SCOTUS Takes Bear Spray To Cherished DOJ Legal Theory – Update for July 2, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HOW IS A CROOKED ACCOUNTANT LIKE BEAR REPELLANT SPRAY?

bearspray240702Hint: The Supreme Court says he’s not.

SCOTUS ruled last week in a 6-3 opinion that 18 USC § 1512(c)(2) – which bars obstruction of an official proceeding – applies only to evidence tampering, such as destruction of records or documents, in official proceedings.

The law, intended to plug a hole in the criminal code after the Enron scandal in 2001, was meant to criminalize tampering with records to obstruct their use in government proceedings. After listing “altering, destroying, mutilating or concealing objects” to impair their use in an “official proceeding,” the subsection adds a “catch-all” provision that it also applies to anyone who corruptly “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.”

j6240702The government unsurprisingly has seized on the “catch-all” to prosecute people who rioted on January 6, 2021, at the Capitol, including more than one person who used bear spray on Capitol Hill police. This is not to say that the “tourists” who trashed the place with human feces on the walls and beat up the police didn’t have it coming: what they did was rioting, pure and simple.

However, you can always trust the Dept of Justice to stretch a criminal statute like a taffy pull when the government wants to convict someone. Why be simple – say, charging them with riot, mayhem, assaulting a federal officer, criminal trespass – when you can be cute?

bewareaccountant240702The Supreme Court effectively vacated about 300 of those January 6th § 1512(c)(2) convictions, holding that the general principles used to construe statutes instruct courts that “a general phrase can be given a more focused meaning by the terms linked to it.” Because subsection (c)(2) immediately follows examples that relate to messing with “objects” to be used as evidence, SCOTUS said “the most sensible inference” is that the scope of (c)(2) is limited by the examples in (c)(1).

The government’s expansive construction of subsection (c)(2) would have other effects as well, the majority opinion suggested. It “would criminalize a broad swath of prosaic conduct, exposing activists and lobbyists alike to decades in prison.”

Fischer v. United States, Case No 23-5572, 2024 USLEXIS 2880 (June 28, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later – Update for July 1, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TIMING IS EVERYTHING

bribeB160627It’s a crime for state and local officials to “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept “anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded” for an official act. That’s a bribe, prohibited by 18 USC § 666.

Last week, the Supreme Court ruled that § 666 only applies to bribes, not gratuities. The law prohibits state and local officials from accepting bribes that are promised or given before the official act. But gratuities, which are given after the facts, are not covered.

It’s the graft version of “viva la difference.”

viveladifference240701An Indiana mayor got $13,000 after his city bought a million bucks worth of garbage trucks from a local dealer. Hizzoner said the payment was for “consulting.”  Uh-huh.

The government couldn’t prove the deal was in place before the truck purchase but told the jury that didn’t matter, because the gratuity after the fact was as illegal under § 666 as the bribe would have been.

Not so, the Supremes said last Friday.

The Court explained that bribes are payments made or agreed to before an official act to influence the official regarding that future official act. American law generally treats bribes as inherently corrupt and unlawful. Gratuities, on the other hand, are typically payments made to an official after an official act as a token of appreciation.

Gratuities, thus, are different. The majority opinion held

Gratuities are typically payments made to an official after an official act as a token of appreciation. Some gratuities can be problematic. Others are commonplace and might be innocuous. A family gives a holiday tip to the mail carrier. Parents send an end-of-year gift basket to their child’s public school teacher. A college dean gives a college sweatshirt to a city council member who comes to speak at an event. A state legislator’s neighbor drops off a bottle of wine to congratulate her for her work on a new law.

As those examples suggest, gratuities after the official act are not the same as bribes before the official act. After all, unlike gratuities, bribes can corrupt the official act—meaning that the official takes the act for private gain, not for the public good. That said, gratuities can sometimes also raise ethical and appearance concerns. For that reason, Congress, States, and local governments have long regulated gratuities to public officials.

garbagetruck240701However, such regulation of state or local officials has been left to states and localities. “State and local governments often regulate the gifts that state and local officials may accept,” Justice Kavanaugh wrote in the 6-3 opinion. “Section 666 does not supplement those state and local rules by subjecting 19 million state and local officials to up to 10 years in federal prison for accepting even commonplace gratuities. Rather, § 666 leaves it to state and local governments to regulate gratuities to state and local officials.”

Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson wrote a dissent, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.

The Mayor has since served his entire 21-month sentence, making his victory (especially since he was also convicted of an IRS-related felony) a bit hollow.

Snyder v. United States, Case No 23-108 (June 26, 2024) 2024 USLEXIS 2843 (June 26, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Felon-in-Possession Constitutionality Decision May Be Within ‘Range’ – Update for June 28, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

GOVERNMENT WANTS DEFINITIVE 2ND AMENDMENT FELON-IN-POSSESSION RULING NOW

gunknot181009The pundits sprouted like mushrooms after a rain shower this past week, making all manner of interpretations and predictions on the future of the 2nd Amendment in the wake of the Supreme Court’s United States v. Rahimi decision.

“The Court has endorsed taking guns from convicted felons, a category that now includes Donald Trump,” wrongly declared the New Yorker.

“One of the first things that’s going to happen is that the Supreme Court is going to take up a bunch of lower-court decisions on the 2nd Amendment, vacate them, send them back down for reconsideration in light of Rahimi. So we’re about to get a spate of second bites at the apple from the lower courts trying to apply this,” predicted Slate.

“The majority repeated Heller’s statement that “prohibitions… on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill’ are ‘presumptively lawful’… This suggests that the Court remains generally open to those restrictions… I expect that the Court will send Range back to the 3rd Circuit for further consideration in light of Rahimi; we’ll see what the 3rd Circuit judges say on remand,” UCLA law prof Eugene Volokh wrote in Reason.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman asked whether, in Rahimi’s wake, Donald Trump (a convicted felon subject to 18 USC 922(g)(1)) or Hunter Biden (a drug abuser when he bought his gun subject to 18 USC 922(g)(3)) can constitutionally be barred from firearm possession:

I do not believe Donald Trump or Hunter Biden “poses a clear threat of physical violence to another,” and § 922(g)(1) notably serves to permanently disarm anyone with a felony conviction. Further, the federal government has, since Bruen, generally argued for the constitutionality of 922(g)(1) based on the notion that only “responsible” individuals have 2nd Amendment rights. The Rahimi court directly and expressly rejected that notion. But still, as we saw before in 2nd Amendment cases like Heller and McDonald, the Court in Rahimi seems to still embrace dicta that can be read to suggest that the very broad criminal prohibition set forth in 18 USC § 922(g)(1) is still constitutional.

William & Mary law professor Kami Chavis wrote, “Although the court upheld Section 922(g)(8)… barriers to other attempts to implement modern gun regulations likely remain.”

iloveguns221018After the pundits all pontificated, the Solicitor General checked in last Monday, filing a surprising supplemental brief in Garland v. Range that asked the Court to quickly grant cert in a “range” of felon-in-possession cases to clarify who it can disarm under § 922(g)(1) consistent with the 2nd Amendment.

Specifically, SG Elizabeth Prelogar has asked SCOTUS to review some or all five separate pending cases dealing with the federal gun ban for felonies of varying severity. She argued that “we believe [the Court] should grant plenary review to resolve Section 922(g)(1)‘s constitutionality… Although this Court’s decision in Rahimi corrects some of the methodological errors made by courts that have held Section 922(g)(1) invalid, it is unlikely to fully resolve the existing conflict.”

The government argues that the conflict is important. Out of about 64,000 criminal cases reported to the Sentencing Commission in Fiscal Year 2022, more than 7,600 were § 922(g)(1) cases, 12% of all federal criminal cases.

It seems that just about everyone expected a spate of GVR orders on pending petitions for cert. (A GVR is a single-sentence order in which the Supreme Court grants certiorari, vacates the appellate court decision, and remands the case for further consideration in light of a new SCOTUS decision, in this case, Rahimi).

The government’s supplemental brief argues that “a GVR order is inappropriate if the delay and further cost entailed in a remand are not justified by the potential benefits of further consideration by the lower court. In our view, that is the case here. Section 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality has divided courts of appeals and district courts. Although this Court’s decision in Rahimi corrects some of the methodological errors made by courts that have held Section 922(g)(1) invalid, it is unlikely to fully resolve the existing conflict. And given the frequency with which the government brings criminal cases under Section 922(g)(1), the substantial costs of prolonging uncertainty about the statute’s constitutionality outweigh any benefits of further percolation. Under these circumstances, the better course would be to grant plenary review now.”

gun160711The government recommends that SCOTUS grant cert on multiple cases to be heard in one ultimate felon-in-possession case, including Doss v. United States (whether applying felon-in-possession is constitutional where the petitioner has “a lengthy criminal record” that “includes over 20 convictions, many of them violent”) and Jackson v. United States (petitioner has “previous felony convictions for non-violent drug crimes”). The government also asked that the Court add to the mix either Range v. Attorney General (3rd Circuit held 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to a man convicted of food-stamp fraud from 25 years before) or Vincent v. United States (10th Circuit held 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to addicted woman convicted of bank fraud 15 years before but now drug-free and running large charity).

As for Range and Vincent, the Government argues that “[g]ranting review in one of those cases would enable this Court to consider Section 922(g)(1)’s application to non-drug, non-violent crimes.”

A statement in the supplemental brief suggests the Government may have concluded that Rahimi means that it cannot win arguing that 922(g)(1) is constitutional in all circumstances. SG Preloger says that granting “review in cases involving different types of predicate felonies” would “enable the Court to consider Section 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality across a range of circumstances that are fully representative of the statute’s applications.”

guns170111If the government were convinced that it can defend 922(g)(1) in all circumstances, it would be happy with certiorari in either Range or Vincent, because winning on either of those cases would establish that 922(g)(1) is constitutional and thus immune to an “as applied” challenge. The fact that the government suggests that the Court hear swath of cases with defendants ranging from saint to sinner implies that the SG has conceded that the “as applied” constitutional line is going to fall somewhere in between Mr. Doss and Ms. Vincent.

Such a conclusion is almost foreordained by the Rahimi court’s warning that its Rahimi ruling is narrow:

Our resolution of Mr. Rahimi’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(8) necessarily leaves open the question whether the statute might be unconstitutional as applied in particular circumstances… We do not decide today whether the government may disarm a person without a judicial finding that he poses a “credible threat” to another’s physical safety… We do not resolve whether the government may disarm an individual permanently… We do not determine whether § 922(g)(8) may be constitutionally enforced against a person who uses a firearm in self-defense… Nor do we purport to approve in advance other laws denying firearms on a categorical basis to any group of persons a legislature happens to deem, as the government puts it, “not ‘responsible.’”

The Court will accept the SG’s invitation, if at all, early next week (although the Solicitor General has substantial influence with the Court). If the Supremes do take the cases, it will move up by at least a year the time we’ll have a definitive ruling on the constitutional limits of the felon-in-possession statute.

United States v. Rahimi, Case No 22-915, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2714 (June 21, 2024)

United States v. Doss, Case No. 22-3662, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 31748 (8th Cir. Dec. 1, 2023)

United States v. Jackson, 69 F.4th 495 (8th Cir. 2023)

Vincent v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1197 (10th Cir. 2023)

Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023)

Supplemental Brief, Garland v. Range, Case No. 23-374

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)

New Yorker, The Supreme Court Steps Back From the Brink on Guns (June 22, 2024)

Slate, John Roberts Tried to Clean Up Clarence Thomas’ Mess. He May Have Invited More Chaos (June 24, 2024)

Reason, Some Takeaways from Today’s Rahimi 2nd Amendment Opinions (June 21, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, After Rahimi, can Donald Trump legally possess a gun? How about Hunter Biden? (June 24, 2024)

Bloomberg Law, Narrow Gun Opinion Says Law Not in ‘Amber,’ But History Rules (June 25, 2024)

The Reload, DOJ Asks Supreme Court to Resolve Question of Gun Rights for Felons (June 25, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS Goes For Defendant on ACCA Case – Update for June 27, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

“SEPARATE OCCASIONS” ACCA FINDING MUST BE BY JURY

In an unusual 6-3 lineup (with a vigorous dissent by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, who is widely assumed to be defendant-friendly), the Supreme Court ruled last week that the 5th and 6th Amendments require that imposing an Armed Career Criminal Act sentence on a convicted felon in possession of a firearm requires a jury, not a judge.

scotus161130The ACCA (18 USC 924(e)) imposes a mandatory 15-year prison term on a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun or ammo who has previously committed three violent felonies or serious drug offenses on separate occasions. Up to now, judges have made decisions on whether occasions were “separate” by a preponderance of the evidence. However, the Supremes hold that as an element of the offense, whether the felonies occurred on separate occasions, must be found by a jury and that the standard should be “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

circuitsplit220516Up to now, circuits have been split on whether a judge or a jury had to find that the three occasions were different. A Supreme Court opinion two years ago, Wooden v. United States, established standards for deciding when offenses had been committed on “different occasions.” Now, how those standards are to be decided has broken in favor of defendants as well.

A surprising twist in the case was that the government agreed with the defendant that the element should be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt:

Petitioner renews his contention that the 6th Amendment requires a jury to find (or a defendant to admit) that predicate offenses were under the ACCA. In light of this Court’s recent articulation of the standard for determining whether offenses occurred on different occasions in Wooden v United States, the government agrees with that contention. Although the government has opposed previous petitions raising this issue, recent developments make clear that this Court’s intervention is necessary to ensure that the circuits correctly recognize defendants’ constitutional rights in this context. This case presents a suitable vehicle for deciding the issue this Term and thereby providing the timely guidance that the issue requires.

jury151228The decision is yet another chink in the armor of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, which permits a judge instead of a jury to find certain facts related to a defendant’s past offenses. That decision is at odds with Apprendi v New Jersey, which held that the elements of any statute that increased the statutory sentencing range had to be decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Erlinger majority described Almendarez-Torres as “an outlier” and “at best an exceptional departure” from historic practice. 

Erlinger v. United States, Case No 23-370, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2715 (June 21, 2024)

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)

– Thomas L. Root

Nothing to See Here Anymore,’ BOP Tells Court About FCI Dublin – Update for June 25, 2024

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But first, a mea culpa…

THOSE PESKY DETAILS

embarrassedLast week, I reported on a U.S. Sentencing Commission methamphetamine study that debunked the idea that there was anything special about meth with purity over 90%, despite the fact that 80% plus pure meth comes with much higher Guideline sentencing ranges.

I reported that the study found that meth tested by the government in fiscal year (FY) 2022 averaged over 90% pure with a median purity of 98%, “measurements dramatically higher than just two years before, when meth purity ranged from 10 to 80%.”

An alert reader questioned my data. It turns out he was correct.

According to the DEA, meth purity ranged from 10% to 80% in the year 2000, NOT 2020. My embarrassment at my error tests out at 100% purity, and I thank my reader for pointing out the mistake.

USSC, Methamphetamine Trafficking Offenses In The Federal Criminal Justice System (June 13, 2024)

‘WE BURIED THE DUBLIN PROBLEM, SO LET’S STOP TALKING ABOUT IT,’ BOP TELLS COURT

The Federal Bureau of Prisons has asked the U.S. District Court in Oakland to dismiss a class action lawsuit demanding systemic changes at FCI Dublin as moot, on the grounds that no one is imprisoned there anymore.

“The injunctive claims addressing conditions of confinement at FCI Dublin—a facility where no inmates are confined—must be dismissed as moot,” the motion filed last Tuesday argues. The plaintiff’s money damages claims, consideration of which have been stayed until August, would remain on file.

The suit was filed last August by female inmates, alleging rampant sexual assault and retaliation by Dublin staff. BOP abruptly shut down the facility in April shortly after Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers appointed a special master to oversee changes at the prison.

paniccrowd240625

The BOP’s motion admits that Dublin was in “dire need of immediate change.” The agency said, “Following its own deliberative process, BOP leadership determined that it needed to close FCI Dublin and transfer all female adults in custody (AICs) to other federal facilities. The transfer process was conducted subject to various court orders and in coordination with the Court’s special master. That process is now complete, and the AICs previously confined at Dublin are now at new facilities. If Dublin is eventually reopened, it will not be used to house female AICs again.”

The Court has described the closure of Dublin as “hasty and chaotic” but the BOP claims it “was carefully planned” and that the Court was privately advised a month before the April 15 mass movement.

A group of Congressional representatives is investigating allegations that the transfers were conducted inhumanely.

Motion to Dismiss, California Coalition for Women Prisoners v, BOP, ECF 326, Case No 4:23-cv-4155 (ND Cal, June 18, 2024)

KQED-TV, Biden Administration Seeks to Dismiss Lawsuit Over Bay Area Women’s Prison Abuses (June 18, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

What Does Rahimi Mean for 922(g)(1) Constitutionality? – Update For June 24, 2024

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WHITHER RAHIMI?

No one who paid any attention to Zackey Rahimi’s case doubted for a moment that the Supreme Court would find a way to uphold the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(8), the subsection of the felon-in-possession statute that prohibited people subject to domestic protection orders (DPO) from possessing guns.

Old Zackey is 87 miles of bad track, a bad boy’s bad boy. He was hit with a DPO for bouncing his girlfriend’s face off his car’s dashboard. After the DPO was issued, Zackey kept harassing her anyway, For good measure, he also shot at another car in an unrelated road rage incident and opened fire at a What-a-Burger when his friend’s credit card was declined. Zack is not a sympathetic defendant.

whataburger230703On Friday, the Supreme Court upheld § 922(g)(8) (at least as it had been applied to Zack), concluding that the nation’s “tradition of firearm regulation allows the Government to disarm individuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety of others.”

The 8-1 majority (Justice Thomas dissenting) observed that “some courts have misunderstood the methodology of our recent Second Amendment cases,” meaning New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The Court cautioned against taking too rigid a view of the historical tradition of gun regulation that Bruen requires to be found in order to hold that a firearm statute is consistent with the Second Amendment. Instead, courts should look at whether the modern law being challenged is “relevantly similar” to historical regulations “in both why and how it burdens the Second Amendment right. Section 922(g)(8) restricts gun use to check demonstrated threats of physical violence, just as the [colonial-era] surety and going armed laws do. Unlike the regulation struck down in Bruen, Section 922(g)(8) does not broadly restrict arms use by the public generally.”

SCOTUS held that courts should focus on the purpose of the regulation and the burden that it places on the Second Amendment right to bear arms. “For example,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “if laws at the founding regulated firearm use to address particular problems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within a permissible category of regulations.”

Zack challenged 922(g)(8)’s facial constitutionality – that is, he argued that the law is always unconstitutional – rather than arguing it was unconstitutional “as applied” to Zack’s situation. That probably was the better of a bad choice, because an “as applied” challenge would have focused on Zack, whose personal history was terrible. The Court, ruling that 922(g)(8) was not facially unconstitutional, had no problem concluding that “Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to the facts of Rahimi’s own case.”

rahimishirt240624The Rahimi majority opinion (before the five concurring opinions and one dissent), ends with before now, “this Court did not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis… of the full scope of the Second Amendment. Nor do we do so today. Rather, we conclude only this: An individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.” (Emphasis added by me).

Ohio State law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Policy and Law blog, observed that the closing ‘only this’ statement “leads me to think that litigation over the Second Amendment is not going to get much easier for lower courts after this ruling.”

The Washington Post said, “The decision was limited in scope, leaving for another day more difficult questions about the viability of other gun-control measures, such as… restrictions on gun possession by nonviolent offenders.” USA Today said the decision doesn’t foreshadow how Rahimi’s more flexible approach in applying history “will be applied to other restrictions such as prohibiting non-violent felons from having guns, according to Joseph Blocher, co-director of the Center for Firearms Law at Duke University School of Law.”

irresponsible240624Rahimi leaves us with almost as many questions about the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) — the actual felon-in-possession subsection — as we had before last Friday’s decision. There are few hints in the opinion, although SCOTUS did unanimously reject the government’s argument that Zack could be deprived of his right to have a gun because he is not a “responsible” citizen.

Arguments that convicted felons are not “responsible” citizens have been government mainstays in contending that § 922(g)(1) is consistent with Bruen. “‘Responsible’,” Roberts wrote, “is a vague term. It is unclear what such a rule would entail, and there is no support for such a rule in the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment cases.”

UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh wrote in Reason that

The majority repeated Heller’s statement that “prohibitions… on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill’ are ‘presumptively lawful’… This suggests that the Court remains generally open to those restrictions, even though it turns out such restrictions actually lack a long historical pedigree.

At the same time, perhaps there is some room after Rahimi for this “presumpti[on]” to be rebutted with regard to people convicted of felonies that don’t suggest a “credible threat to the physical safety of others,” especially if those felonies are part of the well-post-[18th century] increase in the number of nonviolent crimes that are classified as felonies. A few courts have so concluded (to oversimplify slightly); US v Range… is one example. I expect that the Court will send Range back to the 3rd Circuit for further consideration in light of Rahimi; we’ll see what the 3rd Circuit judges say on remand.

violent160620A commentator on the Sentencing Law and Policy site suggested that “in 922(g)(1) cases the court is going to have to draw a line between white-collar offenders who present no danger and felons convicted of assault and felons convicted of drug trafficking (an offense that, in a particular case may not involve violence, but presents an enormous risk of gun violence).”

For now, look to Range and other similar cases to be remanded and for the 9th Circuit to rehear Duarte (for which a petition for rehearing is now pending).

United States v. Rahimi, Case No 22-915, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2714 (June 21, 2024)

SCOTUSBlog, Supreme Court upholds bar on guns under domestic-violence restraining orders (June 21, 2024)

Washington Post, Supreme Court upholds gun ban for domestic violence restraining orders (June 21, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Supreme Court, by an 8-1 vote, rejects Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(8) (June 21, 2024)

Reason, Some Takeaways from Today’s Rahimi Second Amendment Opinions (June 21, 2024)

USA Today, Supreme Court upholds law banning domestic abusers from owning guns (June 21, 2024)

United States v. Duarte, 101 F.4th 657 (9th Cir, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS Writes Fed.R.Evid. 704(b) Out of the Books – Update for June 21, 2024

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DID EXPERTS JUST GET A LOT MORE USEFUL?

expertB240621It is a fundamental principle of common law that witnesses can only testify about what they saw, heard or felt. They are not allowed to expound any deductions based on the facts. That being the case, expert testimony—testimony given by someone with knowledge or experience in a particular field or discipline that renders an opinion based on the facts—ought to be an abomination.

But it’s a necessary abomination. So necessary that experts, once qualified as such by the presiding judge, can give opinions on just about anything, even the ultimate issues in the case (such as “the defendant was negligent,” “calling some a ‘scumbag’ is not defamatory,” or “the substance the defendant possessed was fentanyl”).

But after John Hinckley, the man who shot President Reagan in order to impress actress Jodie Foster, was found not guilty by reason of insanity after a battle of experts arguing that he was or was not nuts, Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) was adopted to hold that while experts could issue all other ultimate-issue opinions from the stand, “[i]n a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.”

Yesterday, the Supreme Court crafted an end-around to 704(b), a decision that may reverberate to the benefit of criminal defendants as much as it benefitted the government in the case before the Justices.

endrun240621Adriana Diaz was arrested at the United States-Mexico border after the door frames of the car she was driving were found to be packed with illegal drugs hidden in the door frames. At trial, Adriana argued that the car was not hers, that she was driving it as a favor, and that she had no idea of what was under the door panels.

A government expert testified that “most” drug mules knew what they were carrying because drug traffickers do not typically entrust drugs to an unknowing person. The jury, apparently concluding that Adriana was like “most” drug mules, convicted her.

Adriana argued that the government expert had violated 704(b) because he had testified to her mental state. However, in a 6-3 ruling, SCOTUS upheld the expert testimony in a fine case of hair-splitting: “An expert’s conclusion that ‘most people’ in a group have a particular mental state is not an opinion about ‘the defendant’ and thus does not violate Rule 704(b),” Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the majority.

"100% Expert" Cachet (bleu)Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, the most experienced Justice on the court in criminal defense work, wrote in a concurring opinion that “the type of mental-state evidence that Rule 704(b) permits can prove essential not only for prosecutors, but for defendants as well.” She could be right, especially where novel defenses–such as diminished capacity arguments (think ‘battered women’ defenses)–are used.

However, in a vigorous dissent, Justice Neil Gorsuch (joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elana Kagan), complained that the decision let

[t]he government come[] away with a powerful new tool in its pocket. Prosecutors can now put an expert on the stand — someone who apparently has the convenient ability to read minds — and let him hold forth on what “most” people like the defendant think when they commit a legally proscribed act. Then, the government need do no more than urge the jury to find that the defendant is like “most” people and convict. What authority exists for allowing that kind of charade in federal criminal trials is anybody’s guess, but certainly it cannot be found in Rule 704.

Diaz v. United States, Case No. 23-14, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2709 (June 20, 2024)

Courthouse New Service, SCOTUS won’t restrict expert testimony in drug trafficking case (June 20, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Supreme Court, by 6-3 vote, rejects claim that mental state expert testimony violated FRE 704(b) (June 20, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

‘We Only Believe You When It’s Convenient,’ DOJ Tells BOP inmate Sexual Abuse Victims – Update for June 20, 2024

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KUMBAYA MOMENT PAST FOR COMPASSION FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS

kumbaya221003Last November, prosecutors asked female inmate Ilene Wahpeta to provide a victim impact statement at the sentencing of Andrew Jones, a former BOP employee convicted of sexually assaulting three inmates at FCI Dublin and sentenced to eight years..

Reason reported last week that six months later, the same Dept of Justice that presented her victim testimony as a compelling basis to sentence the former CO to 96 months is arguing against Ilene’s compassionate release motion on the basis that Ilene wasn’t a named victim in Jones’s criminal case and that her claims aren’t credible.

In September 2022, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco wrote a letter to FAMM saying that she had ordered BOP Director Peters to “review whether BOP’s policy regarding compassionate release should be modified” to accommodate female prisoners who had been assaulted by federal employees. Peters responded that “she has begun to consider requests from inmates who have been abused and are not deemed to be threats to the community if they are granted their release,” according to the New York Times.

forcedsex161202Then, Sentencing Commission Guideline § 1B1.13(b)(4) was modified effective last November to include as an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying sentence reduction cases where “the defendant, while in custody… was a victim of sexual abuse involving a “sexual act,” as defined in 18 USC § 2246(2) (including the conduct described in 18 USC § 2246(2)(D) regardless of the age of the victim…”

Last week, Reason said that DOJ is actively undercutting its own policy as well as § 1B1.13(b)(4). Ilene’s case is such an example. “Lawyers representing incarcerated women filing for early release based on their status as sexual assault survivors say federal prosecutors are now routinely fighting to disqualify their clients because of an unreasonably narrow definition,” Reason reported.

DOJ has been arguing that the cases against the BOP employees accused of sexual abuse have to be completed prior to granting compassionate release under § 1B1.13(b)(4). In other cases (like Ilene’s), DOJ is saying that the victims’ claims are not credible.

“Before November 1, 2023, when this policy statement went into effect, in almost every single case the government was agreeing or not opposing the compassionate release motion,” FAMM attorney Shanna Rifkin, who has been working with BOP inmate abuse victims, says. “Since then, there has been a lot more resistance to compassionate release motions based on sexual abuse.”

When the Sentencing Commission was considering adopting what became § 1B1.13(b)(4), DOJ argued in written comments that “permitting compassionate release hearings only after the completion of other administrative or legal proceedings will help ensure that allegations are more fairly adjudicated, prevent mini-trials on allegations, and reduce interference with pending investigations and prosecutions.”

“It effectively puts the DOJ back in the driver’s seat,” Rifkin told Reason, “because who drives a criminal case? The Department of Justice. Victims of abuse have no say over when a case against their abuser will be brought, if it will be brought, and who will be charged as the victims in the case.”

womenprison240620And while a finding of guilt may sound like a reasonable standard, Reason said, it is a surprisingly difficult one to meet in cases of sexual assault perpetrated by government employees… So women who are survivors of his abuse ostensibly have to wait until the government has concluded their case in order to have a cognizable claim under this policy statement.”

According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, from 2016 to 2018 perpetrators of staff sexual misconduct were only convicted, sentenced, fined, or pleaded guilty in 6 percent of substantiated incidents in federal and state prisons.

Reason, Advocates Say the Justice Department Is Failing To Provide Relief to Women Who Were Abused in Prison (June 10, 2024)

New York Times, Justice Dept. Considers Early Release for Female Inmates Sexually Abused Behind Bars (Dec 13, 2022)
– Thomas L. Root

Raising the Bar on Methamphetamine Purity – Update for June 18, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING COMMISSION METH STUDY ACKNOWLEDGES REALITY

reeves230706Ever since U.S. District Judge Carlton Reeves (Southern District of Mississippi)—who happens to have a side gig as chairman of the U.S. Sentencing Commission—ruled that these days everybody’s methamphetamine was so pure that the “methamphetamine actual” and “ice” purity enhancement in § 2D1.1 of the Guidelines made no sense, people have been asking me when the USSC is going to catch up with reality and throw out the higher sentencing ranges for 90% pure and higher meth.

I thought that we might have seen it in this year’s proposed amendments, but it didn’t happen. However, a Sentencing Commission study released last week suggests that the Commission may be looking for a change in next year’s amendment cycle.

It’s important, too. Over the past 20 years, meth trafficking offenses have risen by 168%, now accounting for half of all federal drug trafficking cases.

The study found that meth tested in fiscal year (FY) 2022 averaged over 90% pure with a median purity of 98%. Furthermore, the meth was uniformly tested at high purity whether it was classified for sentencing as a meth mixture (91% average purity), meth actual (93%) or ice (98%). These purity averages are dramatically higher than just two years before, back when methamphetamine purity ranged from 10 to 80%.

meth240618Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) and (B)(viii), it takes ten times as much weight of a meth mixture as it does actual meth or ice to trigger mandatory minimum penalties. So let’s say you’re a criminal newbie caught with a pound of meth of average purity. That would be 458 grams. If you are sentenced for 458 grams of “a mixture containing methamphetamine,” your advisory sentencing range would be 78-97 months. But if the government pushes for sentencing your pound as “methamphetamine actual,” you would have a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months with a sentencing range topping out at 135 months.

As the late Johnny Cochrane is reputed to have said (at least by South Park) in his fictional but brilliant Chewbacca defense, “That does not make sense.”

chewbacca240618The Commission can change its Guidelines (and likely will in the next year or two), but altering 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) would require Congressional action.

Meth trafficking sentences averaged 91 months in FY 2022, the longest average among major federal drug trafficking offenses, more than fentanyl (65 months) and heroin (66 months). Meth trafficking offenses carried mandatory minimum penalties more often (74%) than all other drug trafficking offenses (57%).

USSC, Methamphetamine Trafficking Offenses In The Federal Criminal Justice System (June 13, 2024)

United States v. Robinson, Case No. 3:21-cr-00014 (S.D.Miss., December 23, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

FCI Dublin Is Closed But The Controversy Keeps Swirling – LISA Newsletter For June 17, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE BAND PLAYS ON…

BOPbus240429Acting with efficiency and consideration for the well-being of prisoners, the Federal Bureau of Prisons closed FCI Dublin two months ago.  This is the BOP version.

Acting precipitously, hiding its intentions, and with all the care and haste of a concentration camp evacuation in front of the advancing enemy, the BOP shuttered FCI Dublin, treated inmates like cattle while they were being transferred to other facilities in order to stop or at least hobble investigations into the inmate abuse at BOP facilities. This is the critics’ version.

Three Senators and 19 Representatives wrote to BOP Director Colette Peters last Thursday to get to the bottom of the unprecedented prison closure.  

rios-marques240617The letter they sent asks who made the decision to close Dublin and when the decision was made. The request focuses on the role of Regional Director Rios-Marques in the culture of abuse at FCI Dublin, “including her selection of a succession of wardens who have been at best ineffective and at worst complicit in retaliation and intimidation,” and wants to know whether she was following BOP policy “when she refused to advise [the Special Master appointed by the court to oversee Dublin] of the impending closure, which would begin the next day, even when asked directly on April 14?”

Madam Regional Director, you’ve got 29 years in at the BOP. It might be a good time to contemplate retirement.

The letter hints at a credibility gap forming between Congress and the BOP. “[T]here has been a tragic and unacceptable history of long-term abuse of [prisoners] at FCI Dublin,” the letter says. “Up until weeks before the closure of FCI Dublin, BOP leadership and their counsel repeatedly asserted that conditions and care at FCI Dublin were constitutionally adequate, and repeatedly denied allegations of staff misconduct and retaliation.”

cattle240617The letter also recounted that the legislators were concerned “about shocking abuses that allegedly took place during the mass [prisoner] transfers,” noting that “this level of disregard for human dignity cannot be tolerated. Additionally, the frantic nature of the closure of FCI Dublin reflects a lack of adequate planning and proper safeguards to protect the rights of [prisoners].”

[I have replaced the letter’s use of “AIC” — Peters’s kinder, gentler “Adult in Custody” term — with “prisoner.”  Peters says “AIC” but other BOP employees call them “bitches.” These women are ‘prisoners’ and ‘inmates’ until such a time as BOP line employees start treating them like AICs, or at least treat them like human beings and not like cattle, Director Peters’s “feel-good” relabeling notwithstanding.]

BOP officials have stated that the Dublin closure plan was “carefully considered over months,” an assertion that would have made Pinnochio blush.

The legislators want written answers by July 10, 2024.

Pinocchio160812Meanwhile two advocacy groups last Wednesday asked U.S. District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, the Northern District of California jurist overseeing the class action case against the BOP for Dublin sexual abuse, to unseal court records and preserve public access to hearings.

The legal nonprofit Public Justice and the ACLU of Northern California jointly filed a motion for increased transparency in the case, which is set for trial in June 2025. In the last two months, Judge Gonzalez Rogers has held a series of closed hearings to address the Dublin closure. “These hearings took place without prior notice, and in many instances, the docket does not reflect that they even occurred,” the groups said in a statement.

Letter from Sens Mark DeSaulnier, Laphonza Butler and Richard J. Durbin (and others) to BOP Director Colette Peters (June 13, 2024)

Associated Press, Legal advocates seek public access to court records about abuse at California women’s prison (June 12, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root