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Short Rockets – Update for June 18, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SOME SHORTS FROM LAST WEEK…

rocket190620Crack Retroactivity: Monae Davis won release a year ago when a district court gave him a retroactive crack sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act. However, he has lived under a cloud since then because the government appealed, arguing that because his offense involved 1.5 kilos of crack, he was not eligible for a Section 404 reduction (because his Guidelines would not change).

The question of eligibility has haunted Section 404 applicants since First Step passed. Does 404 relief turn on whether only on whether the punishment specified in the statute under which the defendant was charged has changed, or must the change mean that the Guidelines for the amount of drugs with which the defendant was involved changed?

Freedom is vastly preferred over prison, but Monae’s joy must have been muted, knowing as he did that a case in front of the Court of Appeals could send him back to prison tomorrow (and I mean “tomorrow” in its most literal sense).

Luckily for Monae, two weeks ago his joy became unbounded. The 2nd Circuit joined the surge of courts of appeal disagreeing with the government’s draconian view of Section 404. The Circuit rejected the government’s argument that Section 404 eligibility turns on a defendant’s actual conduct, holding that “eligibility depends on the statutory offense for which a defendant was sentenced, not the particulars of any given defendant’s underlying conduct. Because the retroactivity meant that the Fair Sentencing Act now applied, and because the FSA modified the statutory penalties for Monae’s offense, he was eligible for Section 404 relief.

United States v. Davis, Case No. 19-874, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 17736 (2nd Cir June 5, 2020)

Drug “Safety Valve”:  Devin Hodgkiss pled guilty to distributing meth on an occasion in April 2018 and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in June 2018 (an 18 USC § 924(c) offense). He asked for “safety valve” sentencing under 18 USC 3553(f) to duck under the 10-year drug statutory minimum, but the district court denied him, holding that he was ineligible for the safety valve because he had possessed a gun as relevant conduct.

safetyvalv200618[Background: The “safety valve,” found in 18 USC § 3553(f), permits a drug defendant who meets certain limiting criteria (light criminal history, no leadership role, no violence, no gun, etc) to be sentenced without regard to statutory minimum sentences (and with a Guidelines break as well)].

Last week, the 8th Circuit reversed, holding that Devin was entitled to the safety valve despite its requirement that the defendant not have possessed a firearm “in connection with the offense.”

“Relevant conduct,” the Circuit said, “is a concept developed by the Sentencing Commission… The ‘safety-valve‘ limitation on statutory minimums, however, appears in an Act of Congress that is not governed by definitions in the sentencing guidelines. Therefore, to determine whether Hodgkiss possessed a firearm ‘in connection with the offense,’ 18 USC 3553(f)(2), we must consider what the statute means by ‘the offense’.”

The 8th concluded that the term “offense” should be strictly defined as “offense of conviction.” Here, Devin was convicted of distribution based on an April 2018 drug sale. The § 924(c) was based on a June 2018 drug distribution. Therefore, the gun was not possessed in connection to the drug conviction. He still faced a mandatory minimum of five years for the gun, but the 10-year statutory minimum no longer applied.

United States v. Hodgkiss, Case No. 19-1423, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 17874 (8th Cir June 8, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Sotomayor Unhappy With 11th Circuit’s Need for Speed – Update for June 16, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR WOODSHEDS 11th CIRCUIT ON § 2244 OPINIONS

Alone among the federal circuit courts of appeal, the 11th has a practice of publishing its decisions on inmates’ 28 USC § 2244 motions seeking the right to bring a second-or-successive § 2255 motion.

oneanddone200616A little background: Every convicted defendant has the right to file one motion to set aside the conviction or sentence under 28 USC § 2255, the federal statute that controls how a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging convictions is brought in the federal system. The filing is subject to strict time limits, and once an inmate files a § 2255 motion and has that motion decided on the merits, he or she cannot bring another unless some tough-to-get permission is first granted by a federal court of appeals.  Like March Madness, this freedom tourney is “one and done.”

To get that permission, a defendant files a motion under 28 USC § 2244 for permission to file a second-or-successive § 2255. Permission is only granted in limited, well-defined circumstances. The § 2244 proceeding is a quickie: the appellate court is to decide the motion in 30 days, leaving the court little time to consider a complex inmate application. The government rarely is permitted to file an opposition to the request. Any denial of an inmate’s § 2244 motion cannot be appealed, reconsidered or taken to the Supreme Court. What is more, the appeals court has to decide it within 30 days of filing, 

Some circuits make it even tougher. In the 11th Circuit, an applicant must confine his or her entire legal argument to a single-page form. To make matters worse, the 11th Circuit publishes its decisions on § 2244 motions.

speeddating200616“Publishes its decisions?” you ask. “How can that be a bad thing? Doesn’t it help future filers by explaining the Court’s position on the issues that may be raised?”

That is true, but the problem is that the courts publish everything, as long as “publish” has a small “p.” When a court Publishes a case with a capital “P,” that means that the case becomes precedent. All district courts in the circuit must follow the precedent, and the court of appeals itself cannot reverse or abandon the precedent unless the court does so in an en banc proceeding. What’s more, the holdings don’t just bind § 2244 filers. They will bind future litigants on direct appeal as well.

(By the way, I use the capital “P”/small “p” for illustration only.  It is not a term of art in law).

Thus, published decisions that are binding on future litigants (including those on direct appeal) are being decided on the sketchiest of records, in a judicial version of “speed dating.”

Last week, Justice Sonia Sotomayor issued a rare concurring statement in a decision denying certiorari to an appellant who had been bound by an 11th Circuit § 2244 denial. Michael St. Hubert argued on appeal that his Hobbs Act robberies were not “crimes of violence” that could support convictions under 18 USC § 924(c) for using a gun during their commission. The issue is quite a live one after last summer’s United States v. Davis. But Mike and several other defendants were shut out by the Circuit because it had already settled the question they raised in its § 2244 proved.

25words200616Justice Sotomayor suggested that the appellate court’s § 2244 practice “raises a question whether the Eleventh Circuit’s process is consistent with due process.” She wrote, “In sum, the Eleventh Circuit represents the ‘worst of three worlds.’ It “publishes the most orders, adheres to a tight timeline that the other circuits have disclaimed,” and “does not ever hear from the government before making its decision.” In this context, important statutory and constitutional questions are decided (for all future litigants) on the basis of fewer than 100 words of argument.”

The Justice urged the 11th Circuit to adopt procedures that “better accord with basic fairness—and would ensure that those like [this defendant] would not spend several more years in prison because of artificially imposed limitations like 100 words of argument.”

United States v. St. Hubert, 2020 US LEXIS 3146 (Supreme Ct. June 8, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

BOP 4, Inmates 0 in COVID-19 Litigation – Update for June 15, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE WEEK IN COVID-19 LITIGATION

prisonhealth200313As of last night, June 14th, the number of Federal Bureau of Prisons inmates with COVID-19 had dropped from 2,109 a week ago to 1,341. The number of BOP facilities with COVID-19 on premises rose from 62 to 65, and then fell back to 62 as of last night. Deaths continued to climb, however, from 81 a week ago to 87 last night.

The numbers aren’t bad for the BOP. Inmate sickness has been fluctuating between 1,300 and 2,100 for a few weeks, and the number of prisons affected has leveled. But the BOP’s big advances last week were in the courtroom, not the medical suite.

Besides the 6th Circuit’s stay in FCI Elkton litigation, last Tuesday, Judge Rachel P. Kovner of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied prisoners a preliminary injunction because of inept medical care they claim amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, reasoning that despite deficiencies in MDC Brooklyn’s COVID-19 response, officials likely did not act with “deliberate indifference” to the health threat.

“Petitioners have not shown a clear likelihood that MDC officials have acted with deliberate indifference to substantial risks in responding to COVID-19,” Judge Kovner ruled. “Rather than being indifferent to the virus, MDC officials have recognized COVID-19 as a serious threat and responded aggressively.”

Nevertheless, the court cited significant problems with the BOP’s response to the pandemic. In particular, the judge noted the prison was way too slow responding to sick-calls requests and generally failed to isolate symptomatic inmates. “The MDC appears not to be isolating individuals who report COVID-19 symptoms,” in “tension with the CDC’s guidance” that they should be kept away from other inmates, Judge Kovner wrote. “Under standards of care that both parties have accepted, MDC officials’ apparent failure to fully implement the CDC guidance in these areas constitutes a deficiency in the MDC’s response to COVID-19.”

destroyevidence200615Judge Kovner also held the BOP had destroyed evidence by shredding the paper sick call requests used as the pandemic worsened. She sanctioned the BOP by drawing the inference that “the destroyed records would have contained additional reports of COVID-19 symptoms.” Still, the judge accepted the prison’s claims that it was doing the best it could under the circumstances, ruling that the evidence before the court did not clearly show that the inmates were at risk of serious harm, considering the MDC’s virus response, or that the prison did not care enough to shield them from that risk.

Meanwhile, last Thursday, a Massachusetts district court dealt a blow to the inmate habeas corpus/8th Amendment action against FMC Devens. The court held that the action – while calling itself a habeas corpus petition – was really a suit about prison conditions subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The plaintiffs were given until the end of this week to show compliance with the PLRA, which mandates exhaustion of BOP administrative remedies as a jurisdictional condition. This holding conflicts with the 6th Circuit’s Wilson holding of three days before.

Lose200615The North Carolina habeas corpus case against FCC Butner likewise suffered a setback on Thursday, when the Eastern District of North Carolina federal court denied a preliminary injunction. Like the 6th Circuit in the Elkton case, the district court ruled that while the inmate plaintiffs met the objective prong of the deliberate indifference showing, by showing that COVID-19 “poses significant health risks to both the world and community at large” and that the “disease’s uncontrolled spread within FCC Butner therefore presents a substantial risk of serious or substantial physical injury resulting from the challenged conditions,” they had not shown that the BOP was ignoring the spread of the illness.”

Chunn v. Edge, Case No. 20-cv-1590, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100930 (E.D.N.Y., June 9, 2020)

Grinis v. Spaulding, Case No. 1:20-cv-10738-GAO, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103251 (D.Mass., June 11, 2020)

Hallinan v. Scarantino, Case No. 5:20hc2088, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103409 (E.D.N.C., June 11, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Compassionate Release Exhaustion Requirement Nonwaivable, Court Says – Update for June 12, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

6TH CIRCUIT HOLDS THERE’S NO EXCUSING EXHAUSTION UNDER COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

notime160915The 6th Circuit ruled last week that 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s requirement that an inmate first ask the warden to recommend compassionate release, and then either exhaust remedies or wait 30 day before going to court is a “mandatory claims-processing rule” that cannot be waived because of emergency.

Ever since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March, the volume of motions filed with federal courts seeking compassionate release has skyrocketed. The statute requires that a prisoner may file the motion with his or her sentencing court only “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier…” A large number of filers skipped that requirement, arguing to their courts that they should be allowed to skip the administrative exhaustion requirement, because the COVID-19 dangers make every second count.

timewaits200325To be sure, the exhaustion requirement makes no sense. First, the notion that anyone can navigate the BOP’s three-level administrative remedy process in under six months is fantasy. The agency not only has 20 to 40 days to respond at each level, but the rules entitle the BOP to automatic extensions of time. An inmate has fair winds and following seas if he or she can push an administrative remedy to conclusion in six months.

Second, the old compassionate release statute permitted only the BOP to file motions for compassionate release on behalf of inmates. Congress became so irked at the BOP’s chary use of its power that in the First Step Act, it granted inmates the right to file themselves. But in order to let the BOP salvage a shred of honor from its stripping the BOP of its sole authority to make such motions, Congress offered the BOP a fig leaf of what is essentially a right of first refusal.

But the odds that the BOP is any more likely to bring such motions now than at any time in the past are really long. That makes the requirement that an inmate make a request to the warden and then wait 30 days little more than a pointless ritual.

No matter. Congress wrote it the way it wrote it, and anyone who recalls those hectic days in December 2018 pushing First Step to fruition should not be surprised that the 149-page bill is somewhat less pellucid that the Declaration of Independence.

time161229Last week, the 6th Circuit held that the exhaustion requirement of the statute means what it says, and that court-made “equitable carveouts” to its terms – including the excuse that the request is an emergency – make no sense. “Remember that Congress made compassionate release available only to elderly prisoners and those with “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for release. For such prisoners, time usually will be of the essence. That would make nearly every prisoner eligible to invoke ‘irreparable harm’ and eligible to jump the line of applications — making the process less fair, not more fair.”

United States v. Alam, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 17321 (6th Cir, June 2, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

6th Circuit FCI Elkton Holding a Mixed Bag – Update for June 11, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THREE WINS AND A LOSS AT THE 6TH CIRCUIT

winloss200611On the third try, the Federal Bureau of Prisons finally succeeded in getting a higher court to issue a stay in the FCI Elkton (Ohio) habeas corpus/8th Amendment case, stopping for the moment the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio’s injunction demanding that the BOP identify and either transfer or release medically vulnerable inmates.

On Tuesday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that the preliminary injunction – which can only issue if a moving party can show irreparable harm and likelihood that it will succeed on the merits of the case – should be set aside. This does not mean that the inmate plaintiffs in the class action cannot win, but I suspect the BOP is betting that time (and attrition of the medically vulnerable inmates, as one after another comes down with COVID-19), will render the whole lawsuit moot before it’s done.

Technically, the lawsuit is a petition for writ of habeas corpus, addressed to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The remedy in a habeas action is release of the prisoner or abatement of the unconstitutional condition. Here, the prisoners claimed that the BOP was violating the 8th Amendment, exacting “cruel and unusual punishment” by the Elkton administration’s “deliberate indifference” to a deadly medical condition, COVID-19.

plague200406In a 2-1 decision, the 6th Circuit panel struck down the district court’s order to thin the ranks of the 2,000 inmates at Elkton (located in Lisbon, Ohio, about 65 miles southeast of Cleveland), where more than a quarter have tested positive for the coronavirus and 19 inmates have died. U.S. District Judge James Gwin ruled in April that the administration was not doing enough to protect inmates, and ordered that the BOP transfer or release elderly or medically compromised prisoners.

“Deliberate indifference” has two components, one objective and one subjective. The Circuit ruled that while the plaintiffs had shown that objectively, COVID-19 was a genuine medical danger at the facility, they were unlikely to prove that the steps the BOP had taken as of April 22 — such as screening for symptoms, limiting visitation, increasing cleaning and providing masks — were insufficient to raise the administration’s response above the “deliberate indifference” standard. The majority on the panel agreed that the BOP’s “actions show it has responded reasonably to the risk posed by Covid-19 and that the conditions at Elkton cannot be found to violate the Eighth Amendment.”

Chief Judge R. Guy Cole Jr. dissented, writing that he was “left with the inescapable conclusion that the BOP’s failure to make use of its home confinement authority at Elkton, even as it stared down the escalating spread of the virus and a shortage of testing capacity, constitutes sufficient evidence for the district court to have found that petitioners were likely to succeed on their Eighth Amendment claim.”

habeasB191211Inmate advocates were disappointed with the ruling, but I think there were three wins in the decision for inmates. First, the BOP has argued in this case as well as in other pending cases elsewhere that inmates could not proceed on habeas corpus, but instead had to use a cumbersome procedure that would not have permitted as a remedy the release of inmates. The Court roundly dismissed this argument, holding that the claim being made can proceed on a 28 USC § 2241 habeas corpus petition.

Second, the Court swept aside BOP arguments that the inmates had to “exhaust” administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. This would have required each inmate plaintiff to file administrative remedies to the warden, then the regional BOP office, and final with the BOP in Washington, a cumbersome and largely futile procedure that would have consumed six months before a suit could even be brought.

Finally, the Court held that

“petitioners have provided evidence that they are ‘incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.’ The COVID-19 virus creates a substantial risk of serious harm leading to pneumonia, respiratory failure, or death. The BOP acknowledges that ‘[t]he health risks posed by COVID-19 are significant.’ The infection and fatality rates at Elkton have borne out the serious risk of COVID-19, despite the BOP’s efforts. The transmissibility of the COVID-19 virus in conjunction with Elkton’s dormitory-style housing—which places inmates within feet of each other—and the medically-vulnerable subclass’s health risks, presents a substantial risk that petitioners at Elkton will be infected with COVID-19 and have serious health effects as a result, including, and up to, death. Petitioners have put forth sufficient evidence that they are ‘incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm’.”

tryhard200611This is a powerful foil to the government’s oft-repeated claim in opposing compassionate release motions that the BOP is adequately meeting inmate medical needs despite COVID-19, and that there is thus no need to protect vulnerable inmates by compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1). In other words, the 6th said that the BOP was trying, but that it was not succeeding.

That may save the BOP from 8th Amendment claims – at least at the preliminary stage of litigation such as the Elkton case – but it refutes any government claim that no one needs to go home, because the BOP is keeping everyone safe.

Wilson v. Williams, Case No. 20-3447, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18087 (6th Cir. June 9, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

No COVID-19 Curve Flattening in the BOP – Update for June 9, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

COVID-19 ROUNDUP

Talk about illness… Everyone’s sick to death about COVID-19 talk. But wishing it gone is a little bit different than having it gone. That’s somewhat the problem that the Federal Bureau of Prisons has with the coronavirus in general, and that BOP Director Michael Carvajal has with it in particular.

The BOP’s active coronavirus count jumped 23% this past week, from 1,710 sick inmates on June 1 to 2,109 yesterday. Staff infection ticked up from 171 to 185, and the number of BOP facilities reporting the virus jumped 7%, from 57 to 62. Cumulative inmate COVID-19 deaths increased last week from 70 to 81.

flatten200609The numbers keep ticking up, and – what’s worse – at the same pace. Nevertheless, when the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing a week ago today, Director Carvajal told the senators that “at this point, we have more recoveries than new infections. I believe that this shows that we are now flattening the curve.”

That’s not what flattening the curve means. “Flattening the curve” means to stagger the number of new infections over a longer period of time, although I suppose that eventually – when the BOP runs out of inmates yet to be infected – the curve will necessarily flatten when there’s no one left to get sick. But whatever else is happening, the BOP’s curve is not flattening.

Something else that’s not happening is a decrease in inmate class actions against the BOP. Those are proceeding apace around the country:

Massachusetts: A class of inmate plaintiffs who had conditions identified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that heightened their risk for contracting COVID-19 or having a worse outcome from it (the “medically vulnerable”) sued the Federal Medical Center at Devens, Massachusetts, seeking proper and complete home confinement relief from the administration there. The Massachusetts federal district court denied the inmates an emergency injunction in May, but they asked for reconsideration last week. The court had denied the injunction in part because there had only been a single COVID-19 case at Devens when the injunction was denied. But since then, 24 inmates have been diagnosed as having the virus.

COVID joints200609

The injunction was also denied because the BOP had convinced the judge that it was “immediately reviewing all inmates who have COVID-19 risk factors… to determine which inmates are suitable for home confinement.” But then Devens’ warden, testifying in a different proceeding last month (one seeking compassionate release for an inmate), admitted that medical vulnerability to COVID-19 has not been considered a factor by the Devens front office in its compassionate release decisions, and that Devens refuses to transfer any prisoner to home confinement due to COVID-19, regardless of age or medical vulnerability, until the prisoner has served at least 50% of his sentence or at least 25% of his sentence with under 18 months left to serve.

The judge who originally heard the warden’s testimony in the compassionate release action found the policy to be “utterly inconsistent” with the Attorney General’s direction to maximize the use of home confinement as a tool to combat COVID-19, leaving “at-risk inmates who are not being individually assessed for release. And some of them may get very sick. Some of them may die.”

That reconsideration motion is pending.

Connecticut: In litigation over FCI Danbury, the judge has ordered the parties to give inmates a release form that would let the court release their presentence reports to the plaintiffs’ lawyers. The plaintiffs say access to the PSRs – which include a section on the defendants’ medical conditions – would help inmates vulnerable to the virus.

Inmate deaths200609

New York: U.S. District Judge Edgardo Ramos was preparing to rule on an inmate motion for injunction after a doctor tasked with inspecting MCC New York issued a scathing report proclaiming basic sanitation and virus screening failures. In a May 26 filing, Dr. Homer S. Venters criticized poor inmate screening and concluded that the prison has “ignored” signs that the virus may be widespread. Dr. Venters also reported a lack of access to basic sanitation, including soap. and he saw evidence that the facility is “widely infested with mice and roaches.”

Ohio: The FCI Elkton injunction came to a screeching halt after the BOP went back to the Supreme Court last week and this time convinced Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor to grant its stay request. The Northern District of Ohio injunction issued by Judge James Gwin is now on hold, pending an appeal to the 6th Circuit Court.

North Carolina: An inmate suit over conditions at the several prisons making up the Butner Federal Correctional Complex, like the ones in Massachusetts, Ohio and Connecticut, seeks a court order that the Butner administration accelerate home confinement and compassionate release due to the rampant coronavirus at Butner (which has 571 active inmate cases and 18 deaths).

The BOP has moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that things are not as bad as the plaintiffs say they are because a lower percentage of infected inmates are dying than victims in the general public. Yesterday, the inmates replied,

More than 900 men incarcerated at Butner—almost 21 percent of Butner’s population—have tested positive for the virus that causes COVID-19. Nineteen people (including a BOP staff member) have died1—far more than at any other BOP facility. Half of those deaths happened in the 13 days since Petitioners filed this lawsuit. Infections and deaths are rapidly rising. The situation gets worse by the day.

Despite these harrowing and undisputed facts, Respondents contend that “FCC Butner’s efforts have been effective in managing infections and treating inmates.” Because they have purportedly taken some steps to mitigate the spread (however ineffective and late), Respondents argue their response to this deadly outbreak cannot possibly be deemed constitutionally defective. But that is not the law.

California: The inmates in a habeas corpus action against FCI Terminal Island and FCC Lompoc have asked the Central District of California federal court to order “a highly expedited process — for completion within no more than 48 hours — for BOP to use procedures available under the law to review members of the Class for enlargement of custody… in order to reduce the density of the prison population… and subsequently ordering the release of those granted temporary enlargement.” Separately, the complaint requests injunctive relief under the 8th Amendment to order improved conditions for all prisoners remaining at the institutions in the form of social distancing and provision of hygiene products.

(The May 10 spike represented the explosion of cases at FCI Terminal Island)
                         (The May 10 spike represented the explosion of cases at FCI Terminal Island)

The BOP has moved to dismiss the California suit for the same reasons it has raised elsewhere, that the court lacks the power to grant the asked-for relief and that the plaintiffs have not exhausted remedies. The court should decide the issue this week.

Grinis v. Spaulding, Case No 1:20cv10738 (D. Massachusetts)

Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, Case No 3:20cv569 (D Connecticut)

Hallinan v. Scarantino, Case No 5:20hc2088 (Eastern District of North Carolina)

Wilson v. Williams, Case No 4:20cv794 (Northern District of Ohio)

Fernandez-Rodriguez v. Licon-Vitale, Case No 1:20-cv-03315 (Southern District of New York)

Wilson v. Ponce, Case No 2:20cv4451 (Central District of California)

– Thomas L. Root

BOP Gets Grilled On Home Confinement – LISA Newsletter for June 8, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LAWMAKERS’ QUESTIONS ABOUT BOP HOME CONFINEMENT ARE GETTING SHARPER

Congressional lawmakers last week started raising questions about the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ release of high-profile inmates, and began calling for widespread testing of federal inmates as the number of coronavirus cases has exploded in the federal prison system.

hotseat200608Sen. Kamala Harris and Rep. Hakeem Jeffries sent a letter Monday to Attorney General William Barr and BOP Director Michael Carvajal over the Bureau’s use of its CARES Act home confinement authority. The CARES Act permits the BOP essentially to designate an inmate’s home as his or her prison, and to send the inmate home for as much of his or her remaining sentence as the BOP wishes. This authority lasts as long as there is a national emergency declared by the President (read “pandemic”).

Citing the release of former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort and former Trump lawyer and fixer Michael Cohen to home confinement, the Harris/Jeffries letter said “these examples make clear that there are two systems of justice in our country – one for President Trump and his associates, and another for everyone else. These examples also heighten our concern about the politicization of the Department of Justice.”

The letter demanded to know whether the White House played any role in the release of Manafort or Cohen, and wanted a list of “each official at DOJ and BOP who considered and/or cleared Paul Manafort’s transfer to home confinement.” The lawmakers wrote, “As President Trump’s associates are cleared for transfer, tens of thousands of low-risk, vulnerable individuals are serving their time in highly infected prisons.”

Regular readers of this blog may be forgiven for thinking that the writer is no fan of the ham-handed management at the BOP, but despite this, the Cohen release has gotten a bad rap. The BOP announced that its standards for release of vulnerable inmates included a requirement that they have completed either 50% of their sentences, or 25% of their sentences and have fewer than 18 months remaining.

You may recall that Cohen (like many inmates) was identified as being a home confinement candidate in April. Then he was taken off the list, only to be relisted in late May. When that happened, I did the math. He had done well less than half his sentence, but he had done more than 25%, and he was within 18 months of release as of May 22, 2021. Type his name into the BOP website, and see whether I am wrong.

lovelost200608Of course, last time I checked, Trump is no Cohen fan. Why Harris and Jeffries would think the White House threw him a life ring on early release boggles the mind.  Manafort – who had years to go on his sentence and was well under 50% done – is another matter.

The BOP has disputed that it is giving any preferential treatment to high-profile inmates and has said it has placed 3,544 inmates on home confinement since Barr first issued a memo ordering an increase in the use of home confinement in late March. However, as AP reported last Monday, “the response from the Bureau of Prisons on the coronavirus has raised alarm among advocates and lawmakers about whether the agency is doing enough to ensure the safety of the about 137,000 inmates serving time in federal facilities.”

At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing last Tuesday, Carvajal was grilled by senators over whether minority inmates and those with fewer connections were receiving similar treatment to Manafort in being sent home.

Carvajal said the BOP has transferred more than 3,500 inmates to home confinement since the CARES Act passed. In response to questioning, he explained the BOP began by identifying 27,000 inmates with at least one COVID-19 risk factor. Only about 4,000 of those qualified for home confinement under Attorney General William Barr’s March and April memos. When the BOP decided to include those with only minor disciplinary problems in the last year, the number rose to 5,300.

allen200608Sen. Cory Booker (D-New Jersey) demanded a breakdown of the demographics of people BOP has approved for transfer to home confinement, saying he is concerned racial bias might be impacting the decisions, including in the application of PATTERN. Carvajal did not provide the demographic data at the hearing, but he assured Booker with the sincerity of a bureaucrat that the BOP administration is taking that concern seriously, and that home confinement approval data tracks with the demographics of the federal prison population.

We’ll see if any data are released to support that platitude.

Letter to William Barr from Kamala Harris and Hakeem Jeffries, June 1, 2020

AP, Lawmakers question federal prisons’ home confinement rules (June 1)

Courthouse News, Senators Grill Feds on Inmate Protections During Pandemic (June 2)

– Thomas L. Root

‘Everything’s Great, Nothing to See Here, Folks,’ in BOP COVID-19 Response – Update for June 3, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

WHACK-A-MOLE

The BOP, in the new “normal” for COVID-19, is playing “whack-a-mole” with fresh coronavirus outbreaks at facilities that had been COVID-19 free a few weeks ago, as well as increasing illness numbers at institutions that had seemed to be on the mend, The number of inmate COVID-19 cases last night (1,954) is up about 8 percent from a week ago (1,813). Inmate deaths increased from 65 a week ago to 73. But ominously, the number of BOP facilities with COVID-19 cases hit 59 yesterday, an all-time high (and up from 53 a week ago).

whack200602

New COVID-19 breakouts were reported for FCI Talladega and FMC Devens, to note two facilities. Both had reported infections a month before but were later cleared.

Perhaps more ominous, an FCI Terminal Island inmate died last week after the BOP had earlier said the man had recovered from the illness. Adrian Solarzano tested positive for the virus on April 16 and was placed in isolation. The Los Angeles Times said the BOP deemed him “recovered” on May 10 after he no longer showed symptoms. But five days later — on May 15 — Solarzano was admitted to a hospital after complaining of chest pain and anxiety. He was tested twice for COVID-19, and authorities said both results were negative. But his condition worsened, and he was pronounced dead by hospital staff Sunday.

Meanwhile, the Anchorage Daily News reported that an Alaska man granted compassionate release from FCI Terminal Island, which still has 32 inmates and four staff ill, tested positive one day before his release. The BOP put him on a commercial flight to Anchorage, without ever telling him he had the virus.

fail200526The inmate’s lawyer says a chain of misfires allowed the BOP to swab the inmate for testing on May 5, get positive-for-the-virus lab results on May 7, and release him to fly home commercially on May 8. “There are so many institutional failures you can identify in this,” said Daniel Poulson, a federal public defender who represented the inmate on his compassionate release motion.

A class action lawsuit – looking a lot like successful suits brought in Connecticut about FCI Danbury and Ohio on FCI Elkton – was filed May 26 on behalf of the inmates at the several prisons that are part of the Butner, North Carolina, complex. The suit, Hallanan v. Scarantino, was brought by prisoners represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of North Carolina, the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and the law firm of Winston & Strawn.

The action seeks an injunction ordering Butner to release or transfer vulnerable prisoners, and alleges that Butner officials “have not taken the necessary steps to address the risk faced by the people in their custody. They have opposed motions for compassionate release, and they have failed to order furloughs or transfers to home confinement with sufficient speed and in sufficient numbers. They have failed to make other arrangements within the facility to allow for adequate physical distancing. And they have failed to implement effective isolation, quarantine, testing, screening, hygiene, and disinfecting policies or meaningfully modify movement protocols for staff and incarcerated people.”

Meanwhile, the Intercept reported last week that while BOP’s COVID-19 numbers included 230 halfway house residents at 42 RRCs, it “is clear is that the real number of residents with Covid-19 in federal halfway houses is higher than what appears on the BOP website.” The Crime Report reported that because some halfway houses receive a per diem rate based on the daily population at a given facility, the contractors “have an incentive to keep halfway houses as full as possible. Critics blame such financial incentives for a reluctance to send more people home during the pandemic.”

huckster200603But despite all of the foregoing, everything in the BOP is hunky-dory. Just ask BOP Director Michael Carvajal, who yesterday testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that

In total, from March 1, 2020, the date of the beginning of the national emergency proclaimed by President Trump, until today, 5,323 inmates total have tested positive for COVID- 19 and to-date, 3,784 have recovered. More than 80 percent of infected individuals have not become significantly ill. The number of hospitalized inmates – those who became significantly ill – is currently only 83 in total. And in fact, the number hospitalized is on a significant downward trajectory (see attached), suggesting that our attempts to mitigate the transmission of the virus is effective.

(I added the bold-face for emphasis). The attached graph:

BOPgraph200603

But the fact that 80% of the inmates have not become significantly ill suggests very little (other than good fortune). More telling is that so far, only 10% of the inmate population has been tested for COVID-19.  At the same time, the number of BOP facilities at which the virus is present keeps climbing:BOPJointsCOVID200603

The only certainty is that while the BOP bungles at institutions like Oakdale, Elkton, Danbury, Butner, Fort Worth and Terminal Island go on, the Director and his PR machine will continue to publicly proclaim, “In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bureau has taken, and will continue to take, aggressive steps to protect the safety and security of all staff and inmates, as well as members of the public.”

A parenthetic note: It is doubtful that the BOP’s Medical Director installed much confidence in the members of the Judiciary Committee at yesterday’s hearing. During his testimony, according to Associated Press reporter Mike Balsamo, he wore his face mask incorrectly:

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Oops.

The Intercept, As Coronavirus Spreads in Federal Prisons, Cases in Halfway Houses are Being Undercounted (May 28)

The Crime Report, Halfway Houses Called Another Vector for Coronavirus (May 28)

Anchorage Daily News, He tested positive for the coronavirus. One day later, a federal prison flew him home to Alaska (May 26)

Huff Post, Inside A Federal Prison With A Deadly COVID-19 Outbreak, Compromised Men Beg For Help (May 26)

Hallanan v. Scarantino, Case No. 20-HC-2088 (E.D.N.C., filed May 26, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

59(e) Motion Not A Trap for the Unwary: Supreme Court – Update for June 2, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT HOLDS 59(e) MOTION IS NOT A SECOND BITE OF THE HABEAS APPLE

For the last 2 years, prisoners seeking one final whack at the lawfulness of their convictions or sentences have had to contend with the limitations of a law known by the mouthful “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.”

secondbiteapple190213Even the name of the Act is strange. No one can be opposed to “antiterrorism.” Well, almost no one. But “effective death penalty?” I suppose an effective death penalty is one that leaves you dead. But what Congress was getting at here was a means of limiting what some lawmakers thought were endless habeas corpus actions brought by the condemned, so that their date with the Grim Reaper could be delayed as long as possible. The AEDPA was intended to limit such collateral attacks, so that execution was more likely to kill the prisoner than old age.

But the practical effect of the AEDPA was to severely limit the right of prisoners to the federal writ of habeas corpus. The Act set hard time limits on filing motions under 28 USC 2254 (for state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief) and 28 USC 2255 (for federal prisoners), and – important for today’s topic – the right to bring a second 2254/2255 motion after the first one has been decided.

There was a time when a prisoner could file as many 2254 or 2255 motions (known as “second-or-successive” motions) as a court would accept before concluding that the prisoner was “abusing the writ.” But the AEDPA turned the equitable and flexible “abuse of the writ” doctrine into a rigid statutory rule. Now, a prisoner seeking to file a second-or-successive 2255 motion must first get permission to do so from the court of appeals, and the circumstances under which permission can be granted are tightly circumscribed by 28 USC 2244.

But water seeks and finds its own level, and in the wake of the AEDPA’s passage, crafty prisoners filed all manner of other motions instead of second-or-successive 2255s. They would file petitions for writs of mandamus or error coram nobis or audita querela, or Rule 60(b) motions, or civil actions. The courts would whack down the efforts as fast as the prisoners filed them, holding that a motion by any other name was in effect a second-or-successive 2255 if it attacked the conviction or sentence in some manner.

whack200602In civil procedure, a motion brought under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 60(b) asks a court to set aside a judgment that is already final, based on any of a variety of reasons (the favorite one probably being due to newly-discovered evidence). Rule 60(b) quickly became an inmate favorite, letting the movant try to reopen a former 2255 proceeding well after the fact because of evidence of some new constitutional violation or even just more evidence on an issue already raised and lost. In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled in Gonzalez v. Crosby that such a motion was really a second-and-successive 2255 prohibited by the AEDPA unless the motion was solely addressed to some infirmity in the 2255 proceeding itself.

Fast forward 15 years to yesterday. Texas prisoner Greg Banister lost his 28 USC 2254 proceeding, in which he challenged his state conviction in federal court after losing in all of the Texas courts. He lost in front of the federal district judge, too, but – having access to both a book of federal civil rules and a typewriter – Greg promptly filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Rule 59(e) gives a party one more chance to convince the district court it was wrong in its judgment, and it stops a judgment from becoming final as long as it was filed on time and remains pending.

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The federal judge, not any more impressed by Greg’s Rule 59(e) motion than it had been by the underlying 2254 petition, denied the motion. Greg then filed his notice of appeal. However, the district court ruled that the Rule 59(e) motion had really been a second-or-successive 2254 motion over which the court had no jurisdiction. Therefore, the court said, the Rule 59(e) motion had not kept the court’s judgment from becoming final the day it was entered, and that meant that Greg’s notice of appeal – which would have been timely if Greg’s Rule 59(e) filing had stayed finality of the judgment – was late.

The Fifth Circuit agreed with the trial judge. Thus, Greg was denied his appeal.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court reversed the decision. Justice Kagan, writing for a 7-2 court, observed that the case “is about two procedural rules. First, Rule 59(e) applies in federal civil litigation generally. (Habeas proceedings, for those new to the area, are civil in nature)… The Rule enables a party to request that a district court reconsider a just-issued judgment. Second, the so-called gatekeeping provision of the… AEDPA, codified at 28 USC §2244(b), governs federal habeas proceedings. It sets stringent limits on second or successive habeas applications.”

habeas170510The Supreme Court observed that even under the old “abuse of the writ” standard, courts had historically considered Rule 59(e) motions filed in habeas corpus cases on their merits. Plus, a prisoner may invoke Rule 59(e) only to request “reconsideration of matters properly encompassed” in the challenged judgment. And, the Court said, “’reconsideration’ means just that: Courts will not entertain arguments that could have been but were not raised before the just-issued decision. A Rule 59(e) motion is therefore backward-looking; and because that is so, it maintains a prisoner’s incentives to consolidate all of his claims in his initial application.”

As well, the Rule consolidates appellate proceedings. “A Rule 59(e) motion briefly suspends finality to enable a district court to fix any mistakes and thereby perfect its judgment before a possible appeal,” Justice Kagan wrote. “The motion’s disposition then merges into the final judgment that the prisoner may take to the next level. In that way, the Rule avoids ‘piecemeal appellate review’… Its operation, rather than allowing re-peated attacks on a decision, helps produce a single final judgment for appeal.”

The Court contrasting the speed and efficiency of a Rule 59(e) motion with a Rule 60(b) motion, which can be filed years after the judgment. The availability of a Rule 60(b) motion “threatens serial habeas litigation; indeed, without rules suppressing abuse, a prisoner could bring such a motion endlessly. By contrast, a Rule 59(e) motion is a one-time effort to bring alleged errors in a just-issued decision to a habeas court’s attention, before taking a single appeal. It is a limited continuation of the original proceeding—indeed, a part of producing the final judgment granting or denying habeas relief. For those reasons, Gonzalez does not govern here.”

Banister v. Davis, Case No. 18–6943, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3037 (Supreme Court, June 1, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Double Secret PATTERN Scoring – Update for June 1, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BAIT AND SWITCH?

bait200601For those of you who just came in, the First Step Act, among many other things, mandated that the Federal Bureau of Prisons would employ a state-of-the-art risk and needs assessment program, intended to determine how likely an inmate was to be a recidivist upon release, and what programs would best address the factors making him or her likely to reoffend.

First Step provided that inmates could then earn credits for successfully completing the programming, credits that would enable them to go home earlier or obtain extra halfway house.

It was intended to be a win all around.

The Dept. of Justice conducted a 10-month long study-and-comment period beginning in April 2019 on how to best develop a risk and need assessment program that met First Step standards. That resulted in adoption of PATTERN (“Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs” for you folks who eschew acronyms). PATTERN employed a series of about a dozen static and dynamic factors to provide an aggregate number placing the inmate being tested in the minimum, low, medium or high category.

The original PATTERN factors were very publicly modified last January to lessen the risk that PATTERN might be unconsciously biased so that it returned higher scores for racial minorities. And with that, PATTERN was ready for use.

The BOP announced that all inmates had been rated by PATTERN, but a number of people from different institutions expressed frustration at getting their PATTERN score from BOP staff. A few swore their BOP case managers had no idea what PATTERN even was. Using the revised PATTERN matrix over the past four months, I have helped several people estimate their PATTERN scores. But in almost every case, when the people I helped received their actual PATTERN scores from the BOP, those scores were higher – sometimes much higher – and the reason for the discrepancy was a mystery.

topsecret200601We may now have an answer to the conundrum, but it is not a pretty one. ProPublica, an independent investigative journalism nonprofit, last week reported that it had obtained a 20-page policy document drafted by the BOP earlier this year that altered the PATTERN standards to make “it harder for an inmate to qualify as minimum risk.” The draft document, which does not appear to have been finalized, dramatically changes the maximum number of points for each risk category, according to ProPublica. “It really tanks the whole enterprise if, once an instrument is selected, it can be strategically altered to make sure low-risk people don’t get released,” Brandon Garrett, a Duke University law professor who studies risk assessment, was quoted as saying. “If you change the cut points, you’ve effectively changed the instrument.”

ProPublica said a BOP spokesman had confirmed that the Bureau had revised the risk categories without informing the public. The 2019 report was an “interim report,” ProPublica quotes the spokesman as having said. “The interim report mentioned that DOJ would seek feedback and update the tool accordingly, which was done.” The spokesman said the draft policy document “was not authorized for release.”

So, as Dean Wormer might have said, it’s like a double secret PATTERN score.

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Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote in his Sentencing Policy and Law blog that the ProPublica report was “yet another ugly example of how the Department of Justice acts more like a Department of Incarceration.”

The ProPublica report came in a week in which former Trump lawyer Michael Cohen was sent to home confinement, although he has served only a third of his sentence. The Cohen and Paul Manafort releases, a Marshall Project/NBC report said, are “raising questions about the BOP’s opaque process and its fairness.”

ProPublica reported that Senators Richard Durbin (D-Illinois) and Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), who were First Step Act co-authors, said last week the DOJ’s inspector general has agreed to examine BOP’s compliance with Barr’s home confinement directive and overall response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

ProPublica, Bill Barr Promised to Release Prisoners Threatened by Coronavirus — Even as the Feds Secretly Made It Harder for Them to Get Out (May 26)

Sentencing Law and Policy, “Bill Barr Promised to Release Prisoners Threatened by Coronavirus — Even as the Feds Secretly Made It Harder for Them to Get Out” (May 27)

The Marshall Project, Michael Cohen and Paul Manafort Got to Leave Federal Prison Due to COVID-19. They’re The Exception (May 21)

– Thomas L. Root