We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

YOU’LL NEVER FORGET YOUR FIRST FELONY

The Supreme Court heard oral arguments last week in United States v. Gary and Greer v. United States, two cases that would dramatically increase the benefits to defendants flowing from Rehaif v. United States.

But the devil’s in the details, and the prospects for neither one looks good. While it’s dangerous to predict the outcome of a case based on what you hear at oral argument, the Supremes seemed skeptical of the relief the defendants were urging and perhaps just a little uneasy over the genie that Rehaif let out of the bottle.

Mike Gary pled guilty to an 18 USC 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession charge. After Rehaif held that a defendant had to actually know that he or she fell within a class that was prohibited from having a gun, the 4th Circuit held that the district court’s failure to tell Mike that the government had to prove he knew he was a felon at the time he possessed the weapon was a “structural” error, and therefore his conviction had to be vacated whether or not the error made any difference in the proceeding’s outcome.

In the second case, Greg Greer was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession. After Rehaif, the 11th Circuit reaffirmed his conviction on the ground that, according to his presentence report (which was not part of the evidence at trial), Greg had previously been convicted of five felonies and had served more than a year in prison. Therefore, the court reasoned, it wouldn’t have made any difference if his jury had been properly instructed about the government’s obligations, because if Rehaif had been the law, the government would easily have shown that Greg knew he was a prohibited felon. At the Supreme Court, Greg was arguing that the appellate court should have limited itself to the evidence in front of the jury (which of course contained nothing about Greg’s checkered past).

The justices were overtly skeptical of Greg’s argument. Justice Thomas asked, “Do you have any doubt in this case that the government would have preferred to introduce the evidence that you say is lacking here?… Your approach would put someone who stipulates in a better position than someone who actually went to trial.”

Justice Breyer, who wrote Rehaif, seemed to be looking for a way to limit any further fallout from the decision. “Why only look at the trial record?” he asked, before posing a number of hypotheticals. “There could have been something that happened before the trial [that is] an error,” the justice noted. “There could be something on the list of witnesses, there could be a limitation on what’s asked,” Breyer continued. “The possibilities are endless. So where does this idea come from you can only look at certain things?” he asked. “I’m totally at sea as to why or how to draw some line.”

The justices seemed similarly skeptical of Mike Gary’s case, with many noting that it could have widespread effects on existing convictions. Speaking about the proposition that an individual’s felony status “is not the kind of thing that one forgets,” Justice Kavanaugh said, “from that premise it seems odd to throw out all of the convictions” and asked Mike’s lawyer if he believed that premise to be true.

“The question shouldn’t be whether defendants are typically aware of the element or the element is typically satisfied,” Gary’s counsel replied. “The question should be whether the defendant when he pleads guilty understood that that was part of the charge and therefore was given an opportunity to exercise his own free will.”

Both cases will be decided by the end of June.

SCOTUSBlog, Justices wrestle with procedural issues stemming from their own federal criminal-law decision (April 21, 2021)

Law & Crime, SCOTUS Seems to Have Heeded Justice Alito’s Warning, Appears Unlikely to Reverse Gun Convictions (April 20, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

AIN’T SEEN NUTHIN’ YET

With the exception of the Fourth Circuit (which is a story for another time), courts of appeal agree that people convicted of being “prohibited persons” in possession of a gun have to meet the F.R.Crim.P. 52(b) “plain error” standard to raise the Supreme Court’s Rehaif case on appeal where they did not do so at trial.

That’s pretty relevant, because until Rehaif was handed down a year ago, no one was raising the issue at trial.

“Plain error” means you have to show that the trial court erred, that the error was plain (or obvious), that it affects your substantial rights, and that the error seriously affects the integrity of the justice system. In Rehaif cases, this means that the defendant had to show that there was a reasonable probability he or she would not have entered a guilty plea or been convicted if the error had not occurred.

To do this, the courts look at how likely it was the defendant would have known he or she belonged to a class of people not allowed to have guns. Sometimes that’s pretty easy to figure out: the defendant knew he or she had previously served more than a year for some prior crime. In that case, it’s hard for a defendant to argue he did not know that he had been convicted of a crime carrying a sentence of more than a year.

But what if the prohibited class the defendant belongs to is not all that clear? Bob Triggs’ kid made some stupid social media posts that suggested shooting up his school, so the police checked to be sure the boy had no access to firearms. In the process, they found that Bob – who had a few hunting rifles – had a 10-year old domestic battery misdemeanor. A conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is as disqualifying for gun possession as a prior felony under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

Bob said he had no idea he couldn’t have a gun, and he surrendered the rifles to the police. They turned it over to the U.S. Attorney (who rarely sees a case unworthy of throwing the might of the United States government at the hapless defendant), and Bob got indicted for a § 922(g) offense.

(In another world, the cops would have said, “Gee, Bob, now you know you can’t have guns,” and would have turned his rifles over to  the someone to sell them and given Bob the proceeds. But this is America, the world’s leading incarcerator of citizens. We just had to prosecute this hapless guy).

After Bob got convicted, Rehaif – which held that a defendant had to know that he or she was a member of a group prohibited from possessing a gun – was decided, and Bob raised it on appeal under the “plain error” standard. The 7th Circuit agreed the district court’s conviction of Bob without proof he knew he was in a prohibited class was an error, and it was pretty obvious.

The Circuit said to establish prejudice from the Rehaif error, Bob had to show a “reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of the government’s burden to prove” he knew of the error.

“Many prosecutions under § 922(g) involve violations of… the felon-dispossession provision, which prohibits firearm possession by any person ‘who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,’ the 7th said. “Under this simple definition, a defendant will have difficulty establishing prejudice from a Rehaif error because the new knowledge element is quite easy to prove, especially when the defendant previously served more than a year in prison… A defendant in that situation ‘will face an uphill battle to show that a Rehaif error in a guilty plea affected his substantial rights’ because the new understanding of the knowledge element doesn’t materially change the guilty-plea calculus.”

But what constitutes a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, the Circuit ruled, is a very complex thing. “Given the comparative complexity of this definition,” the 7th Circuit said, “the guilty-plea calculus changes. Rehaif improves Triggs’s trial prospects, giving him at least a plausible argument that he was unaware that his 2008 battery conviction is a crime of this nature.”

The 7th Circuit may yet rue the day it held that 922(g)’s complexity gave a defendant a plausible reason to believe he was allowed to own guns. The definition of “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” seems pretty straightforward until one reads the pretzel-like definition set out in 18 USC § 921(a)(20). It turns out that sometimes a crime is not a “crime” and a two-year sentence does not exceed one year, and other state laws having nothing to do with disqualifying crime turn it into an offense that doesn’t count.

So the 7th says that § 922(g)(9)’s complicated? You ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

United States v. Triggs, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 20542 (7th Cir. July 1, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root