We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.
“HOW ARE WE DOING? PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING SURVEY…
It’s unlikely that the Federal Bureau of Prisons will be asking prisoners that question anytime soon. But someone might.
At last week’s meeting, the U.S. Sentencing Commission said that in the coming year, it plans to assess how effective the BOP is in meeting the purposes of sentencing listed in 18 USC § 3553(a)(2). Those purposes include the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment and adequate deterrence, to protect the public and to effectively provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or other treatment.
The Commission also plans to continue review of how the guidelines treat acquitted conduct for sentencing purposes. The Supreme Court recently denied review in a baker’s-dozen cases asking it to declare the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing to be unconstitutional. Three Justices cited the ongoing USSC study of the issue as a reason to hold off.
Other Commission priorities in the coming year include studying the career offender guidelines, methamphetamine offenses, sentencing differences for cases disposed of through trial versus plea, and sentences involving youthful individuals.
Egbert drove a metaphorical legal stake into Bivens‘ heart, as the 10th’s decision in the prisoner food case makes clear. It’s easy enough to cluck one’s tongue over Prisoner Adams’ tainted food claim (like any prison food is edible), but a lot of serious Bivens claims died on Egbert’s hill.
We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.
Over 85,000 Federal Bureau of Prisons inmates have either had status points applied in their Guidelines sentencing calculations or had no criminal history points to begin with. However, the Sentencing Commission estimated in its May 2023 Impact Analysis that only about 11,500 prisoners will be eligible for a lower sentencing range due to the status-point change and about 7,250 prisoners will be eligible for a lower sentencing range based upon the “zero-point” change.
Who Should File: The Dept of Justice complained to the Commission that regardless of who is eligible for a reduced sentence, most zero-point offenders or those with status points are likely to move for a reduction anyway. This would flood the courts, critics complained (many of whom have predicted 17 of the last three times changes in the law or Guidelines did so).
Still, history suggests that if you aren’t eligible, you should save a stamp. Motions that are dead on arrival only gum up the works for people who have meritorious issues and are already waiting too long for a judicial response.
Are you eligible? First, figure out whether applying zero-point or status-point to your Guidelines would change your sentencing range. This is important: If after you adjust your Guidelines for zero-point or status-point, your sentence is within or below your adjusted sentencing range, you are ineligible. Period. Do not pass “go.”
Example: Mike Methdealer had zero points and was a Crim I. His Guideline sentencing range was 135-168, but his judge gave him a break, sentencing him to 120 months, his mandatory minimum. Applying zero-point, his Guidelines fall to 108-135, but he still has a 120-month mandatory minimum. Mike is not eligible.
Example: Rick Recidivist had six criminal history points, putting him at the top of Category III. Two of those were status points. Take those away, and he would have four points, putting him at the bottom of Crim Category III. Rick, too, is not eligible.
Even worse, Rick was sentenced as a Guidelines career offender. Definitely not eligible.
Example: Sammy Snitch had a guideline sentencing range of 188-235 months. But he rolled on his co-defendants, and the judge gave him a four-level 5K1.1 departure to 121 months. Applying his status-point reduction would drop his range to 168-210 months. Special rules apply to people with 5K1.1 sentences, and he would be eligible to have his 121 month reduced proportionately.
Things are especially tough for zero-point men and women, who must meet all of the conditions listed in new USSC § 4C1.1: (1) no USSG § 3A1.4 terrorism adjustment; (2) no violence or threats of violence; (3) no one got hurt; (4) no sex offense; (5) the defendant did not personally cause “substantial financial hardship” (defined in Application Note 4(F) of the Commentary to USSG § 2B1.1); (6) no gun involved in the offense; (7) the offense did not involve individual rights under USSG § 2H1.1; (8) no USSG §3A1.1 adjustment for a hate crime or vulnerable victim or USSG §3A1.5 for serious human rights offense; and (9) no adjustment under USSG §3B1.1 for role in the offense and offense was not a 21 USC § 848 continuing criminal enterprise.
When to File: You can file for the reduction as early as November 1, 2023. However, no court is allowed to let the reduction become effective before February 1, 2024.
How to file: The filing you are making is under 18 USC 3582(c)(2) and USSG 1B1.10. There are two components to your showing. One, you have to prove that you are eligible. Two, you have to convince the judge that you are worthy of the reduction.
A judge has almost complete discretion to grant you the reduction up to the bottom of your adjusted range. You have to sell yourself – especially your post-sentence record – to the court.
Who to Hire:No one can answer this for you. You could prepare and file a motion yourself. You could hire a lawyer or a writing service, remember that in the past (such as the drugs-minus-two in 2014 and Section 404 crack motions after the First Step Act), many district courts appointed the Federal Public Defender to represent eligible prisoners. Be sure you’re not eligible to get it for free from the FPD before you spend good commissary money on a mouthpiece.
What Not to Do: Speaking of people willing to take your money, the BOP last week issued a media advisory that a phone scam is going around where callers are identifying themselves as BOP employees to ask you to pay money to secure release to pre-release custody for your loved ones. Presumably, the BOP now takes Apple iTunes cards and Googleplay as well as postal money orders.
You can say a lot of things about the BOP, but it does not call people to demand their personal information or money. For now, you cannot buy $10,000 ankle monitors or use prepaid gift cards to buy people’s way out of BOP custody.
US Sentencing Commission, Public Meeting (August 24, 2023)
We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.
SENTENCING COMMISSION CLIFFHANGER SENDS CRIMINAL HISTORY CHANGES RETROACTIVE
Sentencing Commission meetings – and admittedly, we don’t have many in our sample, because the USSC was moribund for the five years ending last August – are usually yawners. Chairman Carlton Reeves likes to talk and loves polite consensus. No one on the Commission is a bomb-thrower, and every the most vigorous policy disputes are cloaked in courtesy. Everyone – even the ex officio Dept of Justice member Jonathan J. Wroblewski – gets a turn at the mic.
That’s partly why yesterday’s meeting was so surprising.
The Commission approved the first retroactive application of a Guideline change in nine years, deciding that Amendment 821 – which lowers criminal history scores in some cases – should apply to people already sentenced. It also adopted policy priorities for the 2024 amendment cycle that include maybe amending how the guidelines treat acquitted conduct and assessing whether Bureau of Prisons practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing.
Zero is Hero: Right now, someone with zero or one criminal history point (a minor misdemeanor) is scored a Criminal History Category I. This rating provides the lowest sentencing range for any given Guidelines offense level. The Commission has adopted a new ”zero-point” Guidelines amendment, which added Section 4C1.1 to the Guidelines. The new section will grant people with zero criminal history points who meet a long list of other conditions (such as no guns or violence, no sex offenses) a 2-level reduction in their Guidelines offense level. The practical effect will be that the person’s advisory sentencing range will drop two levels (such as from Level 30 (97-121 months) to Level 28 (78-97 months).
Status Seekers: At the other end of criminal history, the Guidelines have always assigned an extra two points if the current offense was committed while someone was under supervision. Supervision could be probation or parole from a prior offense or supervised release from a prior federal offense. The two points (called “status points”) could be a snare for the unwary. A defendant involved in a conspiracy of several years duration might pick up a DUI offense during the period the conspiracy is going on. Even if the local judge lets him or her off with unsupervised probation, that local conviction would add 2 criminal history points and quite likely land the defendant in a higher criminal history category.
Last April, the Sentencing Commission abolished all status points for people who had fewer than seven accumulated criminal history points driving their criminal history category. For those with seven or more points, only one status point would be added rather than two. In making this change, the USSC determined that status points had little to no relevance in the accurate determination of a criminal history profile.
As it must do whenever it lowers the Guidelines, the Commission last May opened a proceeding to determine whether those changes should benefit people who have already been sentenced as well as those who have yet to be sentenced. This retroactivity proceeding ended with yesterday’s meeting.
Chairman Reeves opened the meeting with a full-throated endorsement of making the criminal history amendments retroactive. Commissioners Luis Restrepo (Judge on the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals) and Laura Mate (Federal Public Defender) followed him, voicing their support for full retroactivity.
I yawned. It hardly mattered at this point that the Commission’s audio feed was garbled, because retroactivity was up 3-0, and it seemed that victory was a foregone conclusion. A done deal.
But then, Commissioner Claire Murray (a former Assistant Attorney General) delivered an ordered and rational argument against retroactivity, followed by complementary arguments against going retro by Commissioners Candice Wong (US Attorney’s Office for DC) and Claria Horn Boom (US District Judge from both districts of Kentucky). Suddenly, the vote was 3-3, and retroactivity was tottering.
It thus fell to Commissioner John Gleeson (Wall Street lawyer and former federal judge) to decide whether 18,000 or so federal prisoners would be eligible to have their sentences adjusted to what USSC doctrine now believed was appropriate. Judge Gleeson did not disappoint.
Speaking in quiet, measured tones, Judge Gleeson observed that the opponents of retroactivity complained that the changes made by Amendment 821 “do not remedy a systemic wrong and thus could not rectify a fundamental unfairness in the guidelines manual,” and thus the need for finality and the administrative burden placed on courts by retroactivity meant that the changes should not be made retro. “In my view,” Judge Gleeson said, “it is hard to overstate how wrong that argument is.”
Judge Gleeson highlighted the disproportionate impact the two criminal history guidelines had had on minorities. He said that 43% of the prisoners affected by the retroactive change in status points are black and 20% are Hispanic. About 69% of those benefitting from the zero-point change are Hispanic. Judge Gleeson said that while
“there’s no such thing as fully remedying and racial disparity that’s been built into our criminal justice system for so long… making these amendments retroactive will have a tangible effect for people of color… Overreliance on criminal history can drive pernicious racial disparities in sentencing… we [have] visited fundamental unfairness on thousands of people through guidelines that judges follow… [that] we know from the data are wrong… At the receiving end of these sentences there are three-dimensional human beings.”
Final vote for retroactivity was 4-3.
The retroactivity order prohibits district courts from granting any change in sentences prior to February 1, 2024. The Commission voted that delay to ensure that people who might be released will have the opportunity to participate in reentry programs and transitional services that will increase the likelihood of successful reentry to society.
The Commission estimated in its July 2023 Impact Analysis that retroactive application would carry a meaningful impact for many currently incarcerated individuals:
• 11,495 prisoners will have a lower sentencing range due to the status-point change, with a possible sentence reduction of 11.7%, on average.
• 7,272 prisoners will be eligible for a lower sentencing range based upon the “Zero-Point” change, with an average possible sentence reduction of 17.6%.
Eligible prisoners will have to file a motion with their sentencing courts under 18 USC § 3582(c)(2) seeking the reduction. The district court is entitled to grant no more than a reduction to the bottom of the revised sentencing range (with special rules for people who have had departures for assisting the government), and no issues may be considered other than the revised criminal history score. Whether to grant as much a reduction as possible, only part of the possible reduction, or none at all is entirely up to the judge.
US Sentencing Commission, Public Meeting (August 24, 2023)
We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.
WAKE UP AND SMELL THE COFFEE
I always start my day with a hot cup of Death Wish coffee. The caffeine jolt is sufficient to enable me to write about consequential but deadly dull topics, topics such as the “relation back” doctrine as applied to 28 USC § 2255 motions.
I’ll wait while you pour another cup. Or two. This procedural topic is as dry as unbuttered toast, but it’s important to some folks.
“Some folks” includes Freddie Coleman. A decade ago, Fred was sentenced to life in federal prison for conspiring to distribute crack cocaine. The district judge based the sentence on 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A), which (at the time) mandated a life sentence for a defendant with two or more prior drug distribution felonies. (The statute changed as a result of the First Step Act, but that change was not retroactive).
After losing his appeal, Freddie filed a pro se motion under 28 USC § 2255 to vacate his sentence, arguing that his attorney had provided ineffective assistance by not advising him early on that the government had filed a notice that he should get an enhanced sentence – in this case life in prison – because of some prior state drug distribution felonies. Such notices are filed pursuant to 21 USC § 851 and are generally known as “851 notices.”
Later, after the § 2255(f)5 deadline for filing passed – which usually is the cutoff for specifying the issues on which a § 2255 movant intends to proceed – Freddie tried to amend his pleading expanding on his allegations and claiming for the first time that his lawyer was also ineffective by failing to object to the § 851 notice on the grounds that under the categorical approach adopted in Taylor v. United States, Freddie’s prior Illinois cocaine convictions did not qualify as prior felony drug offenses given that Illinois defined “cocaine” more broadly than federal law.
The district court ruled against Fred’s claim that his lawyer never told him about the potential life sentence. On top of that, the district court denied Freddie’s motion to amend, finding that the amendment did not “relate back” to his initial pleading as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) because “the claims rested on distinct types of attorney misfeasance and were supported by different facts.”
Last week, the 7th Circuit reversed, vacating Fred’s life sentence.
Everyone knows about statutes of limitations, laws that require people to file claims within a certain period of time or lose them forever. The same is true of adding new claims to an existing action: those new claims have to be raised within the limitations period or they are barred.
Rule 15(c) provides a limited exception to the limitations bar against amended claims. The subsection allows that “amendments relate back to the date of the original pleading when the claim asserted in the amended plea ‘arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.'” Fred argued that his claim that his attorney was ineffective not just in one way but in two where the § 851 notice was concerned was allowable because it all related back to the same transaction.
The Circuit agreed:
Even where an amendment invokes a legal theory not suggested by the original complaint and relies on facts not originally asserted,” the 7th said, “relation back is in order so long as the original and amended petitions state claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts… Even ‘significant’ changes to a complaint… can relate back so long as the defendant had fair notice of the substance of the new allegations from the outset.
Construing Fred’s original pro se§ 2255 petition liberally, the Circuit ruled, “as we must… we conclude that the government was reasonably on notice of the claims contained within Coleman’s amended petition. Those claims are substantively similar in time and type to those asserted in his original motion: his attorney’s failure to provide legal advice as to the contents and impact of the § 851 notice.”
Both of Fred’s claims – that his lawyer failed to advise him of the risks of a life sentence because of the § 851 notice and his lawyer’s failure to research whether the § 851 notice was right – challenged his attorney’s conduct as to the § 851 notice. But because the claims relied on different facts, the district court found, the amendment did not relate back. The appellate court thought this was “too crabbed a view” of Fred’s claims, “particularly given his pro se status at the time.”
Just because an amended claim “may involve some different facts than those originally alleged,” the Circuit held, “does not necessarily mean that that claim is not tied to the original claim via a common core of operative facts… Coleman’s success on either of his theories would require the district court to inquire into his attorney’s treatment of the § 851 notice and the adequacy of advice he provided to Coleman as to the impact the notice may have had on the case. This commonality is enough to unite the claims.” And because the government had gotten the district court to rule that Fred’s § 2255 motion meant he had waived the attorney-client privilege as to anything to do with the § 851 notice and the potential life sentence,” the government had the ability to “uncover the facts underlying Coleman’s amended claims.”
“Accordingly, the 7th said, “on balance, any prejudice the government may suffer by allowing the amended complaint to relate back to the original filing is outweighed by the preference expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in particular, for resolving disputes on their merits.”
After all of this dry resolution of Rule 15(c)’s “relation back” application to Fred’s case, the appellate court found that Fred’s attorney seemed to have dropped the ball by not arguing that the overbroad Illinois statute counted as a prior “felony drug offense” that would enhance his minimum sentence. “It would have been objectively unreasonable for Coleman’s defense counsel to have not even considered a categorical challenge to the government’s reliance on prior Illinois cocaine convictions to enhance Coleman’s sentence,” the Circuit said. “Of course, if counsel did consider the argument but had credible strategic reasons for not raising it, that would be a different question. But because the claim alleged in Coleman’s amended § 2255 motion, if proven, would entitle him to relief, we find that an evidentiary hearing on this issue is necessary. “
We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.
THE HILL ARGUES GOP SHOULD LAY OFF FIRST STEP ATTACKS
Writing in The Hill last week, Marc Levin – chief policy counsel for the Council on Criminal Justice – wrote that while the First Step Act was a bipartisan effort to rein in excessive penalties for low-level drug offenses and allowed some people in federal prison to earn time off their sentences by completing programs, Republican presidential candidates “in their attempts to pass the Trump train on the right are now claiming that the Act caused a crime surge while sidestepping their burden of proof.”
These attacks are ironic, Levin wrote, given Republicans’ past support for the law, and the fact that many left-wing groups opposed it primarily because they felt it didn’t go far enough.
While it is reasonable to ask whether First Step is “somehow to blame for the subsequent uptick in crime,” Levin wrote, “the best evidence currently available suggests otherwise.” People released early with FSA credits, for example, comprise under 1% of all prisoners in the US. What’s more, some 38 states offer earned credits like those provided for in the Act, and those states have found that such credits boost program participation rates, improving behavior behind bars and prospects for success upon release.
The BOP has reported that 12.4% of those released early due to FSA credits have been reincarcerated at the federal, state or local level. Even these numbers overstate matters: the BOP has acknowledged the number includes all those released at various times since the Act went into effect in 2019.
Levin writes that “legitimate policy disagreements on crime should be part of political campaigns. But prison reforms at the state and federal level have been embraced across the spectrum because all Americans have an interest in a system that treats people fairly and breaks the cycle of crime without breaking the bank.”
We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.
APPEALS COURT TAKES GRANT OF COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MOTION INTO ITS OWN HANDS
Appellate courts are usually much more circumspect in reversing trial courts, vacating a decision but not explicitly directing the district judge how to decide things on remand.
Not that the savvy district judge doesn’t read between the lines. An appellate court vacatur with a suggestion – often implicit – that the district court needs to think about the case differently usually leads to a different ruling the second time around.
Not always. When Kelvin Brown was convicted of drug trafficking nine years ago, the jury also found him guilty of two 18 USC § 924(c) counts as well. Back then, the first § 924(c) carried a mandatory minimum sentence starting at five years. The second conviction – even if it resulted from events the next day – required an additional mandatory minimum of 25 years. The district court thus sentenced Kelvin to 30 years in prison for his two § 924(c) convictions and stacked another 27 years on him for the various drug offenses.
Six years later, during the height of the COVID crisis, Kelvin moved for compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A). The judge turned him down flat without even asking the government to respond. Kelvin appealed, and the 4th Circuit remanded, directing the district court to consider the fact that Kelvin got 20 more years for the gun than he would have had to get after the First Step Act passed in 2018 in light of the Circuit’s decision in United States v. McCoy.
The district court denied Kelvin a second time in December 2021, again neglecting to address the whopping § 924(c) sentences despite (as the 4th Circuit put it) “our express recognition in our previous remand order that McCoy – and its holding that disparate § 924(c) sentences can constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release – is relevant to this case.”
Two days ago, the 4th Circuit threw up its hands and told the district judge to watch how it’s done. The 4th cut Kelvin’s sentence by 20 years (which still leaves him with 37 years to do), both expressing its frustration and apologizing for its interference:
We hold that the district court abused its discretion by denying Brown’s motion because his disparate sentence creates an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for his early release, and the § 3553(a) sentencing factors overwhelmingly favor a sentence reduction. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to rectify that disparity and reduce Brown’s prison sentence by twenty years.
Ordinarily, we understand that district courts wield broad discretion in deciding compassionate release motions… So, in a different case, we might remedy the district court’s error by remanding for the district court to consider Brown’s disparate sentence in the first instance. Yet the district court here has already had two opportunities to review Brown’s compassionate release motion: its initial denial of Brown’s motion in July 2020, and its second denial in December 2021 after we remanded Brown’s case for further consideration. Each time, the district court neglected to address Brown’s disparate sentence.
The Circuit also found that Kelvin’s disparate sentence strongly affects the 18 USC § 3553(a) sentencing factors: “The First Step Act‘s amendment to § 924(c) reflects Congress’s judgment that sentences like Brown’s are dramatically longer than necessary or fair,” the appeals court said, “and, in turn, are not necessary to serve the ends of § 3553(a)(2).”
Notable in the 4th’s analysis is its holding that the need for Kelvin’s longer sentence has been called into question because COVID-19 created hardship in prison life “not contemplated by the original sentencing court” and that those hardships have “undoubtedly increased his prison sentence’s punitive effect.” The Circuit observed that Kelvin’s facility was placed on lockdown in response to the pandemic, during which he was “confined to his cell for 22.5 hours a day,” and the recreation areas were closed.” The majority opinion said, “Even if those factors have been mitigated by the evolving circumstances of the pandemic, that they plagued Brown at any point has made his incarceration harsher and more punitive than would otherwise have been the case… Therefore, Brown’s drastic sentence, which might have been ‘sufficient but not greater than necessary’ before the coronavirus pandemic, may no longer be justified.”
The opinion also emphasizes that Kelvin’s “one disciplinary infraction throughout his incarceration—a fact the district court also failed to mention—casts further doubt on the court’s concern for the safety of the community. And while the court did briefly consider Brown’s rehabilitative efforts” – which included a stack of programming and mentoring work to his credit – “it failed to weigh how those efforts ameliorate any risk posed to Brown’s community upon his release.” Citing Pepper v. United States, the Circuit ruled that such “postsentencing rehabilitation minimizes the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and provides the most up-to-date picture of Brown’s history and characteristics, which also favors a sentence reduction.”
The 2-1 opinion is remarkable not only for the fact that an appellate court took the unusual step of granting a compassionate release motion itself but because of the reliance on the harshness of Bureau of Prisons conditions during the pandemic and the elevation of post-sentencing conduct as a factor in § 3553(a) analysis in reaching its decision.
United States v. Brown, Case No. 21-7752, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 21403, at *24-25 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 2023)
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9TH CIRCUIT HOLDS HOBBS ACT AIDER AND ABETTOR COMMITS CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Call me dense (you wouldn’t be the first), but I have never understood how an attempt to commit a Hobbs Act robbery could not be a crime of violence – as the Supreme Court held in United States v. Taylor – but aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery was a crime of violence under 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A)(3).
In Taylor, the Supremes held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery was not a crime of violence, because one could attempt a Hobbs Act robbery without actually attempting, threatening or using violence. If, for example, Peter Perp is arrested in a jewelry store parking lot with masks and a gun as he approaches the front door, he could be convicted of an attempted Hobbs Act robbery without ever having gotten to the point of attempting to threaten or employ violence at all. In fact, the people inside the store might not even be aware that they were about to be robbed. Sure, Petey can go down for an attempted Hobbs Act robbery (and get plenty of time for that), but he could not be convicted of a § 924(c) offense.
Taylor seemed to focus on what elements would have to be proven for the particular defendant to be convicted of the Hobbs Act crime. The principals in the crime – the guys who actually waved guns in the jewelry store clerks’ faces – must be shown to have employed violence or threatened to do so. But how about the guy sitting behind the wheel of the getaway car? He’s aiding and abetting, and certainly can be convicted of the Hobbs Act offense just like the gun-wielders. But that’s not the point. The point is whether he is also guilty of a 924(c) offense, too.
Leon Eckford is as disappointed as I am (maybe more, because he’s doing the time) that the 9th Circuit went the other way on my pet legal argument the other day. Leon pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting two Hobbs Act jewelry store robberies. He was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment, including a mandatory minimum sentence for the use of a firearm during a crime of violence under § 924(c).
On appeal, Leon argues that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence and therefore could not serve as a predicate for his § 924(c) conviction and mandatory minimum sentence. A couple of days ago, the 9th rejected his argument.
The Circuit claimed that Leon’s argument “misunderstands the nature of aiding and abetting liability. At common law, aiding and abetting was considered a separate offense from the crime committed by the principal actor, but “we no longer distinguish between principals and aiders and abettors; principals and accomplices “are equally culpable and may be convicted of the same offense.”
The 9th complained that Leon “would have us return to the era when we treated principals and accomplices as guilty of different crimes. We have long moved past such distinctions for purposes of determining criminal culpability, although the terminology may be useful for other reasons.” This is nonsense. Leon freely admitted that his aiding and abetting the Hobbs Actrobberies made him as guilty of the offense as if he had been inside the stores. He did not ask to be treated as having been convicted of a “different crime.”
Instead, as the Circuit admitted without appreciating its significance, the law has moved past distinguishing principal versus accomplice “for purposes of determining criminal culpability,” that is, for figuring out whether Leon was guilty of a Hobbs Act offense. But, as the 9th admitted, “the terminology may be useful for other reasons.”
Primary among those reasons is to determine whether the defendant’s commission of the Hobbs Act was a crime of violence. This is not to say that the court should focus on what Leon himself did. The categorical approach to determining whether aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery is violent does not look at the facts of the case. Instead, it focuses on what must be proven to prove a defendant was an aider-and-abettor.
The 9th Circuit noted that it had “repeatedly upheld § 924(c) convictions based on accomplice liability.” So what? The 9th Circuit had previously held that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery was a crime of violence until Taylor reversed the holding. Being wrong once is hardly an argument that you aren’t wrong now.
The Circuit argues that nothing in its analysis in Leon’s case is “clearly irreconcilable with Taylor. Taylor dealt with an inchoate crime, an attempt, and does not undermine our precedent on aiding and abetting liability. There are fundamental differences between attempting to commit a crime, and aiding and abetting its commission… Chief among these differences is that in an attempt case there is no crime apart from the attempt, which is the crime itself, whereas aiding and abetting is a different means of committing a single crime, not a separate offense itself. Put differently, proving the elements of an attempted crime falls short of proving those of the completed crime, whereas a conviction for aiding and abetting requires proof of all the elements of the completed crime plus proof of an additional element: that the defendant intended to facilitate the commission of the crime.
The 9th held that “[o]ne who aids and abets the commission of a violent offense has been convicted of the same elements as one who was convicted as a principal; the same is not true of one who attempts to commit a violent offense. Accordingly, we conclude that our precedent is not clearly irreconcilable with Taylor.”
But if 924(c) is intended to fix extra liability for using a gun in a crime of violence, the element that the defendant employed or threatened violence should be required.
United States v. Eckford, Case No. 17-50167, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 21175 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2023)
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A 2255 PAIR
Two federal appellate court decisions last week of interest on motions for post-conviction relief under 28 USC § 2255:
Denaturalization is Too Collateral for Padilla, Circuit Says: In 2006, Abe Farhane – a naturalized American citizen – pled guilty to lying to the government and conspiring to commit money laundering. After Abe was released in 2017, the government started denaturalization proceedings to strip him of his citizenship under 8 USC § 1451(a) for having become a citizen by “concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.”
Abe was still on supervised release after his prison sentence, which entitled him to file a 28 USC § 2255 motion for post-conviction relief. Abe filed a § 2255 motion claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer never told him he might lose his citizenship and be deported due to his guilty plea. Had he known that, Abe argued, he never would have entered a guilty plea.
His § 2255 was denied, and last week, the 2nd Circuit upheld the decision.
The Supreme Court held in the 2009 Padilla v. Kentucky decision that a lawyer has a duty to “inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation,” noting that there was no “distinction between direct and collateral consequences” of a guilty plea when measuring the effectiveness of counsel. But the 2nd Circuit said that Padilla had no role in this case, because “civil denaturalization is a separate proceeding that may or may not occur following the plea. The government exercises considerable discretion in bringing denaturalization cases, as does the district court in evaluating the evidence… indeed, the government could seek to denaturalize Farhane without relying on his guilty plea. Instead, it turns on the defendant’s actual conduct.”
The Court’s hair-splitting seems to be a distinction without a difference, as the dissenting judge in the 2-1 decision pointed out.
Advertising Makes Illinois Drug Statute Overbroad: After Otis Elion pled guilty to distributing meth, and he was sentenced as a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1. That Guideline increases sentencing exposure dramatically for someone with two prior convictions for crimes of violence or serious drug felonies.
Otis’s attorney did not challenge that designation, and the court imposed a 167-month prison term.
In a § 2255 motion, Otis argued his attorney’s failure to object amounted to ineffective assistance because two of the three predicates were convictions under Illinois law for “look-alike” drugs, and those offenses did not fit within the statute’s definition of serious drug felonies.
Otis’s district court denied relief.
Last week, the 7th Circuit reversed, concluding that Otis was properly sentenced as a career offender and, therefore, did not suffer prejudice from counsel’s performance.
A “serious drug felony” is a federal drug trafficking offense or a state offense that matches the Guidelines definition of controlled substance offense. If the elements of the state crime are the same as, or narrower than, the elements of the Guidelines offense, “the crime of conviction qualifies as a predicate offense.”
Otis’s Illinois offense made it “unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture, distribute, advertise, or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute a lookalike substance,” and defines advertise as “the attempt, by publication, dissemination, solicitation or circulation, to induce directly or indirectly any person to acquire, or enter into an obligation to acquire” a controlled substance.
The 7th said the Illinois statute is broader than 21 USC § 841 and thus could not be a predicate for Guidelines “career offender” status. “Advertise is an independent word in the statute, and its definition uses the term induce, not sell or distribute. Given this, we decline to read ‘advertise’ as merely restating, in narrower terms, what other statutory language already covers. For these reasons, the look-alike statute’s inclusion of ‘advertise’ means it punishes a broader range of conduct than the Guidelines controlled substance offense.”
The Circuit reversed the denial of his § 2255 motion and remanded the case “for an evaluation of counsel’s performance.”
Elion v. United States, Case No. 20-1725, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 20286 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 2023)
We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.
Nevertheless, two pieces last week provided support to criminal justice from surprising sources.
First, the conservative Washington Times published an opinion piece decrying attacks on Republican presidential candidates for having supported the First Step Act, legislation that “has garnered overwhelming support among Republican voters, underscoring the power of prudent and popular conservative criminal justice reform.”
The writer noted that violent crime is rising for a lot of reasons, but “none of which are related to the First Step Act.” He observed that “an impressive 86% of polled Republicans said the First Step Act reflected their views” and argued that “with a focus on evidence-based recidivism reduction programs and judges’ discretion in sentencing, the First Step Act exemplifies a sustainable and thoughtful approach” to public safety.
The column reports that the “First Step Act’s recidivism rate of just over 12% for those released under it, compared with the 43% rate for the general population released from federal prisons, attests to its success.”
Citing the case of Alice Johnson, famously granted clemency by President Trump based on Kim Kardashian’s intervention in her favor, Tolman said, “Alice’s story was first warped during her trial by prosecutors who manipulated drug laws – not to nab a drug “queen pin,” but to pin the blame on the little guy. As a former prosecutor, I’m peeling back the curtain on this practice and setting the record straight.”
Tolman noted that Alice was offered a plea deal for 60 months, but “at the urging of her attorney, Alice chose to exercise her constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial. What the prosecution did next can only be described as retaliation. It brought new drug conspiracy charges against Alice that had not been considered before, accusing her of attempted possession of 106 kilograms of cocaine. No physical evidence was ever found to support this, but physical evidence was not required at the time. Instead, to make its case, the prosecution coerced two of Alice’s co-defendants to change their testimonies in exchange for reduced sentences, pinning the blame on Alice… The “trial penalty” — the increase in sentencing for those who choose to go to trial rather than take a plea deal – is very much alive. Alice’s trial is the perfect example of how perverse incentives within the criminal justice system, spurred by the failed “War on Drugs,” ruin lives and tear families apart while doing nothing to improve public safety.”
Writing in his Sentencing Policy and the Law blog, Ohio State law professor Doug Berman “found notable that this former US Attorney so readily and clearly highlights how prosecutors impose a ‘trial penalty’ as a form of ‘retaliation’ for defendants who exercise their constitutional rights to trial.”
We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.
(In its final action before fleeing Washington, DC, at the end of June for three months of summer vacation, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari in Rahimi, meaning that What-A-Burger, road rage, and stalking will soon be a part of 2nd Amendment discourse).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), you may not possess a firearm if you are an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance. A couple of district courts have already ruled that Bruen invalidates this prohibition, but on Wednesday, Patrick Daniels – maybe the guy Charlie Daniels (no apparent relation) had in mind as driving down the highway while “tokin’ on a number and digging on the radio” – was the latest beneficiary of Bruen’s historical “heuristics.”
Pat is a dedicated but “unlawful user” of cannabis. When Pat was pulled over for a traffic infraction, police smelled marijuana in his car. A search turned up a couple of loaded handguns. When questioned, Pat admitted that he smoked marijuana about 14 days per month, although no one thought to ask him whether he was high at the time or, for that matter, test him for controlled substances.
That was a mere detail to the DEA, however. Before Pat knew it, he was charged with a § 922(g)(3) offense. A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to nearly four years in prison.
Pat appealed, arguing that Bruen made his conviction a violation of the 2nd Amendment. Two days ago, the 5th Circuit agreed.
The Circuit first concluded that the 2nd Amendment clearly applied to Pat:
The right to bear arms is held by “the people.” That phrase “unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” Indeed, the Bill of Rights uses the phrase “the people” five times. In each place, it refers to all members of our political community, not a special group of upright citizens. Based on that consistent usage, [District of Columbia v.] Heller concluded that “the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.” Even as a marihuana user, Daniels is a member of our political community. Therefore, he has a presumptive right to bear arms. By infringing on that right, § 922(g)(3) contradicts the plain text of the Second Amendment.
The 2nd Amendment codified a “‘pre-existing right’ with pre-existing limits,” the 5th explained. Thus, “to ascertain those limits, history is our heuristic. Because historical gun regulations evince the kind of limits that were well-understood at the time the 2nd Amendment was ratified, a regulation that is inconsistent with those limits is inconsistent with the 2nd Amendment. So whether Pat’s conviction violated his 2nd Amendment right to bear arms “depends on whether § 922(g)(3) is consistent with our nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,” the 5th said. “It is a close and deeply challenging question.”
Smoke enough, and you might see this… but it wouldn’t violate § 922(g)
However, the Circuit found, while “throughout American history, laws have regulated the combination of guns and intoxicating substances,” at no time “in the 18th or 19th century did the government disarm individuals who used drugs or alcohol at one time from possessing guns at another… [O]ur history and tradition may support some limits on an intoxicated person’s right to carry a weapon, but it does not justify disarming a sober citizen based exclusively on his past drug usage. Nor do more generalized traditions of disarming dangerous persons support this restriction on nonviolent drug users. As applied to Daniels, then, § 922(g)(3) violates the 2nd Amendment.”
Meanwhile, the 5th Circuit took in the chin last week when the Supreme Court reversed its refusal to stay a district court holding that new Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) that effectively banned “ghost guns” violated the Administrative Procedure Act.
At the end of June, Judge Reed O’Connor of the Northern District of Texas held in Garland v. Vanderstokthat ATF regulations defining “ghost guns” – kits of components that do not meet the definition of “firearm” but may be assembled, with some simple machining performed at home by the end user, into functional firearms lacking any serial number – as firearms exceeded the agency’s authority and thus were invalid.
The government sought a stay of Judge O’Connor’s order from the 5th Circuit, which the Circuit denied. On July 24, the 5th ruled that “[b]ecause the ATF has not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits, nor irreparable harm in the absence of a stay, we DENY the government’s request to stay the vacatur of the two challenged portions of the Rule…This effectively maintains, pending appeal, the status quo that existed for 54 years from 1968 to 2022.”
Last Wednesday, the Supreme Court reversed the 5th Circuit, holding in a one-paragraph order that Judge O’Connor’s injunction against the new rule is “stayed pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is timely sought.”
The Supreme Court decision granting the stay was 5-4, with Justice Barrett in the majority. This surprised some commentators, who have placed Justice Barrett firmly in the pro-2nd Amendment camp. But as Slate argued Wednesday, her decision in favor of a stay does not necessarily mean the ATF can breathe easy:
Barrett’s vote may be attributable to her distaste for “nationwide vacatur.” In a recent decision, the justice cast serious doubt on the legality of this tool, which allows a lone federal judge to block a federal policy in all 50 states. She is quite right to be skeptical that this power exists, or at least that it can be used as freely as O’Connor and his fellow conservatives deploy it today… If that’s true, and Barrett’s vote was purely procedural, then the ghost guns rule is not out of the woods yet… When it comes back to SCOTUS on the merits, though, Barrett could vote to strike down the rule, since the side debate over O’Connor’s use of “vacatur” would no longer be relevant. Gun rights advocates will fight this one all the way to the bitter end. And the Biden administration should not assume it has Barrett on its side as it fights for the new rule’s long-term survival.
All of this is prelude for the central question of interest to prisoners, whether Bruen has invalidated 18 USC 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession statute. That question, already decided in favor of defendants in the 3rd Circuit – Range v. Atty General – and against defendants in the 8th Circuit – United States v. Jackson – will no doubt be reaching the Supreme Court soon enough.
At last week’s meeting, the U.S. Sentencing Commission said that in the coming year, it plans to assess how effective the BOP is in meeting the purposes of sentencing listed in 18 USC § 3553(a)(2). Those purposes include the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment and adequate deterrence, to protect the public and to effectively provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or other treatment.
Speaking of prisoner satisfaction, inmates should not expect any help if they are unhappy with the chow. Two weeks ago, the 10th Circuit ruled that an inmate claim that the BOP was tampering with the food it served him – in violation of the 8th Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment – presented a new application of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The Circuit said that the existence of alternative remedies (the BOP’s administrative remedy route, no doubt) made a Bivens claim unavailable to the prisoner under last year’s Supreme Court decision in Egbert v. Boule.
The Supreme Court held in the 2009 
