Despite the Hoopla, Under 10% of BOP Inmates Are Vaccinated – Update for March 16, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

VACCINATIONS CRAWL AHEAD

COVIDvaccine201221The BOP claimed the lowest number of inmate COVID cases yesterday (621) since April 23, 2020, but with the pace of new inmate tests slowing to a crawl, the agency isn’t finding what it isn’t looking for. Staff cases remain as high (at 1,392) as they were the last week of November, and COVID is still present in 124 institutions of thew BOP’s 128 facilities.

The BOP’s vaccination numbers are climbing, but ever so slowly. The first inmates felt the needle in December, but 90 days later, only 9.7% of the inmate population has been inoculated (up from 6.6% a week ago). At this point, 44% of the BOP staff has taken the shot (up from 41% a week before).

Don’t let anyone say BOP employees don’t contribute to their communities. Last week, The Villages, Florida, News reported, “On the day when seven more local COVID-19 deaths were reported, statistics from the BOP showed that 8.55 of cases among staff members across the country are at the massive prison facility in Coleman – just outside the confines of the southern portion of The Villages.”

I have previously expressed skepticism over the BOP’s public numbers of inmates “recovered” from COVID-19. It appears I have company. In United States v. Mathews (reported on yesterday), Judge Karen Nelson Moore noted that “according to the BOP and the Department of Justice, in the federal prison system, 1,804 incarcerated persons have COVID-19, 45,542 have ‘recovered’ from COVID-19, and 222 have died from the virus.” The quotation marks with which she bracketed the word ‘recovered’ suggest the judge has the same trouble accepting the BOP’s reported number as authoritative that many others have.

A New Jersey news outlet reported a story with an all-too-familiar ending. When inmate Dominick Pugliese finally won his CR motion in February, the former Ft Dix inmate was already nearly dead. Dom had told the court in repeated motions that COVID could place him in greater danger of having a serious illness due to his asthma and hypertension, according to court documents.

notsick210316Prosecutors naturally opposed Dom’s motions, saying he had not served enough of his sentence and questioning the seriousness of his medical issues. By the time Dom was finally released – after repeatedly being turned down – his lawyer told the court that Dom was on a ventilator, no longer respond to verbal or tactile stimuli. Medical staff described his condition as “‘extremely grave,’ with a 78% likelihood of mortality,” counsel said. “The defendant, Dominick Pugliese, is dying.”

The judge finally agreed to release Dom, holding that “the severity of his condition suggests that at best he may be facing prolonged hospitalization and rehabilitation.” That turned out to be optimistic. Dom died on March 6. The good news for the BOP, of course, is that its bean counters did not have to add his death to the current 240-deceased inmate tally.

Villages News, 8.5 percent of COVID-19 cases among federal prison staff at Coleman facility (March 8, 2021)

NJ.com, 2 inmates begged for release from federal prison in N.J. where coronavirus raged. They both died of COVID. (March 13, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Any Friend of Bill is a Friend of Mine… – Update for March 15, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

WHAT ARE THE ODDS?

By some accounts, as many as 10,000 motions for sentence reduction (compassionate release) under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) because of the COVID-19 pandemic have been filed in the past year. Data regarding grants have been hard to come by, but estimates range from 500 to 1,000 compassionate release motions have been granted.

presjudgeCR210315A Georgetown University study made available last week studied over 4,000 compassionate release decisions issued since last April, comparing the rate of compassionate release grants to the ideology of the judge. The indicator used for the judge’s ideology – not a perfect correlation, probably, but a reasonable compromise – was the identity of the President who appointed the jurist. Obama, the reasoning goes, probably appointed relatively few John Birch Society members to the bench, just as Trump probably avoided card-carrying socialists.

Of the 4,077 decisions studied by the author, Victoria Finkle (an economist and financial journalist turned law student), 17.1% were granted. People with judges appointed by Bill Clinton – remember the FOBs? – did the best at 24.9%, while people with George W. Bush-appointed judges fared the worst at 8.8%. Obama judges granted 20.9%, Trump’s judges only 9.3%.

An unreported 6th Circuit decision last week garnered a lot of legal press attention, as judges took potshots at each other whether COVID-19 data from The Marshall Project, a criminal justice advocacy group that has been out front on reporting on COVID in prisons. But the judges’ spat is not what makes the opinion interesting.

Kwame Mathews, who has multiple sclerosis, filed for compassionate release. His district court turned him down, finding that the “possibility of contracting COVID-19” and multiple sclerosis do not fit into the four extraordinary and compelling circumstances set forth in USSG § 1B1.13, that Kwame “would be a danger to others and the community if released” per § 1B1.13(2). The district court depicted Kwame’s motion as arguing that “the spread of COVID-19 throughout the nation qualifies as a compelling and extraordinary circumstance” and did not address the situation at FCI Terre Haute. “Equally troubling,” the Circuit said, “is the district court’s treatment of Kwame’s multiple sclerosis. The court found without any substantiation that Kwame failed to assert that he has “a serious physical or medical condition or a serious functional or cognitive impairment that prevents him from providing self-care” and suggested that Kwame does not have “an actual medical condition.”

ms210315

Noting that there is no cure for multiple sclerosis and that Kwame’s condition is unlikely to improve, the 6th said multiple sclerosis certainly qualifies as an ‘obvious’ serious medical need. “Notified that someone was suffering from multiple sclerosis, an objective layman would deem the condition serious,” the Circuit said. “Among other things, the condition can cause serious and permanent nerve damage that can lead to permanent disabilities.”

Kwame did not get compassionate release because – as in the case discussed next – his criminal history and sentence length argued against it. But the Circuit clearly said that a medical condition does not have to be on the CDC’s list in order to be an extraordinary and compelling reason for a COVID release.

notefrommom210315Johnny Tomes filed for compassionate release, producing a note from his parents that he had asthma. The district court turned him down, holding that USSG § 1B1.13 limits the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release to just a few situations and that John’s poorly documented asthma wasn’t one of them. Johnny hadn’t gotten COVID-19, the district court observed, and the BOP was taking precautionary measures to prevent an outbreak. Thus the district judge reasoned (and I use that term advisedly), John couldn’t prove the BOP would not be able to take care of him if he got sick.

Last week, the 6th Circuit reluctantly affirmed the decision. Although it was wrong to hold § 1B1.13 was binding on John’s case, the district court had also found that John’s extensive criminal history and the fact he had only done a few years of his 20-year sentence were 18 USC § 3553(a) sentencing-factor reasons arguing against compassionate release. Noting that “district courts may deny compassionate-release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking,” the Circuit said it “can affirm a court’s denial of a defendant’s compassionate release motion based on the court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors alone.”

Finkle, Victoria, How Compassionate? Political Appointments and District Court Judge Responses to Compassionate Release during COVID-19 (January 22, 2021) 

United States v. Mathews, Case No 20-1635, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6944 (6th Cir. March 8, 2021)

Law & Crime, ‘Absolutely Savage’ Clinton-Appointed Circuit Judge Calls Out Trump-Appointed Colleague in Nearly Full-Page Footnote (March 8, 2021)

United States v. Tomes, Case No 20-6056, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6773 (6th Cir. March 9, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Havis – Not Just for Drugs Anymore, 6th Circuit Says – Update for March 12, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

6TH CIRCUIT EXPANDS HAVIS HOLDING TO FRAUD GUIDELINES

The 6th Circuit expanded its groundbreaking United States v. Havis decision to white-collar cases last week in a fraud decision that suggests a Guidelines defense for a lot of defendants.

devil180418The devil’s in the details. Most federal crimes carry a statutory penalty of from a minimum to a maximum sentence. Distributing 100 grams of powder cocaine, for example, carries a punishment of zero-to-20 years. Where precisely within that range a judge should sentence a defendant is where the Sentencing Guidelines come in.

The Guidelines consider a variety of factors in determining an offense level – such as, in our cocaine example, the quantity of drugs, whether the defendant supervised other people, lied to the authorities, had a weapon in hand while dealing the powder, entered a guilty plea, and so on. Then, the defendant gets points for prior convictions (varying – drunk driving doesn’t score like a prior bank robbery, for instance), and a sentencing range is determined from a matrix with the criminal history as the abscissa and the total offense level as the ordinate.

The Guidelines are written by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a judicial branch agency established by Congress. When a Guideline is written or amended, the provision is adopted by the Commission. Congress then has six months to either reject the change (kind of a legislative veto) or do nothing. If Congress does nothing, the Guideline provision is deemed adopted.

All of which brings us to Havis. I wrote about this decision in summer 2019 (way back before the pandemic). Each Guideline has appended to it commentary, which may be Application Notes – instructing a court on how to apply the provision – or just background. This is often useful stuff, but – unlike the Guideline itself – commentary is added by the Commission but not subject to Congressional approval.

humpty210312In Havis, the 6th Circuit was considering a particular piece of commentary attached to USSG § 4B1.2.  That Guideline defined “drug trafficking” crime in detail, but it did not specify that an attempt to commit a drug trafficking crime (or, for that matter, to conspire to commit such a crime), was included in the definition. No problem for the Commission staff – it just wrote into the commentary that attempts and conspiracies were included.

“Not so fast,” the 6th Circuit said in Havis. The Commission is not allowed to add to a Guideline definition approved by Congress with its own gloss. Sure, the definition could be expanded to include attempts and conspiracies, but to do so, it had to be approved by the Commission and subjected to Congressional oversight first.

Whew! Time for a break.  Get a cup of coffee and then let’s resume.

Last week, the 6th Circuit took up the case of Jennifer Riccardi, a postal employee who pled guilty to stealing 1,505 gift cards from the mail.

mail210312Jen worked in the Cleveland, Ohio, U.S. Postal Service distribution center (Motto: ‘Where Quality is a Slogan, and Chaos is a Lifestyle‘). In September 2017, an Ohioan mailed a $25 Starbucks gift card from Mentor, Ohio, to nearby Parma.  The card never arrived.  The sender complained to the U.S. Postal Service, which – in perhaps the only recorded instance in history – took the complaint seriously. opened an investigation. Investigators learned that supervisors at a Cleveland distribution center had been finding lots of opened mail in the processing area. Now you’d think this would have caused some puzzlement, but it did not until investigators followed the trail to Jen. When confronted, she admitted that she had been stealing mail that might contain cash or gift cards for quite some time. A search of her home uncovered over 100 pieces of mail that she had taken just that day, $42,102 in cash, and 1,505 gift cards.  The gift cards were laid out on the floor organized by the 230 or so merchants at which they could be redeemed.  Sad she hadn’t used such organizational skills at the Postal distribution center.

Most of the cards were worth about $35.00, for a total value of about $47,000. Under § 2B1.1 of the Guidelines, Jen’s offense level based on the amount of the loss, something § 2B1.1 does not define. But the Guidelines commentary to § 2B1.1 helpfully “instructs that the loss shall be not less than $500.00 for each unauthorized access device, a phrase that… covers stolen gift cards. Applying that definition, the district court pumped Jen’s loss up from $47,000 (which what the stolen cards were actually worth) to $752,500 (that is, 1,505 cards multiplied by $500.00 per card).

“So what?” you might ask. The ‘so what’ is that Jen’s Guidelines offense level depends a lot on the amount of loss.  A loss of $47,000 elevated her range by six levels. But if you pretend the loss was $752,500 – and it would really be pretending – her offense level would shoot up 14 levels. In Jen’s case, the difference was a sentencing range of 10-16 months and a range of 46-57 months. The district court gave Jen 56 months.

loss210312Based on its Havis holding, the 6th rejected the loss calculation and sentence. Havis held “guidelines commentary may only interpret, not add to, the guidelines themselves… And even if there is some ambiguity in 2B1.1’s use of the word “loss,” the commentary’s bright-line rule requiring a $500 loss amount for every gift card does not fall “within the zone of ambiguity” that exists. So this bright-line rule cannot be considered a reasonable interpretation of — as opposed to an improper expansion beyond — 2B1.1’s text.”

Ohio State University law prof Doug Berman thinks this case is a big deal. He wrote in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, “the fraud guideline is not the only one important part of the federal sentencing guideline with an intricate set of commentary instructions that might be challenged as full of ‘improper expansions.’ I sense a growing number of litigants and courts are starting to hone on potentially problematical guideline commentary and that some variation of this issue with be getting to the U.S. Supreme Court before too long. In the meantime, defense attorneys would be wise to challenge (and preserve arguments around) any application of guideline commentary that even might be viewed as ‘expansionary’.”

United States v. Riccardi, Case No 19-4232, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6163 (6th Cir. March 3, 2021)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Did a Sixth Circuit panel largely decimate the federal sentencing fraud guidelines (and perhaps many others)? (March 5)

– Thomas L. Root

Last Week in Washington… – Update for March 11, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ODD COUPLE STRIKE AGAIN; CALL TO REPEAL AEDPA

oddcouple210219A few weeks ago, Senators Richard Durbin (D-Illinois) and Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), the top two guys on the Senate Judiciary Committee, teamed up to introduce the COVID-19 Safer Detention Act (S.312), which would make grant of compassionate release for COVID-related reasons easier and relax the Elderly Offender Program age and sentence limits. Last week, the odd couple was at it again, introducing the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act (S.601).

The Act, a similar version of which was introduced last year but died without a vote, would prohibit federal courts from using conduct for which a defendant was acquitted as factors to pump up Guidelines scores.  

nuns170427The problem is this: Donnie Dopehead is charged with two drug counts, one for distributing 100 kilos of marijuana and the other for selling 15 grams of cocaine. The Feds have Donnie dead to rights on the coke: as he sold it to his customers, a busload of nuns was stopped at the light, and they all saw it happen. But the marijuana beef is based on the vague testimony of a demented neighbor with poor eyesight, who – on the witness stand – admits it may have been bales of hay, not marijuana, and the guy unloading it may have been Clarence Crackfiend, not Donnie.

The jury acquits Donnie of the pot, but convicts on the coke.

If Donnie had no prior criminal record, his sentencing range for the cocaine of which he was convicted would be 10-16 months. But at sentencing, the court will also consider the marijuana, if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Donnie dealt it. In sentencing law, “preponderance” seems to mean that the prosecutor said it, and that’s good enough for the judge.  With the pot added in, Donnie’s Guideline sentencing range is 51-63 months.

hammer160509The thinking (and I employ that term loosely) is that just because the jury said the government hadn’t proved the pot charge beyond a reasonable doubt didn’t mean that it hadn’t been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. And the lower evidentiary standard, coupled with the loosey-goosey procedural protections of a sentencing proceeding, means that the defendant has little of avoiding a five-year sentence for what should be more like 12 months.

The Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act, simply enough, would have said in Donnie’s case that the court could sentence on the cocaine, but not the pot.

An identical bill, backed by a long list of conservative and liberal advocacy groups, is being introduced in the House by Reps Steve Cohen (D-Tennessee) and Kelly Armstrong (R-North Dakota).

You may reasonably suspect that this bill, along with the Safer Detention Act and other measures may be rolled together in a larger criminal justice package later this year.

chip201016

Meanwhile, a Washington Post article last week kicked off a series on the horror that is the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Back in 1996, Congress took a chisel to habeas corpus, adopting procedural limitations that make arguing the merits of 2254 and 2255 motions – especially second ones – a byzantine nightmare, a “thicket of real through-the-looking-glass shit,” according to one long-time defense attorney.

The Post series will “look at how the AEDPA was passed, how it works in the real world, the injustices it has wrought and what we can do to fix it. The good news is that much of this can be fixed. Congress could repeal or reform the AEDPA tomorrow. And for all the criticism of his criminal justice record — most of it justified — Joe Biden was one of the most vocal critics of the AEDPA’s habeas provisions. The then-senator warned of dire consequences if those provisions passed. History has proved him right.”

S.601, A bill to amend section 3661 of title 18, United States Code, to prohibit the consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing (March 4, 2021)

Press Release, Durbin, Grassley, Cohen, Armstrong Introduce Bipartisan, Bicameral Prohibiting Punishment Of Acquitted Conduct Act (March 4, 2021)

Washington Post, It’s time to repeal the worst criminal justice law of the past 30 years (March 3, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

BOP Solves COVID Problem By Not Looking For It – Update for March 9, 2021

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BOP RUNS A REVERSE ON COVID TESTING


The BOP COVID numbers kept plummeting last week, ending the day yesterday with 783 sick inmates, down 46% in a week. But, strangely enough, staff COVID numbers remain stubbornly high at 1,569, nearly at the level of a week before. COVID is still in 126 BOP facilities.

reverse210309

For over 10 months, inmate COVID cases always exceeded staff cases, once by a factor of five. But on Feb 11, the number of staff cases passed the number of inmate cases for the first time. Last Friday, it was 100% higher.

This may be why: Last April, the BOP warned its increased inmate testing program would “increase the number of COVID-19 positive tests reflected on the BOP’s… public website.” Now, someone at Central Office has figured out that the obverse is equally true: less testing decreases the number of inmate COVID cases.

From Aug 1 through Feb 15, the BOP averaged 331 tests a day. But since Feb 15, the testing rate has fallen dramatically. Last week, the daily average was 44 tests a day. Yesterday, the BOP reported only 32 inmate tests in the entire system.

It’s not like the BOP has run out of people to test. Its own numbers show that about 45,000 inmates have never been tested. The current positivity rate of 44% – meaning that 44 out of 100 inmates tested had the virus – suggests about 20,000 undetected cases are still in the system.

covidtest200420The BOP does not control the staff COVID numbers: staffers get their own tests. So the inmate number, which the BOP controls, keeps falling. The staff number it does not control continues to reflect reality.

The BOP’s numbers last Friday showed that 41% of the staff have gotten the COVID vaccine, while only 8.4% of inmates have been inoculated. Only 72% of all BOP facilities report receiving the vaccine, with FCI Marianna having the highest percentage of inmates vaccinated, 53.5%, while three reporting facilities – Seatac, Miami, and Devens – report no inmates have taken the shot. A total of 2,233 inmates (1.5% of all inmates) were vaccinated last week.

The BOP told a Connecticut federal court last week (in a case involving FCI Danbury) that inmates who decline vaccinations without a documented medical reason will not be given further consideration for CARES Act home confinement. The BOP said it would consider home confinement for inmates who accept vaccinations, up until the time they are fully inoculated (usually two weeks after receiving the second dose).

return161227An article in The Regulatory Review argued the Dept of Justice’s January legal opinion that people in home confinement had to be recalled to federal prisons after the pandemic ended is flawed: “What the CARES Act limits to the covered emergency period is the Bureau Director’s authority to lengthen the permissible amount of time that people can spend in home confinement. Once a person’s home confinement period is properly lengthened by the Bureau — during the emergency, when the Bureau has the authority to do so — nothing in the law requires that someone’s period of home confinement must be shortened once the pandemic is over. The statute only limits when the Bureau of Prisons has authority to move people into home confinement for longer durations of their sentence.”

Finally, the Bureau of Prisons Reform Caucus, which started with a couple of congressmen last fall, has added to its membership and purpose. Now with at least eleven congressmen and women as members, the Caucus issued a series of statements last week on its purpose and plans. Caucus chair Fred Keller (R-Pennsylvania) said, “This pandemic has brought to light many failures in the BOP’s operations, including detrimental inmate transfer policies, staffing shortages, and agency retention issues. The various backgrounds and experiences of the members of this caucus will enable us to better tackle these issues on behalf of the American people.”

Press Release, BOP Expands COVID-19 Testing (Apr 24, 2020)

Associated Press, Inmates refuse inoculations in Connecticut federal prison (March 3, 2021)

The Regulatory Review, The Justice Department Should Preserve Home Confinement (March 1, 2021)

NorthCentralPA.com, Bureau of Prisons Reform Caucus releases series of statements on future plans, accountability (March 5, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Circuits Do Violence to ‘Attempted Violence’ – Update for March 8, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TWO CIRCUITS REFUSE TO “DAVIS” ATTEMPT CRIMES

It was a rough week for violent crime.

violent160620The Supreme Court’s 2019 United States v. Davis decision held that conspiracy to commit a violent crime was not itself a “crime of violence” that fell within the definition in 18 USC § 924(c). That is important, because a § 924(c) for using or carrying a gun during a crime of violence or drug offense carries a hefty mandatory sentence that by law is consecutive to the sentence for the underlying offense.  

Since Davis, a hot question facing courts has been whether a mere attempt to commit a violent crime should be lumped with conspiracy as inherently nonviolent.

Last Monday, the 2nd Circuit denied Kevin Collier’s post-conviction motion to throw out his § 924(c) in the wake of Davis, holding that his attempted bank robbery offense (18 USC §2113(a)) was indeed a crime of violence supporting his § 924(c) conviction.

In 2019, the Circuit held in United States v. Moore that § 2113(a) bank robbery was categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause, and in United States v. Hendricks the Court found that Hobbs Act robbery and New York 3rd-degree robbery were crimes of violence as well. But Kevin argued he could be convicted of an attempt to rob a bank without ever getting to the point that he used force or threatened anyone and that it thus did not fall under § 924(c)’s elements clause. Driving up to the bank with a mask and a gun was enough to get him convicted, and that did not require he first commit any violent act.

violence180508The 2nd Circuit disagreed, noting that the crime of attempt requires that the defendant have intended to commit each of the elements of the substantive crime. A § 2113(a) conviction for attempted bank robbery requires that the defendant “by force and violence, or by intimidation… attempt[s] to take” the property at issue. Because Hendricks held that bank robbery by intimidation was a crime of violence, “a conviction for attempted bank robbery is a categorical match for a crime of violence under 924(c)’s elements clause, regardless of whether the substantial step taken involved the use of force.”

The 2nd declined to reach the question of whether all “attempts” to commit other crimes of violence would necessarily be considered “crimes of violence” under § 924(c), limiting its holding to attempted § 2113(a) bank robbery, which expressly requires that the attempt have been committed by force, violence, or intimidation. The Circuit admitted the question might be thornier if the statute of conviction did not clearly state that the elements of the attempt must include an act of force, violence, or intimidation.

The very next day, the 2nd Circuit issued an en banc opinion reversing a prior appellate decision that New York 1st-degree manslaughter was not a crime of violence. Gerald Scott was released in 2018 after serving 11 years of a 22-year Armed Career Criminal Act sentence when the district court held his prior manslaughter convictions were not crimes of violence. The district court reasoned that because someone can cause death by omission, manslaughter could be accomplished without employing any force or threat of force at all.

violence160110The en banc decision needed 50 pages to explain why New York 1st-degree manslaughter in New York qualifies as a crime of violence, and 70 more pages for the concurrences and dissents to debate what Ohio State law prof Doug Berman called “a formalistic legal matter that is an awful artifice of poorly conceived and constructed federal sentencing law.” In a nutshell, the majority, relying on the definition of physical force in Curtis Johnson v. United States, held that “1st-degree manslaughter is a categorically violent crime because its elements — (1) the causation of death (2) by a person intent on causing at least serious physical injury — necessarily involve the use of violent force.”

Finally, not to be outdone, last Friday a 3rd Circuit panel held that an attempt to commit a Hobbs Act robbery was categorically a crime of violence under the “elements” clause of 18 USC § 924(c). Defendant Marcus Walker argued that his conviction must be vacated because a person can be convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery based on nothing more than an intent to complete the robbery without actually committing a violent act and with only the intent to do so.

But the 3rd, in a decision that described in detail the circuit split on the issue, refused to follow the 4th Circuit’s United States v. Taylor ruling, and instead joined the 5th, 7th, 9th and 11th Circuits in holding tha it is “apparent that Congress meant for all attempted crimes of violence to be captured by the elements clause of § 924(c), and courts are not free to disregard that direction and hold otherwise.”

furball210308There is little doubt that this issue, and probably the whole “attempt” furball, is headed for the Supreme Court.

Collier v. United States, Case No 17-2402, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5894 (2d Cir. Mar 1, 2021)

United States v. Scott, Case No 18-163-cr, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6014 (2d Cir. Mar 2, 2021)

United States v. Walker, Case No 15-4062, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6453 (3d Cir. Mar 5, 2021)

Lexology, Second Circuit Holds that Attempted Bank Robbery is Categorically a ‘Crime of Violence’ (March 4, 2021)

Sentencing Law and Policy: En banc Second Circuit needs 120 pages and five opinions to sort out whether NY first-degree manslaughter qualifies as a federal “violent crime” (March 2, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Aren’t We All Felons? – Update for March 5, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

‘EVERYTHING’S BEEN CRIMINALIZED,’ SUPREME JUSTICE COMPLAINS

Respected observers of federal criminal jurisprudence have long criticized the over-criminalization of life. Most famously, long-time defense attorney Harvey Silverglate wrote his book Three Felonies a Day that

The average professional in this country wakes up in the morning, goes to work, comes home, eats dinner, and then goes to sleep, unaware that he or she has likely committed several federal crimes that day. Why? The answer lies in the very nature of modern federal criminal laws, which have exploded in number but also become impossibly broad and vague.

felony210305During oral arguments last week in Lange v. California – California case holding in which the lower courts ruled that a police officer may always enter a suspect’s home without a warrant if the officer is in pursuit of the suspect and has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a misdemeanor – Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch revealed refreshing skepticism of the criminal justice system that channeled Attorney Silverglate.

It is “settled,” California’s lawyer argued, “that officers may enter a home without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe a fleeing suspect has committed a felony.” Gorsuch countered, “We live in a world in which everything has been criminalized. And some professors have even opined that there’s not an American alive who hasn’t committed a felony in some—under some state law. And in a world like that, why doesn’t it make sense to retreat back to the original meaning of the 4th Amendment, which I’m going to oversimplify, but generally says that you get to go into a home without a warrant if the officer sees a violent action or something that’s likely to lead to imminent violence….Why isn’t that the right approach?”

Reason, ‘Everything Has Been Criminalized,’ Says Neil Gorsuch as He Pushes for Stronger Fourth Amendment Protections (February 25, 2021)

Library of Economics and Liberty, Three Felonies a Day? (January 5, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Last Week’s § 2255 Gleanings – Update for March 4, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

INMATES GO 2-2 ON § 2255 DECISIONS LAST WEEK

The Courts handed federal inmates two 28 USC § 2255 wins and two losses last week.

habeas191211For the uninitiated, habeas corpus (literally, a Latin imperative phrase to “produce the body”) has been around for about 806 years, give or take, ever since a band of angry noblemen forced King John to sign the Magna Carta (the “Great Charter of Liberties”) as an alternative to having his royal butt kicked.

One liberty the noblemen secured was the right not to be locked up without reason. The Magna Carta empowered courts to issue a writ (order) to a jailer to “produce the body” – that is, come to court with a particular prisoner and show why that prisoner’s detention is legal. Habeas corpus has become known as the “Great Writ,” so ingrained in English common law that our constitution simply assumes the right exists. The constitution only references habeas corpus in the negative, by denying the president the right to suspend the writ except in time of war.

Notwithstanding the constitutional origins of habeas corpus, Congress controls how prisoners may exercise their right to seek the writ in the federal courts by statute. For instance, 28 USC § 2244 regulates the filing of habeas corpus petitions for all claims of illegal detention for reasons other than a defect in the conviction or sentence. Section 2255 of Title 18 permits a federal prisoner to file a habeas corpus petition where the claim is that the conviction or sentence is contrary to law.

Every federal prisoner has the right to bring one § 2255 motion, subject to rather strict time limits. Bringing a second such petition is possible under very limited circumstances, with permission first being granted by the Court of Appeals.

Now for the week’s news:

violence181008(1) Dearnta Thomas pled guilty to a substantive RICO offense, and an 18 USC § 924(c) count for using a gun in furtherance of a crime of violence. The predicate “crime of violence” for the § 924 offense was aiding and abetting the commission of a VICAR offense (Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity under 18 USC § 1959), those predicate violent crimes being two Virginia state-law offenses, a conviction for use or display of a firearm in committing a felony and another for “pointing, holding, or brandishing a firearm, air or gas-operated weapon or object similar in appearance.”

After the 2019 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Davis, Dearnta filed for permission under 28 USC § 2244 to bring a successive § 2255. Last week, the 4th Circuit held that Davis announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court and that Dearnta’s argument – that the state convictions were not crimes of violence within the meaning of Davis – stated a plausible claim.

(2) Meanwhile, Travis Harris asked the 5th Circuit for permission to file a successive § 2255 arguing that after Davis, his conviction for using a destructive device during a crime of violence (18 USC § 844(i)), should be thrown out, because the predicate offense – arson – was no longer a crime of violence.

The 5th agreed, holding – as the 4th Circuit has previously said – that Davis was retroactive and that Travis raised a plausible enough claim to go forward.

lawyerjoke180807(3) Things didn’t go so well for Kevin Kelley in the 1st Circuit. Kev figured he had a “gotcha:” it turned out the Assistant U.S. Attorney who had signed Kevin’s indictment had not paid his bar dues. Because F.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) says that an indictment “must be signed by” a government lawyer, and the AUSA’s law license had been suspended for nonpayment of dues, Kevin argued in his § 2255 motion that the bad signature invalidated the indictment and “robbed the district court of jurisdiction to proceed against him.”

Last week, the 1st Circuit rejected Kev’s technicality. “The Supreme Court, after all, has long viewed a government lawyer’s indictment signing as necessary only as evidence of the authenticity of the document,” the Circuit said, and Rule 7’s “intent is for common sense to prevail over technicalities.” Thus, the Circuit said, “it is unsurprising that many courts refuse to stamp ‘invalid’ an indictment signed by a prosecutor with bar-license problems if other evidence shows that the government was backing the prosecution — with some cases explicitly saying that in such a situation, the complaining party cannot prove prejudice.”

Here, the evidence showed the indictment had been approved by the AUSA’s superior, and that was good enough for common sense to prevail, the Court ruled, especially where Kevin could prove he was not harmed by the suspended AUSA working under a nonpayment suspension.

(4) Finally, Greg Olson got a target letter from the U.S. Attorney, telling him he would be indicted, but offering that he could get a lawyer and work out a preindictment deal. Greg and his lawyer worked out a 30-month plea to tax evasion, but the deal foundered when the government refused to provide any discovery. Greg got indicted, hired a different lawyer, but ended up with a 48-month sentence.

target210305Greg filed a § 2255 motion claiming his pre-indictment lawyer screwed up the plea deal. But last week, a 9th Circuit panel shot him down. Precedent in the circuit holds a defendant has no 6th Amendment right to effective counsel before he is a defendant, meaning that a three-judge panel cannot overrule the prior case. Of course, in such cases, if a three-judge panel thinks the precedent is nonsense, it can refer its case to the court en banc, but here, the Circuit said, “In determining whether this is an appropriate case to do so, we must assess whether Olson might prevail if current circuit precedent were to be overruled… The record does not support Olson’s claim that his counsel was ineffective. An en banc ruling would therefore not affect the result.”

In re Thomas, Case No 19-292, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5316 (4th Cir. February 23, 2021)

In re Harris, Case No 19-51045, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5719 (5th Cir. February 25, 2021)

Kelley v. United States, Case No 19-1932, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5646 (1st Cir.  February 25, 2021)

United States v. Olson, Case No 19-16591, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5027 (9th Cir.  February 22, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Ain’t No Way To Treat The Ladies – Update for March 2, 2021

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YOU THINK YOU HAVE IT BAD

freeze191004FMC Carswell, the system’s only woman’s medical center, avoided the power outages that affected Fort Worth and the rest of Texas in the recent winter storm. But the weather left the prison – and the 1,066 women confined there – without heat or hot water when the outside temperature fell to 5 degrees.

The inmates “are trapped in there with feces, with water up to their ankles. They do not have anywhere to defecate at. There’s no cleaning supplies. There’s no water made available,” Cynthia Simons, the women’s fellow at the Texas Criminal Justice Coalition, told Filter.

whoyabelieve201214Emery Nelson of the BOP’s public affairs division disputed the inmates’ complaints. “Inmates were given advance warning of the planned water shut-off and were provided additional water during the repair period, which lasted approximately four hours,” Nelson said in an email. “Please note, FMC Carswell did not experience a sewage leak and at no time was there sewage inside the housing unit,” he wrote.

Yup, those doggone women inmates made it all up, the parts about “being unable to flush the toilets, which quickly filled with feces and urine. Women defecated into trash bags, which began to pile up, but lacked running water to wash their hands,” as well as reports that women inmates were fishing feces from overflowing toilets with their hands.

The San Francisco Bay View reported, “seven hours after the water had stopped, prison staff allowed some of the women to walk to the prison’s hospital building with five-gallon buckets. At the hospital, which had not lost water, women filled the buckets with water, then schlepped them across the snow to the housing unit, and bucket-flushed the toilets. But, with over 500 women from both units using them, the toilets soon filled with human waste again.”

lies171106In case you’re pondering who to believe, this is the same BOP that denied any problems at MDC Brooklyn while inmates were freezing in the dark.  And (last June) that COVID was under control.  And that all employees were following CDC guidelines for wearing personal protective equipment… You don’t have to look too hard for examples. There’s kind of a trend.

San Francisco Bay View, Unprepared for COVID, Texas women’s prison was equally unprepared for Uri (February 27, 2021)

Filter magazine, In Texas Prisons, Horror Stories Emerge From Catastrophic Blackout (February 23, 2021)

Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Women, some sick with COVID-19, left ‘freezing’ without heat at Fort Worth medical prison (Februry 16, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

CARES Act Extended, But Does the BOP ‘Cares’? – Update for March 1, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

COVID AND CARES ACT HOME CONFINEMENT TO GO ON… FOR NOW

caresbear210104CARES Act Re-upped, As If the BOP Cares: The CARES Act, passed in March 2020, dumped truckloads of money on the coronavirus pandemic. More important that piles of dough (for our purposes, at least), Section 12003 authorized the Federal Bureau of Prisons to place inmates in home confinement as long as the nation is under a COVID emergency and the Attorney General has determined that the “emergency conditions will materially affect the functioning of the Bureau.” President Trump declared a COVID emergency under the National Emergencies Act a few weeks before CARES passed, and Attorney General William Barr made the materiality finding on April 4th.

Under the National Emergencies Act, an emergency only lasts a year unless the President extends it. That means the emergency would have ceased today, and with it, the CARES Act authority would expire.

Last week, President Biden extended the COVID emergency without specifying an end date (which is common). In essence, the COVID emergency will be over with Biden says it is. Biden wrote, “The COVID-19 pandemic continues to cause significant risk to the public health and safety of the Nation. More than 500,000 people in this Nation have perished from the disease, and it is essential to continue to combat and respond to COVID-19 with the full capacity and capability of the Federal Government.”

One could reasonably infer from the President’s statement that the “full capacity and capability” of the government would include continued BOP use of its CARES Act home confinement authority. Yet, as the New York Times observed last week in a scathing article about the BOP’s failure to use home confinement at FCI Danbury, “just 7,850 of the 151,735 people serving federal sentences right now have been granted home confinement — about 5%. State prison populations have fallen by 15% since the pandemic began, according to the Prison Policy Initiative, but not because inmates are being released to home confinement. Instead, many state prisons simply have stopped accepting transfers from county jails.”

The BOP website prefers to trumpet that “the total number of inmates placed in home confinement from March 26, 2020 to the present (including inmates who have completed service of their sentence) is 22,158.” But it turns out that most of those people were placed there in normal course by halfway houses or under elderly offender home detention. The CARES Act home confinees have not constituted much more than a dribble.

home210218The Times reported that “Danbury was singled out for prompt action” by Barr last April, “because it had seen an outbreak, [but] only about 100 inmates have been granted home confinement so far, many as recently as December. At least 550 are still under consideration, most of them convicted of nonviolent offenses like fraud or drug possession.”

It’s not like the problem is limited to Danbury, either. A California federal court found last summer that “[d]espite… the existence of emergency conditions facing the BOP as the result of the pandemic… there is no evidence Respondents are prioritizing their use of statutory authority under the CARES Act to grant home confinement to Lompoc inmates… or giving due consideration to inmates’ age or medical conditions in evaluating eligibility of home confinement.” And a New York federal court found that “rather than attempt to use home confinement, furloughs, and compassionate release as tools to reduce the density among the most vulnerable inmates, the prison chose to not pursue that path at all until well after the initial outbreak had subsided.”

In fact, at Danbury, the BOP settled a class action lawsuit by promising to expedite release of inmates to home confinement. But five months after the BOP and Danbury warden made the deal, a Connecticut federal court found they had “breached the provision of the Settlement Agreement requiring that they ‘endeavor to release individuals approved for home confinement to home confinement within 14 days of the approval decision.”

About 48,000 of the 105,000 inmates the BOP has tested (still, a year later, only 69% of its inmates have had the nose swab) have contracted COVID. This is despite the BOP’s self-lauded “multiphase action plan” to protect inmates and staff from COVID-19. A Pennsylvania federal court dryly observed that “[t]he government’s assurances that the BOP’s ‘extraordinary actions’ can protect inmates ring hollow given that these measures have already failed to prevent transmission of the disease.” The agency’s slow-walk implementation of CARES Act placement cases seems to be cut from the same cloth.

The COVID Curve: The BOP continued last week to report fewer COVID cases. Last Friday’s total of 1,414 was down 29% from the week before. Staff cases remain stubbornly high, 1,622 (down only 3% from the week before). COVID remains present at 128 facilities, up two from last week, but there have been no reported deaths in the last 7 days.

As of Friday, the BOP reported vaccination data for 78 facilities. It reports that about 34% of its 36,000 staff have been vaccinated, and 6.9% of inmates have gotten the shot (up from 5.3% last week). The number of vaccine doses the BOP says it has distributed suddenly froze last week at 58,300, after climbing steadily since January. This suggests the BOP is out of additional doses until it gets its next distribution.

comparison210228

Plotting the rise and fall in inmate COVID numbers against the national ebb and flow shows the graphs are nearly a perfect fit. This is troubling, because late last week, Dr. Rochelle Walensky, director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention warned that with relaxing restrictions and a spread of variant viruses, the declines since January “may be stalling, potentially leveling off at still a very high number. We at CDC consider this a very concerning shift in the trajectory.” The nation had an average of about 66,350 new daily coronavirus cases a day over the last week, higher than the week before which was 64,000 new cases a day.

If national numbers rise again, history suggests the BOP numbers will, too.

Equally troubling is the fact that BOP staff COVID cases have not shown the kinds of decline that inmate and national numbers have. Beyond that, it has taken the BOP over two months to get a mere one-third of its staff vaccinated. The likelihood that staff is the primary vector for spreading COVID inside facilities thus remains high.

Federal Register, Continuation of the National Emergency Concerning the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic (86 FR 11599, Feb 26, 2021)

CARES Act (Mar 26, 2020)

New York Times, Vulnerable Inmates Left in Prison as Covid Rages (Feb 27, 2021)

Torres v. Milusnic, 472 F.Supp.3d 713 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2020)

Fernandez-Rodriguez v. Licon-Vitale, 470 F.Supp.3d 323 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2020)

Whitted v. Easter, Case No. 3:20-cv-569 (D.Conn. December 11, 2020), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232843

Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020) (Cole, C.J., dissenting).

United States v. Rodriguez, 451 F.Supp.3d 392 (E.D. Pa. 2020).

Los Angeles Times, New fears of next coronavirus wave as case declines slow and variants grow (February 27, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root