Tag Archives: 18 usc 3582

Thanksgiving Week: What to Have for Dessert? – Update for November 29, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DESSERT

pumpkinpie241129It can be hard to pick which traditional Thanksgiving pie – pumpkin or apple – to eat as a finish to the feast. But a tough choice like this one usually ends with eating both, not a decision to just forget dessert altogether and go home.

The 7th Circuit had a problem last week deciding whether a prisoner appealing the denial of his 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release motion should be given a court-appointed attorney. Ultimately, the Circuit decided not to decide.

The 7th took only three pages to deny the appeal but needed another 43 pages to express the differing views of the three-judge panel.

The inmate had an appointed attorney in district court, but when the lawyer withdrew, the Circuit provisionally appointed a replacement to argue whether the appeals court had the authority under 18 USC § 3006A “to appoint counsel at public expense—whether in an individual case or through a general order—for defendants… seeking a reduction of their sentences under 18 USC 3582.”

The 7th has previously held that district courts are not required to appoint counsel in compassionate release proceedings, “but it does not prohibit them from doing so.”

The panel found that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the compassionate release motion, so it did not reach the issue of whether it had the power to appoint counsel: “In Judge Lee’s view… the principle of judicial restraint counsels that we not reach the issue, because we can affirm the district court’s denial… on narrower grounds… Judge Hamilton has doubts about whether the panel should address the merits, but explains why he believes the language of the Criminal Justice Act gives federal courts discretion to make such appointments… Judge Scudder believes it appropriate to resolve the merits question, and he would hold that the plain language of § 3006A does not authorize appointments of counsel in § 3582(c) proceedings.”

applepie241129One judge wanted pumpkin pie, one wanted apple pie, and one wanted both. So the panel decided on no dessert at all. However, with inmates frequently asking courts to appoint counsel, it is worthwhile noting that serious legal questions may make appointment impossible.

United States v. Bonds, Case No. 24-1576, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 29690 (7th Cir., November 21, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Some Pro Tips for Compassionate Release D-I-Y’ers from the 1st Circuit – Update for August 8, 2024

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1ST CIRCUIT HANDS OUT A FEW PRO TIPS FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE MOTIONS

The 1st Circuit reminded us last week that 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release decisions are granted largely in the district court’s discretion, and if the district court thinks you’re still a danger to the community, don’t expect love from the court of appeals.

walkedwomantalkedman240808Michel D’Angelo robbed a bank in 2012 dressed like a woman and carrying a purse he told tellers contained a bomb. His lengthy criminal history of burglary, theft, disorderly conduct, criminal threatening, multiple assaults, and trafficking in prison contraband, qualified him under the law at the time as a Guidelines career offender (sentencing range of 210-240 months. The judge varied downward because of Mike’s mental health challenges and gave him 180 months.

In 2022, 11 years after the bank robbery, Mike sought compassionate release. He argued that changes in Guidelines interpretation meant that he would not be a career offender if he were sentenced today, that he had been rehabilitated, and that the BOP had not adequately treated his mental conditions.

The district court denied the compassionate release motion. Last week, the 1st affirmed, finding that the district court’s holding that Mike was still a danger to the public — despite his showing on other 3553(a) factors — was well within the judge’s discretion.

The case arose when USSG § 1B1.13 was still advisory, making some of its holding inapplicable to current compassionate release motions. However, there are two takeaways worth considering for those seeking compassionate release now.

nickdanger220426First, the district court found Mike to still be a danger because he had a long criminal history even before robbing the bank; the robbery was “a frightening and life-endangering offense;” and he had “accumulated a tumultuous disciplinary record while incarcerated.” Also, Mike’s recidivism score was “high,” a fact more important to the Circuit than Mike’s argument that his age – 42 years old – made him statistically less likely to commit new crimes.

The lesson here is that if you have a significant criminal history (Mike’s was a “V”), if you committed a crime of violence, or if you have a checkered institutional disciplinary record, you may have a steep hill to climb getting a compassionate release. If your PATTERN score is a “low” or “minimum,” you should soundly thump that fact.

Second, the 1st agreed that Mike wouldn’t be a career offender if sentenced today, but it held that that fact alone was not extraordinary and compelling. Look to § 1B1.13(b)(6) (change in sentencing law that produces a gross disparity and the prisoner has served 10 years and his or her “individualized circumstances” justify a reduction. Mike had gotten a downward variance sentence to 180 months because of his mental health problems, within what his Guidelines would have been without career criminal status. No gross disparity here, and Mike’s “individualized circumstances,” mainly his institutional conduct and progress, were not good.

The tip is that a change in the law alone is not enough to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for grant of a compassionate release motion. Read and follow § 1B1.13(b)(6).

nothingcoming210420The final pro tip in this decision arose from Mike’s complaint that the district court was obligated to correctly calculate his lower Guidelines range (without career offender) before performing the 18 USC § 3553(a) “sentencing factors” analysis. The 1st disagreed, finding that the district judge “correctly calculated this lower Guidelines range before explaining why § 3553(a) did not favor reducing Mike’s sentence. Because the district court performed its § 3553(a) analysis after assuming that the career-offender enhancement would not apply, we gather from context that it implicitly considered that Guidelines range as part of its analysis.”

This holding suggests that any compassionate release motion raising the argument that the movant would not have been sentenced as harshly today should include a reasonably detailed analysis of the correct Guideline range and point out that any § 3553(a) analysis should start from the adjusted lower range.

United States v. D’Angelo, Case No. 22-1875, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 18794 (1st Cir. July 30, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

2255s Motions Aren’t Compassionate (and Vice Versa) – Update for June 14, 2024

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INNOCENCE ≠ COMPASSION

paid240615Everyone knows that paying your bills on time helps you build a strong credit history. That is probably the least of a host of good reasons for not doing what New York City drug lord Jeffrey Minaya did in 2000 instead of paying a Mexican cartel the $6.5 million he owed for 274 kilos of cocaine. He decided instead to whack the two cartel members who had been sent to the Big Apple to collect.

The drug lord hired Patrick Darge to shoot the bill collectors, and Pat, in turn, subcontracted backup duties to his cousin Joe Fernandez. The two guys sent from Mexico to pick up the loot were murdered in a rather ham-handed hit, but somehow the authorities were stymied as to the identity of the perps for over a decade.

However, in 2011, after Joe had accumulated a wife and kids, a regular job, and a clean record ever since the murder he was allegedly part of, he got picked up and charged.

pantsonfire160805Joe went to trial, where the government deployed his cousin, star witness Patrick Darge, to testify against him. This was significant because no one else could put Joe at the murder scene. On cross-examination, Pat admitted that as a cooperating witness in a different case, he lied to government agents and the judge about his involvement in two prior murders, his history of credit card fraud, the extent to which he dealt drugs, his brother’s involvement in his drug dealing business, and his brother’s habit of “shooting people.” Despite Pat’s admitted prevarications, the jury believed him and convicted Joe both of an 18 USC § 1958 murder-for-hire conspiracy resulting in two deaths and use of a firearm to commit two murders in violation of 18 USC §§ 924(j)(1). Joe was sentenced to two life sentences.

Joe appealed, arguing that Pat’s history of lies meant the jury should not have believed him. Joe lost. He then filed a 28 USC § 2255 post-conviction motion, arguing he was actually innocent and that the § 924(j) conviction in light of United States v. Davis. The court vacated the § 924(j) conviction, leaving Joe with only one life sentence to serve.

innocent161024In 2020, after about nine years in prison, Joe filed a motion for sentence reduction under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A), a so-called compassionate release motion. Joe argued that his potential innocence in light of Pat’s non-credible testimony and the disparity between his life sentence and the considerably lower sentences imposed on his co-defendants were “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction.

The district court was persuaded by Joe’s potential innocence and sentencing disparity grounds:

Although there is factual support for the jury’s verdict and the verdict has been affirmed, a certain disquiet remains. Did Patrick Darge sacrifice his cousin, Petitioner Fernandez, to save his brother, Alain Darge? Patrick and Alain ran to the Dominican Republic directly after the murders of Cuellar and Flores. Joe Fernandez did not. Fernandez was arrested 11 years after the murder, in his home, with his family. He was earning a living and had no record of violence. Patrick Darge had considerable motive to lie and had lied before to the Government in order to obtain more favorable treatment for himself and his brother. Additionally, the physical evidence indicated that all but one bullet fired at the scene of the crime came from a .380 caliber gun, which was the gun Darge used, despite the fact that Darge claimed Fernandez fired nearly all the shots.

The district court granted Joe’s motion, and Joe went free. Until this week, when the 2nd Circuit reversed the district court.

The 2nd held that Joe’s sentencing disparity is not an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence “under the plain meaning of the statute.” It is not extraordinary, the 2nd held, “(indeed, it should be expected) that a defendant who proceeds to trial and is convicted receives a longer sentence than his co-defendants who plead guilty to different crimes, accept responsibility, and assist the government by cooperating.” Nor is the disparity between Joe’s sentence and his co-defendants’ sentences “compelling”. Disparities between the sentences of coconspirators can exist for valid reasons, the Circuit ruled, “such as… the offenses of conviction, or one coconspirator’s decision to plead guilty and cooperate with the government.”

As for Joe’s potential innocence claim, the appellate court held that “a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment, unless there is a “clear intention otherwise.” The post-conviction remedy afforded by 28 USC § 2255 “places explicit restrictions on the timing of a habeas petition and the permissibility of serial petitions… Neither of these restrictions appl[ies] to a § 3582 motion.” The Circuit observed:

If Congress had intended to permit defendants to circumvent the strictures of 28 USC § 2255 by making challenges to the validity of a conviction cognizable on a compassionate release motion, it would surely have said so. Absent such a clear declaration of intent, we conclude that since challenges to the validity of a conviction must be made under § 2255, they cannot qualify as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Compassionate release is not a channel to habeas relief or an end run around the limitations of § 2255.

guiltyproveninnocent230807Joe may have a pretty strong argument that he is innocent, a sacrificial lamb for the sins of his cousins. But if there’s a procedural means of getting him to a point that a court can actually entertain that claim, compassionate release is not it.

United States v. Fernandez, Case No. 22-3122-cr, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 14133 (2d Cir. June 11, 2024)

United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019)

– Thomas L. Root

District Court’s Detailed Compassionate Release Decision Is a Treat – Update for December 8, 2023

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THE HOPEFUL FUTURE OF COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

From the 11th Circuit last week – traditionally, the place where motions for compassionate release went to die – comes a detailed, thoughtful order granting release to a prisoner serving a life sentence for drug distribution.

cocaine170511Bill Vanholten was about 12 years into a life sentence for trafficking cocaine, a sentence he got because he had two prior convictions for selling two dime bags of marijuana, about $20.00 worth, to two undercover cops when he was 19 years old in 1994. In January 2012, Bill was charged with possessing 10 kilograms of cocaine. At the time, a defendant charged with that quantity of cocaine who had two prior drug felonies would get a mandatory life sentence if the government filed what is known as a 21 USC § 851 enhancement with the court.

The government has traditionally used 851 enhancements as a bludgeon to force defendants to cooperate. If the defendant won’t snitch, the government files the 851 and rachets up the minimum sentence dramatically. Bill wouldn’t budge, refusing to identify his source for the coke, so the government filed the 851 notice of two prior drug felonies, a 2006 federal coke charge and one of the “dime bag” offenses. Those two priors mandated a life-without-parole sentence, which, the court said unhappily, it was required to impose.

Six years later, the First Step Act modified the list of prior offenses qualifying for 851 enhancements and lowered the mandatory minimums. After First Step, the “dime bag” offense would not count as a serious drug offense for a 21 USC § 851 enhancement. On top of that, the mandatory minimum sentence for a single 851 enhancement prior dropped to 15 years. If Bill had been sentenced after First Step passed, his court would have only been required to sentence him to 15 years.

compassion160124The First Step Act also permitted defendants to file sentence reduction motions – so-called compassionate release requests – under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A). Before the Act, only the Federal Bureau of Prisons could bring such a request on an inmate’s behalf, an event as rare as a snow flurry on July 4th. All that stood in the way was the Sentencing Commission’s guideline on compassionate release, USSG § 1B1.13. That guideline, written prior to First Step, narrowly circumscribed what “extraordinary and compelling” reason could justify sentencing reduction and required that any reduction be “consistent” with applicable Sentencing Commission policy.

Section 1B1.13 could have been updated by the Sentencing Commission in 2019, but the Commission lost its quorum through the expiration of commissioner terms only a few days after the First Step Act passed.

Most federal circuits recognized the obvious, that the creaking 1B1.13 relic – written long before First Step was even dreamed of – was Commission policy but not “applicable” Commission policy. Only two of the 12 federal circuits remained mired in the past, not permitting any reason for compassionate release not specifically written into the guideline. Bill’s Circuit was one of them.

Four years later, the Sentencing Commission regained a quorum and immediately set to amending 1B1.13. The amendment became effective on November 1, 2023.

sarcodiosis23128In 2022, Bill moved for compassionate release, citing his sarcodiosis, a chronic condition characterized by inflammation in the lungs and other organs, as justification. His court-appointed an attorney to help Bill, who added an argument that the change in the law provided an independent reason for compassionate release. Bill’s lawyer asked the court to sit on the motion until the new 1B1.13 became effective. When it did, the government agreed that Bill’s medical condition established “extraordinary and compelling” reasons warranting release both alone and combined with other factors.

Last week, the court reduced Bill’s life sentence to time served (which, considering Bill’s accumulated good time, now equals 15 years.

The district court’s decision is a model of careful scholarship and proper application of the new 1B1.13. The court relies on Sentencing Commission studies to hold that Bill’s sentence

is an outlier among drug trafficking offenders… Federal prosecutors do not uniformly seek § 851 enhancements, so sentences for offenders like him vary considerably… Some judicial districts see § 851 notices filed for as many as 75% of eligible drug trafficking defendants whereas other districts do not see them filed at all. Since most offenders confronted with an enhanced sentence cooperate, a little less than 4% of eligible defendants ultimately face an enhanced penalty at sentencing… Those in the 4% receive prison terms roughly ten years longer than the average sentence for similar offenders who evaded the enhanced penalty, and twelve years longer than the average for eligible offenders against whom the notice was never filed.

The court candidly admitted that Bill “received one of these unusually long sentences as a de facto punishment for not cooperating.” While the court acknowledged that Bill’s sentence could not be completely compared with a 13-year sentence a cooperator with a similar record had received (because Bill did not cooperate and thus did not receive credit for doing so), it noted nonetheless that the differences between the defendants “do not wholly account for the more than twenty-year disparity between a thirteen-year prison term and life behind bars.”

lock200601The court observed that Bill “received a sentence at least twenty years longer than the fifteen-year minimum Congress now deems warranted for offenders like him. He had a criminal history category of II, comprised entirely of nonviolent offenses, which would warrant nothing close to a life sentence under the guidelines. Whatever ‘significant period of incarceration’ this Court may have settled on at the original sentencing, had it any discretion back then, would not have come within twenty years of Mr. Vanholten’s remaining life expectancy. A difference of a generation between the actual sentence and the sentence Mr. Vanholten would likely receive today no doubt makes for a gross disparity.”

Similarly, the court cited medical studies establishing that sarcodiosis fit the new 1B1.13(b)(1)(B) “extraordinary and compelling” reason that a defendant (1) is suffering from a serious physical or medical condition that (2) substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and (3) from which he is not expected to recover. “Though he is not at death’s door,” the court ruled, Bill’s “medical records show that his sarcoidosis is both chronic and persistent, hurting his lungs and pulmonary function. He is unlikely to recover from it. According to the opinion of medical experts, Mr. Vanholten’s morbidity puts him at a heightened risk of a sudden and serious cardiac event, and a decreased life expectancy,” citing medical journals. At the same time, the court relied on Bill’s records showing infrequent consultation with specialists and noted that the Dept. of Justice “makes no secret that the BOP’s chronic medical staffing shortage has made its ability to deliver healthcare a challenge.”

MerryChristmasBill231208The court released Bill, effective a week from today. Beyond the happy ending for a badly over-sentenced defendant, the court has given prisoners an early Christmas gift, a roadmap for effectively negotiating compassionate release under the new 1B1.13.

United States v. Vanholten, Case No. 3:12-cr-96 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2023), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213764

U.S. Sentencing Commission, Application and Impact of 21 U.S.C. § 851: Enhanced Penalties for Federal Drug Trafficking Offenders (2018)

– Thomas L. Root

Mr. Explainer Here: All About Guidelines Retroactivity – Update for July 20, 2023

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MR. EXPLAINER TACKLES RETROACTIVE GUIDELINES

USSC160729The good news is that the U.S. Sentencing Commission is likely to approve a proposal that two Guidelines changes it adopted in April should be retroactive for people already sentenced.

The better news is that Congress seems too busy to try to gin up a veto of any of the provisions approved by the USSC and submitted to the legislators for review.

Today’s guest is Mr. Explainer, who is here to guide us through the fine print of getting retroactive application of the two changes:

• First, no one can file a motion for retroactive application of the two Guidelines changes until six months pass from the time the USSC sends the proposed retroactivity order to Congress. That means that all of the inmates doing a happy dance in anticipation of November 1, 2023, will have to wait at least until Punxatawny Phil sees his shadow.

• Second, the two changes have conditions attached:

(a) The zero-point change in the Guidelines (new USSG § 4C1.1) says that defendants are eligible for a 2-level reduction in their Total Offense Level (usually good for a two-sentencing range reduction) if they had zero criminal history points and meet all of the following conditions:

(1) had no adjustment under § 3A1.4 (Terrorism);

(2) did not use violence or credible threats of violence in connection with the offense;

(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury;

(4) the offense is not a sex offense;

(5) the defendant did not personally cause substantial financial hardship;

(6)  no gun was involved in connection with the offense;

(7) the offense did not involve individual rights under § 2H1.1;

(8) had no adjustment under § 3A1.1 for a hate crime or vulnerable victim or  § 3A1.5 for a serious human rights offense; and

(9) had no adjustment under § 3B1.1 for role in the offense and was not engaged in a 21 USC § 848 continuing criminal enterprise.

(b) The change in § 4A1.1(e) – the so-called status point enhancement – says only that one point is added if the defendant already has 7 or more criminal history points and “committed any part of the instant offense (i.e., any relevant conduct) while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.”

fineprint180308• The USSC staff has figured that about 11,500 BOP prisoners with status points would have a lower guideline range under a retroactive § 4A1.1(e). The current average sentence for that group is 120 months and would probably fall by an average of 14 months.

• About 7,300 eligible prisoners with zero criminal history points would be eligible for a lower guideline range if the zero-point amendment becomes retroactive. The current average sentence of 85 months could fall to an average of 70 months.

• The reduction – done under 18 USC § 3582(c)(2) – is a two-step process described in USSC § 1B1.10.

(a) First, the court determines whether the prisoner is eligible. For a zero-point reduction, the court would have to find that the prisoner (1) had no criminal history points; (2) had none of the other enhancements in his case or guns or sex charges, or threats of violence or leader/organizer enhancements or any of the other factors listed in § 4C1.1. Then, the court would have to find that granting the two-level reduction would result in a sentencing range with a bottom number lower than his or her current sentence.

If your guidelines were 97-121 months, but the court varied downward to 78 months for any reason other than cooperation, you would not be eligible because reducing your points by two levels would put you in a 78-97 month range, and you are already at the bottom of that range. Special rules apply if you got a § 5K1.1 reduction for cooperation, but people sentenced under their sentencing ranges for reasons other than cooperation may not be eligible.

(b) To benefit from the status point reduction, the decrease in criminal history points is more problematic. If you have 4, 5, or 6 criminal history points, you are in Criminal History Category III. If two of those points are status points, they would disappear. Going from 5 points to 3 or 4 points to 2 would drop you into Criminal History Category II. If your prior sentencing range had been 70-87 months, your new range would be 68-78 months, and you would be eligible.

But if you had 6 criminal history points, you would only drop to 4 points, and you would still be in Criminal History Category III. No reduction in criminal history, no decrease in sentencing range, and thus no eligibility.

• Once you’re found to be eligible, your judge has just about total discretion whether to give you all of the reduction you’re entitled to, some of it, or none of it. You cannot get more than the bottom of your amended sentencing range, and the court cannot consider any other issues in your sentence than the retroactive adjustment.

usscretro230406Convincing the court that you should get the full benefit of your reduction is best done with letters of support from the community, a good discipline record and a history of successful programming. Showing the court that you have been rehabilitated to the point that the reduction has been earned is a good idea.

There’s a good reason that the retroactivity – if it is adopted – will end up benefitting no more than 12% of the BOP population. It is not easy to show eligibility and even tougher to prove that the court should use its discretion to give you the credit.

USSC, Retroactivity Impact Analysis of Parts A and B of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment (May 15, 2023)

USSC, Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts (May 3, 2023)

USSC § 1B1.10, Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as a Result of Amended Guideline Range (Policy Statement)

– Thomas L. Root

Explainer: When Federal Prisoners Can Get Relief Under Range, Dubin – Update for June 12, 2023

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ASK THE PROFESSOR

explainer230612Last week, I reported on the 3rd Circuit’s en banc ruling that someone convicted of a nonviolent “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” (18 USC § 922(g)(1)) could not constitutionally be prohibited from possessing a gun or ammo. That report was followed by a dispatch on the Supreme Court’s decision last Thursday that dramatically limited the reach of the aggravated identity theft statute (18 USC § 1028A).

This was followed by the predictable questions from prisoners: “When can I use the Range decision to get my § 922(g) conviction vacated? And how about getting rid of my aggravated identity theft conviction under § 1028A?”

Very good questions, and inquiries for which the hopemongers who will write any motion for a federal prisoner in exchange for a modest fee – let’s call them what they are, hopemongers – have a ready answer. That answer usually starts with, “Pay me…”

Now let’s ask the professor.  Or, because he’s nowhere around, ask me…

professor230612To be sure, a lot of people could be affected by the decisions, provided there’s a procedural route to raise them. About 21% of federal prisoners have a § 922(g) conviction, while about 2% are doing time for aggravated ID theft. That’s a potential of about 35,000 felon-in-possession and 3,500 § 1028A defendants.

Range: Remember first that the Range decision is only binding in the 3rd Circuit. If your case isn’t from there, Range doesn’t help you. In fact, as I reported a week ago, the 8th Circuit just went the other way in its United States v. Jackson decision.

However, if your 1-year deadline for filing a § 2255 motion hasn’t expired, by all means challenge § 922(g) constitutionality in your motion. But if your time has expired, your options are limited. Under 28 USC § 2255(f)(3), you can file within a year of a new SCOTUS ruling on the constitutionality of a statute, but Range is not a Supreme Court case. If you have already lost your § 2255 motion, you have to get Court of Appeals permission to file another § 2255 and that standard likewise requires that the motivating decision be from the Supreme Court.

So how about a 28 USC § 2241 petition? We’ll know a lot more about § 2241s in a few weeks when SCOTUS decides Jones v Hendrix. For now, fitting a Range-type claim into the standards for bringing a § 2241 (under the § 2255(e) saving clause) will be tough.

dice161221For § 922(g) defendants, it may be worth a shot if your conviction came from a 3rd Circuit district court. For everyone else, it’s a waiting game…

ID Theft: For those beyond the § 2255 filing deadline, the traditional 28 USC § 2241 petition for habeas corpus will likely be available under the saving clause.

Because Dubin is a statutory interpretation and not a constitutional holding (despite Justice Gorsuch’s argument that it could easily have been), the route of filing a second or successive § 2255 (under the rules set up by § 2255(h)) is probably unavailable.

General Pro Tip: If you’re proceeding on § 2255 or § 2241, find competent help. Procedural questions are boring but vitally important to winning.

Ohio State University law prof Doug Berman observed last week that “offenders now looking to pursue what might be called “Dubin claims” could, of course, face procedural barriers of all sorts. But the still-open-ended sentence reduction authority of 3582 might be one ready means for at least some (over-sentenced) prisoners to secure relief…”

USSC, Quick Facts – Felon in Possession (June 2022)

USSC, Quick Facts – Sec 1028A Aggravated Identity Theft Offenses (July 2022)

Sentencing Law and Policy, How many of the many thousands convicted of federal aggravated identity theft might now have Dubin claims? (June 8, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Rely on USSC Guidance… Or Not, 7th Circuit Says – Update for April 18, 2023

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THAT WAS THEN, THIS IS NOW

Remember when the 7th Circuit ruled that old Guideline 1B1.13 – that rather rigidly defined what constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for sentence reduction under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) – did not apply to inmate-filed compassionate release  motions?

The Circuit ruled in the 2020 United States v. Gunn decision that while 1B1.13 did not apply, the result was not a “sort of Wild West in court, with every district judge having an idiosyncratic release policy.” This was because “the substantive aspects of the Sentencing Commission’s analysis in 1B1.13 and its Application Notes provide a working definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’… the Commission’s analysis can guide discretion without being conclusive.”

wildwest230418Well, apparently, it guides until it doesn’t guide. And “doesn’t” happened last week, when the 7th ruled that a prisoner’s “unconstitutionally-imposed mandatory life sentence” from a 2001 case cannot be a part of the “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for a compassionate release despite the fact that a week before the opinion was issued, the Commission formally proposed amending 1B1.13 to include harsh sentences that no longer could be imposed due to a change in the law.

Suddenly, the Commission’s analysis provides no meaningful guidance to the Circuit at all:

The USSC is in the process of studying the issue, and recently it has proposed defining ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ to include circumstances in which ‘[t]he defendant is serving a sentence that is inequitable in light of changes in the law.’ But this effort is still at an early stage—so early that we see no value in speculating on what such a change would mean. Until the Commission definitively says otherwise, we will not deviate from our current understanding. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

The opinion cited the draft USSC proposal from January and not the Commission’s April 5th action released eight days before the Circuit’s opinion was handed down. A reasonable observer could conclude that “the Commission [has] definitively [said] otherwise” at this point:

[T]he proposed amendment would add a new category (“Unusually Long Sentences”) providing that if a defendant received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant’s individualized circumstances.

One can only hope that the prisoner’s attorney seeks rehearing of a decision that reflects much more sloppiness than one should expect from an appellate court.

United States v. Williams, Case No. 22-1212, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 8826 (7th Cir., April 13, 2023)

United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020)

U.S. Sentencing Commission, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (Preliminary) (April 5, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

7th Circuit Finds the Jurisdictional ‘Force’ Is With This One – Update for February 3, 2023

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COURT DOESN’T LACK JURISDICTION JUST BECAUSE YOU MIGHT LOSE

Wolfgang Von Vader had some run-ins that resulted in a 2000 conviction in the Western District of Wisconsin for distributing methamphetamine (a Guidelines “career offender” 270-month sentence) and a 2012 federal conviction in Kansas for possessing heroin in prison (a 120-month consecutive sentence).

jurisdiction180410Wolf applied for 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release in both Kansas and Wisconsin. Both courts shot him down. The Kansas decision is currently on appeal in the 10th Circuit. In the Wisconsin case, the government argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider Wolf‘s compassionate release motion because he had already served all of his 2000 Wisconsin sentence, and is now on his consecutive 2012 Kansas sentence. Section 3582(c) does not authorize release from an expired sentence, the government contended, which makes Wolf’s Wisconsin compassionate release motion moot.

The district court agreed, and dismissed Wolf’s motion for lack of jurisdiction.

Last week, the 7th Circuit disagreed, reversing Wolf’s dismissal. Maybe a retroactive reduction is unauthorized by statute, the Circuit said, “but we do not see how this moots [Von Vader’s] request. If § 3582(c) does not supply authority for the relief Von Vader wants, then he loses on the merits, not for lack of jurisdiction.”

vader230203“The judge in Wisconsin could order the Bureau of Prisons to treat the Wisconsin sentence as if it had expired earlier and to reduce the time remaining on the Kansas sentence accordingly,” the 7th ruled. “Or the court in Wisconsin could make an adjustment in the length of supervised release, on the Wisconsin sentence, tht will follow the conclusion of the Kansas sentence. As long as relief is possible in principle, the fact that a given request may fail on statutory grounds does not defeat the existence of an Article III case or controversy.”

United States v. Von Vader, Case No 22-1798, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 1750 (7th Cir., January 24, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

The Short Rocket – Update for January 27, 2023

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rocket190620We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

Today, the short rocket – decisions from around the federal circuits…

SOME CASE SHORTS

Timing is Everything: In 2015, Benny Hall pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and using a gun in a crime of violence, (an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offense). After the Supreme Court decided in United States v. Davis that conspiracy to commit a crime of violence was not itself a crime of violence that supported a § 924(c) conviction for using a gun in a crime of violence, Benny filed a 28 U.S.C. §2255 post-conviction motion asking that the § 924(c) be thrown out.

corso170112The government convinced the district court that Benny’s § 924(c) conviction didn’t depend only on the conspiracy, but also on his admissions in open court that established that he had actually attempted to commit the robbery.

‘Gotcha!’ the government cried.

‘Not so fast!’ the 2nd Circuit replied last week. Last summer, the  Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Taylor that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence. The Circuit threw out § 924(c) conviction and the mandatory 10-year add-on sentence it represented.

Hall v. United States, Case No 17-1513, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 1256 (2d Cir., January 19, 2023)
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11th Holds Drug Conspiracy Can’t Lead to Guidelines ‘Career Offender’: Brandon Dupree was convicted of a 21 U.S.C. § 846 drug conspiracy, and was hammered at sentencing as a Guidelines “career offender” (which dramatically increased the advisory sentencing range). An 11th Circuit panel rejected Brandon’s argument that an inchoate offense (that is, a mere plan to commit a crime) does not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of the Guidelines ‘career offender’ enhancement.

brandon230127Last week, the full Circuit sitting en banc said, ‘Let’s go, Brandon,’ and reversed his ‘career offender’ sentence. The 11th ruled that “application of the enhancement turns on whether the ‘instant offense of conviction’ is ‘a controlled substance offense’ [under USSG] 4B1.1(a)… The plain text of 4B1.2(b) unambiguously excludes inchoate crimes. Dupree must be resentenced without application of the career offender enhancement.”

United States v. Dupree, Case No 19-13776, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 1183 (11th Cir., January 18, 2023)
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Channeling Your Inner Habeas: People are always asking why they can’t point out in their 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release motions that their sentences were wrongly calculated, that their lawyers were ineffective imbeciles, that something was very wrong with how they were convicted.

reallawyer170216Mike Escajeda was convicted of selling drugs and carrying a gun. After losing his direct appeal, Mike filed a compassionate release motion, arguing that the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” required by an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release motion were that (1) his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He even admitted in his motion that he had filed for compassionate release because he figured that he could not win relief under § 2255.

Last week, the 5th Circuit ruled that the habeas-channeling rule prevented Mike from raising 2255-type issues in a compassionate release motion. The Circuit said, “Congress provided specific avenues for post-conviction relief that permit prisoners to challenge the legality of their confinement in federal court… The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that by codifying these specific provisions, Congress required prisoners to bring their legality-of-custody challenges under [28 USC 2241, 2244, 2254, and 2255], and prohibited prisoners from bringing such claims under other, more-general statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

[A] prisoner cannot use § 3582(c) to challenge the legality or the duration of his sentence,” the 5th held. “Such arguments can, and hence must, be raised under [the habeas statutes]… Because Escajeda’s claims would have been cognizable under § 2255, they are not cognizable under § 3582(c).”

United States v. Escajeda, Case No 21-50870, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 1041 (5th Cir., January 17, 2023)
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DOJ SORNA Rule Blocked: The U.S. District Court for Central District of California last week issued a preliminary injunction blocking the Dept of Justice’s new Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act rule because it violated due process and the 1st Amendment.

injunction230127The rule requires people who had been convicted of a sex crime to register as sex offenders in their state, even if the sex crime convictions have been expunged and the people are not allowed by the state to register. Because plaintiff John Doe could not register, the DOJ’s rule said that he could be prosecuted at any time, and he would have been forced to prove that registration was impossible — “an affirmative defense,” Doe’s lawyer said, “that turns the presumption of innocence on its head.

The court ruled that it was likely an unconstitutional violation of due process to require anyone to affirmatively prove his innocence when he had never been convicted.

Preliminary injunction, ECF 55, Doe v. DOJ, Case No 5:22-cv-855 (CD Cal., Jan 13, 2023)

Reason, A Federal Judge Says the DOJ’s Sex Offender Registration Rules Violate Due Process by Requiring the Impossible (January 19, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

The Sentence That Was Right Then Might Not be Right Now, 4th Circuit Says – Update for January 20, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CONSIDER 3553(a) IN LIGHT OF REASONS FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE, 4TH CIRCUIT SAYS

Back in 2008, Mike Mangarella was convicted of a massive sweepstakes fraud and was sentenced to 600 months. Twelve years later, Mike – old and sick and in the middle of a COVID pandemic – moved for compassionate release.

compassion160208The district court agreed that Mike’s COVID concerns were extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. But the judge was miffed that the Assistant U.S. Attorney agreed with Mike that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors favored his compassionate release, complaining that the “government had failed to explain why – disregarding COVID-19 – the same § 3553(a) factors that originally supported a 30-year sentence now pointed to a sentence of only 14 years.” The judge told the government to “focus on the § 3553(a) factors without reference to COVID-19.”

(For those just joining us, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court considering a compassionate release sentence reduction motion must “consider[] the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” Those factors are the standards a court must consider in imposing a criminal sentence, such as the history of the offender and nature of the crime, need for deterrence, what punishment is “just,” protection of the public, and so on.  It is what constitutes “considering” that is at issue here.)

tea160404After the district court’s scolding, the government read the tea leaves and quickly changed its position. The district judge then held that – even assuming that Mike’s reasons were “extraordinary and compelling” – his compassionate release motion should be denied based on the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

Last week, the 4th Circuit vacated the decision and sent it back to the district court. The Circuit said it was not satisfied that the district court, in weighing the § 3553(a) factors, considered Mike’s “principal argument — originally joined by the government — for why those factors no longer warranted a 30-year sentence: that given his particular risk profile with respect to COVID-19, his prison sentence now carried with it a significant chance of a life-threatening illness.”

The record from Mike’s district court suggested that the judge decided that if 50 years was the right sentence in 2008, it must automatically continue to be the right sentence 14 years later. But the § 3553(a) factors in a compassionate release motion “must account not only for the circumstances at the time of the original offense but also for significant post-sentencing developments.” The Circuit specifically cited Chief Judge Gregory’s concurrence in United States v. Kibble that “there is good reason to believe that, in some cases, a sentence that was ‘sufficient but not greater than necessary’ before the coronavirus pandemic may no longer meet that criteria.”

The holding underscores that § 3553(a) sentencing factors must be considered in light of the “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for compassionate release, not in a vacuum (as many district courts have done up to now).

United States v. Mangarella, Case No 20-7912, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 518 (4th Cir., January 10, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root