A Little More on Brooklyn’s Own Devil’s Hole – Update for November 5, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MDC BROOKLYN RAID ENDS

kickdoor241105I noted last week that BOP had just experienced the second law enforcement raid on a prison this year, as the DOJ Inspector General, DEA, FBI and other agencies descended on MDC Brooklyn apparently searching for contraband, drugs, guns and cellphones in the mother of all shakedowns. 

Now a little more on that…

BOP spokesman Donald Murphy said in a statement released last Monday that “the operation was preplanned and there is no active threat” at the facility where 1,176 people are held.

Reports of sexual assaults and inhumane conditions at the MDC, as well as two inmate murders this year, have prompted vehement criticism from judges, activists and inmate families. In 2017, mistreatment of pregnant inmates caused a federal judge to say the MDC sounded more like “a prison in Turkey or some third-world country” than a US federal prison in the United States. A year later, a former lieutenant was convicted of raping detainees. In 2019, power failures left those inside without heat in the middle of a January cold snap.

carchase241105In August, a U.S. district judge said that MDC conditions were so appalling that he would sentence a 75-year-old to home confinement rather than send him there. In September, a BOP correctional officer was charged with violating civil rights after he was said to have chased a car he saw in the MDC parking lot at high speed for five miles, during which he fired his BOP-issued weapon at the vehicle, wounding one occupant.

Last month, an inmate was charged in an 18 USC § 1958 murder-for-hire plot that led to a 28-year-old woman being killed last year. The inmate allegedly used a contraband cellphone to set the plot in motion while awaiting sentencing for directing a different shooting years earlier.

On Friday, the BOP issued a statement that the “multi-agency operation” had concluded, having “confiscated a number of electronic devices, drugs and associated paraphernalia, and homemade weapons.”

The agency press release “thank[ed] the participating agencies for their support and partnership in this effort to create a safe and secure environment at our facilities.”

cockroaches241105C’mon. That’s like the owner of a cockroach-infested restaurant thanking health inspectors for shutting the place down for a thorough cleaning.  Is there no institutional shame that MDC Brooklyn is the shining bag of animal droppings atop BOP’s pile of institutional garbage?

Unlike much of what BOP Director Colette S. Peters has been cleaning up, the MDC Brooklyn mess – inmate murders and BOP officers racing through the streets of Brooklyn shooting at people – has happened and is happening on her watch.

You own this one, ma’am.

The New York Times, US Officials Sweep Troubled Brooklyn Prison Where 2 Were Killed (October 28, 2024)

Associated Press, Authorities launch ‘interagency operation’ at federal jail in New York housing Sean ‘Diddy’ Combs (October 28, 2024)

BOP, Multi-Agency Operation Concludes at MDC Brooklyn (November 1, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

3rd Circuit ‘Lopers’ the Sentencing Commission – Update for November 4, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

WHERE THERE’S A ‘WILL’ THERE’S A ‘WON’T’

chevron230508One of our favorite Supreme Court decisions last June was Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, a case that punched Chevron deference’s ticket by holding that courts don’t have to defer to agencies’ interpretations of federal law as long as those interpretations are reasonable. Instead, Loper Bright held, courts are in the business of figuring out what statutes say, and they should not defer to a bunch of unelected bureaucrats who often have a vested interest in the interpretations they put on the laws the agencies are supposed to administer.

We saw the dark side of Loper Bright last Friday. The day after the 6th Circuit heard oral argument in a case over whether the Sentencing Commission’s guideline, USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) – that says an extraordinary and compelling reason for a compassionate release may include an overly-long sentence that could not be imposed today because of a change in the law – exceeds the Commission’s authority.

In the First Step Act, Congress reduced the mandatory minimums for some drug offenses and refined 18 USC § 924(c) to provide that the 25-year minimum for a second § 924(c) offense could only be imposed after a prior § 924(c) conviction. Before First Step, if you carried a gun when you sold pot on Monday and then carried it again when you sold pot on Wednesday, you would get maybe 60 months for selling drugs AND a mandatory consecutive 60 months for carrying a gun on Monday AND a mandatory consecutive 300 months for Wednesday’s gun. Your two-day drug selling binge would have netted you 420 months (35 years) in prison.

retro240506For reasons more political than legal, Congress did not make the changes in drug and § 924(c) mandatory minimum sentences retroactive. But in the years since, some judges found that the fact that some people were serving impossibly long sentences that they could not have had imposed on them after First Step passed could constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for grant of a compassionate release motion. Other Circuits, notably the 3rd, 7th and 11th, ruled that overly long sentences could not serve as extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release because Congress had not made the changes to the laws that dictated those sentences retroactive.

When the Sentencing Commission finally adopted a new Guideline – § 1B1.13 – a year ago, it included as one of the defined extraordinary and compelling reasons for a compassionate release grant a case where a defendant had a disparately long sentence because of a nonretroactive change in the law. The Dept of Justice began a full-throated attack on subsection (b)(6), arguing that because First Step does not make the changes in § 924(c) retroactive, the Commission was exceeding its authority by letting people do an end run around Congress.

A 6th Circuit panel heard oral argument last week in United States v. Bricker, three consolidated cases in which the government is arguing that subsection (b)(6) exceeds the Sentencing Commission’s congressionally delegated authority. The next day, in United States v. Rutherford, a 3rd Circuit panel held that subsection (b)(6) is invalid.

The Rutherford defendant won a compassionate release after 20 years of being locked up on a 42-year sentence for two armed robberies of a doctor’s office. Citing its right under Loper Bright to ignore the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of the extent of its authority, the Rutherford panel ruled against Mr. Rutherford based on its belief as to “the will of Congress”:

Subsection (b)(6)… as applied to the First Step Act’s modification of § 924(c), conflicts with the will of Congress and thus cannot be considered in determining a prisoner’s eligibility for compassionate release. Congress explicitly made the First Step Act’s change to § 924(c) nonretroactive… [I]t would be inconsistent with [the] pertinent provisions of the First Step Act… to allow the amended version of § 924(c) to be considered in the compassionate release context because Congress specifically decided that the changes to the § 924(c) mandatory minimum sentences would not apply to people who had already been sentenced.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, criticized the 3rd’s decision. “Besides the non-textual nature of divining the “will” of Congress to rule against a defendant, this holding conflates Congress’s nonretroactivity decisions in the First Step Act with its decision, in the very same Act, to expand access to compassionate release and to keep in place the broad parameters of USSC authority to set terms for compassionate release. There is nothing at all “inconsistent” with Congress saying not everyone should automatically retroactively benefit from a particular change in law and the USSC saying that judges can consider a change in law for a select few pursuing another legal remedy.”

forceofwill241104A cardinal canon of statutory construction holds that where the text of a statute is clear, that’s all that matters. But Rutherford holds in essence that what the court thinks Congress “willed” is more important than what the law Congress passed actually says.

A Fifth Circuit panel has already held that subsection (b)(6) is a legitimate exercise of Commission authority. Prof Berman believes it is “inevitable” that the issue will have to be settled by the Supreme Court.

United States v. Rutherford, Case No. 23-1904, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 27740 (3d Cir., November 1, 2024)

United States v. Bricker, Case No. 24-3286 (6th Cir., argument held October 31, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Based on “the will of Congress,” Third Circuit panel adheres to prior ruling limiting ground for compassionate release (November 1, 2024)

United States v. Jean, 108 F.4th 275 (5th Cir., 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

A Little Something for Halloween – Update for October 31, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TRICK OR TREAT

Trick – Tomorrow is November 1st, and you know what happens then…

Nothing.

nothinghere190906I get emails all the time asking me about new laws supposedly becoming effective on November 1. One hopeful prisoner wrote last week, asking me to send him all the changes in 18 USC § 924(c) taking effect tomorrow.

I was tempted to send a blank email back to him, but I have written so often about the myth of November 1st. If he hadn’t gotten it by now, a blank email would just have him blaming the Bureau of Prisons’ clunky email system for stripping the message of hope out of my response.

So, one more time: Nothing happens tomorrow, except that last May’s announced Guideline amendments become effective. None of those changes are retroactive, so nothing in the changes will benefit people who have already been sentenced.
jackolanternpumpkin241031

TreatThe Dept of Justice and other law enforcement agencies on Monday morning raided (“conducted a sweep,” The New York Times said) of MDC Brooklyn.

IG230518The DOJ Office of the Inspector General led the operation, which included DEA and FBI agents.  Donald Murphy, a spokesman for the Bureau of Prisons, said in a statement that “the operation was preplanned and there is no active threat” at the prison, where around 1,200 people are held, including Sean Combs, known as Diddy, and Sam Bankman-Fried.

Murphy said the BOP had been involved in the planning. He said the action was “designed to achieve our shared goal of maintaining a safe environment for both our employees and the incarcerated individuals housed at MDC Brooklyn.”

MDC Brooklyn has the dubious distinction of being so bad that judges have conditioned prison terms on defendants not being designated to the facility.

The New York Times, U.S. Officials Sweep Troubled Brooklyn Prison Where 2 Were Killed  (October 28. 2024)

Associated Press, Authorities launch ‘interagency operation’ at federal jail in New York housing Sean ‘Diddy’ Combs (October 28, 2024)

jackolanternpumpkin241031

Trick – In 2022, 18 USC § 2243(c) passed, making it illegal for someone acting as a federal law enforcement officer to knowingly engage in a sexual act with someone in federal custody. A Government Accountability Office report last week told Congress that no one has been charged or convicted since the law passed.

The Report somewhat hopefully chalked up the nonuse of the new statute to several anodyne factors:

First, individuals cannot be charged for prohibited conduct that occurred prior to the provision’s effective date of October 1, 2022. Second, it can take several years from the time of an alleged incident to the filing of a criminal case to a disposition of the criminal case. Finally, according to an official from DOJ’s Office on Violence Against Women, many victims do not report sexual abuse immediately due to a variety of factors, including fear of retaliation.

What a relief! I thought for a minute there might be a deliberate failure to root out violations.

GAO 25-107684, Federal Law Enforcement: Criminal Sexual Acts while Serving in Official Capacity (October 21, 2024)
jackolanternpumpkin241031

Treat – In August 2019, Tamir Abdullah, a defendant serving a federal crack cocaine sentence, moved for a sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act (the retroactive Fair Sentencing Act). The district court denied the motion a swift 4-1/2 years later.

delayed200115Last week, the 6th Circuit upheld the denial but spared no words in its condemnation of U.S. District Court Judge John Adams (N.D. Ohio), a judge who is so bad that the 6th Circuit once ordered him to undergo a mental health examination:

Although we grant district courts broad discretion in managing their own dockets, we look unfavorably upon lengthy, unjustified, and inexplicable delays on the part of district courts in deciding cases… We see no reason in the record to justifiably explain why the district court took 1,625 days to resolve a straightforward sentence-reduction motion… Nor was the order finally issued by the district court adequate. That gravely flawed order failed to analyze Abdullah’s sentence-reduction motion under the multi-step test… and instead ruled on an argument—entitlement to compassionate release due to the COVID-19 pandemic—that Abdullah’s motion plainly did not advance.

The criticism is reminiscent of similar complaints about U.S. District Judge Timothy Black (S.D. Ohio) last winter.  It cannot be said too often that a sentence reduction motion that sits undecided is sometimes worse than no remedy at all.

United States v. Abdullah, Case No 24-3093, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 26639 (6th Cir. Oct 22, 2024)
jackolanternpumpkin241031

– Thomas L. Root

Harris and Trump Agree With Each Other… Decriminalize Marijuana – Update for October 29, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS

You can tell it’s election season, as presidential candidates stake out positions on every issue (including how nice the island of Puerto Rico might be). Marijuana reform is “the rare bipartisan issue” in this year’s presidential election, according to The Wall Street Journal, that everyone seems to embrace.

marijuana221111Both Donald Trump and Kamala Harris have offered support for easing restrictions. More than half the states have legalized adult marijuana use. The pot industry says more reforms are needed, but these are all in banking, decriminalization of personal-use qualities, and research studies.

What no one’s talking about is changing the federal criminal code on marijuana, let alone retroactively. While reclassification of marijuana as a Schedule III drug, anticipated in the next two months, will mean that some penalties for some offenses will probably be reduced – especially in the Guidelines –violations of the Controlled Substances Act which “apply to activities involving marijuana specifically, such as the quantity based mandatory minimum sentences […] would not change as a result of rescheduling,” the Congressional Research Service said.

As part of her pledge, Kamala Harris said she would take steps to ensure that black men, disproportionately incarcerated and disenfranchised by the war on drugs, would stand to profit from the industry. Harris’s pledge to end marijuana prohibition sets her apart from both Biden and Trump, making her the first candidate to say that prohibition is a priority.

During his administration, Biden made a lot of promises about marijuana, including pardons for simple possession convictions to reschedule pot. Biden has only granted pardons to a small fraction of weed-related convictions during his administration. Biden’s sponsorship of the Violent Crime Control Act of 1994 has left him, rightly or wrongly, with the reputation as being opposed to criminal justice reform.

sessions180119Meanwhile, Trump has changed his tune on marijuana during this election season, taking positions at odds with his record of having appointed anti-drug zealot Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III as his attorney general. But Trump later pushed the First Step Act through Congress, although he has publicly groused that he did it primarily to get black support which he never received.

Advocates and opponents now cross party lines. In Florida, Bradford County Sheriff Gordon Smith — a Republican — made an ad backing that state’s referendum, said Florida Politics. Legalization will “let us focus on serious crime, making our streets and neighborhoods safer,” Smith said. But Gov. Ron DeSantis (R) is fighting the proposal, said NBC News. The one-time GOP presidential candidate is campaigning against the referendum, one observer said, “as if it’s his own name on the ballot.”

Martin Luther King, Jr., once said, “The arc of the moral universe is long but it bends toward justice.” Likewise, the arc of marijuana regulation is long but it bends toward reform. Just not tomorrow and maybe not even next year.

Wall Street Journal, The Rare Bipartisan Issue in This Year’s Election: Recreational Weed (October 21, 2024)

The Week, Is legal weed a bipartisan issue now? (October 23, 2024)

The Guardian, Kamala Harris promises full marijuana legalization – is that a gamechanger? (October 19, 2024)

HeraldNet, Comparing Harris and Trump on crime and justice (October 19, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

For Ineffective Assistance Claim, Its Lousy Investigation That Matters – Update for October 28, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

WOULDA, COULDA, SHOULDA

woulda241028A tough battle for anyone filing a 28 USC § 2255 post-conviction motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel is to successfully argue that his or her defense attorney should have done something different – called a different witness, made a different objection, pursued a different theory – that would have won the case. Strickland v. Washington, the gold standard of ineffective assistance of counsel, holds that a lawyer’s strategic choices are almost sacred, as long as they result from adequate investigation.

John Neuhard ran into that last week. John was indicted on child porn production and related counts. When John’s court-appointed lawyer, Richard Korn, met with him, he was puzzled by John’s “awkward behaviors when answering questions” and “flat, emotionless” responses in a recorded police interrogation.

Rick discussed the issue with John’s prior attorney, with John’s parents, and with John himself. Rick hired two experts, one of whom found John was autistic while the other thought the diagnosis was inconclusive. Rick checked out his client’s school record and read up on autism and any connection to sexual crimes.

Rick concluded it was a “close call” but decided that introducing John’s autism at trial was likely to do more harm than good. Rick worried that, regardless of what an expert might caution, the jury would view John as a “mentally ill sexual deviant who lacked control over his impulses,” as the 6th Circuit put it. “So, he decided that he would introduce autism evidence only if ‘absolutely necessary.’”

SODDI190402Rick’s defense theory was classic SODDI – ‘some other dude did it.’ John lived with three other guys, Rick argued, any of whom had access to the computer and could have produced the porn.  During the investigation, all three of the others offered to take polygraph tests, a fact that the government and Rick agreed before trial would not be mentioned. Nevertheless, during her testimony, a government agent volunteered that the other three residents “were cooperative, helpful, offered to take lie detector tests…”   Rick objected and during a sidebar, asked the Judge to cure the error by letting Rick introduce evidence that John had also offered to take a polygraph, too, at least before he lawyered up and withdrew his offer.

The court instead struck the remark from the record and admonished the jury twice not to consider any testimony “about other people offering to go take a polygraph.”

After the government rested its case, Rick moved for a mistrial, arguing that the court’s instruction did not remedy the damage caused by the agent’s statement.  The court denied the motion and, of course, John got convicted.

John hired a new lawyer, who raised six issues on appeal. His conviction was upheld, with the Circuit specifically finding that the district court had not abused its discretion in rejecting lawyer Rick’s polygraph offer and instead giving a limiting instruction.

John filed a § 2255 motion arguing that Rick was ineffective by not investigating his autism sufficiently and by bungling the polygraph mistrial argument. The district court denied the motion after a hearing, and John appealed.

Last week, the 6th Circuit affirmed the district court. An attorney making a strategic decision must adequately investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them. A strategy is reasonable, the Circuit said, if it falls within the range of logical choices an ordinarily competent attorney… would assess as reasonable to achieve a specific goal. Strickland demands a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

The 6th ruled that Rick took reasonable steps to investigate the autism issue. Based on the evidence he obtained, Rick consulted with his client and concluded that presenting autism evidence entailed the risk that the jury would perceive John “as a mentally ill ‘monster’ who could not control his impulses to sexually abuse children.” While Rick had an expert who would testify that such a conclusion was wrong, Rick thought such caution would “not matter” to a jury, and that risk outweighed any benefit the autism testimony might gain John.

Skunk241028

His concern was the old-time “skunk in the jury box” problem. The autism argument might well be a skunk in the jury box. Once there, the jury was unlikely to disregard the smell just because the judge instructed it to do so.

John’s § 2255 lawyer produced a new expert’s opinion that John was much more autistic, “functioning in many ways like a ten-year-old child,” than the trial experts had found.  John said that it should have been obvious to Rick that he needed to perform more research and introduce autism evidence. The 6th, however, said John’s § 2255 motion failed to “clearly explain why having a more severe diagnosis would have mattered.”  The question where attorney effectiveness is concerned is whether the evidence shows that Rick should have been aware at the time of the trial “that additional investigation would produce more favorable evidence than the previous experts had provided.”

The 6th concluded that the evidence could not.

The fact that Rick might have gotten a more severe diagnosis if he had hired a third expert doesn’t show that hiring two experts and doing the research he did not put Rick on notice that more investigation should be done.

polygraph180925John also claimed Rick was ineffective for not demanding an immediate evidentiary hearing on whether the government agent deliberately brought up the polygraph offer, which should have caused a mistrial. In the § 2255 hearing, the agent admitted that John’s trial was her first time testifying, that she mistakenly made the polygraph remark, and that she immediately felt “like an idiot” afterward. The district court found her explanation credible, a finding an appellate court “gives great deference to.”  John had no evidence that the agent’s polygraph reference was intentional, the 6th observed, and the polygraph offer remark was, at best, “only a small part of the evidence against John.”

If Rick had demanded and gotten an immediate hearing on the agent’s mistake, the appellate court concluded, there was no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.

Rick’s “strategic decision, based on sufficient investigation,” the Circuit ruled, “fell well within the range of reasonable representation.”

Neuhard v. United States, Case No. 22-2120, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 27126 (6th Cir., October 25, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Just in Time for the Holidays: BOP Announces Restrictive Mail Policy – Update for October 25, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

YOU’VE GOT MAIL

Federal Bureau of Prisons Director Colette Peters announced last week that the agency will introduce new procedures in November 2024 in all prisons other than minimum-security facilities. All general correspondence (including photos and commercial greeting cards) sent to prisoners will be photocopied, and only color photocopies will be provided to the inmate.

mailB241025The new restrictions, which Peters said was a result of “[t]he rise in illicit substances sent to incarcerated individuals through US mail,” will require that all incoming general correspondence must be on plain white paper and in a white envelope. No glitter, labels, stickers, perfume, lipstick, crayon, or marker will be accepted.

Legal and special mail will continue to be opened in the presence of the inmate after BOP investigators verify that the identified sender really is the sender. Peters warned that while efforts would be made to deliver legal mail within 24 hours, that may not happen because “thorough vetting is required to ensure the highest level of security.”

A BOP mailroom supervisor at USP Atwater died last August, apparently from contact with a drug-laden document sent to an inmate by legal mail. Speculation in the media at the time blamed fentanyl for the death, but the three defendants charged in the death thus far have been accused only of a conspiracy to distribute only one named drug, “AB-CHMINACA and MDMB-4en-PINACA, commonly referred to as Spice.”

This is not to say that fentanyl was not a factor, nor that it was uninvolved in the poisoning of a BOP employee at USP Thomson in early September, just that it has not yet been identified as being present. In the Atwater case, it is unlikely that autopsy results will be revealed prior to trial.

United States v. Jones, Case No 1:24-cr-209 (E.D.Cal.)

BOP, Message from the Director and CPL-33 President (October 16, 2024)

AFGE 4070 Press Release, A Correctional Officer was exposed to what was believed to be amphetamines. The staff member was given Narcan before being transported to a local hospital. (September 2, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Neither More Nor Less Compassion, Sentencing Commission Reports – Update for October 24, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

COMPASSIONATE RELEASE GRANT RATES HOLD STEADY

The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Fiscal Year 2024 preliminary data on compassionate release motions filed pursuant to 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A), released last week, show that for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, the national rate for grants of such motions (out of a total of 2,901 ruled on) was 16.1%.

compassion160208This number represents an improvement over FY 2023 (13.8% of 3,140) and a very slight improvement over the cumulative average of the 15.9% grant rate since the First Step Act – which gave prisoners the right to file their own motions instead of limiting such filings to the whims of the Federal Bureau of Prisons – became law in December 2018.

Significant numbers of compassionate release motions only began to be filed when COVID-19 struck in late March 2020. Grant rates started out at 35% in April 2020, but fell to a 16.9% average by the end of that year.

The latest data show that in FY 2024, drug offenders got 55% of the compassionate release grants, followed by robbery offenders (14 %). People with Criminal History VI  – the most serious criminal history category – received 37% of the grants, followed by those with the best criminal histories, Criminal History I, with 23%.

funwithnumbers170511The Commission also reported that of 12,366 USSG Amendment 821 Part A movants – seeking a lower sentence because they previously had a higher Criminal History Category for being on probation, parole or supervised release when they committed their current offense (“status-point” offenders) – 35.9% have been granted. Of the 9,649 USSG Amendment 821 Part B movants seeking a lower sentence because they had absolutely no prior criminal offenses (zero criminal history points), 30.9 pct have been granted.

For status-point offenders, 44.9% had drug charges and 24.7% had firearms offenses. For zero-point movants, 78.6% are doing time for drugs, with fraud offenses in second place at 10.2%.

USSC, Compassionate Release Data Report (Preliminary FY 2024 Cumulative Data) (October 17, 2024)

USSC, Part A of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment Retroactivity Data Report (October 17, 2024)

USSC, Part B of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment Retroactivity Data Report (October 17, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Supremes to Decide Sentencing Factors That Apply to Supervised Release Violations – Update for October 22, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS GRANTS CERT TO SUPERVISED RELEASE CASE

The Supreme Court justices often don’t decide to grant review (certiorari or “cert”) to a case after just one Friday conference. Petitions may be “re-listed,” that is, deferred for additional consideration at the next conference.

scotus161130Generally, a re-list or two increases a cert petition’s odds of being granted. Interestingly, the odds of being granted start to fall with more than two re-lists. That was proven with yesterday’s grant of certiorari in Esteras v. United States, a case that examines what factors a court may consider in holding that a person has violated a supervised release term and ordering him or her back to prison

The supervised release statute, 18 USC § 3583(e) requires a court to consider some but not all of the 18 USC § 3553(a) sentencing factors in deciding whether to send a violator back to prison (and for how long). The statute omits reference to § 3553(a)(2)(A) — which lists the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense, as legitimate considerations when imposing an initial sentence on people.

Five courts of appeals have concluded that district courts may rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors even though they’re excluded from the list. Four other appellate have concluded that they may not. The government argues that courts can properly consider such factors and that “[a]ny modest disagreement among the courts of appeals on the question presented has no practical effect.”

The decision will be handed down by the end of next June.

Esteras v. United States, Case No 23-7483 (certiorari granted October 21, 2024)

SCOTUSBlog.com, Fourteen cases to watch from the Supreme Court’s end-of-summer “long conference” (October 10, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Former BOP Official Says “Wait Until The Halfway House Has Space” Is A Fable – Update for October 21, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE ANT AND THE GRASSHOPPER

antgrasshopper241021Most kids recall Aesop’s fable about the grasshopper who played away the summer while his neighbor, the industrious ant, worked dawn to dusk storing food for the winter. You can imagine the ending: the grasshopper. When the cold winds blow, the hungry grasshopper begs for food from the ant but is refused.

The situation sums up the virtues of hard work and planning for the future, a lesson lost on the Federal Bureau of Prisons when it came to wisely using the years following the First Step Act’s passage to expand access to halfway house space.

Admittedly, 18 USC § 3624(g) is a long, convoluted subsection. But that’s no excuse for the BOP skipping the very last paragraph, which says “[t]he Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall ensure there is sufficient prerelease custody capacity to accommodate all eligible prisoners.” After all, “shall” means “shall” and “all” means “all.”

The grasshopper was reduced to begging. The BOP, on the other hand, has addressed its lack of preparation by vigorously arguing that nothing was its fault and that inmates with FSA credits earned by successfully completing programming that reduces recidivism can use them for halfway house or home confinement only at the whim of the halfway houses. The BOP has told courts that a prisoner has no constitutional right to be placed in a particular facility and that the BOP has exclusive authority and discretion to designate the place of confinement.

The shortage of halfway house or home confinement capacity for all of the FTCs people have to redeem is no secret. BOP Director Collette Peters testified about it before Congress last summer. Her lament that the BOP has a “capacity” problem – like the government’s use of the shortage as a reason FTCs cannot be redeemed – has a flavor of John Belushi as Jake Blue, kneeling in the muck in front of Carrie Fisher, blubbering that his tux had been at the cleaners and that “it’s not my fault.”

fault200814What has been a secret, however, is that the BOP apparently has been fully aware that “shall” means “shall,” and that it is obligated to place prisoners in halfway house or home confinement when their FTCs dictate, not when the halfway house says so. In a remarkable article published this week in ExpertClick, former BOP official and consultant Bruce Cameron and recently retired BOP Unit Management Section Chief Susan M. Giddings – candidly acknowledge that “[t]he BOP has no discretion to deny or delay transfer to prerelease custody for any reason, including the lack of physical space.”

It is not surprising that Bruce would state this obvious fact. He retired from the BOP 11 years ago and has run Federal Prison Authority, a consultancy that (among other things) assists people with RDAP and placement in community programs ever since. But Dr. Giddings – whose declarations have supported any number of government oppositions to prisoner habeas petitions since First Step – only retired from the BOP five months ago. As the “go-to” BOP official on all matters related to FTCs, she would have been privy to the BOP’s thinking when she retired in the same month as the remarkable Woodley v. Warden decision was handed down by a district court in Kansas.

In the ExpertClick article, Susan and Bruce argue that the Woodley decision has limits that are easily overlooked. The Woodley court ruled that while the BOP must place an inmate so that she may use all of her FTCs, the agency “retains its discretion regarding the type and location of placement.” They focus on the Woodley court’s caveat that “the BOP retains the discretion to decide whether to transfer the petitioner to a [halfway house] or home confinement, or even whether to transfer to petitioner to early supervised release[…] Nor does the Court require that petitioner be placed in any particular [halfway house]; thus, the BOP retains the discretion to choose the particular prerelease facility.”

Petitioner Woodley could not be placed in a Tampa halfway house in time to use his FTCs, so pursuant to the court’s order that it do something to place him, the BOP sent him to one in Orlando, 70 miles away. Susan and Bruce complain that by requiring placement so as to use all of a prisoner’s FTCs,

Congress gutted the real and vital purpose of reentry services. Yet, that is the real issue and impact of Woodley. For all their talk, Congress failed to include participation in a meaningful prerelease community program as a part of the FSA, literally contradicting the purpose of the Second Chance Act. So, whether an incarcerated person is placed 5, 50, or 500 miles from their home and community, all that matters is that they were transferred.

outtahere230914It is unlikely that an inmate seeking to cash in his FTCs cares much about the meaningfulness of the “prerelease community program” to which he is sent. What is noteworthy to prisoners is that experts – especially Dr. Giddings, only months from having been at the center of BOP decision-making on all matters related to FTCs – accept as a given Woodley’s holding that “[t]he BOP has no discretion to deny or delay transfer to prerelease custody for any reason, including the lack of physical space.”

Woodley v. Warden, Case No. 24-3053, 2024 USDist LEXIS 87521 (D.Kan. May 15, 2024)

ExpertClick, Woodley v. Warden Revisited: Time Credits, Prerelease Placement, and Agency Discretion (October 17, 2024)

House Subcommittee on Crime And Government Surveillance, Testimony of Colette Peters (July 23, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

6th Circuit Applies Williams to § 922 Cases – Update for October 18, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

A CINCINNATI GUN SHOW

The 6th Circuit last week wasted no time finding practical applications for its August holding in United States v. Williams that while 922(g) may not categorically disqualify everyone within its prohibitions on firearms ownership, it does when dangerousness is involved.

gunshow241018Williams established that felons are among “the people” protected by the 2nd Amendment. Williams held that consistent with the 2nd Amendment, “our nation’s history and tradition demonstrate that Congress may disarm individuals they believe are dangerous,” and so “most applications of § 922(g)(1) are constitutional.” Applying that standard to defendant Williams, the panel concluded that the defendant’s § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession conviction was constitutional in light of his extensive criminal record, which included aggravated robbery and attempted murder.

After Williams, defendants may still argue that their facts make them an individualized exception to the application of § 922(g)(1). That’s what Christopher Goins argued. He was on probation for a state felony when he had a friend buy him two AR-15 frame pistols at a gun store. Chris took possession of the firearms in the gun store parking lot in full view of surveillance cameras.

At the time Chris took delivery of the gun, he had multiple convictions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, including a DUI, driving under the influence on a suspended license, and possession of drugs. A state court had initially sentenced Chris to one year of jail time for each of the three offenses, but it then withheld the sentence and instead gave Chris to 120 days of imprisonment and four years of probation. One condition of probation was that Chris could not possess a weapon of any kind.

The 6th upheld Chris’s § 922(g)(1) conviction, finding that the nation’s “historical tradition demonstrates that Congress may lawfully disarm probationers like Goins, who (1) are under a firearm possession limitation as a condition of probation, (2) are under a relatively short probation sentence for a dangerous crime, and (3) whose repeated and recent actions show a likelihood of future dangerous conduct.”

nickdanger220426The same day, another 6th Circuit panel ruled that Jaylin Gore’s conviction for possessing a stolen gun (18 USC 922(j)) and receipt or transfer of a gun while under indictment (922(n)) was consistent with the 2nd Amendment.

The Circuit ruled that “there is ample historical support for prohibitions on the purchase or receipt of stolen goods and “there is no indication that firearms were exempt from such laws.”

As for prohibiting receipt or transfer of a gun while under indictment, the 6th ruled, “§ 922(n)’s prohibition is comparable to the founding-era history of pretrial detention ‘in both why and how it burdens the 2nd Amendment right… Like pretrial detention, § 922(n) restricts indicted persons’ rights during the fraught period between indictment and trial, for the purpose of furthering public safety and protecting the integrity of the criminal process. And just as bail was denied outright only for defendants facing serious charges, so § 922(n) is triggered only by indictment for a felony charge… So for those who already possess one or more firearms, § 922(n) represents only a slight burden on the 2nd Amendment right; and even for those who do not, § 922(n)’s prohibition is a lesser burden than detention or permanent disarmament.”

Finally, the 6th held last Thursday that Sylvester Gailes, a guy described as a “serial perpetrator of domestic violence,” could not use the 2nd Amendment to avoid his § 922(a) conviction. Sly had repeatedly beaten the mother of his children (occasionally doing so in the presence of the kids). He had been convicted of multiple domestic violence misdemeanors.

Under 18 USC § 922(g)(9), someone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is prohibited from possessing a gun.

The Circuit ruled that “domestic violence convictions generally involve some sort of physical force… When the presence of a gun accompanies the use of physical force, the likelihood that abuse turns to homicide greatly increases… It is no surprise then that Congress sought to deprive people with domestic violence convictions from possessing firearms.”

guns170111The 6th held that “[t]aken together, Rahimi [which held that someone subject to a domestic protection order] and Williams evince that our history and tradition of firearm regulation support § 922(g)(9). Although § 922(g)(9) is by no means identical to the historical sources above or a founding-era regime, it does not need to be. The historical sources cited in Rahimi and Williams establish the constitutionality of modern firearms regulations targeting those who pose a clear threat of physical violence to another.

United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir., 2024)

United States v. Goins, Case No 23-5848, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 25355 (6th Cir., October 8, 2024)

United States v. Gore, Case No 23-3640, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 25361 (6th Cir., October 8, 2024)

United States v. Gailes, Case No 23-5928, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 25571 (6th Cir., October 10, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root