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‘Fortunate Sons’ and Clemency In The Trump Era – Update for January 22, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TRUMP PARDONS 13, COMMUTES 8

For those who think that the old can be new again, recall Creedance Clearwater Revival’s 1969 protest song, Fortunate Son, and lay those lyrics next to President Donald Trump’s clemencies granted last week to 13 people (pardons) and 8 people (sentence commutations).

The pardons included five people who had served their sentences years ago, one woman whom Trump had pardoned five years ago for a fraud who was now indicted for a new fraud, and three currently facing a political bribery scandal in Puerto Rico.

The commutations included one mortgage fraud defendant serving 62 months and seven drug cases, two of whom were serving life sentences and four others serving 20 years or more.

One of the commutations went to James Phillip Womack — son of Arkansas Republican Congressman Steve Womack — who was sentenced in May of last year to eight years behind bars after being convicted of methamphetamine distribution.

The clemencies garnering the most reporting were pardons of Puerto Rico’s former governor, Wanda Vázquez Garced, who pled guilty last year in a federal public corruption case, and her two co-defendants, her aide Mark Rossini and billionaire Venezuelan-Italian banker Julio Martin Herrera Velutini.

Herrera Velutini’s daughter, Isabel Herrera, donated $2.5 million in December 2024 and $1 million last July to the pro-Trump political action committee MAGA Inc., according to public records. A White House official told CBS News that the donations had nothing to do with the pardon.

In a related story, the Washington Post reported yesterday that the pardoned January 6th defendants are demanding return of restitution payments paid as part of their criminal sentences. A judge ruling on a demand of one of them, Yvonne St. Cyr (who served half of her 30-month sentence before being pardoned), said in an order returning her $2,270.00), “Sometimes a judge is called upon to do what the law requires, even if it may seem at odds with what justice or one’s initial instincts might warrant. This is one such occasion.”

The Post said, “The ruling revealed an overlooked consequence of Trump’s pardon for some Jan. 6 offenders: Not only did it free them from prison but it emboldened them to demand payback from the government. At least eight Jan. 6 defendants are pursuing refunds of the financial penalties paid as part of their sentences, according to a Post review of court records… Others are filing civil lawsuits against the government seeking millions of dollars, alleging politically tainted prosecutions and violations of their constitutional rights. Hundreds more have filed claims accusing the Justice Department, the FBI and other law enforcement agencies of inflicting property damage and personal injuries, according to their lawyer.”

Washington Monthly observed last week that

It is safe to say that Trump’s abuse of the pardon power has no parallel in American history. Almost every president has granted a few that seem dodgy in retrospect; many have used them as an instrument of partisan politics; a few have used them as instruments of corruption. But in extent and scale, Trump’s pardons fall well below the subterranean ethical floor established even over the past 50 years. In pardoning 1,500 rioters convicted of involvement in the January 6 insurrection, Trump showed contempt for the law enforcement officers who protected the Capitol, and the system of government they preserved. His other pardons, from crypto fraudsters to foreign drug lords, reek with contempt for the very idea of law. Trump is also the first president to claim the power to undo a predecessor’s pardons, and the first to claim the power to pardon an offender convicted by a state, not the federal government. 

DOJ, Pardon and Commutations (January 15, 2026)

CBS, Trump Pardons Puerto Rico’s former governor Wanda Vázquez (January 16, 2026)

KATV, Trump commutes prison sentence of congressman’s son convicted in federal drug case (January 17, 2026)

Washington Post, They ransacked the U.S. Capitol and want the government to pay them back (January 20, 2026)

Washington Monthly, Amnesty Transactional (January 14, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

4th Circuit Restricts FSA Credit Eligibility – Update for January 20, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

4TH CIRCUIT HANDS DOWN TROUBLING FSA CREDIT DECISION

From the 4th Circuit last week came the first appellate decision on First Step Act credit eligibility, a 2-1 decision that is as dangerous as it is superficial.

William White is locked up until 2037, but he was actively earning FSA credits at a West Coast Bureau of Prisons facility. When he was transferred to a facility on the East Coast, Bill spent a few days in transit at FTC Oklahoma City. After arriving at his destination joint, he found that he had been denied three days of programming credit while he was at the FTC because he was in transfer status. He filed a 28 USC § 2241 petition for habeas corpus, arguing that he had been denied due process by having his incarceration unlawfully extended.

The district court denied Bill’s petition, ruling that denial of FSA time credits for the three-day transit period was consistent with the BOP’s regulations and policy statement. The district court explained that an eligible prisoner in transit (such as Bill) generally “are not ‘successfully participating’ in [recidivism reduction programs] and accordingly they are not able to accrue [FSA time credits].” Bill appealed.

Last week, the 4th Circuit upheld the District Court’s denial of Bill’s petition . The appeals court held that

[t]he FSA provides that “[a] prisoner… who successfully completes evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities, shall earn time credits” based on time participating in such programming.  Because White does not claim that he participated in such programming or activities during the three days he was in transit, he cannot claim that he “earned” FSA time credits… Moreover, White’s argument that the BOP should have offered him such programming during his transfer so that he could have earned the FSA time credits cannot, even if successful, lead to a ruling awarding him such credits because he still would not have shown that he had earned them by actually participating in the programming, as required by the FSA.

The opinion is concerning for a reason that goes well beyond the lost three days. Bill contended that he should have gotten the credit because he had “opted” into FSA programming but was not actually participated in a program at that time. The BOP bases the award of FSA time credits on a prisoner’s “earning status” – that is, his or her willingness to participate in programming even if the programming has a waiting list or is just plain unavailable. The 4th expressed skepticism that this program was consistent with the First Step Act. The Circuit observed:

Although the BOP’s program statements and practice about this approach are neither clear nor consistent, we conclude that if they reflect that the BOP awards credits for non-participation, that practice goes beyond the text of the FSA and its regulations. But more importantly, the BOP’s decision to award credits absent actual participation does not expand its statutory obligations under the FSA. The law remains clear that a prisoner’s statutory right to FSA time credits is tied to his actual participation in qualified programming. And in the absence of evidence that White participated in programming during his three-day stay at the Transfer Center, the BOP did not have a statutory obligation to award him FSA time credits for those days.

Beyond that, the 4th concluded that the FSA time credit program does not create a protected liberty interest for prisoners, an interest which must exist in order for a prisoner to successfully maintain a § 2241 habeas corpus. The Circuit ruled that “because the text of the FSA does not create a statutory entitlement for a prisoner to earn FSA time credits, we conclude that White did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in earning them, and the BOP therefore did not violate his rights under the Due Process Clause in denying them to him.”

In a detailed and biting dissent, Judge Robert King complained that “under the majority’s decision, the BOP is excused, without clear limitations, from providing programming to prisoners every day; the BOP can award FSA time credits to some prisoners based on their mere “earning status,” but require actual participation of others; prisoners who claim a wrongful denial of programming can seek only future programming; and no back credits can be awarded unless a prisoner can come up with evidence of actual participation, something that, on this record, the BOP itself does not track. As such, the majority does not just flout the plain text of the FSA and the BOP’s policies and practices. Its decision also threatens chaos, unequal treatment, and other unfairness in the FSA time credit system.”

White v. Warden, Case No. 23-7116, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 793 (4th Cir. January 13, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

5th Circuit Knows Improper Delegation of Authority to Probation Officer When It Sees It – Update for January 16, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

5th CIRCUIT SAYS IMPROPER DELEGATION OF COURT’S AUTHORITY “DEPENDS”

About 15 years ago, Brent Dubois got 151 months in federal prison for a drug trafficking offense. When he was released, he began a three-year term of supervised release, one condition of which was that he participate in a substance abuse program. The court authorized Brent’s probation officer to decide whether the program would be inpatient or outpatient.

The PO put him in an outpatient substance abuse program, but Brent turned out to be less than a model student. Almost immediately, he had difficulty staying enrolled, leading to several supervised release revocation petitions and different substance abuse programs.

The court tried in vain to adjust his conditions to foster success. When Brent’s probation officer filed a fourth petition for revocation in late 2024, Brent admitted that he had quit his latest substance abuse program and was using methamphetamine. The district court reluctantly sentenced him to ten months in prison followed by 32 months of supervised release, and again ordered that he “participate in a program (inpatient and/or outpatient) approved by the probation office for treatment of narcotic or drug or alcohol dependency…”

On appeal, Brent complained that allowing the probation officer to decide whether his substance abuse program should be inpatient or outpatient was an impermissible delegation of the court’s sentencing authority that violated Brent’s rights.

Last Monday, the 5th Circuit agreed.

A district court must always have “the final say on whether to impose a condition,” the Circuit ruled. While a “probation officer’s authority extends to the modality, intensity, and duration of a treatment condition, it ends when the condition involves a significant deprivation of liberty.” Confinement in an inpatient program implicates “significant liberty interests,” the 5th held, meaning that “the decision to place a defendant in inpatient treatment cannot be characterized as one of the managerial details that may be entrusted to probation officers.”

But there are exceptions. When the prison sentence is short, a sentencing court, with “relative clarity because supervision is to commence relatively soon,” can forecast which kind of treatment – inpatient or outpatient – will better suit a defendant.” While “the precise line dividing permissible and impermissible delegations may be unclear, our opinions conclusively establish (1) ten months is sufficient to show an impermissible delegation and (2) ten years is insufficient to make the same showing.”

Here, Brent’s revocation sentence was only ten months, “a sufficiently short sentence to demonstrate an impermissible delegation.” The Circuit set aside the delegation of authority to the probation officer.

Despite its self-congratulatory claim to having done so, the Circuit strained to harmonize two inconsistent Circuit precedents (Martinez and Medel-Guadalupe, issued the same day). One declared a delegation to decide substance abuse program decisions to the probation office was permissible and the other decided it was not.

The takeaway is that the 5th believes that a deprivation of liberty on supervised release without involvement of the sentencing court isn’t as much of a big deal when the defendant has been in prison for a long time first. The dividing line of what is too short a sentence and too long a sentence isn’t clear, but – like Justice Potter Stewart’s famous explanation of what is obscenity – the sentencing judge is expected to be able to say I “know it when I see it.”

The Supreme Court’s repeated emphasis that supervised release is not punishment but rather an aid to the defendant’s reintegration into the community should make deprivations of liberty on supervised release a bigger deal rather than a lesser one.  Just two months ago, Justice Jackson asked during an oral argument (at page 4) whether

isn’t the whole — the reason why supervised release is sort of fundamentally different than parole or — or probation or imprisonment is because it’s not imposed for punishment. It’s supposed to be about helping this person reintegrate into society…

That suggests that the standard adopted by the 5th Circuit – that is, ‘it depends on how long you’ve been locked up’ – is not very defensible.

United States v. Dubois, Case No. 24-11046, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 831 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026)

Rico v. United States, Case No. 24-1056, Oral Argument Transcript

United States v. Martinez, 987 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2021)

United States v. Medel-Guadalupe, 987 F.3d 424 (5th Cir. 2021)

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964)

~ Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Separates 924(c) and (j) – Update for January 15, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ONE TO A CUSTOMER

Cigarettes are bad for you, whether you’re smoking them or stealing them. Dwayne Barrett found that out too late. But his campaign to stamp out smoking by robbing vendors of their tobacco products led to a Supreme Court decision yesterday on the reach of the federal criminal code’s harsh and unforgiving gun penalty statute.Dwayne and his gang – unimaginatively just called the “Crew” – committed a series of at least eight robberies in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania between August 2011 and January 2012. Their niche was knocking over convenience stores and illegal cigarette vendors, guys who sell untaxed cowboy killers smuggled from southern states at a discount because the merch is untaxed. Such people made good marks for Dwayne and his Crew because the victims can hardly file police reports.

But it’s hard to hide a heist from the authorities when someone gets killed. During one robbery, Dwayne and two other Crew members stuck up three guys selling untaxed cigarettes out of the back of a minivan. Brandishing guns, two of the Crew hijacked the minivan and drove off with one of the victims, Gamar Dafalla, still aboard. Mr. Dafalla surreptitiously threw $10,000 in sales proceeds out of the moving vehicle. Enraged by this, the Crew member shot Mr. Dafalla to death.

Dwayne was following the van in a car, so he wasn’t present when the killing occurred, but he was charged with the robbery, with tried to prevent his merchandise from being stolen.

Dwayne was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy, as well as several 18 USC § 924(c) counts for using guns to commit the robberies (crimes of violence under § 924(c)). In the case of the death of Mr. Dafalla, Dwayne was convicted of both a § 924(c) count – because his co-conspirator was using and carrying a gun during the robbery – and an 18 USC § 924(j) offense (because death resulted from the § 924(c) conduct). Thus, he was convicted under both statutes for the same act, essentially treating the gun use that caused Mr. Dafalla’s death as a basis for two separate convictions.

Dwayne was sentenced to 90 years in prison, later reduced to 50 years. Twenty of those years came from concurrent sentences on three Hobbs Act robbery counts. Twenty-five years came from a consecutive term on the § 924(j) conviction, into which the District Court – believing that § 924(c) and § 924(j) were not separate offenses that could be punished cumulatively – merged into the § 924(c) conviction.

The Second Circuit, however, rejected the District Court’s position that the Double Jeopardy Clause required it to treat § 924(c) and § 924(j) as the same offense. Although the Government regularly concedes that § 924(c) and § 924(j) overlap and may not be punished cumulatively and qualify as the same offense under the governing test laid out in Blockburger v. United States, it convinced the Circuit that the two provisions “are separate offenses for which Congress has clearly authorized cumulative punishments.”

The 5th Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” In the 1932 Blockburger decision, the Supreme Court directed reviewing courts to evaluate whether one criminal statute required proof of any element that another did not.  If no different proof was needed, double jeopardy barred additional prosecution and punishment.

While Congress may pass two different statutes directed at prohibiting the same offense, the Blockburger presumption holds that Congress ordinarily does not intend to do so. This means that courts must find evidence of Congress’s intent before finding that different statutes punish the same crime, and thus that a defendant cannot be charged or punished for violating both under Blockburger.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court sided with Dwayne and the District Court, applying the Blockburger presumption that Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both §§ 924(c) and (j) for a single act that violates both provisions. In other words, one conviction and one sentence for one violation. One to a customer.

Blockburger addresses whether multiple convictions, not just multiple sentences, are allowed by the 5th Amendment. The assumption underlying the Blockburger rule is that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes, where punishment means a criminal conviction and not simply the imposition of sentence.

When enacted, § 924(c) made it a discrete offense to use or carry a firearm in connection with a predicate federal crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. Congress later added § 924(j) to provide a different penalty scheme for § 924(c) violations that cause death. Section 924(j) has no mandatory minimums, the Supreme Court observed, but instead authorized significant maximum sentences – including the death penalty or life in prison – when the underlying violation is murder committed with a gun.

In a unanimous opinion (but for a partial concurrence by Justice Neil Gorsuch, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote that § 924’s text “suggests strongly, perhaps conclusively,” that Congress did not disavow Blockburger here. Congress included Blockburger-surmounting language twice within § 924(c) itself: It mandated that a § 924(c)(1) conviction must be “in addition to the punishment provided for” the underlying violent or drug crime and it also mandated that a conviction under § 924(c)(5)—for using or carrying armor piercing ammunition—must be “in addition to the punishment provided for” the conviction under” § 924(c)(1).

Such “in addition to” language has previously been found to be “crystal clear” evidence of a legislature’s intent to overcome Blockburger. But Congress used no similar language with respect to the interplay between subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j).

Dwayne’s case could have implications for future convictions across the country.

Gorsuch argued in his concurrence that the Court has been confusing about double jeopardy in the past. The Supreme Court has at times said the clause “protects against multiple punishments for the same offense,” he wrote, and has held that multiple convictions for the same offense constitute multiple punishments, even when secured in a single proceeding. “From this, it would seem to follow that Congress cannot authorize multiple convictions for the same offense in concurrent prosecutions. But this Court has also sometimes said that, in the concurrent-prosecution context, the Clause merely directs courts to ascertain statutory meaning accurately,” Gorsuch wrote.

He said the court will someday need to resolve that “tension.”

Barrett v. United States, Case No. 24-5774, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 433 (January 14, 2026)

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)

The National News Desk, Supreme Court limits dual charges in overlapping gun statutes (January 14, 2026)

~ Thomas L. Root

Inspector General Faults BOP Treatment of Dying Inmate – Update for January 13, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

REST IN PEACE, FRED BARDELL

Do you remember Frederick Bardell?

You should not forget him.

Mr. Bardell was a BOP prisoner whose medical and release mistreatment by the Federal Bureau of Prisons were acts, as described by U.S. District Court Judge Roy Dalton (Middle District of Florida) in an October 2022 Order,  “indifferent to… human dignity.”

Fred was housed at FCI Seagoville when he developed an intestinal mass that turned into metastatic colon cancer. Although a BOP medical expert determined that Fred “ha[d] a high likelihood” of having colon cancer “with likely metastasis to the liver,” the BOP did nothing.

An outside specialist said later that if Fred had gotten prompt treatment when the mass was first found, he would have had a 71% chance of recovery. But prompt treatment is simply not how BOP healthcare rolls.

As LISA reported at the time, Fred’s first compassionate release motion (filed under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)) was denied after the BOP falsely assured the court that Fred could receive adequate care in custody. Judge Dalton later wrote, “As we now know, it was not true that Mr. Bardell could receive adequate care in custody. And, regrettably, his condition was indeed terminal.”

Fred’s second compassionate release motion filed three months later – supported by an affidavit from an oncologist that Fred was likely dying of cancer – was granted. The Court ordered him released as soon as the Probation Office and Fred’s attorney worked out a release plan.

The BOP didn’t wait for a release plan. After forcing Fred’s parents to pay $500 for an airline ticket, the BOP dumped Fred – who by then was “skin and bones, wheelchair dependent, and bladder and bowel incontinent” – on the airport curb without even a wheelchair. Only with the aid of strangers was Fred able to get on the plane, change planes in Atlanta, and arrive, his clothes soaked with blood and feces, in Jacksonville. His parents took him straight to a hospital, where he died nine days later.

Judge Dalton was outraged, holding the Seagoville warden in contempt, not for the negligent medical care but for the heartless way the prison dumped Fred at the airport:

The BOP as an institution and Warden Zook as an individual should be deeply ashamed of the circumstances surrounding the last stages of Mr. Bardell’s incarceration and indeed his life. No individual who is incarcerated by order of the Court should be stripped of his right to simple human dignity as a consequence.

The judge found that the BOP’s actions were “inconsistent with the moral values of a civilized society and unworthy of the Department of Justice of the United States of America.”

A special master appointed by Judge Dalton confirmed that prison officials allowed an incarcerated man to waste away from highly treatable cancer and misrepresented key facts about his health care to a court. After that, the judge referred the matter to the DOJ Office of the Inspector General.

Last week, the Inspector General concluded that “serious failures by multiple levels of staff” at Seagoville led to Fred’s death from colon cancer. The OIG “identified job performance and management failures at multiple levels within FCI Seagoville, from line staff through the Warden. We also identified problems with the BOP’s medical care of inmates, handling of compassionate release requests due to medical circumstances, and handling of compassionate release orders.”

The OIG found that severe understaffing led to six months of delays in scheduling a colonoscopy for Fred, despite symptoms, tests, and scans showing that he likely had advanced colon cancer. As his condition worsened, staff denied his requests for a compassionate release without fully reviewing his medical records and then misrepresented the adequacy of treatment he was receiving to a federal judge. And when that judge finally ordered Bardell’s release, no fewer than nine BOP officials and employees failed to read the court’s order and thus violated the Judge’s directive to wait until a release plan had been approved. The Report said, “The hastiness of the BOP’s handling of Bardell’s release was extremely concerning because the BOP did not take measures to ensure his safe and compassionate transport in light of his medical condition.”

The OIG also said that “the BOP’s handling of Bardell’s request for a reduction in sentence [RIS] was deficient, and the government’s related representations to the Court that there was ‘no indication’ that Bardell could not ‘receive adequate care in custody’ were inconsistent with what we learned during the course of our investigation and review.”

The canard that a compassionate release is unnecessary because there is ‘no indication’ that an inmate cannot ‘receive adequate care in custody’ is one common to government oppositions to medical-condition compassionate release RIS requests. The OIG tears the fig leaf from these representations. In Fred’s case, the Inspector General’s report found,

that the government’s inaccurate representations were the result of the government’s reliance on the BOP’s RIS decision, which we found to be based on a seriously deficient process within the BOP, and [Assistant United States Attorney Emily C. L.] Chang’s honest, although nonexpert, understanding of the limited records provided by the BOP. While we believe that it would have been prudent for Chang to consult with BOP medical professionals, other BOP employees, or other medical experts to better understand the BOP medical records, Bardell’s medical condition, and the BOP’s ability to care for him, we noted that Department procedures in place at the time did not require her to speak with such individuals.

‘It’s so because we say it’s so,’ the BOP says in an ipse dixit run wild…

Those familiar with litigation involving BOP conduct are all too aware of the government’s unquestioning reliance on the Bureau’s ipse dixit pronouncements. Whether the OIG’s implicit doubt that doing so is appropriate will change anything is probably unlikely.

DOJ OIG, Investigation and Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Conditions of Confinement and Medical Treatment of Frederick Mervin Bardell and Related Representations to the Court, Upon Referral by Senior U.S. District Judge Roy B. Dalton, Jr. (January 6, 2026)

Reason, Inspector General Report Finds Serious Failures Led to an Inmate Wasting Away From Treatable Cancer (January 6, 2026)

New York Times, Judge Holds Prison Officials in Contempt for Treatment of Terminally Ill Inmate (October 13, 2022)

LISA, BOP Mistreatment of Inmate Dying of Cancer Sparks Outrage (October 17, 2002)

~ Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Loosens 2255 ‘Second or Successive’ Restrictions – Update for January 12, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS GUTS § 2244 LIMITATIONS ON SUCCESSIVE § 2255 MOTIONS

For federal prisoners, the only workable means of challenging an unlawful conviction or sentence after direct appeal rights have lapsed is through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Such a petition is brought through a mechanism provided by 28 USC § 2255.

The procedure is restricted as to timing and frequency: generally, the motion must be filed within a year of the end of direct appeal rights. What’s more, it is a one-to-a-customer filing: to bring a “second or successive” § 2255 motion, the prisoner must get advance approval from the Court of Appeals, and the new filing must fit within very narrow restrictions described in 28 USC § 2255(h).

Congress adopted the restrictions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act some 30 years ago. I have railed about the AEDPA often enough, so here I will just mention that constitutional abomination in passing.

Back in 2008, Michael Bowe was convicted of conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and using a gun during the offenses in violation of 18 USC § 924. In 2016, after the Supreme Court invalidated the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act, Mike filed a § 2255 motion arguing that § 924(c)’s residual clause was unconstitutional as well. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that – regardless of the residual clause’s constitutionality – he was not entitled to a second bite of the apple because attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause of the statute.

In 2019, after United States v. Davis held that conspiracy to commit a violent crime was not itself a violent crime, Mike sought permission from the 11th Circuit under § 2255(h) to file a second or successive motion raising whether his § 924(c) conviction should be thrown out. A three-judge panel found that while Davis announced a new, retroactive constitutional rule (one of the two statutory gateways for successive motions under § 2255(h)(2)), Mike could not show that his § 924(c) conviction was unconstitutional because Circuit precedent still treated attempted Hobbs Act robbery as a crime of violence under the elements clause.

After United States v. Taylor held in 2022 that attempted Hobbs Act was not a crime of violence either, Mike once again asked the 11th Circuit for authorization under § 2255(h), arguing that Davis and Taylor left neither of his Hobbs Act convictions as a valid predicate for a § 924(c) charge. The Circuit dismissed the part of his request resting on Davis, reasoning that the claim had been “presented in a prior application” and that the panel lacked jurisdiction over such old claims under 28 USC § 2244(b)(1). That statute on its face applies to state prisoners seeking leave to file a second 28 USC § 2254 petition in federal court, not federal prisoners proceeding under § 2255. Nevertheless, language in § 2255(h) has led courts to ambiguously apply § 2244(b)(1) to federal § 2255 movants as well.

The Circuit panel also denied the part of Mike’s request that rested on Taylor because Taylor did not announce a new constitutional rule within the meaning of § 2255(h)(2).

Mike didn’t give up, going back to the 11th several times, seeking authorization to pursue a § 2255 motion, asking for an en banc hearing, and seeking reversal of Circuit precedent applying § 2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar to federal prisoners’ successive § 2255 motions. He also requested certification of the question whether § 2244(b)(1) applied to federal prisoners at all. But the 11th turned down all of his entreaties.

Mike eventually filed for a Supreme Court review, pointing out that while six Circuits apply § 2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar to federal prisoners, three others held that it only applied to state prisoners seeking leave to file a second § 2254 petition in federal court.

Last Friday, the Supreme Court ruled for Mike.

First, the Justices held 5-4 that while 28 USC § 2244 provides that a denial of authorization “to file a second or successive application” shall not be subject to Supreme Court review, that provision does not apply to federal prisoners. The Supremes reasoned that the limitation is housed within § 2244, “which imposes several strict requirements that apply only to state prisoners.” What’s more, § 2244(b)(3)(E) addresses only “second or successive application’ but “unlike state prisoners who file such ‘applications,’ federal prisoners file ‘motions’.”

The Supreme Court also ruled that § 2244(b)(1)’s “old-claim” bar – that states that “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under § 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed” – applies only to state prisoners alone: “That specific reference to § 2254 was deliberate: Elsewhere in this very section, Congress expressly distinguishes § 2254 “applications” from § 2255 “motions… When interpreting statutes, the Court presumes that “differences in language like this convey differences in meaning.” By its plain terms, § 2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar applies only to state prisoners.”

In the Bowe decision, SCOTUS resoundingly underscores that “the best textual reading of both § 2255(h) and § 2244(b) is that, when a federal prisoner moves for authorization [to file a successive § 2255], a panel can authorize the filing if the filing makes a prima facie showing that it satisfies one of the two grounds in § 2255(h), the ‘two—and only two—conditions in which a second or successive § 2255 motion may proceed’,” quoting Jones v. Hendrix.

Bowe v. United States, Case No. 24-5438, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 4 (Jan. 9, 2026)

United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019)

United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022)

Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023)

~ Thomas L. Root

8th Circuit Holds Sex Offenders Don’t Need to Self-Shame on Halloween – Update for January 9, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HERE’S SOME CANDY, LITTLE GIRL…

In the universe of criminal offenses, there is no category more reviled than that of sex offender. It’s a broad category – covering every crime from looking at kiddie porn downloaded from the Internet to statutory rape to horrific physical abuse of a baby – but the “sex offender” label is enough for most people to generate loathing and repugnance not just at the offense but at the offender.

And no offense is easier for a politician to demagogue. I know of prisoners – adults who are first-time offenders – serving 50-year sentences for child porn crimes that involved no physical contact whatsoever. Say what you want, in a system where the average federal sentence for murder is about 25 years, the time meted out in the federal system for child sex offenses redefines “Draconian,” suggesting that defendants would do better murdering their victims than sexually abusing them. (Neither is a good idea, but the inversion between the average sentence for taking a life and for producing a disgusting video is puzzling).

Every few months, I will have some inmate serving a horrific sentence for child porn ask when Congress is going to do something to reduce his (or occasionally, her) sentence. My answer’s always the same: no legislator ever lost an election by being too hard on kiddie porn. I know of about 538 elected people on Capitol Hill who would swim drunk and naked in the Tidal Basin with the “Argentine Firecracker” before signing on to a bill that injected any sense into sex offender sentences.

For such offenders, the punishment never ends. Thomas Sanderson knows that. Come every October, Sanderson and his family have always set up large, elaborate Halloween displays involving decorations, sound effects, and fog machines. You know the type: 15-foot skeletons, big blow-up ornaments, orange lights… the works. As a district court judge described it, the Halloween Sandersons regularly were “throwing large parties, hosting a bonfire, handing out candy to children outside, decorating [their] residence, and keeping… lights on.”

In 2006, Tom was convicted of sodomy with a 16-year-old female friend of the family. Section 566.010 of the Missouri Revised Statutes defines sodomy as “deviant sexual misconduct.” What is “deviant sexual misconduct” in Missouri is quite broad, including virtually any offense where penetration does not occur, even just getting “handsy” with the crotch of the victim. Not to discount the mental trauma that such conduct may inflict on the victim, but being convicted of sodomy in Missouri is something much less than its Biblical definition.

No matter. Tom was labeled a sex offender who was required to register annually with the authorities. Plus, while he was locked up, Missouri passed the so-called Halloween Statute in 2008 (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 589.426)

The statute restricts registered sex offenders from participating in Halloween, requiring  them on October 31st to

(1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children;

(2) Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to employment or medical emergencies;

(3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence;” and

(4) Leave all outside lights off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.

When Tom was released, he asked the local police whether he was required to comply with the Halloween statute, given that he had been convicted well before the law was enacted. The police assured him that he had been “grandfathered in” and thus could continue participating in Halloween festivities (which, as we shall see, is a great cautionary tale illustrating why you should never accept legal advice from a cop).

For the next 14 years, Tom’s Halloween displays didn’t just continue, they grew more extravagant with each year. But in 2022, although Tom had never been accused of any further sexual misconduct, some neighborhood Karen complained that Tim was having innocent fun by participating in Halloween.  Consequently, Tom was arrested, charged, and convicted for violating the Halloween statute (a crime for which he got probation).

Tom brought a facial challenge to the Halloween statute under the 1st Amendment, specifically arguing that subsection 3 — the sign mandate — unconstitutionally compelled speech from all Missouri registered sex offenders. After a bench trial, the district court found the sign mandate unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction preventing the State from enforcing it anywhere in Missouri.

Missouri appealed.

Last week, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the sign requirement cannot survive the “strict scrutiny” required by constitutional law and thus violates the 1st Amendment.

The government can restrict private speech – and even force people to say things they don’t want to (“compelled speech”) – when it can establish a compelling state interest in preventing the harm that the restriction addresses and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to address that harm. Here, the Circuit ruled that

the sign mandate is not merely incidental to conduct: it explicitly requires registrants to post a sign bearing a specific message. True, the other three provisions of the Halloween statute regulate a registrant’s conduct. But the sign mandate requires only speech (the posting of a sign with the government’s message), not any other related conduct. In fact, it requires verbatim speech… Because the sign mandate (1) explicitly requires registrants to speak the government’s message in the form of a sign at their residence, and (2) dictates specifically what that sign must say, it compels speech.

Missouri argued that the sign requirement served a compelling state interest by making it easier for police officers to “be able to ensure that there is compliancy” without getting out of their cruisers, thus making enforcement of the Halloween statute more efficient, and providing “an extra layer of protection for children.” However, Missouri conceded that there was no requirement that the sign be put in front of the house instead of the rear (or even posted in the resident’s kitchen) and even if the sign were on a Post-It note, it would be in “compliancy” if it had the right wording. (Making up words is not a state felony, but it should be – a topic for another time).

The 8th held that while Missouri argued it had a compelling interest by demonstrating that Halloween presented unique risks for “grooming” children that could lead to future abuse, it “could not provide any evidence for the claim that signs provide any additional protection beyond the other restrictions imposed on registrants in the Halloween statute. There was no evidence to support the idea that children would be at risk if there was no sign, so long as the registrant complied with the remaining provisions of the statute (i.e., remaining inside the residence, not giving candy to or otherwise engaging with children, and leaving lights off). In other words, nothing in the record indicates that a child knocking on a door that no one opens presents a risk to that child.”

What was more, the Circuit ruled, while

[w]e agree with the State that narrow tailoring does not require “perfect” tailoring. Here, however, there is insufficient evidence to support the State’s assertion that the sign mandate is the least restrictive means of achieving its goals. The record does not support the claim that, despite the remaining provisions of the Halloween statute, the sign mandate is necessary to further the government’s compelling interest in protecting children on Halloween. Accordingly, the sign mandate burdens more speech than necessary and fails strict scrutiny.

Missouri, in true “smear the defendant” fashion, tried to offer testimony from the victim, then 16 years old but now in her 30s, and from its expert – who had never met Tom – about Tom’s “dangerousness.” One can fairly ask whether the 20 years that passed since Tom’s offense and Halloween 2024 didn’t suggest that maybe he was rehabilitated (especially since he had celebrated Halloween in his usual overblown fashion for 14 years without any suggestion of sexual misconduct).

The 8th, however, said that Tom’s record didn’t matter: “[E]ven if the evidence had been admitted, it would not have affected the verdict. That is because any evidence of Sanderson’s dangerousness—either from [the 2006 victim] or from the State’s expert, who never met or conducted an evaluation of Sanderson—would have supported only the compelling interest prong of the legal analysis. But, as discussed, the sign mandate failed strict scrutiny on the second prong: whether it was narrowly tailored. Nothing about the unique risks posed by Sanderson—or any other registrant for that matter—would have overcome the sign mandate’s tailoring deficiency.”

Sanderson v. Hanaway, Case Nos. 24-3120, 24-3204, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 3, at *11-12 (8th Cir. Jan. 2, 2026)

~ Thomas  L. Root

No One’s Pardoning Trump’s Use of Pardon Power – Update for January 8, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NO ONE’S HAPPY ABOUT PRESIDENT TRUMP’S EPIC CLEMENCY PARADE

If there is a unifying thread of reaction to President Trump’s unprecedented train of pardons and commutations in 2025, it’s one of disquiet.

Trump granted clemency this year to over 1,600 people. The biggest tranche was the first one – 1500-plus people getting clemency (14 just commutations, the rest pardons) for the January 6, 2021, riot. Since then, he has commuted another 13 sentences and pardoned 72 others. For a range of figures, Trump said he viewed them as victims of an unfair justice system. Some were tied to his newfound interest in cryptocurrency or shared in his 2020 election grievances, while another (a Texas developer involved in bid-rigging) was simply brought up to Trump during a round of golf with a Republican buddy.

Twenty of the pardons went to businessmen, 16 to politicians, five to celebrities, 24 to anti-abortion activists, and 12 to people convicted of other non-drug offenses.  Only eight were for drug crimes, and those included the guy who started the Silk Road deep-web drug bazaar and a former Honduran president.

More than half of the acts of clemency for named individuals relate to prosecutions pursued by the Biden Dept of Justice — in addition to the Jan 6 cases.

Even Fox News was critical, saying, “While presidents of both parties have long used their pardon power in controversial ways, Trump’s clemency activity in 2025 stood out for its volume and for the deal-making style that has been a defining feature of his approach to power.” Fox listed Trump’s most controversial clemencies as including the Jan 6 rioters, Texas congressman Henry Cuellar (bribery charges, not yet to trial), the Chrisleys, former congressman George Santos (widespread fraud), and former Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernandez (serving a 45-year sentence for the same charges just made this past weekend against Nicholas Maduro and his wife).

Attorney Mitch Jackson, writing on Substack, said Trump had “corruptly commodified one of the most potent parts of the presidency and turned it into a product to be sold to the highest bidder.”

The scheme works like this: People seeking clemency pay about $1 million to hire well-placed lobbyists within the administration who then work to secure a pardon from Trump. If those pardons are successful, the person receiving clemency may also pay a six-to-seven-figure “success fee” after the president signs the paperwork guaranteeing their release, according to the essay.

In one instance, Donald Trump, Jr., introduced a lobbyist named Ches McDowell to the president while McDowell was seeking a pardon for Changpeng Zhao, the billionaire founder of Binance. Binance reportedly paid $800,000 to McDowell for the work and then offered a success fee of more than $5 million once Zhao was freed.

Trump pardoned Zhao, who had been convicted of money laundering, last October. Whether a success fee was paid, and if so for how much, has not been reported. However, Rep Maxine Waters (D-CA) claimed that Zhao “spent months lobbying Trump and his family while funneling billions into Trump’s personal crypto company,” World Liberty Financial. Reports indicate Binance parked $2 billion in WLFI’s stablecoin, generating about $80-87 million annually. The Trump family owns 60% of WLFI, meaning that Binance’s deposit meant the family could receive $48-52 million in passive income.

Jackson wrote:

In Donald Trump’s Washington, freedom has a price tag. The presidential pardon, one of the most serious powers granted by the Constitution, now looks like a product on a shelf. Picture what this means in real life. If you or someone you love faced an unjust sentence, would you have a million dollars for a broker. Most families do not. Your petition would sit in a stack, waiting for a formal review that can take years. Meanwhile, a billionaire pays for a direct line, and the request reaches the President through a family member at a ceremony. The system looks less like equal justice and more like a private club with a cover charge.

A cottage industry has arisen of lobbyists seeking clemency for a wide variety of clients. David Schoen, one of Trump’s former impeachment lawyers is following the same pardon playbook that has rewarded allies of the president and been driven by a desire for political retribution.

Schoen is representing two mobsters who were sentenced to life in 1992. In a Christmas Eve letter to Trump, Schoen sought clemency by arguing that they had been unfairly convicted by prosecutor Andrew Weissmann—a foe of Trump’s who led FBI director Robert Mueller’s special counsel team that investigated Russian interference in the 2016 election.

Wall Street Journal, A Visual Breakdown of Trump’s Pardon Spree (December 10, 2025)

Raw Story, ‘Disturbing’: Lawyer exposes how Trump shredded a ‘core promise’ of American law (December 28, 2025)

Benzinga, Trump Pardoned 3 Crypto Felons In 10 Months—Here’s What Each One Cost (January 2, 2026)

Fox News, Deal-making clemency: Inside Trump’s most disputed pardons of 2025 (December 30, 2025)

Free Press, Ex-Trump Lawyer Lobbies to Free Mobsters Prosecuted by an Enemy of the President (December 31, 2025)

~ Thomas  L. Root

A Compassionate Release Win for Commutees – Update for January 6, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

COMMUTATION DOESN’T NEGATE COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

In 2012, Jonathan Wright was sentenced to life imprisonment after a federal drug conviction. In 2024, he filed an 18 USC § 3582(c)(1) compassionate release motion based on First Step Act changes in 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A)  mandatory minimum sentences.

The district court reduced Jon’s sentence to 420 months followed by 10 years of supervised release but never addressed Jon’s argument that his prior Arkansas convictions no longer qualified as predicate offenses for his sentence enhancement.

Jon appealed, arguing that the district court should have reduced his sentence even more. While the appeal was pending, President Joe Biden commuted Jon’s sentence to 330 months last January.

The government argued that Biden’s commutation should moot Jon’s appeal, and even if it didn’t, the Arkansas statute’s overly broad definition of controlled substance should nevertheless be read to be consistent with federal law.

Last week, the 8th Circuit gave Jon a late stocking stuffer.

Although the Circuits are split on the question, the 8th ruled that Biden’s commutation did not moot Jon’s compassionate release motion. The President’s power to commute criminal sentences derives from the Constitution – the Article II power to “grant Reprieves and Pardons.” “A commuted sentence,” the Circuit held, “does not become ‘an executive sentence in full’ but instead remains a judicial sentence – but one that the executive will only enforce to a limited extent.

As for Jon’s prior convictions under Arkansas § 5-64-401, the 8th observed that the statute incorporated a state Dept of Health regulation that defined a “narcotic drug” to include all cocaine isomers, while federal felony drug offenses encompass only optical and geometric cocaine isomers. Circuit precedent holds that a state drug statute that criminalizes even “one additional isomer” of cocaine beyond what the federal statute proscribes cannot produce a predicate felony drug offense for federal sentencing purposes.

The Circuit ruled that the district court’s decision to not consider that Jon’s priors no longer counted under § 841(b)(1)(A) when ruling on his compassionate release motion “was based on an erroneous legal conclusion and accordingly was an abuse of discretion.” When resentencing Jon on remand, the 8th directed, the “district court is required only to considerthat Jon ‘s prior convictions no longer qualify as predicate offenses for his sentence enhancement. The district court is not required to accept this point as a reason to further reduce Jon’s sentence.”

This opinion is significant, ruling in essence that at least in the 8th Circuit, changes in the law creating gross disparities between the existing sentence and the sentence if imposed today have a substantial role in the compassionate release calculus.

United States v. Wright, Case No. 24-2057, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33882 (8th Cir. December 30, 2025)

~ Thomas  L. Root

March Will Bring Cherry Blossoms and Supreme Court Arguments – Update for January 5, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS SCHEDULES ARGUMENT ON TWO CRIMINAL CASES OF NOTE

The Supreme Court has issued its February oral argument schedule, including two cases of substantial interest to federal defendants and prisoners.

The two arguments actually fall the first week of March, not in February… but then this is the Supreme Court, where the last week of next June will still be “October Term 2025.” Nevertheless, we can be confident that before the cherry blossoms bloom along the Tidal Basin, we may have some idea of the high court’s thinking on two consequential criminal cases now before it.

The cases:  First, the one not getting much press but arguably the more important of the two is Hunter v. United States, a case that asks whether a federal appeals court properly dismissed a Texas man’s appeal of a mandatory-medication condition when he had waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement, but the judge who imposed the condition told him that he had a right to appeal.

The importance is this: Something like 94% of federal criminal cases end in guilty pleas, and virtually all of those pleas are entered pursuant to a written plea agreement between the defendant and the government. And virtually all of those agreements have the defendant agreeing to waive his or her rights to appeal, to file post-conviction attacks on their conviction and sentences, and to give up other rights – such as to seek compassionate release or even bring a Freedom of Information Act request for records from the government.

The Hunter issues before the Supreme Court include what, if any, are the permissible exceptions to waiver in a plea agreement, now generally recognized as only being claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. A second issue is whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he or she has a right to appeal and the government does not object.

The Supreme Court case getting more attention is United States v. Hemani, in which the government is challenging a 5th Circuit ruling that 18 USC § 922(g)(3) – that prohibits an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance from possessing a gun – violates the 2nd Amendment as applied to the defendant. Mr. Hemani was a regular marijuana user but was not high while in physical possession of his handgun.`

Law Professor Joel Johnson, a former Supreme Court litigator with the Dept of Justice, recently argued in a SCOTUSBlog post that the Supreme Court could easily dispose of the Hemani case by relying on the rule of lenity instead of the 2ndAmendment. He said, “If the court decides that the law applies only to people who are armed while intoxicated, the 2nd Amendment concerns largely vanish. There is stronger historical support for disarming someone who is high – and thus not of sound mind – than there is for disarming someone who happened to smoke a joint last weekend but is no longer impaired.”

Also in a SCOTUSBlog post, NYU Law Professor Danial Harawa argued for a revival of the rule of lenity:

Congress has enacted thousands of criminal laws, many written broadly and enforced aggressively. With an overly bloated criminal code, lenity should function as a meaningful check – a reminder that punishment must rest on clear legislative authorization… At bottom, the rule of lenity is about who bears the risk of uncertainty in the criminal law. For most of the court’s history, that risk fell on the government. When Congress failed to speak clearly, defendants were entitled to the benefit of the doubt. If it wanted, Congress could rewrite the law to clarify its reach. There is no cost for congressional imprecision, however, and thus no real need for Congress to legislate carefully and clearly. When lenity is weakened, the cost of ambiguity shifts from the government to defendants, and the result is more defendants. Given the pedigree and importance of this rule, the Supreme Court needs to resolve when the rule applies sooner rather than later.

Second Amendment advocates and scholars hope that Hemeni will advance the 2nd Amendment debate begun by Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi. But even if it does not, it may provide some enduring guidance on the rule of lenity, an issue of less sexiness but perhaps more import to criminal law.

SCOTUSblog, Court announces it will hear case on gun rights among several others in February sitting  (January 2, 2026)

Hunter v. United States, Case No. 24-1063 (oral argument set for March 3, 2026)

United States v. Hemani, Case No, 24-1234 (oral argument set for March 2, 2026)

SCOTUSblog, An off-ramp for the court’s next big gun case (December 18, 2025)

SCOTUSblog, Reviving Lenity (December 26, 2025)

~ Thomas  L. Root