Vindictive Resentencing Gets An Asterisk – Update for August 10, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NOT ALL HIGHER RESENTENCES ARE BECAUSE THE JUDGE DOESN’T LIKE YOU

It is an article of faith that if you win an appeal or § 2255 motion, a district court cannot increase your sentence the second time around, because to do so would be vindictive and violate the 5th Amendment.

hammer160509The lead case on the subject, North Carolina v. Pearce, holds that “due process of law requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial, and that a defendant be freed of any apprehension of retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge. Accordingly, the reason for imposition after retrial of a more severe sentence must affirmatively appear in the record, and must be based on objective information concerning the defendant’s identifiable conduct after the original sentencing proceeding.”

Just as Pepper v. United States holds that a judge at resentencing may consider good post-sentencing conduct in imposing a lower sentence, a judge at resentencing may consider lousy post-sentencing conduct in hammering a defendant with a higher sentence.

Ask Carey Singleton. He was sentenced to 13 years for Hobbs Act robbery but got the sentence vacated on appeal. On resentencing, the Singletary was resentenced on July 6, 2021. Before the hearing, the government filed a revised sentencing memo reporting that Carey had gotten at least 15 shots (disciplinary infractions), including three “instances of weapons possession, three instances of threatening to harm correctional officers, five instances of disobeying lawful orders, one instance of lock tampering, and one sexual act.”

What’s more, Carey had since pleaded guilty to three state charges for an unrelated armed robbery he had committed in 2017. The government asked the court to run any new sentence consecutively to Carey’s state term.

Carey’s sentencing judge was “tremendously concerned” by these post-sentencing developments and resentenced him “taking into account new information, including the new convictions and the multitude of extremely serious infractions.” The court then imposed a 6-month increase from its initial 13-year sentence to the top of Carey’s advisory Guidelines range. And it ordered that the sentence run consecutively to Carey’s 10.5-year state sentence.

Carey appealed, arguing that the district court increased his sentence vindictively as punishment for his initial appeal. Last week, the 4th Circuit rejected his claim.

Pearce established a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness “whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant” after a successful appeal. To defeat this presumption, the district court must justify its increased sentence by identifying relevant conduct or events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing proceedings.”

vindictive170720Here, the Circuit held, “the district court amply rebutted any presumption of vindictiveness by affirmative reference to objective, post-sentencing events… It described Singleton’s intervening disciplinary record at length, concluding that Singleton’s remorse at his initial allocution was a ‘false apology,’ and that his conduct in prison ‘showed us who he is.’ The new state convictions gave the sentencing judge further “insight” into Carey’s character, justifying the district court’s conclusion that the “conduct in the totality bespeaks a tremendous need for society to be protected from Carey Singleton.”

United States v. Singletary, Case No 21-4351, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 19775 (4th Cir. Aug 1, 2023)

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)

Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011)
<><>

– Thomas L. Root

‘Spirit Is Willing But…’ In Federal Drug Reform – Update for August 8, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NOTHING HAPPENING HERE…

vacation190905If Congress does not approve a new appropriations bill by September 30, the government could shut down. But as anyone who works in or with the federal government knows, the government pretty much shuts down every year for the month of August as legislators, agency heads and government employees leave town for vacations.

This leaves a number of issues important to federal defendants hanging. Two of those are cocaine and marijuana reform.

Before leaving town for the beach, Dept of Justice officials filed comments with the U.S. Sentencing Commission urging the Commission to adopt a number of priorities for the coming year. On the equivalency of powder and crack cocaine, the DOJ urged the Commission (1) to advocate that Congress for passage of the EQUAL Act (S.524 and H.R.1062) to remedy the current disparity between treatment of powder cocaine and cocaine base; and (2) to remind sentencing courts of “their obligation, when considering [18 USC § 3553(a)] sentencing factors, to consider the pharmacological similarities between powder and crack cocaine and whether it is appropriate to impose a variance consistent with the relevant base offense level for powder cocaine.”

You may recall that last October, President Biden directed that the Dept of Health and Human Services lead an effort to reclassify marijuana as something less than a Schedule I drug. That effort includes review by the Drug Enforcement Administration.

marijuana160818Pressed by Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL) during a July 27 oversight hearing on DEA, DEA Administrator Anne Milgram told the subcommittee that the agency has not been provided with a definite timeline to review marijuana’s classification. When Gaetz asked Milgram if she would request the timeline from the HHS, she said, “I will ask.”

The rescheduling of marijuana probably won’t be done until late next year. A rescheduling could possibly lead to changes in 21 USC § 841 as to punishment – if not conviction ¬– for marijuana.

DOJ, Letter to Sentencing Commission (July 31, 2023)

Forbes, DEA Head Pledges To Seek Federal Marijuana Rescheduling Review Timeline From HHS (July 31, 2023)

House Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance, Hearing (July 27, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

You Look Like a Criminal – Update for August 7, 2023

If you have a question, please send a new email to newsletter@lisa-legalinfo.com.

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DISTRICT JUDGE KICKED OFF CASE FOR PROCEDURAL TIRADE

Maybe it’s climate change or Donald Trump. Perhaps the Supermoon. Blame whatever you want, but I haven’t seen two judicial bias decisions in seven years. Now I’m writing about the second one in seven days.

judge160222Leron Liggins was charged with drug distribution in the Eastern District of Michigan. Using Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 20, he had brought in a similar pending charge from the Eastern District of Kentucky so he could resolve both at once. On the eve of trial, Leron’s lawyer told the court he wanted to plead guilty, but when he appeared for the change of plea hearing, Leron demanded a new lawyer (for the second time).

US District Judge Stephen Murphy was not amused. He said, “Most defendants don’t get my attention or stand out, but Mr. Liggins does.” After reviewing the tortured procedural history of the case, the Judge said:

I’m tired of this case. I’m tired of this defendant. I’m tired of getting the runaround. This has been going on since February 6, 2018. We’ve got a case out of Kentucky that came here under Rule 20. Rule 20 says the reason for the transfer was the defendant has agreed to plead guilty. I feel as if the Court has been misled. I’ve been told in an official pleading and informally the defendant was going to plead guilty. We canceled jurors. We got a trial date. Now we got this.

Leron tried to talk, but the Judge shut him down, saying, “If you speak anymore, I’ll have you hauled out of here.” Then, turning to Leron’s lawyer, the Judge exploded:

This guy has got my attention. What do you want me to do? This guy looks like a criminal to me. This is what criminals do. This isn’t what innocent people, who want a fair trial do. He’s indicted in Kentucky. He’s indicted here. He’s alleged to be dealing heroin, which addicts, hurts and kills people, and he’s playing games with the Court.

The pandemic and Leron’s demands for other counsel ended up delaying things for a couple more years. Right before the trial was to begin, Leron’s new lawyer moved to have the Judge recuse himself for bias under 28 USC § 455(a).

murphy230807The next day, Judge Murphy denied the motion while saying he appreciated the “opportunity to clear up a few things that ha[d] been bothering [him] for a few months.” The Judge incorrectly recounted that Leron had “engaged in a personal colloquy” with the court that had caused the district judge to become “upset.” He had not, unless “STFU” passes for a friendly exchange of views. Nevertheless, for his conduct, the district judge delivered a faux apology:

And I want to say right now directly to Mr. Liggins I’m sorry, I apologize for getting upset. I did that because, A, I thought we were going to have a guilty plea; B, I thought that the colloquy was getting out of hand; and C, I lost my head… Now, having said that, I would say two things. Number one, [Leron’s lawyer] in that transcript agreed with my underlying concerns, and number two, just because I got mad does not mean I’m biased against Mr.—Mr. Liggins… I was mad, I was hostile, I was disapproving, and I regret it. I made a mistake by yelling like that, but I wasn’t upset or concluding that Mr. Liggins was—was guilty of an offense or hostile or partial toward him. I concluded he was acting in a manner which was frankly obstructionist and making me mad.

Leron, the Judge is sorry that you behaved so badly that you made him mad. Can you tell how sorry the Judge is?  

Neither can I.

The Judge then asserted, “I’m not, trust me. I give Mr. Liggins the same rights and opportunities here to demonstrate his innocence or lack of guilt as any other litigant.”

guiltyproveninnocent230807(Parenthetical:  You have to love the Judge’s standard of proof.  All this time we thought the government had to prove a defendant’s guilt. Turns out, at least practicing MurphyLaw, that a defendant has to prove his innocence.)

Leron was unable to prove his lack of guilt. He was convicted. After that, he appealed. Last week, the 6th Circuit threw Judge Murphy off the case.

A judge’s misconduct at trial may be “characterized as bias or prejudice” if “it is so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.” But this takes more than just judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases. “Expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women sometimes display,” the 6th held, “do not establish such bias or partiality… Only if the remarks reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible” does a judge cross the line.

But Judge Murphy found that line, and he crossed it. The appellate court said:

Difficult as the recusal standard may be to reach, we find that the district judge’s unacceptable remarks at the January 30, 2020 hearing satisfy it. Among the many disparaging remarks about Liggins that the district judge made, the most troubling is that Liggins ‘looks like a criminal to me.’ We are highly concerned by this remark, especially when directed toward Liggins, an African American man… These remarks served no purpose for courtroom administration, but rather constituted gratuitous commentary by the district judge about his opinion of Liggins and his feelings about Liggins’ case.

blamevictim230807In classic victim-blaming, the government conceded that Judge Murphy should not have lost his temper, but argues that his frustration was “understandable” based on Leron’s conduct during pretrial proceedings. The 6th shut that argument down flat: “To the contrary, we do not find the district judge’s conduct understandable in the least. The complexity or long duration of a criminal case gives no license to a district court to prejudge the defendant’s guilt or otherwise dispose of the case in any manner except through fair proceedings:

Finally, the Circuit ruled, the Judge’s apology – which, even if it should have counted for anything, was two years too late – didn’t matter. “In considering the denial of a motion for recusal pursuant to 28 USC § 455, we do not look to whether the district court made a sufficiently curative apology to the defendant in ruling on the motion; rather, we consider whether recusal was warranted at the time that the defendant made the motion.” Judge Murphy’s “looks like a criminal” comments “demonstrated a deep-seated . . . antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”

That was enough to warrant recusal.

United States v. Liggins, Case No. 22-1236, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 20040 (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

‘Patience, Patience’ on Guidelines Changes, DC Circuit Says – Update for August 4, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DC CIRCUIT IS NOT AN EARLY ADOPTER OF NEW COMPASSIONATE RELEASE STANDARDS

Louis Wilson – convicted 26 years ago of several counts, including killing a federal witness – filed for compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), seeking to cut his life sentence to time served.

Louie argued that the extraordinary and compelling reasons supporting his compassionate release motion included (1) if United States v. Booker and Apprendi v. New Jersey had been decided prior to his sentence, he would have gotten 25 years instead of life because the district court considered additional facts during sentencing not proven to a jury; (2) the national murder sentencing statistics have “trended downward;” and (3) his medical conditions plus his exemplary prison citizenship supported compassionate release.

patience230804Louie argued that the purported intervening changes in law went to his length of time served and should constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons. The district court concluded, however, that time served in prison “does not in and of itself constitute an extraordinary and compelling circumstance.” After considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court denied Louie’s motion.

Last week, the D.C. Circuit denied Louie’s appeal.

Under D.C. Circuit precedent in United States v. Jenkins, change in law arguments cannot be extraordinary and compelling reasons supporting compassionate release. But, Louie argued, since the D.C. Circuit decided Jenkins, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines (to be effective November 1st absent Congressional veto) regarding what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. The proposed guidelines state that district courts may consider a “change in the law” to ‘determine whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason’ for release if he has “served at least 10 years [of] an unusually long sentence.”

Without explanation, the Circuit refused to “decide whether Wilson’s contentions would constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons under the not-yet-effective guidelines.”

The lesson is that no one should expect a Circuit to do now what its precedent says it cannot do. Wait until November.

United States v. Wilson, Case No. 21-3074, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 18608 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Senate Leader Pushed on EQUAL Act – Update for August 3, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ADVOCATES DEMAND SCHUMER MOVE ON EQUAL ACT

The New York Daily News last week reported that a coalition of 35 reform groups have delivered a letter to Sen Charles Schumer (D-NY), the Senate majority leader, demanding passage of the EQUAL Act (S.524), the latest iteration of a bill that would equalize the punishments for powder and crack cocaine.

equal220812

Last summer, Schumer made the legislation a priority, but the bill didn’t get a Senate floor vote before the 117th Congress ended. Now, advocates are requesting that Schumer push for the bill once more. The letter demanded action in the summer session, but that session ended last week without action.

“While we appreciate Sen. Schumer’s support for the EQUAL Act, the reality is that Democrats have now controlled the Senate Judiciary [Committee] for three years without advancing any meaningful criminal justice reform,” said Janos Marton, vice president of political strategy for Dream.org. “Now is the time to do that.”

Inimai Chettiar, federal director of Justice Action Network, another signer on the letter, agreed: “This bill needs to move ASAP. Given that Sen. Schumer is the majority leader, he also has the power to put pressure on the Judiciary Committee to have them move this bill,” she said. “It’s been three years that we’ve been waiting.”

crack-coke200804Congress narrowed the disparity between crack and powder with the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010. Prior to the passage of that measure, one gram of crack resulted in the same sentence as 100 grams of powder cocaine. Even after the Fair Sentencing Act became law, an 18:1 ratio remained, meaning that 28 grams of crack resulted in the same punishment as a half kilo of powder. EQUAL would make punishments for crack the same as those for powder cocaine.

New York Daily News, Advocates demand Schumer do more to end crack cocaine sentencing disparity (July 25, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Qui Custodiet? – Update for August 1, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CAESAR’S WIFE

The Romans recognized the problem: “Qui custodiet ipsos custodes?” Roughly translated, “Who will guard the guards?”

Just as Julius Caesar expected his wife Pompeia to be above suspicion of disloyalty and infidelity, we expect our judges to be above suspicion of bias. But, as the Supreme Court has observed, “Bias is easy to attribute to others and difficult to discern in oneself.” Rare is the federal defendant who hasn’t felt like his or her judge is biased.

At least weekly, someone asks me how they can get his or her case assigned to a different judge because “my judge is biased against me.” The plain truth is that winning reassignment of a case to a different judge because of bias “is a serious request rarely made and rarely granted,” as the 2nd Circuit put it last week.

irony230801Everyone knows how hard correctional officers work and how important it is to ensure they have a carefree retirement. For BOP employees, the federal government guarantees a generous and secure sunset for its employees. But state and local COs have to depend on retirement promises made by governments that, unlike Uncle Sam, can’t print money to cover any shortfalls.

The New York City Correctional Officers Benevolent Association collected money from its members to invest in a pension plan. COBA’s executives got bribed into investing $20 million in Platinum Partners, a shaky pension plan that went bankrupt primarily because the pension managers pillaged it for their own benefit.

One of the bit players, defendant Jona Rechnitz, cooperated with the government. In fact, the government said, Jona was “one of the single most important and prolific white collar cooperating witnesses in the recent history of the Southern District of New York.” The government told the court that while Jona knew about the bribes, he “did not appear to know that Platinum was a fraud, or even that it was a bad investment.”

But District Court Alvin Hellerstein ordered changes in Jona’s Presentence Investigation Report, including that he had “had to know” both that Platinum was a “high-risk fund” and that the Fund was “willing to pay a bribe to obtain funds to satisfy a liquidity shortage, thus making it reasonably foreseeable that an investment of pension funds risked the loss of those funds.”

money160118At sentencing, Judge H bumped Jona’s restitution from a proposed $1.2 million to $10 million and sentenced him to 5 months. Before judgment was entered, COBA intervened, asking that restitution be increased to $14.25 million.

While the appeal and COBA’s motion were pending, Jona learned from witnesses who had spoken to Andrew Kaplan – another defendant in the ongoing Platinum prosecutions – that Andy considered Judge Hellerstein to be “like a father” to him, and the judge had even advised Andy as to whether he should accept the government’s plea offer regarding his Platinum-related criminal conduct. The Judge and Andy had also talked about the significant monetary losses associated with the charges against Kaplan, and Kaplan’s feelings towards other Platinum executives.

While COBA’s motion for additional restitution was still pending, Jona asked the Judge to recuse himself to “avoid the appearance of any impropriety and in an abundance of caution.” Jona’s primary concern was that the size of his restitution turned largely on the credibility of his claim that he had believed “in the soundness of Platinum Partners as an investment vehicle,” and that the Judge might have obtained extrajudicial information regarding the case from Andy Kaplan, which Jona would not have had the opportunity to challenge.

cmon161027The Judge turned him down, holding that his relationship with Andy Kaplan and the case pending against Andy were unrelated to the restitution issue involving Jona, in part because “there is no suggestion that [Jona] had any relationship with [Andy].” The Judge denied that he had any extra-record information regarding Jona or Platinum.

While Jona’s appeal was pending, the government told Jona’s lawyer that Judge Hellerstein had phoned the Assistant U.S. Attorney working on the case to ask how much Jona had paid in restitution and to complain that Jona was “sly, cannot be trusted, and use[d] religion as a cloak.” The Judge asked the AUSA “not to speak to [Jona’s] counsel about this…”

Jona argued to the 2nd Circuit that Judge Hellerstein should have recused himself under 28 USC § 455. Last week, the 2nd Circuit agreed.

Under § 455(a), a judge should disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” while § 455(b) requires a judge to recuse or herself in any case where the judge has “a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding,” or where the judge or spouse or someone within the 3rd degree of relationship to either has an interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding or may be a witness.

The Circuit concluded that Judge Hellerstein had crossed the line.

First and foremost, the district judge had a close, near-paternal personal relationship with Kaplan… a person who was directly involved in Jona’s bribery case… The government correctly points out that Kaplan was not one of the most central figures in Jona’s bribe scheme. But Jona’s testimony implicated Kaplan in concealing the Platinum investment from other COBA employees – a circumstance that placed Kaplan squarely in the middle of yet another incidence of wrongdoing at a firm where, through his guilty plea, he had already admitted to participating in a different criminal conspiracy…

The district judge did not merely have a close personal relationship with Kaplan; he advised Kaplan on his criminal case arising out of the Platinum collapse… The district judge’s advisory role is further problematic in light of the restitution question because Kaplan’s and Jona’s interests are plausibly adverse on that issue. COBA, of course, can recover its losses only once, even though two groups – those involved in the bribery scheme and those involved in the fraud – arguably caused them… Because Kaplan is a defendant in the Platinum case, it is possible that he will be ordered to pay restitution… [T]he more COBA recovers from the bribery defendants, the less it will need to recover from the Platinum defendants.

The Circuit concluded that “the judge’s close relationship with Kaplan, his advisory role in Kaplan’s criminal case, and the proximity of the cases (including with respect to restitution) would cause a reasonable person to question the district judge’s impartiality and was sufficient to necessitate recusal under 455(a).”

bias230801But the Circuit wasn’t done: “The district judge’s phone call with the prosecutor here was doubly ill-advised because it was both ex parte and off-the-record,” the panel held, “magnifying the concerns inherent to both types of communications. After all, but for the commendable transparency of the United States Attorney’s Office, Jona would not have learned of this phone call… [T]here is no obvious justification for conducting this particular inquiry ex parte and off-the-record. A public docket entry requiring an update from the parties would have been equally effective to monitor Jona’s restitution payments… And to the extent that the district judge felt the need to emphasize his views on Jona’s allegedly negative qualities, such statements should be reserved for open, on-the-record forums, if shared at all.”

Jona’s case was assigned to a different judge for resentencing.

United States v. Rechnitz, Case No 20-1011-cr, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 19054 (2d Cir. July 26, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Vacation’s Over, Back to Work – LISA Update for July 31, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

OCCASIONALLY (BUT RARELY) I’M RIGHT

I am back from a week in the wilds with three wild grandchildren, a great vacation marred only by the LISA site crashing for five days. Did I remember to publicly thank LISA’s website provider for its alacrity in fixing the problem?

No, I did not forget to My omission was quite deliberate.

Now back to work: I have been predicting for weeks that the US Sentencing Commission will probably make the new Sentencing Guidelines §§4A1.1(e) and 4C1.1 retroactive sometime in August.

Amended §4A1.1(e) abolishes “status points” from Guidelines criminal history, while §4C1.1 reduces the Guidelines offense level for some people with zero criminal history points.

iamright230731Last Thursday, the USSC announced a public meeting will be held on August 24, and that the meeting will include as an agenda item a “possible vote on retroactivity of Parts A and B of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment.”

For the uninitiated, “Parts A and B of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment” are the zero-point and status-point changes we’re talking about.

If the vote is favorable, then people will likely be able to apply for 18 USC § 3582(c)(2)/USSG § 1B1.10 retroactivity at the end of February 2024.

Of course, Congress could veto the proposed amendment. However, half of the 6-month review period for the 2023 amendments has already passed, and Congress is on vacation until the week after Labor Day. With an appropriations bill deadline at the end of September and reams of unfinished business, the chance both the House and the Senate will veto any part of the 2023 Amendments before the November 1 effective date is remote.

The same is probably true for the 6-month review period on retroactivity.

US Sentencing Commission, Public Meeting – August 24, 2023 (July 27, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

We’re Ba-a-a-ck – Update for July 25, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HOBBLED BY TECHNOLOGY AND BUREAUCRATIC INCOMPETENCE

After seven years, over 1,400 posts and (this coming Sunday) our 400th weekly newsletter, our website crashed late last week. Our outstanding web host, which I won’t name but rhymes with “Bluehost,” only required five contacts and 96 hours to restore us.

Makes me proud to have sent the company all that money for so many years…

ALL IN THE FAMILY

Gilbert Bicknell and his son Junior ran a drug distribution business. Nothing wrong with that: Eli Lilly, Abbott Labs, and Pfizer do the same, earning substantial profits for their shareholders.

But Gil and Junior operated on a much smaller and less legal scale. They sold methamphetamines (and not from a licensed pharmacy, either). In July 2020, the police saw the pair passing around meth at a gas station. When the duo left in separate cars, the police gave chase to Junior (who was holding the bag). Gil swerved to cut off the pursuing cruisers to no avail, and both were arrested.

snitchin200309Gil pleaded guilty and, to avoid the 10-year mandatory minimum, gave the authorities a statement to qualify for the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) safety valve, which lets a district court impose a sentence below the otherwise mandatory minimum to low-level drug defendants who “truthfully provide to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” Gil debriefed and then claimed at sentencing that he should receive relief from the 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) 10-year mandatory minimum.

But Gil didn’t reckon on Junior, who cut his own deal and told the government that his dad had been less than candid in his debrief, leaving out a lot of criminal mischief from his admission of wrongdoing. At Dad’s sentencing, Junior testified against his father. Gil got 151 months.

But the government wasn’t without blemish. It signed a written plea agreement with Junior which he agreed to cooperate with the government by providing information about his father’s criminal conduct. But “perhaps owing to a clerical oversight,” the appellate decision helpfully suggests, “the plea agreement itself was not entered into the district court’s docket.” The government never disclosed the agreement to Gil.

At Gil’s sentencing, Junior testified against his father. What’s more, the boy falsely and repeatedly claimed he had entered an “open” plea of guilty – a plea not made pursuant to a plea agreement. The Assistant U.S. Attorney – who was the same one who signed Junior’s plea agreement on behalf of the government – suborned the perjury.

The government also put the case agent who had conducted Gil’s safety-valve proffer on the stand. He testified that based on watching the interview, he thought Gil had “tried to minimize his own criminal conduct and that he generally came across as not credible.”

snitch160802The district court smelled a rat. During a break in the proceedings following Junior’s testimony against his father, the Court managed to locate a copy of the written plea agreement. The judge told the parties what he discovered, but Gil’s lawyer inexplicably did not recall Junior to the stand to confront the boy about his lies.

On appeal, Gil argued that his Brady and Giglio rights had been violated. A couple of days ago, the 7th Circuit agreed, but said “so what?”

In the 1962 Brady v. Maryland decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the government violates a defendant’s 5th Amendment due process rights when it suppresses evidence favorable to the defendant. A decade later, in Giglio v. United States, the Court confirmed that Brady’s disclosure requirement applies to evidence that could be used to impeach a government witness. In order to make a showing that his or her Brady/Giglio rights were violated, “a defendant must show that undisclosed information was ‘material either to guilt or to punishment.’”

The Circuit said, “Brady’s materiality requirement explains the result here. Gilbert Bicknell was left completely in the dark about evidence that would have been useful to impeach a witness who testified against him at sentencing. That evidence would not have affected the outcome of his sentencing, though, so the government’s failure to disclose does not lead to relief under Brady or Giglio.”

The 7th said that Junior’s plea agreement would have been “useful impeachment evidence, as it would have definitively shown that he was co-operating with the government and, in the interest of receiving a reduced sentence, may have had an incentive to slant his testimony. But the fact that Junior testified as a government witness was itself enough to make plain to anyone at the hearing—including Gilbert, his lawyer, and the district court—that he was cooperating with the government. Remember too that Junior admitted his desire for a reduced sentence while on the witness stand.”

The boy’s stated hope for a lesser sentence gave Gil’s lawyer plenty of ammo to cross-examine Junior on his credibility even without the plea agreement. Gil’s lawyer, the Circuit said, “opted not to challenge Junior’s credibility based on the information he had available to him, but his decision not to use that evidence does not make the plea agreement any less cumulative.”

brady160314The case was not a slam-dunk. The 7th Circuit said at the outset: “But make no mistake: the government’s failure to adhere to its disclosure obligation deeply troubles us. It failed to inform a criminal defendant before sentencing that one of the government’s key witnesses—the defendant’s own son—would be testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement. That agreement was a textbook example of Giglio information, and it is very unsettling that more care was not taken to ensure its disclosure before sentencing. Though we must affirm, we do so reluctantly.”

To be sure, Gil has ample basis to question his lawyer’s failure to pursue the blatantly false statements, and he can do so in a 28 USC § 2255 motion. But the Circuit’s ruling glosses over an important question: Junior lied, but so did the Assistant U.S. Attorney. Without penalizing the government for its attempted cheat, the 7th’s decision suggests that there is no downside to the prosecution for getting caught.

United States v. Bicknell, No. 22-2268, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 18300, at *9 (7th Cir. July 19, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Mr. Explainer Here: All About Guidelines Retroactivity – Update for July 20, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MR. EXPLAINER TACKLES RETROACTIVE GUIDELINES

USSC160729The good news is that the U.S. Sentencing Commission is likely to approve a proposal that two Guidelines changes it adopted in April should be retroactive for people already sentenced.

The better news is that Congress seems too busy to try to gin up a veto of any of the provisions approved by the USSC and submitted to the legislators for review.

Today’s guest is Mr. Explainer, who is here to guide us through the fine print of getting retroactive application of the two changes:

• First, no one can file a motion for retroactive application of the two Guidelines changes until six months pass from the time the USSC sends the proposed retroactivity order to Congress. That means that all of the inmates doing a happy dance in anticipation of November 1, 2023, will have to wait at least until Punxatawny Phil sees his shadow.

• Second, the two changes have conditions attached:

(a) The zero-point change in the Guidelines (new USSG § 4C1.1) says that defendants are eligible for a 2-level reduction in their Total Offense Level (usually good for a two-sentencing range reduction) if they had zero criminal history points and meet all of the following conditions:

(1) had no adjustment under § 3A1.4 (Terrorism);

(2) did not use violence or credible threats of violence in connection with the offense;

(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury;

(4) the offense is not a sex offense;

(5) the defendant did not personally cause substantial financial hardship;

(6)  no gun was involved in connection with the offense;

(7) the offense did not involve individual rights under § 2H1.1;

(8) had no adjustment under § 3A1.1 for a hate crime or vulnerable victim or  § 3A1.5 for a serious human rights offense; and

(9) had no adjustment under § 3B1.1 for role in the offense and was not engaged in a 21 USC § 848 continuing criminal enterprise.

(b) The change in § 4A1.1(e) – the so-called status point enhancement – says only that one point is added if the defendant already has 7 or more criminal history points and “committed any part of the instant offense (i.e., any relevant conduct) while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.”

fineprint180308• The USSC staff has figured that about 11,500 BOP prisoners with status points would have a lower guideline range under a retroactive § 4A1.1(e). The current average sentence for that group is 120 months and would probably fall by an average of 14 months.

About 7,300 eligible prisoners with zero criminal history points would be eligible for a lower guideline range if the zero-point amendment becomes retroactive. The current average sentence of 85 months could fall to an average of 70 months.

• The reduction – done under 18 USC § 3582(c)(2) – is a two-step process described in USSC § 1B1.10.

(a) First, the court determines whether the prisoner is eligible. For a zero-point reduction, the court would have to find that the prisoner (1) had no criminal history points; (2) had none of the other enhancements in his case or guns or sex charges, or threats of violence or leader/organizer enhancements or any of the other factors listed in § 4C1.1. Then, the court would have to find that granting the two-level reduction would result in a sentencing range with a bottom number lower than his or her current sentence.

If your guidelines were 97-121 months, but the court varied downward to 78 months for any reason other than cooperation, you would not be eligible because reducing your points by two levels would put you in a 78-97 month range, and you are already at the bottom of that range. Special rules apply if you got a § 5K1.1 reduction for cooperation, but people sentenced under their sentencing ranges for reasons other than cooperation may not be eligible.

(b) To benefit from the status point reduction, the decrease in criminal history points is more problematic. If you have 4, 5, or 6 criminal history points, you are in Criminal History Category III. If two of those points are status points, they would disappear. Going from 5 points to 3 or 4 points to 2 would drop you into Criminal History Category II. If your prior sentencing range had been 70-87 months, your new range would be 68-78 months, and you would be eligible.

But if you had 6 criminal history points, you would only drop to 4 points, and you would still be in Criminal History Category III. No reduction in criminal history, no decrease in sentencing range, and thus no eligibility.

• Once you’re found to be eligible, your judge has just about total discretion whether to give you all of the reduction you’re entitled to, some of it, or none of it. You cannot get more than the bottom of your amended sentencing range, and the court cannot consider any other issues in your sentence than the retroactive adjustment.

usscretro230406Convincing the court that you should get the full benefit of your reduction is best done with letters of support from the community, a good discipline record and a history of successful programming. Showing the court that you have been rehabilitated to the point that the reduction has been earned is a good idea.

There’s a good reason that the retroactivity – if it is adopted – will end up benefitting no more than 12% of the BOP population. It is not easy to show eligibility and even tougher to prove that the court should use its discretion to give you the credit.

USSC, Retroactivity Impact Analysis of Parts A and B of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment (May 15, 2023)

USSC, Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts (May 3, 2023)

USSC § 1B1.10, Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as a Result of Amended Guideline Range (Policy Statement)

– Thomas L. Root

Back To School After a 30-Year Break – Update for July 19, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HEADED PELL MELL FOR A COLLEGE DEGREE

There is no truer lesson in the criminal justice milieu than this: education is the enemy of recidivism.

A BOP release last week trumpeted that “as of July 1, 2023, all provisions of the FAFSA Simplification Act related to incarcerated students are active… Pell Grant[s are] now available to all qualified incarcerated people to further pursue post-secondary education…. While this process must be initiated and managed by the individual postsecondary school, the BOP eagerly awaits the increase in partnership opportunities.”

grad190524There was a time when the BOP and colleges partnered all over the country for in-prison programs.  And it worked. Inmates participating in secondary education programs behaved better and custodial officials viewed them as “easier to manage.”  Programs throughout the United States also reported decreases in recidivism for inmate-students by as much as 57%. One program that once had reported 80% recidivism saw numbers drop to 10% in the early 1980s. Three out of four inmates who received some type of higher education were able to find sustainable employment within the critical first three years after release.

Yet despite decades of effectiveness, prisoner access to Pell Grant aid was revoked in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. At that time, politicians in both major parties portrayed the aid as a handout to the “undeserving.”  The 1994 law reflected public discontent with Pell Grant eligibility for inmates by blocking inmates from receiving higher education financial assistance.

In the final year of Pell Grant eligibility in prisons, inmates accounted for $56 million in funding out of $9.3 billion – six-tenths of one percent – allocated for federal higher education aid. But within Within three years of the passing of the Crime Bill, only eight prison higher education programs were left standing.

It only took three decades, but Pells are back. The Dept of Education estimates that reauthorization could allow about 760,000 additional people to become eligible for Pells through prison education programs when fully implemented.

Colleges are willing partners because the Pell Grants are a fount of money. But inmates will benefit from the education and FSA credits. It should be a win-win.

BOP, Pell Grants Restores Possibilities for Incarcerated People (July 12, 2023)

The Marshall Project, Students Behind Bars Regain Access to College Financial Aid (July 8, 2023)

Washington Post, Educational aid for prisoners works. Yet it’s politically precarious (August 22, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root