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922(g) FELON IN POSSESSION CHALLENGES EXPLODE AFTER BRUEN
The latest example was handed down two days ago in United States v. Diaz. In that case, the 5th Circuit ruled that just being a felon was insufficient to make the application of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) consistent with the Second Amendment. But where the defendant had been convicted of a felony of theft, that “would have led to capital punishment or estate forfeiture” at the time the Second Amendment was ratified, “disarming [the defendant] fits within this tradition of serious and permanent punishment” and is thus constitutionally applied.
I will write more about Diaz on Monday. For now, back to the trendline:
The Trace reported that “at least 30 of the challenges to the felon gun ban have succeeded. While that ratio may seem small, it marks a stark departure from the past, when effectively none succeeded, and it shows that Bruen has cracked the longstanding consensus that people convicted of serious crimes may constitutionally be barred from gun ownership.”
When weighing the felon gun ban, judges have distinguished between violent and nonviolent offenses. But a former prosecutor told The Trace (an unapologetically anti-gun publication), that drawing the line is tough. “Who’s dangerous? What is your definition of dangerous? It’s easier to have a bright line. But that bright line is gone.”
Andrew Willinger, the executive director of the Duke Center for Firearms Law – which disseminates and supports reliable, balanced, and insightful scholarship and programming on firearms law – said it remains unclear whether banning gun possession among entire categories of people, like felons, is constitutional, particularly when their convictions were for nonviolent offenses that posed no obvious danger to the public.
“You’re really talking about categorical group determinations, rather than any kind of individualized finding of a threat of danger,” Willinger said. “And [United States v.] Rahimi doesn’t endorse [categorical prohibitions], but it also doesn’t rule them out, right?”
No one can know how the Supreme Court will rule when the felon gun ban finally gets to the high court, although no one can doubt that it will. When Justice Amy Coney Barrett was a 7th Circuit judge, she wrote a dissent favoring restoration of gun rights to nonviolent felons. “That is probably the direction that the Supreme Court is headed if and when it takes up these cases,” Willinger said, “which I think it probably has to do at some point in the near future.”
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“Mull’s argument is foreclosed by 8th Circuit precedent,” the appellate court said, citing United States v. Jackson, a decision holding that even after United States v. Rahimi, 18 USC 922(g)(1) does “not violate the 2nd Amendment as applied to defendant whose predicate offenses were non-violent drug offenses.”
The Circuit also noted its decision two weeks ago in United States v. Cunningham that Jackson forecloses any argument that there must be a “felony-by-felony determinations regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to a particular defendant”), the opposite of what the 6th Circuit held in its Williams holding.
United States v. Mull, Case No. 23-3424, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 21943 (8th Cir. Aug 29, 2024)
5th Circuit Holds Alien-In-Possession is Constitutional But Sober Doper-in-Possession is Not: Last week, the 5th Circuit split on a pair of § 922(g) cases.
The § 922(g)(3) prohibition on people who use illegal drugs possessing guns is a different matter. In United States v. Connelly, the Circuit held that while § 922(g)(3) is not unconstitutional in all situations (such as some on meth shooting up farmers’ mailboxes), it is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who uses weed and coke occasionally but is a “sober citizen not presently under an impairing influence and… [not] was intoxicated when she was arrested.”
The 5th said that by regulating a defendant based on habitual or occasional drug use, § 922(g)(3) imposed a far greater burden on her 2nd Amendment rights than history and the tradition of firearms regulation can support.
Kansas District Court Holds § 922(o) on Possessing Machine Gun is Unconstitutional ‘As Applied’: Complaining that the statutory definition of a machine gun is “extremely broad,” enough to encompass aircraft-mounted automatic cannon to a small stun gun to a BB gun that shoots multiple rounds of projectiles using compressed air,” a district court ruled that 18 USC § 922(o) – that outlaws possession of a “machinegun” (and only the U.S. Code calls a machine gun a “machinegun”) – is unconstitutional as applied to “bearable arms” such as defendant Tamori Morgan’s select-fire AR-15 and his Glock giggle switch (that makes a Glock pistol full auto).
The court rejected the Government’s attempt to show that 18th-century law provides a basis for § 922(o). Those laws banned breaching the peace with unusual or dangerous weapons, but unlike those laws, the Court ruled, § 922(o) “says nothing about the manner in which machineguns are carried or displayed. Instead, § 922(o) criminalizes the mere possession of such weapons without regard to how the possessor uses them.”
The Court also rejected the Government’s argument that the 2nd Amendment “would allow weapons to be prohibited solely on the basis that they are ‘dangerous and unusual” or ‘highly unusual in society at large.’”
The Court noted that possessing a machine gun is not illegal, but rather only possessing a machine gun that is not registered:
There are over 740,000 legally registered machineguns in the United States today,” the Court said. “Machineguns have been in existence for well over a century. While the federal government has regulated transfer and possession of such weapons since passage of the National Firearms Act in 1934,” even now, “it is perfectly legal for a person who has not been divested of his firearm rights under some other provision of law to acquire and possess a machinegun… In that sense, machineguns are not unusual. The government fails to address these facts, and thus fails to meet its burden to demonstrate that possession of the types of weapons at issue in this case are lawfully prohibited under the 2nd Amendment.
On a Reload podcast, 2nd Amendment attorney Matt Larosiere predicted the case is quite likely to be appealed and unlikely to win at the next level, but nevertheless the Morgan decision “would help him and other gun-rights activists in future cases against the ban as well as other portions of the NFA.”
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DANGER IS MY BUSINESS
The 6th Circuit handed down a rather inverted but consequential decision last Friday, holding that 18 USC § 922(g)(1) – the statute that prohibits people convicted of a felony from possessing guns or ammo – was consistent with the 2nd Amendment as applied to Erick Williams, a convicted felon with a colorful and rather high-octane rap sheet.
A quick word about “as applied.”
In constitutional law, a facial challenge is a challenge to a statute in which a plaintiff argues that the law is always unconstitutional no matter how it is employed. A law against criticizing the government would always violate the 1st Amendment, whether used against a Marxist firebrand on a soapbox or that nice 80-year-old lady next door tending her gladiolas who complains that Social Security should do better in sending her checks.
Facial challenges are generally hard to win because, despite Congress’s institutional incompetence, facially unconstitutional statutes rarely make it through the legislative process.
In an “as applied” challenge, on the other hand, a plaintiff argues that a statute is unconstitutional not in every sense but rather only when applied in limited cases. The claim in Batson v. Kentucky, where the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race, did not find that peremptory strikes to eliminate jurors from the pool were unconstitutional in all cases, but were unconstitutional when used to strike jurors because of their race.
Back to the live action: Erick, who had previously been convicted of armed robbery and other offenses but who had served his time, was caught in a traffic stop with a handgun. Convicted of being a felon In possession, he appealed on the ground that § 922(g)(1) was facially unconstitutional in the wake of NY State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.
Applying last June’s US v Rahimi decision (in which the Supreme Court ruled that § 922(g)(8), which denied guns to people subject to domestic protection orders), the Circuit ruled that § 922(g)(1) was not unconstitutional as applied to a guy whose “criminal record shows that he’s dangerous.”
“Through § 922(g)(1), Congress has decided to enact a class-wide disarmament of felons,” the Circuit wrote. “[T]hat statute is constitutional as it applies to dangerous individuals… Consider William’s criminal record. He has two felony counts of aggravated robbery. Robbery is a common-law crime against the person. What’s more, aggravated robbery is robbery… accomplished with a deadly weapon.” Indeed, Williams robbed two people at gunpoint, stealing cash, a watch, and clothing. That offense alone is sufficient to conclude that Williams, if armed, presents a danger to others or the public. But that’s not all. Williams has also been convicted of attempted murder. And he’s already been convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon. In that case, he agreed to stash a pistol that was used to murder a police officer. The government could’ve pointed to any one of those convictions to demonstrate his dangerousness. Thus, Williams may be constitutionally disarmed through a class-based statute like § 922(g)(1).”
The 6th had “little trouble concluding that Williams is a dangerous felon” and thus, that “the government may, consistent with the 2nd Amendment, punish him for possessing a firearm. And the government may enact this prohibition through a broad, class-wide ban like § 922(g)(1). His as-applied challenge therefore fails.”
The Circuit was rather expansive in its holding, however, providing a roadmap for other people with prior convictions who may nevertheless retain a constitutional right to firearms. The 6th limited its definition of who might be dangerous to those who had “committed a crime against the body of another human being… including (but not limited to) murder, rape, assault, and robbery, or… a crime that inherently poses a significant threat of danger, including (but not limited to) drug trafficking and burglary. An individual in either of those categories will have a very difficult time, to say the least, of showing he is not dangerous.”
In Range v. Atty General, the 3rd Circuit opened the felon-in-possession door a crack. The 6th Circuit has nudged it a bit more by applying Rahimi’s dangerousness analysis to the “as applied” mix. To be sure, the 6th included some provisos.
First, it said that it did not exclude “crimes that pose no threat of physical danger, like mail fraud, tax fraud, or making false statements” from being dangerous, but rather deferred that for another day.
Second, it explained that district courts need not find a “categorical” match to a specific common-law crime to show that a person is dangerous. Instead, district courts “should make fact-specific dangerousness determinations after taking account of the unique circumstances of the individual, including details of his specific conviction” and should consider a defendant’s entire criminal record — not just the specific felony underlying his § 922(g)(1) prosecution.”
Finally, the Circuit was implicitly critical that Erick had not sought a declaratory judgment that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him before being arrested, holding that “Williams availed himself of his constitutionally required opportunity to show that he is not dangerous – albeit after he violated the law, not before.” Whether a movant’s timing – attacking § 922(g)(1) before an arrest rather than as a defense after an arrest – will matter in the constitutional calculus (and it should not), remains to be seen.
Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, said last Sunday, “By my read, this opinion means that any and every person within the Sixth Circuit criminal charged with illegal firearm possession under 922(g)(1) — and perhaps other federal and state gun control provisions? — can now seek dismissal of that charge by making ‘an individualized showing that he himself is not actually dangerous.’ In addition, I wonder if this Williams opinion might now provide a means for the millions of persons with non-violent felony convictions in the Sixth Circuit to seek a declaratory judgment that they are ‘not actually dangerous’ and thus have a Second Amendment right to possess (and purchase) firearms like all their fellow citizens.”
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THE FUTURE OF GUNS
I got an email last week from a Georgia friend who’s been home for about eight years from serving a 30-year on a crack conspiracy, asking whether it was true that an appeals court said he could once again own a shotgun and pursue his passion for duck hunting (a passion not shared by the ducks themselves).
I explained that what he had read about, the 9th Circuit’s United States v. Duarte decision, did not necessarily say that and–even if it had–the last word hasn’t yet been written about the 2nd Amendment and 18 USC § 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession statute.
The May 9th Duarte decision had a 3-judge panel split 2-1, with the majority holding that the 2nd Amendment does not necessarily exclude people formerly convicted of felonies: New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen’s “scattered references to ‘law-abiding’ and ‘responsible’ citizens did not implicitly decide the issue in this case., the Court said. In the 2008 District of Columbia v. Hellerdecision, the Supreme Court made passing reference to the “presumptive[] lawful[ness]” of felon firearm bans, but the Duartemajority said the presumption “will no longer do after Bruen,” given Bruen’s call for a historical analysis and that the “felon firearm ban[] was never an issue the Heller Court purported to resolve.”
Eugene Volokh, a constitutional law professor at UCLA, told Courthouse News Service that Duarte “is a shift in Ninth Circuit law, and it differs from the view adopted by many circuits… However, it’s similar to what the Philadelphia-based 3rd Circuit decided last year in Range v. Attorney General.“
Duarte leaves open the possibility that felons convicted of violent crimes could still be prohibited from owning firearms. What’s more, the government wasted no time, last week filing a Petition for Rehearing En Banc and for Expedited Order Vacating Panel Opinionthat asks the 9th Circuit for en banc review of Duarte. Appellant Steve Duarte has been ordered to file an opposition by May 30th.
En banc review may be put on hold pending the Supreme Court decision in the United States v. Rahimi decision, due any time before the end of June. The Rahimi case considers the constitutionality of a law banning gun possession by people subject to domestic violence restraining orders. Volokh said, “The question in Rahimiand the question in this case aren’t identical, but they share considerable similarities.”
For now, both Range and Duarte are “as applied” cases, not holding that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face, that is, in every circumstance, but rather only “as applied to the one’s own particular conduct.” In Range, the petitioner had been convicted 25 years before on a food-stamp misdemeanor that carried a possible 2-year sentence (and thus fell under § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition). The Duarte majority held that the defendant lacked any violent crime conviction (despite the fact that one of his priors was for fleeing and eluding, which sounds like more than a simple jaywalking to avoid a cop on the same sidewalk Steve was on).
The § 922(g)(1) tide may be turning, but no one should feel as though it’s open season on gun ownership just yet, or–more to the point–that a felon-in-possession conviction is open to a successful constitutional attack.
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BRUEN CONTINUES TO EXPAND GUN RIGHTS
For the first time, a West Texas federal judge last month ruled that 18 USC § 922(g)(5)(A) – which prohibits aliens in the country unlawfully from possessing guns or ammo – violates the 2nd Amendment in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2022 New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen decision. The West Texas decision, which the government has appealed to the 5th Circuit, is noteworthy, as is the judge’s lament at the outset of her opinion:
The Court pauses to join the choir of lower courts urging the Supreme Court to resolve the many unanswered questions left in Bruen’s wake… In the estimate of one legal scholar who reviewed more than 300 decisions applying Bruen, “lower courts have received Bruen’s message to supercharge the 2nd Amendment, but they have not yet located its Rosetta Stone. Their collective decisions in the months since the ruling have been scattered, unpredictable, and often internally inconsistent…” Against this backdrop of uncertainty, the Court “applie[s] Bruen as well as possible in evaluating the constitutionality of” the gun laws that Sing-Ledezma is charged with violating.
Citing Bruen, the judge deemed the law prohibiting people here illegally from possessing a gun “facially unconstitutional” and “an outlier that our ancestors would never have accepted.”
Last week, the 3rd Circuit joined in the “supercharging,” ruling that a Pennsylvania law that bans 18-to-20-year-olds from carrying guns outside their homes during a state of emergency violates the 2nd Amendment. The 3rd ruled that 18-to-20-year-olds, like other subsets of the American public, are “presumptively among ‘the people’ to whom 2nd Amendment rights extend…. The Commissioner cannot point us to a single founding-era statute imposing restrictions on the freedom of 18-to-20-year-olds to carry guns… At the time of the 2nd Amendment’s passage, or shortly thereafter, the minimum age for militia service in every state became eighteen… We understand that a reasonable debate can be had over allowing young adults to be armed, but the issue before us is a narrow one. Our question is whether the Commissioner has borne his burden of proving that evidence of founding-era regulations supports Pennsylvania’s restriction on 18-to 20-year-olds’ 2nd Amendment rights, and the answer to that is no.”
In a thoughtful law review note to be published in the next few weeks, Jamie McWilliam argues that
in the context of felon disarmament, the primary group of laws that the government has put forward involve disarming classes that the government deemed dangerous… [embodying] a broad theme of dangerousness… [T]o determine the scope of the dangerousness standard, courts should look to the principles embodied by the 2nd Amendment itself—in particular, defense against immediate personal violence. Ultimately, this essay suggests that only those who have actually created the kind of danger that the amendment was meant to protect against—i.e., who have perpetrated physical violence—should be disarmed. This standard may defend against potentially prejudicial discretion, while simultaneously upholding 2nd Amendment rights and protecting our community.
Many expect the Supreme Court to adopt such a dangerous exception to Bruen, an adoption that should advance the argument that many felon-in-possession convictions – where the dangerousness of the defendant is nonexistent – violate the 2nd Amendment.
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HOW ABOUT THOSE “NEW LAWS” ON FELON-IN-POSSESSION?
I had yet another email last week – and there have been a lot of them – asking for information about any “new laws” on 18 USC § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession.
We need to get some things straight.
Remember those high school government classes you skipped? The teacher explained that a new “law” has to be passed by Congress and signed by the president, in this case by the notoriously anti-gun President Biden. When will that happen?
We are now into an election year in which Americans will elect one new president, 435 new members of the House and 33 new senators. Democrat voters, by and large, don’t like guns and hate the 2nd Amendment. Republican voters, by and large, love the 2nd Amendment but don’t think convicted felons should be allowed to do or have anything. Most people (77% of Americans and 92% of Republicans) think the crime rate is rising when, in fact, violent crime dropped 8% last year over 2022, the murder rate has plummeted, and the property crime rate fell 6.3% to what would be its lowest level since 1961.
So you tell me: who in Congress would vote to walk back felon-in-possession laws so soon after toughening them? Who in Congress would want to face attacks during a reelection campaign that he or she made it easier for criminals to get guns?
If you answered “no one,” you’re pretty close.
Federal law prohibiting anyone with a felony conviction from ever possessing a gun or ammo has only been around since 1961. But among politicians, it is untouchable. Every change to 18 USC § 922(g) in the last 63 years has only increased the classes of people prohibited from having guns or increased the penalties for violating the statute.
There is action on felon-in-possession, but it’s taking place across the street from the Senate and House chambers at the Supreme Court. Back in June 2022, the Supreme Court ruled in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen that when the 2nd Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. Only if a statute limiting firearm possession is consistent with “this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the 2nd Amendment’s ‘unqualified command’.”
Bruen has led to a cascade of 2nd Amendment attacks on 18 USC § 922(g). Most notably, the 3rd Circuit ruled in Range v. Attorney General, an en banc decision last June, that § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession is unconstitutional as it applies to people convicted of nonviolent felonies. Range came only a week after the 8th Circuit ruled in United States v. Jackson that the § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession ban remained a lawful limitation on gun possession even after Bruen.
Meanwhile, the government convinced the Supreme Court to take up United States v. Rahimi, a case in which the 5th Circuit ruled that § 922(g)(8) – which prohibits someone subject to a domestic protection order from possessing a gun – was unconstitutional. Oral arguments in Rahimi last fall did not go all that well for the defendant, chiefly because Zackey Rahimi is a bad actor who threatened to kill his girlfriend, opened fire on a motorist in a road rage incident, and tried to shoot up a What-a-Burger because his friend’s credit card was declined.
Meanwhile, the Range petition for cert, also filed by the government, appears to be on hold pending the Rahimi decision.
Now add to that a petition filed on December 21 by Melynda Vincent, who passed a $492.00 counterfeit check while battling a drug addiction 15 years ago. Melynda sued the government in 2020 for the right to own a gun. The 10th Circuit ruled last fall that Bruendid not change the fact that felon-in-possession was constitutional. The government plans to oppose Melynda’s petition, but the issue – whether a sympathetic nonviolent offender whose crime was committed years ago can constitutionally be denied the right to possess a gun – is much like Bryan Range’s case.
Melynda is as ideal a petitioner as Zack Rahimi is a poster child for gun control. Her federal judge gave her probation 15 years ago and challenged her to turn her life around. Melynda did that and more. She earned a bachelor’s degree in behavioral science followed by a master’s degree in social work and a second master’s degree in public administration. She is the founder and executive director of the Utah Harm Reduction Coalition, a nonprofit that works to develop science-driven drug and criminal justice reform policies. She also started the first legal syringe exchange service in the state.
It seems probable that the Supreme Court will try to limit Bruenwhere public safety is concerned. This makes it likely that the court may limit § 922(g)’s limitations to cases where the defendant’s dangerousness is at issue, which would benefit the Bryan Ranges and Melynda Vincents of the country, as well as any number of federal defendants whose § 922(g)(1) convictions have nothing to do with their perceived risk to public safety.
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SPECULATION INCREASES THAT SCOTUS WILL REVIEW § 922(g)(1) CONSTITUTIONALITY
When the Supreme Court heard arguments earlier this month in United States v. Rahimi on whether 18 USC § 922(g)(8) – which prohibits people under a domestic protection order from having guns – violates the 2nd Amendment, Justice Amy Barrett asked the government, “But you’re trying to save, like, the Range issue. So you’re not applying dangerousness to the crimes?”
The New York Times last week expanded on what it called Justice Barrett’s “cryptic” reference for those not following the gun debate: “She was… referring to… Bryan Range, who has challenged a federal law prohibiting people who have been convicted of felonies from owning guns.” Barrett’s reference provides the clearest indication yet that the Court may review Range v. Atty Gen’l (now known as Garland v. Range), the 3rd Circuit en banc decision holding that the felon-in-possession law is unconstitutional as applied to a guy like Bryan Range, who had an old nonviolent felony conviction on his record.
Bryan is a far more sympathetic figure than domestic violence defendant Zackey Rahimi, accused of threatening women and being involved in 5 shootings in a 2-month stretch. Bryan’s criminal history, on the other hand, consisted of doing 3 years of probation 25 years ago for making a false statement to get food stamps, with only minor traffic violations and a ticket for fishing without a license since then.
A week ago, the Supreme Court considered whether to grant review in Range – which both the government and Bryan Range’s lawyers want – but the Court has not announced any action on the petition. The government asked the Court to wait on Range until it decides Rahimi. Bryan’s lawyers argued that there was no reason for delay and that the Court should consider both cases in its current term, which ends in June.
But would the Supreme Court grant a second 2nd Amendment case this term? Some believe it would. Writing in the Volokh Conspiracy, a blog by constitutional law professors, Josh Blackmon (South Texas College of Law) said, “Even if Rahimi loses by a lopsided margin, Range could pull out a victory by the same margin from [New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen]. Indeed, the Court may be able to split those cases in a way so as not to water down Bruen. The Court could even vacate-and-remand Rahimi in light of Range.”
Last week, Blackmon argued that “in Rahimi, presumably, a majority of Justices will want to write that the 2nd Amendment rights must be taken away from people merely accused of being dangerous, even if they are not convicted, let alone indicted. I think that opinion will be harder to write than one may think.”
In other news, the 4th Circuit ruled last week that Maryland’s handgun licensing law, which featured a 30-day waiting period, a requirement that the applicant submit fingerprints, and completion of a 4-hour handgun course, was unconstitutional. The Circuit held that Maryland has not met its burden to show a ‘historical analogue’ demonstrating that its law falls within a historically recognized exception to the right to keep and bear arms… and it has offered no other historical evidence to justify its law.”
It appears that pressure on the Supreme Court to rule on § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession’s constitutionality before next June is increasing because of the complexity of the issues raised in Rahimi.
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RAHIMI ORAL ARGUMENT NEXT WEEK IS HIGH STAKES FOR SECOND AMENDMENT
On Tuesday, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in United States v. Rahimi, a case that will determine the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(8), the subsection of the federal firearms possession statute that bars people subject to domestic protection orders from having guns or ammo. Rahimi may well do more than that, addressing the constitutionality of all of 922(g) – including possession of guns by felons.
We hold that when the 2nd Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the 2nd Amendment’s “unqualified command.
Bruen superseded the Court’s long-standing practice of allowing the government to weigh its interest in public safety against the possibility of imposing a limitation on 2nd Amendment rights.
Since Bruen, several 922(g)-based restrictions have been declared unconstitutional. Possession of guns by people who are subject to domestic protection orders, who use controlled substances – illegal under 922(g)(3), and who have been convicted of nonviolent criminal offenses, illegal under 922(g)(1), have been held to be unconstitutional under Bruen. The government has sought certiorari on all of these decisions, suggesting to the Supreme Court that a Rahimi decision can clean them all up (and in the government’s favor).
Social and public health advocates argue in essence that “validating the federal law prohibiting persons subject to domestic violence protective orders from gun possession will literally mean the difference between life or death for many victims of abuse, their family, friends, law enforcement, and the broader community,” as the Bloomberg School of Public Health puts it.
Rahimi provides the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify how lower courts should apply the new framework laid out in Bruen. This will significantly impact the continued viability of current gun laws and the ability of legislators to address what the Bloomberg School calls “the ongoing gun violence epidemic.”
But others suggest that 922(g)(8) looks “more like a political performance than a serious effort to reduce abusive behavior.” Writing in Law & Liberty, George Mason University laws professor Nelson Lund argues that nevertheless, “the government’s brief [in Rahimi] may look like little more than a Hail Mary pass aimed at persuading the Justices to revise or deceptively “clarify” the novel Bruen test. This gambit, however, could very well succeed. The Bruenholding has its roots in a dissenting opinion written by then-Judge Kavanaugh before he was promoted to the Supreme Court. His opinion was exposed to serious objections arising largely from the paucity of historical evidence that could support a viable history-and-tradition test. Bruen suffers from the same weakness, and it was clear from the start that the Court would find itself driven toward reliance on means-end analysis, although not necessarily the very deferential form that Bruen rejected.”
Mr. Rahimi fired off a few rounds at a fast-food joint when his friend’s credit card was declined.
Robert Leider, an assistant professor at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School in Arlington, Virginia, said at a Federalist Society forum in September that “the real legal question that everyone is interested in with Rahimi is to see how the court clarifies and applies the text, history and tradition test that it announced two terms ago in Bruen. Unquestionably, the government sought review in this case to water down the test.”
Solicitor General Elizabeth B. Prelogar took steps to expedite the review of Rahimi, citing the “substantial disruption” that invalidation of the domestic violence gun restriction would create. Meanwhile, as the American Bar Association Journal put it, Prof. Leider said the Solicitor General “slow-walked [the] cert petition in another gun case, in which the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit in June struck down the so-called felon-in-possession statute, barring those sentenced to prison for more than one year from possessing a firearm.”
That 3rd Circuit case, Range v. Atty General, involves a man convicted of food stamp fraud 25 years before who was prevented from buying a gun.
“Mr. Rahimi is the poster child for irresponsible gun possession,” Leider said. “I think the government wanted this case and not the Range welfare fraud case because this case is much easier on the judgment line.”
He’s right that Rahimi is a tough case for those hoping that Bruenmay ultimately limit the proscription on nonviolent felons owning guns (such as the case in the 3rd Circuit en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General. The evidence suggests that the presence of firearms in abusive relationships increases the risk of injury and death substantially.
After seeking cert on the Range decision, the government suggested the Court sit on the petition until a decision is handed down in Rahimi.
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(In its final action before fleeing Washington, DC, at the end of June for three months of summer vacation, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari in Rahimi, meaning that What-A-Burger, road rage, and stalking will soon be a part of 2nd Amendment discourse).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), you may not possess a firearm if you are an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance. A couple of district courts have already ruled that Bruen invalidates this prohibition, but on Wednesday, Patrick Daniels – maybe the guy Charlie Daniels (no apparent relation) had in mind as driving down the highway while “tokin’ on a number and digging on the radio” – was the latest beneficiary of Bruen’s historical “heuristics.”
Pat is a dedicated but “unlawful user” of cannabis. When Pat was pulled over for a traffic infraction, police smelled marijuana in his car. A search turned up a couple of loaded handguns. When questioned, Pat admitted that he smoked marijuana about 14 days per month, although no one thought to ask him whether he was high at the time or, for that matter, test him for controlled substances.
That was a mere detail to the DEA, however. Before Pat knew it, he was charged with a § 922(g)(3) offense. A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to nearly four years in prison.
Pat appealed, arguing that Bruen made his conviction a violation of the 2nd Amendment. Two days ago, the 5th Circuit agreed.
The Circuit first concluded that the 2nd Amendment clearly applied to Pat:
The right to bear arms is held by “the people.” That phrase “unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” Indeed, the Bill of Rights uses the phrase “the people” five times. In each place, it refers to all members of our political community, not a special group of upright citizens. Based on that consistent usage, [District of Columbia v.] Heller concluded that “the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.” Even as a marihuana user, Daniels is a member of our political community. Therefore, he has a presumptive right to bear arms. By infringing on that right, § 922(g)(3) contradicts the plain text of the Second Amendment.
The 2nd Amendment codified a “‘pre-existing right’ with pre-existing limits,” the 5th explained. Thus, “to ascertain those limits, history is our heuristic. Because historical gun regulations evince the kind of limits that were well-understood at the time the 2nd Amendment was ratified, a regulation that is inconsistent with those limits is inconsistent with the 2nd Amendment. So whether Pat’s conviction violated his 2nd Amendment right to bear arms “depends on whether § 922(g)(3) is consistent with our nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,” the 5th said. “It is a close and deeply challenging question.”
Smoke enough, and you might see this… but it wouldn’t violate § 922(g)
However, the Circuit found, while “throughout American history, laws have regulated the combination of guns and intoxicating substances,” at no time “in the 18th or 19th century did the government disarm individuals who used drugs or alcohol at one time from possessing guns at another… [O]ur history and tradition may support some limits on an intoxicated person’s right to carry a weapon, but it does not justify disarming a sober citizen based exclusively on his past drug usage. Nor do more generalized traditions of disarming dangerous persons support this restriction on nonviolent drug users. As applied to Daniels, then, § 922(g)(3) violates the 2nd Amendment.”
Meanwhile, the 5th Circuit took in the chin last week when the Supreme Court reversed its refusal to stay a district court holding that new Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) that effectively banned “ghost guns” violated the Administrative Procedure Act.
At the end of June, Judge Reed O’Connor of the Northern District of Texas held in Garland v. Vanderstokthat ATF regulations defining “ghost guns” – kits of components that do not meet the definition of “firearm” but may be assembled, with some simple machining performed at home by the end user, into functional firearms lacking any serial number – as firearms exceeded the agency’s authority and thus were invalid.
The government sought a stay of Judge O’Connor’s order from the 5th Circuit, which the Circuit denied. On July 24, the 5th ruled that “[b]ecause the ATF has not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits, nor irreparable harm in the absence of a stay, we DENY the government’s request to stay the vacatur of the two challenged portions of the Rule…This effectively maintains, pending appeal, the status quo that existed for 54 years from 1968 to 2022.”
Last Wednesday, the Supreme Court reversed the 5th Circuit, holding in a one-paragraph order that Judge O’Connor’s injunction against the new rule is “stayed pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is timely sought.”
The Supreme Court decision granting the stay was 5-4, with Justice Barrett in the majority. This surprised some commentators, who have placed Justice Barrett firmly in the pro-2nd Amendment camp. But as Slate argued Wednesday, her decision in favor of a stay does not necessarily mean the ATF can breathe easy:
Barrett’s vote may be attributable to her distaste for “nationwide vacatur.” In a recent decision, the justice cast serious doubt on the legality of this tool, which allows a lone federal judge to block a federal policy in all 50 states. She is quite right to be skeptical that this power exists, or at least that it can be used as freely as O’Connor and his fellow conservatives deploy it today… If that’s true, and Barrett’s vote was purely procedural, then the ghost guns rule is not out of the woods yet… When it comes back to SCOTUS on the merits, though, Barrett could vote to strike down the rule, since the side debate over O’Connor’s use of “vacatur” would no longer be relevant. Gun rights advocates will fight this one all the way to the bitter end. And the Biden administration should not assume it has Barrett on its side as it fights for the new rule’s long-term survival.
All of this is prelude for the central question of interest to prisoners, whether Bruen has invalidated 18 USC 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession statute. That question, already decided in favor of defendants in the 3rd Circuit – Range v. Atty General – and against defendants in the 8th Circuit – United States v. Jackson – will no doubt be reaching the Supreme Court soon enough.
We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.
DISTRICT COURT SAYS § 922(g)(1) UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Deep in the Old South, federal judge Carlton W. Reeves holds court. He is black, the first in his family to attend college, an Obama appointee with a resume of work for the ACLU. He wrote the district court decision that was ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization (the decision that struck down Roe v. Wade), and he has repeatedly blocked Mississippi laws widely considered to be discriminatory to LGBT persons.
In short, he’s a guy conventional wisdom figures to be in line with all that President Biden and the progressive wing of the Democratic Party hold dear, so much so that Biden last year made him the new chairman of the Sentencing Commission.
So you would expect Judge Reeves to be all in on gun control in general and the value of laws prohibiting felons from possessing guns in particular. You would be wrong.
Last week, Judge Reeves ruled in a 75-page opinion that the felon-in-possession statute violates the 2nd Amendment.
The government was prosecuting Jessie Bullock, who as a 31-year-old hothead had gotten into a fatal bar fight. He did time for manslaughter. Now, the 59-year-old Jessie was caught in possession of a .22 level-action rifle and a .22 revolver, hardly the stuff of gang wars or bank robberies. No matter. The government charged him with being a felon in possession.
Judge Reeves, who wanted the parties to agree that an expert historian be appointed to give a report on the history of laws prohibiting felons from having guns, lamented the lack of historical evidence supporting the cases the government cited in support of its position. “It is unsurprising that the government relies on jurisprudence filled with such methodological flaws,” he observed tartly, because “[t]he same errors define the Supreme Court’s own Second Amendment jurisprudence…”
Relying on the 3rd Circuit’s en bancRange decision of three weeks ago, Judge Reeves held that “the government[] does not identify a “well‐established and representative historical analogue” from either era supporting the categorical disarmament of tens of millions of Americans who seek to keep firearms in their home for self‐defense.
Although he ruled against the government, Judge Reeves criticized the judicial philosophy of “originalism,” underlying Bruen that holds that the Constitution should be interpreted as it was understood when it was written. For much of American history, he said, interpretation of the Constitution has changed to incorporate modern values, citing the 2015 Obergefell ruling legalizing same-sex marriage.
“The next generation will have its own conceptions of liberty,” the Judge wrote. “It will interpret the principles of the Constitution, enduring as they are, differently than this generation has interpreted them. Change is unstoppable.”
United States v. Bullock, Case No 3:18-CR-165, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112397 (S.D.Miss., June 28, 2023)
The latest example was handed down two days ago in United States v. Diaz. In that case, the 5th Circuit ruled that just being a felon was insufficient to make the application of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) consistent with the Second Amendment. But where the defendant had been convicted of a felony of theft, that “would have led to capital punishment or estate forfeiture” at the time the Second Amendment was ratified, “disarming [the defendant] fits within this tradition of serious and permanent punishment” and is thus constitutionally applied.
No one can know how the Supreme Court will rule when the felon gun ban finally gets to the high court, although no one can doubt that it will. When Justice Amy Coney Barrett was a 7th Circuit judge, she wrote a dissent favoring restoration of gun rights to nonviolent felons. “That is probably the direction that the Supreme Court is headed if and when it takes up these cases,” Willinger said, “which I think it probably has to do at some point in the near future.”
