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‘All Work And No Pay’ For BOP Employees – October 23, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

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‘WELCOME TO OUR WORLD,’ BOP EMPLOYEES COULD GREET COURT WORKERS

A Columbia, South Carolina, newspaper spotlighted the state of Federal Bureau of Prisons employees since the shutdown, and the picture was not a pretty one: “As essential workers, employees at federal prisons are still required to show up every day. But with funding frozen due to the government shutdown, employees are facing an uncertain future. With no immediate end in sight for the shutdown, the paycheck they received last week might be the last one they see for a while. ‘Morale is very low,’ said Talmadge Coleman, who recently retired from FCI Edgefield and is president of the Local 0510 at the prison. Staff were ‘very disgruntled’ at the situation…”

The State reported that “many staff members were already living paycheck to paycheck” and last week got only a partial salary check covering time through September 30th. “With the shutdown, that will leave many of these employees who guard federal prisoners unable to pay their mortgages, make car payments or even afford groceries or the gas to get to work. Many staff members are single moms, people looking after their parents and juggling medical bills and the rising cost of living, Coleman said. ‘Creditors don’t want to hear it,’ Coleman said.”

One correctional officer told a Texas TV station that BOP employees are “looking at, ‘OK, I can make it through this month. But if it hits November 1st and we’re not getting paid…’”

President Trump has directed through executive orders that the BOP and other agencies no longer honor the collective bargaining agreements between the agencies and about a half million workers. “The agency doesn’t recognize us anymore, so that’s one less thing that we can help with,” said Brandy Moore White, president of Council of Prison Locals 33, a union that represents federal prison employees. “It’s just disaster upon disaster.”

During the 2019 shutdown, the BOP gave employees a letter that they could show to creditors explaining the situation. This time, the agency has provided no such letter.

The BOP issued an automated response to a media request asking for comment on the shutdown: “Due to the lapse in appropriations, the Office of Public Affairs is not available to respond.”

The State, Federal prisons in SC were already struggling. Then the government shut down (October 14, 2025)

KXXV-TV, Federal prison officers working without pay as shutdown reaches day 6 (October 16, 2025)

 

~ Thomas L. Root

6th Extends Section 404 Reduction to Sentence Packages – Update for October 21, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

A “PACKAGE” DEAL

“Best Friends” sounds like a warm and cuddly name for a gang, more like a gaggle of 6-year-old girls back in the 1980s swapping Cabbage Patch Kids. But the 1980s and 1990s Motor City’s “Best Friends” gang was a little more into drug distribution, for-hire murders and drive-by shootings than ugly-faced little dolls with birth certificates.

In 1995, four of the principals were convicted of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, possession of crack, and several counts of intentional killing in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 USC § 848(e)(1)(A), with a few 18 USC § 924(c) use-of-gun counts tossed in for good measure. The four besties were all convicted and received life sentences.

After the First Step Act was passed, the four filed for sentence reductions under Section 404, which allowed for retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act’s reduction in statutory punishments for crack cocaine offenses. After a tortuous trek through the district court to the court of appeals and back again, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan deemed the four amigos eligible for a Section 404 reduction. After a 2022 hearing, the district court reduced their sentences for the drug conspiracy and homicide convictions from life imprisonment to various terms of years.

The government appealed, and last week, the 6th Circuit reversed and remanded.The Circuit rejected the District Court’s interpretation of Section 404 that would allow unlimited resentencing authority for any offense if a covered offense happened to also present. The 6th concluded that such a reading of the section did not align with the First Step Act’s purpose of resentencing “as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect.”

After all, the 6th reasoned, even if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in force when the four best friends were sentenced in 1998, the homicide life sentences under § 848(e) would still have been permitted independent of the crack possession and conspiracy convictions.

The “sentencing package doctrine” recognizes that sentencing multiple counts is an inherently interrelated, interconnected, and holistic process, and that when an appellate court vacates a sentence and remands for resentencing, the sentence becomes void in its entirety and the district court is free to revisit any rulings it made at the initial sentencing. In this case, the 6th held that when sentences are interdependent or form a ‘package,’ modifying one sentence may require reconsideration of the entire sentencing scheme to maintain the court’s original sentencing intent. Finding that the ‘sentencing package‘ doctrine is consistent with First Step Section 404’s text and context, the Circuit vacated everyone’s resentencings and remanded for the District Court to determine whether each defendant’s homicide sentence was part of a ‘sentencing package’ with the covered crack drug offense.

The holding aligns with decisions by the 4th and 7th Circuits.

United States v. Dale, Case No. 23-1050, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 26682 (6th Cir. October 14, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

Federal Courts Are Closing (Sort Of) – Update for October 20, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CLOSED FOR REMODELING

Usually, when you see a hand-scrawled sign on a restaurant door that the place is “closed for remodeling,” the between-the-lines message is that the place is out of business until the next unlucky owner can be fleeced.

President Trump’s government closed on October 1st because the Democrats refuse to sign on to a continuing resolution keeping the Feds funded unless healthcare cuts are restored. When that happened, the federal courts announced that they had enough money in the coffers to keep operating at least until October 17th.

Last Friday, the “Closed for Remodeling” signs went up.

Unlike executive branch federal agencies, the federal courts been able to sustain paid operations for a few weeks after the shutdown by using fees and other funds courts have collected that are not dependent on Congress. But tight budgets in recent years meant the courts entered this shutdown with less money in the bank than they had during the 35-day 2019 shutdown, during which the courts sustained paid operations for whole length of the impasse.

A few weeks ago, Administrative Office of United States Courts estimated that court funding would be exhausted by last Friday. And, as forecast, it was.

The AOUSC – the central support agency for courts providing a wide range of legislative programs, budgeting and administrative support services – announced late last Friday that beginning on Monday, Oct 20, it will no longer have funding to sustain full operations, and until the shutdown ends, federal courts will maintain limited operations necessary to “perform the Judiciary’s constitutional functions.” 

This followed an internal memorandum circulated the day before explaining that “If Congress does not pass and the President sign into law legislation funding the Judiciary’s operations, we will enter Phase 2 of this lapse in appropriations beginning Monday, October 20, 2025… During the morning of October 20, furlough notices will be distributed, and orderly shutdown activities will commence.”

Federal judges will continue to be federal judges – nothing can change that – but clerks’ offices and court staff “may only perform certain excepted activities permitted under the Anti-Deficiency Act.” The ADA prohibits the government from entering into any contract – including paying employees to work – that is not “fully funded,” because doing so would obligate the government in the absence of an appropriation adequate to the needs of the contract.

The AOUSC said that “excepted activities” include work necessary to perform Article III constitutional functions, activities necessary for the safety of human life and protection of property, and activities otherwise authorized by federal law. Employees will be expected to perform such duties “without pay during the funding lapse. Staff members not performing excepted work will be placed on furlough.”

Each appellate and district court is expected to make its own decisions on how to manage its cases and probation/pretrial supervision services during the shutdown. Each court and federal defender’s office will determine how it will find the resources needed to support the work the court deems essential.

AOUSC’s message to courts seems to be ‘you’re on your own.’

PACER, which is more than amply funded by user fees, will continue to be operated.

The Supreme Court announced that it, too, will be furloughing staff and be closing the building to public tours. SCOTUS “expects to run out of funding on October 18,” Patricia McCabe, Supreme Court public information officer, told The Hill last week. “As a result, the Supreme Court Building will be closed to the public until further notice… The Supreme Court will continue to conduct essential work such as hearing oral arguments, issuing orders and opinions, processing case filings, and providing building support needed for those operations.”

Sounds like business as usual at SCOTUS.

As for what individual courts will do during the shutdown, expect those announcements during this coming week.

AOUSC, Judiciary Funding Runs Out; Only Limited Operations to Continue (October 17, 2025)

AOUSC, Guidance For Judiciary Operations During Phase 2 Of The Lapse In Appropriations  (October 16, 2025)

Reuters, US courts set to run out of money, begin furloughs as shutdown lingers (October 17, 2025)

The Hill, Supreme Court to run out of funding due to shutdown (October 17, 2025)

Thomas L. Root

Jailer Trump Sends Former Death Row Prisones to Supermax – Update for October 17, 2025


We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

PRESIDENT TRUMP MAKES BOP DESIGNATION DECISIONS

Among the last clemencies made by President Biden before leaving office were his commuting the sentences of 37 BOP death row inmates to life. Hours later, newly installed President Trump ordered that the life sentences of these men be made into what the Wall Street Journal called “a living hell.”

Based on the order Trump had Attorney General Pam Bondi issue, the BOP officials canceled plans to transfer most of the inmates to mainline prisons. Instead, Acting Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove III executed Bondi’s order, directing that all but a few prisoners requiring medical facilities be designated to ADMAX Florence, which the Wall Street Journal called “the harshest institution in the federal system.”

The Journal said that Aaron Reitz, then an assistant attorney general, led a roundtable with the families and said he was disappointed that the cells “have windows to see daylight.” He suggested that prison food was too good for these men. “I’ve got no problem with gruel.” he said. “If made right, it’s a nutritious all-in-one meal.” Later in an interview, Reitz said, “If you’re not going to be killed lawfully at the hands of the state, well, your prison sentence is going to be hard as hell.” 

The Journal reported that “while the president’s authority to grant clemency for federal crimes is virtually unfettered, the power to impose vengeance via prison assignments isn’t clear.”

Attorney General Pam Bondi said Trump wanted to “ensure that they spend the remainder of their lives in conditions consistent with the egregious crimes they committed.” David Fathi, director of the National Prison Project at the ACLU, which represents 21 of the inmates, said that none of the prisoners qualified for ADX placement under the BOP’s Program Statement 5100.08, Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification Manual. ‘None of our plaintiffs were designated for ADX,” he said. “Under Attorney General Bondi, all of our plaintiffs have been slated for ADX, not because of a security risk but to inflict maximum suffering.”

“People should be very concerned about the president and attorney general’s disregard for the law in this case,” Fathi said. “Today, it may be people who are very unpopular. Tomorrow, it could be anybody.”

Wall Street Journal, Biden Spared 37 Killers From Execution. Trump Ordered Up a Lifetime of Torment (October 11, 2025)

Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 5100.08 CN-2, Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification Manual (March 5, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

Sometimes You Can Speak For Yourself, 6th Circuit Says – Update for October 16, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CATCH-22

When Derek Riley pled guilty in 2016 to conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, his Guidelines Criminal History Category was III yielded an advisory sentencing range of 135 to 168 months. The district court sentenced him to 160 months.

In 2023, Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines retroactively lowered some criminal history points, including Derek’s. His new Guideline sentencing range was 121 to 151 months. A public defender representing him in the resentencing stipulated with the government to a 144-month sentence, which the court imposed.

Derek was not happy with the new sentence and filed a document he wrote himself called a “Motion for Reconsideration.” In it, he stated that his attorney had agreed to the stipulation as to his sentence without his knowledge or consent and that, therefore, the district court should reconsider and entertain the arguments he wanted to make in favor of a “time-served” sentence. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Derek had a lawyer and thus was not allowed to file pro se motions under the policy prohibiting “hybrid” representation. The court told Derek that if he wanted to file a motion for reconsideration claiming that his lawyer had gone off the reservation, he should have his lawyer file it for him.

Joseph Heller’s “Catch-22” was this: If a World War II bomber airman wanted to avoid flying combat missions over Europe by claiming he was insane, he had to apply for the exemption. But the combat missions were so dangerous – only 25 pct of aircrews survived the 25 missions they were to fly before being relieved – that claim madness to get out of combat was interpreted as proof of sanity, so the application would be denied. “Catch-22” now describes a paradoxical situation from which there is no escape.

Thinking that the court’s instruction that only his lawyer could file a motion claiming his lawyer had agreed to something without his client’s approval veered very close to being a “Catch-22,” Derek filed a pro se notice of appeal.

Last week, the 6th Circuit agreed with Derek. The Circuit acknowledged that the rule against hybrid representation was a good one, because usually, whether to file certain motions and what to say in those motions are decisions for counsel, not the defendant.

“But cases like this one,” the 6th held, “present a materially different landscape. Here, the court was not simply presented with a disagreement over strategic choices made by the attorney nor an instance of nonspecific dissatisfaction. Instead, the court was faced with the defendant’s specific allegation that his counsel made a decision affecting the overarching aims of the representation without his knowledge or assent. A defendant must be permitted to make important decisions as to the direction of his case regardless of whether he is represented. A lawyer may not override a defendant’s decision to accept or reject a plea offer or disposition offered by the government because ‘decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial rights are of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate…’ Where a defendant alleges conduct that amounts to such a violation, his allegations, if true, point to a breakdown in proper representation. His dissatisfaction and disagreement with his counsel should, therefore, be an apparent and pressing concern, triggering the district court’s obligation to investigate.”

The Circuit observed that the “clear thrust of the motion was that Riley wanted to proceed pro se because his counsel had agreed to a specific disposition of his § 3582 motion (a revised sentence of 144 months) without his consent. The district court then had an obligation to address that allegation directly in deciding Riley’s pro se motion.”

United States v. Riley, Case No. 24-1287, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 26350 (6th Cir. October 9, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS Will Decide When a Waiver Has Been Waived  – Update for October 14, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

WAVING GOODBYE TO WAIVER CONFUSION?

The Supreme Court last Friday granted review to a federal criminal case asking whether a plea agreement appeal waiver binds a defendant where the judge advised him that he had the right to appeal.

Munson Hunter pled guilty to aiding and abetting wire fraud. He signed a plea agreement that, among other things, provided that he was giving up his right to appeal.

At sentencing, a the judge imposed a mental health condition over the defendant’s objection and then told the defendant, “You have a right to appeal.”

Munson appealed the mental health condition to the 5th Circuit, which – pointing to his appeal waiver – dismissed the appeal.

SCOTUS will address two issues:

Whether the only permissible exceptions to a general appeal waiver are for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he has a right to appeal, and the government does not object.

A Circuit split exists on the issue. In the 9th Circuit, if a sentencing judge advises a defendant of a right to appeal and the government fails to object, the appeal waiver in the plea agreement has no effect.

The Supreme Court will now settle the issue.

Hunter v. Texas, Case No 24-1063 (certiorari granted October 10, 2025)

SCOTUSBlog, Court grants criminal case on right to appeal (October 10, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

Beck v. Choy May Be Supreme Court “Sleeper” Case for Inmate Healthcare Rights – Update for October 10, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BORING… UNTIL IT’S NOT

The Supreme Court heard oral argument in a case that most would think makes melba toast exciting by comparison.  But it’s a sleeper, a question of boring civil procedure that has major importance to federal inmates seeking to hold the Bureau of Prisons accountable for healthcare malpractice.

When prisoners receive negligent healthcare, many start planning to bring an 8th Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.  However, proving that ham-handed medical care was inflicted deliberately is hard. Add to that the fact that since the Supreme Court’s Egbert v. Boule decision in 2022, bringing any federal constitutional claim seeking money damages – a so-called Bivens action – is just about impossible.

Impossible and unnecessary, because healthcare negligence is medical malpractice, and medical malpractice is negligence.  A prisoner can easily bring a negligence action against federal officers or employees under the Federal Tort Claims Act (explainer here).  Proving negligence is much easier than proving deliberate indifference. And, face it, most of the lousy healthcare in the BOP system is the result of negligence rather than a deliberate design to inflict cruelty on inmates. As Hanlon’s Razor cautions us, “Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity.”

There is a catch, however. When a prisoner brings a malpractice suit, he or she must do so in the state where the negligence occurred. The suit is judged according to state malpractice law, although it is brought in federal court. And most states have rules or statutes that require the plaintiff bringing the lawsuit to accompany his or her complaint with an affidavit from an expert that sets out the standard of care in the state and the expert’s belief that the defendant BOP doc or nurse failed to live up to it.

These are typically called “affidavits of merit,” and they are required in order to discourage frivolous lawsuits. They’re tough for inmates, however, even those with strong cases, because no expert is going to provide such an affidavit unless hired. The last time I hired one for a prisoner, it cost $5,000 (and that was eight years ago). Most inmates just don’t have that kind of money lying around.

The affidavit of merit rule has wiped out thousands of inmate FTCA suits over the years, making it impossible for them to get past the complaint stage to where they can engage in discovery (and maybe obtain a settlement). I have not been alone in arguing to courts that the law requires applying federal rules of procedure but state laws governing the substantive issue of whether malpractice has occurred.  This holding, as first-year law students can recite in their sleep, is Erie Railroad Co. v Tompkins.

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins is a landmark Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that the United States does not have a general federal common law. Instead, while federal courts may follow federal procedural rules – such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure – they must apply state substantive law, not federal law, to lawsuits that do not involve federal questions. Most American lawyers and legal scholars regard Erie as one of the most important decisions in U.S. Supreme Court history, a decision that has been described as “go[ing] to the heart” of the American system of federalism.

The issue of whether state laws requiring an affidavit of merit with a medical malpractice complaint are substantive or procedural has now reached the Supreme Court. Last Monday, the Court heard argument in Berk v. Choy, a case that asks whether the Delaware state affidavit of merit requirement is a procedural requirement – in which case it does not apply in a federal court FTCA suit – or a substantive requirement that federal courts have to honor.

At the argument, some of the Justices viewed the requirements as “unacceptably hostile to the central conception of the federal trial system,” according to SCOTUSBlog:

Justice Elena Kagan led that group, drawing on a big-picture conception of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure doubtless influenced by her decades teaching about the subject as a professor. For Kagan, the Delaware rules fly in the face of “the entire thrust of the Federal Rules,” which were “meant to establish a notice pleading system where all you had to do was say: ‘Here I am, here’s my claim, I’m going to be seeking damages, the end,’ and everything else was supposed to happen later in the normal course of things.”

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, for example, saw Delaware’s rule as hostile to the federal system: “[W]e have this Delaware law saying what is necessary to file or initiate a malpractice lawsuit as a matter of procedure. You have to have this separate [affidavit]. Notably, it’s not evidence. It is just what is a necessary step to initiate this lawsuit. And under federal law, no such thing is required. The federal law says that the action commences by filing a complaint with the court.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor pointed to the requirements for filing an answer to a complaint: “The Federal Rules require that an answer be served in 20 days; the Delaware rule says the answer doesn’t have to be served until the affidavit’s filed.”

The defendant hospital argued that the Court shouldn’t focus on details like those cited by Jackson and Sotomayor, contending that there was no reason “that a federal court must ignore the entirety of a state statute if any part of it might conflict with a federal rule in some case.”

Several justices recognized that such an approach would ask SCOTUS to pick and choose among the various pieces of the Delaware statute.  Justice Neil Gorsuch said, “You are cracking and extracting… some things from the Delaware rule that you would apply in federal court and other things that you wouldn’t… [W]e’re creating this Frankenstein of a statute, right? We’re taking bits and pieces and adapting it, but what authority does a federal court have to rewrite Delaware law in that fashion?” 

SCOTUSBlog writer Ronald Mann said that it was difficult to determine from the argument how the Court would rule. “[I]t is safe to say that several justices will reject Delaware’s procedures, and hard to believe that Kagan won’t write something, but not at all clear what side the court, as a whole, will favor.”

A ruling invalidating the affidavit of merit requirement would be a major victory for inmate FTCA filers.

Berk v. Choy, Case No 24-440 (argued October 6, 2025)

SCOTUSBlog.com, Justices debate state limits on malpractice actions for cases in federal court (October 7, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

Riding Along In My Automobile Ain’t Necessarily Interstate Commerce – Update for October 9, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

8TH CIRCUIT NOT DRIVEN TO FIND INTERSTATE NEXUS IN SEX CRIME

Muhammad Arif ran a little convenience store in rural Arkansas. He had a handyman employee, a guy who worked hard but could barely support his kids on what he made.

Mo wanted to throw a few extra bucks the family’s way. Great idea. He figured he could do that by soliciting the handyman’s young daughter to engage in sex with him. Not so great an idea. Twice while Mo was driving the 15-year-old home, he pitched her for sex in exchange for money. Twice she refused. Twice he gave her $20.00 to keep her mouth shut about his indecent pitch.

The young lady was short of money but not of brains. She secretly recorded Mo both times and turned him in. The Feds charged Mo with commercial sex trafficking of a minor in violation of 18 USC § 1591(a)(1).

The statute requires that the prohibited act was done “in or affecting interstate commerce.” At trial, a detective testified that Mo drove a 2016 Nissan that had been built in Mississippi. The government offered no evidence about how Mo’s use of the Nissan otherwise affected interstate commerce but argued that because Mo had propositioned the girl while driving in a car built in another state, his crime affected interstate commerce.

Mo argued the government failed to prove that what he did met the “interstate commerce” element. The district court agreed, holding that driving a car on a road, without more, is not evidence of “an actual rather than potential effect on interstate commerce.” The government appealed, arguing that committing a crime that affects interstate commerce, like commercial sex trafficking, satisfies the commerce element of § 1591(a)(1) even if the offense was committed without traveling across state lines.

Last week, the 8th Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of Mo’s case. While the case is sex-related, the “interstate commerce” element – common to many federal criminal statutes – makes the analysis interesting and applicable to a variety of statutes that depend on “affecting commerce” for validity.

The Constitution’s Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce… among the several states.” For more than a century, the 8th observed, “Supreme Court decisions have mechanically recited that the Commerce Clause permits congressional regulation of three categories: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities that ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce.” This third category includes “purely local activities that are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”

The Circuit had previously held “that Congress’s use of ‘affecting’ in § 1591(a)(1)… suggests that there must be evidence of an actual rather than potential effect on interstate commerce.” The 8th admitted that “it does not take much for a criminal act to affect interstate commerce. Any actual impact, no matter how minor, will do.” However, while “a probability of affecting commerce is sufficient in some cases… the probability must be realistic rather than merely speculative.”

Congress may prohibit conduct committed “through the use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, or other instrument of interstate or foreign commerce,” such as in the arson statute (18 USC § 844). But § 1591(a) is textually different than § 844. “The commerce element in § 1591(a)(1) is conduct ‘in or affecting interstate commerce,’ not use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce,” the appellate court wrote. “Merely using the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce is relevant but does not necessarily demonstrate an actual effect on commerce that satisfies the jurisdictional element.”

The government argued that, because a car is an instrumentality of commerce, proof of any use of a car in committing commercial sex trafficking of a minor is sufficient evidence of an actual impact. The Circuit disagreed: “Merely driving a car on a road, without more, does not establish a sufficient interstate commerce nexus. The use of an instrumentality of commerce for a 20-minute intrastate trip in this case is simply not the same as connecting to a multi-state cellular network or the internet, a system that is inexorably intertwined with interstate commerce.”

Mo’s Nissan was certainly linked to interstate commerce, but “the government’s evidence failed to establish that Arif’s use of the car in soliciting [the girl] during two short intrastate drives to her home had an identifiable actual effect on intrastate commerce.”

United States v. Arif, Case No. 24-2323, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 25582 (8th Cir. October 2, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

GAO Finds BOP Employee Misconduct Process Flawed – Update for October 7, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

JUSTICE DELAYED’: BOP MISCONDUCT RESOLUTION SYSTEM FLAWED, GAO SAYS


The Government Accountability Office, a congressional agency, issued a report last week criticizing the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ backlog of over 12,000 unresolved employee misconduct complaints.

The BOP received 15,000 employee misconduct allegations last year alone, with beefs ranging from unexcused absences to inmate abuse. The most frequent allegations involved charges of unprofessional conduct or failure to follow policies. Other common allegations claimed employees were absent without leave or failing to follow a supervisor’s instructions. These kinds of accusations have increased during the last 10 years.

Criminal misconduct made up about 14% of allegations lodged in the last decade, allegations of physical and sexual abuse such as those at FCI Dublin, which have resulted in seven convictions so far. But, as of last February, the BOP had more than 12,000 employee misconduct cases awaiting investigation or discipline.

The GAO report noted that the BOP had hired more investigators and taken other steps to reduce the number of open cases. However, the Report found, the BOP “continues to miss its own goals for reducing the backlog of cases and doesn’t have a plan for meeting those goals.”

Bureau officials told GAO that the longer a misconduct case drags on, the more difficult it is to hold employees accountable. As time passes, the employee who is the subject of the complaint “may not remember the details of the incident when investigators question them. Or the employee might leave the bureau before being disciplined.” About 37% of the 12,153 cases open as of February 2025, had been unresolved for three years or longer.

The Report also found that while the BOP collects data on employee misconduct and compares the information from year to year, it doesn’t track misconduct trends across longer periods. “This means the Bureau is missing opportunities to identify trends and address them,” the GAO said.  Also, while the BOP trains employees to prevent misconduct, it doesn’t use their feedback to evaluate the training’s effectiveness.

The BOP was once again on the GAO’s High Risk List for 2025 because of crumbling facilities and threats to prison safety posed by understaffing (which, last week’s Report notes, “can exacerbate employee misconduct. To ensure that incarcerated people are treated humanely and keep its facilities secure, the bureau needs to address these issues and improve its approach to holding employees accountable.”

The Wall Street Journal last week argued that the BOP’s decertification of the 30,000-member employees’ union will help with misconduct allegations. The Journal said, “One of the strongest arguments against prison-guard unions is their role in shielding abusive officers from discipline. In some cases, the unions have ‘frustrated and undermined accountability,’ David Fathi, director of the American Civil Liberties Union National Prison Project, has said.”

After the FCI Dublin sexual abuse scandal, both prisoners and staff said union interference delayed corrective action. Seven of eight corrections officers charged with sex abuse crimes pled guilty or were convicted by juries, according to news reports. At the trial of the eighth officer, the local union president testified that the union abhorred “dirty officers” but claimed the defendant – Darnell “Dirty Dick” Smith, who was charged with 15 sex crimes against women inmates – was accused in retaliation by prison managers for speaking up about their alleged misconduct.

At USP Thomson in 2022, union resistance thwarted a new warden’s plan to fire violent officers. In January 2023, the union called for the warden to be canned for failing “to address the rampant sexual assault and misconduct of employees by inmates.” Some correctional officers tried to persuade inmates to assault the warden.

One BOP inmate told The Marshall Project earlier this year: “On a day-to-day basis, the union is a threat to the well-being of most inmates. It’s what guarantees that the officer who beats you will get away with it.”

Writing in Forbes last week, Walter Pavlo said, “Employee misconduct in federal prisons has consequences that ripple far beyond the individuals directly involved. For incarcerated people, misconduct can lead to harm, abuse, and violations of their basic rights. For staff, it can create a work environment where trust erodes and morale declines. The BOP has consistently ranked last in employee satisfaction, and the recent demise of their union has, for the moment, been troubling for many frontline staff. For the institution as a whole, unresolved allegations undermine legitimacy and weaken public confidence in the system. Legal and financial risks also rise, as cases of abuse or negligence can result in costly lawsuits and federal scrutiny.”

GAO, Bureau of Prisons: Strategic Approach Needed to Prevent and Address Employee Misconduct (GAO-25-107339, September 29, 2025)

Wall Street Journal, Trump Fires the Prison-Guard Union (October 4, 2025)

Forbes, Study Critical Of Bureau Of Prisons Investigating Misconduct (October 1, 2025)

GAO, High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness (GAO-25-107743, February 25, 2025)

KTVU-TV, Former FCI Dublin officer charged with sex abuse provides witness list (September 10, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

Supremes Kick Off New Court Year With Four Criminal Cases – Update for Monday, October 6, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BUSY CRIMINAL MONTH AHEAD AT SUPREME COURT

Today’s the first Monday in October, and you know what that means.

The Supreme Court has already scheduled 15 criminal law and related cases during the 9-month term that opens today. While none was added at last week’s “long conference,” the term kicks off with oral argument on two criminal cases this week and another two next week, what SCOTUSBlog called “bookend[s to] the two weeks of oral argument referred to as the ‘October sitting.’”

In Villarreal v. Texas, to be argued today, the Court will consider whether a defendant’s 6th Amendment right to counsel is violated when the judge prohibits the defendant and his lawyer from discussing the defendant’s testimony during an overnight recess that occurs while the defendant is on the stand.

In Barrett v. United States, to be argued tomorrow, the defendant was convicted of an 18 USC § 924(c) offense and a § 924(j) offense (which is a § 924(c) offense in which death results). The 2nd Circuit had allowed the defendant to receive separate cumulative sentences totaling 30 years for the two convictions based on the same robbery-killing. The issue is whether the constitutional ban on double jeopardy prohibits sentencing a defendant for both offenses arising from the same event.

Ellingburg v. United States, which asks whether mandatory restitution constitutes criminal punishment such that the Constitution’s ex post facto clause would prohibit it, will be argued October 14.

Finally, Case v. Montana, to be argued Wednesday, October 15, asks whether a probable cause standard governs warrantless home entries in non-criminal “emergency aid” situations, or if a lower “reasonable suspicion” standard suffices. Here, the police had some reason to believe defendant Case might die by suicide, which the parties assume would allow an emergency entry, but also some reason to think that Case was not in danger. The Montana Supreme Court split 4-3 on whether just a suspicion that emergency aid is really needed –  rather than the higher “probable cause” standard – should be required for police to enter.

SCOTUSBlog, Upcoming criminal law arguments, and putting faith in life tenure (October 3, 2025)

Villarreal v. Texas, Case 24-557, to be argued October 6

Barrett v. United States, Case 24-5774, to be argued October 7

Ellingburg v. United States, Case 24-482, to be argued October 14

Case v. Montana, Case 24-624, to be argued October 15

 

~ Thomas L. Root