A Spate of 2nd Amendment Decisions – Update for September 3, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

GUNNING FOR THE 2ND AMENDMENT

iloveguns221018A Quick and Categorical Denial: While the 6th Circuit took a deep dive into post-Rahimi 2nd Amendment law last week – holding that an ex-felon convicted of a nonviolent offense may not be subject to 18 USC § 922(g)(1)’s limitation on possessing a gun or ammo – the 8th Circuit swatted away any argument that 18 USC § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to Darris Mull, a defendant with prior nonviolent drug felony convictions.

“Mull’s argument is foreclosed by 8th Circuit precedent,” the appellate court said, citing United States v. Jackson, a decision holding that even after United States v. Rahimi, 18 USC 922(g)(1) does “not violate the 2nd Amendment as applied to defendant whose predicate offenses were non-violent drug offenses.”

The Circuit also noted its decision two weeks ago in United States v. Cunningham that Jackson forecloses any argument that there must be a “felony-by-felony determinations regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to a particular defendant”), the opposite of what the 6th Circuit held in its Williams holding.

United States v. Mull, Case No. 23-3424, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 21943 (8th Cir. Aug 29, 2024)

United States v. Jackson, Case No. 22-2870, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19868 (8th Cir. Aug 8, 2024)

United States v. Cunningham, Case No. 22-1080, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 20715 (8th Cir. Aug 16, 2024)

5th Circuit Holds Alien-In-Possession is Constitutional But Sober Doper-in-Possession is Not: Last week, the 5th Circuit split on a pair of § 922(g) cases.

Jose Massina-Canto was convicted under 18 USC § 922(g)(5) of being an illegal alien in possession of a gun. He argued that § 922(g)(5) violates the 2nd Amendment under New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen and Rahimi.

The 5th held that because Bruen and Rahimi do not “unequivocally abrogate” Circuit precedent in United States v. Portillo-Munoz, “under this circuit’s rule of orderliness, we are bound to follow Portillo-Munoz.”

doggun240213The § 922(g)(3) prohibition on people who use illegal drugs possessing guns is a different matter. In United States v. Connelly, the Circuit held that while § 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutional in all situations (such as some on meth shooting up farmers’ mailboxes), it is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who uses weed and coke occasionally but is a “sober citizen not presently under an impairing influence and… [not] was intoxicated when she was arrested.”

The 5th said that by regulating a defendant based on habitual or occasional drug use, § 922(g)(3) imposed a far greater burden on her 2nd Amendment rights than history and the tradition of firearms regulation can support.

United States v. Medina-Cantu, Case No. 23-40336, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 21730 (5th Cir. Aug 27, 2024)

United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011)

United States v. Connelly, Case No. 23-50312, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 21866 (5th Cir. Aug. 28, 2024)

carriefgun170807Kansas District Court Holds § 922(o) on Possessing Machine Gun is Unconstitutional ‘As Applied’: Complaining that the statutory definition of a machine gun is “extremely broad,” enough to encompass aircraft-mounted automatic cannon to a small stun gun to a BB gun that shoots multiple rounds of projectiles using compressed air,” a district court ruled that 18 USC § 922(o) – that outlaws possession of a “machinegun” (and only the U.S. Code calls a machine gun a “machinegun”) – is unconstitutional as applied to “bearable arms” such as defendant Tamori Morgan’s select-fire AR-15 and his Glock giggle switch (that makes a Glock pistol full auto).

The court rejected the Government’s attempt to show that 18th-century law provides a basis for § 922(o). Those laws banned breaching the peace with unusual or dangerous weapons, but unlike those laws, the Court ruled, § 922(o) “says nothing about the manner in which machineguns are carried or displayed. Instead, § 922(o) criminalizes the mere possession of such weapons without regard to how the possessor uses them.”

The Court also rejected the Government’s argument that the 2nd Amendment “would allow weapons to be prohibited solely on the basis that they are ‘dangerous and unusual” or ‘highly unusual in society at large.’”

The Court noted that possessing a machine gun is not illegal, but rather only possessing a machine gun that is not registered:

There are over 740,000 legally registered machineguns in the United States today,” the Court said. “Machineguns have been in existence for well over a century. While the federal government has regulated transfer and possession of such weapons since passage of the National Firearms Act in 1934,” even now, “it is perfectly legal for a person who has not been divested of his firearm rights under some other provision of law to acquire and possess a machinegun… In that sense, machineguns are not unusual. The government fails to address these facts, and thus fails to meet its burden to demonstrate that possession of the types of weapons at issue in this case are lawfully prohibited under the 2nd Amendment.

On a Reload podcast, 2nd Amendment attorney Matt Larosiere predicted the case is quite likely to be appealed and unlikely to win at the next level, but nevertheless the Morgan decision “would help him and other gun-rights activists in future cases against the ban as well as other portions of the NFA.”

United States v. Morgan, Case No. 23-10047, 2024 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 149550 (D. Kan. Aug 21, 2024)

The Reload, Podcast: Gun-Rights Lawyer Matt Larosiere on a Federal Judge Ruling Against the Machinegun Ban (September 1, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Government Moves Quickly on Atwater BOP Staff Death – Update for August 30, 2024

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ARRESTS IN USP ATWATER STAFF DEATH CASE

I reported last week on the death of a BOP mailroom supervisor at USP Atwater, apparently from contact with a drug-laden document sent to an inmate by legal mail.

Spice_drugWhile the toxicology has not been completed, authorities last week arrested Jamar Jones, a USP Atwater inmate, Stephanie Ferreira, his girlfriend in Indiana former drug felon Jermen Rudd III.

The 30-page arrest complaint, rich with detail, recounts an investigation worthy of CSI Miami. Evidence included months of recorded phone calls and email between the inmate and the others, surveillance footage from a St Louis post office, linking the girlfriend’s Evansville, Indiana, computer to the Postal Service online tracking site, and even St. Louis police license plate reader data to place the third guy in the vicinity of the post office when the package was sent.

The trio, all of whom are being held without bond (Jones, of course, was already in custody), were indicted yesterday on conspiracy to distribute drugs (21 USC 846). Jones was also indicted on an 18 USC § 1791(a)(2) and (b)(2) charge for inmate obtaining or attempting to obtain a controlled substance, and Stephanie and Jermen were indicted on the same 1791(a)(2) and (b)(2) offenses for attempting to provide an inmate with a controlled substance.

cellblock240830Despite press speculation that the document was impregnated with fentanyl, the indictment charges only that the defendants tried to smuggle “a detectable amount of AB-6 CHMINACA and MDMB-4en-PINACA, Schedule I controlled substances, commonly referred to as ‘Spice’.”

The indictment also does not allege that the defendants caused the death of BOP mailroom supervisor Marc Fischer, which suggests that the toxicology reports have not been completed yet.

Criminal Complaint, United States v. Jones, Case No 1:24-cr-209 (ED Cal, ECF 1, August 19, 2024)

Indictment, United States v. Jones, Case No 1:24-cr-209 (ED Cal, ECF 11, August 29, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Watershed Moment for Felon-in-Possession and 2nd Amendment? – Update for August 27, 2024

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DANGER IS MY BUSINESS

nickdanger220426The 6th Circuit handed down a rather inverted but consequential decision last Friday, holding that 18 USC § 922(g)(1) – the statute that prohibits people convicted of a felony from possessing guns or ammo – was consistent with the 2nd Amendment as applied to Erick Williams, a convicted felon with a colorful and rather high-octane rap sheet.

A quick word about “as applied.”

In constitutional law, a facial challenge is a challenge to a statute in which a plaintiff argues that the law is always unconstitutional no matter how it is employed. A law against criticizing the government would always violate the 1st Amendment, whether used against a Marxist firebrand on a soapbox or that nice 80-year-old lady next door tending her gladiolas who complains that Social Security should do better in sending her checks.

Facial challenges are generally hard to win because, despite Congress’s institutional incompetence, facially unconstitutional statutes rarely make it through the legislative process.

In an “as applied” challenge, on the other hand, a plaintiff argues that a statute is unconstitutional not in every sense but rather only when applied in limited cases. The claim in Batson v. Kentucky, where the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race, did not find that peremptory strikes to eliminate jurors from the pool were unconstitutional in all cases, but were unconstitutional when used to strike jurors because of their race.

Back to the live action: Erick, who had previously been convicted of armed robbery and other offenses but who had served his time, was caught in a traffic stop with a handgun. Convicted of being a felon In possession, he appealed on the ground that § 922(g)(1) was facially unconstitutional in the wake of NY State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.

Applying last June’s US v Rahimi decision (in which the Supreme Court ruled that § 922(g)(8), which denied guns to people subject to domestic protection orders), the Circuit ruled that § 922(g)(1) was not unconstitutional as applied to a guy whose “criminal record shows that he’s dangerous.”

danger210211“Through § 922(g)(1), Congress has decided to enact a class-wide disarmament of felons,” the Circuit wrote. “[T]hat statute is constitutional as it applies to dangerous individuals… Consider William’s criminal record. He has two felony counts of aggravated robbery. Robbery is a common-law crime against the person. What’s more, aggravated robbery is robbery… accomplished with a deadly weapon.” Indeed, Williams robbed two people at gunpoint, stealing cash, a watch, and clothing. That offense alone is sufficient to conclude that Williams, if armed, presents a danger to others or the public. But that’s not all. Williams has also been convicted of attempted murder. And he’s already been convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon. In that case, he agreed to stash a pistol that was used to murder a police officer. The government could’ve pointed to any one of those convictions to demonstrate his dangerousness. Thus, Williams may be constitutionally disarmed through a class-based statute like § 922(g)(1).”

The 6th had “little trouble concluding that Williams is a dangerous felon” and thus, that “the government may, consistent with the 2nd Amendment, punish him for possessing a firearm. And the government may enact this prohibition through a broad, class-wide ban like § 922(g)(1). His as-applied challenge therefore fails.”

The Circuit was rather expansive in its holding, however, providing a roadmap for other people with prior convictions who may nevertheless retain a constitutional right to firearms. The 6th limited its definition of who might be dangerous to those who had “committed a crime against the body of another human being… including (but not limited to) murder, rape, assault, and robbery, or… a crime that inherently poses a significant threat of danger, including (but not limited to) drug trafficking and burglary. An individual in either of those categories will have a very difficult time, to say the least, of showing he is not dangerous.”

In Range v. Atty General, the 3rd Circuit opened the felon-in-possession door a crack. The 6th Circuit has nudged it a bit more by applying Rahimi’s dangerousness analysis to the “as applied” mix. To be sure, the 6th included some provisos.

First, it said that it did not exclude “crimes that pose no threat of physical danger, like mail fraud, tax fraud, or making false statements” from being dangerous, but rather deferred that for another day.

Second, it explained that district courts need not find a “categorical” match to a specific common-law crime to show that a person is dangerous. Instead, district courts “should make fact-specific dangerousness determinations after taking account of the unique circumstances of the individual, including details of his specific conviction” and should consider a defendant’s entire criminal record — not just the specific felony underlying his § 922(g)(1) prosecution.”

Finally, the Circuit was implicitly critical that Erick had not sought a declaratory judgment that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him before being arrested, holding that “Williams availed himself of his constitutionally required opportunity to show that he is not dangerous – albeit after he violated the law, not before.” Whether a movant’s timing – attacking § 922(g)(1) before an arrest rather than as a defense after an arrest – will matter in the constitutional calculus (and it should not), remains to be seen.

Notguns170330Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, said last Sunday, “By my read, this opinion means that any and every person within the Sixth Circuit criminal charged with illegal firearm possession under 922(g)(1) — and perhaps other federal and state gun control provisions? — can now seek dismissal of that charge by making ‘an individualized showing that he himself is not actually dangerous.’ In addition, I wonder if this Williams opinion might now provide a means for the millions of persons with non-violent felony convictions in the Sixth Circuit to seek a declaratory judgment that they are ‘not actually dangerous’ and thus have a Second Amendment right to possess (and purchase) firearms like all their fellow citizens.”

United States v. Williams, Case No. 23-6115, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21375 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Sixth Circuit panel rules federal prohibition of felon gun possession is “constitutional on its face and as applied to dangerous people” (Aug 25, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Bivens, Uh-huh. What Is It Good For? Absolutely Nuthin’ – Update for August 23, 2024

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BIVENS – KILLING IT SOFTLY

I was just graduating from high school when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Webster Bivens, who sued federal agents after they broke into his apartment without a warrant and arrested him on a drug charge (that was promptly dismissed by a magistrate judge).

policeraid170824In the 50-year-plus interlude since I turned 18, Webb Biven’s handwritten lawsuit seeking monetary damages against the agents who kicked down his door became famous in legal circles as Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Webb has quite accidentally lent his name to all lawsuits seeking money for federal officials’ and agents’ misconduct, widely known as “Bivens actions.”

I now carry a Medicare card. The high school from which I graduated no longer exists. And when reading this week’s 3rd Circuit’s decision in Kalu v. Spaulding, I keep recalling Edwin Starr’s 1969 piece War, albeit with different lyrics:

Bivens, uh-huh, what is it good for?
Absolutely nuthin’.
Say it again, y’all.

Or maybe Roberta Flack: Bivens – Killing It Softly.

Congress has authorized federal money-damages lawsuits against state and local officials and employees for the violation of one’s constitutional rights in 42 USC § 1983. When Webb argued in 1971 that there must exist a similar right to sue federal officials and employees for damages when they run roughshod over a person’s constitutional rights, the Supreme Court obliged him, finding in the Constitution an implied right to do to federal officials what § 1983 lets one do to state and local officials.

In the decade following the Bivens decision — which authorized suits seeking damages for 4th Amendment violations — the Supreme Court approved a Bivens damage remedy for a congressional staffer’s gender discrimination claim under the 5th Amendment (Davis v. Passman) and for a federal prisoner’s inadequate-care claim under the 8th Amendment (Carlson v. Green).

However, 1980 was the high-water mark for Bivens. Since then, citing the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial power, SCOTUS has consistently narrowed the grounds that can support a Bivens actions.

“At bottom,” the Supremes said two years ago in Egbert v. Boule, a decision that drove a stake through the heart of Bivens, “creating a cause of action is a legislative endeavor.” Thus, litigants are denied the right to bring a Bivens action in “a new context.”

bivens240823If it ain’t a 4th Amendment “kick-down-the-door” suit, a member of Congress with wandering hands, or an 8th Amendment inadequate care claim, Bivens is good for absolutely nuthin’.

This week, the 3rd Circuit demonstrated in a lengthy opinion just how dead Bivens is, making the casual reader wonder why the Supreme Court — which is not adverse to the death penalty — didn’t simply consign Bivens to the dustbin of history the way it did Roe v. Wade (another relic of my youth).

John Kalu, who was a federal inmate at the time, brought an 8th Amendment claim against a Bureau of Prisons correctional officer for sexually assaulting him on three occasions. John has since been released and thus has no remedy for the alleged offense except money damages. However, the Circuit held, “[h]eeding the Supreme Court’s recent and repeated warning that we must exercise ‘caution”’ before implying a damages remedy under the Constitution, we decline to extend the Bivens remedy to Kalu’s claims.”

The 3rd admitted that John’s Bivens claim for sexual assault was pretty close to the Carlson situation, where the Court allowed a Bivens action for the BOP’s failure to protect a prisoner from a sexual assault by another prisoner. But while admitting that “the distinctions between Kalu’s sexual assault claim and the one recognized in Carlson are perhaps small, at least in practical terms… given the Supreme Court’s expressed caution about extending the Bivens remedy, the new-context inquiry is easily satisfied here.”

The Circuit ruled that

the availability of an alternative remedial scheme through the BOP’s administrative remedy program, Congress’s repeated omission of a cause of action against individual officials in both the Prison Litigation Reform Act and the Prison Rape Elimination Act, and separation of powers principles are special factors counseling against extending Bivens liability to Kalu’s officer-on-prisoner sexual assault claim. As Egbert cautions, whether to supplement an existing remedial scheme with a damages action is a legislative determination that we are not allowed to ‘second-guess…’ We therefore hold Kalu’s 8th Amendment sexual assault claim… is ineligible for remedies under Bivens.

In Egbert, the Supreme Court indicated that if it had to decide Bivens today, it “would decline to discover any implied causes of action in the Constitution.” One wonders why the Supreme Court didn’t simply overturn Bivens, stare decisis be damned, and spare the judicial system and plaintiffs the steady drip inevitably leading to limiting Bivens to a meaningless singularity.

forcedsex161202One of the unanimous three-judge panel in Kalu was Judge Luis Restrepo, who also serves on the US Sentencing Commission. Although Judge Restrepo felt that Egbert required that he join the majority opinion, he wrote a concurring opinion delivering a blistering criticism of “the alarming reports of pervasive staff-on-inmate sexual abuse within the Bureau of Prisons and corresponding flaws in the administrative remedy process.”

Judge Restrepo noted that while the “Federal Prison Oversight Act, which President Joe Biden recently signed into law… provides much-needed safeguards, the provision of a civil legal remedy for survivors of staff-on-inmate abuse is notably absent from the text of the statute. This absence, Egbert cautions us, may lend ‘reason to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy’ in cases such as the one before us’.”

Uh-huh.

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 (1971)

Egbert v. Boule, 596 US 482 (2022)

Davis v. Passman, 442 US 228 (1979)

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)

Kalu v. Spaulding, Case No. 23-1103, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21092 (3d Cir. Aug. 21, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

The Thief As Victim – Update for August 22, 2024

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PAY THE MAN, SHIRLEY

John O’Hara ripped off his mama.

paytheman240822In February 2019, John pled guilty to wire fraud and bank fraud for stealing over $300,000 from his aged mother, whose finances he was managing. She died a few weeks after his guilty plea – from a broken heart, perhaps? – but she nonetheless passed on leaving her entire estate to her boy John.

At sentencing, the Court ordered John to do 26 months in prison and to pay $332,150 or so in restitution to his mother’s estate. Despite knowing the restitution that John paid to the estate would end up back in his own pocket, the government did not object to the restitution order.

John was released in May 2021 but – contrary to his conditions of supervised release – had paid no restitution since his release from prison. Normally, a supervised releasee would be violated for such a history of noncompliance with release conditions, but the district court was realistic. In May 2023, it issued an order noting that while John had failed for two years “to pay any portion of the restitution as directed by the Court,” still,

inasmuch as the defendant would be the recipient of any restitution he might pay in the future, it is hereby ordered that, within fourteen days, the United States is directed to state its position regarding whether the defendant should be discharged from his existing restitution obligation.

The government suggested that since it couldn’t see the defendant being allowed to pay himself, the Court should substitute the Crime Victims Fund in place of his mother’s estate. John, of course, suggested that the court just forget the whole restitution thing.

The district court ruled that “allowing a perpetrator to effectively receive his own restitution would have the effect of nullifying a court’s restitution order and circumventing Congress’ intent to require mandatory restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.” It thus amended the judgment to require John to pay the $332,150 to the Crime Victims Fund.

John appealed, and this week, the 6th Circuit reversed the amended judgment, saying (albeit reluctantly), “Pay the man, Shirley.  And that man is yourself.”

After a court imposes a sentence, the Circuit observed, it has no authority to change the sentence “unless such authority is expressly granted by statute.” Because a restitution order is a part of the sentence, if a court wants to change a restitution order, “it must point to express statutory authorization to do so.”

money240822While 18 USC § 3664 expressly allows modification of restitution order, it lists only “a handful of ways a restitution order may be altered.” It may be amended if the victim’s losses are not ascertainable at sentencing, adjusted due to a defendant’s changed economic circumstances, or modified if the defendant is resentenced.

None of these, the 6th said, apply here, “so the district court could not use them to amend the judgment.”

The Circuit understood the district court’s motivation. “This is a case where a court may be tempted to elide the statute’s text to do what makes practical sense within the spirit and confines of the MVRA,” the appellate court wrote. “But even given the MVRA’s laudable goals, a court does not have discretion to ignore the statutory limits on modifying a final restitution order.”

This is not to say that the courts are without power to deny John his plan to pay himself restitution. The 6th included a detailed footnote observing that Kentucky statute § 381.280(2) excludes people from inheriting the results of their wrongdoing. “We leave the statute’s application to state courts,” the appellate decision states. “We only note that such a statutory scheme seems to fit the occasion and reiterate that it would be in the power of the probate court to apply its terms were the estate to be reopened and receive any money.”

The Circuit’s message: Justice may yet triumph, Mr. O’Hara.

United States v. O’Hara, Case No. 23-5695, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20983 (6th Cir. Aug. 20, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Courts Should Favor 2255 Motion Decisions on the Merits, 9th Circuit Holds – Update for August 20, 2024

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RULE 4 SHOULD BE USED SPARINGLY IN 2254/2255 CASES, 9TH HOLDS

A 28 USC § 2255 motion often seems to be stacked against the movant. The district court can throw it out on its own if the judge thinks it “plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief.” If the court tells the government to answer, the judge can then deny the motion without allowing for discovery or an evidentiary hearing. If there is a hearing, the court can then deny it.

Lose200615So many ways to lose!

The court’s right to dismiss the § 2255 motion without even asking for a response from the prosecutor is enshrined in Rule 4 of the clumsily-named Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. 2255. Rule 4 is a lot like Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings (except that in the § 2255 rules, a judge may also rely on “the record of prior proceedings,” something the Court does not have available to it in a 28 USC § 2254 review of a state habeas proceeding.

Pat Neiss filed a state habeas claim that his Montana conviction should be set aside because his lawyer was ineffective. He was denied by the state courts, so he filed a 28 USC § 2254 petition in district court. Thirteen days after he filed, the district court summarily dismissed Pat’s petition with prejudice, holding that Pat’s claim was not cognizable because his trial counsel “moved repeatedly, in different contexts, to suppress the evidence,” even though he failed to make the one suppression motion – a particularity claim – that would have worked.

The district court cited Strickland v, Washington’s statement that “Counsel’s decision to focus on certain aspects of these attacks rather than on others does not cause their performance to ‘f[a]ll below an objective standard of reasonableness.”

A 9th Circuit decision last week reversed the summary dismissal, warning judges to err on the side of the petitioner in applying Rule 4.

The Circuit held that Rule 4 permits summary dismissal of claims on the basis of lack of cognizability only where the allegations in the petition are vague, conclusory, palpably incredible, or patently frivolous or false.” Rule 4’s standard, the Court said, “essentially is whether the movant has made specific factual allegations that, if true, state a claim on which relief could be granted… Our case law has made clear that as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal under Rule 4. The legal term ‘frivolous’ is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as ‘lacking a legal basis or legal merit; manifestly insufficient as a matter of law.’ And 9th Circuit case law is in accord.”

stupidlawyr191202Here, the 9th said, Pat’s petition alleged that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when counsel waived a meritorious particularity objection to a search warrant. The Supreme Court has recognized that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may be based on defense counsel’s failure to litigate a 4th Amendment claim competently. Thus, these allegations state a cognizable claim on which relief could be granted, the Circuit held.

Nothing on the face of Pat’s petition plainly showed that his particularity objection to the search warrant lacked merit as a matter of law or that trial counsel’s failure to object on that ground could not have prejudiced him. But rather than conducting this analysis, the district court ruled that regardless of whether a particularity challenge was made, counsel’s wide and repeated efforts to get the computer search evidence suppressed were objectively reasonable.”

At the summary dismissal stage,” the 9th held, “district courts must consider only whether a claim is frivolous, not whether it is ultimately—or likely—a winner or loser.”

Neiss v Bludworth, Case No. 22-35877, 2024 U.S. App.  LEXIS 20752 (9th Cir., August 16, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

BOP Employee Death From Suspected Drug-Laden Letter – Update for August 19, 2024

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BOP MAIL SUPERVISOR DIES AFTER EXPOSURE TO MAIL SOAKED IN “UNKNOWN SUBSTANCE”

A Bureau of Prisons mailroom supervisor at USP Atwater died August 10th  “following his exposure to mail saturated in an unknown substance”, according to a statement issued by BOP Director Colette Peters.

marcfischer240819Supervisory Correctional Systems Specialist Marc Fischer was pronounced dead at a local hospital after falling ill upon coming into contact with the substance. A second employee also came into contact with the substance but was treated at a hospital and released.

Mr. Fischer, a veteran of the United States Coast Guard, had worked for the BOP for over 23 years, according to Corrections1. He spent his entire career at USP Atwater, starting as a correctional officer in 2001 and becoming a Supervisory Correctional Systems Specialist in 2009.

The BOP and federal law enforcement agencies are investigating whether the substance was fentanyl, according to ABC News. The Los Angeles Times reported that “[r]esearchers say that briefly touching fentanyl cannot cause an overdose, and the risk of death from accidental exposure is low.” Nevertheless, the newspaper’s headline claimed “possible fentanyl exposure.”

Last December, Rep. Don Bacon (R-NE) introduced H.R. 5266, the Interdiction of Fentanyl in Postal Mail at Federal Prisons Act, a bill that would require the BOP to electronically scan all inmate mail coming into its facilities. The measure has not yet cleared the House Judiciary Committee, let alone been introduced in the Senate. With fewer than 40 days left in Congress’s legislative calendar, it is unlikely that it will make it before Congress expires.

Mr. Fischer left behind a wife, a son and a daughter.

Reaction to the incident could substantially curtail inmate access to the type of tangible connection to family that kids’ drawings, greeting cards and printed photos provide. That might be an unfortunate overreaction.

However, there will be time to reason out what steps, if any, should be taken to protect BOP workers and to further curtail drugs entering facilities. For now, the focus should be on the real tragedy here:  Mr. Fischer is dead and a family mourns. 

ABC, Bureau of Prisons employee dies after coming into contact with ‘unknown substance’ (August 10, 2024)

Los Angeles Times, Prison worker dies at Atwater Federal Prison in Central Valley; possible fentanyl exposure (August 10, 2024)

Corrections1, Calif. corrections official dies after coming into contact with unknown substance in mail (August 15, 2024)

BOP, Message from the Director (August 12, 2024)

H.R.5266, Interdiction of Fentanyl in Postal Mail at Federal Prisons Act

– Thomas L. Root

November 1st Promises to be a Quiet Day – Update For August 16, 2024

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MYTHBUSTERS

I might fairly be accused of trotting out the old “Mythbusters” trope every few months or so when I have nothing else to write about. But it’s not so.

mythbusters240816A loyal reader, himself a skilled jailhouse lawyer, urged me several months ago to revisit some of inmates’ most cherished rumors and myths. He was feeling a little beaten down by well-intended questions about how the Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo decision invalidating the Chevron deference doctrine must mean that people with medium and high recidivism scores will now be able to earn First Step Act credits. (Hint: Loper Bright will affect FSA credits not at all).

Others are demanding to know how President Joe Biden’s signing of H.R. 3019 into law would do the same.

It has been a busy summer, however, and although I am getting the usual number of emails asking why the BOP won’t renew the elderly offender home detention program and when the new meth law takes effect, it took this email yesterday to force my hand:

PATRICIA PRISONER on 8/15/2024 at 10:32:58 AM wrote

i have a question concerning the FSA..IN NOVEMBER WHEN THE LAWS COME INTO EFFECT..WILL THE PPL WITH HIGH OR MEDIUM RECIDIVISM BE ABLE TO USE THEIR TIME CREDITS??DO ANYTHING CHANGE FOR THOSE WHO HAVE PROGRAMED BUT WONT BE ABLE TO CHANGE THEIR STATUS TO A LOW???

Aarrgh! Another FSA credit question.

So here we go, by the numbers:

(1)    What will happen on November 1st?

On November 1st, two things will happen. First, Sentencing Guidelines amendments proposed last spring will go into effect, unless Congress blocks them (which it will not).

nothinghere190906The second is that BOP Director Colette Peters will ride up to the front gate of every BOP institution and give one lucky inmate a ride home on the back of her BOP Central Office unicorn.

Only one of the foregoing is true. And it ain’t the unicorn.

Unfortunately, the traditional November 1st date for the effectiveness of sentencing guidelines amendments has attained an almost mythical status on the inmate grapevine commonly known as “inmate.com.” But let’s remember this (covered in high school government class, probably on a day you skipped): The sentencing guidelines, like all government regulations, are NOT laws. Guidelines are written by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to authority granted by Congress. They are advisory only. A judge does not have to follow them. And this year, not a single Guidelines amendment will retroactively apply to people already sentenced. So, the amendments going into effect on November 1 have absolutely no effect on federal prisoners.

Congress has not passed any changes to the federal criminal laws this year. With only about 35 more days of legislative sessions this year for the House and 39 for the Senate (and with elections for all representatives and one-third of the senators), there is no chance that Congress will do anything to benefit federal prisoners.

The misperception that crime is rising is one of the bogeymen of this election cycle. No legislator’s going to vote for something that may benefit maybe 50,000 federal prisoners but gives his or her opponent an opening to argue that the incumbent voted to let dangerous criminals go free. As the politicians say, it’s bad optics.

(2) The BOP is not arbitrarily denying FSA credits to high and medium recidivism inmates.

Under 18 USC 3624(g)(1), in order to use FSA credits, a prisoner must have a “minimum” or “low” recidivism risk or “ha[ve] shown through the periodic risk reassessments a demonstrated recidivism risk reduction.” It is possible for a medium or high recidivism inmate to earn the right to spend FSA credits, but the statute (18 USC 3624(g)(1)(D)(ii)) is very specific about how difficult earning such a right would be.

recidivism240408The important point is that any changes to the FSA credit program – that lets prisoners earn credits to shorten sentences and permit more halfway house/home confinement – that would permit people with high and medium recidivism scores to use their credits, both the House and the Senate would have to pass an amended First Step Act law and the President would have to sign it. It simply is not going to happen this year.

And while we’re on it, why won’t the BOP let people with 18 USC § 924(c) gun charges have FSA credits? Simply enough, it’s because Congress deliberately excluded § 924(c) convictions from eligibility. The BOP’s got no power to change that.

(3) H.R. 3019 was indeed signed by the President, but it is the Federal Prison Oversight Act and has nothing to do with FSA credits.

In the 5½ years since the First Step Act was passed, no one has mounted any serious effort to change the FSA credits. Congress seems content that 63 different categories of offenses (comprising about half of all federal inmates) remain ineligible for FSA credits.

The FPOA is legislation that holds great promise for increasing BOP accountability, but it has nothing to do with the First Step Act in general or FSA credits in particular.

(4) Elderly Offender Home Detention Program has come and gone.

I still get complaints that the BOP is denying people who are 60 years old home confinement at their two-thirds date.

Of course it is. The two-thirds home confinement for 60+ people was the Elderly Offender Home Detention Program, authorized by the First Step Act. It was a pilot program, and was authorized to run until September 30, 2023. When it expired, I wrote about it.

The important point is that Congress set the expiration date. The BOP has no right to waive the expiration date or to extend it. It’s up to Congress, and Congress hasn’t done a thing about it.

(5) When does the new meth law go into effect?

meth240618What new meth law? About 18 months ago, a single district court in Mississippi ruled that the Guidelines enhancement for methamphetamine purity should not be applied because these days, just about all meth is high purity. The judge in question, however, was Carleton Reeves, who happens to be chairman of the Sentencing Commission, making the holding kind of a big deal.

The Guidelines enhancement is based on 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), which sets differing levels for pure meth and a “mixture… containing a detectable amount” of meth. Last June, the Commission released a study showing that meth purity is no longer a reasonable metric for enhancement. The Commission may yet take up the enhancement, although it has not yet committed to do so. However, no real change can be effected until Congress changes the law. Congress has given no indication it is interested in doing so.

(6)    A Basic Government lesson

We should all understand that a “congress” runs for two years. We are in the 118th Congress right now. It ends on January 2, 2025, The 119th Congress begins on January 3, 2025, and ends on January 3, 2027.

When a Congress ends, any bill that is pending but not passed disappears. The 119th Congress starts with a clean slate. This means that any bill currently pending (like marijuana reform, the EQUAL Act, First Step Act changes) will die.

Whether any criminal justice reform legislation makes it through the 119th Congress has a lot to do with who controls the House and Senate and who will be sitting in the White House. If one party ends up controlling all of it (especially the Democrats), some of what has been stalled – such as the Cannabis Administration and Opportunity Act and EQUAL Act — may have a real shot.

– Thomas L. Root

“Abandon Hope” at MDC Brooklyn – Update for August 15, 2024

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A PRISON UNFIT FOR PRISONERS

The Tower of London, Black Hole of Calcutta, Devil’s Island… Add to the list of infamous prisons where no one should be confined the Federal Bureau of Prisons Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York.

calcutta240108Last week, US District Judge Gary Brown (EDNY) sentenced 74-year-old Daniel Colucci – convicted of failing to pay over taxes collected from his employees to the IRS – to nine months in prison conditioned on the BOP not designating him to serve it at MDC Brooklyn, a designation to that would be, “under present circumstances, unacceptable.”

The opinion, describing in extensive detail the inhumane conditions at MDC Brooklyn – including lengthy lockdowns, vicious assaults and significant delays in providing medical care – came several weeks after an MDC inmate was killed in a fight there.

Judge Brown ruled that the severity of the million-dollar tax loss, the court’s suspicions about the “depth” of Colucci’s remorse, and reluctance to pay restitution, made the nine-month sentence necessary.

However, all of that was trumped, the Court said, by the risk that Colucci’s short sentence might result in the BOP designating him to MDC Brooklyn:

[J]udges in this district are subject to a steady drumfire of [allegations of inhumane treatment at MDC]… And these issues continue to affect judicial determinations. In United States v. Chavez, contrary to statutory presumptions, Judge Furman ordered that a narcotics defendant subject to a multi-year sentence remain at liberty pending surrender, based largely on the conditions at MDC. In United States v Griffin, Judge Komitee granted a motion for compassionate release based primarily on the conditions at MDC for a defendant serving time for violating supervised release. Cf. United States v. Santana (“Given the severe prison conditions that prevail at the MDC (conditions that amount to imposing harsher punishments on prisoners), this Court and others have adjusted sentences of defendants in custody there for lengthy periods.”). In yet another case, Judge Cogan indicated that he might have sentenced an offender to incarceration “if not for the length of the sentence landing him in the Bureau of Prison’s Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn.

medicalcare220912In Chavez, Judge Furman identified three areas of concern in the post-COVID conditions at MDC: (1) continued reports of inordinate periods of lockdown, (2) claims that the facility provides inadequate and/or substantially delayed necessary medical care—a particular risk in this case and (3) general issues about the conditions at the facility. Allegations of inadequate supervision, unbridled assaults and lack of sufficient medical care are supported by an increasing body of evidence, with certain instances that are irrefutable. [See] Griffin (‘it has been well documented that the MDC has an ongoing issue with frequent lockdowns due to violence and the threat of violence, among other concerns, which has delayed medical care for a number of inmates’).”

The Court also cited Griffin’s finding that “[c]haos reigns, along with uncontrolled violence” at the facility. Judge Brown wrote, “This Court has identified shocking instances of brutal violence within the facility. This review is necessarily limited, as the Court’s access to relevant information was exceptionally narrow. In other words, there were, most certainly, other incidents not collected during this Court’s review. Nevertheless, the results are staggering.”

Colucci was deserving of some incarceration, the Court held, but the “circumstances present a conundrum… [T]he defendant, like the defendant in Chavez, is over 70 years of age, faces significant health challenges and has no criminal record… Thus, a sentence of incarceration imposed, if that sentence would be served at the MDC, would most assuredly be excessive..”

The Court ruled that Colucci would remain on bond until the BOP designated him to a facility. If he is sent somewhere other than MDC Brooklyn, he will do his time there. However, if the BOP designates MDC as Colucci’s facility, the Court intends to vacate the 9-month sentence and send Colucci to home confinement instead.

accountable220225David E. Patton, the former chief federal defender for New York City, told the New York Times that the BOP has evaded accountability for the deplorable state of MDC Brooklyn. “People are dying because of their inaction,” he said. “I know it’s not easy to take on your colleagues in the Bureau of Prisons. I know it’s not easy to reform a broken culture. But it’s time for some fortitude from our leaders.”

The BOP told The Times, “We make every effort to ensure the physical safety and health of the individuals confined to our facilities through a controlled environment that is secure and humane.”

United States v. Colucci, Case No. 23-CR-417, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138497 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2024)

United States v. Chavez, Case No. 22-CR-303, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1525 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2024)

United States v. Griffin, Case No. 22-CR-408, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102127 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2024)

United States v. Santana, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90220 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2024)

New York Times, Brooklyn Jail Is Too ‘Inhumane’ for 75-Year-Old Tax Scammer, Judge Says (August 8, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Open Season on Gun Laws – Update for August 13, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

FURBALL OVER SECOND AMENDMENT CONTINUES

lotsalaw240813As a young pup in law school a half-century ago, I had a contract law professor, Robert J, Nordstrom, who was as theatrical as he was brilliant. One day while discussing an obscure point of contract law, he dramatically waved his arm in the general direction of the law library and said, “Remember, people, there’s enough law in there for everybody.”

I got his point. A canny lawyer could find a decision somewhere in the law books that supported whatever position – however ridiculous – he or she wanted to take. Turns out that the same is true of history.

After New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, lawyers stampeded to the history books to find evidence that the many statutes regulating guns on the federal and state books had 18th and 19th-century precedents. Then, last June’s United States v. Rahimi decision relaxed the Bruen standard a bit, clarifying that the historical regulation didn’t have to be identical, just analogous.

In other words, the history doesn’t have to fit exactly. It just has to sort of fit. What’s more, in the fitting, the courts can draw such conclusions as they wish. The results are a pastiche of contradictions. For instance, AR-15s can be banned in Maryland but not in New Jersey.

In the last two weeks alone

• the 8th Circuit quickly upheld its decision that 18 USC § 922(g)(1) did not violate the 2nd Amendment when applied to a defendant previously convicted of a drug offense. The case had been appealed to the Supreme Court but was remanded for the Circuit to reconsider it in light of Rahimi. The Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court said in District of Columbia v. Heller that nothing has “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” and that neither Bruen nor Rahimi nor historical analysis changed that.

United States v. Jackson, Case No. 22-2870, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19868 (8th Cir., Aug. 8, 2024)

• the 11th Circuit ruled that neither Bruen nor Rahimi “abrogate[d] our previous holding that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the 2nd Amendment because “felons are categorically ‘disqualified’ from representing their 2nd Amendment right under Heller.”

United States v. Lowe, Case No. 22-13251, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19494 (11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024)

minuteman240813• the 4th Circuit upheld Maryland’s ban on “assault weapons,” concluding that guns such as the popular AR-15 platform (perhaps 25 million copies in civilian hands in the United States) are outside 2nd Amendment protection because they are “military-style weapons designed for sustained combat operations that are ill-suited and disproportionate to the need for self-defense.” The Circuit cited Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769) that noted existing prohibitions on “riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, which would terrify the good people of the land.”

Bianchi v. Brown, Case No. 21-1255, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19624 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024)

• on July 30, the US District Court for New Jersey ruled that the state’s AR-15 platform ban violated the 2nd Amendment because the style of rifle is commonly owned throughout the United States and well-adapted for self-defense.

Association of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc., v. Platkin, Case No. 18-10507, 2024 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 134737, (D.N.J., July 30, 2024)

• In the same week, the 4th ruled that 18 USC § 922(k) – which outlaws possession of a gun with an obliterated serial number – did not violate the 2nd Amendment. The Circuit said that because “we cannot fathom any common-sense reason for a law-abiding citizen to want to use a firearm with an obliterated serial number for self-defense, and there is no evidence before us that they are nonetheless commonly lawfully used, we conclude that firearms with obliterated serial numbers are not in common use for a lawful purpose and they therefore fall outside the scope of the 2nd Amendment’s protection.”

United States v. Price, Case No. 22-4609, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19623 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024)

furball240813The more we see the Bruen standard applied, the confusing-er it gets. The Rahimi holding, at least this early in the game, does not seem to have helped a lot.

Professor Nordstrom might have said, “There’s enough history out there for everyone.”

Pick your facts and make your holdings.

– Thomas L. Root