Tag Archives: compassionate release

Von Vader’s Back Raising Compassionate Release Issue at SCOTUS – Update for October 21, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CERT PETITION TAKES AIM AT COMPASSIONATE RELEASE CIRCUIT SPLIT

vader231020Last winter, I wrote about Wolfgang Von Vader, who had both a 2000 conviction in the Western District of Wisconsin for distributing meth (a “career offender” 270-month sentence) and a 2012 federal conviction in Kansas for possessing heroin in prison (a 120-month consecutive sentence).

Wolfgang applied for 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release in both Kansas and Wisconsin. The Wisconsin case, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, was reversed by the 7th Circuit and remanded last winter. In the Kansas case, however, his compassionate release motion was denied outright.

Wolfgang’s case should have been resentenced because of Johnson v. United States and Mathis v. United States, but when a multi-agency task force reviewed cases of prisoners qualifying for a 28 USC § 2255 motion to get him the lower sentence, Wolfgang got skipped. It was an accident. As his petition for cert put it, “extraordinary and compelling” describes his circumstances.

oops170417The 10th Circuit, however, held that the district court could not consider the change in the law brought about by Johnson and Mathis in determining whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranted a sentence reduction. Such reasons, the Circuit reasoned, are limited only to “new facts about an inmate’s health or family status, or an equivalent post-conviction development” and that any “legal contention” is categorically outside of § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s scope.

Wolfgang has filed for Supreme Court review, with his petition filed by a partner in the Supreme Court/appellate practice group at McDermott Will and Emery, a 1,400-lawyer global firm. In his petition, Wolfgang noted that the 10th’s holding is at odds with other circuits on an issue on which the 7th Circuit has specifically asked the Supremes to hear.

scotus161130The effectiveness of the amended Guideline 1B1.13 in a little less than two weeks will help a lot of people, but it will not resolve whether a judge can consider a change in the law that makes a prisoner innocent of the offense or, at least, the sentence. With the Supreme Court slamming the door on using 28 USC § 2241 petitions to address changes in statutory interpretation (Jones v. Hendrix last June), the Von Vader cert question is an important one to a lot of people.

Von Vader v. United States, Case No 23-354 (petition for certiorari filed September 29, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

First Step’s Coming Birthday Reason for Hagiography – Update for October 19, 2023

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FIRST STEP ACT TURNS FIVE YEARS OLD

Cake201130The anniversary is still 63 days away, but a couple of early hagiographic articles on the First Step Act’s 5th birthday are already being posted.

The Crime Report said last week that First Step “now allows federal inmates to significantly reduce their actual penal custody time. That fits into the primary goal of The Act, which is to reduce recidivism among nonviolent offenders through greater emphasis on rehabilitation in the Bureau of Prisons.”

The philanthropy Arnold Ventures interviewed Colleen P. Eren, Ph.D., author of a new book, Reform Nation: The First Step Act and the Movement to End Mass Incarceration. She noted that “33,000 people have been released from federal prison so far under the First Step Act, according to FAMM. The recidivism rate for those people is 12.4% compared to a rate of around 43% for others exiting federal prison. The First Step Act made President Obama’s Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive, resulting in the release of around 4,000 people who were sitting in prison under the 1987 crack cocaine sentencing disparity. It also made it easier to get compassionate release, and a total of 4,500 people have been released under that change.”

compromise180614First Step was far from perfect, but Dr. Eren says that’s more of a feature than a bug. “The First Step Act is an example of people not letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. There were differences to negotiate between conservative reformists and progressive reformists. Conservatives think that the incarceration system went too far but that it’s not fundamentally flawed… Left-leaning organizations refused to give their support until sentencing reform was included, which was significant… The left had to accept the PATTERN risk assessment – They said it was racist, reinforced existing disparities, and didn’t go far enough toward ending mass incarceration. It was a classic reform-versus-revolution tension.”

Five years into the Act, the BOP has yet to work out properly accounting for FSA credits and placing prisoners with credits in halfway house and home confinement appropriately. But as frustrating as the implementation of First Step has been, life before the Act passed was much bleaker.

The Crime Report, The First Step Act: A Five-Year Review and the Path Forward (October 10, 2023)

Arnold Ventures, Historic Bipartisan Justice Reform Turns Five (October 6, 2023)

Colleen Eren, Reform Nation: The First Step Act and the Movement to End Mass Incarceration (Stanford Univ Press, Sep 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Compassionate Release Denial Too Short on Detail, 5th Circuit Says – Update for September 6, 2023

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5th CIRCUIT SAYS ‘HELP US OUT A LITTLE HERE’ ON COMPASSIONATE RELEASE DENIAL

stanford230904When Allen Stanford, one of America’s leading fraudsters, applied for compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) for a third time, his district court was tiring of him just a bit. The judge denied Allen’s latest attempt at a legal jailbreak  with a terse denial: “[H]aving considered the motion and the applicable law, the Court determines that the foregoing motion should be denied.”

In an August 17 order, the 5th Circuit wanted to give the judge the benefit of the doubt. “[T]he same district judge has ably presided over every chapter of the Stanford saga, and has previously found that Stanford ‘perpetrated one of the most egregious criminal frauds ever presented to a trial jury in federal court’,” the Circuit said, suggesting the district judge probably made a bulletproof decision in denying Allen’s motion and telling him to work toward his release date on March 31, 2103, a mere 79-1/2 years from now.

Nevertheless, the process matters, the 5th seemed to say:

puzzled201223[T]he district court’s order does not tell us that the court based its decision on the § 3553(a) factors. It states only that the court ‘considered [Stanford’s] motion and the applicable law’ and determined that the motion should be denied. We therefore have no reliable indication of the reason for the court’s decision to deny relief. We do not know whether the court denied Stanford’s motion because it concluded—despite new arguments and allegedly new facts—that the § 3553(a) factors still do not warrant early release, or because it concluded that Stanford’s situation is insufficiently ‘extraordinary and compelling,’ or both… Stanford’s third compassionate-release motion may have little chance of success. But judges have an obligation to say enough that the public can be confident that cases are decided in a reasoned way.

The Circuit remanded the case “for the district court to explain its reasons for denial.”

United States v. Stanford, Case No. 22-20388, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 21624 (5th Cir. August 17, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

“Hold My Beer,” 4th Circuit Says in Compassionate Release Case – Update for August 18, 2023

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APPEALS COURT TAKES GRANT OF COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MOTION INTO ITS OWN HANDS

Appellate courts are usually much more circumspect in reversing trial courts, vacating a decision but not explicitly directing the district judge how to decide things on remand.

holdmybeer230818Not that the savvy district judge doesn’t read between the lines. An appellate court vacatur with a suggestion – often implicit – that the district court needs to think about the case differently usually leads to a different ruling the second time around.

Not always. When Kelvin Brown was convicted of drug trafficking nine years ago, the jury also found him guilty of two 18 USC § 924(c) counts as well. Back then, the first § 924(c) carried a mandatory minimum sentence starting at five years. The second conviction – even if it resulted from events the next day – required an additional mandatory minimum of 25 years. The district court thus sentenced Kelvin to 30 years in prison for his two § 924(c) convictions and stacked another 27 years on him for the various drug offenses.

Six years later, during the height of the COVID crisis, Kelvin moved for compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A). The judge turned him down flat without even asking the government to respond. Kelvin appealed, and the 4th Circuit remanded, directing the district court to consider the fact that Kelvin got 20 more years for the gun than he would have had to get after the First Step Act passed in 2018 in light of the Circuit’s decision in United States v. McCoy.

extraordinary220719The district court denied Kelvin a second time in December 2021, again neglecting to address the whopping § 924(c) sentences despite (as the 4th Circuit put it) “our express recognition in our previous remand order that McCoy – and its holding that disparate § 924(c) sentences can constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release – is relevant to this case.”

Two days ago, the 4th Circuit threw up its hands and told the district judge to watch how it’s done. The 4th cut Kelvin’s sentence by 20 years (which still leaves him with 37 years to do), both expressing its frustration and apologizing for its interference:

We hold that the district court abused its discretion by denying Brown’s motion because his disparate sentence creates an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for his early release, and the § 3553(a) sentencing factors overwhelmingly favor a sentence reduction. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to rectify that disparity and reduce Brown’s prison sentence by twenty years.

Ordinarily, we understand that district courts wield broad discretion in deciding compassionate release motions… So, in a different case, we might remedy the district court’s error by remanding for the district court to consider Brown’s disparate sentence in the first instance. Yet the district court here has already had two opportunities to review Brown’s compassionate release motion: its initial denial of Brown’s motion in July 2020, and its second denial in December 2021 after we remanded Brown’s case for further consideration. Each time, the district court neglected to address Brown’s disparate sentence.

The Circuit also found that Kelvin’s disparate sentence strongly affects the 18 USC § 3553(a) sentencing factors: “The First Step Act‘s amendment to § 924(c) reflects Congress’s judgment that sentences like Brown’s are dramatically longer than necessary or fair,” the appeals court said, “and, in turn, are not necessary to serve the ends of § 3553(a)(2).”

dungeon180627Notable in the 4th’s analysis is its holding that the need for Kelvin’s longer sentence has been called into question because COVID-19 created hardship in prison life “not contemplated by the original sentencing court” and that those hardships have “undoubtedly increased his prison sentence’s punitive effect.” The Circuit observed that Kelvin’s facility was placed on lockdown in response to the pandemic, during which he was “confined to his cell for 22.5 hours a day,” and the recreation areas were closed.” The majority opinion said, “Even if those factors have been mitigated by the evolving circumstances of the pandemic, that they plagued Brown at any point has made his incarceration harsher and more punitive than would otherwise have been the case… Therefore, Brown’s drastic sentence, which might have been ‘sufficient but not greater than necessary’ before the coronavirus pandemic, may no longer be justified.”

The opinion also emphasizes that Kelvin’s “one disciplinary infraction throughout his incarceration—a fact the district court also failed to mention—casts further doubt on the court’s concern for the safety of the community. And while the court did briefly consider Brown’s rehabilitative efforts” – which included a stack of programming and mentoring work to his credit – “it failed to weigh how those efforts ameliorate any risk posed to Brown’s community upon his release.” Citing Pepper v. United States, the Circuit ruled that such “postsentencing rehabilitation minimizes the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and provides the most up-to-date picture of Brown’s history and characteristics, which also favors a sentence reduction.”

illdoitmyself230818The 2-1 opinion is remarkable not only for the fact that an appellate court took the unusual step of granting a compassionate release motion itself but because of the reliance on the harshness of Bureau of Prisons conditions during the pandemic and the elevation of post-sentencing conduct as a factor in § 3553(a) analysis in reaching its decision.

United States v. Brown, Case No. 21-7752, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 21403, at *24-25 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 2023)

United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020)

Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011)

– Thomas L. Root

‘Patience, Patience’ on Guidelines Changes, DC Circuit Says – Update for August 4, 2023

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DC CIRCUIT IS NOT AN EARLY ADOPTER OF NEW COMPASSIONATE RELEASE STANDARDS

Louis Wilson – convicted 26 years ago of several counts, including killing a federal witness – filed for compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), seeking to cut his life sentence to time served.

Louie argued that the extraordinary and compelling reasons supporting his compassionate release motion included (1) if United States v. Booker and Apprendi v. New Jersey had been decided prior to his sentence, he would have gotten 25 years instead of life because the district court considered additional facts during sentencing not proven to a jury; (2) the national murder sentencing statistics have “trended downward;” and (3) his medical conditions plus his exemplary prison citizenship supported compassionate release.

patience230804Louie argued that the purported intervening changes in law went to his length of time served and should constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons. The district court concluded, however, that time served in prison “does not in and of itself constitute an extraordinary and compelling circumstance.” After considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court denied Louie’s motion.

Last week, the D.C. Circuit denied Louie’s appeal.

Under D.C. Circuit precedent in United States v. Jenkins, change in law arguments cannot be extraordinary and compelling reasons supporting compassionate release. But, Louie argued, since the D.C. Circuit decided Jenkins, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines (to be effective November 1st absent Congressional veto) regarding what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. The proposed guidelines state that district courts may consider a “change in the law” to ‘determine whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason’ for release if he has “served at least 10 years [of] an unusually long sentence.”

Without explanation, the Circuit refused to “decide whether Wilson’s contentions would constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons under the not-yet-effective guidelines.”

The lesson is that no one should expect a Circuit to do now what its precedent says it cannot do. Wait until November.

United States v. Wilson, Case No. 21-3074, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 18608 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

A Compassionate Release Math Lesson – Update for June 15, 2023

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3582 ≠ 2255, 6TH CIRCUIT SAYS

Most of the time, unsavory houseguests nick a towel from the bathroom or a spoon from the silver. Not Lennie Day. While staying at Roy West’s Akron, Ohio, house (the decision says he was “hiding out”), Lennie stole $300,000 in cash and jewelry, a .40-caliber gun, and car keys.

houseguest230615If this had been an Airbnb rental, Lennie would have gotten a flaming’ bad review.

Roy, appalled at Lennie’s poor manners, felt that he should confront his erstwhile guest and upbraid him for his rudeness. So Roy organized a posse of friends, led them to Detroit, and asked them to locate Lennie
so that he could express his unhappiness directly to Lennie. He didn’t find him, but later, Lennie passed away after being perforated by several bullets. Sadly, Roy never got to tell Lennie what a faux pas his guest had committed…

In 2014, Roy was convicted for his participation in what the government labeled a murder-for-hire conspiracy targeting Lennie. He was sentenced to life in prison. His direct appeal and a post-conviction motion under 28 USC § 2255 failed.

Eight years later, Roy sought compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argued that extraordinary and compelling reasons for the reduction included his risk of catching COVID, his rehabilitation, and – raising it for the first time – that his sentence violated Apprendi v New Jersey, a 2000 Supreme Court decision holding that any statutory sentencing enhancement had to be supported by a jury finding the facts supporting the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt.

Roy claimed that the jury instructions given at his trial did not require the jury to find that death resulted from the conspiracy – a necessary finding for the court to impose a life sentence for the crime.

The district court didn’t bite on the medical risk for COVID, but it did find that the Apprendi error and Roy’s rehabilitation constituted “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to reduce his sentence. It reduced Roy’s sentence to 17 years and cut him loose.

Last week, the 6th Circuit reversed, agreeing with the government that Roy’s § 3582 motion was really a second or successive § 2255 motion in mufti.

mufti230615The Circuit assumed the district court was right that “a harmful Apprendi violation occurred.” That doesn’t matter, the Circuit said, because “compassionate release cannot ‘provide an end run around habeas.’ The § 2255 procedure “provides a specific, comprehensive statutory scheme for post-conviction relief” and therefore, the 6th ruled, “any attempt to attack a prisoner’s sentence or conviction must abide by its procedural strictures.”

Once a prisoner has already filed and appealed the denial of a § 2255 motion (as Roy had already done), “relief cannot be obtained in a successive § 2255 motion unless new evidence or a new rule of constitutional law is announced,” the Circuit held. Roy “cannot avoid these restrictions on post-conviction relief by resorting to a request for compassionate release instead.”

Of course, because Apprendi predated Roy’s conviction and – for whatever reason – the error was not raised in his self-written § 2255, there is no way he will be allowed a second § 2255. Roy will just have to do his sentence. For the rest of his natural life.

United States v. West, Case No. 22-2037, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 14424 (6th Cir. June 9, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

‘Hey, Abuse Victims, We Didn’t Really Mean It’ – Update for May 11, 2023

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SERIOUS STEPS TAKEN TO ADDRESS FEMALE PRISONER ABUSE

justkidding230511Just kidding. Last week, a BOP contractor employee monitoring home confinement inmates who sexually abused a Miami woman on house arrest got a prison sentence one month shorter than his victim’s time on house arrest.

Miami-Dade resident Benito Montes de Oca Cruz, 60, got a 4-month prison sentence for one count of abusive sexual contact, followed by a year of supervised release, four months of which will be on home confinement. His victim was on five months of house arrest at the end of her 51-month sentence when he committed “abusive sexual contact” on her.

Remember when DOJ official Lisa Monaco said that women prisoners who suffered sexual abuse at the hands of BOP employees would be recommended for compassionate release due to their treatment? She was kidding, too. One FCI Dublin victim was denied a compassionate release recommendation last fall, the BOP telling her “that the officers’ cases have not yet been ‘adjudicated…’ [Her attorney] said that prison officials told her to refile her motion, most likely once all the officers are charged or sentenced.”

The inmate has under a third of her sentence to serve – under three years – so the BOP’s “come back next week” directive should run out the clock on her request right smartly.

Sadly, this would be true even if she were doing a life term. One of the abusive COs, aptly if disgustedly known as ‘Dirty Dick,” committed suicide after he learned that he was under investigation for abusing women, according to the woman’s lawyer. “So unless they are planning to do a final adjudication… there will never she will never be able to meet the Bureau of Prisons’ standard.”

Maybe Satan can convene a grand jury somewhere in the fires of hell… 

beatings230511Of course, this begs the question of why the BOP and DOJ themselves cannot turn their considerable investigative powers to determine whether the abuse happened.  The BOP has its own investigative office, the SIS (which stands for “Special Investigative Supervisor”). The DOJ has an inspector general office. To be sure, the BOP doesn’t need to get a criminal conviction against a BOP employee to recommend compassionate release for an inmate victim, either.  But showing any initiative might hurt BOP employee morale by suggesting that abusing inmates was not a perk of working at the BOP.

And after all, how many other sordid tales about ‘Dirty Dick’ would be enough to corroborate that he was a s abuser? E. Jean Carroll only required two…

Last week, the female prisoner filed for compassionate release with her sentencing judge, seeking a sentencing reduction of about 34 and a half months of her 120-month sentence.

Miami Herald, A Bureau of Prisons monitor gets his sentence. He raped a Miami woman on house arrest (April 30, 2023)

KTVU, Dublin prison sex assault survivor seeks compassionate release after BOP denies (May 5, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Rely on USSC Guidance… Or Not, 7th Circuit Says – Update for April 18, 2023

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THAT WAS THEN, THIS IS NOW

Remember when the 7th Circuit ruled that old Guideline 1B1.13 – that rather rigidly defined what constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for sentence reduction under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) – did not apply to inmate-filed compassionate release  motions?

The Circuit ruled in the 2020 United States v. Gunn decision that while 1B1.13 did not apply, the result was not a “sort of Wild West in court, with every district judge having an idiosyncratic release policy.” This was because “the substantive aspects of the Sentencing Commission’s analysis in 1B1.13 and its Application Notes provide a working definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’… the Commission’s analysis can guide discretion without being conclusive.”

wildwest230418Well, apparently, it guides until it doesn’t guide. And “doesn’t” happened last week, when the 7th ruled that a prisoner’s “unconstitutionally-imposed mandatory life sentence” from a 2001 case cannot be a part of the “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for a compassionate release despite the fact that a week before the opinion was issued, the Commission formally proposed amending 1B1.13 to include harsh sentences that no longer could be imposed due to a change in the law.

Suddenly, the Commission’s analysis provides no meaningful guidance to the Circuit at all:

The USSC is in the process of studying the issue, and recently it has proposed defining ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ to include circumstances in which ‘[t]he defendant is serving a sentence that is inequitable in light of changes in the law.’ But this effort is still at an early stage—so early that we see no value in speculating on what such a change would mean. Until the Commission definitively says otherwise, we will not deviate from our current understanding. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

The opinion cited the draft USSC proposal from January and not the Commission’s April 5th action released eight days before the Circuit’s opinion was handed down. A reasonable observer could conclude that “the Commission [has] definitively [said] otherwise” at this point:

[T]he proposed amendment would add a new category (“Unusually Long Sentences”) providing that if a defendant received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant’s individualized circumstances.

One can only hope that the prisoner’s attorney seeks rehearing of a decision that reflects much more sloppiness than one should expect from an appellate court.

United States v. Williams, Case No. 22-1212, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 8826 (7th Cir., April 13, 2023)

United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020)

U.S. Sentencing Commission, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (Preliminary) (April 5, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Guideline Amendments Adopted in Contentious USSG Love-fest – Update for April 6, 2023

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SENTENCING COMMISSION ADOPTS AMENDMENTS

USSC170511The U.S. Sentencing Commission yesterday adopted proposed amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for the first time in five years, with the new “compassionate release” guidelines consuming much of the meeting and generating sharp (but collegial) disagreement.

The “compassionate release” Guideline, USSG § 1B1.13, was approved on a 4-3 vote. It updates and expands the criteria for what can qualify as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to grant compassionate release – the language in 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) – and it will give judges both more discretion and more guidance to determine when a sentence reduction is warranted.

The new categories that could make an inmate eligible for compassionate release include

• if the prisoner is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or specialized medical care not being provided by the BOP and without which he or she is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.

• if the prisoner is housed at a prison affected or at imminent risk of being affected by (an ongoing outbreak of infectious disease or an ongoing public health emergency declared by the appropriate federal, state, or local authority, and due to personal health risk factors and custodial status, he or she is at increased risk of suffering “severe medical complications or death as a result of exposure” to the outbreak.

• if the prisoner’s parent is incapacitated and the prisoner would be the only available caregiver.

• if the prisoner establishes that similar family circumstances exist involving any other immediate family member or someone whose relationship with the prisoner is similar in kind to that of an immediate family member when the prisoner would be the only available caregiver.

• if the prisoner becomes the victim of sexual assault by a corrections officer.

• if a prisoner received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, changes in the law (other than to the Guidelines) may be considered in determining whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed.

The amendments also provide that while rehabilitation is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason, it may be considered in combination with other circumstances.

compassion160208Three of the seven-member Commission disagreed sharply with the “unusually long sentence” amendment. Commissioner Candice C. Wong said, “Today’s amendment allows compassionate release to be the vehicle for applying retroactively the very reductions that Congress has said by statute should not apply retroactively.”

Commissioner Claira Boom Horn, who is a sitting US District Court Judge in Kentucky, observed that “nothing in the First Step Act – literally nothing, not text, not legislative history – indicates any intention on Congress’s part to expand the substantive criteria for granting compassionate release, much less to fundamentally change the nature of compassionate release to encompass for the first time factors other than the defendant’s personal or family circumstances. The Supreme Court tells us that Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes and it did not do so here.”

Commissioner Claire McCusker Murray said, “The seismic expansion of compassionate release promulgated today not only saddles judges with the task of interpreting a free will catch-all but also ensures a flood of motions, a flood that will then repeat anytime there is a nonretroactive change in the law. For the past several years, while the Commission lacked a quorum to implement the First Step Act, the country has experienced a natural experiment in what happens when judges have no operative guidance as to the criteria they should apply in deciding release motions. The result has been widespread disparities. In Fiscal Year 2022, for example, the most generous circuit granted 35% of compassionate release motions, the most cautious granted only 2.5%. The disparities within circuits and even within courthouses were often just as stark. We fear that with today’s dramatic vague and ultimately unlawful expansion of compassionate release that we… will expect far more of the same.”

Commissioner John Gleeson, a retired US District Court judge and Wall Street law firm partner, disagreed: “[The amendment’s] common sense guidance is fully consistent with separation of powers principles, our authority as the Sentencing Commission, and with the First Step Act. Most importantly, it will ensure that § 3582(c)(1)(A) of Title 18 of the United States Code serves one of the purposes Congress explicitly intended it to serve when that law is enacted almost 40 years ago: to provide a needed transparent judicial second look at unusually long sentences that in fairness should be reduced.”

noteasycongress221212Congress may veto one or more of the Guidelines proposals between now and November 1, 2023. That has only once before, when Congress voted down a guideline lessening the crack/cocaine disparity in 2005. Congress is pretty busy, and both the Senate and House are pretty evenly split politically, but the extent of the disagreement at the Commission gives cause for concern. If Congress does veto, it is unclear whether would focus solely on the “unusually long sentence” subsection of new § 1B1.13, or whether the entire amended Guideline would be jettisoned.

In other action, the Commission had been considering an amendment that prohibited courts from imposing longer sentences based on alleged crimes of which a defendant had been acquitted. Commission Chairman Carleton Reeves, a federal district judge from the Southern District of Mississippi, said the Commission needs more time before making a final determination on the issue.

Reuters reported that Michael P. Heiskell, President-Elect of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, said he was disappointed by the delay. “Permitting people to be sentenced based on conduct for which a jury has acquitted them is fundamentally unfair because it eviscerates the constitutional right to trial and disrespects the jury’s role,” he said in a statement.

However, the Commission’s delay may rejuvenate the McClinton v. United States petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court has been sitting on at the suggestion of the Dept of Justice, awaiting Sentencing Commission action on acquitted conduct. A Supreme Court decision that use of acquitted conduct in sentencing is unconstitutional would benefit many more people than would a prospective Guidelines change.

The USSC also adopted a criminal history amendment that eliminates “status points” (sometimes called “recency points”) – additional criminal history points assessed if the defendant committed the current crime within two years of release for a prior crime – and grants a 2-level downward adjustment to a defendant’s offense level if he or she had zero criminal history points and met other criteria.

The Commission also approved an amendment to criminal history commentary advising judges to treat prior marijuana possession offenses more leniently in the criminal history calculus, making downward adjustments for offenses now seen as lawful by many states.

The proposal doesn’t seek to remove marijuana convictions as a criminal history factor entirely, but it would revise commentary within the guidelines to “include sentences resulting from possession of marihuana offenses as an example of when a downward departure from the defendant’s criminal history may be warranted,” according to a synopsis.

usscretro230406None of the Guidelines changes is retroactive without specific Commission determination that they should be. The USSC yesterday issued a notice that it will consider, pursuant to 18 USC § 3582(c)(2) and 28 USC § 994(u), whether Guidelines changes on “status points” and the “zero criminal history points” adjustment should be retroactive, and ask for public comment on the matter.

Although the Guidelines amendments do not become effective until November, most federal circuits have declared that – while the current § 1B1.13 is not binding on district courts because it is pre-First Step – courts should consider it to express the opinion of an agency expert in sentencing. The amended § 1B1.13 has every bit of the authority that the current non-binding § 1B1.13 has, and it has the additional benefit of being evidence of current Sentencing Commission thought.

USSC, Adopted Amendments (Effective November 1, 2023) (April 5, 2023)

USSC, Issue For Comment On Retroactivity Of Criminal History Amendment (April 5, 2023)

Reuters, U.S. panel votes to expand compassionate release for prisoners (April 5, 2023)

Marijuana Moment, Federal Sentencing Commission Approves New Marijuana Guidelines For Judges To Treat Past Convictions More Leniently (April 5, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

A Mea Culpa and A Chocolate Bunny – Update for March 31, 2023

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EASTER BUNNY DROPS OFF ROTTEN EGGS FOR ME, BUT IT’S THE BOP’S RESPONSE THAT REALLY SMELLS

rotteneggs230331In LISA’s February 28th installment, The Easter Bunny’s Working for the BOP, I noted a New York Times report about the Federal Bureau of Prison’s promise, in the wake of sexual abuse of female inmates by BOP staff at FCI Dublin (California) and elsewhere, to favorably consider bringing sentence reduction motions for victimized inmates.

In one of the first tests of that promise, the Times reported the BOP general counsel denied a compassionate release application filed by a middle-aged female inmate who claimed the sexual abuse she suffered from BOP personnel justified the grant of a sentence reduction.

The Times said that BOP officials familiar with the case privately admitted that they did not dispute her allegations and thought her release would not pose a public safety threat.

Somehow, I made it less than clear that the BOP thought the inmate would not pose a danger to the public. In fact, I dropped the word “not” from the reports, making it seem that the BOP saw her as a danger.

(Don’t bother to look at the old post. I fixed it).

gutenberg230331Back in journalism school (around the time Gutenberg invented the press), I learned that when a defendant was acquitted, one should always write that he or she was “found innocent.” Literally, a jury does not find a defendant innocent, but rather “not guilty.” However, the imprecision was deemed acceptable, because to use the more accurate “not guilty” ran the risk that the word “not” might be dropped in error, opening the newspaper to a libel suit.

I always thought that the risk of that was pretty slim. Now I know better, and I am chagrinned at the error.

I’m embarrassed, but not as much as the BOP should be. What the BOP’s decision on this inmate means is that it had absolutely no reason for denying the inmate’s request that it bring a compassionate release motion on her behalf, except for the BOP’s belief that while she suffered at the hands of BOP employees, her suffering just wasn’t bad enough for the BOP to acknowledge.

So exactly how bad does the abuse have to be before the BOP figures some atonement is called for?

Incidentally, last week former FCI Dublin Warden Ray Garcia was sentenced to 70 months on multiple counts of sexual abuse of female inmates, and Jose Viera, a CO at MDC Los Angeles, got 120 months in federal prison for deprivation of rights under color of law arising from his sexual abuse of a female detainee. BOP Director Colette Peters said last Thursday that “to the victims and all negatively impacted by these offenses, be assured, we will continue our commitment to rooting out this criminal behavior and holding those who violate their oath accountable.”

chocobunny230330The BOP has an interest in locking up employees who sexually abuse inmates. Notably, Director Peters mentioned nothing about any BOP concern for the impact of that conduct on the victims.  After all they’re just inmates.  Or, to use Ms. Peters’s expression, “adults in custody.”

I regret my error in the original story, and I owe the inmate the best pickings from my Easter basket (if I get one). Sadly, if I could give her no more than a couple of jelly beans and a chocolate bunny, it would still be more than she can expect from the BOP.

The New York Times, Justice Dept Struggles to Carry Out Early Release Program for Abused Inmates (February 22, 2023)

DOJ, Former Bureau of Prisons Corrections Officer Sentenced to 10 Years in Federal Prison for Sexually Assaulting Inmate in Los Angeles Jail (March 20, 2023)

BOP, Statement regarding the sentencing of Ray J. Garcia (March 23, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root