Tag Archives: borden

Back In The Trenches, A Couple of 922(g) Decisions… – Update for February 13, 2024

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE 10TH GIVETH, THE 10TH TAKETH AWAY

gunfight230919In the world of gun restrictions, all eyes are on the Supreme Court, which will decide United States v. Rahimi – and maybe the future of the 2nd Amendment – sometime between now and June. But litigation over 18 USC § 922(g), the laundry list of people who the government says should not have guns or ammo, in the lower courts continues unabated.

Out in the wild, wild west, the 10th Circuit last week handed down a pair of 18 USC § 922(g) decisions, giving defendants a mixed bag.

In one case, Colorado defendant Kenneth Devereaux was convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun (violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1)). He received a 2-level enhancement in his Guidelines range because the district judge considered a prior conviction for assault under 18 USC § 113(a)(6) to be a crime of violence.

doggun240213Last week, the 10th Circuit disagreed. A “§ 113(a)(6) assault can be committed recklessly,” the Circuit observed, but since the 2021 Supreme Court decision in Borden v. United States, “a reckless offense categorically does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”

Section 113(a)(6) “sets forth a single indivisible assault offense, to which only the categorical… approach [applies],” the 10th ruled. “Because an assault resulting in serious bodily injury under § 113(a)(6) can be committed recklessly, after Borden it cannot qualify as a crime of violence…”

Things did not go so well for Jonathan Morales-Lopez. He and a buddy were caught stealing guns from a Utah gun store. When he was frisked, the police found a loaded Smith and Wesson he had previously stolen from the same store stuffed in his pants and a personal-use amount of meth in a plastic bag.

The State of Utah did its number on Jonathan for the theft, but the Feds picked up the gun case. He was charged as an unlawful drug user in possession of a gun under 18 USC § 922(g)(3). After he was convicted, Jon argued that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutionally vague, violating his 5th Amendment rights. The district court agreed with Jon, and the government appealed.

“When the validity of a statute is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised,” the Circuit wrote, “it is a cardinal principle that courts]will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” To avoid the vagueness problem, the 10th said, courts have interpreted § 922(g)(3) to convict a defendant only if the Government “introduced sufficient evidence of a temporal nexus between the drug use and firearm possession.”

knifegun170404Here, the appeals court said, that wasn’t even a close call. Jon was carrying his personal meth stash in his pocket and told the police after his arrest that he couldn’t remember much because he was high on the controlled substance at the time. “The facts presented at trial, coupled with reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, could support the conclusion that Morales-Lopez was an “unlawful user” of methamphetamine,” the Circuit held, “one whose use was ‘regular and ongoing, while in possession of a stolen firearm.”

What is puzzling is that Jon’s lawyer did not argue that § 922(g)(3) violated the 2nd Amendment, a claim that has already gotten traction in at least one other court of appeal. Hunter Biden plans that defense. Jon’s lawyer’s failure to raise it may be a subject for his § 2255 motion.

United States v. Devereaux, Case No. 22-1203, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 2751 (10th Cir., February 6, 2024)

Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 210 L. Ed. 2d 63 (Supreme Court, 2021)

United States v. Morales-Lopez, Case No. 22-4074, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 3051 (10th Cir., February 9, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

When Murder Is Nonviolent – Update for July 18, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

IS § 924(c) A VIOLENT CRIME?

I still get questions from people asking whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) remains a “crime of violence.”

The answer is that § 924(c) – which criminalizes the use of a gun during a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense – has never itself been a “crime of violence.”

cmonman230718“C’mon, man!” I hear people out in TV Land saying, “how can using a gun in a crime not be a “crime of violence?”

To you I say, “Welcome to federal criminal law.”

To those prisoners with § 924(c) charges because of an underlying drug offense, violence has nothing to do with nothing. The § 924(c) applies because you had a gun in the closet while you sold meth out of your bedroom. Or because you figured it’d be cool to have a Lorcin .380 stuck in your waistband where its principal threat was to your reproductive organs. You can’t have a gun while you’re selling controlled substances. It’s illegal. (Of course, selling controlled substances is illegal, too, but that’s a topic for another day).

To those people with § 924(c) charges because of an underlying crime of violence, the § 924(c) is not the “crime of violence.” It’s just a conviction resulting from another “crime of violence.”

Section 924(c) does define “crime of violence:” It’s (1) a felony; that is either

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.

violence180508But after a line of Supreme Court decisions from Johnson v. United States through last year’s United States v. Taylor decision, alternate definition (b) has been invalidated as unconstitutionally vague. As a result, conspiracies to murder are not crimes of violence, because you can conspire with your buddies all night without using or threatening someone with the use of force. Attempts to rob a fellow drug dealer are not crimes of violence because you can complete an attempt just by walking up to the victim’s door with a gun in your hand and evil on your mind. In fact, some folks are starting to think that nothing is a “crime of violence” anymore.

Under the circumstances, Tiffany Janis could be forgiven for thinking that her crime wasn’t violent, either. All she did was to come home, catch her cheatin’-heart husband in flagrante delicto, and express her displeasure by shooting him a few times.

Because the domestic discord played out on Indian reservation land, it ended up in federal court, where Tiffany was convicted of 2nd-degree murder and discharging a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence.

In a § 2255 motion, Tiffany argued that her 2nd-degree murder conviction was not a crime of violence, meaning that her § 924(c) conviction had to be vacated.

Tiffany’s murder conviction required that the government show she had killed another person “with malice aforethought.” She argued that killing a person “with malice aforethought” can be done without “us[ing] force against the person or property of another,” as required by § 924(c)(3)(A). Under SCOTUS’s Borden v. United States holding, Tiffany maintained, § 924(c)’s force clause requires “directing or targeting force” at another person or their property. The 8th’s 2nd-degree murder precedent, however, showed that “malice aforethought” can be established without a perp “targeting” force in the way that the force clause, as interpreted by Borden, requires.

The 8th Circuit disagreed, ruling:

Homicides committed with malice aforethought involve the “use of force against the person or property of another,” so 2nd-degree murder is a “crime of violence.” This holding implements the Supreme Court’s command to interpret statutes using not only “the statutory context, structure, history, and purpose,” but also “common sense…”

violent160620“Murder is the ultimate violent crime – irreversible and incomparable in terms of moral depravity,” the Court said. Borden quoted from an opinion by then-Judge Alito holding “the quintessential violent crimes, like murder or rape, involve the intentional use’ of force… Malice aforethought, murder’s defining characteristic, encapsulates the crime’s violent nature.”

Murder is still a crime of violence. Only in federal law could such a question be debatable.

Janis v. United States, Case No. 22-2471, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 16993 (8th Cir. July 6, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

D.C. Circuit Creates More “Compassionate Release” Circuit Confusion – Update for October 26, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DC CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT CHANGES IN THE LAW CANNOT SUPPORT COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

circuitsplit220516The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has deepened the circuit split on compassionate release, joining three other circuits in holding that a prisoner cannot use the fact he or she is serving a sentence that could not be imposed today as “extraordinary and compelling” reason for an 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) compassionate release.

In 2016, Curtis Jenkins was caught by D.C. police with drugs and a gun. He got bonded out of jail, but a short time later he was caught by D.C. police again with drugs and a gun. Curtis thus faced two 18 USC § 924(c) counts (for carrying a gun during drug trafficking) and a 15-year Armed Career Criminal Act count (18 USC § 924(e)), not to mention qualifying as a “career offender” under the Sentencing Guidelines (which dramatically jacks up the sentencing range).

Factor all of that into the mix, Curtis was looking at a minimum 45-year sentence. He did the wise thing, agreeing to a plea deal that carried a Guidelines range of 23-27 years. Despite that range – still a substantial chunk of time – The parties agreed to recommend only 12 years to the sentencing judge.

From there, things got even better. Curtis walked out of sentencing with eight years. For the math-challenged among us, good lawyering had cut Curtis’s sentence exposure by about 82%.

It looked like a great deal at the time, but after a few years, Curtis thought it had all turned to dust later.

First, in 2018, the First Step Act changed § 924(c) so that the 25-year add-on sentence required by law for the second § 924(c) violation would only apply if the second offense came after a first conviction. If that had been the law when Curtis was convicted, his 45-year mandatory minimum sentence would have been only 30 years.

May you rest in peace, Betty... stealing America's hearts did not make you ACCA-qualified.
May you rest in peace, Betty… stealing America’s hearts did not make you ACCA-qualified.

Second, things changed for Curtis’s ACCA conviction. If a felon was caught with a gun back when Curtis was nabbed, he or she faced a zero-to-ten-year sentence. But if the defendant had three prior convictions for violent crimes or drug offenses, the sentence was a minimum 15 years. Two of Curtis’s predicate offenses qualifying him for the ACCA were for assault with a weapon. D.C. law at the time permitted conviction for that offense even when the assault was committed “recklessly.” But in 2021, the Supreme Court ruled in Borden v. United States that any crime that could be committed recklessly was not a “crime of violence” for ACCA purposes. If that had been the law when Curtis was convicted, his 30-year mandatory minimum sentence exposure would have dropped to only 10 years.

Third, the Court of Appeals held in United States v. Winstead that drug offenses relied on to qualify someone as a Guidelines career offender could not count when they were mere attempts. Curtis’s drug priors were for attempted drug distribution, meaning that the high sentencing range that applied because he was a Guidelines “career offender” would have been out, too.

Like that, all of the very good reasons Curtis once had for taking a 12-year deal disappeared like Halloween candy on trick-or-treat night. He moved for a sentence reduction, arguing that if he had made a deal based on the sentence exposure he would have faced if he were sentenced today, it would have been a lot lower.

emptybowl221027The district court denied Curtis’s
motion, holding that changes in the law were not the kind of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for sentence reduction listed in USSG § 1B1.13, the Guidelines policy statement covering compassionate release motions. That statement does not bind the court, the judge ruled, but he nonetheless referred to it for “guidance.”

The district court said the First Step Act, Winstead, and Borden were irrelevant, because the compassionate-release statute does not permit courts to reexamine the lawfulness or fairness of a sentence as originally imposed.

Two weeks ago, the DC Circuit upheld the district court’s denial. “We agree with the 3rd, 7th, and 8th Circuits,” the appellate panel wrote. “To begin, there is nothing remotely extraordinary about statutes applying only prospectively. In fact, there is a strong presumption against statutory retroactivity, which is ‘deeply rooted in our jurisprudence’ and ‘embodies a legal doctrine older than our Republic’… [The Supreme Court has held that] in federal sentencing the ordinary practice is to apply new lower penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding that change from defendants already sentenced. And what “the Supreme Court views as the ‘ordinary practice’ cannot also be an ‘extraordinary … reason’ to deviate from that practice.”

extraordinary221027But other Circuits – including the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 9th and 10th – do consider such changes to be among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for sentence reduction that will drive a compassionate release motion. The Circuit split just exacerbated by Curtis’s D.C. Circuit decision will most likely be fixed not by the Supreme Court but rather by the newly-reconstituted Sentencing Commission.

The Commission, which just announced having received over 8,000 public comments on its announcement of proposed priorities – has its first public meeting set for this coming Friday. The Commission is expected to adopt its priorities for the coming year, the first of which is likely to be to amend § 1B1.13 to bring some predictability to compassionate release cases.

When that happens, § 1B1.13 will again be binding on the courts, and we can expect a little uniformity to be injected into what is now a chaotic compassionate release system.

United States v. Jenkins, Case No. 21-3089, 2022 U.S.App. LEXIS 28198 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 11, 2022)

U.S. Sentencing Commission, Public Meeting, October 28, 2022

U.S. Sentencing Commission, Public Comments on Priorities (October 23, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Attempted Crime of Violence Does Not Support 18 USC 924(c) – Update for June 22, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TAYLOR-MADE DECISION

The Supreme Court ruled yesterday in a 7-2 decision that an attempt to commit a crime of violence is not in itself a “crime of violence” for purposes of 18 USC § 924(c).

gunknot181009A little review: under 18 USC § 924(c), possessing, using or carrying a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug offense will earn a defendant a mandatory minimum consecutive sentence of at least five years (and much worse if the defendant waves it around or fires it). A “crime of violence” is one that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.”

This fairly straightforward question of what constitutes a crime of violence has spawned a series of Supreme Court decisions since Johnson v. United States in 2015. The last words on the subject were United States v. Davis, a 2019 decision holding that conspiracy to commit a crime of violence was not a “crime of violence” that would support a conviction under 18 USC § 924(c), and last summer’s Borden v. United States (an offense that can be committed recklessly cannot be a “crime of violence,” because a “crime of violence” has to be committed knowingly or intentionally).

The Court has directed that interpretation of whether a statute constitutes a crime of violence is a decision made categorically. The Court’s “categorical approach” determines whether a federal felony may serve as a predicate “crime of violence” within the meaning of the statute if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” This definition is commonly known as the “elements” clause.

The question is not how any particular defendant may have committed the crime. Instead, the issue is whether the federal felony that was charged requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of its case, that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force.

knifegunB170404This approach has caused a lot of mischief. The facts underlying yesterday’s decision, Taylor v. United States, were particularly ugly. Justin Taylor, the defendant, went to a drug buy intending to rip off the seller of his drugs. Before he could try to rob the seller, the seller smelled a setup, and a gunfight erupted. Justin was wounded. The drug dealer was killed.

Because Justin never actually robbed the seller – he didn’t have time to do so – he was convicted of an attempted Hobbs Act robbery under 18 USC § 1951 (a robbery that affects interstate commerce) and of an 18 USC § 924(c) offense for using a gun during a crime of violence. Justin argued that while he was guilty of the attempted Hobbs Act robbery, he could not be convicted of a § 924(c) offense because it’s possible to commit an attempted robbery without actually using or threatening to commit a violent act. Under Borden and Davis, Justin argued, merely attempting a crime of violence was not itself a crime of violence.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court agreed.

Justice Gorsuch ruled that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the “elements clause.” To secure a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government must prove that the defendant intended to complete the offense and completed a “substantial step” toward that end. An intention, the Court said, is just that and no more. And whatever a “substantial step” requires, it does not require the government to prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or even threatened to use force against another person or his property. This is true even if the facts would allow the government to do so in many cases (as it obviously could have done in Taylor’s case).

maskgun200218The Court cited the Model Penal Code’s explanation of common-law robbery, which Justice Gorsuch called an “analogue” to the Hobbs Act. The MPC notes that “there will be cases, appropriately reached by a charge of attempted robbery, where the actor does not actually harm anyone or even threaten harm.” Likewise, the Supreme Court ruled, no element of attempted Hobbs Act robbery requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force.

Taylor raises interesting questions about “aiding and abetting.” In Rosemond v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant can be convicted as an aider and abettor under 18 USC § 2 “without proof that he participated in each and every element of the offense.” Instead, Congress used language in the statute that “comprehends all assistance rendered by words, acts, encouragement, support, or presence… even if that aid relates to only one (or some) of a crime’s phases or elements.”

Taylor’s finding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery cannot support a § 924(c) conviction because a defendant can be convicted of the attempt without proof that he or she used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force, then it stands to reason that if the defendant can be convicted of aiding or abetting a Hobbs Act robbery without proof that he or she used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force, “aiding and abetting” likewise will not support a § 924(c) conviction.

In separate dissents, Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel Alito argued that the lower court should have been reversed. Justice Thomas said the court’s holding “exemplifies just how this Court’s ‘categorical approach’ has led the Federal Judiciary on a ‘journey Through the Looking Glass,’ during which we have found many ‘strange things.’”

violence180508Indeed, a layperson would find it baffling that Justin could shoot his target to death without the government being able to prove he used a gun in a crime of violence. But Justice Thomas’s ire is misplaced. One should not blame the sword for the hand that wields it. Congress wrote the statute. It can surely change it if it is not satisfied with how the Court says its plain terms require its application.

United States v. Taylor, Case No. 20-1459 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3017 (June 21, 2022).

– Thomas L. Root

How Much of a ‘Mulligan’ Should a Resentenced Defendant Get – Update for February 10, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DO-OVER REQUIRED

mulligan190430Javier Fuentes-Rodriguez illegally reentered the United States after having been previously convicted of an aggravated felony. Such reentry violates 8 USC § 1326(b)(2). Javier got 30 months in prison. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Borden v. United States, which held that any crime that could be committed recklessly did not fit the “crime of violence” definition, which requires purposeful action.

Before Borden, Javier’s prior felony – Texas family violence – had been considered “aggravated” under 18 USC § 16(b). But it is possible to commit Texas family-violence assault recklessly, and after Borden, the government and Javier agreed he was only guilty of illegal reentry after a non-aggravated assault (8 USC § 1326(b)(1)).

What’s the difference? There’s no difference in the Guidelines necessarily, but – as the 5th Circuit put it – “1326(b)(2) is associated with worse collateral consequences than 1326(b)(1).” What that means is that if Javier is convicted for unlawful reentry after committing an “aggravated felony,” he can never come back legally.

Javier and the government agreed that after Borden, his conviction under 1326(b)(2) had to be changed, but the question was how to change it. Javier wanted the case remanded, at which time the judge could presumably give him a much better sentence, departing downward if the judge chose to do so. The government simply wanted the sentence reformed by the 5th Circuit, changing the number of the statute of conviction without changing the sentence.

violence151213Javier’s position made some strategic sense for the defense. It’s possible (even if improbable) that the judge’s sentence was influenced because of her perception Javier had slapped around his wife (or whatever the facts were). A resentencing would let Javier’s lawyer argue something like, “See, it wasn’t so bad.” Even if that argument had not worked, the defense is always entitled to argue the defendant’s excellent prison record as a factor to mitigate a new sentence.

Would it have worked? We’ll see. Last week, the 5th Circuit remanded the case. “We acknowledge that in [a similar case], our court reformed the judgment directly rather than remanding for entry of an amended judgment by the district court, and we could do the same here, coming to the same result,” the 5th held. “However, due to the frequent use of district court judgments of conviction by judges, attorneys, and others, we find remanding this case for entry of an amended judgment will reduce the risk of future confusion.”

United States v. Fuentes-Rodriguez, Case No 15-40740, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 551 (5th Cir., Feb 3, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

A Couple of ‘Shorts’ – Update for July 9, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

GRANDMA GOES HOME AS ADVOCATES BEAT UP BIDEN ON HOME CONFINEMENT

short210709FAMM, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Justice Action Network last week called on President Biden to use his clemency authority to prevent about 4,000 people now on CARES Act home confinement from being sent back to prison when the pandemic ends.  Nothing new there. But then, into the middle of this brouhaha stepped the Bureau of Prisons.

A month ago, Gwen Levi, a Baltimore grandmother who had been sent to home confinement under the CARES Act, was returned to prison by the BOP.  Her offense was “escape.” In the BOP, that means that she was taking a computer class, and during class, she turned off her phone. The halfway house called to check on her whereabouts, but she did not call back until after class. For that, she went back to prison for another eight years.

The BOP didn’t reckon on the media outcry. After all, who doesn’t like grandmas? The Washington Post trumpeted, A grandmother didn’t answer her phone during a class. She was sent back to prison.” USA Today blared, “‘Scared and confused’: Elderly inmate sent home during COVID is back in prison after going to computer class.” A grandmother didn’t answer her phone during a class in Baltimore. The Mayor of Baltimore issued a statement complaining that

Following Gwen’s early release from prison last year, the 76-year-old chose to rewrite her story by volunteering for advocacy organizations around Baltimore. But while grace is a rare occurrence, judgment in America flows abundantly. Gwen recently made national headlines after being sent back to prison for failing to answer her phone during a computer class. This lack of patience and empathy was wrong…

Last Tuesday, Gwen’s district court judge granted her compassionate release.
levi210709

However, the media hue-and-cry may be having an effect. Every movement needs an icon, and Gwen may be it. For months advocacy groups have been asking Biden to address the issue, resulting from a Trump DOJ Office of Legal Counsel memo holding that CARES Act home confinees should be sent back to prison once the COVID-19 emergency ended. Biden has not withdrawn the memo, despite bipartisan calls for the Administration to do so.

Maybe now, the issue will get traction.

Rep. Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-N.J.), who led a letter of 28 House Democrats in April calling for the policy to be rescinded, “is disappointed he hasn’t officially extended the home confinement program,” a spokesperson said. Other advocates are considering it a misstep for Biden to not discuss the program as part of the administration’s crime portfolio.

A BOP spokeswoman said, “This will be an issue only after the pandemic is over. The president recently extended the national emergency and the Department of Health and Human Services has said the public health crisis is likely to last for the rest of the year.” The White House revisits the emergency declaration every three months, leaving the former prisoners in a constant state of limbo. The next deadline is later this month.

“This is not a heavy lift for the Biden administration. All these people were moved out of prison because Trump officials felt it was safe enough for them to go home, said Holly Harris, president and executive director of Justice Action Network. “What more political cover does President Biden possibly need? Lawmakers and advocates from both sides of the aisle agree: it’s time for President Biden to grant clemency to these men and women so they can fully connect with their families, secure jobs, and move on with their lives. Anything less is unconscionable.”

ABA Journal, Judge rules for grandma on home confinement after arrest for not answering calls during computer class (July 7, 2021)

ACLU, Bipartisan Organizations Call on President Biden to Immediately Prevent Thousands on Home Confinement From Being Sent Back to Federal Prison (June 28, 2021)

The Hill, Biden faces criticism for not extending home confinement for prisoners (June 26, 2021)

New York Times, Thousands of Prisoners Were Sent Home Because of Covid. They Don’t Want to Go Back (June 27, 2021)

BORDEN NOTCHES ITS FIRST COLLATERAL WIN

Kristen Brenner was convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun in violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1). Because of her prior convictions, the government sought to get Krissy a minimum 15-year Armed Career Criminal Act sentence. Her district court refused the government, however, agreeing with Krissy that her Tennessee reckless aggravated assault conviction (related to impaired driving) was not a crime of violence.

Reckless, maybe... but not c a crime of violence,
Reckless, maybe… but not a crime of violence,

The government appealed, but the case was held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court decision in Borden v. United States. After that June 10 decision held that crimes that could be committed with a “reckless” intent did not fit the “crime-of-violence elements” definition, the government moved to dismiss its appeal in Krissy’s case.

Last week, the 6th Circuit dismissed the government appeal. “Because we apply the law as it currently stands, Borden controls Brenner’s case. Borden analyzed the very statute under which she was convicted, which refers to a person ‘recklessly committing an assault’… Under Borden, that mens rea is insufficient.”

United States v. Brenner, Case No 19-5647, 2021 US App LEXIS 19657 (6th Cir. July 1, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Supremes Leave Behind Busy Fall Docket as They Take Summer Break – Update for July 6, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

The Supreme Court wrapped up a fairly lackluster October Term 2020 last Thursday, having delivered little of merit in the criminal law area other than Borden v. United States. But the nine justices left a teaser or two as they headed in various directions for a three-month vacation.

hobbsact200218On Thursday, the Court granted review to United States v. Taylor, a 4th Circuit decision holding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence for purposes of 18 USC § 924(c) and the Armed Career Criminal Act. The 4th’s decision created a Circuit split – four other circuits hold that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence – leading the government to seek certiorari. The split – and the fact that the government usually gets its way when it asks for discretionary review – probably convinced the Supreme Court to hear the case, which will be argued late this year.

The Supreme Court left town without deciding whether to review Bryant v. United States, the 11th Circuit holding that prohibits using the compassionate release statute to challenge excessive sentences. Seven other circuits have held that the narrow grounds for 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions listed in Guidelines policy statement § 1B1.13 do not limit compassionate release motions brought by inmates, but only when such motions are brought by the Bureau of Prisons. (Remember the last time one of those was filed by the BOP?) Only the 11th Circuit – no surprise there – holds that § 1B1.13 still governs such motions.

longconf210706

The Bryant petition is on relist, and certiorari won’t be decided until the first conference of the new court year – known as the “long conference” – set for the last week of September 2020.

United States v. Taylor, Case No 20-1459, (certiorari granted July 1, 2021)

Bryant v. United States, Case No 20-1732 (petition for cert pending)
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– Thomas L. Root

‘Reckless Is Not Violent,’ Supremes Say – Update for June 14, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS TAKES ANOTHER SWIPE AT ACCA

The Supreme Court last Thursday further limited the types of offenses that constitute crimes of violence for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. In a 5-4 ruling in favor of the prisoner in Borden v. United States, the majority (if you can call it that) ruled that crimes that can be committed through recklessness rather only through specific intent are not crimes of violence.

borden210614Justice Elena Kagan wrote an opinion that was joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Neil Gorsuch. Justice Clarence Thomas did not join Kagan’s opinion but concurred in the result. So for you math-inspired people, that makes the final tally on the decision 4-4-1. At the Supreme Court, the fact that five Justices agreed with the result makes that result the winner. However, it can complicate figuring out what opinion as to how the Court got there is in the majority. That’s the Marks v. United States problem, boys and girls, and that is a topic for another time.

For now, we’re focusing on Borden. The case involved the definition of “violent felony” set out in 18 USC § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), defined as any felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”

The defendant, Chuck Borden, pled guilty to an 18 USC § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession charge, which the district court enhanced under the ACCA to a statutory minimum of 15 years, The defense argued the ACCA did not apply because one of the three priors relied on by the district court was a Tennessee conviction for reckless aggravated assault. That crime can result from reckless conduct – a lower legal standard than “purposefully or knowingly” assaulting someone. Chuck argued that only purposeful or knowing conduct can meet ACCA’s definition of “violent felony.” Mere recklessness, he argued, does not qualify.

bordennunss210615The decision turned on the meaning of “physical force against the person of another.” The government argued that “against” had a meaning similar to “I tripped and fell against the guy ahead of me in line,” suggesting referring to one body contacting another. That way, if you were driving recklessly, and careened into a busload of nuns, the crime would be an ACCA predicate, because you employed physical force against a busload of “anothers.”

The majority, however, agreed with the defendant that “against” means something more. “The phrase ‘against another,’ when modifying the ‘use of force,’ demands that the perpetrator direct his action at, or target, another individual,” the opinion holds. “Reckless conduct is not aimed in that prescribed manner.”

Justice Thomas concurred, but did so not because of the definition of “against.” Instead, he argued that the phrase “use of physical force” is limited to intentional acts designed to cause harm.

habeas_corpusThe immediate question raised by Borden is whether current prisoners can use it to attack now-illegal sentences. Because the decision does not make a ruling on constitutional law, it will not be retroactive under 28 USC 2255(f)(3). However, it probably is attackable under 28 USC 2241, relying on the § 2255(e) “saving clause.”

Ohio State University law prof Doug Berman said in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, “I am truly making a wild guess here, and I am eager to hear from folks in the field about whether they agree that only hundreds of sentences may be potentially disrupted by Borden or if in fact it could end up being thousands. Whatever the exact number, as I will explain in a future post, every ACCA defendant with a viable Borden claim should be thankful for the First Step Act making ‘compassionate release’ motions available to bring directly to court.”

Borden v. United States, Case No 19-5410, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 2990 (June 10, 2010)

Sentencing Law and Policy, How many federal prisoners might now be serving illegal sentences after Borden? (June 11, 2021)

SCOTUSBlog.com, Court limits definition of “violent felony” in federal gun-possession penalty (June 10, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root