Tag Archives: sex offender

Sex Offender Reporting Requirement Held Unconstitutional – Update for September 21, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DISTRICT COURT HOLDS SEX OFFENDER INTERNET REPORTING LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL

pornC160829In the pantheon of criminal offenses, none feels seamier or more disgusting than sex offenses. The label covers crimes from groping to rape to possessing child porn, with the offenders routinely not just given long prison sentences but subjected to limitations during and after prison that drug offenders, fraudsters and robbers never experience.

A rudderless young man who robbed a couple of banks and served over a decade in federal prison turned a talent as a “jailhouse lawyer” into a law school degree and admission to the bar. He’s now a celebrated law school professor and was even the subject of a laudatory 60 Minutes story. And he deserves it.

But what if, instead of armed bank robbery, the inmate had downloaded images of naked children engaged in simulated sex.  Just my opinion here, but I suspect the 60 MInutes crew would have stayed home, the State of Washington bar would never have found him to be rehabilitated, and his name would be found on the Internet – along with his address and a warning that he was a sex offender – as a warning to neighbors instead of hagiography. He’d be serving up Slurpees at 7-Eleven instead of training future lawyers at Georgetown.

kporn160124Sex crimes are forever, and the “forever” is untethered to the degree of harm caused to society. Rape and sex abuse are one thing, but as disgusting as I find the idea of looking at (let alone collecting) suggestive images of naked kids, I have trouble with the idea that we can forgive a history of violence but not someone who looked at flickering images on a computer screen.

No crime is as easy to demagogue as is a sex crime. That may be why Congress has found it so easy to rachet up minimum sentences for kiddie porn offenses. The Sentencing Commission has candidly acknowledged that at the direction of Congress, it has amended USSG § 2G2.2 several times, each time recommending harsher penalties. In United States v. Dorvee, the 2nd Circuit noted that the rachet effect persisted despite the Sentencing Commission being

openly opposed [to] these Congressionally directed changes… Speaking broadly, the Commission has also noted that “specific directives to the Commission to amend the guidelines make it difficult to gauge the effectiveness of any particular policy change, or to disentangle the influences of the Commission from those of Congress.”

There’s some evidence that the Congressional view of child porn punishment is at odds with public sentiment. US District Court Judge James Gwin of the Northern District of Ohio, as an experiment, had jurors in his courtroom anonymously note a recommended sentence for people they convicted, He would not look at the recommendations until he had imposed sentence. In one sex offender case, he wrote,

While this case and the jury selected to hear it were unremarkable, the disparity between the punishment that the jury felt [the defendant] should receive and the punishment recommended by the Guidelines was striking. The jurors’ mean recommended sentence was 20 months imprisonment, and the median recommended sentence was 15 months. The Guidelines recommended a sentence between 87 and 108 months. Even the low end of the Guidelines range was almost six times the jurors’ median recommendation.

All of the foregoing gets us to today’s case. Connecticut law requires that after release, convicted sex offenders disclose to police all of their email and social media addresses, as well as other Internet communication identifiers. Jim Cornelio, a released offender, sued in federal court, claiming the disclosure requirement violated his 1st Amendment right to free speech.

sexpornoffender230921Last week, the US District Court for Connecticut agreed. The Court held that by compelling Jim to disclose all of his Internet addresses and identifiers, “the law chills and inhibits his right to speak freely on the Internet and to do so anonymously if he wishes… [Thus], the State must show that the law advances an important government interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free speech. And it must also show that the law does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further the government’s interest.”

The Judge held that the State “has an important government interest in detecting and deterring sex offenders from using the Internet to engage in crime.” However, although the disclosure law has been in place for over 15 years,

the State cannot point to a single example of when its database of sex offenders’ email addresses and other Internet communication identifiers has helped the police detect or solve any crimes. And the State concedes that it has no evidence that requiring sex offenders to disclose their Internet communication identifiers deters them from using the Internet to commit more crimes. Moreover, even if I assumed that the State was able to show that the disclosure law advances an important government interest, the State nonetheless fails to show that the breadth of the disclosure law does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further that interest.

United States v. Dorvee, 604 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2010)
United States Sentencing Commission, The History of the Child Pornography Guidelines (October 2009)

Cornelio v Connecticut, Case No 3:19-cv-1240, 2023 USDist LEXIS 163106 (D.Conn. Sep 14, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

The Sheriff Was Making It Up – Update for January 28, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

YOU PUT THE WORDS RIGHT IN MY MOUTH

In October 2018, two Butts County Sheriff’s deputies placed signs in the front yards of all 57 registered sex offenders in the County, warning kids to “STOP” and “NO TRICK-OR-TREAT AT THIS ADDRESS.” When one of the people whose house had the posted sign called the Sheriff, he was told it was a crime to remove it.

trickortreatsign220128

The next year, three of the registered sex offenders sued, seeking a court order prohibiting the Sheriff from placing the signs again. The district court denied the injunction.

Last week, the 11th Circuit reversed, concluding that “the Sheriff’s warning signs are compelled government speech, and their placement violates a homeowner’s First Amendment rights.” The Court noted that First Amendment protection “includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all… The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of individual freedom of mind.”

Where First Amendment rights are implicated, the state has to show it has a “compelling interest” in doing so and that the violation is “narrowly tailored” to achieve that end. Everyone agreed that protecting kids from sex abuse is compelling. But the Sheriff tried to swat a fly with a sledgehammer.

Before placing the signs, the Sheriff didn’t consider whether any of the registrants were classified as likely to recidivate. What’s more, he admitted that in the past six years he’d been Sheriff, he had never had an issue with a registrant having unauthorized contact or reoffending with a minor. The Sheriff could not show the Butts County sex offenders “actually pose a danger to trick-or-treating children or that these signs would serve to prevent such danger.”

trick220128Influencing the decision might have been the Sheriff’s explanation that he had placed the signs because Georgia law forbids registered sex offenders from participating in Halloween. After the warning signs were placed, the Sheriff posted a message on the Department’s Facebook page, along with a picture of the sign, in which he said as much. That was more trick than treat: Georgia law says nothing of the such.

“Assuming that yard signs alerting people to the residences of registered sex offenders on Halloween would prevent the sexual abuse of children (which, we repeat, is not supported by any record evidence),” the Circuit held, “the signs are not tailored narrowly enough.”

The decision against the Sheriff does not seem to have affected his popularity…

sheriffFB220128

McClendon v. Long, Case No. 21-10092, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 1635 (11th Cir., Jan. 19, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

State Can’t Make You Say “Uncle” – Update for October 30, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BRANDED

Remember when you were a kid, and the neighborhood bully would knock you down and push your face into the mud or twist your arm or something until you cried “Uncle”? That is what is known as “compelled speech.

Nine states require sex offenders to carry driver’s licenses emblazoned with some variation of the words “SEX OFFENDER” in bright capital letters across the top of the card. It’s like making the former defendant say “Uncle!” for the rest of his life, every time he writes a check, votes or goes to the doctor (all places we regularly have to show our DLs, at least in Ohio).

brand201031In Louisiana, Tazin Hill had had enough crying “Uncle.” He altered his license to hide the sex-offender label, and he was charged with a felony for doing so. Last week, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that making sex offenders carry the labeled licenses violated the 1st Amendment by compelling them to say something the government ordered them to say, known as “compelled speech.” In this case, the label “SEX OFFENDER” was what the license holders were compelled to say.

The court held the identification card, branded with the words “sex offender” and the person’s “name, picture, address, and other identifying characteristics… is that “readily associated with him” and must be routinely displayed to others. Thus, “the branded identification card is compelled speech, and it is a content-based regulation of speech that consequently must pass strict scrutiny. While the state certainly has a compelling interest in protecting the public and enabling law enforcement to identify a person as a sex offender, Louisiana has not adopted the least restrictive means of doing so. A symbol, code, or a letter designation would inform law enforcement that they are dealing with a sex offender and thereby reduce the unnecessary disclosure to others during everyday tasks… As Louisiana has not used the least restrictive means of advancing its otherwise compelling interest, the branded identification requirement is unconstitutional.”

A state could as easily require people to carry licenses labeled “convicted felon” or “annoying neighbor” or even “leaves toilet seat up.” The mischief a state government can cause once people are being labeled is vast, making this and other similar decisions applicable to everyone, not just people convicted of sex offenses.

Louisiana v Hill, Case No 20-0323, 2020 LA LEXIS 2512 (LA Sup Ct Oct 20, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root