A Trio of Sentencing Cases – Update for May 22, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

2-0-1 ON SENTENCING ACTIONS LAST WEEK

Three separate proceedings on sentencing or sentence reduction came to our attention last week, unrelated except for the possibilities they represent.

colostomy190523First, Steve Gass asked his court for a compassionate release. While doing 106 months for six bank robberies (Mr. Gass preferred using a note rather than a gun in each of them), Steve was diagnosed with a malignant tumor located in his rectal wall. The tumor was successfully removed, but along with it, he lost his rectum and anus. The procedure left him dependent on a colostomy bag and subject to what the Court euphemistically called “special hygiene requirements” and heightened medical monitoring. (Having had a colostomy bag for six terrible weeks once, I have some sense of those “special” requirements – a gas mask and a gasoline-powered power washer are on the list).

While Steve had beaten the cancer, he argued, his current condition is nevertheless “both serious and difficult to manage in a prison setting, marked neither by enhanced sanitary conditions appropriate for colostomy-dependent patients or heightened monitoring necessary to prevent secondary effects of infection or recurrence of a malignancy.” Clearly, the tumor did not affect Steve’s remarkable capacity for understatement.

The government, being the caring and benevolent organism that it is, argued that Steve had “recovered” from colorectal cancer, so his colostomy condition – which he could and would have to manage for the rest of his life – cannot qualify as the kind of “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a reduction anticipated by 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

compassion160124The district court, recognizing the government’s disingenuous argument for being the same substance that fills Steve’s colostomy bag – ruled that Steve had “shown that his physical and medical condition substantially diminishes his ability to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility. And this is not a condition that [he] will ever recover from — he will be device dependent and subject to enhanced hygiene and monitoring requirements for the rest of his life.” The court, with a gift for understatement the equal of Steve’s, thus held that the permanent colostomy was extraordinary and compelling enough.

Still, the court did not shorten Steve’s sentence. Rather, it creatively resentenced Steve to the time remaining on his sentence, but ordered Steve to home confinement for the remaining 28 months or so he had to serve. The decision showcases how the sentence reduction power can be employed with precision to fashion modifications that address the prisoner’s situation without simply letting recipients out to run amok

*     *     *

gunknot181009In the 6th Circuit, Dave Warren got a statutory maximum 120-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a gun in violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1). Both he and the government sought a sentence somewhere within his 51-63 month Guidelines range. But the judge was convinced that Dave’s criminal history made him “a high risk offender… an individual that must be deterred. 51 to 63 months… considering the danger this individual poses to the community, is nowhere in my view close to what is required.”

Last week, the 6th Circuit reversed the sentence. The appeals court noted that “because the Guidelines already account for a defendant’s criminal history, imposing an extreme variance based on that same criminal history is inconsistent with the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct…”

“We do not mean to imply that only a sentence in or around that range will avoid disparities with other similar defendants,” the Court wrote. “But we do not see how the sentence imposed here avoids them.” Because the district court’s discussion of whether its 120-month sentence avoided unwarranted sentencing disparities depended only on criminal history factors already addressed by the Guidelines, the 6th said, the district court relied “on a problem common to all” defendants within the same criminal history category Dave fell into – that is, that they all have an extensive criminal history – and thus did not provide “a sufficiently compelling reason to justify imposing the greatest possible deviation from the Guidelines-recommended sentence in this case.”

*     *     *

Robber160229Finally, I recently reported on a remarkable “Holloway”-type motion in Chad Marks’ case. Chad was convicted of a couple of bank robberies, but unlike Steve Gass, Chad did carry a gun. Under 18 USC § 924(c), using or carrying a gun during a crime of violence or drug deal adds a mandatory five years onto your sentence. If you are convicted of a second 924(c) offense, the minimum additional sentence is 25 years. Unfortunately, the statute was poorly written, so that if you carry a gun to a bank robbery on Monday, and then do it again on Tuesday, you will be sentenced for the robberies, and then have a mandatory 30 years added to the end of the sentence, five years for Monday’s gun, and 25 years for Tuesday’s gun.

Congress always meant that the second offense’s 25 years should apply only after conviction for the first one, but it did not get around to fixing the statute until last year’s First Step Act adopted Sec. 403. But to satisfy the troglodytes in the Senate (yes, Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Arkansas, I mean you), the change the law was not made retroactive.

grad190524Chad has served 20 years, during which time he has gone from a nihilistic young miscreant to a college-educated inmate teacher and mentor. The federal judge who sentenced Chad 20 years ago recognizes that post-conviction procedure is so restricted that the court can do nothing, but he asked in an order that the U.S. Attorney “carefully consider exercising his discretion to agree to an order vacating one of Marks’ two Section 924(c) convictions. This would eliminate the mandatory 25-year term that is now contrary to the present provisions of the statute.”

Since then, Chad Marks’ appointed counsel has filed a lengthy recitation of the defendant’s extraordinary BOP record. Despite this, and despite the fact that over two months have elapsed since the judge’s request to the U.S. Attorney, the government has not seen fit to say as much as one word about the matter.

Order, United States v. Gass, Case No. 10-60125-CR (SDFL Apr. 30, 2019)

United States v. Warren, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14005 (6th Cir. May 10, 2019)

Order, United States v. Marks, Case No. 03-cr-6033 (WDNY, Mar. 14, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

No Clemency for the Hot Polloi – Update for May 21, 2019

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NEW TRUMP PARDONS DO LITTLE TO SPUR CLEMENCY HOPE

clemency170206President Trump last week granted a full pardon to media tycoon Conrad Moffat Black and Patrick Nolan, former Republican leader of the California State Assembly, but there is little in those acts of executive grace to cause prisoners who are not politically connected or are not BBFs with celebrities that Trump will start granting clemency to the thousands whose applications languish on file.

Black, a British citizen, had been the CEO of the publisher of Chicago Sun-Times, The Daily Telegraph and The Jerusalem Post. He was convicted in 2007 on three counts of mail fraud and one count of obstruction of justice. Two fraud counts were later thrown out by the Supreme Court. Black served 37 months in federal prison. Last year wrote a book called Donald J. Trump: A President Like No Other, which some media accounts allege was little more than a hagiography.

Nolan was a California legislative leader who spent years in prison after being convicted in the 1990s, after being secretly recorded accepting checks from an undercover FBI agent. He pled to one count of racketeering and did 25 months. Trump characterized Nolan’s decision to plead guilty as a “difficult” one, which makes him no different from all the other 94% of federal defendants who plead guilty every year.

These pardons do little to encourage federal inmates that Trump will wield his clemency power to benefit prisoners who are not connected. 

pardonme190123The President has pardoned nine people and commuted the sentences of three others since taking office, in a pattern apparently driven by politics, celebrity support and television. The only commutation of someone who was not politically connected was that of Alice Johnson, whose case had been taken to the president by Kim Kardashian West.

A few have complained that the President’s pardons are driven by politics or are “all about him.” This, of course, makes him no different from his predecessors (Obama and Manning, Clinton and Rich).

The President has been rumored to be planning pardons, timed for the Memorial Day weekend, of servicemen who have been accused or convicted of war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan.  However, the opposition to such actions appears to be fierce, and some have suggested that the hue and cry may cause Trump to abandon the plan.

The Hill, Trump pardons media tycoon, former GOP leader of California State Assembly (May 15)

The New York Times, Trump May Be Preparing Pardons for Servicemen Accused of War Crimes (May 18)

The Hill, Here are the 12 pardons or reduced sentences granted by Trump (May 16)

– Thomas L. Root

The “Closer to Home” Illusion – Update for May 20, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BOP DOES NOT HAVE TO WALK 500 MILES

aardvark190520There is not a single inmate in the federal prison system who would not be willing to walk, roll or crawl 500 miles to be home right now. Any no one on the outside is so hard-hearted that he or she cannot concede that housing inmates close enough to family to permit visits does not help with rehabilitation.

For those reasons (if basic humanity were not enough), the First Step Act’s provision directing the Bureau of Prisons to “place the prisoner in a facility as close as practicable to the prisoner’s primary residence, and to the extent practicable, in a facility within 500 driving miles of that residence,” got a lot of coverage when the bill passed last December.

But just as the media buzz that 4,000-plus inmates were going to be dumped on America’s streets the day after the Act passed was wrong, the giddy hopes that inmates were about to be placed near to their families have been tempered by the realities of what the Act says and what the BOP is willing to do.

There is a usually a separation between promise and reality, sometimes a crack and sometimes a chasm. It is probably worthwhile, therefore, to explain just how little Sec. 601 of the First Step Act really promises families and inmates.

Sec. 601 modified 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) to read that the BOP should try to place prisoners within 500 miles of home. That placement, however, is not required. In fact, it is subject to some pretty big exceptions, being subject to

(1)   bed availability,
(2)   the prisoner’s security designation,
(3)   the prisoner’s programmatic needs,
(4)   the prisoner’s mental and medical health needs,
(5) any request made by the prisoner related to faith-based needs,
(6)  recommendations of the sentencing court, and
(7)  “other security concerns of the” BOP.

Number 7 is a doozy. The placement need not violate a rule, or a BOP program statement, or even a local rule adopted by the sending or receiving prison. It just has to be a “concern.” Whatever that is, it is clearly something to be defined by the BOP.

jello190520Prior to the First Step Act, the BOP required that an inmate be at one institution for at least 18 months, and that he or she have 18 months without a disciplinary report (the BOP called it “clear conduct”) before he or she could be considered for a transfer. Often, transfers were denied because the inmate was deemed to need programming available at his or her current location, or occasionally, because the inmate had skills (a welder, for example, or a GED instructor) the current institution believed it needed to retain. When the transfer came (if it did), the inmate seldom ended up at the institution he or she desired.

In the wake of First Step, however, the BOP is still requiring that an inmate be at one institution for at least 18 months, and that he or she have 18 months without a disciplinary report (the BOP called it “clear conduct”) before he or she could be considered for a transfer. The BOP can still deny transfers for programming needs, perceived mental health needs (which, given the state of mental health treatment in the system, is a hoot), and for lack of bed space (which inmates from years past know to be an excuse that means whatever the BOP wants it to mean). Anything not covered by the foregoing can easily fall within the as-amorphous-as-Jello “security concerns” exception.

But they can’t do that, can they? Of course not. The injured inmate can always that the BOP to court…

Not so fast. Sec. 601 of the First Step Act added a free pass to the BOP: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.” So you don’t like what the BOP did? You can’t sue, can’t even bring a habeas corpus action, can’t even get on Judge Judy. The directive of § 601, detailed in its mandate and limitations, is completely undone by the last line of § 601, which tells the BOP, “if you don’t follow the law, no one is allowed to call you on it.”

wendys190520Imagine a football game like that, where one team gets a yellow flag repeatedly, with each penalty being marched off for zero yards. Or, my preferred fantasy, a diet on which if you succumb to Wendy’s Peppercorn Mushroom Melt Triple with a side of Baconator Fries and large Coke, the 2,190 calories you consume would not keep you from dropping a pound a day. Sweet deal for the BOP.

If the BOP could be sued, the results would not be much different. Courts traditionally give substantial deference to the judgments of prison administrators. Even restrictive prison regulations are permissible if they are “‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological interests. The BOP would say that its transfer restrictions – like 18 months of clear conduct – serve a legitimate penological goal. The courts, deferring to the BOP’s interpretation of the revised statute and its flexibility granted therein, would undoubtedly accept that.

chevron190520Finally, even without prison-administration deference, courts generally defer to administrative agencies “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules… and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” This is called “Chevron deference,” and – while opponents hope to see the Supreme Court undo it at some point soon – it would easily apply to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) as to how the BOP measures bed availability, security concerns, programming needs and mental and physical health needs.

So if the BOP ignores the Act’s 500-mile placement requirement, there is no remedy. Even if there were, BOP rules on transfer and the exceptions to closer-to-home would probably be unassailable.

Sec. 601, First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-015, 132 Stat. 5208, 5238 (Dec. 21, 2018)

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)

– Thomas L. Root

If You Want to Go Home, Die Faster – Update for May 16, 2019

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CAN’T TEACH AN OLD DOG NEW TRICKS

die190513The Bureau of Prisons has been notorious for refusing to make sentence reduction recommendations to courts because dying inmates seemed to be in pretty good health, and surely able to finish their sentences, no matter what doctors might say. The First Step Act tried to remedy the BOP’s convenient myopia by letting inmates file for sentence reductions with district courts if the BOP refused to do so for them.

You’ll be glad to know that the government remains just as oblivious to medical reality and insensitive to impending death as ever. When Steve Brittner’s BOP doc told him that his Stage IV brain tumor was bad enough to withdraw further treatment and sign him up for hospice care, Steve filed for an 18 USC § 3582(c) sentence reduction so he could die at home.

The government opposed the reduction, arguing Steve did not have a terminal illness within the meaning of the guidelines because his medical records “do not indicate that the tumor has metastasized.” Plus, the government contended, Steve could not show “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances because his medical records did not indicate an inability to care for himself.

Last week, Steve’s district court swept aside the government’s opposition and said Steve could die at home. First, the court said, the Guidelines on sentence reduction do not require that Steve show that his tumor has metastasized for his condition to be terminal. Instead, the guidelines provide a number of examples of medical conditions that would meet the standard for a “terminal illness.”’ A metastatic solid-tumor cancer” is just example.

compassionaterelease190517

Second, to show extraordinary and compelling circumstances, an inmate does not have to show both a terminal illness and inability to care for oneself. “The Government reads a conjunctive requirement into the guideline comment where none occurs,” the district court observed. The Guidelines provide that “extraordinary and compelling” reasons exist “under any of the circumstances set forth below,” of which a terminal condition is one and inability to care for oneself is another.”

“Of importance,” the court wrote, “the treatment options available to Brittner have been exhausted. According to the last treatment note available to the Court, dated November 15, 2018… the plan… was to hold, or discontinue further therapy, and it was recommended to Brittner that he consider comfort measures, specifically hospice, which his treating oncologist “considered very reasonable due to worsening performance status… It is clear from the nature of his disease and his worsening condition as documented above, that Brittner’s prognosis is grim, his disease is terminal, and the length of his life can be measured most likely in weeks, as opposed to months.”

United States v. Brittner, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73653 (D.Mont. May 01, 2019)

Reason.com, A Terminally Ill, Wheelchair-Bound Inmate Applied for Compassionate Release. The Justice Department Argued He Wasn’t Dying Fast Enough to Qualify (May 3)

– Thomas L. Root

Keeping Count – Update for May 15, 2019

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SENTENCING BY THE NUMBERS

The Sentencing Commission Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report and Sourcebook came out last week. Besides the obvious (which the Annual Report sort of soft-pedaled, that the Commission lacks a quorum, and thus cannot perform its primary duties), the release contains some interesting numbers taken from 2018’s 69,400 district court sentencings. (All years are fiscal years, running from Oct. 1 to Sept. 30):

• The Feds are busier this year than last. The sentencing caseload increased by 3.7% from 2017, the first increase in caseload since 2011.

numbers180327• It’s not what you did, it’s where you’re from, that matters. Immigration crimes replaced drug offenses as the largest single group of offenses. Immigration cases increased from 30.5% in 2017 to 34.4% in 2018, while drug and firearms prosecutions fell.

• Meth is the drug of choice. Methamphetamine offenses, the most common drug type in the federal system, continued to rise (from 30.8% of all drug offenses in 2016 and 34.6% in 2017 to 39.8% in 2018).

• The Guidelines still rule. 75% of federal offenders were sentenced under the Guidelines Manual in 2018. Of those, 51.0% were sentenced within the defendants’ Guidelines sentencing range, an increase of 1.9 points from 2017. The number of defendants getting downward departures for helping the government remained at 10.1%, the same level as 2017.

U.S. Sentencing Commission, FY 2018 Sourcebook (May 8, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

If Not For Supervised Release, What’s Forever For? – Update for May 14, 2019

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FOREVER IS A LONG TIME

41475-Forever-Is-A-Long-TimeKevin Carson was convicted of having hundreds of kiddie porn images on his computers and having sent some such images to young girls. He got a below Guidelines sentence of 240 months and lifetime supervised release, with conditions prohibiting him from using Internet devices without probation office approval and avoiding from any social media.

Kevin appealed the lifetime supervised release term and the computer and social media restrictions. Because his trial lawyer did not object to the supervised release or the conditions (and for that matter, did not even bother filing a sentencing memorandum, something the appellate court noted with disdain), Kevin had to show that the mistakes were plain error that affected his substantial rights (under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)).

computer190514Last week, the 8th Circuit upheld the lifetime supervised release term and the conditions. Kevin complained the trial court did not consider sentencing factors in giving him lifetime supervised release, but the Circuit said a sentencing court’s explanation “may be relatively brief if the district court rests its decision on the Sentencing Commission’s reasoning and decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case.” Here, a Guidelines policy statement provided that if the offense of conviction is a sex offense, “the statutory maximum term of supervised release is recommended.” Thus, Kevin’s lifetime supervised release term “was a straightforward application of this policy.”

As for the computer restrictions, the Court ruled that as long as Kevin  could use computers and social media with Probation Office approval – rather than an outright ban – the condition is not too great a restriction on his freedom. Kevin argued that the social media restriction was unconstitutional under Packingham v North Carolina, but the Circuit said Packingham “invalidated only a post-custodial restriction and expressed concern that the statute applied even to persons who have already served their sentence.” Because Kevin will still be serving a sentence on supervised release for as long as he is able to draw breath, the Court held, he will never finish serving his sentence, and thus, Packingham does not make the district court’s restriction on social media during supervised release plain error.

forever190514The decision is noteworthy for Judge Kelly’s incisive dissent, in which he complains that the district court left the 8th Circuit with no explanation for why it varied downward one-third on the sentence but maxed out the supervised release. The need for individual tailoring of supervised release conditions to offenders is substantial, the Judge said, and the advent of IoT devices like thermostats and doorbells, and Amazon.com, could leave Kevin violating supervised release by turning up the heat.

The Judge underscored the problem with sweeping, blunt supervised release conditions like these: Kevin “was thirty-three at the time of his arrest, and his lifetime term of supervised release could very well last decades. We can only imagine the universe of internet-reliant electronic devices that will pervade everyday life by then. The length and conditions of his supervised release may well be justified, but such punishment deserves, at minimum, some reasoned explanation from the sentencing court.”

United States v. Carson, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14044 (8th Cir. May 10, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

No Running Out the Clock on Supervised Release – Update for May 13, 2019

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FLEEING IN PLACE

emily190513Emily Bernges, my high school Latin teacher, taught us that the Latin verb “fugare” means “to flee,” and is the basis of the English word “fugitive.” Based on that, you might think that to be a fugitive, you have to take flight, or at least do something that seems like running from the law.

Not necessarily, as Phillip Thompson found out. He did some federal time last decade, followed by five years of supervised release. The supervised release was not such a big deal to Phil, because he was deported to his native Jamaica as soon as he was released in 2010. Before he left for the islands, Phil was a told that one condition of his supervised release was that if he came back to the USA, he had to promptly report to his probation officer. Because returning to this country after being deported is a federal crime all by itself, you would think that the last thing Phil would want to do if he sneaked back onto the mainland was report to his PO.

You would be right. Phil returned to the USA in 2012, but got deported again about a month later, well before before his PO found out he had been back. When she did learn of it, she filed a violation petition, but Phil was already back in Jamaica and beyond the reach of the Probation Office. But Phil came back in December 2014, five months before his 5-year supervised release term expired, and this time he stayed. Having the foresight to use an alias and obtain a phony driver’s license, Phil flew under the radar for more than two years, during which time he was busily engaged in organizing large-scale marijuana importation and routing the money through bank accounts back to Jamaica (or so the authorities say).

Phil got arrested in 2017, and after his fingerprints ratted him out, his Probation Officer learned he was back. She amended the pending violation petition, and his supervised release was revoked. Phil challenged the district court’s jurisdiction to even hear his supervised release revocation, because supervised release had expired in June 2015. The district court disagreed, saying under the “fugitive tolling” doctrine, Phil was a fugitive from the time he got back to the USA until he was arrested, and his supervised release stopped running during that time.

Last week, the 4th Circuit agreed. As a general rule, the Court said, a district court’s power to revoke supervised release ends when the supervised release term expires, but the term stops running if the defendant absconds from supervised release and thus becomes a fugitive. Phil argued he was not a fugitive under the fugitive tolling doctrine, because only an active and knowing effort to evade adjudication of a supervised release violation petition is sufficient to trigger the fugitive tolling doctrine. He never knew about the July 2011 petition filed against him because he had been deported two months before.

fugitive190513The 4th disagreed. The fugitive tolling doctrine provides that a supervised release term “is tolled when a defendant absconds from supervision.” That is because Congress intended defendants to serve their full supervised release term, and just as an escaped prisoner’s sentence is not credited for the time the prisoner spends out of custody, a supervised release term should not be credited for the time that a defendant, “by virtue of his own wrongful act,” spends out of supervision. Fugitive tolling, the Court said, “prevents a situation in which we reward an absconder for his misconduct, allowing a fugitive defendant to run out the clock on his release term while refusing to submit to supervision.”

Here, Phil did not just come back to the USA and not report, but he used an alias, got phony ID, and admitted he knew he was supposed to report to the PO if he returned. That was enough to show active measures to hide, and to thus make him an absconder.

United States v. Thompson, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14035 (4th Cir. May 10, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Too Much Frivolity For a Lawyer? – Update for May 9, 2019

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APPLES AND ORANGES

noBS190509A long time ago, Congress decided that prisoners filed too many nonsense lawsuits. There was no cost to the prisoner, who always qualified for in forma pauperis status (which meant, among other things, that the prisoner did not have to pay the federal district court filing fee of $400.00 plus). So in 1996, Congress amended 28 USC § 1915, which requires courts to perform what one lawyer I know crudely but accurately calls the “bullshit review.” If after the judge casts his or her practiced eye on the complaint, the court decides that the complaint is utter crap – known in the legal world as “frivolous” – the prisoner will be denied in forma pauperis status. Of course, the inmate can still go forward by paying the filing fee, but for a guy making a quarter an hour, $400.00 buys a lot of Honeybuns at the commissary.

But that’s all in the civil litigation world. If you find yourself behind the criminal 8-ball, things are different. Apples and oranges.

Matthew Didham wanted to appeal the district court’s revocation of his supervised release. He asked for appointment of counsel, because he could not afford to keep paying his retained attorney, who withdrew after Matt was revoked.

The district court turned him down, because Matt had $750 in his commissary account, and therefore, the court reasoned, he could afford the appeal filing fee. Plus, the district judge found, citing 28 USC § 1915(a)(3), Matt’s appeal was frivolous, because he had “not articulated any argument to suggest that the court revoked his supervised release in error.”

Last week, the 7th Circuit reversed, and appointed counsel for Matt. It held that the district court had confused apples for oranges, applying the statute which applies for prisoners’ civil appeals, with the Criminal Justice Act, governing criminal and supervised release appeals. In 28 USC § 1915 cases, the court can deny counsel if the filing is frivolous. But for a supervised release violation, the right to counsel is set out in 18 USC § 3006A “for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation.” It is not for the district judge to deny where he thinks he was right, and an appeal of his decision must therefore be wrong.

United States v. Durham, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 13264 (7th Cir.  May 2, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

11th Circuit Travels Farther From Earth – Update for May 8, 2019

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11TH CIRCUIT BAR FIGHT

Last week, the 11th Circuit denied en banc review of a case in which a pre-Booker Guidelines career offender sought collateral review of his sentence, based on the void-for-vagueness doctrine of Johnson v. United States. No surprise there. But a number of judges on that court, including the former acting chairman of the Sentencing Commission, Judge William Pryor, wrote 27 weird pages explaining the soundness of their denial.

earth190508Essentially, the majority said that the Guidelines were always advisory, even when they were mandatory, because the mandatory guidelines were never lawful. Therefore, a judge could have given the defendant the same high sentence even if he was not wrongly considered to be a career offender, despite the obvious fact that any judge who had done that would have been summarily reversed. If the sentence conceivably could not have changed, the majority wrote, then the ruling (in this case, Beckles) is obviously procedural, and the defendant cannot rely on it to change his sentence, because it is not retroactive.

Judge Rosenbaum and two other judges threw 36 pages back at the majority:

According to the Pryor Statement, the Booker Court did not make the Guidelines advisory because they were always advisory, since the Sixth Amendment never allowed them to be mandatory. That is certainly interesting on a metaphysical level.

But it ignores reality. Back here on Earth, the laws of physics still apply. And the Supreme Court’s invalidation of a law does not alter the space-time continuum. Indeed, there can be no dispute that from when the Guidelines were adopted in 1984 to when the Supreme Court handed down Booker in 2005, courts mandatorily applied them, as 3553(b) required, to scores of criminal defendants — including many who still sit in prison because of them.

The inmate, Stoney Lester, was lucky enough to get released on a 2241 motion by the 4th Circuit – in which circuit he was imprisoned at the time – making the 11th Circuit denial academic. But the otherworldly logic of the majority, especially from a circuit fast becoming notorious for accepting any tissue-thin reason to deny a defendant constitutional or statutory justice (see here and here, for instance), is mind-numbing.

Lester v. United States, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 12859 (11th Cir. Apr. 29, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

The Year of No Guidelines – Update for May 7, 2019

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WHITHER GUIDELINES?

Guidelines red text and magnify glassThe first of May was both International Workers Day (for you Marxists) and Law Day (if you’re a lawyer). For the past 31 years, it has also customarily brought a package of Sentencing Guidelines amendments, each of which is to become effective on the following November 1st (six months hence) unless Congress objects, pursuant to 28 USC 994(p).

Not this year. For the fourth time in 31 years, the Commission will adopt no Guideline amendments to send to Congress. This has only happened before in  1996 and 1999, and more recently in 2017.

The problem is one of politics. The Sentencing Commission was established by Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 as a permanent, independent agency within the judicial branch. The seven Commission members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for six-year terms. Commission members may be reappointed to one additional term, also with the advice and consent of the Senate. Three of the members must be federal judges, and no more than four may belong to the same political party. The Attorney General or his designee and the chair of the United States Parole Commission sit as non-voting members of the Commission.

No matter how important the Commission may be to federal inmates, Washington sees it as a political backwater. Already operating with only five members in 2017, the Commission’s voting membership fell further last year to four. Then, at the end of 2018, the terms of Judge William Pryor of the 11th Circuit and New York University law professor Rachel Barkow expired.

emptyroom190507For the past five months, the Commission has had only two voting members. Two more must be appointed and approved by the Senate just to have the minimum number needed for a meeting. Former Sentencing Commission chairwoman Patti Saris, who is Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, complained in a Law360.com article last week, “Today, the United States Sentencing Commission sits without a confirmed chair, or even a quorum of members. This severely impairs the commission’s ability to study further reforms. For example, with only two current commissioners, the commission is unable to pass amendments to make the sentencing guidelines consistent with the statutory provision expanding the “safety valve.” While the research and training activities of the commission continue, the commission needs a quorum.”

Meanwhile, the amendment cycle for 2018 has come and gone without action for the second time in three years. Thank heaven that the Guidelines, after 30 years of development, are perfect in every regard (said no one ever).

Law360.com, The First Step Act Is A Major Step For Sentencing Reform (Apr. 28)

– Thomas L. Root