (5th Cir. 2026)

United States v. Hembree, Case No. 25-1219 (Cert denied, October 5, 2026)

Do The Notes Count? For everyone who ever wondered whether you have to read the footnotes, the Supreme Court will reconsider the 30-year-old Stinson v. United States holding that courts must follow Sentencing Commission commentary that interprets or explains a Guideline “unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”

Stinson made a lot of sense back when courts were required to follow the Guidelines and the Chevron doctrine directed courts to defer to agency interpretation of statutes. But in 2019, in a major test of deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations, the court ruled in Kisor v. Wilkie that courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations only where the regulation is genuinely ambiguous on the question at issue.

In Beaird v. United States, the Supreme Court will consider whether Stinson still correctly captures the deference that courts must give to the Guidelines’ commentary. The degree of deference matters because a significant amount of detail about how the sentencing guidelines should be applied is found in the commentary, covering the gamut of federal crimes from fraud to firearm offenses.

The Beaird defendant claims his sentencing was wrongly calculated to include an enhanced base offense level for unlawful gun possession by counting a 17-round magazine attached to the firearm as a “large-capacity magazine.”

The sentencing Guideline applies an enhancement where the firearm has a “large-capacity magazine,” but exactly how large a magazine must be to ne “large capacity” is only defined in the commentary as a “magazine or similar device that could accept more than 15 rounds of ammunition.” That definition sweeps in just about any double-stack auto pistol on the market, including five of the most popular Glocks, Sigs, Smith & Wessons and HKs.

The defendant argues that the commentary, which unlike the guideline itself is not approved by Congress, improperly expands the scope of the guideline. That guideline, he contends, was intended to target only weapons that are exceptionally dangerous or inherently illegal, not industry-standard semiautomatic firearms.

Beaird v. United States, Case No. 25-5343 (argued October 13, 2026)

BOP Transgender Policy: Lawyers for Bureau of Prisons transgender inmates urged the Supreme Court on Thursday to leave in place a court order that bars the BOP from enforcing a new policy on healthcare that would prevent transgender inmates from obtaining hormone therapy and “social accommodations” (such as makeup, wigs, and padding).

The BOP adopted the policy earlier this year, following President Trump’s February 2025 executive order directing the attorney general to “ensure that no Federal funds are expended for any medical procedure, treatment, or drug for the purpose of conforming an inmate’s appearance to that of the opposite sex.”

Three transgender inmates then went to federal court in Washington, DC, to block the enforcement of the policy. On August 26, Senior US District Judge Royce Lamberth issued an order barring the BOP from implementing the policy, and on September 18, the DC Circuit refused to reverse the order. On September 28, BOP went to the Supreme Court to ask that the order be blocked, complaining that the district court had “substitut[ed] its own policy judgment” for the BOP, “rel[ied] on evidence outside the administrative record… fault[ed] the agency for following presidential directions… [and] denied prison administrators the substantial deference they are due.”

The issue of the temporary order, on the SCOTUS “emergency” docket, will probably be decided next week. Ultimately, a decision on the merits of the underlying case could not just affect transgender inmates but define how much deference courts have to give “prison administrators.”

Trump v. Kingdom, Case No. 26A-416 (application for stay filed September 28, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Another Circuit Invalidates Felon-in-Possession in Nonviolent Case – Updatebfor January 2, 2026

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5TH CIRCUIT HOLDS 922(g)(1) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO NONVIOLENT FELON

Ed Cockerham pled guilty for the Mississippi felony of failing to pay child support. He was sentenced to five years of probation, but he could have gotten up to five years in prison. He got his child support paid and was released from probation.

Subsequently, he was caught in possession of a gun, which put him in violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) based solely on the child support conviction. The district court refused to hold that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to his case. Ed appealed.

Two weeks ago, the 11th Circuit held that § 922(g)(1) violated the 2nd Amendment as applied to Ed’s Case. The Circuit observed that “historical tradition unquestionably permits the Government to disarm violent criminals… [but] history does not support the proposition that felons lose their 2nd Amendment rights solely because of their status as felons.”

In Ed’s case, he had fully paid the child support debt for which he was convicted at the time he was found in possession of a firearm. “So there’s no historical justification to disarm him at that moment,” the 5th ruled, “never mind for the rest of his life.” While other evidence suggested that Ed might be violent (he had been arrested for assault in the past), the Circuit said the 5th Circuit focuses “on the nature of the predicate offense rather than on the defendant’s broader criminal history or individual characteristics.”

The holding is consistent with the 3rd Circuit’s holding in Range v. Attorney General and the 6th Circuit’s United States v. Williams holding.  It is diametrically opposed to decisions of the 8th, 9th and 10th Circuits. The 10th Circuit case – Vincent v. United States – is on its third Supreme Court relist. 

United States v. Cockerham, Case No. 24-60401, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33001 (5th Cir., December 17, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

8th Circuit Affirms ‘Cookie-Cutter’ Approach to Felon Firearm Disenfranchisement – Update for September 9, 2025

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ONE AND DONE

The 8th Circuit last week underscored its hostility to any “as applied” 2nd Amendment challenge to the 18 USC § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession statute.  The Circuit affirmed its holding in United States v. Jackson that “the federal prohibition on possession of firearms by felons is constitutional as a categorical matter. There is no need for a felony-by-felony analysis, and no requirement of an individualized determination of dangerousness as to each person in the class of prohibited persons.”

In 1991, Anthony Browne was a member of the Black Gangster Disciples motorcycle gang/criminal organization. He and some other BGDs followed a rival gang member home. One of Browne’s fellow gang members shot up the place, hitting the intended victim’s mother. While Tony wasn’t the triggerman, he was convicted of committing willful injury and criminal gang participation and got 10 years in prison.

After being released from prison in 1998, Tony got a computer science degree from the University of Iowa and worked for the next 20 years as a software engineer. In 2021, the Dept of Defense granted him a security clearance as part of his job. He also earned an executive order in 2005 from the Iowa governor restoring many of his rights (but not the right to own guns). At age 52, Tony has not had a brush with the law in 34 years.

No matter, the 8th said last week. A “legislature may dispossess forcible felons as a categorical matter,” the Circuit said, and Tony’s argument that under the 2nd Amendment, he is entitled to issuance of a handgun permit unless the sheriff concludes after an individualized determination that Browne is “currently dangerous,” is nothing more than an end run around that.

Writing in The Reload, Jake Fogleman observed that “while he’s no Bryan Range or Melynda Vincent, the distance from [Tony’s] conduct that could credibly lead to him being labeled ‘dangerous’ is significant. There do not appear to be any recent indications that he poses an ongoing threat to the community. On the contrary, he has by all accounts turned his life around. Browne argued his recent history indicates he’s peaceable and, therefore, should have his rights restored. The panel disagreed… ‘Browne’s argument is inconsistent with the relevant history and this court’s conclusions in Jackson. Early American legislatures ordered disarmament and authorized punishment of death for forcible felonies and even for some non-violent offenses… [W]e conclude that the government has satisfied its burden to show that a lifetime restriction on the right of forcible felons to possess firearms, subject to a gubernatorial pardon, is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation.”

Browne v. Reynolds, Case No. 24-1952, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 22449 (8th Cir. Sept 2, 2025)

United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024)

The Reload, Analysis: Eighth Circuit Ruling Shows Thorny Legal Questions Still Surround Rights Restoration Push (September 7, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

The Guns of August Come Early – Update for July 21, 2025

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ONE TOKE OVER THE 2ND AMENDMENT LINE?

Remember how your mother scolded you to take good care of your stuff? The lesson didn’t stick with college student Erik Harris. A few days after he bought two handguns in close succession, Erik got “really drunk” and high at a party. One of his guns disappeared.

As soon as Erik sobered up, he reported the gun stolen and bought a replacement. Incidentally, on each purchase, Erik indicated on the ATF form that he was not an “unlawful user of or addicted to marijuana.”

When Erik’s missing gun turned up in a felon’s possession, police questioned Erik. Remember how your mother told you that the policeman is your friend? That lesson did stick with Erik… to his detriment.

Erik admitted to the cops that he smoked weed regularly, including earlier that same day. He acknowledged that he probably was an “unlawful user” of marijuana and that maybe he wasn’t completely “honest”  when he filled out the ATF form.

Remember that bit you’ve heard in the police shows on TV about “you have the right to remain silent?” That’s not just a right, it’s a pretty darn good idea. Honesty turned out not to be the best policy for Erik. The government charged him with three counts of possessing a gun as an “unlawful [drug] user” under 18 USC § 922(g)(3) and another three counts under § 922(a)(6) for lying to buy each one. Erik got convicted.

Last week, the 3rd Circuit held that § 922(g)(3) didn’t violate the 2nd Amendment on its face because it is completely constitutional to deny guns to unlawful drug users who could pose a risk to others if armed. The nation’s founding-era laws temporarily disarmed people who were dangerously drunk or mentally ill, because their impaired mental state posed a risk to others. Section 922(g)(3)’s temporary restriction on gun rights is analogous to these historical restrictions, the Circuit said, because it addresses a similar problem, the risk of danger due to an altered mental state and imposes a similar burden of temporary disarmament.

But § 922(g)(3) might not apply to Erik, the 3rd conceded, because the District Court did not find that his frequent marijuana use increased the risk that he could not handle guns safely. “Whether Harris’s § 922(g)(3) conviction is constitutional turns on many facts unanswered by the existing record,” so it remanded the case for fact-finding, including on how recently he had smoked prior to gun possession, whether the pot affected his judgment and impulse control, or caused psychosis, and marijuana’s long-term physical and mental effects.

The significance of the decision is the 3rd Circuit’s use once again of an individual dangerousness analysis – like it did in Range – to decide whether § 922(g) was constitutional as applied in a particular situation.

United States v. Harris, Case No. 21-3031, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 17293 (3d Cir. July 14, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

Vincent Case Has Sights on SCOTUS Review – Update for July 10, 2025

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‘CAN’T IGNORE THIS ONE,’ PARTIES MAY TELL SCOTUS IN 922(g)(1) CASE

I have written before about Melynda Vincent, a woman convicted of bank fraud 15 years ago for writing some bad checks while in the throes of drug addiction. Since then, Melynda has cleaned up, graduated from a drug treatment program, earned an undergraduate degree and two graduate degrees, and founded the Utah Harm Reduction Coalition – a nonprofit organization focused on drug treatment and criminal-justice reform – as well as a mental health counseling service, Life Changes Counseling.

In February, the 10th Circuit said, “So what? You still can’t own a gun.” Melynda has filed for Supreme Court certiorari, and she has picked up both the Federal Public Defenders and the National Rifle Association as amici (filing briefs in support of her petition).

Most interesting is this: the DOJ was due to oppose her petition in June. It got an extension until July 11 and then last week asked for and got a second extension until August 11. 

It may be that DOJ, opposed to such petitions in the past but lately avoiding the issue (as in not seeking certiorari in the 3rd Circuit Range case), does not yet know what to do.

I have said before that Vincent is the best case out there to put the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) in front of the Justices. The DOJ’s position on this is something to watch closely.

Vincent v. Bondi, Case No. 24-1155 (petition for certiorari pending)

– Thomas L. Root

Making “Good Enough” on 922(g)(1) the Enemy of 2nd Amendment Perfection – Update for May 19, 2025

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IS DOJ TRYING TO AVOID A SUPREME COURT 922(G)(1) CHALLENGE?

Voltaire wrote (roughly translated) that perfection is the enemy of good enough. Disturbing evidence is emerging that President Trump’s administration is adopting that standard in fighting to keep 18 USC § 922(g)(1) – the felon-in-possession ban that is the most enforced gun law on the federal books – in place.

perfectiongood250519Several DOJ Supreme Court filings last month urged SCOTUS to reject review of F-I-P cases asking whether § 922(g)(1) can be applied to nonviolent felons consistent with New York State Rifle & Postal Assn v. Bruen, arguing in part that the DOJ’s yet-unformed proposal to use 18 USC § 925(c) to restore gun rights for some felons is good enough.

In March, DOJ ginned up an ad hoc rights restoration program to reward actor and Trump supporter Mel Gibson by giving him back his gun rights despite a domestic violence conviction. Opposition to the decision cost Pardon Attorney Elizabeth Oyer her job. Ultimately, the agency restored the gun rights of 10 people (including Gibson), noting cryptically that each person had submitted “materials… seeking either a pardon or relief from federal firearms disabilities, and it is established to [the Attorney General’s] satisfaction that each individual will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief to each individual would not be contrary to the public interest.”

gibsingun250519DOJ has neither issued any regulations on how former felons might apply for gun rights restoration nor has it responded to multiple requests for details. But that has not stopped DOJ from citing this undisclosed and opaque process as an additional reason for the Supreme Court not to grant review in any felon-in-possession 2nd Amendment cases.

On April 25, Solicitor General John Sauer opposed a petition for cert from a 4th Circuit § 922(g)(1) as-applied denial. “Although there is some disagreement among the courts of appeals regarding whether § 922(g)(1) is susceptible to individualized as-applied challenges, that disagreement is shallow,” SG Sauer wrote, “[a]nd any disagreement among the circuits may evaporate given the Dept of Justice’s recent reestablishment of the administrative process under 18 USC § 925(c) for granting relief from federal firearms disabilities.”

The Reload, a gun law newsletter, said, “The Trump Administration’s preferred approach to gun rights for convicted felons [is] one that would grant a high degree of discretion and centralize the decision-making within the executive branch rather than through a widely applicable legal precedent, as gun-rights advocates have long sought in court. As a result, it may undermine many of the movement’s best cases by undercutting the claims of sympathetic plaintiffs.”

The Government seems to be deliberately avoiding picking a Supreme Court § 922(g)(1) fight that it doesn’t think it can win. I reported previously that DOJ decided against filing for cert after losing a 3rd Circuit en banc decision on § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality. In a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Solicitor General said, “In the case of Bryan Range, a Pennsylvania man with a 30-year-old state misdemeanor conviction for understating his income on a food stamp application, the Third Circuit ruled the ban violated his Second Amendment rights… The Department of Justice has concluded that a petition for a writ of certiorari is not warranted in this case,” Solicitor General John Sauer wrote a letter sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee last month. “The Third Circuit’s decision is narrow, leaving § 922(g)(1) untouched except in the most unusual applications.”

Two weeks ago, the 9th Circuit in United States v. Duarte joined the 4th, 8th, 10th and 11th Circuits in refusing to distinguish between violent and non-violent criminals for the purposes of F-I-P constitutionality. The Reload said, “Assuming Duarte appeals the decision, which seems likely, it could present a compelling opportunity for the High Court to address the now deepened circuit split with the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Circuits, which have all recognized an ability for individualized challenges to the federal ban by non-violent offenders.”

melyndavincent250218Last week, a cert petition filed in Vincent v. Bondi may derail the DOJ’s efforts to avoid a Supreme Court reckoning on F-I-P. Melynda Vincent is the poster child for an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), a woman who was convicted 17 years ago of felony bank fraud for passing a fraudulent $498 check when she was homeless and an addict. She got no jail time. Since then, she rehabbed, became a mom, earned several master’s degrees, and started her own rehab counseling firm. Nevertheless, § 922(g)(1) permanently keeps her from possessing a gun to protect her family.

The Reload said that SCOTUS may find ruling on F-I-P easier “by accepting a case like Vincent’s, where even most hardline gun-control advocates would have a difficult time arguing she is too dangerous for consideration.”

DOJ may oppose Vincent by arguing that its new § 925(c) gun rights restoration procedure, whatever it may be, is good enough to take care of her wish to possess a gun. But if § 922(g)(1) violates the 2nd Amendment as applied to Melynda Vincent, then some amorphous and opaque DOJ procedure to restore gun rights on the whim of the AG hardly cures the violation. What’s more, it means that some, if not many, of the tens of thousands of federal prisoners doing time for a potentially unconstitutional offense will be left out in the cold.

The “good enough” of a § 925(c) rights restoration will not be sufficient substitute for the “perfection” of a Supreme Court ruling on § 922(g)(1).

Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, Hunt v. United States, Case No 24-6818 (filed April 25, 2025)

The Reload, The Coming DOJ-SCOTUS Showdown Over Felon Gun Rights (May 18, 2025)

Solicitor General Letter to Sen Richard Durbin (April 11, 2025)

Petition for Certiorari, Vincent v. United States, Case No. 24-1155 (filed May 12, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

Bryan Gets His Gun – Update for April 24, 2025

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GOVERNMENT ENDS RANGE V. ATTY GENERAL NOT WITH A BANG BUT A WHIMPER

fudd250424Last December, the 3d Circuit held that the 18 USC 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession statute was unconstitutional as applied to Bryan Range. Bryan’s recent criminal history included nothing more than a few traffic tickets and fishing without a license, but a quarter century before, he was convicted of making a false statement to get food stamps for his hungry family. That was enough to trigger the F-I-P prohibition on his possessing a gun.

The en banc opinion held in essence that a prior nonviolent offense that qualified under 18 USC 922(g)(1) to prohibit someone from possessing a gun violated the 2nd Amendment. Applying New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, the Circuit held that Bryan

remains one of ‘the people’ protected by the 2nd Amendment, and his eligibility to lawfully purchase a rifle and a shotgun is protected by his right to keep and bear arms. More than two decades after he was convicted of food-stamp fraud and completed his sentence, he sought protection from prosecution under § 922(g)(1) for any future possession of a firearm. The record contains no evidence that Range poses a physical danger to others. Because the Government has not shown that our Republic has a longstanding history and tradition of depriving people like Range of their firearms, 922(g)(1) cannot constitutionally strip him of his 2nd Amendment rights.

This was not the case’s first rodeo. An en banc opinion held the same for Bryan in June 2023, but the Biden Dept of Justice sought Supreme Court review. While the petition was pending, the Supreme Court handed down Rahimi, a case that held that temporarily disarming someone subject to a domestic protection order complied with the 2nd Amendment. SCOTUS remanded all pending 2nd Amendment challenges on its docket – including Range – for reconsideration in light of Rahimi.

gun160711The 3d Circuit ruled that the end of 2024 that nothing in Rahimi changed its position on Bryan’s 2nd Amendment right to buy a hunting rifle. I was fairly sure that the government would head to the Supreme Court again in order to protect America from the dangerous likes of Bryan. Indeed, the DOJ sent signals that it was seriously considering doing just that.

In mid-March, President Trump’s Acting Solicitor General asked the Supreme Court for extra time to decide what to do with Range, reporting that she

has not yet determined whether to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this case. The additional time sought in this application is needed to continue consultation within the government and to assess the legal and practical impact of the Court of Appeals’ ruling. Additional time is also needed, if a petition is authorized, to permit its preparation and printing.

SCOTUS obliged with an extension until last Tuesday (April 22).

With no fanfare, DOJ let the revised deadline pass without a petition for certiorari being filed. This means that the Range decision is final, and in the 3d Circuit at least, people who have been convicted of nonviolent felonies now have a path to restore their gun rights.

What the DOJ decision not to challenge Range at the Supreme Court might mean for the broader question of the as-applied constitutionality of 922(g)(1) is less clear. It could be that DOJ’s compliance with President Trump’s executive order to lessen the burden on 2nd Amendment rights has led it to permit jurisprudence to develop that ties F-I-P to dangerousness rather than the existence of a prior conviction. It could also be a strategic decision that Range was not the hill the government wanted to die on, and that there are better cases in the SCOTUS pipeline (Duarte, perhaps) for the government to use to draw a line in the F-I-P sand.

circuitsplit220516Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing last December in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, suggested that “[b]ecause this Range ruling creates a clear circuit split on the constitutionality of 18 USC 922(g)(1) in some settings, I would expect to see an appeal to the Supreme Court by the U.S. Dept of Justice. But maybe the new incoming [DOJ] officials might not want to test the application and reach of the 2nd Amendment in this particular ‘narrow’ case.”

Regardless of the DOJ’s reasons for taking a pass on Range, the en banc decision is now final, and Bryan can have his gun. What is more, the finality is an incremental but very clear step toward resolving the question of how Bruen and Rahimi limit the reach of F-I-P. Certainly, people in 3rd Circuit with F-I-P convictions may have a path open to them (albeit one with procedural hurdles to cross) to challenge their 18 USC § 922(g)(1) convictions.

Dept of Justice, Application for an Extension of Time Within Which to File a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Case No. 24A-881 (March 12, 2025)

Range v. Attorney General, 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir., December 23, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, En banc 3rd Circuit again finds federal felon-in-possession ban unconstitutional as applied to Bryan Range (December 23, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Another Incremental Victory for Felon-In-Possession – Update for March 31, 2025

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5TH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS FELON-IN-POSSESSION CONSTITUTIONALITY AS APPLIED TO DEFENDANT WITH VIOLENT PAST

The 5th Circuit last week upheld the constitutionality of 18 USC § 921(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession statute as applied to a defendant with a prior aggravated battery conviction.

Comparing the battery offense to Colonial era “armed and affray” laws, the Circuit ruled that the 2nd Amendment permits disarming people like the defendant, Jeremy Schnur.

violent160620The 5th said Jeremy’s “violent aggravated battery conviction is analogous to, and arguably more dangerous than, the ‘prototypical affray [which] involved fighting in public,’ the precursor to the ‘going armed’ laws punishable by arms forfeiture… These affray and going armed laws were intended to “mitigate demonstrated threats of physical violence similar to that displayed by Schnur when he perpetrated the aggravated battery offense [and] supports a tradition of disarming individuals like Schnur pursuant to § 922(g)(1), whose underlying conviction stemmed from the threat and commission of violence.”

The 5th’s approach continues to suggest that those with nonviolent felonies in their background cannot be held subject to the felon-in-possession statute consistent with the 2nd Amendment. This approach has been adopted by the 3rd Circuit in Range v. Atty General and suggested by the 6th Circuit in United States v. Williams. The same question is currently on en banc review in the 9th Circuit’s United States v. Duarte.

United States v. Schnur, Case No. 23-60621, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7030 (5th Cir. March 26, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

St. Vincent Must Remain Unarmed, 10th Says – Update for February 18, 2025

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ADDING TO THE 922(g)(1) MAYHEM…

melyndavincent250218You may remember Melynda Vincent, a woman convicted of bank fraud 15 years ago for writing some bad checks while in the throes of drug addiction. Since then, Melynda cleaned up, graduated from a drug treatment program, earned an undergraduate degree and two graduate degrees, and founded the Utah Harm Reduction Coalition – a nonprofit organization for drug treatment and criminal-justice reform – and a mental health counseling service, Life Changes Counseling.

She’s a poster child for rehabilitation. No, more than that, maybe for sainthood, someone who turned a horrific past and debilitating addiction into something that will benefit countless people (and make society safer).  A therapist who has ‘walked the walk’ the people she counsels are on right now.

In 2021, Melynda sued to be allowed to own a gun. No matter that she might be a saint. The 10th Circuit held that 18 USC § 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession prohibition on gun possession was constitutional as applied to her. After all, she was a felon and that was the end of the story.

At the time, Melynda took her argument to the Supreme Court. SCOTUS sat on her petition for certiorari (along with the government’s request that the high court review the 3d Circuit’s Range decision), and then finally GVR’d her, sending the case back to the 10th for reconsideration in light of United States v. Rahimi.

‘Hint, hint,’ SCOTUS seemed to be saying to the Circuit, ‘take a look at her ‘dangerousness’ before you rubber-stamp a denial based on pre-Rahimi law.

Last week, the 10th ignored the hint. It held that despite New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen and despite Rahimi, its 2009 decision in United States v. McCane that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional when applied to any felon in any situation was still good law. The Circuit relied “on the Supreme Court’s 2008 statement in District of Columbia v. Heller that it was not ‘cast[ing] doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons’” and Rahimi’s recognition of “the presumptive lawfulness of these longstanding prohibitions,” quoting Heller.

“Longstanding?” Prior to 1961, no federal law would have prohibited someone in Melynda’s situation from possessing guns. As the first Range opinion noted, “modern laws have no longstanding analogue in or national history and tradition of firearm regulation.”

The 10th noted that the 4th, the 8th and the 11th Circuits also “have held that Rahimi doesn’t abrogate their earlier precedents upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).”

stvincentB250218Melynda is as sympathetic a felon-in-possession petitioner as anyone could find, maybe even more so than Bryan Range (who, after all, had one ticket for fishing without a license ticket in the 25 years since his food stamp conviction). If § 922(g)(1)‘s felon-in-possession prohibition does not violate the 2nd Amendment as applied to St. Melynda Vincent, the “presumptive lawfulness of these longstanding prohibitions” must be an irrebutable one.

Expect Melynda’s request for Supreme Court review to drop onto the SCOTUS docket before Memorial Day.

Vincent v. Bondi, Case No 21-4121, 2025 USAppLEXIS 3179 (10th Cir. Feb 11, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root