9th Won’t Extend Taylor to Aiding and Abetting – Update for August 17, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

9TH CIRCUIT HOLDS HOBBS ACT AIDER AND ABETTOR COMMITS CRIME OF VIOLENCE

Call me dense (you wouldn’t be the first), but I have never understood how an attempt to commit a Hobbs Act robbery could not be a crime of violence – as the Supreme Court held in United States v. Taylor – but aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery was a crime of violence under 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A)(3).

hobbsact200218In Taylor, the Supremes held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery was not a crime of violence, because one could attempt a Hobbs Act robbery without actually attempting, threatening or using violence. If, for example, Peter Perp is arrested in a jewelry store parking lot with masks and a gun as he approaches the front door, he could be convicted of an attempted Hobbs Act robbery without ever having gotten to the point of attempting to threaten or employ violence at all. In fact, the people inside the store might not even be aware that they were about to be robbed. Sure, Petey can go down for an attempted Hobbs Act robbery (and get plenty of time for that), but he could not be convicted of a § 924(c) offense.

Taylor seemed to focus on what elements would have to be proven for the particular defendant to be convicted of the Hobbs Act crime. The principals in the crime – the guys who actually waved guns in the jewelry store clerks’ faces – must be shown to have employed violence or threatened to do so. But how about the guy sitting behind the wheel of the getaway car? He’s aiding and abetting, and certainly can be convicted of the Hobbs Act offense just like the gun-wielders. But that’s not the point. The point is whether he is also guilty of a 924(c) offense, too.

Leon Eckford is as disappointed as I am (maybe more, because he’s doing the time) that the 9th Circuit went the other way on my pet legal argument the other day. Leon pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting two Hobbs Act jewelry store robberies. He was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment, including a mandatory minimum sentence for the use of a firearm during a crime of violence under § 924(c).

aiding230522On appeal, Leon argues that aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence and therefore could not serve as a predicate for his § 924(c) conviction and mandatory minimum sentence. A couple of days ago, the 9th rejected his argument.

The Circuit claimed that Leon’s argument “misunderstands the nature of aiding and abetting liability. At common law, aiding and abetting was considered a separate offense from the crime committed by the principal actor, but “we no longer distinguish between principals and aiders and abettors; principals and accomplices “are equally culpable and may be convicted of the same offense.”

The 9th complained that Leon “would have us return to the era when we treated principals and accomplices as guilty of different crimes. We have long moved past such distinctions for purposes of determining criminal culpability, although the terminology may be useful for other reasons.” This is nonsense. Leon freely admitted that his aiding and abetting the Hobbs Act robberies made him as guilty of the offense as if he had been inside the stores. He did not ask to be treated as having been convicted of a “different crime.”

Instead, as the Circuit admitted without appreciating its significance, the law has moved past distinguishing principal versus accomplice “for purposes of determining criminal culpability,” that is, for figuring out whether Leon was guilty of a Hobbs Act offense. But, as the 9th admitted, “the terminology may be useful for other reasons.”

violence180508Primary among those reasons is to determine whether the defendant’s commission of the Hobbs Act was a crime of violence. This is not to say that the court should focus on what Leon himself did. The categorical approach to determining whether aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery is violent does not look at the facts of the case. Instead, it focuses on what must be proven to prove a defendant was an aider-and-abettor.

The 9th Circuit noted that it had “repeatedly upheld § 924(c) convictions based on accomplice liability.” So what? The 9th Circuit had previously held that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery was a crime of violence until Taylor reversed the holding. Being wrong once is hardly an argument that you aren’t wrong now.

The Circuit argues that nothing in its analysis in Leon’s case is “clearly irreconcilable with Taylor. Taylor dealt with an inchoate crime, an attempt, and does not undermine our precedent on aiding and abetting liability. There are fundamental differences between attempting to commit a crime, and aiding and abetting its commission… Chief among these differences is that in an attempt case there is no crime apart from the attempt, which is the crime itself, whereas aiding and abetting is a different means of committing a single crime, not a separate offense itself. Put differently, proving the elements of an attempted crime falls short of proving those of the completed crime, whereas a conviction for aiding and abetting requires proof of all the elements of the completed crime plus proof of an additional element: that the defendant intended to facilitate the commission of the crime.

hobbs230316The 9th held that “[o]ne who aids and abets the commission of a violent offense has been convicted of the same elements as one who was convicted as a principal; the same is not true of one who attempts to commit a violent offense. Accordingly, we conclude that our precedent is not clearly irreconcilable with Taylor.”

But if 924(c) is intended to fix extra liability for using a gun in a crime of violence, the element that the defendant employed or threatened violence should be required.

United States v. Eckford, Case No. 17-50167, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 21175 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

2255 Hair-Splitting and the Power of Advertising – Update for August 15, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

A 2255 PAIR

Two federal appellate court decisions last week of interest on motions for post-conviction relief under 28 USC § 2255:

Denaturalization is Too Collateral for Padilla, Circuit Says: In 2006, Abe Farhane – a naturalized American citizen – pled guilty to lying to the government and conspiring to commit money laundering. After Abe was released in 2017, the government started denaturalization proceedings to strip him of his citizenship under 8 USC § 1451(a) for having become a citizen by “concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.”

deport170113Abe was still on supervised release after his prison sentence, which entitled him to file a 28 USC § 2255 motion for post-conviction relief. Abe filed a § 2255 motion claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer never told him he might lose his citizenship and be deported due to his guilty plea. Had he known that, Abe argued, he never would have entered a guilty plea.

His § 2255 was denied, and last week, the 2nd Circuit upheld the decision.

splithair170727The Supreme Court held in the 2009 Padilla v. Kentucky decision that a lawyer has a duty to “inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation,” noting that there was no “distinction between direct and collateral consequences” of a guilty plea when measuring the effectiveness of counsel. But the 2nd Circuit said that Padilla had no role in this case, because “civil denaturalization is a separate proceeding that may or may not occur following the plea. The government exercises considerable discretion in bringing denaturalization cases, as does the district court in evaluating the evidence… indeed, the government could seek to denaturalize Farhane without relying on his guilty plea. Instead, it turns on the defendant’s actual conduct.”

The Court’s hair-splitting seems to be a distinction without a difference, as the dissenting judge in the 2-1 decision pointed out.

Farhane v. United States, Case No. 20-1666, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 20960 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 2023)

Advertising Makes Illinois Drug Statute Overbroad: After Otis Elion pled guilty to distributing meth, and he was sentenced as a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1. That Guideline increases sentencing exposure dramatically for someone with two prior convictions for crimes of violence or serious drug felonies.

Otis’s attorney did not challenge that designation, and the court imposed a 167-month prison term.

In a § 2255 motion, Otis argued his attorney’s failure to object amounted to ineffective assistance because two of the three predicates were convictions under Illinois law for “look-alike” drugs, and those offenses did not fit within the statute’s definition of serious drug felonies.

Otis’s district court denied relief.

Last week, the 7th Circuit reversed, concluding that Otis was properly sentenced as a career offender and, therefore, did not suffer prejudice from counsel’s performance.

A “serious drug felony” is a federal drug trafficking offense or a state offense that matches the Guidelines definition of controlled substance offense. If the elements of the state crime are the same as, or narrower than, the elements of the Guidelines offense, “the crime of conviction qualifies as a predicate offense.”

advertising230815Otis’s Illinois offense made it “unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture, distribute, advertise, or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute a lookalike substance,” and defines advertise as “the attempt, by publication, dissemination, solicitation or circulation, to induce directly or indirectly any person to acquire, or enter into an obligation to acquire” a controlled substance.

The 7th said the Illinois statute is broader than 21 USC § 841 and thus could not be a predicate for Guidelines “career offender” status. “Advertise is an independent word in the statute, and its definition uses the term induce, not sell or distribute. Given this, we decline to read ‘advertise’ as merely restating, in narrower terms, what other statutory language already covers. For these reasons, the look-alike statute’s inclusion of ‘advertise’ means it punishes a broader range of conduct than the Guidelines controlled substance offense.”

The Circuit reversed the denial of his § 2255 motion and remanded the case “for an evaluation of counsel’s performance.”

Elion v. United States, Case No. 20-1725, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 20286 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Learning to Love First Step But Not The Trial Penalty – Update for August 14, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TRUE CONFESSIONS

firststepB180814The focus on federal criminal justice lately has been on the Espionage Act and obstruction of justice (if you’re Donald Trump) and on drug users possessing guns and forgetting to report $10 million in income (if you’re Hunter Biden).

Nevertheless, two pieces last week provided support to criminal justice from surprising sources.

First, the conservative Washington Times published an opinion piece decrying attacks on Republican presidential candidates for having supported the First Step Act, legislation that “has garnered overwhelming support among Republican voters, underscoring the power of prudent and popular conservative criminal justice reform.”

The writer noted that violent crime is rising for a lot of reasons, but “none of which are related to the First Step Act.” He observed that “an impressive 86% of polled Republicans said the First Step Act reflected their views” and argued that “with a focus on evidence-based recidivism reduction programs and judges’ discretion in sentencing, the First Step Act exemplifies a sustainable and thoughtful approach” to public safety.

The column reports that the “First Step Act’s recidivism rate of just over 12% for those released under it, compared with the 43% rate for the general population released from federal prisons, attests to its success.”

Meanwhile, on Fox News, former U.S. Attorney for Utah Brett Tolman argued that Republicans going after the First Step Act ignored the realities of federal drug prosecutions.

Citing the case of Alice Johnson, famously granted clemency by President Trump based on Kim Kardashian’s intervention in her favor, Tolman said, “Alice’s story was first warped during her trial by prosecutors who manipulated drug laws – not to nab a drug “queen pin,” but to pin the blame on the little guy. As a former prosecutor, I’m peeling back the curtain on this practice and setting the record straight.”

alice201229Tolman noted that Alice was offered a plea deal for 60 months, but “at the urging of her attorney, Alice chose to exercise her constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial. What the prosecution did next can only be described as retaliation. It brought new drug conspiracy charges against Alice that had not been considered before, accusing her of attempted possession of 106 kilograms of cocaine. No physical evidence was ever found to support this, but physical evidence was not required at the time. Instead, to make its case, the prosecution coerced two of Alice’s co-defendants to change their testimonies in exchange for reduced sentences, pinning the blame on Alice… The “trial penalty” — the increase in sentencing for those who choose to go to trial rather than take a plea deal – is very much alive. Alice’s trial is the perfect example of how perverse incentives within the criminal justice system, spurred by the failed “War on Drugs,” ruin lives and tear families apart while doing nothing to improve public safety.”

Writing in his Sentencing Policy and the Law blog, Ohio State law professor Doug Berman “found notable that this former US Attorney so readily and clearly highlights how prosecutors impose a ‘trial penalty’ as a form of ‘retaliation’ for defendants who exercise their constitutional rights to trial.”

Washington Times, GOP voters support the First Step Act; our candidates should, too (August 8, 2023)

Fox News, I’m a former prosecutor. The ‘War on Drugs’ incentivizes convictions, not justice (August 8, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Former federal prosecutor describes practice of “retaliation” against drug defendants who exercise trial rights (August 10, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

The Guns of August – Update for August 11, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

“HISTORY IS OUR HEURISTIC”

The 5th Circuit already has a reputation in gun-lovin’ circles for applying last year’s New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen decision in United States v. Rahimi, holding that even a dirtbag subject to a domestic protection order had a 2nd Amendment right to possess a gun.

whataburger230703(In its final action before fleeing Washington, DC, at the end of June for three months of summer vacation, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari in Rahimi, meaning that What-A-Burger, road rage, and stalking will soon be a part of 2nd Amendment discourse).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), you may not possess a firearm if you are an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance. A couple of district courts have already ruled that Bruen invalidates this prohibition, but on Wednesday, Patrick Daniels – maybe the guy Charlie Daniels (no apparent relation) had in mind as driving down the highway while “tokin’ on a number and digging on the radio” – was the latest beneficiary of Bruen’s historical “heuristics.”

Pat is a dedicated but “unlawful user” of cannabis. When Pat was pulled over for a traffic infraction, police smelled marijuana in his car. A search turned up a couple of loaded handguns. When questioned, Pat admitted that he smoked marijuana about 14 days per month, although no one thought to ask him whether he was high at the time or, for that matter, test him for controlled substances.

marijuana221111That was a mere detail to the DEA, however. Before Pat knew it, he was charged with a § 922(g)(3) offense. A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to nearly four years in prison.

Pat appealed, arguing that Bruen made his conviction a violation of the 2nd Amendment. Two days ago, the 5th Circuit agreed.

The Circuit first concluded that the 2nd Amendment clearly applied to Pat:

The right to bear arms is held by “the people.” That phrase “unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” Indeed, the Bill of Rights uses the phrase “the people” five times. In each place, it refers to all members of our political community, not a special group of upright citizens. Based on that consistent usage, [District of Columbia v.] Heller concluded that “the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.” Even as a marihuana user, Daniels is a member of our political community. Therefore, he has a presumptive right to bear arms. By infringing on that right, § 922(g)(3) contradicts the plain text of the Second Amendment.

The 2nd Amendment codified a “‘pre-existing right’ with pre-existing limits,” the 5th explained. Thus, “to ascertain those limits, history is our heuristic. Because historical gun regulations evince the kind of limits that were well-understood at the time the 2nd Amendment was ratified, a regulation that is inconsistent with those limits is inconsistent with the 2nd Amendment. So whether Pat’s conviction violated his 2nd Amendment right to bear arms “depends on whether § 922(g)(3) is consistent with our nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,” the 5th said. “It is a close and deeply challenging question.”

Smoke enough, and you might see this... but it wouldn't violate § 922(g)
Smoke enough, and you might see this… but it wouldn’t violate § 922(g)

However, the Circuit found, while “throughout American history, laws have regulated the combination of guns and intoxicating substances,” at no time “in the 18th or 19th century did the government disarm individuals who used drugs or alcohol at one time from possessing guns at another… [O]ur history and tradition may support some limits on an intoxicated person’s right to carry a weapon, but it does not justify disarming a sober citizen based exclusively on his past drug usage. Nor do more generalized traditions of disarming dangerous persons support this restriction on nonviolent drug users. As applied to Daniels, then, § 922(g)(3) violates the 2nd Amendment.”

Meanwhile, the 5th Circuit took in the chin last week when the Supreme Court reversed its refusal to stay a district court holding that new Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) that effectively banned “ghost guns” violated the Administrative Procedure Act.

At the end of June, Judge Reed O’Connor of the Northern District of Texas held in Garland v. Vanderstok that ATF regulations defining “ghost guns” – kits of components that do not meet the definition of “firearm” but may be assembled, with some simple machining performed at home by the end user, into functional firearms lacking any serial number – as firearms exceeded the agency’s authority and thus were invalid.

The government sought a stay of Judge O’Connor’s order from the 5th Circuit, which the Circuit denied. On July 24, the 5th ruled that “[b]ecause the ATF has not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits, nor irreparable harm in the absence of a stay, we DENY the government’s request to stay the vacatur of the two challenged portions of the Rule…This effectively maintains, pending appeal, the status quo that existed for 54 years from 1968 to 2022.”

Last Wednesday, the Supreme Court reversed the 5th Circuit, holding in a one-paragraph order that Judge O’Connor’s injunction against the new rule is “stayed pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is timely sought.”

The Supreme Court decision granting the stay was 5-4, with Justice Barrett in the majority. This surprised some commentators, who have placed Justice Barrett firmly in the pro-2nd Amendment camp. But as Slate argued Wednesday, her decision in favor of a stay does not necessarily mean the ATF can breathe easy:

Barrett’s vote may be attributable to her distaste for “nationwide vacatur.” In a recent decision, the justice cast serious doubt on the legality of this tool, which allows a lone federal judge to block a federal policy in all 50 states. She is quite right to be skeptical that this power exists, or at least that it can be used as freely as O’Connor and his fellow conservatives deploy it today… If that’s true, and Barrett’s vote was purely procedural, then the ghost guns rule is not out of the woods yet… When it comes back to SCOTUS on the merits, though, Barrett could vote to strike down the rule, since the side debate over O’Connor’s use of “vacatur” would no longer be relevant. Gun rights advocates will fight this one all the way to the bitter end. And the Biden administration should not assume it has Barrett on its side as it fights for the new rule’s long-term survival.

gun160711All of this is prelude for the central question of interest to prisoners, whether Bruen has invalidated 18 USC 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession statute. That question, already decided in favor of defendants in the 3rd Circuit – Range v. Atty General – and against defendants in the 8th Circuit – United States v. Jackson – will no doubt be reaching the Supreme Court soon enough.

United States v. Daniels, Case No. 22-60596, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 20870 (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2023)

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 599 U.S. —, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)

Vanderstok v. Blackhawk Mfg. Grp. Inc., Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00691, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115474 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2023)

Order, Garland v. VanderStok, Case No. 23A82, 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2870 (Aug. 8, 2023)

Reason, Supreme Court Lets Biden’s ‘Ghost Gun’ Regulations Stand Pending Ongoing Lawsuit (August 9, 2023)

Slate, The Big Question Behind Amy Coney Barrett’s Surprise Vote on Ghost Guns (August 8, 2023)

United States v. Jackson, Case No. 22-2870, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 13635 (8th Cir. June 2, 2023)

Range v. AG United States, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Vindictive Resentencing Gets An Asterisk – Update for August 10, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NOT ALL HIGHER RESENTENCES ARE BECAUSE THE JUDGE DOESN’T LIKE YOU

It is an article of faith that if you win an appeal or § 2255 motion, a district court cannot increase your sentence the second time around, because to do so would be vindictive and violate the 5th Amendment.

hammer160509The lead case on the subject, North Carolina v. Pearce, holds that “due process of law requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial, and that a defendant be freed of any apprehension of retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge. Accordingly, the reason for imposition after retrial of a more severe sentence must affirmatively appear in the record, and must be based on objective information concerning the defendant’s identifiable conduct after the original sentencing proceeding.”

Just as Pepper v. United States holds that a judge at resentencing may consider good post-sentencing conduct in imposing a lower sentence, a judge at resentencing may consider lousy post-sentencing conduct in hammering a defendant with a higher sentence.

Ask Carey Singleton. He was sentenced to 13 years for Hobbs Act robbery but got the sentence vacated on appeal. On resentencing, the Singletary was resentenced on July 6, 2021. Before the hearing, the government filed a revised sentencing memo reporting that Carey had gotten at least 15 shots (disciplinary infractions), including three “instances of weapons possession, three instances of threatening to harm correctional officers, five instances of disobeying lawful orders, one instance of lock tampering, and one sexual act.”

What’s more, Carey had since pleaded guilty to three state charges for an unrelated armed robbery he had committed in 2017. The government asked the court to run any new sentence consecutively to Carey’s state term.

Carey’s sentencing judge was “tremendously concerned” by these post-sentencing developments and resentenced him “taking into account new information, including the new convictions and the multitude of extremely serious infractions.” The court then imposed a 6-month increase from its initial 13-year sentence to the top of Carey’s advisory Guidelines range. And it ordered that the sentence run consecutively to Carey’s 10.5-year state sentence.

Carey appealed, arguing that the district court increased his sentence vindictively as punishment for his initial appeal. Last week, the 4th Circuit rejected his claim.

Pearce established a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness “whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant” after a successful appeal. To defeat this presumption, the district court must justify its increased sentence by identifying relevant conduct or events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing proceedings.”

vindictive170720Here, the Circuit held, “the district court amply rebutted any presumption of vindictiveness by affirmative reference to objective, post-sentencing events… It described Singleton’s intervening disciplinary record at length, concluding that Singleton’s remorse at his initial allocution was a ‘false apology,’ and that his conduct in prison ‘showed us who he is.’ The new state convictions gave the sentencing judge further “insight” into Carey’s character, justifying the district court’s conclusion that the “conduct in the totality bespeaks a tremendous need for society to be protected from Carey Singleton.”

United States v. Singletary, Case No 21-4351, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 19775 (4th Cir. Aug 1, 2023)

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)

Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011)
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– Thomas L. Root

‘Spirit Is Willing But…’ In Federal Drug Reform – Update for August 8, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NOTHING HAPPENING HERE…

vacation190905If Congress does not approve a new appropriations bill by September 30, the government could shut down. But as anyone who works in or with the federal government knows, the government pretty much shuts down every year for the month of August as legislators, agency heads and government employees leave town for vacations.

This leaves a number of issues important to federal defendants hanging. Two of those are cocaine and marijuana reform.

Before leaving town for the beach, Dept of Justice officials filed comments with the U.S. Sentencing Commission urging the Commission to adopt a number of priorities for the coming year. On the equivalency of powder and crack cocaine, the DOJ urged the Commission (1) to advocate that Congress for passage of the EQUAL Act (S.524 and H.R.1062) to remedy the current disparity between treatment of powder cocaine and cocaine base; and (2) to remind sentencing courts of “their obligation, when considering [18 USC § 3553(a)] sentencing factors, to consider the pharmacological similarities between powder and crack cocaine and whether it is appropriate to impose a variance consistent with the relevant base offense level for powder cocaine.”

You may recall that last October, President Biden directed that the Dept of Health and Human Services lead an effort to reclassify marijuana as something less than a Schedule I drug. That effort includes review by the Drug Enforcement Administration.

marijuana160818Pressed by Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL) during a July 27 oversight hearing on DEA, DEA Administrator Anne Milgram told the subcommittee that the agency has not been provided with a definite timeline to review marijuana’s classification. When Gaetz asked Milgram if she would request the timeline from the HHS, she said, “I will ask.”

The rescheduling of marijuana probably won’t be done until late next year. A rescheduling could possibly lead to changes in 21 USC § 841 as to punishment – if not conviction ¬– for marijuana.

DOJ, Letter to Sentencing Commission (July 31, 2023)

Forbes, DEA Head Pledges To Seek Federal Marijuana Rescheduling Review Timeline From HHS (July 31, 2023)

House Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance, Hearing (July 27, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

You Look Like a Criminal – Update for August 7, 2023

If you have a question, please send a new email to newsletter@lisa-legalinfo.com.

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DISTRICT JUDGE KICKED OFF CASE FOR PROCEDURAL TIRADE

Maybe it’s climate change or Donald Trump. Perhaps the Supermoon. Blame whatever you want, but I haven’t seen two judicial bias decisions in seven years. Now I’m writing about the second one in seven days.

judge160222Leron Liggins was charged with drug distribution in the Eastern District of Michigan. Using Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 20, he had brought in a similar pending charge from the Eastern District of Kentucky so he could resolve both at once. On the eve of trial, Leron’s lawyer told the court he wanted to plead guilty, but when he appeared for the change of plea hearing, Leron demanded a new lawyer (for the second time).

US District Judge Stephen Murphy was not amused. He said, “Most defendants don’t get my attention or stand out, but Mr. Liggins does.” After reviewing the tortured procedural history of the case, the Judge said:

I’m tired of this case. I’m tired of this defendant. I’m tired of getting the runaround. This has been going on since February 6, 2018. We’ve got a case out of Kentucky that came here under Rule 20. Rule 20 says the reason for the transfer was the defendant has agreed to plead guilty. I feel as if the Court has been misled. I’ve been told in an official pleading and informally the defendant was going to plead guilty. We canceled jurors. We got a trial date. Now we got this.

Leron tried to talk, but the Judge shut him down, saying, “If you speak anymore, I’ll have you hauled out of here.” Then, turning to Leron’s lawyer, the Judge exploded:

This guy has got my attention. What do you want me to do? This guy looks like a criminal to me. This is what criminals do. This isn’t what innocent people, who want a fair trial do. He’s indicted in Kentucky. He’s indicted here. He’s alleged to be dealing heroin, which addicts, hurts and kills people, and he’s playing games with the Court.

The pandemic and Leron’s demands for other counsel ended up delaying things for a couple more years. Right before the trial was to begin, Leron’s new lawyer moved to have the Judge recuse himself for bias under 28 USC § 455(a).

murphy230807The next day, Judge Murphy denied the motion while saying he appreciated the “opportunity to clear up a few things that ha[d] been bothering [him] for a few months.” The Judge incorrectly recounted that Leron had “engaged in a personal colloquy” with the court that had caused the district judge to become “upset.” He had not, unless “STFU” passes for a friendly exchange of views. Nevertheless, for his conduct, the district judge delivered a faux apology:

And I want to say right now directly to Mr. Liggins I’m sorry, I apologize for getting upset. I did that because, A, I thought we were going to have a guilty plea; B, I thought that the colloquy was getting out of hand; and C, I lost my head… Now, having said that, I would say two things. Number one, [Leron’s lawyer] in that transcript agreed with my underlying concerns, and number two, just because I got mad does not mean I’m biased against Mr.—Mr. Liggins… I was mad, I was hostile, I was disapproving, and I regret it. I made a mistake by yelling like that, but I wasn’t upset or concluding that Mr. Liggins was—was guilty of an offense or hostile or partial toward him. I concluded he was acting in a manner which was frankly obstructionist and making me mad.

Leron, the Judge is sorry that you behaved so badly that you made him mad. Can you tell how sorry the Judge is?  

Neither can I.

The Judge then asserted, “I’m not, trust me. I give Mr. Liggins the same rights and opportunities here to demonstrate his innocence or lack of guilt as any other litigant.”

guiltyproveninnocent230807(Parenthetical:  You have to love the Judge’s standard of proof.  All this time we thought the government had to prove a defendant’s guilt. Turns out, at least practicing MurphyLaw, that a defendant has to prove his innocence.)

Leron was unable to prove his lack of guilt. He was convicted. After that, he appealed. Last week, the 6th Circuit threw Judge Murphy off the case.

A judge’s misconduct at trial may be “characterized as bias or prejudice” if “it is so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.” But this takes more than just judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases. “Expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women sometimes display,” the 6th held, “do not establish such bias or partiality… Only if the remarks reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible” does a judge cross the line.

But Judge Murphy found that line, and he crossed it. The appellate court said:

Difficult as the recusal standard may be to reach, we find that the district judge’s unacceptable remarks at the January 30, 2020 hearing satisfy it. Among the many disparaging remarks about Liggins that the district judge made, the most troubling is that Liggins ‘looks like a criminal to me.’ We are highly concerned by this remark, especially when directed toward Liggins, an African American man… These remarks served no purpose for courtroom administration, but rather constituted gratuitous commentary by the district judge about his opinion of Liggins and his feelings about Liggins’ case.

blamevictim230807In classic victim-blaming, the government conceded that Judge Murphy should not have lost his temper, but argues that his frustration was “understandable” based on Leron’s conduct during pretrial proceedings. The 6th shut that argument down flat: “To the contrary, we do not find the district judge’s conduct understandable in the least. The complexity or long duration of a criminal case gives no license to a district court to prejudge the defendant’s guilt or otherwise dispose of the case in any manner except through fair proceedings:

Finally, the Circuit ruled, the Judge’s apology – which, even if it should have counted for anything, was two years too late – didn’t matter. “In considering the denial of a motion for recusal pursuant to 28 USC § 455, we do not look to whether the district court made a sufficiently curative apology to the defendant in ruling on the motion; rather, we consider whether recusal was warranted at the time that the defendant made the motion.” Judge Murphy’s “looks like a criminal” comments “demonstrated a deep-seated . . . antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”

That was enough to warrant recusal.

United States v. Liggins, Case No. 22-1236, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 20040 (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

‘Patience, Patience’ on Guidelines Changes, DC Circuit Says – Update for August 4, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DC CIRCUIT IS NOT AN EARLY ADOPTER OF NEW COMPASSIONATE RELEASE STANDARDS

Louis Wilson – convicted 26 years ago of several counts, including killing a federal witness – filed for compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), seeking to cut his life sentence to time served.

Louie argued that the extraordinary and compelling reasons supporting his compassionate release motion included (1) if United States v. Booker and Apprendi v. New Jersey had been decided prior to his sentence, he would have gotten 25 years instead of life because the district court considered additional facts during sentencing not proven to a jury; (2) the national murder sentencing statistics have “trended downward;” and (3) his medical conditions plus his exemplary prison citizenship supported compassionate release.

patience230804Louie argued that the purported intervening changes in law went to his length of time served and should constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons. The district court concluded, however, that time served in prison “does not in and of itself constitute an extraordinary and compelling circumstance.” After considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court denied Louie’s motion.

Last week, the D.C. Circuit denied Louie’s appeal.

Under D.C. Circuit precedent in United States v. Jenkins, change in law arguments cannot be extraordinary and compelling reasons supporting compassionate release. But, Louie argued, since the D.C. Circuit decided Jenkins, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines (to be effective November 1st absent Congressional veto) regarding what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. The proposed guidelines state that district courts may consider a “change in the law” to ‘determine whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason’ for release if he has “served at least 10 years [of] an unusually long sentence.”

Without explanation, the Circuit refused to “decide whether Wilson’s contentions would constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons under the not-yet-effective guidelines.”

The lesson is that no one should expect a Circuit to do now what its precedent says it cannot do. Wait until November.

United States v. Wilson, Case No. 21-3074, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 18608 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Senate Leader Pushed on EQUAL Act – Update for August 3, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ADVOCATES DEMAND SCHUMER MOVE ON EQUAL ACT

The New York Daily News last week reported that a coalition of 35 reform groups have delivered a letter to Sen Charles Schumer (D-NY), the Senate majority leader, demanding passage of the EQUAL Act (S.524), the latest iteration of a bill that would equalize the punishments for powder and crack cocaine.

equal220812

Last summer, Schumer made the legislation a priority, but the bill didn’t get a Senate floor vote before the 117th Congress ended. Now, advocates are requesting that Schumer push for the bill once more. The letter demanded action in the summer session, but that session ended last week without action.

“While we appreciate Sen. Schumer’s support for the EQUAL Act, the reality is that Democrats have now controlled the Senate Judiciary [Committee] for three years without advancing any meaningful criminal justice reform,” said Janos Marton, vice president of political strategy for Dream.org. “Now is the time to do that.”

Inimai Chettiar, federal director of Justice Action Network, another signer on the letter, agreed: “This bill needs to move ASAP. Given that Sen. Schumer is the majority leader, he also has the power to put pressure on the Judiciary Committee to have them move this bill,” she said. “It’s been three years that we’ve been waiting.”

crack-coke200804Congress narrowed the disparity between crack and powder with the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010. Prior to the passage of that measure, one gram of crack resulted in the same sentence as 100 grams of powder cocaine. Even after the Fair Sentencing Act became law, an 18:1 ratio remained, meaning that 28 grams of crack resulted in the same punishment as a half kilo of powder. EQUAL would make punishments for crack the same as those for powder cocaine.

New York Daily News, Advocates demand Schumer do more to end crack cocaine sentencing disparity (July 25, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Qui Custodiet? – Update for August 1, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CAESAR’S WIFE

The Romans recognized the problem: “Qui custodiet ipsos custodes?” Roughly translated, “Who will guard the guards?”

Just as Julius Caesar expected his wife Pompeia to be above suspicion of disloyalty and infidelity, we expect our judges to be above suspicion of bias. But, as the Supreme Court has observed, “Bias is easy to attribute to others and difficult to discern in oneself.” Rare is the federal defendant who hasn’t felt like his or her judge is biased.

At least weekly, someone asks me how they can get his or her case assigned to a different judge because “my judge is biased against me.” The plain truth is that winning reassignment of a case to a different judge because of bias “is a serious request rarely made and rarely granted,” as the 2nd Circuit put it last week.

irony230801Everyone knows how hard correctional officers work and how important it is to ensure they have a carefree retirement. For BOP employees, the federal government guarantees a generous and secure sunset for its employees. But state and local COs have to depend on retirement promises made by governments that, unlike Uncle Sam, can’t print money to cover any shortfalls.

The New York City Correctional Officers Benevolent Association collected money from its members to invest in a pension plan. COBA’s executives got bribed into investing $20 million in Platinum Partners, a shaky pension plan that went bankrupt primarily because the pension managers pillaged it for their own benefit.

One of the bit players, defendant Jona Rechnitz, cooperated with the government. In fact, the government said, Jona was “one of the single most important and prolific white collar cooperating witnesses in the recent history of the Southern District of New York.” The government told the court that while Jona knew about the bribes, he “did not appear to know that Platinum was a fraud, or even that it was a bad investment.”

But District Court Alvin Hellerstein ordered changes in Jona’s Presentence Investigation Report, including that he had “had to know” both that Platinum was a “high-risk fund” and that the Fund was “willing to pay a bribe to obtain funds to satisfy a liquidity shortage, thus making it reasonably foreseeable that an investment of pension funds risked the loss of those funds.”

money160118At sentencing, Judge H bumped Jona’s restitution from a proposed $1.2 million to $10 million and sentenced him to 5 months. Before judgment was entered, COBA intervened, asking that restitution be increased to $14.25 million.

While the appeal and COBA’s motion were pending, Jona learned from witnesses who had spoken to Andrew Kaplan – another defendant in the ongoing Platinum prosecutions – that Andy considered Judge Hellerstein to be “like a father” to him, and the judge had even advised Andy as to whether he should accept the government’s plea offer regarding his Platinum-related criminal conduct. The Judge and Andy had also talked about the significant monetary losses associated with the charges against Kaplan, and Kaplan’s feelings towards other Platinum executives.

While COBA’s motion for additional restitution was still pending, Jona asked the Judge to recuse himself to “avoid the appearance of any impropriety and in an abundance of caution.” Jona’s primary concern was that the size of his restitution turned largely on the credibility of his claim that he had believed “in the soundness of Platinum Partners as an investment vehicle,” and that the Judge might have obtained extrajudicial information regarding the case from Andy Kaplan, which Jona would not have had the opportunity to challenge.

cmon161027The Judge turned him down, holding that his relationship with Andy Kaplan and the case pending against Andy were unrelated to the restitution issue involving Jona, in part because “there is no suggestion that [Jona] had any relationship with [Andy].” The Judge denied that he had any extra-record information regarding Jona or Platinum.

While Jona’s appeal was pending, the government told Jona’s lawyer that Judge Hellerstein had phoned the Assistant U.S. Attorney working on the case to ask how much Jona had paid in restitution and to complain that Jona was “sly, cannot be trusted, and use[d] religion as a cloak.” The Judge asked the AUSA “not to speak to [Jona’s] counsel about this…”

Jona argued to the 2nd Circuit that Judge Hellerstein should have recused himself under 28 USC § 455. Last week, the 2nd Circuit agreed.

Under § 455(a), a judge should disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” while § 455(b) requires a judge to recuse or herself in any case where the judge has “a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding,” or where the judge or spouse or someone within the 3rd degree of relationship to either has an interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding or may be a witness.

The Circuit concluded that Judge Hellerstein had crossed the line.

First and foremost, the district judge had a close, near-paternal personal relationship with Kaplan… a person who was directly involved in Jona’s bribery case… The government correctly points out that Kaplan was not one of the most central figures in Jona’s bribe scheme. But Jona’s testimony implicated Kaplan in concealing the Platinum investment from other COBA employees – a circumstance that placed Kaplan squarely in the middle of yet another incidence of wrongdoing at a firm where, through his guilty plea, he had already admitted to participating in a different criminal conspiracy…

The district judge did not merely have a close personal relationship with Kaplan; he advised Kaplan on his criminal case arising out of the Platinum collapse… The district judge’s advisory role is further problematic in light of the restitution question because Kaplan’s and Jona’s interests are plausibly adverse on that issue. COBA, of course, can recover its losses only once, even though two groups – those involved in the bribery scheme and those involved in the fraud – arguably caused them… Because Kaplan is a defendant in the Platinum case, it is possible that he will be ordered to pay restitution… [T]he more COBA recovers from the bribery defendants, the less it will need to recover from the Platinum defendants.

The Circuit concluded that “the judge’s close relationship with Kaplan, his advisory role in Kaplan’s criminal case, and the proximity of the cases (including with respect to restitution) would cause a reasonable person to question the district judge’s impartiality and was sufficient to necessitate recusal under 455(a).”

bias230801But the Circuit wasn’t done: “The district judge’s phone call with the prosecutor here was doubly ill-advised because it was both ex parte and off-the-record,” the panel held, “magnifying the concerns inherent to both types of communications. After all, but for the commendable transparency of the United States Attorney’s Office, Jona would not have learned of this phone call… [T]here is no obvious justification for conducting this particular inquiry ex parte and off-the-record. A public docket entry requiring an update from the parties would have been equally effective to monitor Jona’s restitution payments… And to the extent that the district judge felt the need to emphasize his views on Jona’s allegedly negative qualities, such statements should be reserved for open, on-the-record forums, if shared at all.”

Jona’s case was assigned to a different judge for resentencing.

United States v. Rechnitz, Case No 20-1011-cr, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 19054 (2d Cir. July 26, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root