Tag Archives: 21 usc 841

4th Circuit Reverses Pill Mill Case on Flawed Jury Instruction – Update for Thursday, February 8, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DOC ‘FEELGOOD’ HAS TO KNOW IT’S WRONG, 4TH CIRCUIT SAYS

feelgood211019Dr. Joel Smithers ran what the government claimed was a pill mill. The government’s witnesses painted a grim picture of the nonstop line of addicted people who drove 5-6 hours to pay Dr. Joel $300 in cash for an opioid prescription. Over the course of a few years, he wrote prescriptions for tens of thousands of doses.

At trial, Joel offered an explanation for every suspicious behavior identified by the government. — “why his patient forms didn’t indicate which pharmacy would fill their prescriptions, why he didn’t order MRIs when they were needed, why he didn’t take insurance, why he had an extremely unusual payment set-up… why he FedExed prescriptions to patients, and why he had a pre-signed prescription pad in the office… He said he believed that the prescriptions he’d written for each patient were for a legitimate medical purpose.”

The trial court refused to instruct the jury that they had to find Dr. Jerry lacked an actual belief that the prescriptions were appropriate. Joel was convicted of hundreds of 21 USC 841(a) counts and sentenced to 480 months.

While Doc Joel’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court ruled in Ruan v. United States that when a criminal defendant is authorized to dispense controlled substances — such as a doctor who may lawfully prescribe medications — prosecutors can only win a conviction under 21 USC § 841(a) by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to act or knew he or she was acting in an unauthorized manner.

Last Friday, the 4th Circuit threw out Joel’s conviction.

bugs220701The government argued that, despite the Ruan decision, other instructions – such as willful blindness and “good faith” – were enough to tell the jury that it had to find that Joel knew what he was doing was wrong. The 4th rejected this, noting that the Ruan court had rejected the same claim; Ruan noted that words like “good faith,” “objectively,” “reasonable,” or “honest effort” appear nowhere in the statute and would ‘turn a defendant’s criminal liability on the mental state of a hypothetical ‘reasonable’ doctor, rather than on the mental state of the defendant himself or herself’.”

yellowpill170905Ruan held that “‘good faith’ is an objective test,” not the inquiry into the doctor’s actual state of mind that the statute requires. The “good faith” instruction in Joel’s case “directly contravenes Ruan,” the 4th said. “Far from helping the government, it proves Defendants point.”

Joel will get a new trial with a jury instructed that it must find that he “intended to act or knew he was acting in an unauthorized manner.”

United States v. Smithers, Case No 19-4761, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 2399 (4th Cir., Feb 2, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Doc Feelgood Feels Better in Wake of Ruan Decision – Update for June 30, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

WHAT’S UP, DOC?

Almost everyone has heard lurid stories about doctors running pain clinics who operate as nothing more than drug dealers. Busloads of people from out of state unload every day, lining up for five-minute “appointments” that come with prescriptions for powerful opioid painkillers, filthy “clinics” accepting only cash but having hours from 6 a.m. to midnight… The surge in opioid distribution in America is, to use an ironic term, sobering: between 2006 and 2012, 76 billion doses were sold in America, about 230 pills for every person in America.

doritos220630As USA Today once put it

If it sounds like [drug] companies were dispensing dangerous drugs like candy or snack chips, well, they were. In one email exchange from 2009, a former Mallinckrodt national account manager, Victor Borelli, told a customer that 1,200 bottles of oxycodone 30 milligram pills had been shipped. “Keep ’em coming!” the customer responded. “Flyin’ out of here. It’s like people are addicted to these things or something. Oh, wait, people are.” To which Borelli responded: “Just like Doritos keep eating. We’ll make more.”

But there’s always an “on the other hand,” and this issue is not an exception. Finding doctors who have crossed the line by counting the number of opioid prescriptions issued runs the risk of sweeping up physicians who practice responsibly albeit on the cutting edge of pain management. And it can cause a chilling effect, leading “good providers to fear that they will be taken as bad actors even when exercising their best judgment in caring for their patients,” according to a Supreme Court brief filed in the National Pain Advocacy Center.

No one wants to ask, “What’s up, Doc?” only to hear, “I’m afraid to say.”

bugs220701Last Monday, the Supreme Court decided in Ruan v. United States that when a criminal defendant is authorized to dispense controlled substances — such as a doctor who may lawfully prescribe medications — prosecutors can only win a conviction under 21 USC 841 by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to act or knew he or she was acting in an unauthorized manner.

The Court ruled 9-0 in favor of Xiulu Ruan and Shakeel Kahn, who had argued in appealing their convictions that their trials were unfair because jurors were not required to consider whether the two physicians had “good faith” reasons to believe their numerous opioid prescriptions were medically valid.

Xiulu and Shakeel were physicians who had issued thousands of opioid prescriptions. Both were licensed to do so, but each was charged with a violation of 21 USC 841, which prohibits distribution of controlled substances “except as authorized.” The Government used the accepted standard for such dispensing cases, arguing that the specific prescriptions at issue were issued outside the bounds of the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose.

quackdoc210707Section 841(a) begins with “[e]xcept as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally… dispense…” The Court ruled that “once a defendant meets the burden of producing evidence that his or her conduct was ‘authorized,’ the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.” The Court ruled that the “knowingly or intentionally” requirement was necessary because a legal authorization to prescribe and distribute controlled substances “plays a ‘crucial’ role in separating innocent conduct — and, in the case of doctors, socially beneficial conduct — from wrongful conduct.” This “strong scienter requirement helps to diminish the risk of ‘overdeterrence,’ i.e., punishing acceptable and beneficial conduct that lies close to, but on the permissible side of, the criminal line.”

Writing about the decision, one physician – who is also a senior fellow at the Cato Institute – said,

There are always robust debates among clinicians regarding the proper and rational treatment of a host of conditions, from high blood pressure to diabetes to acute and chronic pain—and that patients and their clinical contexts vary—that there is no ONE RIGHT WAY to treat a wide range of medical conditions, treatment must be individualized, and clinicians must remain open to modifications and adjustments along the way. In Ruan vs. United States, the government failed to consider this.

Prescribing medications in an unusual manner, or a manner that falls outside the mainstream, might be a “standard of care” or malpractice issue, but should not be automatically considered a criminal issue. Approximately 20 percent of medications approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are legally prescribed “off‐label,” i.e., for different purposes than those for which the FDA approved them. The originators of off‐label uses fall outside the mainstream of prescribers, but they are not treated as criminals. And many off‐label uses are later approved by the FDA. This is one of the ways clinical medical science advances.

feelgood160805Even in this 9-0 opinion, there was dissension on the Court. Justice Alito, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas and partially joined by Justice Barrett, complained that the majority had made things too difficult and thus produced a muddle:

In criminal law, the distinction between the elements of an offense and an affirmative defense is well-known and important. In these cases, however, the Court recognizes a new hybrid that has some characteristics of an element and some characteristics of an affirmative defense. The consequences of this innovation are hard to foresee, but the result may well be confusion and disruption. That risk is entirely unnecessary.

In Alito’s view, the Controlled Substances Act should be interpreted like its predecessor. The Harrison Narcotics Act provided that “[a]registered physician acts ‘in the course of his professional practice’ when the physician writes prescriptions ‘in good faith,’” Alito wrote. “I would hold that this rule applies under the CSA and would therefore vacate the judgment.”

Ruan v. United States, Case No. 20-1410, 21-5261, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3089 (June 27, 2022)

Cato Institute, Supreme Court Sets Higher Bar for Prosecuting Doctors Who Prescribe Opioids for Pain (June 27, 2022)

Reuters, U.S. Supreme Court sides with doctors challenging opioid convictions (June 27, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court’s Final Days Include Criminal Decisions – Update for June 20, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BIG CRIMINAL DECISIONS STILL PENDING WITH ONLY TWO WEEKS OF SCOTUS TERM LEFT

The Supreme Court held two opinion days last week, but the most-watched criminal cases – United States v. Taylor, Concepcion v. United States and Ruan v. United States – remain among the 18 opinions yet to be issued before the Court’s term ends on June 30.

scotus161130Most people expect the two “big” cases, New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen (a 2nd Amendment case) and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (the possibly-leaked abortion decision) to happen on the last day. But Taylor, which concerns whether an attempted offense that would be a “crime of violence” for application of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) – the mandatory consecutive sentence for using a gun – is a “crime of violence” if it is only attempted but not completed – has been hanging around for six months since its December argument. Concepcion, which concerns proper resentencing considerations in First Step Section 404(b) resentencing, and Ruan, which considers physician liability under 21 USC 841(a), was argued in the Court’s February sitting.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote last week in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog that “the standard and ready explanation, of course, for why decisions in Taylor and Conception may be taking a long time is because the Justices are (perhaps deeply?) divided in these cases, and so we should expect multiple (and lengthy?) opinions. And, to add a bit of spicy speculation, I am inclined to guess that the delay is also partially a function of the Justices in these cases not being divided neatly along the “standard” ideological lines.”

rules201202The only case of interest to defendants last week was Kemp v. United States. In that case, petitioner Dexter Kemp filed a 28 USC 2255 motion in 2015. The District Court dismissed the motion as untimely, and Dix did not appeal. But three years later, he sought to reopen his 2255 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (6), rules which permit a court to reopen an otherwise final judgment if certain conditions are met. A 60(b)(1) motion has to allege that a mistake was made, and must be filed within a year, Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for any other just reason can be filed at any time, but is available only when the other grounds for relief specified in the Rule don’t apply.

Dex was right that the District Court had goofed on dismissing his § 2255 motion as untimely. In a just world, his § 2255 should be reopened, and that would be that. But in the real world, it’s not that easy.

The Supreme Court held that a judge’s error of law is a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1), meaning that Dex’s motion fit under Rule 60(b)(1). Subject to the Rule’s one-year limitations period, Dex’s motion was late and had to be dismissed as untimely.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Any (spicy?) speculations about why SCOTUS has not yet decided Taylor or Conception, two little sentencing cases? (June 13, 2022)

Kemp v. United States, Case No. 21-5726, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 2835 (June 13, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Supremes Burning Midnight Oil To Finish Term – Update for June 8, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT FACES HISTORIC BACKLOG IN FINAL MONTH OF TERM

The Supreme Court – waiting until the bitter end to do the largest share of its work in more than 70 years – has scheduled a rare second opinion day for today.

scotus161130At 10 am, the Court will issue one or more opinions. It still has a lot to choose from.

The court is scheduled to hand down 30 more opinions, 48% of its expected total in argued cases, as its 2021-22 term ends in slightly more than three weeks. While most people are awaiting rulings that could hold that abortion is not a constitutional right but carrying a concealed gun is, there are five decisions of particular interest to federal inmates and defendants:

Concepcion v. United States, Case No. 20-1650. Issue: Whether, when deciding if it should “impose a reduced sentence” under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act (Fair Sentencing Act retroactivity), a district court must – or even may – consider intervening legal and factual developments.

Ruan v. United States, Case No. 20-1410. Issue: Whether a physician charged with prescribing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice may be convicted under 21 USC § 841(a)(1) without regard to whether, in good faith, he or she “reasonably believed” or “subjectively intended” that the prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice.

United States v. Taylor, Case No. 20-1459: Whether 18 USC § 924(c)’s “crime of violence” definition excludes attempted Hobbs Act robbery (which could end up excluding all attempted crimes of violence from being predicates for § 924(c) offenses).

Egbert v. Boule, Case No. 21-147: Whether one can sue a federal officer under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics for First Amendment retaliation claims.

Kemp v. United States, Case No. 21-5726: Whether F.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) authorizes relief based on a district court’s error of law.

scotussplit190627The Supreme Court typically announces opinions on Monday, but as June progresses, more second opinion days like today are likely.

Supreme Court Faces Historic Case Backlog as Fractious Term Comes to an End (June 1)

The New York Times, We preview the five biggest rulings expected from the Supreme Court in the next few weeks (June 8, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Adds Drug, Bivens Cases to Docket – Update for November 10, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS TO HEAR BIVENS, ‘PILL MILL’ CASES

policeraid170824Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court ruled in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics that a person could sue federal agents and employees for violating his or her constitutional rights, even when there was not a specific law authorizing such a suit. (Bivens had its genesis in agents kicking down the door to Webster Bivens’ apartment, searching it and arresting him on drug charges, all without a warrant. The charges were later dismissed, and Webster was held to have the right to sue the agents for money damages arising from their violation of his 4th Amendment rights.

Since then, the Supreme Court recognized Bivens claims for damages for violations of the 4th, 5th and 8th Amendments, but in 2017 froze things by holding in Ziglar v. Abbasi that “expanding the Bivens remedy is now a disfavored activity.”

Last Friday, the justices agreed to decide in whether a Bivens remedy should be available to the owner of an inn on the US-Canada border who complained a Border Patrol agent violated both his 1st and 4th Amendment rights, while declining to reconsider Bivens itself.

feelgood211019The Court also granted certiorari in Ruan v. United States and Kahn v. United States, consolidating those cases to decide whether when the government prosecutes a doctor under 21 USC § 841 for issuing a prescription outside “the usual course of professional practice,” the government must also prove that the doctor knew or intended that the prescription be outside the scope of professional practice. The Court will also decide whether a “good faith” defense protects doctors who have an honest but mistaken belief that they have issued professional practice.”

Those cases relate to so-called pill mills, where doctors allegedly dispense opioids to patients much too freely to feed addictions rather than for a medical purpose. The Supreme Court will consider where the line is to be drawn between doctor discretion – especially in experimenting with pain management techniques – and garden-variety illegal drug dealing.

Egbert v. Boule, Case No 21- 147 (certiorari granted November 5, 2021)

Ruan v. United States, Case No 20-1410 (certiorari granted November 5, 2021)

Kahn v. United States, Case No 20-5261 (certiorari granted November 5, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS May Be Looking at ‘Pill Mill’ Pusher Standards – Update for October 19, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TRIPLE RELIST SUGGEST LIKELY SCOTUS REVIEW OF ‘PILL MILL’ STANDARDS

feelgood211019In Supreme Court-speak, a “relist” is a petition for certiorari that is neither granted nor denied, but rather held over for consideration at a subsequent conference of justices, some with the court issued a “CVSG” (a “call for the views of the Attorney General”). A petition is usually “relisted” because of debate among the justices as to its merit. With only four votes required for grant of certiorari, being “relisted” substantially increases the chances that a petition will be granted, and the case set for briefing. 

According to one academic study, a petition in a non-pauper case (in which the petitioner is able to pay the usual $300 filing fee) “is over 46 times more likely to be granted following a CVSG.” Every relisted case is back to be considered another time at the next conference.

Last week, SCOTUS set three petitions – all of which raise the same question – for a second relist. The Court will consider whether to hear the trio at its next conference, set for October 29th. If certiorari is granted, it could alter felony drug distribution cases involving physicians.

Currently, a physician can be convicted of dispensing controlled substances in violation of 21 USC 841(a) if the dispensing is “outside the usual course of professional practice” or “for other than a legitimate medical purpose. ” In Naum v. United States and Coonce v. United States, the question raised is whether the government may merely prove it was either one – “outside the usual course of professional practice” – or the other – for other than a legitimate medical purpose – but not necessarily both.

In Ruan v. United States, the question is related. To ensure that physicians are not convicted for merely negligent conduct, courts generally permit doctors to advance a “good faith” defense. Ruan asks whether a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice may be convicted under 841(a)(1) without regard to whether, in good faith, he or she “reasonably believed” or “subjectively intended” that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice.

Naum v. United States, Case No 20-1480 (cert pending)
Coonce v. United States, Case No 20-7934 (cert pending)
Ruan v. United States, Case No 20-1410 (cert pending)

– Thomas L. Root

What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You – Update for December 24, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

AND WHAT MIGHT THIS BE?

A drug is a drug is a drug.

puzzled201223It has been the law for at least 30 years that a defendant doesn’t have to know what illegal drugs he might be involved with, as long as he knows that whatever he possesses is illegal. This may make some sense, until you stop to think that carrying around a kilo of crack will get you a dramatically higher sentence than, say, a kilo of pot (the difference between six months and 10 years).

Trontez Mahaffey was busted at Cincinnati Airport with 40 lbs. of vacuum-sealed marijuana. But hidden in one of Tron’s bales was a packet containing 4 lbs. of meth. Tron claimed he knew about the pot, but not about the meth. He argued that under Rehaif v. United States – which required that a felon in possession of a gun really know he was a felon – the government has to show that Tron was aware of what drugs he possessed, not just that he knew he had some kind of illegal substances.

Tron said a drug is not a drug is not a drug.

Last week, the 6th Circuit disagreed. Instead, it joined the 1st and 5th in holding that while there is a “longstanding presumption, traceable to the common law, that Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct,” the ordinary meaning of 21 USC § 841(a)(1) only “requires a defendant to know only that the substance he is dealing with is some unspecified substance listed on the federal drug schedules.”

gotcha170207Under the statute’s plain language, the Circuit ruled, the government need only show “the defendant knew he possessed a substance listed on the schedules, even if he did not know which substance it was.” Not know what he was carrying cost Tron a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. Forty lbs. of pot, by contrast, carries no mandatory minimum sentence and a Guidelines range of about six months.

I guess a drug is not a drug is not a drug. But to a defendant, it is…

United States v. Mahaffey, Case 19-6061, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 39797 (6th Cir. Dec 18, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Judge Holds Change in Drug Sentence Minimums “Extraordinary” Grounds for Sentence Reduction – Update for July 10, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

We’re back after a well-deserved week off in Iceland (where the country’s five prisons each house about 30 (not a typo) inmates, who make an average of 28,000 ISK ($290.00) a month.

COURT GRANTS COMPASSIONATE RELEASE BECAUSE OF CHANGE IN DRUG MINIMUMS

A Houston federal district judge two weeks ago re-sentenced Arturo Cantu-Rivera to time served, negating two life sentences in a grant of an 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) compassionate release motion.

Art was doing time on a drug charged, which had been enhanced by an 851 motion to mandatory life in 1990. The court cited his having completed over 4,000 hours of programming, his tutoring GED classes, his age of 69, and his health, calling all of this an “extraordinary degree of rehabilitation.”

extraordinary190710But as well, the judge noted that the change in the drug mandatory minimums under the First Step Act was part of the “extraordinary and compelling” analysis: “Finally, the Court recognizes as a factor in this combination the fundamental change to sentencing policy carried out in the First Step Act’s elimination of life imprisonment as a mandatory sentence solely by reason of a defendant’s prior convictions… The combination of all of these factors establishes the extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying the reduction in sentence in this case.”

Memorandum Opinion and Order, United States v. Canto-Rivera, Case No. H 89-204 (SD Tex, June 24, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Burrage Won’t Save You if the Evidence is There – Update for March 29, 2018

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

LISAStatHeader2small
RIGHT EVIDENCE BUT WRONG INSTRUCTION IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH ON 2255

heroinkill180329People convicted of drug trafficking can get a greatly increased minimum sentence, up to natural life, if the government proves that drugs they distributed caused the death of a user. Up until a few years ago, this provision – 21 USC 841(b)(1)(A) – was a great bludgeon for the government, which was winning enhanced sentence just by showing that someone who died had taken drugs sold by the defendant, no matter how many other things they might have taken, too.

We saw one case where a woman died when she nodded off at the wheel and drove off the road, hitting a tree. She was legally drunk, but also had marijuana and oxycontin in her system. The guy who sold her the oxy got a minimum 20 years.

In 2014, common sense prevailed in Burrage v. United States, when the Supreme Court held that unless the government could prove that “but for” the drugs sold by the defendant, the user-death enhancement could not be applied. In our drunk-driving case above, the defendant got a sentence reduction because no one could testify that without the oxy, our drunk driver would have stayed on the road. But as Lorenzo Roundtree found out last week, Burrage has its limits.

Lorenzo sold heroin to some people who shared their smack with the victim. Shortly after using the heroin, the drunk victim became unresponsive and died. The medical examiner testified that he died as a result of alcohol and drug intoxication. The judge instructed the jury that if it found the heroin contributed to the victim’s death, that was enough, even if it was not the primary cause of death.

After Burrage, that instruction was no longer good law. (In fact, Burrage said the instruction had never been good law). Lorenzo had a 28 USC 2255 on file when Burrage was handed down, so he amended it to claim that his jury instructions were flawed. Last week, the 8th Circuit turned him down.

Lorenzo’s problem was that a medical examiner testified for the government that the alcohol and heroin had worked together, “synergistically” as the doc put it, to depress the victim’s respiratory system. No one contradicted the doctor’s opinion that the percent of alcohol found in the victim’s bloodstream, 0.16%, was not enough to cause death “if that were the only thing that was in his blood.” The doctor testified the alcohol and morphine “probably worked together,” but “the morphine alone could have caused his death.”

death160714The Circuit held that based on doctor’s uncontradicted testimony, “the incorrect jury instruction did not result in prejudice” to Lorenzo. The doc’s opinion that “the morphine alone could have caused the victim’s death” would be enough to let the jury to find that Lorenzo’s drugs were an “independently sufficient cause of the victim’s death,” as Burrage required. What’s more, the 8th said, because the heroin and liquor “worked synergistically to cause” the victim’s death, but the amount of alcohol alone in the victim’s bloodstream was not enough to cause death, any reasonable jury would have found that the heroin was a “but-for” cause of the victim’s death. Therefore, Lorenzo was not harmed by the bad jury instruction, because if the jury had been properly instructed, it would have found Lorenzo qualified for his natural life sentence anyway.

Roundtree v. United States, Case No. 16-3298 (8th Cir. Mar. 22, 2018)

– Thomas L. Root LISAStatHeader2small