Tag Archives: conspiracy

More Rumors – How Many Can You Identify as True? – Update for October 24, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

RUMORS II – TAKE OUR INMATE.COM RUMOR QUIZ

In prison, “inmate.com” is an information site of almost mythical status. It’s omniscient, omnipresent, omnivorous, and almost always, always wrong.

Unsurprisingly, there really is an inmate.com, although it bears no resemblance to the ethereal website of legend.

legend231023On November 1, the Guidelines amendments proposed last April will become effective. Under 28 USC § 994(p), amendments proposed by May 1 must become effective by November 1 unless Congress votes otherwise. Congress has not done so, and with the House in turmoil and no apparent Senate interest in stopping the amendments, the amendments will be effective in eight days.

Somehow, in the 35 years we’ve had the Sentencing Guidelines, the date of “November 1” has taken on a mystical, legendary quality. This year’s no different, as my email inbox continues to be stuffed with questions about what may happen ten days from now.

trueorfalse231024Take our true-or-false test to see how current you are on the latest November 1st rumors now being featured on  Inmate.com (the mythical one, not the penpal site):


(1) True or false: On November 1, the meth guidelines will be lowered by doing away with the “ice” enhancement.

FALSE. A district judge in SD Mississippi refused a few months ago to enhance for meth purity. It happens that this Judge is also Chairman of the Sentencing Commission, but nothing has been proposed on meth, let alone passed.

(2) True or false: On November 1, a new law will go into effect making 18 USC 924(c) prisoners eligible for FSA credits.

FALSE. The only way for 924(c) people to get FSA credits would be for Congress to amend the First Step Act. There is no proposal in front of either the House or the Senate to do that.

(3) True or false: On November 1, Congress is going to do away with the crime of conspiracy.

FALSE. Such a proposal, if anyone were daft enough to propose it, would never even make it to a committee hearing.

(4) True or false: On November 1, Biden is going to give all federal prisoners a year off of their sentences because of how miserable it was to be locked up for COVID.

FALSE. No one has even suggested such a thing, let alone seriously proposed it.

(5) True or false: On November 1, the new 65% law is going into effect.

FALSE. There ain’t no 65% law, never has been a 65% law, and probably never will be a 65% law.

(6) True or False:  On November 1, the Time Reduction Fairy will appear to magically commute your sentence to ‘time served.’

FALSE, but no more false than all the other November 1 rumors.

timereductionfairy231003Do you detect a trend here? This year, more happens on the 1st of November than All Saint’s Day… but not much. A couple of Guideline amendments go into effect and become retroactive. That’s good. Another one – compassionate release – will help a lot of people. But nothing will come out of Congress, nothing from the White House, very little from the BOP, and just the predictable annual amendment list from the Sentencing Commission.

And thus it will ever be.

– Thomas L. Root

I’m Just Here To Dust and Vacuum – Update for September 13, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE CLEANING LADY

When the authorities busted a methamphetamine house, they found Maria De La Cruz Nava hiding in the master bedroom behind a locked door with ringleader Gus Guzman and one other person. Other persons were present in the kitchen as well as outside the house, which was dirty, held few furnishings, and contained contraband.

cleaningA230913

Maria explained that she was just the cleaning lady. When an officer mentioned that drugs and guns were all over the house, Maria shrugged, “They all used drugs.”

Maria and Gus were charged with a drug trafficking conspiracy, an 18 USC § 924(c) charge and a money laundering charge. After the jury convicted her, she filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion for acquittal and an FRCrimP 33 motion for a new trial. The district court denied the Rule 29 motion, finding that her conviction as a co-conspirator was supported by the record because (1) she was barricaded in a bedroom with Gus; (2) meth was found in the bathroom attached to the bedroom; ( (3) a knife was recovered from a “purse” in the kitchen, and Maria was the only female present; (4) meth was found next to the purse; (5) drug paraphernalia was scattered throughout the house; (6) the expert testimony admitted as to the varying roles of individuals involved in a drug conspiracy; and (7) witnesses placed Maria at the house on other occasions screen.

cleaningB230913Last week, the 8th Circuit reversed. There was no doubt that the evidence showed a conspiracy, the Circuit ruled, but “while our precedent recognizes that proof a defendant joined a conspiracy may be shown entirely through circumstantial evidence… mere association or acquaintance with a drug dealer and mere presence at the location of the crime are insufficient to establish guilt on a conspiracy charge. Furthermore, we will not lightly impute constructive possession of drugs or other contraband to one found in another’s house.”

The 8th noted that

Maria did not admit involvement in the conspiracy, there is no evidence in the record that she was ever in physical possession of either methamphetamine or drug proceeds, and no… witness testified that Maria was involved in drug activity. We are also unable to find evidence that she acted as a courier, facilitated any drug activity, directed any of the conspiracy’s activities, or acted in any manner to advance the illegal end of the conspiracy. The government argues that because Maria was the only woman in the house, a reasonable jury could infer that the bag in the kitchen was a purse and belonged to her. But nothing in the bag demonstrates or even suggests that it was a purse that belonged to a woman. There is no ornamentation on the bag. There were no feminine personal items in the bag. There was no identifying information tying it to Maria. The nondescript, plain bag contained only drug trafficking-related items and is just the sort of storage container that a drug trafficker might use to conceal items without calling attention to himself or herself.

Nevertheless, the Circuit ruled, “while evidence in the record of Maria’s knowledge of and participation in a drug trafficking conspiracy is scant, it is a high burden to overturn a jury’s verdict. We cannot say on this record, although a close call, that no reasonable jury could have found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

PrintMary’s FRCrimP 33 motion for a new trial was another matter. In its order, the district court recited the correct standard for a Rule 33 motion but “it conducted no analysis specific to Maria’s new trial motion,” the Circuit said. Instead, the district court disposed of the motion with one sentence throwaway that said “sufficient evidence was presented against Defendant such that there was not a miscarriage of justice in the jury finding her guilty of Counts 1-3… There is no indication that the court weighed the evidence anew. Likewise, we are unable to determine whether the district court disbelieved any of the witnesses. Given the lack of any analysis, we are unable to discern whether the district court incorrectly applied the standard applicable under Rule 29 to the new trial request or whether it applied the proper, broader standard applicable under Rule 33… We remand to the district court for consideration of Maria’s motion for a new trial as it relates to the drug trafficking conspiracy and related firearms count.”

As to the money laundering conspiracy, the Circuit reversed Maria’s conviction outright. “There is no evidence that she acted in a manner to conceal the nature, source, location, ownership, or control of the conspiracy’s proceeds.”

United States v. De La Cruz Nava, Case No. 22-2914, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 23601 (8th Cir. September. 6, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Even the Government Gets the ‘Blues’ – Update for May 16, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

1ST CIRCUIT GIVES GOVERNMENT THE ‘VARSITY BLUES’

In a stunning reversal, the 1st Circuit last week overturned the fraud and conspiracy convictions on Wednesday of two parents found guilty of participating in the far-reaching bribery prosecution known as Operation Varsity Blues, which resulted in the convictions of dozens of wealthy parents who falsified their children’s applications and made payments to gain admission to prestigious universities from Harvard to USC.

varsityblues230516The biggest bribe I could have paid to get my kids into college would have been a Starbucks Frappuccino for the admissions counselor. But the mother of my kids is a very bright person (but for having married me many years ago), and the kids favored her, which is how I have two MBAs and a Ph.D. now for offspring. 

But some folks with a lot more star power and fatter wallets than I have children who – to put it charitably – struggled academically.  I was shocked and appalled to think that these people would use all of the resources at their disposal to get their kids into some really good colleges.  A parent doing everything in his or her power to help a son or daughter?  Who has ever heard of such a thing?

The thinking was that once admitted, the kid would flourish (or at least graduate). What harm was there in taking a slot and agreeing to pay the freight for four years of great education?

That thinking was not the government’s, however. The government argued that those admission slots were property, and that the parents’ lies that Junior was a great water polo player or Sally had a killer backhand deprived the universities in question of a valuable resource.

The issue is crucial, because I cannot commit wire or mail fraud without depriving you of some actual property.  When I helped my sister submit a photo of my parents for a newspaper piece on their 60th anniversary, I liberally applied Photoshop to clean up some of their wrinkles and gray hair.  Only fair, because I caused more than my share of them.  But it deceived the readers of the local rag into thinking that my folks looked pretty darn good for people in their mid-80s.

fraud170112I sent the picture to the paper by email.  Was it 18 USC § 1343 wire fraud?  No, because what I tricked people into giving up was just a sinking feeling that my mother and father looked better than their mother and father.  And that ‘sinking feeling’ – regardless of how much schadenfreude I may have enjoyed from thinking of all of those readers with more wrinkled parents than mine – was not “property.”

Neither is a university admission offer. The 1st Circuit agreed with the defendants, holding that the trial court’s telling the jury that such offers were “property” as a matter of law swept too broadly. “We do not say the defendants’ conduct is at all desirable,” the 1st ruled. However, “the government’s highly general argument would criminalize a wide swath of conduct. Under the government’s broad understanding of property applied to admissions slots as a class, embellishments in a kindergarten application could constitute property fraud proscribed by federal law.”

The Circuit “rejected the Government’s theories of property rights not simply because they strayed from traditional concepts of property,” but also because the theory “invited the Court to approve a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction in the absence of a clear statement by Congress.”

But the best part of this 156-page decision was the Court’s lengthy explanation as to why the defendants – most of whom had never met each other and had no connection other than they all hired William ‘Rick’ Singer as their college admission guru – were not engaged in a conspiracy.

girlbasketball230516The court also found that the government had failed to prove that the two defendants had agreed to conspire with Rick’s other clients. “While the evidence suffices to show that [the mastermind] and his core group had a financial interest in whether children of parents other than the defendants obtained admission, no parent had any similar financial stake in how successful other children were in getting admitted through the services of the core group. [Precedent] does not permit us to conclude that the defendants’ mere awareness that [the mastermind] and the core group had other parents enrolled suffices to permit a rational juror to infer that the defendants shared the goal of advancing the success of that broader conspiracy.”

The government argued that this was the typical “spoke-and-wheel” conspiracy, where Rich was the hub and the defendants were all out on the rim.  ‘Spoke-and-wheel” conspiracies are how the government likes to roll up big drug-trafficking organizations. It has always been troubling. If I am buying pot from ‘Toker’ Tom, what I care about is that he can supply me for a given amount of money. I don’t care if he charges other people double, or gives it away to others, or smokes whatever else he has himself.  My success selling weed does not rely on the rest of Tom’s customers at all.

Rick’s deal was the same. Gamel Abdelaziz cared that Rick could get his daughter into the University of Southern California by turning her into a basketball phenom (despite the fact she didn’t make the cut for varsity in high school). Beyond that, a University official testified, she was “not an academically competitive applicant outside the athletic recruitment process,” a nice way of suggesting she might want to try the community college down the street.

wendysconspiracy230516The point is that Gamel didn’t care a whit if Rick used or did not use the same legerdemain on his other clients’ kids, or even if Rick had other clients.  It’s the Wendy’s Rule: each customer wants a perfect double bacon cheeseburger, but that customer doesn’t care whether the customer before or after got a good sandwich, or even whether he or she got a sandwich at all. Have the customers all conspired with each other and Wendy’s to possess with intent to distribute sandwiches?

Here, the Court argued that the fact that Rick has a smorgasbord of shady ways to get your kid into college – paying off college coaches to claim your kid is Angel Reese, hiring a Ph.D. to take your kid’s ACT test, endowing a chair at the university – meant that the parents weren’t part of the same conspiracy. But that’s a false dichotomy: simply define the conspiracy as being one together undeserving kids into good colleges, and the different approaches just becomes means to get the job done.

The novelty of the charges and the celebrity status of many of the defendants made Varsity Blues a high-profile case, with moguls and movie stars alike pleading guilty and doing short bids in federal prison. “Almost everybody pleaded guilty, so the government’s legal theories weren’t really tested until this case was decided,” Joshua Sharp, one of the defense attorneys, told the New York Times.

But the Court’s analysis of conspiracies may be a legacy of ‘Varsity Blues’ that benefits a lot of people who may have sold weed to college kids without ever being a college kid themselves.

United States v. Abdelaziz, Case Nos 22-1129 and -1138, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 11507 (1st Cir., May 10, 2023)

New York Times, Appeals Court Overturns Fraud and Conspiracy Convictions in Varsity Blues Scandal (May 10, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Hobbs Is Violent, Hobbs Is Not Violent – Update for May 3, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE TWO FACES OF HOBBS

Two cases decided in the past few weeks illustrate the strange world of Hobbs Act robbery.

janus210502The Hobbs Act, a post-war legacy of Congressman Sam Hobbs (D-Alabama) federalized robbery of the corner candy store. Sam was a man of his time, close friends of J. Edgar Hoover (and sponsor of a bill that would have let the FBI wiretap anyone suspected of a felony, which ultimately did not pass).

The Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act of 1946 amended the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 after the Supreme Court held in United States v. Teamsters Local 807 that Congress meant to exempt union extortion from criminal liability.  Congress did not so intend, and Sam Hobbs sponsored a bill that made sure the Court got the message.

Like its predecessor, the Hobbs Act prescribes heavy criminal penalties for acts of robbery or extortion that affect interstate commerce. The courts have interpreted the Hobbs Act broadly, requiring only a minimal effect on interstate commerce to justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction. That Clark bar you stole at gunpoint?  It was made over in Altoona, Pennsylvania, by the Boyer Candy Co. Inasmuch as you robbed it from a confectioner in Podunk Center,  Iowa, your robbery affected interstate commerce. Presto – a Hobbs Act robbery.

clark2120503The Hobbs Act has been used as the basis for federal prosecutions in situations not apparently contemplated by Congress in 1946. Just ask Earl McCoy.

Earl rode around in the car while his brothers committed armed home invasions, stealing TVs and the such from Harry and Harriet Homeowner at gunpoint. Convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act conspiracy, attempted Hobbs Act robbery and of four counts of using a gun in the commission of the crimes, Earl got sentenced to 135 years.

That’s only 15 years less than Bernie Madoff got for a $65 billion swindle, proving Earl was probably in the wrong business. Of course, Bernie didn’t use a gun. It was the gun that got Earl, five stacked 18 USC § 924(c) counts that added 107 years to his sentence. The First Step Act changed the stacking law, so the same offense would net Earl only 35 years today, still substantial time but at least servable in a normal lifetime.

Ernie appealed his conviction, arguing that the attempted robberies, the conspiracy, and aiding and abetting could not support 18 USC 924(c) convictions. Ten days ago, the 2nd Circuit gave him a split decision.

violence181008The 2nd agreed that after United States v. Davis, Hobbs Act conspiracy no longer supports a § 924(c) conviction. No surprise there. But the Circuit held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery and, for that matter, aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery, was a crime of violence that supports a § 924(c) conviction.

Earl argued that one could attempt a Hobbs Act robbery without ever using force. After all, scoping out a store to rob while carrying a gun is enough to constitute an attempt, and no violence was ever used. Doesn’t matter, the 2nd said. To be guilty of Hobbs Act attempted robbery, a defendant necessarily must intend to commit all of the elements of robbery and must take a substantial step towards committing the crime. Even if a defendant’s substantial step didn’t itself involve the use of physical force, he or she must necessarily have intended to use physical force and have taken a substantial step towards using physical force. That constitutes “attempted use of physical force” within the meaning of § 924(c)(3)(A).

For aiding-and-abetting to be enough to convict someone of a crime, the underlying offense must have been committed by someone other than the defendant, and the defendant must have acted with the intent of aiding the commission of that underlying crime. An aider and abetter is as guilty of the underlying crime as the person who committed it.

Because an aider and abettor is responsible for the acts of the person who committed the crime, the Circuit held, “an aider and abettor of a Hobbs Act robbery necessarily commits all the elements of a principal Hobbs Act robbery.”

lock200601Earl will get 25 years knocked off his sentence, leaving him with a mere 110 years to do. As for whether “attempts” to commit a crime of violence is itself a crime of violence, that question may not be settled short of the Supreme Court.

But the Hobbs Act has a split personality: it is not a crime of violence for all purposes. In the 4th Circuit, Rick Green pled to Hobbs Act robbery, with an agreed sentence of 120 months. But the presentence report used the Hobbs Act robbery as a crime of violence to make him a Guidelines career offender, with an elevated 151-188 month sentencing range. At sentencing, Rick argued Hobbs Act robbery was not a crime of violence under the Guidelines “career offender” definition. His sentencing judge disagreed.

But last week, the 4th Circuit sided with Rick. Applying the categorical approach, the Circuit observed that Hobbs Act robbery can be committed “by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future,” to a victim’s person or property.” The 4th said, “this definition, by express terms, goes beyond the use of force or threats of force against a person and reaches the use of force or threats of force against property, as well… So to the extent the Guidelines definition of “crime of violence” requires the use of force or threats of force against persons, there can be no categorical match.”

Thus, Rick was not a “career offender,” and will get resentenced to his agreed-upon 120 months.

United States v. McCoy, Case No 17-3515(L), 2021 US App. LEXIS 11873 (2nd Cir Apr 22, 2021)

United States v. Green, Case No 19-4703, 2021 US App. LEXIS 12844 (4th Cir Apr 29, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Havis: the 6th Circuit Gift That Keeps on Giving – Update for September 9, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HAVIS MEANS CONSPIRACY DOESN’T COUNT FOR CAREER OFFENDER, EITHER

You remember United States v. Havis, the 2019 en banc decision in which the 6th Circuit held that the Guidelines’ definition of ‘controlled substance offense’ did not include attempt crimes, meaning that a defendant’s prior conviction for attempted drug distribution could not be counted to make him a career criminal. (If you don’t recall it, refresh yourself here).

snakes200909Eddie Valesquez made a deal over the phone with a buddy of his to kill a troublesome witness. (Note: Contrary to popular culture’s suggestions to the contrary, murdering a witness is both illegal and a bad idea). In fact, Eddie found out that the mere planning such a murder problematical: he was convicted of an 18 USC § 1958 conspiracy to commit murder for hire.

Eddie’s prior drug conspiracy conviction was used at sentencing to make him a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, which raised his sentencing range to stratospheric heights, resulting in a 262-month term in prison.

Last week, the 6th Circuit reversed the sentence. It ruled that “although the specific facts of Havis involved an attempt crime, its reasoning applies with equal force to other inchoate crimes not listed in the text of § 4B1.2(b). Accordingly, we have acknowledged that, in light of Havis, conspiracy to distribute controlled substances is not a “controlled substances offense” under § 4B1.2(b).”

United States v. Cordero, Case No. 19-3543, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 28128 (6th Cir. Sep 3, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Virus or No, The World Keeps Turning on Hobbs Act and FSA – Update for March 31, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MEANWHILE, A COUPLE OF IMPORTANT FAIR SENTENCING ACT/HOBBS ACT CASES…

Two appellate cases handed down last week would have been headliners any other time except for now, with the coronavirus crowding everything else out of the news.

crackpowder160606In 2001, Brandon Gravatt was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of powder cocaine and 50 grams or more of crack cocaine (21 USC § 846). He pled guilty to the dual-object drug conspiracy charge, facing sentences of 10 years-to-life for the coke and 10-to-life for the crack. The court sentenced him to just short of 22 years.

After the Fair Sentencing Act became retroactive due to the  provision at Section 404 of the First Step Act (passed in December 2018), Brandon filed for a sentence reduction because the crack statutory minimum had fallen to five years. But the District Court denied his motion, because the 10-to-life sentence for the powder cocaine remained the same.

Last week, in a decision awaited by a lot of people, the 4th Circuit reversed. It held that even in a multi-object conspiracy like Brandon’s – where the penalties of one object (possession of crack) were reduced by the FSA while the penalties of the other (powder cocaine) were not – if the crack minimum sentence fell, Brandon was eligible for resentencing. The Circuit said because Brandon’s “sentence involved a covered offense under Section 404(a) [of the First Step Act], the district court should have reviewed Gravatt’s motion on the merits, applying its discretion under Sections 404(b) and (c).”

Of course, the 4th said, the quantity of powder cocaine in Gravatt’s case could mean the district court would decide not to lower his sentence. “Our decision today,” the Circuit said, “only requires that Gravatt’s sentence receive a substantive review. It should not be construed as expressing any view on how the district court should rule.”

Meanwhile, the 11th Circuit held last week that a Hobbs Act robbery was not a crime of violence for purposes of determining whether a defendant was a “career offender” under Chapter 4B of the Guidelines.

violence151213Joining the 6th and 9th Circuits, the 11th held that because the Guidelines definition of robbery and extortion only extends to physical force against persons, while under Hobbs Act robbery and extortion, the force can be employed or threatened against property as well, the Hobbs Act (18 USC § 1951) is broader than the Guidelines definition, and thus cannot be a crime of violence for career offender purposes.

Unfortunately, because 18 USC § 924(c) does include threats to property as well as to people, the 11th Circuit holding does not apply to defendants with § 924(c) counts supported by Hobbs Act convictions.

United States v. Gravatt, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 9053 (4th Cir Mar 23, 2020)

United States v. Eason, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 9096 (11th Cir Mar 24, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Gun Case Misfires, Shoots Government in the Foot – Update for March 3, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

GENERAL VERDICT DOOMS HOBBS ACT CONSPIRACY/ ATTEMPT CONVICTION

Defendant Stacy Berry was found guilty of a using a gun in a crime of violence (an 18 USC § 924(c) offense) based on both an underlying conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act and an attempted Hobbs Act robbery. A § 924(c) violation, of course, carries a mandatory additional sentence of at least five years.

guns200304Time was, the government liked attaching § 924(c) counts to conspiracies, because conspiracies are so long-lived and squishy that essentially, a defendant’s possession of a gun at any time during a months-long or years-long conspiracy was enough to ensure the § 924 conviction. It was may, prove that during a robbery on a particular date and at a particular location, the defendant knew that his accomplice was going to pull his .44 Klutzman and pistol-whip a store clerk.

Prior to the Supreme Court’s United States v. Davis decision in June 2019, courts generally held that if a crime was violent, then, ipso facto, a conspiracy to commit the crime was violent, too, and any attempt to commit the crime had to be violent. That made securing the § 924(c) conviction a cinch.

sowwind200205Sow the wind, reap the whirlwind. Last month, a district court granted the defendant’s post-conviction 28 USC § 2255 motion, because the government had cleverly attached a § 924(c) count to both a Hobbs Act conspiracy and an attempted Hobbs Act robbery. By now, everyone knows that a Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a crime of violence, and courts are coming around to the view that an attempted crime of violence is not necessarily a crime of violence, either.

Stacy argued that neither the conspiracy nor the attempted robbery was a crime of violence. The government argued that while the conspiracy was not, the attempt certainly was.

The district court held that “it need not rule whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence… The parties acknowledge that the jury instructions allowed for a conviction on either conspiracy or attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and the jury verdict was a general verdict which does not specify which was the basis of the conviction.” For that reason, the § 924(c) conviction was thrown out.

United States v. Berry, 2020 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 20380 (W.D.Va. Feb 6, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Nasty, Brutish Week for the Hobbs Act… But a Ray of Sunshine, Maybe? – Update for January 22, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DARKEST HOUR FOR HOBBS ACT JUST BEFORE DAWN?

violent170315In the wake of last summer’s United States v. Davis Supreme Court decision, a number of federal defendants began asking whether attempting to commit or aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery (18 USC § 1951) can be considered a “crime of violence” that will support an 18 USC § 924(c) conviction and mandatory add-on sentence for possession or use of a gun in the underlying offense. In other words, a crime that any reasonable person might think is violent may not be quite violent enough.

A primer: Under 18 USC § 924(c), anyone who commits a drug trafficking offense or a crime of violence while possessing a firearm is sentenced for the underlying crime, and then hit with a mandatory additional sentence of at least five year and up to life in prison. The minimum sentences increase if the defendant brandished the gun (minimum additional seven-year sentence) or actually fired it (minimum additional seven-year sentence). The hot arguments over the past decade have been what makes an underlying crime a “crime of violence,” with Davis being only the latest case to take up the question.

And yesterday, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Shular v. United States, which could bring the same kind of scrutiny to what constitutes a drug offense that Davis and its antecedents brought to crimes of violence.

Enough background… now for the news. Last week was not especially helpful to defendants hoping that Hobbs Act robbery might be found to be other than a crime of violence. Parts were nasty and brutish. But, mercifully, those may also be short.

First, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on a closely-watched petition filed in Mojica v. United States, which asked indirectly whether a § 924(c) conviction could be based on a conviction for aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery. Mojica argued that aiding or abetting a Hobbs Act robbery was not a “crime of violence” after Davis, because viewed categorically, a Hobbs Act robbery could be committed without using or threatening force. Although there were early signs of Supreme Court interest in the case, brought by talented post-conviction attorney Brandon Sample, certiorari was denied on Jan. 10.

violence180508Meanwhile, the 7th Circuit rejected claims that an attempt to commit a Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the elements test of § 924. Because a Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence, the Circuit said, and because a jury has to find the defendant intended to commit the robbery in order to convict him for attempt, attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a “valid predicate offense” for 924(c).

One ray of sunshine fell in the 9th Circuit, which in an unpublished opinion said, “We accept the government’s concession that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under 18 USC 924(c)(3) in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v Davis… Therefore, we vacate defendants’ convictions for carrying and discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence.”

Robber160229A second ray of light may have flickered the week before. An alert reader commended my attention to Judge Sterling Johnson’s fascinating holding in United States v. Tuckerhanded down January 8th. A defendant was charged with conspiracy to rob a Brooklyn gas station and an attempt to rob the station, both Hobbs Act offenses. (How something so criminally prosaic as robbing a gas station became a federal offense is a question I’ll leave for another day.) He was also charged with two § 924(c) offenses, one for possessing a gun during the conspiracy to rob and another for possessing a gun during the attempt to rob. If convicted of the 924(c) offenses, defendant Tambhia Tucker would have had a minimum of ten extra years added to whatever he might get for the conspiracy and the attempted robbery.

Tambhia filed a pretrial motion to dismiss both 924(c) counts, arguing that after Davis, neither a conspiracy nor an attempt could support a 924(c) conviction. Judge Johnson agreed, holding that Davis made short work of the 924(c) connected to the conspiracy. As for the attempt, the Judge noted that in the 2nd Circuit, previous holdings have established that conducting surveillance of an intended robbery target, or even just obtaining a getaway car for use in a robbery, was enough to convict for attempted Hobbs Act robbery. The Judge concluded that

it is incorrect to say that a person necessarily attempts to use physical force within the meaning of 924(c)’s elements clause just  because he attempts a crime that, if completed would be violent… The defense reasonably interprets “surveillance” as the “minimum criminal conduct,” necessary to convict for attempted Hobbs Act robbery.  Thus, the question becomes whether a person conducting surveillance of a target with the intent to commit robbery necessarily uses, attempts to use, or threatens the use of force… A person may engage in an overt act — in the case of robbery, for example, overt acts might include renting a getaway van, parking the van a block from the bank, and approaching the bank’s door before being thwarted — without having used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. Would this would-be robber have intended to use, attempt to use, or threaten to use force? Sure. Would he necessarily have attempted to use force? No.

As Tucker has pointed out, in the Second Circuit, even less severe conduct, such as “reconnoitering” a target location or possessing “paraphernalia to be employed in the commission of the crime,” can constitute a substantial step and lead to an attempt conviction… Accordingly… this court finds that given the broad spectrum of attempt liability, the elements of attempt to commit robbery could clearly be met without any use, attempted use, or threatened use of violence.

Judge Johnson dismissed both 924(c) counts.

lastword200122This will hardly be the last word on an attempted robbery offense, but it certainly advances the debate.

Mojica v. United States, Case No. 19-35 (cert. denied Jan. 13, 2020)

United States v. Ingram, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 1531 (7th Cir. Jan 17, 2020)

United States v. Soto-Barraza, Case No. 15-10856 (9th Cir. Jan 17, 2020) (unpublished)

United States v. Tucker, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3035 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Seamy Case, Fascinating Holding – Update for November 6, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CHILD SEX CASE YIELDS FASCINATING CONSPIRACY HOLDING

pornA160829Maurice and Tonya, a couple of mutts in Oklahoma City, forced two 15-year old girls into prostitution for three weeks before law enforcement shut them down. A local businessman named Charles Anthony called the escort service the pair were using to sell the girls’ services, and he lined up a single meeting with the girls (not knowing their ages when he phoned).

When the government freed the girls and arrested Maurice and Tonya, it found records of several customers’ sordid night. Three customers, including Chuck, were indicted along with Maurice and Tonya for conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking. Chuck was convicted, and sentenced to the statutory mandatory-minimum 10 years’ imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution to the two teen-aged victims in the amount of $327,000 and $308,000.

A normal reaction to this kind of prosecution is that the defendants get whatever is coming to them. Still, that’s a pretty high price for one night, especially where Chuck did not know the girls’ ages when he lined them up.  Last week, the 10th Circuit expressed grave doubts that Chuck’s conduct, however disgusting, made him a co-conspirator in the entire venture.

Chuck’s appeal, strangely enough, focused on restitution. Last week, 10th Circuit agreed that the district court should have separated the harm Chuck’s one-night assignation with the two girls had caused from the broader harm caused by weeks and weeks of sexual slavery by the two who ran the sex trafficking ring. But the more interesting discussion, because it applies generally to criminal conspiracies, was the Court’s discussion of whether Chuck’s single night made him a co-conspirator.

childpros191107Chuck claimed a variance between the indictment, which charged him with conspiring with the two who rang the ring and two other customers to operate a child-prostitution enterprise for three weeks. Chuck argued that the evidence showed that all he did was to hire the girls for one night, and that was a subset of the larger conspiracy.

The 10th Circuit agreed. The evidence, it said, proved that for three weeks Maurice and Tonya conspired to operate a prostitution enterprise, which included two minor females. Maurice and Tonya played interdependent roles to ensure the success of the enterprise: Maurice recruited and controlled the girls, while Tonya advertised the girls’ services and connected them with customers. “The government offered no evidence,” the Circuit said, that Chuck ever joined the broad conspiracy. Instead, it proved only that Chuck and Tonya agreed to arrange a single commercial sex transaction on one night.

“The main deficiency in proof,” the Court said, “concerns the second and third conspiracy elements, i.e., knowledge of the conspiracy’s objective and knowing participation in it. To demonstrate knowing participation, the evidence must show that the defendant shared a common purpose or design with his alleged coconspirators. Though the defendant need not know the existence or identity of all conspirators or the full extent of the conspiracy, he must have a general awareness of both the scope and the objective of the enterprise to be regarded as a coconspirator.”

Here, the 10th said, nothing suggests that Chuck shared his alleged coconspirators’ purpose to operate a child-prostitution enterprise throughout October 2014. From his perspective, Chuck sought to obtain the girls from Tonya to have sex with on a single night. In fact, in its closing argument, the government described the purpose of the agreement from Chuck’s perspective as ‘having sex,’ not as running a prostitution enterprise.”

Plain error - alas, Chuck's was not.
Plain error – alas, Chuck’s was not.

The sad thing is that, had his lawyers properly preserved this issue with a timely objection at trial, Chuck could have won his conspiracy count on appeal, let alone the limited argument he made that restitution liability was not appropriate. But because they did not, Chuck could only raise the matter as plain error, and on plain-error review, he could cite no other cases that had limited restitution to a smaller conspiracy.

Nonetheless, the discussion of variances and conspiracies as subsets of larger conspiracies has great applicability to drug and white-collar conspiracies, and worth the reading.

United States v. Anthony, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 32605 (10th Cir. 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS Davis Decision Already Cutting Sentences – Update for July 16, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DAVIS IS ALREADY HELPING DEFENDANTS

The ink isn’t yet dry on the Supreme Court’s United States v. Davis decision, but it is already being applied by lower courts.

shortnorth190716The 6th Circuit didn’t do many favors to the Short North Posse when it upheld the convictions and sentences of five defendants who had been found guilty of all sorts of drug-related mayhem in Columbus, Ohio. Almost all of their appeal issues were shot down. Two of the five, however, won on a single issue, and it was a whopper.

For their participation in a home invasion and murder, Chris Harris and Cliff Robinson were convicted of murder by firearm during a crime of violence under 18 USC §§ 924(c) and (j)(1). The government, loving conspiracies as it does, based the pair’s § 924(c) convictions on conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery under 18 USC § 1951(a). After all, proving a conspiracy is much easier than proving a substantive act (like a robbery).

When the government charged Chris and Cliff and the rest of the Posse back in 2014, no one foresaw Johnson v. United States, the 2015 case in which the Supreme Court declared the residual clause of 18 USC § 924(e) unconstitutionally vagueness. In the Short North Posse appeal, the government was forced to admit that a conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery could only be a crime of violence under 18 USC § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause. That clause holds that “a ‘crime of violence’ is a felony offense ‘that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”

violence160110On appeal, Chris and Cliff argued that their 924(c) convictions had to be vacated because § 924(c)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. Naturally, the government argued that Johnson had nothing to do with § 924(c)’s residual clause. However, eight days before the Short North Posse decision, the Supreme Court held in Davis that  the § 924(c) residual clause suffered from the same infirmity that Johnson invalidated. 

Davis conclusively held that a conspiracy to commit a violent act, no matter how violent the act, is not a “crime of violence” under 18 USC § 924(c). Thus, the Short North Posse decision held that “[b]ecause the Government relies only on that now-invalidated clause to support [Chris and Cliff’s] convictions under § 924(c), those convictions must be set aside.”

This is the first Davis win I have seen. There will surely be many to follow.

United States v. Ledbetter, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 19918 (6th Cir. July 3, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root