Did You Mean It When You Said It? – Update for July 12, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

I SAID IT, BUT I DIDN’T MEAN IT

Just about anyone who has pled guilty has suffered through a  change-of-plea hearing under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure – in which they were required to say they were happy with their lawyers, they fully understood the charges, and that no one had pressured them to sign the deal. Some of the answers are uninformed: How, for example, does anyone know whether defense counsel got things right? Others are outright lies: of course, counsel or family or even the government has applied pressure that would make Tommy Torquemada envious.

hitoverhead190712Later, when the defendant discovers his lawyer’s incompetence or the government’s connivance, he or she files a post-conviction habeas corpus motion under 28 USC 2255. And then, the defendant gets hit over the head with answers given at the Rule 11 hearing. No one reasonably believes that the Rule 11 plea answers have any validity, but that’s the game.

When Sergio Murillo signed his plea agreement, he had his lawyer get a lot of references to deportation taken out of the document. His lawyer bargained his charge down to conspiracy, which she told him would not lead to automatic deportation. But the plea agreement still had Sergio agreeing in one section that “because removal and other immigration consequences are the subjects of a separate proceeding, [Appellant] understands that no one, including [Appellant’s] attorney or the District Court, can predict to a certainty the effect of [Appellant’s] conviction on [Appellant’s] immigration status. [Appellant] nevertheless affirms that [Appellant] wants to plead guilty regardless of any immigration consequences that [Appellant’s] plea may entail, even if the consequence is [Appellant’s] automatic removal from the United States.”

Later, Sergio learned he would be deported, and he filed a 2255 motion arguing that his lawyer was ineffective for telling him otherwise. He wanted to take his plea back and go to trial. The district court cited what Sam had agreed to in the plea agreement, and denied the 2255 without a hearing.

don-t-read-too-much-into-it-you-ll-get-nothing-outTwo weeks ago, the 4th Circuit reversed, and ordered the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing. The Court ruled that the district court erred by giving dispositive weight to the one sentence in Sergio’s plea agreement. Instead of weighing evidence that Sam would have rejected the plea agreement had he known it required deportation against evidence that he would have accepted it nonetheless, the district court found that single sentence “dispositive.”

“Giving dispositive weight to boilerplate language from a plea agreement is at odds with Strickland [v. Washington]’s fact-dependent prejudice analysis,” the Circuit ruled. “To determine whether a defendant was prejudiced by an attorney error, Strickland requires courts to undertake an individualized examination of the proceedings in which the error is alleged… A categorical rule affording dispositive weight to a prior statement is ill suited to an inquiry that demands a ‘case-by-case analysis.’”

United States v. Carillo Murillo, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 18725 (4th Cir. June 24, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Keep on Gunnin’ – Update for July 11, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

GUN AND RE-GUN

gunknot181009The Sentencing Commission does not have enough members for a quorum, so it cannot adopt any Guidelines changes. It still has a busy staff, however, and keeps grinding out studies.

At the end of June, the Commission issued a study of about 3,500 federal firearms offenders, reporting that

•   Gun offenders commit new crimes at a higher rate than non-gun offenders, with 68% being arrested for a new crime during the eight years following release, compared to 46% of non-gun offenders, with higher percentages in every age and criminal history group;

• Gun defendants re-offend more quickly than non-gun defendants. The median time from release to the first new crime was 17 months, compared to 22 months for non-gun people; and

•   More gun offenders were rearrested for serious crimes than non-gun offenders, with assault was the most serious new charge for 29%, followed by drug trafficking (14%) and public order crimes (12%). Of the non-gun offenders, assault was the most common new charge for 22%, followed by 19% for public order crimes and 11% for drug trafficking;

United States Sentencing Commission, Recidivism Among Federal Firearms Offenders (June 27, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Judge Holds Change in Drug Sentence Minimums “Extraordinary” Grounds for Sentence Reduction – Update for July 10, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

We’re back after a well-deserved week off in Iceland (where the country’s five prisons each house about 30 (not a typo) inmates, who make an average of 28,000 ISK ($290.00) a month.

COURT GRANTS COMPASSIONATE RELEASE BECAUSE OF CHANGE IN DRUG MINIMUMS

A Houston federal district judge two weeks ago re-sentenced Arturo Cantu-Rivera to time served, negating two life sentences in a grant of an 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) compassionate release motion.

Art was doing time on a drug charged, which had been enhanced by an 851 motion to mandatory life in 1990. The court cited his having completed over 4,000 hours of programming, his tutoring GED classes, his age of 69, and his health, calling all of this an “extraordinary degree of rehabilitation.”

extraordinary190710But as well, the judge noted that the change in the drug mandatory minimums under the First Step Act was part of the “extraordinary and compelling” analysis: “Finally, the Court recognizes as a factor in this combination the fundamental change to sentencing policy carried out in the First Step Act’s elimination of life imprisonment as a mandatory sentence solely by reason of a defendant’s prior convictions… The combination of all of these factors establishes the extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying the reduction in sentence in this case.”

Memorandum Opinion and Order, United States v. Canto-Rivera, Case No. H 89-204 (SD Tex, June 24, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Guidelines Are A “Disaster,” Judge Says – Update for July 3, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

JUDGE BLASTS SENTENCING REFORM ACT

Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden has taken some heat recently because he – like everyone else at the time – supported the 1994 crime control bill that so contributed to mass incarceration. But a federal judge writing in last Sunday’s Washington Post said critics should not stop with 1994.

trainwreckguidelines190703Eastern District of Wisconsin Judge Lynn Adelman wrote that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the Guidelines “have been a disaster, and a debate by lawmakers about their status is long overdue.” Partly due to the sentencing guidelines, about 20% of all people imprisoned in the world are imprisoned in the United States (which has 4.27% of the world population) “The Sentencing Reform Act, and the commission and its guidelines,” the Judge said, “contributed substantially to this inexcusable state of affairs.”

The judge noted that after the Guidelines became advisory in the 2005 United States v. Booker case, the average federal sentence increased from 28 to 50 months and, with the abolition of parole, the average time a defendant served increased from 13 to 43 months. Between 1987 and 2019, the number of federal prisoners increased from about 50,000 to 219,000 before dropping to about 180,000.

badjudge160502Even after the Guidelines became advisory instead of mandatory, Judge Adelman complained, “district court judges have largely failed to… ameliorate the harshness of the federal sentencing system.” After Booker, average sentences dropped from 47.9 months to 44 months, but the percentage of defendants receiving prison-only sentences increased from 83.3% in 2003 to 87.8% in 2018.

The Judge argues that the Sentencing Reform Act should be substantially revised. “Congress was foolish to have abolished parole,” he wrote, “and should overturn that decision.”

Washington Post, There’s another tough-on-crime law Democrats should focus their criticism on (June 30)

– Thomas L. Root

F.R.Crim.P. 36: There’s Life in the Old Carcass – Update for July 2, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MAYBE RULE 36 IS NOT TOOTHLESS AFTER ALL

Everyone knows that Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a defendant to move to correct a clerical error in the criminal case judgment. Over the years, I have found it useful mainly to correct mistakes in the defendant’s name, which invariably become part of the BOP record. Beyond that, we all are aware that Rule 36 cannot correct mistakes of fact or law, and for sure cannot lead to a reduced sentencing.

error161101Last week, the 4th Circuit suggested that maybe we have it wrong. Lamont Vanderhorst’s district court denied his Rule 36 motion to correct a clerical error in his Presentence Report. The PSR characterized one of his state convictions as “conspiracy to sell and deliver cocaine.” In fact, the conviction was “conspiracy to traffick [sic] cocaine by transportation.”

As a result of the clerical error, the district court wrongly sentenced Lamont as a career offender.

The district court denied the motion, holding that Rule 36 cannot serve as a means of pursuing resentencing. The Circuit disagreed, holding that “Rule 36 may serve as an appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain resentencing when a clerical error likely resulted in the imposition of a longer sentence than would have been imposed absent the error.” The 4th said that “when an error is purely a ‘clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, “the policy of finality is trumped and a court is authorized to correct the error at any time.”

Unfortunately, Lamont had four other priors that supported his career offender designation, so he was denied relief anyway. But the principle makes Rule 36 potentially a powerful gadget in the collateral-relief toolbox.

United States v. Vanderhorst, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 18886 (4th Cir. June 25, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

October Term 2018 Ends With A Whimper – Update for July 1, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE SUPREME COURT’S OUT FOR SUMMER… BUT NOT FOREVER

scotus170627The Supreme Court stumbled across the finish line of its current session (called October Term 2018, because that’s when it began) last Friday, ending with a couple of fumbles and a punt. There will be nothing more from the nine Justices – except for the occasional action on a stay of execution – until the “long conference” in the last week of September. 

Then, come Monday, October 7, 2019… the Court will be back at it with October Term 2019.

The last week started out to be a significant one for federal criminal law. Last Monday, the Court handed down the Davis decision, with United States v. Haymond following two days later. For those who follow the Court for criminal law, that just left Mitchell v. Wisconsin and Carpenter v. Murphy for the Court’s final day on Thursday. Mitchell was a 4th Amendment case, asking whether blood can be drawn from an unconscious motorist without a warrant (yes, it can). Carpenter is a big deal for Oklahoma, Native Americans and the many states with reservations inside their borders, because the 10th Circuit held that most of eastern Oklahoma – including the City of Tulsa – still belonged to the Cherokee Nation. It also matters to anyone with a prior Oklahoma state conviction from that area, because all of those convictions might be invalid.

On Thursday, the Court issued big decisions on the census form citizenship question and how Congressional districts are drawn, in each case sort of kicking the can down the road. So it was no surprise when the Chief Justice announced that Carpenter will not be decided this year, but instead will get reargued in the fall.

domino190422But remember how Davis was called Johnson’s “last domino?” Well, it is not. On Friday, the Court issued its final order list of the Term, granting review to Shular v. United States, another case raising an important issue in the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act, this one on the drug trafficking side. For an ACCA conviction, you have to have three prior convictions that are crimes of violence or drug cases. In Shular, the question is whether the determination of a “serious drug offense” under the ACCA requires the same categorical approach used in the determination of a violent felony, the approach just approved in Davis. There is little doubt that the holding will apply to drug crimes underlying 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions – mandatory consecutive sentences starting at five years for using a gun in a drug offense or crime of violence – as well.

Also, in Kisor v. Willkie, a case that asks whether a court must defer to an agency interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation, the Court last Thursday declined to overrule a longstanding line of cases instructing courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, but at the same time, he suggested that the doctrine does not apply in every case where an agency is interpreting its own rules. The tepid ruling leaves the deference doctrine a muddled mess the Court will almost certainly have to address again.

United States v. DavisCase No. 18-431 (decided June 24, 2019)

United States v. Haymond, Case No. 17-1672 (decided June 26, 2019)

Carpenter v. MurphyCase No., Case No. 17-1107 (to be reargued in Fall 2019)

Kisor v.  Willkie, Case No. 18-15 (decided June 27, 2019)

Shular v. United States, Case No. 18-6662 (cert. granted June 28, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS Remands Haymond With Muddled Opinion – LISA Update for June 27, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT BADLY SPLIT ON SUPERVISED RELEASE REVOCATION

The Supreme Court today fractured badly on whether a supervised release revocation requires a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

The issue was an extreme one: Under 18 USC § 3583(k), a supervised release violation involving certain statutes prohibiting child sex abuse or pornography requires a mandatory five-year additional term. The Tenth Circuit had declared the provision unconstitutional, raising the question whether ANY supervised release violation that included a prison term could be found unless a jury did so beyond a reasonable doubt.

scotussplit190627Yesterday, four justices found that supervised release violations that led to prison terms had to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote, “The lesson for this case is clear: Based solely on the facts reflected in the jury’s verdict, Mr. Haymond faced a lawful prison term of between zero and 10 years. But just like the facts the judge found at the defendant’s sentencing hearing in Alleyne, the facts the judge found here increased “the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences” in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”

However, four Justices are not a majority. Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the particular provision at issue, 18 USC § 3583(k), is unconstitutional. But because the role of the judge in a typical supervised-release proceeding is consistent with traditional parole and because Congress clearly did not intend the supervised release system to differ from parole in this respect, he did not agree with the other four that the Apprendi line of cases applied in the supervised-release context.

Four other justices dissented sharply.

Under precedent, § 3583(k) is declared unconstitutional, but Justice Breyer’s narrower decision controls. Thus, for now, traditional supervised release violations remain free of a reasonable-doubt Apprendi v. New Jersey requirement.

A final opinion day for the Supreme Court’s year is set for today. We expect the decision in Carpenter v. Murphy at that time.

United States v. Haymond, Case No. 17–1672 (June 26, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Compassionate Release Gains Legs – Update for June 26, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SHOWING COMPASSION

Last week was a good one for compassionate release, the shorthand way of referring to “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for a sentence reduction under 18 USC 3582(c)(1).

compassion160208FAMM, the Washington Lawyers’ Committee, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers announced the launch of the “Compassionate Release Clearinghouse,” a collaborative pro bono effort among the organizations designed to match qualified prisoners with legal counsel should they need to fight a compassionate release denial or unanswered request in court.

“People who can barely make it out of their beds in the morning should not have to go into court alone against the largest law firm in the nation,” said Kevin Ring, president of FAMM. “Congress was clear that it wanted fundamental changes in compassionate release, yet we’ve seen prosecutors continue to fight requests from clearly deserving people, including individuals with terminal illnesses.”

The Clearinghouse will recruit, train, and provide resources to participating lawyers. It has already matched pro bono attorneys with prisoners in more than 70 cases. The Clearinghouse is actively recruiting additional attorneys and law firms to join in the effort.

Regular readers know that I have been calling the First Step Act’s changes to 3582(c)(1) a ‘killer’ provision, because while Congress may have been focused on getting terminally ill inmates home, it wrote the amendment much more broadly than that. The momentum to use the sentence reduction subsection to its full potential is increasing.

Sentencestack170404Georgetown law professor Shon Hopwood last week published an article at Prison Professors arguing that “there is a viable argument for why federal district court judges can use the compassionate release statute, as amended by the First Step Act, as a second look provision to reduce a sentence for people in federal prison if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” are present.” Shon has written a law review article and a sample brief he will be using to challenge a 213-year federal sentence consisting of stacked 18 US 924 convictions. Both discuss the reasons “why federal judges can and should give sentence reductions in cases where people in federal prison have a demonstrated record of rehabilitation in addition to compelling reasons why they were sentenced too harshly.”

NACDL, FAMM, Washington Lawyers Committee, NACDL Launch Compassionate Release Clearinghouse (June 19)

Prison Professors, A Second Look at a Second Chance: Seeking a Sentence Reduction under the Compassionate Release Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as Amended by the First Step Act (June 18)

– Thomas L. Root

Davis Lives! 924(c)(3)(B) Residual Clause Held to be Unconstitutionally Vague – Update for June 25, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE LAST JOHNSON DOMINO FALLS

By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court yesterday upheld the categorical approach to judging whether offenses were crimes of violence, ruling that 18 USC § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague.

Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote in the majority opinion that “[i]n our constitutional order, a vague law is no law at all.”

vagueness160110The vagueness doctrine rests on the twin constitutional pillars of due process and separation of powers. Having applied the doctrine in two cases involving statutes that “bear more than a passing resemblance to § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause” – those being Johnson v. United States (Armed Career Criminal Act residual clause unconstitutional) and Sessions v. Dimaya (18 USC § 16(b) residual clause unconstitutional) – the Court completed its frolic through the residual clauses in the criminal code.

Courts use the “categorical approach” to determine whether an offense qualified as a violent felony or crime of violence. Judges had to disregard how the defendant actually committed the offense and instead imagine the degree of risk that would attend the idealized “‘ordinary case’ ” of the offense.

The lower courts have long held § 924(c)(3)(B) to require the same categorical approach. After the 11th Circuit’s decision in Ovalles, the government advanced the argument everywhere that for § 924(c)(3)(B), courts should abandon the traditional categorical approach and use instead a case-specific approach that would look at the defendant’s actual conduct in the predicate crime.

The Supreme Court rejected that, holding that while the case-specific approach would avoid the vagueness problems that doomed the statutes in Johnson and Dimaya and would not yield to the same practical and Sixth Amendment complications that a case-specific approach under the ACCA and § 16(b) would, “this approach finds no support in § 924(c)’s text, context, and history.”

hathanded190625The government campaign came to a head in Davis, a 5th Circuit case in which the appellate court said that conspiracy to commit a violent crime was not a crime of violence, because it depended on the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause. The Dept. of Justice felt confident enough to roll the dice on certiorari. Yesterday, the DOJ had its hat handed to it.

Who does this benefit? Principally, it benefits anyone who received a § 924(c) enhanced sentence for an underlying conspiracy charge. Beyond that, it helps anyone else whose “crime of violence” depended on the discredited § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause.

The Court did not rule that Davis is retroactive for 28 USC § 2255  post-conviction collateral attack purposes, because that question was not before it. SCOTUS never rules on retroactivity in the same opinion that holds a statute unconstitutional. There is little doubt that, if Johnson was retroactive because of Welch, Davis will be held to be retro as well.

United States v. Davis, Case No. 18-431 (Supreme Court, June 24, 2019)

ARE 59(e) MOTIONS ‘SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE’ 2255s?

A number of lower courts have ruled that an unsuccessful § 2255 movant who files a motion to alter the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) may be filing a second-or-successive § 2255 motion requiring prior approval.

HobsonsChoiceThis leaves § 2255 movants with a Hobson’s choice. Filing a 59(e) stays the time for filing a notice of appeal. But if the court sits on the 59(e) past the notice of appeal deadline, and then dismisses it as second-or-successive, the § 2255 movant has missed the notice of appeal deadline with the Court of Appeals. If the movant files a notice of appeal to preserve his or her rights, that nullifies the 59(e).

Right now, the only logical election is to ignore Rule 59(e) motions altogether.

Yesterday, the Court granted review in yet another “Davis” case, asking whether the 59(e) motion should be considered second or successive such that it requires the grant of permission under 28 USC § 2244. We’ll have an answer next year.

Banister v. Davis, Case No. 18-6943 (certiorari granted, June 24, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS Rules 922(g) Requires “Knowledge” – Update for June 24, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

KNOWNOTHING-ISM

In a decision that could be seismic for people convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the Supreme Court last Friday ruled that it’s not enough to know that thing stuck in your pants is a gun. You have to know that you are part of a group the law says should not possess a gun. And, for that matter, you have to know you possess a firearm or ammo.

carriefgun170807Hamid Rehaif was in the country on a student visa that required him to be enrolled in college. He dropped out of school, but stuck around Florida to soak up the sun and fun. When ICE finally caught up to him, agents found him in possession of a half box of ammunition. Hamid had not really picked up on the “right to remain silent” thing, so he readily admitted going to a gun range. He was prosecuted for being illegally in possession of a firearm and ammo.

Under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), it is unlawful for a convicted felon to possess a firearm or ammunition. But that’s only subsection (g)(1). There are eight other subsections as well, categories that include fugitives, people under indictment, people convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, people who have been found by courts to be mentally incompetent, illegal aliens, stalkers… there’s a long list.

The government has always gotten away with proving that a defendant had a gun or ammo, and that he or she was a felon or something else on the list. The defendant had to know that that thing he had stuffed in his waistband was a gun. Beyond that, there was no knowledge requirement. A defendant who claimed not to know that he or she was in a prohibited class was just plain out of luck. What the defendant knew or did not know simply was irrelevant. That’s what happened to Hamid. He was fine busting a few caps at the gun range as long as he was in school (and thus compliant with the terms of his student visa). But as soon as he dropped out, his visa automatically expired, and his antics at the gun range became illegal. The district court, and the 11th Circuit, agreed (as did every circuit court in America) that Hamid’s awareness that he should limit his firearms training to Nerf weapons.

rangeThat has now changed. The Supreme Court ruled that in a prosecution under 18 USC 922(g) and 924(a)(2) (they go together), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he or she possessed a firearm and that the defendant knew he or she knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

Whether a criminal statute requires the government to prove that the defendant acted knowingly, the Court said, is a question of congressional intent. There is a longstanding presumption that Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding “each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” This is normally characterized as a “presumption in favor of scienter.”

In 922(g) and 924(a)(2), Justice Breyer wrote for the 7-2 decision, the statutory text supports the presumption. It specifies that a defendant commits a crime if he or she “knowingly” violates § 922(g), which makes possession of a firearm unlawful when the following elements are satisfied: (1) a status element; (2) a possession element (to “possess”); (3) a jurisdictional element (“in or affecting commerce”); and (4) a firearm element (a “firearm or ammunition”). Aside from the jurisdictional element, the Court said, § 922(g)’s text “simply lists the elements that make a defendant’s behavior criminal. The term ‘knowingly’ is normally read ‘as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime.’ And the ‘knowingly’ requirement clearly applies to 922(g)’s possession element, which follows the status element in the statutory text. There is no basis for interpreting ‘knowingly’ as applying to the second 922(g) element but not the first.

innocent161024What does this mean for the many felons-in-possession now in the system? It could be Bailey v. United States all over again, as people head back to court on 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petitions (where those are allowed) arguing that under the new statutory interpretation, they are actually innocent.

Justice Alito wrote a detailed and blistering dissent. He warned that the decision’s

practical effects will be far reaching and cannot be ignored. Tens of thousands of prisoners are currently serving sentences for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). It is true that many pleaded guilty, and for most direct review is over. Nevertheless, every one of those prisoners will be able to seek relief by one route or another. Those for whom direct review has not ended will likely be entitled to a new trial. Others may move to have their convictions vacated under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and those within the statute of limitations will be entitled to relief if they can show that they are actually innocent of violating § 922(g), which will be the case if they did not know that they fell into one of the categories of persons to whom the offense applies… This will create a substantial burden on lower courts, who are once again left to clean up the mess the Court leaves in its wake as it moves on to the next statute in need of ‘fixing’.

Watch that space. This could be very interesting.

Rehaif v. United States, Case No. 17-9560 (Supreme Court, June 21, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root