Tag Archives: second amendment

2nd Amendment May Be Gunning for Felon-In-Possession – Update for January 13, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

IS SCOTUS TEEING UP § 922(g)(1)?

What would you call someone who is prohibited from possessing a gun but is surrounded by a heavily armed detail?

For now, you’d be right to say it’s a federal inmate on a U.S. Marshal Service prisoner transport. But after next week, you’d be equally correct to say, “President Trump.”

Trumpgun250113

After his January 10 New York sentencing, Trump has something in common with the approximate 10 million Americans prohibited from possessing guns by 18 USC § 922(g)(1), the so-called felon-in-possession statute. Although convicted of 34 of the most anodyne felonies imaginable – paying off a porn star to keep an embarrassing story quiet during his presidential campaign and then hiding the payment as a “legal fee” – Trump is forever prevented from having a gun or ammo by the F-I-P statute, no different from a murderer or drug dealer or tax evader or food stamp fraudster.

This is important because the issue of whether § 922(g)(1) can ban everyone ever convicted of a felony from possessing guns consistent with the 2nd Amendment – a question that is increasingly splitting the federal circuits – may be on the cusp of being accepted for Supreme Court review.

F-I-P “probably does more to combat gun violence than any other federal law,” Justice Samuel Alito proclaimed in his 2019 Rehaif v. United States dissent. “It prohibits the possession of firearms by, among others, convicted felons, mentally ill persons found by a court to present a danger to the community, stalkers, harassers, perpetrators of domestic violence and illegal aliens.”

gunfreezone170330Justice Alito’s soaring if evidence-free endorsement of § 922(g) came several years before the Supreme Court’s 2022 New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen and last June’s United States v. Rahimi decisions suggested that whatever the efficacy of § 922(g), its constitutionality was dubious.

After Rehaif, SCOTUS remanded a host of pending § 922(g) petitions for review for application of its standards. Now, many of those cases – and several fresh ones – are coming back to the Supreme Court. In one of those cases, United States v. Daniels, the 5th Circuit ruled in 2023 that § 922(g)(3) – that prohibited drug users from possessing guns – violated the 2nd Amendment. The government sought SCOTUS review, and the high court remanded the court for reconsideration in light of Rahimi. Last week, the 5th Circuit upheld its earlier decision that Mr. Daniels, although using pot about every other day, could not be prevented from owning a gun under the 2nd Amendment when Bruen and Rahimi standards were applied to his situation.

Last week, The New York Times wrote about the coming battle over whether the F-I-P statute comports with the 2nd Amendment, and – if so – to what extent. The Times observed that Bruen and Rahimi “interpreted the 2nd Amendment in a way that puts major parts of the [F-I-P] law at risk and has left lower courts in, as one challenger put it, a ‘state of disarray.’”

Bruen and Rahimi held that if the conduct addressed by a gun law falls within the 2nd Amendment’s protection – like possession of a gun or ammo certainly does – then the law that regulates that conduct must comport with the principles underlying the 2nd Amendment.

“For example,” Rahimi explained, “if laws at the founding regulated firearm use to address particular problems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within a permissible category of regulations. Even when a law regulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason, though, it may not be compatible with the right if it does so to an extent beyond what was done at the founding. And when a challenged regulation does not precisely match its historical precursors, “it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.”

angels170726The question is no mere angels-on-the-head-of-a-pin argument. Over 7,000 people were convicted under § 922(g)(1) in FY 2022. The last head count (taken in 2010) found more than 19 million Americans have felony convictions and are thus disqualified from possessing guns under § 922(g)(1).

Last month, the 3rd and 4th Circuits issued opinions on the constitutionality of F-I-P, with each coming out differently on the issue. An en banc decision in United States v. Duarte is pending in the 9th Circuit. Today, SCOTUS denied review to Dubois v. United States, where the defendant was convicted of F-I-P for a 10-year-old marijuana possession felony. Instead, the Supreme Court GVR-ed the case for 11th Circuit reconsideration in light of Rahimi. 

whac-a-mole922-250113Regardless of SCOTUS action in Dubois, the § 922(g)(1) issue is ripe for review. Even before any government request that may be filed asking for Supreme Court review of Range v. Attorney General, there are no fewer than 15 petitions for certiorari pending on F-I-P constitutionality. Ohio State law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, said last week, “[T]here is a wide array of churning lower-court litigation assailing gun restrictions well beyond federal criminal prohibitions in 18 USC § 922(g), and so it is certainly possible that the Justices might take up disputes over restrictions on types of guns or other regulatory matters before addressing federal possession prohibitions again. In addition, because the incoming Trump administration could be more supportive of a more expansive view of the 2nd Amendment, the Supreme Court’s approach to § 922(g) disputes might get influence by some new advocacy coming soon from the Justice Department.”

Certainly, the fact that the new President himself is disqualified from possessing any of the nearly 5 million guns owned by the very government he will again command in a week may influence the position his Dept. of Justice takes in any Supreme Court F-I-P litigation.

New York Times, Courts in ‘State of Disarray’ on Law Disarming Felons (January 6, 2025)

New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)

Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019)

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2004)

United States v. Daniels, Case No. 22-60596, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 208 (5th Cir. January 6, 2025)

Sentencing Law and Policy, What kind of Second Amendment case will be next for SCOTUS after Bruen and Rahimi? (January 8, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

A Good Day At The ‘Range’ – Update for December 27, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

Today marks our 1700th post since our beginning in 2015.1700th-241227

RANGE REDUX

A little more than two years ago, a 3d Circuit panel of three appellate judges held that arch-criminal Bryan Range – a man whose rap sheet included traffic tickets, fishing without a license and a misdemeanor false statement 25 years ago to get food stamps for his hungry family – had no 2nd Amendment right to own a hunting rifle or buy a shotgun.

gun-sw629-241227Cooler heads prevailed. Granting en banc review, the Circuit issued a seminal decision, holding that a prior nonviolent offense qualifyingi under 18 USC § 922(g)(1) to prohibit someone from having a gun violated the 2nd Amendment.

The government sought Supreme Court review, but while the petition was pending, the Supremes handed down United States v Rahimi, a case that held that the temporary disarming of someone under a court-issued domestic protection order could be disarmed without offending the 2nd Amendment. SCOTUS remanded all of the 2nd Amendment challenges on its docket – including the Range decision – for reconsideration in light of Rahimi.

Since then, the 8th Circuit decided that Edell Jackson, a convicted drug dealer, could be disarmed under 18 USC § 922(g)(1) consistent with the 2nd Amendment. The 6th Circuit held in United States v. Williams that a felon with violent offenses in his past was properly subject to 922(g)(1) consistent with the 2nd Amendment (leaving open the question of § 922(g)(1)’s effect on people with nonviolent felonies), and – just last week – the 4th Circuit said that anyone with a felony conviction was outside the protection of the 2nd Amendment.

Now, the en banc 3rd Circuit has delivered for Bryan like Santa on Christmas Eve, holding last Monday that Bryan Range’s right to own a gun remains protected by the 2nd Amendment despite his quarter-century-old fraud offense.

Applying New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and Rahimi, the en banc Circuit “reject[ed] the Government’s contention that ‘felons are not among “the people” protected by the 2nd Amendment’ [and] that Bryan Range remains among ‘the people’ despite his 1995 false statement conviction. The 3d then rules that

[h]aving determined that Range is one of “the people,” we turn to the easy question: whether § 922(g)(1) regulates 2nd Amendment conduct. It does.

Against this backdrop, it’s important to remember that Range’s crime—making a false statement on an application for food stamps—did not involve a firearm, so there was no criminal instrument to forfeit. And even if there were, government confiscation of the instruments of crime (or a convicted criminal’s entire estate) differs from a status-based lifetime ban on firearm possession. The Government has not cited a single statute or case that precludes a convict who has served his sentence from purchasing the same type of object that he used to commit a crime. Nor has the Government cited forfeiture cases in which the convict was prevented from regaining his possessions, including firearms (unless forfeiture preceded execution). That’s true whether the object forfeited to the government was a firearm used to hunt out of season, a car used to transport cocaine, or a mobile home used as a methamphetamine lab. And of those three, only firearms are mentioned in the Bill of Rights.

For the reasons stated, we hold that the Government has not shown that the principles underlying the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation support depriving Range of his 2nd Amendment right to possess a firearm.

iloveguns221018The Circuit noted that its decision “is a narrow one. Bryan Range challenged the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) only as applied to him given his violation of 62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 481(a).” This suggests that those with prior convictions might have to apply piecemeal for confirmation that their 2nd Amendment rights remain intact.

The 6th Circuit has implied the same, complaining that the defendant – who was arguing in appeal of a § 922(g)(1) conviction that application of the felon-in-possession statute violated the 2nd Amendment – never sought to have his 2nd Amendment rights confirmed until he was caught with a gun.

For now, Range II is a breath of fresh air. The Circuit held resoundingly that Bryan “remains one of ‘the people’ protected by the 2nd Amendment, and his eligibility to lawfully purchase a rifle and a shotgun is protected by his right to keep and bear arms. More than two decades after he was convicted of food-stamp fraud and completed his sentence, he sought protection from prosecution under § 922(g)(1) for any future possession of a firearm. The record contains no evidence that Range poses a physical danger to others. Because the Government has not shown that our Republic has a longstanding history and tradition of depriving people like Range of their firearms, § 922(g)(1) cannot constitutionally strip him of his 2nd Amendment rights.”

Range creates a clear and well-defined circuit split on the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(1). This is probably not the end of the inquiry, although perhaps the Trump Dept of Justice may not share the current administration’s ardor for seeking certiorari on every 922(g)(1) case to come down the pike.

gun160711Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, noted that Bryan’s “case seems particularly sympathetic, as he was convicted nearly three decades ago of only a relatively minor crime. Because this Range ruling creates a clear circuit split on the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) in some settings, I would expect to see an appeal to the Supreme Court by the US Department of Justice. But maybe the new incoming Justice Department officials might not want to test the application and reach of the 2nd Amendment in this particular ‘narrow’ case.”

Range v. AG United States, Case No. 21-2835 (3d Cir. Dec. 23, 2024) 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32560, at *1

Sentencing Law and Policy, En banc Third Circuit again finds federal felon-in-possesion ban unconstitutional as applied to Byran Range (December 23, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Felon-In-Possession 2nd Amendment Challenges Are Trending – Update for September 20, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

922(g) FELON IN POSSESSION CHALLENGES EXPLODE AFTER BRUEN

The Trace reported last week that 55% of over 2,000 federal court decisions citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen over the past two years have challenged the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)’s ban on felons possessing guns and ammo, “making it the single most frequently contested statute by far.”

guns200304The latest example was handed down two days ago in United States v. Diaz. In that case, the 5th Circuit ruled that just being a felon was insufficient to make the application of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) consistent with the Second Amendment. But where the defendant had been convicted of a felony of theft, that “would have led to capital punishment or estate forfeiture” at the time the Second Amendment was ratified, “disarming [the defendant] fits within this tradition of serious and permanent punishment” and is thus constitutionally applied.

I will write more about Diaz on Monday. For now, back to the trendline:

The Trace reported that “at least 30 of the challenges to the felon gun ban have succeeded. While that ratio may seem small, it marks a stark departure from the past, when effectively none succeeded, and it shows that Bruen has cracked the longstanding consensus that people convicted of serious crimes may constitutionally be barred from gun ownership.”

When weighing the felon gun ban, judges have distinguished between violent and nonviolent offenses. But a former prosecutor told The Trace (an unapologetically anti-gun publication), that drawing the line is tough. “Who’s dangerous? What is your definition of dangerous? It’s easier to have a bright line. But that bright line is gone.”

Andrew Willinger, the executive director of the Duke Center for Firearms Law – which disseminates and supports reliable, balanced, and insightful scholarship and programming on firearms law – said it remains unclear whether banning gun possession among entire categories of people, like felons, is constitutional, particularly when their convictions were for nonviolent offenses that posed no obvious danger to the public.

“You’re really talking about categorical group determinations, rather than any kind of individualized finding of a threat of danger,” Willinger said. “And [United States v.] Rahimi doesn’t endorse [categorical prohibitions], but it also doesn’t rule them out, right?”

gun160711No one can know how the Supreme Court will rule when the felon gun ban finally gets to the high court, although no one can doubt that it will. When Justice Amy Coney Barrett was a 7th Circuit judge, she wrote a dissent favoring restoration of gun rights to nonviolent felons. “That is probably the direction that the Supreme Court is headed if and when it takes up these cases,” Willinger said, “which I think it probably has to do at some point in the near future.”

The Trace, More Than a Thousand Felons Have Challenged Their Gun Bans Since the Supreme Court’s Bruen Decision (September 12, 2024)

United States v. Diaz, Case No. 23-50452, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 23725 (5th Cir., September 18, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Deja Vu for the Second Amendment at the 9th Circuit – Update for July 23, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

9TH CIRCUIT ‘GROUNDHOGS’ DUARTE GUN DECISION

groundhogday240723You may recall that in May, a 9th Circuit three-judge panel held that the 18 USC § 922(g)(1) ban on felons possessing guns was held to violate the Second Amendment rights of a guy convicted of drug trafficking.

Last week, the Circuit withdrew the opinion and set the case for en banc review.

In an unusual and entertaining “dissental” from grant of review, 9th Circuit Judge Lawrence VanDyke wrote,

What would you do if you were stuck in one place and every day was exactly the same, and nothing that you did mattered?’ In the Ninth Circuit, if a panel upholds a party’s Second Amendment rights, it follows automatically that the case will be taken en banc. This case bends to that law. I continue to dissent from this court’s Groundhog Day approach to the Second Amendment.

Judge VanDyke only wrote what everyone already knows to be true. “In this circuit,” he said of the 9th, “you could say that roughly two-fifths of our judges are interested in faithfully applying the totality of the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment precedent when analyzing new issues that have not yet been directly addressed by the Court. The other 17/29ths of our bench is doing its best to avoid the Court’s guidance and subvert its approach to the Second Amendment. That is patently obvious to anyone paying attention. To say it out loud is shocking only because judges rarely say such things out loud….”

Meanwhile, the 8th Circuit last week struck down a Minnesota law preventing 18-to-20-year-olds from carrying handguns in public. The case, Worth v. Jacobson, is noteworthy for its application of United States v. Rahimi: “Minnesota states that from the founding, states have had the power to regulate guns in the hands of irresponsible or dangerous groups, such as 18 to 20-year-olds,” the Circuit wrote. “At the step one ‘plain text’ analysis, a claim that a group is ‘irresponsible’ or ‘dangerous’ does not remove them from the definition of the people.”

groundhogs240723

The 8th ruled that “a legislature’s ability to deem a category of people dangerous based only on belief would subjugate the right to bear arms “in public for self-defense” to “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees,” citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and Rahimi.

The decision leaves little doubt that the 8th sees a ban on the entire category of people once convicted of felonies to be equally untenable under the Second Amendment. What this portends for the inevitable Supreme Court showdown on § 922(g)(1) depends in large part on the Third Circuit in Range and the Ninth’s rewrite of Duarte.

United States v. Duarte, Case No. 22-50048, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17601 (9th Cir., July 17, 2024)

Worth v. Jacobson, Case No. 23-2248, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17347 (8th Cir. July 16, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Ninth Circuit Says 922(g)(1) Unconstitutional for Nonviolent Felons – Update for May 13, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

9th CIRCUIT HOLDS NONVIOLENT FELONS MAY POSSESS GUNS

A 9th Circuit panel held 2-1 last week that a defendant with five prior nonviolent felony convictions was not subject to 18 USC § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on possessing guns or ammo under the Second Amendment.

In what may be the biggest Second Amendment ruling since the 3rd Circuit’s Range v. Attorney General decision last June, the 9th found that the Supreme Court’s New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen decision of 2022 means that § 922(g)(1)’s application to people with nonviolent felony convictions violates the Constitution.

throwgun240513Steve Duarte had five prior felony convictions for fleeing and eluding, possession of a controlled substance, and California’s own  felon-in-possession law when the police pulled him over for erratic driving. Naturally, Steve fled (it had worked so well for him before), and just as naturally, the police caught him. But before he was finally pulled over, Steve tossed a handgun from the car window.

The police recovered both the gun and Steve. The Feds picked up the case, with Steve being charged federally with § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession. 

Steve went to trial and lost. But after Bruen was decided while his appeal was pending, Steve argued that his conviction was unconstitutional. He maintained that under Bruen, § 922(g)(1) “violates the Second Amendment as applied to him, a non-violent offender who has served his time in prison and reentered society.”

The 9th Circuit rejected its 2010 United States v. Vongxay holding that the Second Amendment doesn’t invalidate laws prohibiting convicted felons from possessing guns: “Vongxay is clearly irreconcilable with Bruen and therefore no longer controls because Vongxay held that § 922(g)(1) comported with the Second Amendment without applying the mode of analysis that Bruen later established and now requires courts to perform. Bruen instructs us to assess all Second Amendment challenges through the dual lenses of text and history….”

kidgun240125Applying Bruen, the 9th held that the handgun was an “arm” and Steve’s reason for carrying it–self-defense–“falls within the Second Amendment’s plain language.” The Circuit rejected the Government’s contention that the Second Amendment’s term “the people” excluded convicted felons “because they are not members of the ‘virtuous’ citizenry… Bruen and District of Columbia v. Heller foreclose that argument because both recognized the ‘strong presumption’ that the text of the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms that belongs to ‘all Americans,’ not an ‘unspecified subset’.”

Once the right is established, Bruen holds, the Government must prove that § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition as applied to the defendant in question “is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the” Second Amendment right. The Government could not show that disarming nonviolent felons had a “well-established and representative historical analogue” that “imposed a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense” that was “comparably justified” as compared to § 922(g)(1)’s “sweeping, no-exception, lifelong ban.”

“We do not base our decision on the notion that felons should not be prohibited from possessing firearms,” the decision noted. “As a matter of policy, 922(g)(1) may make a great deal of sense. But ‘the very enumeration of the Second Amendment right’ in our Constitution ‘takes out of our hands… the power to decide’ for which Americans ‘that right is really worth insisting upon.”

The impact of Duarte may be attenuated, however, because the Supreme Court is expected to issue its decision in United States v. Rahimi sometime in the next six weeks. Rahimi, which focuses on whether §922(g)(8)’s prohibition on people subject to a domestic relations protection order possessing guns is constitutional after Bruen, is widely expected to further define the Second Amendment limits of § 922(g).

gunfreezone170330Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman observed that “[t]he location and timing of this ruling is almost as interesting as its substance. Many hundreds of § 922(g)(1) cases are prosecuted in this big circuit each year, so the echo effects of this ruling could prove profound (though I would guess not that many involve persons with only nonviolent priors). And, we are likely only weeks away from the Supreme Court finally handing down an opinion in the Rahimi case to address the application of Bruen to a different section of § 922(g).

Berman observes:

Most folks reasonably expect the Rahimi ruling to provide more guidance on how the Bruen Second Amendment test is to be applied to broad federal criminal gun control laws. I would expect the coming Rahimi opinion will lead to the 9th Circuit reviewing this important Duarte ruling in some way, though whether that is in the form of en banc review or panel reconsideration might turn on what Rahimi actually says.

United States v. Duarte, Case No 22-50048, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 11323 (9th Cir, May 9, 2024)

New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen, 597 US 1 (2022)

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 US 570 (2008)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Split 9th Circuit panel declares federal felon-in-possession criminal law unconstitutional as applied to non-violent offenders after Bruen (May 10, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Rahimi Could Be Watershed for § 922(g) Felon In Possession – Update for April 15, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CHRISTMAS SEASON AT THE SUPREME COURT


scotusxmas240415We’re entering what I always think of as Christmas season at the Supreme Court, the final 10 weeks of what is anachronistically called “October Term 2023.”  With 75% of the Court’s term done, only about 24% of its opinions have been issued. That’s common: there’s always a flurry of decisions issued in late April, May and June, with the most controversial decisions saved for last.

The most consequential criminal case yet to be decided, I believe, is United States v. Rahimi. In 2022, the Supreme Court in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen – relying on the Second Amendment – invalidated a New York law that forbade individuals to carry a gun in public unless they could persuade a government official that they faced some extraordinary threat to their personal safety. Applying “originalism,” the judicial philosophy that legal text should be interpreted based on the original understanding at the time of adoption, SCOTUS reasoned that a right reserved to a tiny subset of the population (the right to carry a gun) was an encroachment on a “right of the people” that the Constitution says “shall not be infringed.”

But Bruen reaches further, holding that when defending a law that deprives an individual of the freedom to keep or bear arms, the government must show that the law “is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” The absence of a historical regulation “distinctly similar” to a modern gun-control law is evidence of the modern regulation’s unconstitutionality.

Laws banning all felons from gun possession were not adopted until the 1960s.

In Rahimi, the 5th Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s Bruen decision, holding that 18 USC § 922(g)(8) – which prohibited people subject to domestic violence protection orders from possessing guns – violated the Second Amendment because, at the time the Second Amendment was adopted, no law keeping people subject to a domestic violence protection order was on anyone’s books.

whataburger230703Writing last week in the New York Times, George Mason University law professor Nelson Lund said, “Under Bruen’s originalist test, Rahimi should be an easy case. The government has not informed the Supreme Court of a single pre-20th-century law that punished American citizens, even those who had been convicted of a violent crime, for possessing a gun in their own homes. Not one.”

The problem is that the subject of the Rahimi case, Zackey Rahimi, is an awful defendant. His ex-girlfriend obtained a domestic violence protection order against him on the ground that he had assaulted her, and he has been charged with several crimes involving the misuse of firearms, including shooting up a What-a-Burger when his friend’s credit card was declined.

“If the court pretends that a historical tradition of such laws existed,” Lund wrote, “it will not be faithful either to Bruen’s holding or to the court’s repeated insistence that the right to keep and bear arms is not ‘a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.’”

But following the Bruen precedent could be tough on the Justices, because the outcry of letting the Zack Rahimis of the nation keep their guns will be fierce. Still, Rahimi may have a silver lining for the § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession statute. If Zack wins, that just about guarantees that Garland v. Rangein which the 3rd Circuit ruled that Bruen means that a guy convicted 25 years before of a minor food stamp fraud is allowed to possess a gun – will be upheld. If Zack loses, I suspect SCOTUS will write some “dangerousness” exception into the Bruen standard. Even if that happens, many  § 922(g)(1) defendants will easily jump that hurdle.

toomuchguns240416Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog last week, Ohio State University law prof Doug Berman said, “In the votes and voices of a number of Justices (and others), I sometimes notice that affinity for originalism starts running out of steam when the outcomes start running in concerning directions. Rahimi may prove to be another data point on that front in the coming months.”

United States v. Rahimi, Case No. 22-915 (Supreme Ct, argued November 7, 2023)

New York Times, The Fidelity of ‘Originalist’ Justices Is About to Be Tested (April 9, 2023)

Sentencing Law & Policy, Is Rahimi an “easy case” for any true originalist to rule for the criminal defendant and against the prosecution? (April 10, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Two District Courts Find Felon-in-Possession Unconstitutional – Update for November 20, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

RUMBLINGS OF 922(g) UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

guns200304Even while the Supreme Court ponders Rahimi – the case that questions whether prohibiting people subject to domestic protection orders from having guns – lower courts are expressing doubts about whether 18 USC § 922(g), the statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms, remains constitutional after the Supreme Court’s 2022 New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen decision.

The leading decision against unconstitutionality, of course, is Range v. Atty General, a 3rd Circuit en banc decision last June. Range held that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to Bryan Range, who had been convicted of a welfare fraud offense 25 years ago. The government has filed for Supreme Court review in Range and asked SCOTUS to sit on the petition until it decides Rahimi next spring.

At the same time, the 8th Circuit went the other way in United States v. Jackson.

Down in the trenches, however, two federal district courts have held in the last several weeks that the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional.

In Chicago, Glen Prince – who the Government said had been robbing people at gunpoint on commuter trains – was arrested late one night while standing on a train platform with a gun. Ten days ago, a district court threw out his pending 18 USC § 922(g)(1) indictment – which alleged that Glen was Armed Career Criminal Act-eligible – as unconstitutional under Bruen.

The court ruled that Bruen did not hold that the Second Amendment categorically protects only law-abiding citizens, despite repeated use of such qualified language as “law-abiding citizens” in the decision. The district judge concluded instead that “the government has not met its burden to prove that felons are excluded from ‘the people’ whose firearm possession is presumptively protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment.

gun160711Because the right of a person with a prior felony conviction to possess a gun is presumptively protected by that Amendment, the court said, Bruen gives the government the authority to prohibit possession only when it can “demonstrate that the statute is part of this nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation… Where a ‘distinctly modern’ regulation is at issue, the government must offer a historical regulation that is ‘relevantly similar’ and… must determine whether historical regulations ‘impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified’ as the burden imposed by § 922(g)(1).

The “first federal statute disqualifying certain violent felons from firearm possession was not enacted until… 1938,” the court noted, finding “no evidence of any law categorically restricting individuals with felony convictions from possessing firearms at the time of the Founding or ratification of the Second or 14th Amendments.” The district court concluded that § 922(g)(1) “imposes a far greater burden on the right to keep and bear arms than the historical categorical exclusions from the people’s Second Amendment right. The government has not demonstrated why the modern ubiquity of gun violence, and the heightened lethality of today’s firearm technology compared to the Founding, justify a different result.”

Glen’s ACCA count was dismissed.

Meanwhile, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a district court declared § 922(g) unconstitutional as applied to a man convicted of a DUI two decades ago.

Ed Williams had a prior drunk-driving conviction when he was arrested for DUI in Philadelphia 20 years ago. The prior conviction, combined with the fact that his blood alcohol concentration was three times the legal limit, made the second offense “a 1st-degree misdemeanor punishable by up to 5 years in prison.” That was enough to trigger § 922(g)(1), which prohibits guns to anyone convicted of a crime carrying a maximum sentence of over a year in prison (not just felonies).

gunb160201The district court ruled that “[p]rohibiting [Ed]’s possession of a firearm due to his DUI conviction is a violation of his Second Amendment rights as it is inconsistent with the United States’ tradition of firearms regulation. The Constitution ‘presumptively protects’ individual conduct plainly covered by the text of the Second Amendment, which includes an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for self-defense… Protected individuals presumptively include all Americans… The Supreme Court has held that an individual’s conduct may fall outside of Second Amendment protection ‘[o]nly if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition…’”

The district court relied on the fact that the 3rd Circuit had “determined that Bryan Range, who had a qualifying conviction under Section 922(g)(1) for making a false statement to obtain food stamps and who wished to possess firearms to hunt and to defend himself, could not be denied his 2nd Amendment right to possess a firearm due to that conviction.” The judge held that “the narrow analysis in Range also applies to the Plaintiff here.”

United States v. Prince, Case No. 22-CR-240, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196874 (N.D. Ill., November 2, 2023)

Williams v. Garland, Case No. 17-cv-2641, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203304 (E.D.Pa., November 14, 2023)

WLS-TV, Chicago judge rules statute barring felons from having guns unconstitutional under Bruen decision (November 16, 2023)

Reason, He Lost His Gun Rights Because of a Misdemeanor DUI Conviction. That Was Unconstitutional, a Judge Says (November 15, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court May Walk Back Bruen, But Constitutionality of 922(g)(1) Still Up In The Air – Update for November 13, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HARD CASES MAKE BAD LAW

The Supreme Court appears poised to refine the New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen Second Amendment test for the constitutionality of gun laws, adding a “dangerousness” element that – surprisingly enough – may help a lot of people convicted of felon-in-possession crimes.

SCOTUS heard argument last week in United States v. Rahimi, the case that challenged whether subsection (8) of 18 USC 922(g) – that bans people subject to domestic protection orders from possessing guns – is constitutional under the Second Amendment.

Mr. Rahimi fired off a few rounds at a fast-food joint when his friend's credit card was declined.
Mr. Rahimi fired off a few rounds at a fast-food joint when his friend’s credit card was declined.

Defendant Zackey Rahimi was a bad actor. While under a domestic protection order for stalking an ex-girlfriend, he ran amok in December 2020, shooting up houses, blasting away at bad drivers, firing at a police car, and even loosing off five rounds into the air when a credit card was declined at a Whataburger. In short, he was the government’s dream defendant for its position that Uncle Sam has the right to keep some people away from guns.

And the government needed a dream defendant. The Supreme Court’s 2022 Bruen decision adopted a new standard, specifically that when the Second Amendment covers one’s conduct (such as possessing a firearm), the government can limit that conduct only by showing “that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s “unqualified command.” Bruen thus superseded the Court’s long-standing practice of allowing the government to weigh its interest in public safety against the possibility of imposing a limitation on Second Amendment rights.

Last week’s argument suggests the Court may write some “public safety” back into the Bruen standard. The government argued that the “destabilizing consequences” of the 5th Circuit’s Rahimi ruling require the Court to uphold 18 USC § 922(g)(8) based on the general tradition of Congress taking guns from people who are not responsible, law-abiding citizens – “for example, people who had been loyal to the British government during the Revolutionary War, felons, and drug addicts,” as Amy Howe put it in SCOTUSBlog.

lawabiding231113But the justices puzzled over what “responsible” or “law-abiding” citizen meant exactly. “Responsibility,” Chief Justice John Roberts told the government, is “a very broad concept.” Justice Amy Coney Barrett agreed that domestic violence is dangerous. But in more marginal cases, she asked, how does the government show that other kinds of behavior are dangerous?

The government argued that “responsibility” is “intrinsically tied to the danger you would present if you have access to firearms.” The government told the Court that it can disarm “dangerous individuals” without violating the  Second Amendment.

Roberts clearly thought Zack had no business possessing a gun: “You don’t have any doubt that your client’s a dangerous person, do you?” he asked Zack’s counsel. Justice Samuel Alito wondered whether Rahimi’s position was that “except for someone who has been convicted of a felony, a person may not be prohibited from possessing a firearm in his home?” Justice Elena Kagan interpreted Rahimi’s position as being that the government had to show a historical regulation “essentially target[ed] the same kind of conduct as the regulation under review” to be constitutional.

Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman said,

There seems to be a majority of Justices (and perhaps even all the Justices) who are prepared to rework the Bruen originalist approach to the Second Amendment to uphold the federal criminal firearm prohibition in Rahimi. But I… was especially struck by the claim by Rahimi’s lawyer that there were no complete criminal bans on the possession of guns by certain people until 1968. If originalism as a mode of constitutional interpretation really cared about history, that would seem to be a quite significant bit of history for resolving this case.

nickdanger220426The Rahimi issue is whether people subject to domestic protection orders are dangerous. But if SCOTUS focuses on “dangerousness,” that suggests that maybe people disqualified from owning firearms because of prior convictions – like Bryan Range in the 3rd Circuit case now awaiting a decision on certiorari – convicted of nonviolent crimes may still benefit from Bruen.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed. 2d 387 (2022)

SCOTUSBlog, Justices appear wary of striking down domestic-violence gun restriction (November 7, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Some press pieces reviewing SCOTUS argument in Rahimi Second Amendment case (November 7, 2023)

Reason, Only ‘Dangerous Individuals’ Lose Their Gun Rights Because of Protective Orders, the Government Says (November 8, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Gunning for Bruen – Update for November 3, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

RAHIMI ORAL ARGUMENT NEXT WEEK IS HIGH STAKES FOR SECOND AMENDMENT

scotus161130On Tuesday, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in United States v. Rahimi, a case that will determine the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(8), the subsection of the federal firearms possession statute that bars people subject to domestic protection orders from having guns or ammo. Rahimi may well do more than that, addressing the constitutionality of all of 922(g) – including possession of guns by felons.

The Supreme Court’s 2022 New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen adopted a new originalist 2nd Amendment standard:

We hold that when the 2nd Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the 2nd Amendment’s “unqualified command.

Bruen superseded the Court’s long-standing practice of allowing the government to weigh its interest in public safety against the possibility of imposing a limitation on 2nd Amendment rights.

Since Bruen, several 922(g)-based restrictions have been declared unconstitutional. Possession of guns by people who are subject to domestic protection orders, who use controlled substances – illegal under 922(g)(3), and who have been convicted of nonviolent criminal offenses, illegal under 922(g)(1), have been held to be unconstitutional under Bruen. The government has sought certiorari on all of these decisions, suggesting to the Supreme Court that a Rahimi decision can clean them all up (and in the government’s favor).

sexualassault211014Social and public health advocates argue in essence that “validating the federal law prohibiting persons subject to domestic violence protective orders from gun possession will literally mean the difference between life or death for many victims of abuse, their family, friends, law enforcement, and the broader community,” as the Bloomberg School of Public Health puts it.

Rahimi provides the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify how lower courts should apply the new framework laid out in Bruen. This will significantly impact the continued viability of current gun laws and the ability of legislators to address what the Bloomberg School calls “the ongoing gun violence epidemic.”

But others suggest that 922(g)(8) looks “more like a political performance than a serious effort to reduce abusive behavior.” Writing in Law & Liberty, George Mason University laws professor Nelson Lund argues that nevertheless, “the government’s brief [in Rahimi] may look like little more than a Hail Mary pass aimed at persuading the Justices to revise or deceptively “clarify” the novel Bruen test. This gambit, however, could very well succeed. The Bruen holding has its roots in a dissenting opinion written by then-Judge Kavanaugh before he was promoted to the Supreme Court. His opinion was exposed to serious objections arising largely from the paucity of historical evidence that could support a viable history-and-tradition test. Bruen suffers from the same weakness, and it was clear from the start that the Court would find itself driven toward reliance on means-end analysis, although not necessarily the very deferential form that Bruen rejected.”

Mr. Rahimi fired off a few rounds at a fast-food joint when his friend's credit card was declined.
Mr. Rahimi fired off a few rounds at a fast-food joint when his friend’s credit card was declined.

Robert Leider, an assistant professor at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School in Arlington, Virginia, said at a Federalist Society forum in September that “the real legal question that everyone is interested in with Rahimi is to see how the court clarifies and applies the text, history and tradition test that it announced two terms ago in Bruen. Unquestionably, the government sought review in this case to water down the test.”

Solicitor General Elizabeth B. Prelogar took steps to expedite the review of Rahimi, citing the “substantial disruption” that invalidation of the domestic violence gun restriction would create. Meanwhile, as the American Bar Association Journal put it, Prof. Leider said the Solicitor General “slow-walked [the] cert petition in another gun case, in which the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit in June struck down the so-called felon-in-possession statute, barring those sentenced to prison for more than one year from possessing a firearm.”

That 3rd Circuit case, Range v. Atty General, involves a man convicted of food stamp fraud 25 years before who was prevented from buying a gun.

“Mr. Rahimi is the poster child for irresponsible gun possession,” Leider said. “I think the government wanted this case and not the Range welfare fraud case because this case is much easier on the judgment line.”

He’s right that Rahimi is a tough case for those hoping that Bruen may ultimately limit the proscription on nonviolent felons owning guns (such as the case in the 3rd Circuit en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General. The evidence suggests that the presence of firearms in abusive relationships increases the risk of injury and death substantially.

After seeking cert on the Range decision, the government suggested the Court sit on the petition until a decision is handed down in Rahimi.

United States v. Rahimi, Case No. 22-915 (oral argument November 7, 2023)

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. —, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022)

Johns Hopkins University, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Questions and Answers on U.S. v. Rahimi, the Major Gun Case Before the Supreme Court During its 2023–2024 Term (October 10, 2023)

American Bar Association Journal, Supreme Court takes on first major gun case since landmark ruling last year softened regulations (November 2, 2023)

Law & Liberty, Domestic Violence and the Second Amendment (November 1, 2023)

USA Today, Domestic violence abuse victims need more protections — not less stringent gun regulations (November 2, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

3rd Circuit Sharply Limits § 922(g)(1) ‘Felon-In-Possession’ – Update for June 8, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

A DAY AT THE ‘RANGE’

manyguns190423In a case with substantial implications for gun possession rights, the United States Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit ruled Tuesday that 18 USC § 922(g)(1) – the so-called felon-in-possession statute – is unconstitutional as applied to a man convicted of a nonviolent crime over 25 years ago.

The en banc decision ruled 11-4 that Bryan Range – convicted of 62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 481(a) back in 1995 for falsely stating his family’s income to qualify for food stamps – nevertheless “remains one of ‘the people’ protected by the 2nd Amendment, and his eligibility to lawfully purchase a rifle and a shotgun is protected by his right to keep and bear arms.”

Although 18 USC § 922(g)(1) is often described in shorthand as prohibiting people convicted of felonies from possessing guns, it is more nuanced than that. In fact, it prohibits people convicted of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from firearms and ammo possession (and some crimes are excluded in 18 USC § 921(a)(20) from the calculus).

Under Pennsylvania law, Bryan’s crime was a misdemeanor, one for which he served probation only. But it was punishable by up to five years imprisonment, regardless of what the legislature called. The maximum statutory penalty is what matters to § 922(g)(1), and that theoretical max prohibited Bryan from gun possession.

After Bryan tried and failed to buy a shotgun, he sued in federal court for a declaratory judgment that § 922(g)(1) violated his 2nd Amendment rights. The district court disagreed, and a three-judge 3rd Circuit panel upheld that denial last November. But then, a majority of current 3rd Circuit appellate judges voted last January to hear the case en banc.

gun160711Last June, the Supreme Court changed the 2nd Amendment landscape in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. In that decision, SCOTUS held “that when the 2nd Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct… Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the 2nd Amendment’s ‘unqualified command’.”

The 3rd ruled that the Government had failed to show that “our Republic has a longstanding history and tradition of depriving people like Range of their firearms.” Judge Thomas Hardiman (who was in the running for the Supreme Court seat now occupied by Neil Gorsuch), wrote for the majority. He noted in a footnote that “[e]ven rebels who took part in the 1787 tax uprising in Massachusetts known as Shays’ Rebellion could generally get their weapons back after three years,” and concluded that punishing Bryan Range by revoking his gun rights for an offense that did not involve violence gave lawmakers too much power “to manipulate the 2nd Amendment.” Thus, “§ 922(g)(1) cannot constitutionally strip him of his 2nd Amendment rights.”

Judge Hardiman called the ruling a narrow one, but how that could be so is questionable. Dissenting Judge Cheryl Ann Krause, an Obama appointee to the 3rd Circuit, complained that while it “describes itself as limited ‘to Range’s situation,’ today’s opinion is not designated non-precedential as appropriate for a unique individual case, but has precedential status, necessarily reaching beyond the particular facts presented. It is also telling that it tracks precisely the 5th Circuit’s deeply disturbing opinion in United States v. Rahimi, which, finding no precise historical analogue, struck down as unconstitutional the ban on gun possession by domestic abusers.”

(Note: Rahimi struck down as unconstitutional the ban on gun possession by people subject to domestic violence protection orders, which can be and often are entered without hearings and without counsel. It’s a stretch – if not outright disingenuous – to call someone subject to such an order a “domestic abuser”).

Dissenting Judge Patty Shwartz complained that “[w]hile my colleagues state that their opinion is narrow, the analytical framework they have applied to reach their conclusion renders most, if not all, felon bans unconstitutional.”

gunfreezone170330The New York Times said “Judge Hardiman’s opinion directly addressed many of the core issues raised in the Supreme Court’s decision last June, in expansive language that seemed to suggest that the constitutional foundation of many gun laws was eroding.”

The Range decision created an immediate Circuit split due to last week’s 8th Circuit United States v. Jackson decision, which I wrote about a few days ago. But whether the Government seeks to rush Range to the Supreme Court like it has done with Rahimi is uncertain. Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman is not convinced the Solicitor General would find Range a good certiorari candidate:

Though the federal government would normally seek certiorari review of this kind of ruling, I wonder if the feds might seek to urge the Supreme Court to take up a different case raising the same issue. Bryan Range’s case seems particularly sympathetic, as he was only convicted nearly three decades ago of making a false statement to obtain food stamps in violation of Pennsylvania law. But, whatever the vehicle, the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) is clearly one (of a number of) post-Bruen 2nd Amendment issues the Supreme Court is going to have to confront.

Range v. AG United States, Case No. 21-2835, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 13972 (3d Cir. June 6, 2023)

New York Times, Man Convicted of Nonviolent Crime Can Own Gun, U.S. Court Rules (June 6, 2023)

Associated Press, US appeals court says people convicted of nonviolent offenses shouldn’t face lifetime gun ban (June 6, 2023)

United States v. Jackson, Case No 22-2870, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 13635 (8th Cir. June 2, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, En banc Third Circuit rules, based on Bruen, that federal felon-in-possession law is unconstitutional when applied to nonviolent, nondangerous offender (June 6, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root