Tag Archives: sentence disparity

4th Says District Court Must Consider All Grounds for Sentence Reduction – Update for April 26, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

4TH ISSUES EXPANSIVE COMPASSIONATE RELEASE DECISION

compassion240426Antonio Davis was in the 8th year of a 210-month sentence drug conspiracy sentence when COVID hit. He filed for an 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction (compassionate release) for medical reasons and because he should no longer be a career offender inasmuch as one of his predicate offenses was no longer considered a crime of violence.

The district court denied Antonio’s motion because his medical condition wasn’t that bad and he had gotten vaccinated. The district court rejected Antonio’s career offender argument, finding that the issue should be raised in a 28 USC § 2255 motion. And even if Antonio had shown extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief, the court held that his release would not be justified under the 18 USC § 3553(a) sentencing factors because he had only done half of his sentence and 210 months was needed to address the seriousness of his crimes and the risk of recidivism.

Last week, the 4th Circuit reversed, holding that the district court wrongly failed to consider whether Antonio’s career-offender status claim was an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. “Years after Davis was sentenced,” the 4th said, “this Court held that a 21 USC § 846 [drug] conspiracy conviction… is not categorically a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of the career offender guidelines… If Davis were sentenced after that decision, he would no longer be designated a career offender…”

compassion160124In addition, the Circuit said, Antonio presented a second intervening change in law that would further reduce his sentence. Guidelines Amendment 782, added in 2014, retroactively lowered the base offense level for Antonio’s § 846 conviction by two points, but because he was a career offender, he was not eligible for the reduction. “Today,” the 4th said, “Davis would not be sentenced as a career offender [and he would be] eligible for the retroactive two-point reduction…”

If Antonio “were sentenced today,” the Circuit said, “his guidelines range would be 92 to 115 months—about half of his 210-month sentence.” Citing the Supreme Court’s 2022 Concepcion v. United States decision, the 4th said, “Concepcion’s broad reasoning permits federal judges to think expansively about what constitute ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ for release, absent specific congressional limitations. And the Sentencing Commission’s latest guidance goes a long way to resolve any remaining questions of congressional intent not answered by the Supreme Court’s decision.”

The 4th concluded that “the district court abused its discretion by declining to address Davis’s change-in-law and rehabilitation arguments in its “extraordinary and compelling reasons” analysis. We also find that, given the mitigation evidence Davis supplied, the substantial changes in law between the original sentencing and today, and the potentially gross sentencing disparity created by those changes, the district court’s explanation of the § 3553(a) factors is insufficient.”

United States v. Davis, Case No. 21-7325, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 9399 (4th Cir, Apr 18, 2024)

Government Seeks to Bushwhack Disparate-Sentence Compassionate Release Guideline – Update for December 11, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TIGER TRIES TO EAT ITS YOUNG

Traditionally, the Department of Justice defends federal statutes and regulations from constitutional attack. In fact, DOJ’s role as watchdog over the sanctity of its statutes and rules is so established that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a private litigant to serve the Attorney General in a lawsuit against another private party if the litigant is claiming that any federal statute is unconstitutional.

tigers231211I have seen cases in the past where the government conceded that the application of a statute was unconstitutional – but usually after the Supreme Court has found the statute itself to violate the Constitution. Good examples abound, such as United States v. Brown, a 2nd Circuit summary order noting that where “the underlying crime of violence was a racketeering conspiracy… [t]he Government concedes that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Davis… requires vacatur of those counts of conviction [under 18 USC 924(c)]”).

But I don’t recall a case where the government has mounted a defense based on the argument that the federal agency rule applicable to the private party’s claim was void as contrary to federal statute. Until now.

To channel Rodney Dangerfield, this is a case of a tiger eating its young.

The new USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) – the Guideline that sets out binding Sentencing Commission policy on 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) “compassionate release” sentencing reductions – holds that where a prisoner has

an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law… may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed…

You may recall that when this provision was adopted by the Commission last April, it generated vigorous debate and passed on a whisker-thin 4-3 vote.

retro160110Now, in United States v. Brand, a compassionate release case in the Northern District of Florida, the government has opposed a prisoner’s request for relief from a sentence of stacked 18 USC § 924(c) convictions by arguing that USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) is an unconstitutional expansion of Sentencing Commission authority because it effectively makes nonretroactive changes in the law retroactive. The thrust of the government’s defense is that Congress did not make changes in 18 USC § 924(c) retroactive when it passed the First Step Act five years ago, that this was a deliberate choice made by Congress, and that the Sentencing Commission’s decision to define the sentence disparity resulting from people sentenced before First Step have dramatically higher stacked 924(c) sentences than people sentenced after First Step as “extraordinary and compelling” is unlawful: “Although Congress has delegated broad authority to the Sentencing Commission, subsection (b)(6) is contrary to the text, structure, and purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(a), and is therefore invalid.”

I think the argument is strained. Besides trying essentially to engraft Administrative Procedure Act standards (see 5 USC § 706, for instance) onto a judicial agency that is not subject to the APA, I think that the biggest hole in the government’s argument is that – unlike other agency rules – under 28 USC § 994(p), Guideline amendments (and an explanation of why they are being proposed) must be submitted to Congress 180 days before effectiveness to give Congress a chance to modify or disapprove the amendments. Congress’s right to modify or disapprove makes it tough to argue, as the government does, that the Commission’s reading of the compassionate release statute “exceeds the gap left by Congress.” If Congress had thought the new § 1B1.13(b)(6) was overreaching, outside the Commission’s authority, or contrary to the non-retroactivity of First Step, it had six months to say so.

The government relies on Mayo Foundation for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, but in that case, the court notes that “the ultimate question is whether Congress would have intended, and expected, courts to treat [the regulation] as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency of ‘gap-filling’ authority.” Here, I think, the existence of the six-month review period and Congress’s election not to modify or veto during that period is more than ample evidence of Congress’s intent.

lincolnfool161125But the real danger in Brand is this: The court denied the prisoner appointment of counsel right about the time the government lodged its novel constitutional claim that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1 requires a party contesting the constitutionality of a federal statute to serve the Attorney General of the United States with notice of the action. Under 28 USC § 2403(a), a court ruling on such a challenge is required to do the same. Upon receiving notice, the Attorney General has a right to intervene as a party in the case and present evidence. Both of these requirements suggest that the government has a compelling interest in defending the sanctity of its rules and statutes.

So what happens when the Attorney General himself contests the lawfulness of a federal regulation, especially where it is a quasi-statute as is a sentencing guideline? Expecting a pro se prisoner to competently defend the lawfulness of a federal rule against the government puts a lot of weight on the shoulders of the inmate. What is more, it is almost certain to result in steamrolling the government’s position into the final order, resulting in the making of a bad ruling out of an unbalanced contest.

Sentencing Commission guideline 1B1.13(b)(6) has the tacit approval of Congress. If any compassionate release defense calls for the appointment of counsel, defending the lawfulness of a properly adopted guideline does.

United States v. Brown, 797 Fed.Appx 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2019)

United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. —, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019)

Gvt Response to Motion for Compassionate Release (ECF 108), United States v. Brand, Case 8:11-cr-380 (N.D.Fl., filed November 17, 2023)

Mayo Foundation for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 US 44 (2011)

– Thomas L. Root

Fascinating Look At Sentencing Disparity – Update for April 3, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

VIVA LA DIFFERENCE

Paul Manafort’s recent sentencing, a combined 90 months in prison, is a miscarriage of justice because it is too high or too low, depending on your political persuasion. But it has focused media attention on federal sentencing policy.

The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University has released a “study of judge sentencing differences at 155 federal courthouses across the country” in which “the judge with the lowest average prison sentence was compared with the judge with the highest average sentence at each courthouse.”

TRAC found that half of the 767 federal judges now on the bench serve at courthouses where the average prison sentence differed by at least 23 months depending upon which judge handled the case. Of these, 8.6% serve at six courthouses where the average prison sentence length handed down by judges varies according to judge by more than 48 months.

dice161221

The biggest crapshoot in the system is Orlando in the Middle District of Florida. There, the difference between sentence imposed by the softest judge and the hardest judge is 80 months. Second place is the Greenbelt district court of the District of Maryland, with over 64 months difference among the seven judges serving there.

The TRAC study compares average sentences for each federal judge without controlling for the specific caseloads of these judges, and its authors warn that variations in average sentences could reflect caseload differences as much as judicial differences. But in the full report, TRAC notes that due to “the fairly large number of defendants sentenced by each judge, where there is random assignment of cases to judges then statistically speaking each judge should have closely comparable caseloads so that differences in the nature of the offenses and defendants’ histories are roughly comparable.”

The study has its limitations but Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote in his Sentencing Policy & Log blog that, “still, it is interesting and useful to be reminded statistically of what all federal criminal justice practitioners know well, namely that most judges have their own distinctive and unique approaches to sentencing decision-making.” The study is undoubtedly an important tool for any defense attorney wanting to show sentence disparity.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Interesting new TRAC data on intra-courthouse judge-to-judge differences in sentences (Mar. 24, 2019)

TRAC, Seeing Justice Done: The Impact of the Judge on Sentencing (Mar. 22, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root