All posts by lisa-legalinfo

Timbs a Yawner at Supreme Court – Update for February 26, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

‘DOG BITES MAN’ AT SUPREME COURT

Dogbite160314In journalism, a “dog bites man” story is one that is completely expected and ho-hum. The Supreme Court’s handed down a decision like that last week in Timbs v. Indiana, holding that the 8th Amendment’s ban on excessive fines applied to the states through the 14th Amendment.

SCOTUS did not find that Indiana’s forfeiture of Mr. Timbs’ $42,000 Land Rover for the sale of a couple of hundred dollars’ worth of heroin was excessive. Instead, the case was remanded for the trial court to figure that out. The Feds already operate under the 8th Amendment, which has had limited effect on federal forfeitures.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman noted in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog that during the Timbs oral argument, some Justices seemed to struggle with the notion that forfeiture of an SUV for selling drugs may violate the 8th Amendment, but forfeiture of a lifetime of liberty for possessing drugs does not.

Today, SCOTUS will hear oral argument in two significant supervised release cases, In Mont v. United States, a 6th Circuit case asking whether the supervised release term for one offense is tolled under 18 USC 3624(e) while a releasee is locked up in pretrial confinement for a new criminal case. In United States v. Haymond, SCOTUS will review a 10th Circuit decision that 18 USC 3583(k), which requires additional prison time for sex offenders who violate supervised release, is unconstitutional, because it imposes additional punishment based on new conduct for which the offenders have not been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt.

habeas_corpusUnited States v. Davis will decide whether 18 USC 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutional. SCOTUS has set April 17, 2019, for oral argument. Alas, the government’s request for certiorari in United States v. Wheeler, which was relisted for conference last Friday, was again relisted for March 1st. Wheeler asks whether a prisoner whose 28 USC 2255 motion challenging a statutory minimum was denied based on current circuit precedent may later seek habeas relief in a 28 USC 2241 petition (allowed by the 2255(e) “escape clause”) on the ground that the circuit’s interpretation of the statutory minimum has changed.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Why I am certainly hoping, but not really expecting, Timbs to end up being a big deal (Feb. 22)

Timbs v Indiana, Case No. 17-1091, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 1350 (Sup.Ct. Feb. 20, 2019)

Mont v. United States, Case No. 17-8995 (Supreme Court oral argument Feb. 26, 2019)

United States v. Haymond, Case No. 17-1672 (Supreme Court oral argument Feb. 26, 2019)

United States v. Davis, Case No. 18-431 (Supreme Court oral argument Apr. 17, 2019)

United States v. Wheeler, Case No. 18-420 (relisted for Supreme Court conference on March 1, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

No One Much Cares About the ‘Seven Days’ Debacle – Update for February 25, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BAD NEWS, GOOD NEWS

fishbicycle190225The bad news: We have already reported in detail on the error in the First Step Act that accidentally tied the effective date for the additional seven-days-a-year good-conduct time for federal inmates to the effectiveness of the earned-time credits, a pairing that makes as much sense at relating a fish to a bicycle.

Although there has been a hue and cry from all of the usual advocate-suspects, no one has owned up to the blunder, let alone taken steps to fix it.

I’m not often right, but I predicted a month ago that Congress would be uninterested in doing anything to correct the sloppy drafting. This is because Congress, as an institution, addresses a problem once, happily concludes that the problem is all fixed, and then moves on to the next problem. Criminal justice and prison reform got their moment in the sun with passage of First Step. It will be a long time before Congress comes back to the issue. That is all the more true here, because the drafting gaffe will remedy itself in July, when the seven-day credits take effect.  Some prisoners who should be home now will surely suffer, but that’s hardly an effect that will fire the imagination of Congress, especially the Senate leadership. 

And more: Law professor Nora V. Demleitner, editor of the Federal Sentencing Reporter, complained last week in The Hill that new Attorney General William Barr is no reformer. “Congress should have demanded an attorney general committed to decreasing the federal prison population, improving re-entry, and limiting prison sentences for minor offenders… an attorney general committed to the spirit of the [First Step] Act. Instead it settled for someone who will interpret it as narrowly as possible and implement it grudgingly.”

retro160110The Good News: Speaking last week at a crime symposium, Koch Industries general counsel Mark Holden identified three priorities for the next federal prison reform legislation. Holden, who was point man for Koch Industries’ backing of First Step, said that congress first should apply First Step’s sentencing changes retroactively – the 18 USC 924(c) destacking provision, the reductions in mandatory minimums under the drug trafficking statute, and “safety valve” qualifications.

In addition, Holden called on Congress to codify the Supreme Court’s Brady v. Maryland ruling requiring prosecutors share all of the information that they have about the alleged crime with the accused at the outset the case, and to adopt a clearer and more stringent mens rea rule. Also, he urged the Trump administration to reform the executive clemency process and then to apply it to “create second chances for people who wouldn’t necessarily qualify for relief under the First Step Act.”

Meanwhile, a push is on to again make Pell Grants available for prisoners. Complaints that hard-work Americans were paying for criminals to go to college cauaed Congress to prohibit issuing prisoners Pell Grants, which provide students with financial need aid for college. Without Pells, the number of prison college programs plummeted from 772 to just eight by 1997.

In 2015, the US Dept of Education started a pilot program, allowing some colleges to use Pells to increase access to college courses in prison.

education180509Last week, a conservative magazine called on Congress to expand Pell grants to prisoners nationwide. “Such programming brings gains for both prisoners and public safety,” the American Conservative said, “rebuilds families, is fiscally prudent, and acknowledges the individual dignity of those in prison.”

It may happen. There has been bipartisan support for legislation to reinstate Pells for prisoners. Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-Tennessee), chairman of the Senate Education and Labor Committee, has hinted the change may be part of reauthorizing the Higher Education Act. “Most prisoners, sooner or later, are released from prison, and no one is helped when they do not have the skills to find a job,” Alexander said last year. “Making Pell Grants available to them in the right circumstances is a good idea.”

The Hill, Barr confirmation reveals shallowness of congressional commitment to justice reform (Feb. 19)

The Crime Report, The First Step Act: It’s Only a ‘First Step’ (Feb. 18)

American Conservative, Sending Our Prisoners to College (Feb. 21)

The Intercept, How The Federal Government Undermines Prison Education (Feb. 18)

– Thomas L. Root

Court Cannot Hear Government Dog Whistle – Update for February 20, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUMMONING THE SPIRITS

In law school, a cynical but wise professor told me that whenever someone argued you were violating the “spirit of the law,” that necessarily meant that you were not violating the letter of the law.

Ed Raifsnider learned that the hard way last week. Like many people with plea agreements, he reasonably expected the government to keep its word by recommending an in-Guidelines sentence. The AUSA literally did that, but Ed said, “the Government effectively recommended an alternative sentence by strongly suggesting the district court should not follow its formal recommendation.”

dogwhistle190220That’s hardly unusual. The government does that all the time, telling the court things like, “We are obligated by the plea agreement to recommend an in-guidelines sentence,” which is a dog whistle if ever there was one, communicating to the sentencing court that the government will provide the picket signs for an angry mob if the judge does not hammer the defendant, despite anything the plea agreement may say to the contrary.

But the Court was not very sympathetic to Ed. It found no breach, holding that “we do not suggest the Government can never breach a plea agreement by implicitly recommending a different sentence than the one it is bound to recommend by the agreement, but we do not believe this line has been crossed here.”

If there’s a line somewhere, we’re still waiting to see it.

United States v. Raifsnider, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 4443 (8th Cir. Feb. 14, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

A Toast to Ripeness: Supervised Release Follies – Update for February 19, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

FUN AND GAMES WITH SUPERVISED RELEASE

A pair of decisions last week serve as a reminder to federal inmates that if they think prison is frustrating, just wait…

supervisedrelease180713More than one inmate lived in one federal district, but caught his or her case in another. That happened to Randy Pittman. When that happens, the BOP will release the inmate to the federal district in which the crime was committed, not the one in which the inmate lives, unless the inmate convinces the BOP to ask for a transfer of supervision.

With Randy’s prison term set to expire, he asked the district court to grant relocation of his supervised release under 18 USC 3605. There’s nothing unusual about such a request, and Randy justifiably saw no benefit to doing halfway house in Texas when he intended to live with his family in Georgia.

The district court denied his motion as premature because Randy was not yet on supervised release. Randy appealed, but last week the 5th Circuit threw the case out, holding it lacked jurisdiction.

The Circuit held that the district court’s denial of supervised release relocation as being premature was not a final order under 28 USC 1291. Randy argued that the harm he would suffer was real, because forcing him to enter a halfway house in the Texas would undermine his ability “to reintegrate into society.” After all, the halfway house was supposed to let him attain a stable residence, gainful employment, and to prepare for his reentry into society.”

The Circuit did not care. The district court said Randy’s motion was premature. “The best view is that,” the 5th said, is that “the denial of Pittman’s motion is simply not a final, appealable order.”

Of course, it seems that Randy’s harm was immediate, that being a term of halfway house in a place where getting a job, renting an apartment, opening a bank account and getting a current driver’s license made no sense. And it hardly served society either, telling a soon-to-be-released prisoner that he should engage in entirely futile attempts to reintegrate into a society 700 miles from his family. By the time Randy is on supervised release, the damage – an utterly stupid halfway house placement – would be done. The primary question of ripeness is whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention. That should have made the issue here, even if it is a collateral order, reviewable.

nobeer180605For David Bell, who was on supervised release, the problem was that the district court has placed special conditions on him that he ““not consume or possess alcoholic beverages or beer, including 3.2% beer, at any time” and that he be at his “place of residence between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., 7 days per week,” unless working.

Dave argued that these had nothing to do with his conviction for marijuana trafficking and money laundering, but the district court said

I’ve had too many defendants that go out and get to drinking, then they get intoxicated and then they go out and violate their supervised release.” As for the curfew, the court said, “And the same reason I put that curfew on there… [T]hey violate their probation, they’re out usually past midnight. They’re out on the prowl, and they get into trouble. They get drinking, then they’re out prowling the streets. Now, there’s no indication you do that. But I’m going to leave it on there because I’m not even going to give you the chance to be tempted by it.

Dave appealed, and last week, the 8th Circuit threw out the conditions. Supervised release conditions must 1 be reasonably related to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 USC 3553(a), involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in 3553(a); and be consistent with policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. What’s more, the sentencing court “must make an individualized inquiry into the facts and circumstances underlying a case and make sufficient findings on the record so as to ensure that the special condition satisfies the statutory requirements.”

The 8th Circuit noted it had previously vacated alcohol bans “where the defendant’s history or crime of conviction” did not support them. Drug convictions alone do not justify such restrictions, and “even repeated marijuana use and light alcohol consumption are not necessarily sufficient to establish dependency.”

supervisedleash181107Here, the Court ruled, the sentencing judge abused his discretion in imposing the condition prohibiting Dave from any alcohol consumption. “Rather than conducting an individualized inquiry into the circumstances of Bell’s alcohol use and drug dependence,” the appellate panel held, “the district court cited its general experience with prior offenders. In fact, the court admitted that there was no indication that Dave drank or prowled the streets.”

As well, the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing a curfew. Rather than making individualized findings, the court referenced its general experience with offenders and admitted that there was “no indication” this experience pertained to Dave.

The 8th did not “see a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed the condition after an individualized assessment… It is unclear how the curfew is reasonably related to the protection of the public or Bell’s criminal history and rehabilitative and correctional needs given that the conspiracy involved distributing marijuana through the mail and laundering the proceeds.”

United States v. Pittman, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 4490 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2019)

United States v. Bell, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 4155 (8th Cir. Feb. 12, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Unintended Consequences – Does First Step Act Open Up 8th Amendment Argument? – Update for February 18, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DOES FIRST STEP OPEN WINDOW FOR 8TH AMENDMENT CLAIM ON HARSH GUN SENTENCES?

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman asked this interesting question in a post on his Sentencing Law and Policy blog last week.

Prof. Berman noted that First Step Act Sec. 403, “described as a ‘clarification of Section 924(c),’ eliminates the required “stacking” of 25-year mandatory minimums for multiple 924(c) counts at the same time… Sadly, Congress did not make Section 403 of the First Step Act retroactive, and thus defendants previously subject to these extreme stacked sentences will get no direct relief from the new Act.”

Sentencestack170404In 2010, Wendell Rivera–Ruperto was paid by undercover FBI informants to serve as “armed security” at six fake drug deals, and received a 162-year sentence, of which 130 years were for his six stacked 924(c) convictions. In a 1st Circuit decision last year, Wendell was denied rehearing en banc despite one judge’s complaint that courts “have no choice but to approve mandatory ‘forever’ sentences… so long as they can hypothesize a rational reason for the legislature to have thought that the underlying criminal conduct was [so] serious…” The dissenting judge hoped for Supreme Court review.

SCOTUS has incorporated a proportionality analysis into the cruel and unusual punishment analysis required in capital cases. In Harmelin v. Michigan, the defendant asked the Court to extend the reach of that analysis to noncapital cases such as his life sentence for 650 grams of cocaine. Five Justices agreed that Harmelin’s sentence was not unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, but six Justices agreed that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause bore some kind of proportionality analysis. Among those six, three supported a proportionality principle that deferred to legislative judgments, while three others supported a more searching proportionality analysis that would have struck down the mandatory life sentence.

cruel190218This Friday, the Justices will consider whether to review the case. “Notably, and not surprisingly,” Prof. Berman wrote, “the feds now say in opposition to cert that passage of the First Step Act reduces the important of the case: ‘future defendants in petitioner’s position will not be subject to mandatory consecutive sentences of at least 25 years [and the] question presented by his case therefore has diminishing significance’.” But “the fact that the 8th Amendment is supposed to take guidance from an ‘evolving standards of decency’ and be responsive to a ‘national consensus’ against a sentence, I strongly believe the enactment of the First Step Act primarily operates to make Wendell Rivera–Ruperto’s constitutional claim even more substantively potent.”

Justice Kennedy’s retirement last summer creates a window of opportunity for advocates to urge overturning (or cutting back) Harmelin’s 8th Amendment precedent. “Thus,” Berman said, “I am rooting super hard for the Justices to grant cert in Rivera–Ruperto.” Grant of cert in this case, which Berman calls “potentially the biggest non-capital Eighth Amendment case in a generation,” might open other stacking cases to 8th Amendment review.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Doesn’t the FIRST STEP Act add juice to Eighth Amendment challenge to extreme stacked 924(c) sentence in Rivera-Ruperto? (Feb. 10)

Rivera-Ruperto v. United States, Case No. 18-5384 (Supreme Ct.)

– Thomas L. Root

Justice Must be Timely, Or Not At All – Update for February 14, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CORAM NOBIS – HE WHO HESITATES…

Oliver Wendell Holmes famously lectured a new lawyer from the bench, after the tyro attorney started arguing about justice, “This is court of law, young man, not a court of justice.”

lawnotjustice190213Well, it’s an imperfect world, but over the centuries, the common-law system developed a body of law authorizing writs – called “extraordinary writs” because they were, indeed, out of the ordinary – each tailored to address some injustice (sorry, Ollie) that the strictures of the law otherwise overlooked. The most famous is the writ of habeas corpus, an order from the court to a jailer to produce the prisoner before it and show by what authority the poor fellow was being detained. Injunctions, orders that a certain activity be stopped, likewise are extraordinary writs, as are their lesser-known prerogative-writ cousins, writs of prohibition, writs of quo warranto, and writs of mandamus. Then, there are the real unknowns, such as the writ of audita querala or writ of error coram nobis.

Many courts have limited the use of extraordinary writs, but not the Feds: the All Writs Actpassed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”

secondbiteapple190213Federal prisoners, who as a group sat in the back of the room during high school government class, discover the All Writs Act like travelers in the desert stumbling on an oasis of cool water and verdant fruit trees. With post-conviction petitions seemingly limited to a single 28 USC 2255 motion except in the most restricted of circumstances, inmates seeking a second or late-filed bite of the apple often consider a petition for a writ of error coram nobis to be a novel end run around the ban on multiple 2255s may want to look at what happened to Reuben Delhorno.

This is largely because newbies in the law library have forgotten or never knew what my wife calls the “Greater Minds Than Mine” rule. Any novel dodge or loophole you may discover in the law has already been found, beaten like a rented mule, and usually plugged by one court of aother. Greater minds than yours (or mine) have stumbled on your discovery a long time before you (or I) did.

rentedmule190213Reuben filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, seeking to get out of a plea agreement for a conviction on which he had already served his sentence, in order to avoid deportation.

Coram nobis is a common-law writ available to correct errors of fact and law in criminal cases, but only when the movant is no longer in custody, and (1) the error is of the most fundamental character so as to render the criminal conviction invalid; (2) there are ‘sound reasons’ for the defendant’s ‘failure to seek earlier relief’; and (3) the defendant continues to suffer from his conviction.

Generally, a petition for writ of error coram nobis cannot be used for a second bite of the 2255 apple. As one court put it, given the broad purpose of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, it would be “astounding if the ‘second or successive’ restrictions on 2255 motions could be rendered wholly ineffective by the simple ruse of labeling future § 2255 motions as petitions for writs of coram nobis.”

But Reuben did not do that. Instead, he sat on his hands while locked up, letting the deadline to file a 2255 pass. Only after he finished his term and found that ICE was waiting to hustle him back to Mexico did he wake up to the errors in his criminal proceeding.

At his change of plea hearing, Reuben said that he was born in Mexico but no one mentioned the immigration consequences of a guilty plea, even though the hearing took place more than a year after the Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky that a defense lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise the client that a guilty plea would result in automatic deportation.

nothappen181016Reuben complained his attorney’s representation was unreasonable, because he never discussed with Reuben the immigration consequences of conviction. The Court was “troubled that apparently neither his counsel, the prosecutor, nor the court raised the issue of the mandatory immigration consequences with him.” However, it found that Reuben lacked evidence that he would not have pled guilty even if he had been told about deportation.

But Reuben’s biggest problem was that he could not explain why he waited five years to raise the issue, instead of on appeal or in a 2255 motion. “A person seeking a writ of coram nobis,” the Court ruled, “must offer sound reasons for his failure to seek relief earlier.” Reuben could not, and thus had his coram nobis dismissed.

United States v. Delhorno, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3977 (7th Cir. Feb. 8, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

‘Off With Their Heads’: Supervised Release Violations to be Aired at SCOTUS – Update for February 12, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT TO HEAR SUPERVISED RELEASE CASE WITH FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS

Nationally, about a third of all people on supervised release – which is a period of a few years to life after a prisoner is released that is much like parole – get violated. Many of those people are sent back to prison for a term specified in 18 USC 3583(e)(3). The revocation proceeding has a star-chamber quality, employing loosely-goosey evidentiary and procedural safeguards as well as a limp preponderance-of-the-evidence standard instead of reasonable doubt.

thThe revocation hearing often comes down to the Probation Officer, herself an employee of the very court hearing the revocation, telling the court what her investigation into the alleged violation found, with that being enough for the preponderance finding, confrontation clause rights and hearsay concerns be damned.

“Although such violations often lead to reimprisonment, the violative conduct need not [even] be criminal,” the Supreme Court observed 19 years ago in Johnson v. United States. In fact, where the “acts of violation are criminal in their own right, they may be the basis for separate prosecution,” the Court said.

Now, 34 years after supervised release was created as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, SCOTUS is finally asking the hard questions about revocation procedures. In two weeks, the Court will hear oral arguments in United States v. Haymond, a 10th Circuit decision that held the supervised-release emperor has no clothes. The Tenth ruled that it was “unconstitutional and unenforceable” for a district court to revoke supervised release and impose five more years of prison on a defendant based on finding by a simple preponderance of the evidence that he violated the conditions of his release by knowingly possessing child porn.

The Circuit decision invalidated the parts of 18 USC 3583(k) that required a district court to impose prison based on a preponderance finding that a defendant violated the conditions of his release, even where the violation itself might by not be criminal.

imageA Supreme Court decision upholding the appellate decision in Haymond could have implications for over 150,000 people who are now or will someday be on supervised release. Simple math suggests that 50,000 of them will be violated – itself suggesting a systemic failure in the supervised release program – and a substantial percentage of them will face a return to prison. Not stripping defendants of their liberty, restricted though it is on supervised release, without a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that they violated supervised release seems a small price to exact from a system that fails so many.

Law360, High Court Takes On Supervised Release Revocations (Feb. 4)

United States v. Haymond, Case No. 17-1672 (Supreme Court, oral argument Feb. 26)

– Thomas L. Root

News of the (Good) Weird – Update for February 11, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SOME RUMORS ARE STRANGE ENOUGH TO BE TRUE
Did you hear about Mark getting released by his judge?
Did you hear about Mark getting released by his judge?

I hear from a lot of people, and unfortunately, most of what I hear is rumor. So I was skeptical last Friday when a guy at FCI Big Springs reported a friend of his had just gotten released on his recalculated 54 days of good time.

You should remember that in the First Step Act, Congress clarified its intent from 30 years ago that federal inmates receive 54 days of good-conduct time per year. Previously, the provision was so poorly written that the Bureau of Prisons read it to mean that after 365 days, a prisoner would get an award of 54 days. What Congress meant was that 311 days of good conduct, an inmate would be awarded 54 days (which would make a year).

What’s the difference?  Seven days a year, which the First Step Act made retroactive to the beginning of the current  sentence.  I talked to one inmate at the end of his 23-year sentence who is in line to get an additional five months off. Instead of being home for Thanksgiving, he’ll be there for July 4th.

Or he would have been. But in correcting its prior screw-up, Congress committed a new one: the effective date for the seven days additional good time was placed in the wrong section of First Step (Section 102(b)(1)(A), along with the earned-time credits). Congress intended that the earned-time credits become effective only after giving the Attorney General time to adopt a risk assessment algorithm. But it neither intended nor saw a need to delay application of the additional seven days, which the BOP can apply to inmates’ sentences with the push of a button.

Screwup190212Despite its intent, Congress goofed, so that instead of taking effect when the First Step Act was signed, the additional good time will not be effective until July 19, 2019. This has made a mess of halfway house and release dates for a lot of people whose date would have moved by weeks or months. Just last week, Mother Jones reported that “4,000 prisoners who hoped to be out for the holidays remain stuck behind bars waiting for answers.”

So when I heard on Friday that federal prisoner Mark J. Walker had been given his extra good time and immediately released by a Federal District of Oregon judge, I doubted it.

It happened.

There is a lot of story to this case, such as what drove Mark’s public defender to file the motion, that I just do not know. But file the PD did, delivering to the Court a 14-page petition for writ of habeas corpus on Jan. 25 that argued the only rational interpretation of the First Step Act was that the Sec. 102(b)(2) 210-day delay applied only to the new extra time credit and not to the seven days additional good time. Plus, the PD argued, delaying the effectiveness of the extra seven days violated due process by being arbitrary and capricious, and Mark’s immediate release was necessary to avoid irreparable harm.

The argument is creatively, innovatively weird. The government’s response, on the other hand, was just plain weird. The AUSA chose to ignore Mark’s substantive arguments, instead opposing the petition solely on the ground that the Oregon court lacked jurisdiction, and that Mark should have filed in the Northern District of Texas, where he was confined.

release161117Last Thursday, an Oregon federal district court ruled that “given the Government’s failure to address the merits… and the equities of the situation” it would grant “the relief requested… without a final determination of the merits of the legal issues raised by Defendant.” Senior US District Judge Ralph R. Beistline ordered the BOP to recalculate Mark’s sentence and to release him “without delay if the recalculation confirms that the Defendant’s term of imprisonment has expired.” Mark was released the same day.

By its terms, the decision is not intended to rule on the merits, and as a district court order, it lacks precedential value, but it is a creative and audacious filing that let Mark go free two months before he otherwise would have.

Order, United States v. Walker, Case No. 3:10-cr-00298 (D.Oregon, Feb. 7, 2019)

Mother Jones, Trump’s One Real Bipartisan Win Is Already Turning Into a Mess (Feb. 5)

– Thomas L. Root

Federal Judge Goes to Jail… And Does Not Like It – Update for February 7, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

COLD CELLS PUT BOP WARDEN ON HOT SEAT

U.S. District Judge Analisa Torres toured MDC Brooklyn, the federal high-rise lockup in the Sunset Park neighborhood of the borough, yesterday. She did not seem to like what she saw.

hotseat190207The Judge conducted her walk-through with lawyers and a court reporter in tow, hearing about the inmates’ days in the dark and freezing cold – without medical or mental health treatment – while Federal Bureau of Prisons staff worked in coats and gloves.

CNN reported that Judge Torres spoke with inmates through their cell doors, repeating what they said for the benefit of the court stenographer and lawyers and officials who accompanied her.

One inmate described the “mental breakdown” of his cellmate while the power was out, according to the court transcript. The outage rendered “emergency buttons” to get the attention of guards ineffective.

When the inmate finally reached an officer to tell him his cellmate was suicidal, “I think they took it as a joke,” he told Torres.

The inmate said he “physically had to take … literally had to take the noose out of his cellmate’s hand.”

“He was trying to kill himself,” the inmate said.

“I’m sorry to hear that,” Torres said.

“Thank you for being worried about us, ma’am, and treating us like human beings,” the inmate told the judge.

The Judge repeated for the reporter, “He is a mental health patient, and he was feeling suicidal and no one came to help him. He said the temperature dropped to freezing. They had nothing in there, they had no thermal shirts.”

She observed water damaged ceilings in another cell, where, she said, “you can see copious amounts of paint peeling and hanging from the ceiling. The ceiling is painted white, but the water damaged area has a kind of a golden tone to it. It almost looks like wet tissues hanging from the ceiling.” The inmate in the cell told her that it was “like sleeping under a waterfall.”

“He says they didn’t care for you,” Torres told the lawyers and court reporter. “If you tried to get an extra blanket, they ignored him.”

Lack of power, freezing conditions and appalling treatment of inmates at the Brooklyn facility sparked a national outcry and unprecedented protests this past weekend, leading to the Judge ordering the unusual hearing and forced tour of the prison. The string of heat outages began at the Brooklyn detention facility weeks earlier, according to jail staff and inmates who testified during the hearing.

dungeon190207Instead of intervening to protect those incarcerated at the jail, the warden at MDC, Herman Quay, lied about the extent of the crisis, while downplaying long-standing issues at the facility, attorneys told the Judge. “I have personal knowledge that what the warden said was false,” Deirdre von Dornum, attorney-in-charge of the Federal Defenders of New York, alleged during yesterday’s hearing.

Warden Quay asserted that detainees were never deprived of heat, medical access or hot meals, but von Dornum — who was able to tour MDC Brooklyn last weekend only because Judge ordered the BOP to let her in – said she witnessed clients confined to freezing cells, some of them suffering from serious medical conditions. A number had not received a hot meal in five days.

MDC inmate Donnell Murray testified that BOP employees had measured the temperature of his cell as being between 30 and 40 degrees. He complained that he was cut off from speaking with family members and attorneys — something else Warden Quay denied — and was unprepared for his impending trial.

“The lights was out. The heat was off, and we was locked in,” Murray testified. “It was hard on me because it was dark. It was cold. I was nervous.”

The hearing came after Federal Public Defender Ezra Spilke requested the Court look into “inhumane conditions” at MDC. It was the first time that BOP employees testified under oath about conditions at the facility. BOP lawyers tried to postpone the hearing and Judge Torres’ inspection tour on Monday night, but were denied.

Warden Quay, who has been accused of lying by officials, BOP staff and inmates, was a “no-show” at the hearing. BOP employees who did testify offered details that directly conflicted with Quay’s denials and the BOP spin that the prison was merely “experiencing a partial power outage” related to an electrical fire last Sunday.

liar151213The heat is on, if not in the facility, then at least on the Warden’s backside. The Dept of Justice announced Wednesday that its Inspector General will investigate the BOP’s response to heating and electrical failures at MDC Brooklyn.

In a statement, the DOJ said the IG, who conducts independent, internal investigations, would determine if the BOP properly responded to the crisis at the Metropolitan Detention Center and whether it had adequate contingency plans in place.

Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-New York), denounced what he called a “total lack of urgency and concern” by the BOP. Nadler and other officials toured the facility last weekend, where according to The New York Times, over 1,600 inmates have been largely confined to their freezing, dark cells for nearly a week, since an electrical fire partially cut off power to the jail. The fire resulted in a ban on visitation and a lockdown.

“The situation is really, really a nightmare,” said Rep. Nydia M. Velázquez (D-New York), whose district includes the jail. Officials, including Rep. Velázquez and Nadler, initially were denied a tour of the facility on Friday night.

gulag190207

The BOP said in a statement on Saturday night that a new electrical panel had been installed by that day and that the “facility is working to restore power as expeditiously as possible.” It expected work to be completed by yesterday. Earlier, the BOP issued a statement that the facility was “experiencing a partial power outage… Cells have heat and hot water, there is lighting in the common areas and inmates are receiving hot meals,” the release said. The BOP blamed the electrical failure on Consolidated Edison, the local electric utility.

Con Ed disputed the BOP report, saying “It’s an internal problem, and their electricians will have to fix it. End of story.” Likewise, correctional officers’ union leaders and defense lawyers rebutted the BOP account. The local union president said the problems began around Jan. 5, when the facility first lost power. The heating issues began last week, leaving inmates and staff to face freezing weather for the first time. “We didn’t have heat in the building, we didn’t have light,” he said. “The weather was actually unbearable.”

A case manager told The Times that the inmates “just stay huddled up in the bed. “I have several inmates that are very elderly. One of them complained that he’s been sick for the last few days. He looks sickly. He’s walking slower. Talking slower.”

The City of New York offered relief supplies to MDC Brooklyn late last week. The facility initially turned down the relief supplies, but after New York City William diBlasio said the City was sending trucks full of blankets, hand warmers, and generators, regardless of whether they’d be accepted. MDC Brooklyn reportedly said Saturday it would accept the help, and the supplies arrived late in the evening.

CNN, A federal judge toured a troubled New York jail. What she found is disturbing (Feb. 7)

The New York Times, ‘A Nightmare’: Inside the Federal Jail in Brooklyn With Little Heat or Electricity (Feb. 2)

The New York Times, Justice Department Calls for Investigation Into Brooklyn Jail Where Heat and Power Failed (Feb. 6)

The Gothamist, Protests Continue As Officials Report ‘Intolerable, Immoral’ Conditions Inside Freezing Brooklyn Jail (Feb. 3)

The Gothamist, Brooklyn Jail Officials Accused Of Lying About Heat Outages: ‘What The Warden Said Was False’ (Feb. 5)

– Thomas L. Root

Some of It’s Violent, Some of It’s Not – Update for February 5, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MIXED WEEK FOR CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

Defendants arguing that prior state convictions were not crimes of violence enjoyed mixed results last week.

violent160620A 10th Circuit panel ruled in United States v. Bong that robbery under Kansas law can be accomplished with minimal force that falls short of the “violent force” required under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s elements clause. What’s more, Kansas aggravated robbery – a robbery committed by someone armed with a dangerous weapon or who inflicts bodily harm during course of a robbery – is not violent, either. Merely being “armed” with a weapon during the course of a robbery, the court said, is not sufficient to render the state offense a “violent crime” for ACCA purposes.

Things did not go so well in the 2nd Circuit. There, the court held in United States v. Thrower that 3rd degree robbery under N.Y. Penal Law 160.05 is a crime of violence for ACCA purposes. The crime requires “forcible stealing,” which is defined as common to every degree of robbery in New York State, requires use or threat of the immediate use of physical force sufficient to prevent or overcome victim resistance. “By its plain language,” the Circuit said, “the New York robbery statute matches the Armed Career Criminal Act.” The holding includes not just 3rd degree robbery, but by necessity all levels of New York robbery.

A 9th Circuit panel, however, held in United States v. Vederoff that 2nd degree assault under Wash. Rev. Code 9A.36.021(1) is overbroad when compared to the generic definition of aggravated assault, because the statute encompasses assault with intent to commit a felony. Because Washington’s 2nd-degree assault statute is indivisible, the panel could not apply the modified categorical approach, and therefore concluded that Washington second-degree assault does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the enumerated clause of USSG 4B1.2. For the same reason, the panel held, 2nd-degree murder under Washington Code 9A.32.050 is overbroad because the statute covers felony murder. The panel found the statute indivisible, and therefore concluded 2nd-degree murder is not a “crime of violence” under the enumerated clause of USSG 4B1.2.

The 8th Circuit ruled in Mora-Higuera v, United States that a defendant’s 2255 motion, asserting a due process right to be sentenced without reference to the residual clause of USSG 4B1.2(a)(2) under the mandatory guidelines, was not dictated by Johnson v. United States, because it is “reasonably debatable whether Johnson’s holding regarding the ACCA extends to the former mandatory guidelines.” Thus, the defendant was not able to challenge his mandatory Guidelines career offender sentence on the grounds one of the prior crimes of violence was invalidated by Johnson.

vaguenes160516Finally, the 10th Circuit agreed in United States v. Pullen that “the Supreme Court has never recognized a void for vagueness challenge to the Guidelines and so Johnson neither creates a new rule applicable to the Guidelines nor dictates that any provision of the Guidelines is subject to a void for vagueness challenge.”

United States v. Bong, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 2798 (10th Cir. Jan. 28, 2019)

United States v. Thrower, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3145 (2nd Cir. Jan. 31, 2019)

United States v. Vederoff, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3314 (9th Cir., Feb. 1, 2019)

Mora-Higuera v. United States, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 3139 (8th Cir. Jan 31, 2019)

United States v. Pullen, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 2937 (10th Cir. Jan. 29, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root