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Supreme Court Rules “Remaining-in” Burglary is Generic Burglary – Update for June 11, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT ‘REMAINING IN” BURGLARY IS GENERIC BURGLARY UNDER ACCA

Jamar Quarles was convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun under 18 USC § 922(g)(1). Because he had three prior convictions for crimes of violence, he was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years under 18 USC § 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act.

burglar160103In order to be a crime of violence, you may recall, 18 USC 924(e) requires that the conviction either be (1) for burglary, arson, use of explosives or extortion (the “enumerated crimes” clause); or (2) a crime involving an actual or threatened use of physical force against another person (the “elements” clause).

Jamar appealed his ACCA conviction, arguing that one of the prior offenses, Michigan third-degree home invasion, was not generic burglary, because its terms were broader than mere generic burglary. Thus, he maintained, the home invasion did not fit the definition of “crime of violence” under the enumerated crimes clause.

Some 29 years ago, the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States defined generic burglary under §924(e) to mean “unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” The Michigan third-degree home invasion statute applied when a person “breaks and enters a dwelling or enters a dwelling without permission and, at any time while he or she is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling, commits a misdemeanor.”

Jamar argued that this provision was too broad, because it encompassed situations where the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully remaining in a dwelling. He contended that generic remaining-in burglary under the ACCA occurs only when the defendant has the intent to commit a crime at the exact moment when he or she first unlawfully remains in a building or structure.

The District Court rejected that argument, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Yesterday, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts.

remaining190611The Supreme Court said that “remaining in” refers only to the burglary being a continuous event, that begins when one enters the building unlawfully and does not end until he or she exits. The common understanding of “remaining in” as a continuous event, the Court said, “means that burglary occurs for purposes of §924(e) if the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time during the continuous event of unlawfully remaining in a building or structure.” To put it in conventional criminal law terms, the Court explained, “because the actus reus [the act of burglary] is a continuous event, the mens rea [intent to commit a crime while there] matches the actus reus so long as the burglar forms the intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully present in the building or structure.”

The Court made it clear what concerns partly drove the train. It observed that “the important point is that all of the state appellate courts that had definitively addressed this issue as of 1986 [the year the ACCA was adopted] had interpreted remaining-in burglary to occur when the defendant forms the intent to commit a crime at any time while unlawfully present in the building or structure… To interpret remaining-in burglary narrowly… would thwart the stated goals of the Armed Career Criminal Act. After all, most burglaries involve unlawful entry, not unlawful remaining in. Yet if we were to narrowly interpret the remaining-in category of generic burglary so as to require that the defendant have the intent to commit a crime at the exact moment he or she first unlawfully remains… many States’ burglary statutes would presumably be eliminated as predicate offenses under §924(e). That result not only would defy common sense, but also would defeat Congress’ stated objective of imposing enhanced punishment on armed career criminals who have three prior convictions for burglary or other violent felonies.”

Quarles v United States, Case No. 17-778 (Supreme Court, June 10, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Sentencing Commission Cannot Add to Drug Offense Definition, 6th Circuit Says – Update for June 10, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NEITHER FISH NOR FOWL

fishfowl170803Everyone who paid attention in high school government class knows there are three branches of the federal government, the legislative (Congress), the executive (President and the agencies), and the judicial.

And then there’s the United States Sentencing Commission. It is part of the judicial branch, but it is part legislative, too, answering to Congress (which has the right to pass on any amendments, and veto those of which it disapproves). Legal scholars might say it’s neither fish nor fowl.

In 2017, Jim Harvey pled guilty to felon-in-possession of a firearm. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant convicted of a 18 USC 922(g)(1) offense starts with a base offense level of 14, but that level increases to 20 under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4) or (6) if he or she has a prior conviction for a “controlled substance offense.” At sentencing, the district court decided that Jim’s 17-year-old Tennessee conviction for selling or delivering cocaine was a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines.

Jim objected because the Tennessee statute criminalized both sale and delivery of cocaine. Under state law, “delivery” of drugs includes the “attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance.” Jim argued that the prior conviction was not a controlled substance offense because the Guidelines’ definition of “controlled substance offense” does not include “attempt” crimes.

Jim was right that the Guidelines themselves do not include “attempt” offenses. However, each of the Guidelines comes with its own handy commentary and application notes, helpful annotations by the Sentencing Commission to aid users in what it considers the “proper” way to apply each Guideline. The commentary at the end of USSG § 4B1.2(b), which (among other things) defines a controlled substance offense for Guidelines purposes, directs that the definition of controlled substance offense in the text necessarily includes ‘the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.’

robbank190610Not so, Jim argued. The Guidelines text itself says nothing about attempt, and the Sentencing Commission, he complained, has no power to add attempt crimes to the list of offenses in § 4B1.2(b) through its own commentary. It would be like West Publishing adding a note after the bank robbery statute saying that bank robbery includes the offense of shaking a few quarters out of your kid’s piggy bank for bus fare.

Last Thursday, the 6th Circuit agreed with Jim.

The Guidelines commentary, the Court said, “never passes through the gauntlets of congressional review or notice and comment. That is generally not a problem, the Supreme Court tells us, because such commentary has no independent legal force — it serves only to interpret the Guidelines’ text, not to replace or modify it. Courts need not accept an interpretation that is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with” the corresponding guideline.

bootstrappingBut the problem comes where the commentary does more than just interpret, but instead tries to bootstrap the Guideline into saying something more than what Congress approved. In this case, the commentary in question does not “interpret,” but rather supplements. The Commission was perfectly capable of adding “attempt” to the Guideline itself. Clearly, the 6th Circuit noted, the “Commission knows how to include attempt crimes when it wants to — in subsection (a) of the same guideline, for example, the Commission defines “crime of violence” as including offenses that have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”

To make attempt crimes a part of 4B1.2(b), the Commission did not interpret a term in the guideline itself, but instead used Application Note 1 to add an offense not listed in the Guideline. Application notes, the Court held, are to be “interpretations of, not additions to, the Guidelines themselves.” If that were not so, the institutional constraints that make the Guidelines constitutional in the first place — congressional review and notice and comment — would lose their meaning.

Jim’s case was remanded for resentencing.

United States v. Havis, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 17042 (6th Cir. June 6, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

First Step Tidbits – Update for June 5, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

FIRST STEP ROUNDUP

Looking for a Loophole: First Step news from last week: First, a cautionary tale for anyone who thinks there is a magic potion that will make the sentencing changes in the First Step Act retroactive.

loophole190605As with most legislation the First Step Act represents countless compromises. Prominent among those were the deals made on retroactivity. The Act changed 18 USC § 924(c), which punishes people who use a gun in a drug crime or crime of violence with a mandatory consecutive term of five years (if the defendant was just carrying the gun), seven years (if the defendant brandished the gun) or 10 years (if the defendant actually shot it). All of that makes sense. The statute also imposes a mandatory consecutive 25 years on a defendant for a second conviction under 924(c).

The problem was lousy draftsmanship. Congress figured that it you got five years extra for a 924(c) conviction but did not learn your lesson, you ought to get a minimum 25 years on the second conviction. But the provision was written so that any subsequent conviction under 924(c) got you the enhanced time. Say that today you sell some dope on the street corner, with a gun stuffed in your pants. Then, tomorrow you do the same thing. The U.S. Attorney will charge you with two distribution counts and two 924(c) counts, one for each day. Before the First Step Act, you would get a sentence for the drugs, a consecutive five years for today’s 924(c) count, and a consecutive 25 years for tomorrow’s 924(c). That was not the way it was supposed to work, but U.S. Attorneys don’t care what Congress meant. They only care about what Congress wrote.

The First Step Act changed 924(c) to make it clear that the 25 years can be added only if you had already been convicted of the first 924(c) before you committed the second one. Likewise, it changed portions of 21 USC § 841(b)(1) to make the former mandatory life sentence into a 25-year sentence, and the former 20-year sentence into a 15-year sentence. But to sell some of the troglodytes in the Senate (yes, we mean you, Sen. Tom Cotton [R-Alabama]) on supporting First Step, the changes in the mandatory minimums were not made retroactive. Only the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act – which like First Step had the retroactivity taken out in order to rustle up enough support to pass the measure – was made retroactive in First Step.

trog190605Devan Pierson thought he could wriggle through a loophole. He got sentenced to life for a drug distribution case, due to his criminal history and the presence of guns. On appeal, he argued that because the First Step Act had made life sentences into 25-year maximum sentences, his life sentence – which was still on direct review – should be reduced.

Last Friday, the 7th Circuit disagreed. “Subsection 401(c) states that the amendments in that section ‘shall apply to any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.’ In common usage in federal sentencing law, a sentence is “imposed” in the district court… In the First Step Act, Congress chose language that points clearly toward that same result: the date of sentencing in the district court controls application of the new, more lenient terms.”

* * *

Power of the Media: I wrote last week about some district courts holding that reductions in crack sentences under the retroactive Fair Sentencing Act must rely on the “offense controls” theory instead of the “indictment controls” theory. If you are in that kind of fix, it is good to have friends in the media.

In 1994, in the depths of the war on drugs, Sonny Mikell picked up a third federal drug conviction in Florida and was handed a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison. Although he was only found guilty for 50 grams by a jury, the sentencing judge agreed with the presentence report that held him culpable for 290 grams (for sentencing purposes).

When the First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive, Sonny applied for relief. His sentencing judge granted it promptly, sending Sonny home right from the hearing. But the government appealed to the 11th Circuit, apparently intending to argue that the “offense controls” theory (and the 290 grams) should govern.

Stopthedrugwar.org picked up the story, and ran it week. Citizen Truth republished it. The next day, the government dismissed its appeal without explanation. Citizen Truth may not be Kim Kardashian, but it got the job done.

* * *

You’re My Bestie: Finally, the Daily Beast picked up the story of Rufus Rochell, a man from inauspicious circumstances who befriended Conrad Black when the two were together at FCI Coleman. Black, a wealthy Canadian publisher and friend of Trump, was pardoned by the President a few weeks ago.

bff190605Rufus and Conrad both worked in the education department, Rufus as a law clerk and Conrad as a tutor helping inmates study for their GEDs. “They had conversations about history and education. And they found humor in the subtle absurdities of prison life, such as the thunderous rain that fell whenever inmates were asked to report for lawn duty.”

When Conrad was released on bail after a favorable SCOTUS decision, a rumor spread that he had been arrogant and condescending as an inmate. At Conrad’s request, Rufus wrote a letter refuting the claim, and praising his selflessness.

Now that Conrad has been pardoned, Rufus is hoping for a break through the First Step Act or executive clemency, and is looking to Conrad for support. According to the Daily Beast, nothing has yet been forthcoming.

I have heard a lot of guys being released who promised to send friends money, to keep in touch, even get together after it was all over. It does not often happen. You would hope, however, that when someone is powerful, rich and close to power, especially when he himself has been blessed with good luck, such a promise would not be forgotten.

United States v. Pierson, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 16296 (7th Cir. May 31, 2019)

CitizenTruth.org, Why Are Prosecutors Trying to Send a First Step Act Ex-Prisoner Back to Prison? (May 28)

Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Mikell, Case No. 19-11459-G (11th Cir. May 29, 2019)

Daily Beast, Trump Pardoned Billionaire Conrad Black but Left His Prison Buddy Behind

– Thomas L. Root

Ask Not For Whom the Supervised Release Term Tolls – Update for June 4, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT PRETRIAL DETENTION LATER CREDITED TO NEW SENTENCE TOLLS SUPERVISED RELEASE

Jason Mont was on five years’ supervised release after doing time for a federal drug offense, scheduled to end on March 6, 2017. With nine months to go, Ohio arrested him for a marijuana trafficking conspiracy and locked him in the beautiful, high-rise Mahoning County jail.

supervisedrelease180713Four months later, Jason pled guilty to the pot charge in state court, and then admitted in federal court that he had violated his supervised-release conditions by virtue of the new state convictions. The federal district court finally got around to issuing a supervised release violations warrant on March 30, 2017, four months later, right after Ohio sentenced him to six years in prison for the pot, with credit for the 10 months he had spent in Mahoning County jail.

When Jason finally had his supervised release revocation hearing in June 2017, he challenged the district court’s jurisdiction on the ground that his supervised release had expired on March 6. he argued that the expiration of his supervised release deprived the district court of jurisdiction to issue the warrant on March 30. The court rejected the argument, and ordered him to serve 42 months’ federal imprisonment, to run consecutive to his state sentence.

The Sixth Circuit held that Jason’s supervised-release period was tolled under 18 USC § 3624(e), which provides that a “term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a . . . crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.” Because the roughly 10 months of pretrial custody was held to be “in connection with [Jason’s] conviction,” the appellate court said, his supervised release was tolled in June 2016, and had not yet resumed running as of the time the warrant issued. Thus, there was ample time left on the supervised release term when the warrant issued.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court narrowly agreed. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that pretrial detention later credited as time served for a new conviction is “imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction” and thus tolls the supervised-release term under 18 USC § 3624(e), even if the court must make the tolling calculation after learning whether the time will be credited.

The Court said the text of § 3624(e) compels its conclusion. First, dictionary definition of the term “imprison,” both now and at the time Congress created supervised release, encompasses pretrial detention. Second, the phrase “in connection with a conviction” encompasses a period of pretrial detention for which a defendant receives credit against the sentence ultimately imposed. Congress, like most states, instructs courts calculating a term of imprisonment to credit pretrial detention as time served on a subsequent conviction.

supervisedrevoked181106The statute undeniably requires courts to retrospectively calculate whether a period of pretrial detention should toll a period of supervised release, as evidenced by its inclusion of the 30-day minimum jail stay needed to trigger tolling. The statute does not require courts to make a tolling determination as soon as a defendant is arrested on new charges or to continually reassess the tolling calculation throughout the pretrial-detention period. Inasmuch as the statute does not count jail for less than 30 days as tolling supervised release, it clearly anticipates that the tolling decision need be made only once at the end of the period in question.

The statutory context also supports the Court’s interpretation. The Supreme Court said it “would be an exceedingly odd construction of the statute to give a defendant the windfall of satisfying a new sentence of imprisonment and an old sentence of supervised release with the same period of pretrial detention. Supervised release is a form of punishment prescribed along with a term of imprisonment as part of the same sentence. And Congress denies defendants credit for time served if the detention time has already ‘been credited against another sentence’.”

Mont v. United States, Case No. 17-8995 (Supreme Court, June 3, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Trump Supreme Court Appointee Gorsuch May Not Be All ‘Law and Order’ – Update for June 3, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

Last week’s posts were light to the point of being non-existent. I was off watching my oldest graduate from Harvard Business School (after a 13-year stint in Army aviation, most of which was in special operations). Yeah, I’m pretty proud watching my kids accomplish things I never could have done…

But, now, it’s back to work.

JUSTICE GORSUCH HINTS HE MAY NOT BE A “LOCK” VOTE FOR GOVERNMENT

This is the time of year I am usually up to my armpits in Supreme Court decisions. But with only four weeks left (and only four opinion days scheduled), SCOTUS still has 31 cases to decide, including a passel of important criminal decisions. Maybe we’ll see something today…

Meanwhile, the high court’s decision in Nieves v. Bartlett last week (a narrow decision holding that if a cop has probable cause to arrest you, you cannot make a 1st Amendment retaliatory arrest claim) was interesting primarily for a notable voting lineup and multiple separate opinions. Nieves especially provides more evidence that Justice Gorsuch is a sharp critic of the criminal justice system.

policestate190603In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch wrote:

History shows that governments sometimes seek to regulate our lives finely, acutely, thoroughly, and exhaustively. In our own time and place, criminal laws have grown so exuberantly and come to cover so much previously innocent conduct that almost anyone can be arrested for something. If the state could use these laws not for their intended purposes but to silence those who voice unpopular ideas, little would be left of our 1st Amendment liberties, and little would separate us from the tyrannies of the past or the malignant fiefdoms of our own age.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman said in his Sentencing Law and Policy Blog that “the sparring in Nieves now has me even more excited (if that was possible) to see what the Court does in the biggest criminal cases I am watching, especially Gundy and Haymond.”

Nieves v Bartlett, Case No. 17-1174 (May 28, 2019)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Notable comments in notable SCOTUS opinions addressing First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims (May 28, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Fair Sentencing Act Resentencing Takes Ominous Turn – Update for May 28, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS LOOM ON FAIR SENTENCING ACT RESENTENCINGS

A good number of crack defendant resentencings have breezed through district courts since the First Step Act authorized the retroactive application of the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”) to people sentenced for crack prior to August 2010.

The concerns of a few dissident district judges, however, may be gaining traction, jeopardizing future FSA resentencings.

crackpowder160606The problem is this: Just about all of the pre-FSA indictments alleged the defendant had “five or more” or “fifty or more” grams of crack. Back then, five or more bought a defendant a minimum 5 years, while 50 or more was good for a 10-year minimum. But what the indictment alleges is one thing. What the presentencing report says is something else altogether, and the PSR’s amount of drugs (used for setting the Guidelines range) is what the district court usually finds.

On FSA resentencings, some defendants have convinced courts that if the indictment said “five or more grams” of crack, for instance, their sentences should be based on five grams. Some sentences have fallen dramatically as a result.

Dan Blocker argued to his judge that when a defendant seeks an FSA sentence reduction, the relevant question is not how much crack was involved in the offense, but instead only how much was charged in the indictment.

Some other courts have grappled with this argument, but Dan’s court took it by the horns. In an interim decision, the district court complained Dan’s approach – the “indictment-controls” theory – “misreads the statute and is demonstrably inconsistent with Congress’s intent.” The district judge said the First Step Act specified that a sentence reduction is allowed only for a “covered offense,” that is, “a violation of a Federal criminal statute…” Violation of the statute is the criminal conduct, the court said, not the indictment. Thus, the court must follow the offense-controls theory, not the indictment-controls theory.

Comparativecrack190425

The court said the question is what sentence would have been imposed had the FSA been in effect when Dan sold the crack. The answer, the court held, does not turn on what the actual indictment charged, but rather on what it would have charged had the FSA governed the case. The court speculated that if the FSA had been in effect, Count 1 would have charged that the conspiracy involved 280 grams or more, not just 50, and other counts would have charged the higher amounts – 28 grams and 280 grams – listed in the FSA. “The only reason the actual indictment used the lower amounts,” the court said, “was that those were the amounts included in the statute at that time – the indictment tracked the statute.”

The higher amounts might have affected Dan’s decision to plead guilty, the court said, thus requiring a hearing to figure out what Dan might have done in response to what the indictment might have said.

If what the indictment in a pre-August 2010 crack said controlled resentencing, the court complained, “every crack defendant sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act took effect would be eligible for a reduction…” and the First Step Act would “provide a windfall sentence reduction to pre-August 2010 defendants that people sentenced after 2010 would not get. “Congress could not have intended to treat crack defendants this much more favorably than powder defendants.

The so-called offense controls theory will almost certainly be appealed. Major appeals questions about retroactive FSA resentencings, even if resolved in the defendants’ favors, are likely to result in inconsistent circuit decisions, and could tie up resentencings for a year or better.

United States v. Blocker, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79934 (N.D.Fla., Apr. 25, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Dog Bites Man: Congress Expected to Do Nothing on Criminal Justice Reform This Session – Update for May 23, 2019

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CONGRESS POISED TO DO NOTHING ON JUSTICE REFORM UNTIL AFTER 2020

The media are already buzzing about the 4,000+ expected releases from federal prison after July 19, when the seven-days-per-year extra good time awarded in the First Step Act is scheduled to be effective.

grid160411The Washington Examiner wrote last week that “Trump’s potentially contradictory impulses for law and order but also second chances face a looming political test when about 4,000 federal inmates are released in July under an expansion of “good time” credit in the First Step Act, which he signed in December. Reform advocates say successful reentry into society for the looming wave must be assured. Otherwise, the reform cause and its political backers, including Trump, could be damaged.”

The immediate release wave had been expected right when the bill passed on Dec. 21. But as the Examiner put it, a “drafting error placed the good time credit expansion — allowing an extra seven days a year — in an unrelated section of the law featuring a seven-month delay.”

mcconnell180219While Congress may be watching to see how the releasees do, it will not be acting on any criminal justice reform itself. It is clear that nothing the Democratic-run House of Representatives may pass is even going to come to a vote in the Senate. In Saturday’s Wall Street Journal, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) made it clear that the Republican-led Senate will block anything Senate or House Democrats want. “Meanwhile, the Democrats are divided,” the Journal said. “House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer tout their legislative agenda, but half or more of their followers would rather rough up President Trump and then impeach him.”

Some of the Democrats running for president are touting criminal justice reforms as part of their platforms, but neither the candidates nor their opponents are interested in seeing anything enacted before the election.

With some of the 25-odd Democrats announced for president including strong criminal justice proposals in their platforms, it is unlikely the Senate would hand any of them a victory by passing any criminal justice reform measure.

Washington Examiner, Trump embrace of criminal reform faces test as 4,000 inmates near release (May 17)

Wall Street Journal, Mitch McConnell on Judges and the ‘Graveyard’ (May 18)

– Thomas L. Root

A Trio of Sentencing Cases – Update for May 22, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

2-0-1 ON SENTENCING ACTIONS LAST WEEK

Three separate proceedings on sentencing or sentence reduction came to our attention last week, unrelated except for the possibilities they represent.

colostomy190523First, Steve Gass asked his court for a compassionate release. While doing 106 months for six bank robberies (Mr. Gass preferred using a note rather than a gun in each of them), Steve was diagnosed with a malignant tumor located in his rectal wall. The tumor was successfully removed, but along with it, he lost his rectum and anus. The procedure left him dependent on a colostomy bag and subject to what the Court euphemistically called “special hygiene requirements” and heightened medical monitoring. (Having had a colostomy bag for six terrible weeks once, I have some sense of those “special” requirements – a gas mask and a gasoline-powered power washer are on the list).

While Steve had beaten the cancer, he argued, his current condition is nevertheless “both serious and difficult to manage in a prison setting, marked neither by enhanced sanitary conditions appropriate for colostomy-dependent patients or heightened monitoring necessary to prevent secondary effects of infection or recurrence of a malignancy.” Clearly, the tumor did not affect Steve’s remarkable capacity for understatement.

The government, being the caring and benevolent organism that it is, argued that Steve had “recovered” from colorectal cancer, so his colostomy condition – which he could and would have to manage for the rest of his life – cannot qualify as the kind of “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a reduction anticipated by 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

compassion160124The district court, recognizing the government’s disingenuous argument for being the same substance that fills Steve’s colostomy bag – ruled that Steve had “shown that his physical and medical condition substantially diminishes his ability to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility. And this is not a condition that [he] will ever recover from — he will be device dependent and subject to enhanced hygiene and monitoring requirements for the rest of his life.” The court, with a gift for understatement the equal of Steve’s, thus held that the permanent colostomy was extraordinary and compelling enough.

Still, the court did not shorten Steve’s sentence. Rather, it creatively resentenced Steve to the time remaining on his sentence, but ordered Steve to home confinement for the remaining 28 months or so he had to serve. The decision showcases how the sentence reduction power can be employed with precision to fashion modifications that address the prisoner’s situation without simply letting recipients out to run amok

*     *     *

gunknot181009In the 6th Circuit, Dave Warren got a statutory maximum 120-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a gun in violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1). Both he and the government sought a sentence somewhere within his 51-63 month Guidelines range. But the judge was convinced that Dave’s criminal history made him “a high risk offender… an individual that must be deterred. 51 to 63 months… considering the danger this individual poses to the community, is nowhere in my view close to what is required.”

Last week, the 6th Circuit reversed the sentence. The appeals court noted that “because the Guidelines already account for a defendant’s criminal history, imposing an extreme variance based on that same criminal history is inconsistent with the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct…”

“We do not mean to imply that only a sentence in or around that range will avoid disparities with other similar defendants,” the Court wrote. “But we do not see how the sentence imposed here avoids them.” Because the district court’s discussion of whether its 120-month sentence avoided unwarranted sentencing disparities depended only on criminal history factors already addressed by the Guidelines, the 6th said, the district court relied “on a problem common to all” defendants within the same criminal history category Dave fell into – that is, that they all have an extensive criminal history – and thus did not provide “a sufficiently compelling reason to justify imposing the greatest possible deviation from the Guidelines-recommended sentence in this case.”

*     *     *

Robber160229Finally, I recently reported on a remarkable “Holloway”-type motion in Chad Marks’ case. Chad was convicted of a couple of bank robberies, but unlike Steve Gass, Chad did carry a gun. Under 18 USC § 924(c), using or carrying a gun during a crime of violence or drug deal adds a mandatory five years onto your sentence. If you are convicted of a second 924(c) offense, the minimum additional sentence is 25 years. Unfortunately, the statute was poorly written, so that if you carry a gun to a bank robbery on Monday, and then do it again on Tuesday, you will be sentenced for the robberies, and then have a mandatory 30 years added to the end of the sentence, five years for Monday’s gun, and 25 years for Tuesday’s gun.

Congress always meant that the second offense’s 25 years should apply only after conviction for the first one, but it did not get around to fixing the statute until last year’s First Step Act adopted Sec. 403. But to satisfy the troglodytes in the Senate (yes, Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Arkansas, I mean you), the change the law was not made retroactive.

grad190524Chad has served 20 years, during which time he has gone from a nihilistic young miscreant to a college-educated inmate teacher and mentor. The federal judge who sentenced Chad 20 years ago recognizes that post-conviction procedure is so restricted that the court can do nothing, but he asked in an order that the U.S. Attorney “carefully consider exercising his discretion to agree to an order vacating one of Marks’ two Section 924(c) convictions. This would eliminate the mandatory 25-year term that is now contrary to the present provisions of the statute.”

Since then, Chad Marks’ appointed counsel has filed a lengthy recitation of the defendant’s extraordinary BOP record. Despite this, and despite the fact that over two months have elapsed since the judge’s request to the U.S. Attorney, the government has not seen fit to say as much as one word about the matter.

Order, United States v. Gass, Case No. 10-60125-CR (SDFL Apr. 30, 2019)

United States v. Warren, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14005 (6th Cir. May 10, 2019)

Order, United States v. Marks, Case No. 03-cr-6033 (WDNY, Mar. 14, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

No Clemency for the Hot Polloi – Update for May 21, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NEW TRUMP PARDONS DO LITTLE TO SPUR CLEMENCY HOPE

clemency170206President Trump last week granted a full pardon to media tycoon Conrad Moffat Black and Patrick Nolan, former Republican leader of the California State Assembly, but there is little in those acts of executive grace to cause prisoners who are not politically connected or are not BBFs with celebrities that Trump will start granting clemency to the thousands whose applications languish on file.

Black, a British citizen, had been the CEO of the publisher of Chicago Sun-Times, The Daily Telegraph and The Jerusalem Post. He was convicted in 2007 on three counts of mail fraud and one count of obstruction of justice. Two fraud counts were later thrown out by the Supreme Court. Black served 37 months in federal prison. Last year wrote a book called Donald J. Trump: A President Like No Other, which some media accounts allege was little more than a hagiography.

Nolan was a California legislative leader who spent years in prison after being convicted in the 1990s, after being secretly recorded accepting checks from an undercover FBI agent. He pled to one count of racketeering and did 25 months. Trump characterized Nolan’s decision to plead guilty as a “difficult” one, which makes him no different from all the other 94% of federal defendants who plead guilty every year.

These pardons do little to encourage federal inmates that Trump will wield his clemency power to benefit prisoners who are not connected. 

pardonme190123The President has pardoned nine people and commuted the sentences of three others since taking office, in a pattern apparently driven by politics, celebrity support and television. The only commutation of someone who was not politically connected was that of Alice Johnson, whose case had been taken to the president by Kim Kardashian West.

A few have complained that the President’s pardons are driven by politics or are “all about him.” This, of course, makes him no different from his predecessors (Obama and Manning, Clinton and Rich).

The President has been rumored to be planning pardons, timed for the Memorial Day weekend, of servicemen who have been accused or convicted of war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan.  However, the opposition to such actions appears to be fierce, and some have suggested that the hue and cry may cause Trump to abandon the plan.

The Hill, Trump pardons media tycoon, former GOP leader of California State Assembly (May 15)

The New York Times, Trump May Be Preparing Pardons for Servicemen Accused of War Crimes (May 18)

The Hill, Here are the 12 pardons or reduced sentences granted by Trump (May 16)

– Thomas L. Root

The “Closer to Home” Illusion – Update for May 20, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BOP DOES NOT HAVE TO WALK 500 MILES

aardvark190520There is not a single inmate in the federal prison system who would not be willing to walk, roll or crawl 500 miles to be home right now. Any no one on the outside is so hard-hearted that he or she cannot concede that housing inmates close enough to family to permit visits does not help with rehabilitation.

For those reasons (if basic humanity were not enough), the First Step Act’s provision directing the Bureau of Prisons to “place the prisoner in a facility as close as practicable to the prisoner’s primary residence, and to the extent practicable, in a facility within 500 driving miles of that residence,” got a lot of coverage when the bill passed last December.

But just as the media buzz that 4,000-plus inmates were going to be dumped on America’s streets the day after the Act passed was wrong, the giddy hopes that inmates were about to be placed near to their families have been tempered by the realities of what the Act says and what the BOP is willing to do.

There is a usually a separation between promise and reality, sometimes a crack and sometimes a chasm. It is probably worthwhile, therefore, to explain just how little Sec. 601 of the First Step Act really promises families and inmates.

Sec. 601 modified 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) to read that the BOP should try to place prisoners within 500 miles of home. That placement, however, is not required. In fact, it is subject to some pretty big exceptions, being subject to

(1)   bed availability,
(2)   the prisoner’s security designation,
(3)   the prisoner’s programmatic needs,
(4)   the prisoner’s mental and medical health needs,
(5) any request made by the prisoner related to faith-based needs,
(6)  recommendations of the sentencing court, and
(7)  “other security concerns of the” BOP.

Number 7 is a doozy. The placement need not violate a rule, or a BOP program statement, or even a local rule adopted by the sending or receiving prison. It just has to be a “concern.” Whatever that is, it is clearly something to be defined by the BOP.

jello190520Prior to the First Step Act, the BOP required that an inmate be at one institution for at least 18 months, and that he or she have 18 months without a disciplinary report (the BOP called it “clear conduct”) before he or she could be considered for a transfer. Often, transfers were denied because the inmate was deemed to need programming available at his or her current location, or occasionally, because the inmate had skills (a welder, for example, or a GED instructor) the current institution believed it needed to retain. When the transfer came (if it did), the inmate seldom ended up at the institution he or she desired.

In the wake of First Step, however, the BOP is still requiring that an inmate be at one institution for at least 18 months, and that he or she have 18 months without a disciplinary report (the BOP called it “clear conduct”) before he or she could be considered for a transfer. The BOP can still deny transfers for programming needs, perceived mental health needs (which, given the state of mental health treatment in the system, is a hoot), and for lack of bed space (which inmates from years past know to be an excuse that means whatever the BOP wants it to mean). Anything not covered by the foregoing can easily fall within the as-amorphous-as-Jello “security concerns” exception.

But they can’t do that, can they? Of course not. The injured inmate can always that the BOP to court…

Not so fast. Sec. 601 of the First Step Act added a free pass to the BOP: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.” So you don’t like what the BOP did? You can’t sue, can’t even bring a habeas corpus action, can’t even get on Judge Judy. The directive of § 601, detailed in its mandate and limitations, is completely undone by the last line of § 601, which tells the BOP, “if you don’t follow the law, no one is allowed to call you on it.”

wendys190520Imagine a football game like that, where one team gets a yellow flag repeatedly, with each penalty being marched off for zero yards. Or, my preferred fantasy, a diet on which if you succumb to Wendy’s Peppercorn Mushroom Melt Triple with a side of Baconator Fries and large Coke, the 2,190 calories you consume would not keep you from dropping a pound a day. Sweet deal for the BOP.

If the BOP could be sued, the results would not be much different. Courts traditionally give substantial deference to the judgments of prison administrators. Even restrictive prison regulations are permissible if they are “‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological interests. The BOP would say that its transfer restrictions – like 18 months of clear conduct – serve a legitimate penological goal. The courts, deferring to the BOP’s interpretation of the revised statute and its flexibility granted therein, would undoubtedly accept that.

chevron190520Finally, even without prison-administration deference, courts generally defer to administrative agencies “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules… and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” This is called “Chevron deference,” and – while opponents hope to see the Supreme Court undo it at some point soon – it would easily apply to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) as to how the BOP measures bed availability, security concerns, programming needs and mental and physical health needs.

So if the BOP ignores the Act’s 500-mile placement requirement, there is no remedy. Even if there were, BOP rules on transfer and the exceptions to closer-to-home would probably be unassailable.

Sec. 601, First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-015, 132 Stat. 5208, 5238 (Dec. 21, 2018)

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)

– Thomas L. Root