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Supreme Court’s Final Days Include Criminal Decisions – Update for June 20, 2022

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BIG CRIMINAL DECISIONS STILL PENDING WITH ONLY TWO WEEKS OF SCOTUS TERM LEFT

The Supreme Court held two opinion days last week, but the most-watched criminal cases – United States v. Taylor, Concepcion v. United States and Ruan v. United States – remain among the 18 opinions yet to be issued before the Court’s term ends on June 30.

scotus161130Most people expect the two “big” cases, New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen (a 2nd Amendment case) and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (the possibly-leaked abortion decision) to happen on the last day. But Taylor, which concerns whether an attempted offense that would be a “crime of violence” for application of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) – the mandatory consecutive sentence for using a gun – is a “crime of violence” if it is only attempted but not completed – has been hanging around for six months since its December argument. Concepcion, which concerns proper resentencing considerations in First Step Section 404(b) resentencing, and Ruan, which considers physician liability under 21 USC 841(a), was argued in the Court’s February sitting.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote last week in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog that “the standard and ready explanation, of course, for why decisions in Taylor and Conception may be taking a long time is because the Justices are (perhaps deeply?) divided in these cases, and so we should expect multiple (and lengthy?) opinions. And, to add a bit of spicy speculation, I am inclined to guess that the delay is also partially a function of the Justices in these cases not being divided neatly along the “standard” ideological lines.”

rules201202The only case of interest to defendants last week was Kemp v. United States. In that case, petitioner Dexter Kemp filed a 28 USC 2255 motion in 2015. The District Court dismissed the motion as untimely, and Dix did not appeal. But three years later, he sought to reopen his 2255 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (6), rules which permit a court to reopen an otherwise final judgment if certain conditions are met. A 60(b)(1) motion has to allege that a mistake was made, and must be filed within a year, Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for any other just reason can be filed at any time, but is available only when the other grounds for relief specified in the Rule don’t apply.

Dex was right that the District Court had goofed on dismissing his § 2255 motion as untimely. In a just world, his § 2255 should be reopened, and that would be that. But in the real world, it’s not that easy.

The Supreme Court held that a judge’s error of law is a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1), meaning that Dex’s motion fit under Rule 60(b)(1). Subject to the Rule’s one-year limitations period, Dex’s motion was late and had to be dismissed as untimely.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Any (spicy?) speculations about why SCOTUS has not yet decided Taylor or Conception, two little sentencing cases? (June 13, 2022)

Kemp v. United States, Case No. 21-5726, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 2835 (June 13, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Fecklessness Is No Legal Strategy, 1st Circuit Says – Update for November 15, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SOMETIMES THE DIFFERENT DRUM IS POUNDING OUT THE WRONG BEAT

diffdrummer211115Sandy Flores-Rivera was one of 46 people charged with a drug-trafficking conspiracy. At trial, most of the evidence against Sandy and her co-defendants came from three cooperating witnesses, all of whom fingered Sandy and helped the government present non-testimonial evidence.

After the jury returned guilty verdicts against Sandy and the other defendants, the government belatedly disclosed some pretrial documents created by a cooperating witness. One was a letter to the lead prosecutor, in which the witness described himself as the government’s “best cooperator: “I promised you to do everything you said and I have done it to the point that you know how this has gotten, we have more than we expected, more evidence and more strength for the case…” Another document consisted of notes that the cooperating witness kept of conversations he had with other cooperators while they were in prison together, in which he had encouraged them to testify. Finally, the government disclosed a note showing the FBI knew the cooperating witnesses were talking to each other in jail.

Of course, the government’s failure to disclose this evidence – which suggested the cooperating witnesses were singing a version of the “truth” they thought would be most pleasing to the authorities who controlled their fates – was a slam-dunk violation of the constitutional requirement of disclosure enshrined in Brady v. Maryland.

[Remember Brady? Brush up on it here]

Sandy and the other defendants moved for a new trial under Rule 33(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure due to the Brady violation, but the district court turned them down. On appeal, the other defendants again raised the Brady violation, and this time someone listened: the 1st Circuit granted those other defendants new trials because the court found it was “reasonably probable that the impeachment evidence would have caused the jury to acquit” them.

lawyerjoke180807Sandy’s lawyer, however, marched to a different drummer: he didn’t bother raising the Brady issue in Sandy’s appellate brief, but rather argued a couple of loser claims that hadn’t even been preserved in the lower court record. Those issues ran into what the 1st Circuit called “a stone wall of controlling precedent.” In fact, the Circuit even pointed out in amazement that Sandy’s counsel had joined in the new trial motion at the district court but inexplicably “did not renew the argument despite his clear awareness of his ability to adopt a co-appellant’s arguments in a consolidated case… since he reserved his right to do so in Sandy’s opening brief.”

After losing her appeal while her co-defendants won theirs, Sandy filed a post-conviction motion under 28 USC § 2255 claiming her attorney rendered ineffective assistance on appeal. Last week, the 1st Circuit agreed.

The Circuit said the government’s case against Sandy “depended quite heavily on the largely uncorroborated testimony of the three cooperators. Hence, she would have prevailed on the Brady issue just like her co-defendants had she raised the issue. And for that reason, she establishes prejudice under Strickland.”

Appellate counsel performs deficiently, the Circuit said, when he or she “ignor[es] issues that are clearly stronger than those presented.” Forgoing an argument is not a reasonable strategic decision when there is no downside to objecting to an error or when the omitted argument would not “detract from” but would rather “build upon” another challenge.

feckless211115“Here,” the 1st ruled, “any reasonable attorney handling Flores-Rivera’s appeal would have known of the Brady claim’s availability even after a cursory review of the district court docket and the arguments offered by Flores-Rivera’s co-defendants… Appellate counsel opted to forgo an obviously serious, preserved Brady claim in favor of two dubious plain-error challenges, one of which was foreclosed by binding precedent. That choice resembles rejecting a lifeboat in favor of two lily pads… Fecklessness is not a strategy.”

Flores-Rivera v. United States, Case No. 18-1963, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 32404 (1st Cir. Oct 29, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Procedure Talks, Substance Walks – Update for June 1, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DOES INNOCENCE MATTER? NOT MUCH.

I had a recent email exchange with a guy who, years after his conviction, believes he has the golden bullet to convince his judge that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. When I pointed out he had no procedural route for raising the argument, given that he’s known about the issue for years, he responded that all he has to do is convince the judge of the righteousness of his claim, and the procedure will take care of itself.

innocent210504But procedure never takes care of itself. That is to say, procedure rules over substance. Years ago, Professor Henry J. Friendly complained that habeas corpus procedure had gotten so hidebound that a petitioner’s claim that he or she was actually innocent simply didn’t matter. The title of the law review article said it all: Is Innocence Irrelevant: Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments. Even after Friendly’s now-famous 1970 article, the Supreme Court was unable to untether actual innocence from procedure: in Herrera v. Collins, it held that “a claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.  In other words, a prisoner who is actually innocent must show a constitutional violation to obtain relief.  As dissenting Justice Blackmun complained, the only principle this position espouses is “the principle that habeas relief should be denied whenever possible.”

Two cases this week reminded the defendants that the righteousness of their causes paled in significance next to the “angels-on-the-head-of-a-pin” arguments over procedure. In an 11th Circuit case, Sandchase Cody (we’ll call him “Sandy”) initially won his § 2255 motion, having proven to the sentencing court that some of his prior state convictions should not count as Armed Career Criminal Act predicates.

But his victory turned to ashes at resentencing. Initially, Sandy had been sentenced to 294 months for drug distribution and a concurrent 294 months for the ACCA charge. But instead of resentencing on both counts, the judge merely cut his ACCA count to 120 months – the statutory max without the ACCA – keeping the 294 months on the drug count.

angels170726“Unfair!” Sandy cried, apparently laboring under the misappreciation that fairness actually mattered. He appealed, arguing he should have been resentenced on both counts. But because the appeal only challenged the resentencing, not his favorable § 2255 decision, Sandy did not ask for a certificate of appealability (COA). He argued to the 11th Circuit that because he was appealing the new sentence – and not the § 2255 decision vacating the prior sentence – a COA was not necessary.

Background: Under 28 USC § 2253, a prisoner may not appeal a “final order in a proceeding under § 2255” unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, finding that reasonable judges could debate whether the prisoner’s claim has merit. The intent of the COA procedure is to reduce frivolous appeals, just another way that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act has strangled habeas corpus.

Last week, the 11th Circuit dismissed Sandy’s appeal, holding that the COA requirement applies “not only to an appeal from the final order in a proceeding under section 2255 but also to an appeal from an amended criminal judgment, to the extent it raises section 2255 issues.” By contrast, the Circuit said, direct appeal matters that arise after the § 2255 proceeding — for example, an argument that the district court misapplied the sentencing guidelines at a prisoner’s resentencing — do not require a COA. But Sandy complained in his appeal that § 2255 required he get a complete resentencing, not just a resentencing on one count. That was an argument, the 11th said, over the remedies authorized by § 2255. Thus, it was a § 2255 appeal, and it required a COA.

It seems a trifling point, but procedure prevented his argument from being heard.

In the 6th Circuit, on the other hand, the appeals court ruled that a piece of arcane procedure worked for Edres Montgomery. Edres got resentenced under First Step § 404, the retroactive Fair Sentencing Act. But at resentencing, everyone – including Edres’s lawyer – assumed Edres’s Criminal History range was VI (that’s “6” for the Latin-challenged among us).

But it was only a V (that’s a “5”), Edres discovered afterward, so he appealed. The government argued Edres waived his right to appeal it by not objecting at sentencing. This gave the 6th a chance to expound on waiver, forfeiture, and invited error.

A “defendant can only waive a right that he knows of and actively abandons,” the 6th said. When a claim is waived, it is unappealable. “Forfeiture is at the other end of the spectrum… the passive failure to make a timely assertion of a right.” If a defendant forfeits a claim, “Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) allows us to consider such unpreserved arguments for plain error.”

errorA160425In the middle is “invited error”, where the defendant contributes in some way to the district court’s error without intentionally relinquishing his rights. Here, Edres invited the error when his own lawyer agreed Edres’s Criminal History was VI. This left Edres “more responsible for the district court’s error than when he merely forfeits an argument, but he had not made the conscious choice to waive the argument.” Thus the appeals court said, “the consequences fall in between those for forfeiture and waiver… [and while] we do not review invited errors as a matter of course, but we are also not foreclosed from reviewing them; instead, we review for plain error when “the interests of justice demand” it.

The Court said that under a Rule 52 “plain error” analysis, the mistake should be corrected.

United States v. Cody, Case No. 19-11915, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 16019 (11th Cir. May 28, 2021)

United States v. Montgomery, Case No. 20-1201, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 15382 (6th Cir. May 24, 2021)
– Thomas L. Root

What Did Counsel Know And When Did He Know It? – Update for March 19, 2021

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WHAT WAS THE LAWYER THINKING? 4TH CIRCUIT REMANDS § 2255 CASE TO FIND OUT

interrog170124James Pressley (aka Bubba, according to the court) was interrogated after an alleged drug buy. He said the interrogation was custodial, and no one read him his rights. The cop said it was a friendly, roadside consensual chat. Whatever it was, Bubba implicated himself and got convicted.

On a post-conviction habeas corpus motion filed pursuant to 28 USC § 2255, Bubba claimed his lawyer rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress his incriminating statements. Bubba said he asked counsel to file such a motion, but counsel never did so. The district court denied Bubba’s § 2255 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court found Bubba admitted that he made the incriminating statements after the government offered potential benefits in exchange for cooperation, the cops told Bubba he was not under arrest, and Bubba voluntarily got into the car with the officers.

Last week, the 4th Circuit reversed. Bubba told a version of the interrogation that was much different from the district court’s. He said the police followed him, threaten to intercept him, surrounded him, and pointed weapons at him. But the § 2255 record did not show whether Bubba ever told his lawyer that. What’s more, while his lawyer provided an affidavit to the court, he did not explain any reasons – strategic or otherwise – for declining to file a motion to suppress.

District courts seldom hold hearings on § 2255 motions, and this case was no exception. The 4th said that here, “the record contains only a sworn statement from Pressley’s brother, who relayed a conversation with counsel in which counsel purportedly stated that he would not seek suppression because Bubba “made the statement on himself” and counsel “did not think [a suppression motion] would do any good…. We thus are left to speculate regarding what information counsel knew about the circumstances of the interrogation, and how he evaluated that information before deciding not to file a motion to suppress.”

thinker210319The Circuit conceded that “under the circumstances presented here, counsel could have made a reasonable and informed legal judgment not to file such a motion, after balancing the likelihood of success on the motion with the risk of requiring Pressley to testify at a suppression hearing.” But without knowing what counsel was thinking, Bubba’s § 2255 motion could neither be granted nor denied. “Without knowing what information was available to counsel at the time, or the tactical considerations that competent counsel would be obliged to consider, we cannot determine whether counsel acted within the wide range of professionally competent assistance when he refused to file a motion to suppress.”

United States v. Pressley, Case No. 19-6222, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 7150 (4th Cir., March 11, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Resentencing Good Fortune Can’t Be Bootstrapped Into a New 2255 – Update for February 8, 2021

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GOING BACK TO THE WELL

nogoingback210208Any federal prisoner who has filed a post-conviction habeas corpus motion under 28 USC § 2255 knows that the § 2255 remedy – a powerful way to get as conviction overturned or sentence vacated – is pretty much a one-and-done thing: you can’t file a second § 2255 without permission from a court of appeals (pursuant to 28 USC § 2244). Getting that permission is a pretty tall order, requiring that you show there’s a new Supreme Court decision that the Court has decided should be applied retroactively to cases already decided, or you have some newly-discovered evidence that is so boffo that the jury would have acquitted you and the judge himself would have driven you home.

Charlie Armstrong thought he had found a work-around that would let him file a second § 2255 without having to jump through the § 2244 hoop. After being convicted and imprisoned on a marijuana charge, Charlie found himself to be the beneficiary of the Sentencing Commission’s 2014 reduction of drug-crime scoring for Guidelines sentence. The change was essentially an across-the-board reduction of two levels, and people already sentenced were allowed to apply two their sentencing judges for discretionary resentencing applying the 2-level reduction under the procedure laid out in 18 USC § 3582(c)(2).

After his conviction but before the 2014 Guidelines reduction, Charlie filed a § 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. While the § 2255 motion was pending, the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 782, and after Charlie applied to his sentencing court, his judge cut his sentence by 25%.

mulligan190430Some time later, the district court got around to denying Charlie’s § 2255 motion (which, alas, is the fate of most such motions). Charlie promptly filed a second § 2255, challenging his newly-reduced sentence on the basis of ineffective assistance of his attorney. Charlie explained that he didn’t need § 2244 permission to file the new motion, because his 2-level reduction was a new, intervening judgment giving him the right to challenge the new sentence with a § 2255, essentially giving him a § 2255 mulligan.

The district court disagreed, and dismissed the new § 2255 petition as a second or successive motion.

The 2010 Supreme Court Magwood v. Patterson decision held that if “there is a ‘new judgment intervening between the two [§ 2255] petitions, an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not second or successive.” With this opinion in hand, Charlie appealed the district court’s denial, arguing his 2-level reduction was the exactly the kind of new judgment Magwood had in mind.

doover210208Last week, the 11th Circuit turned him down. The Circuit said that in Magwood, the sentencing court “conducted a full resentencing and reviewed the aggravating evidence afresh,” the 11th said, giving the sentencing judge a chance to commit new errors or to repeat the same errors as in the original sentence. But a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction “does not authorize a sentencing or resentencing proceeding.” Instead, it simply “provides for the ‘modification of a term of imprisonment’ by giving courts the power to ‘reduce’ an otherwise final sentence in circumstances specified by the Commission.”

Armstrong v. United States, Case No 18-13041, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 3265 (11th Cir., February 5, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

“If At First You Don’t Succeed…” Doesn’t Work in Habeas Corpus – Update for October 28, 2020

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WHEN TOO MUCH IS MORE THAN ENOUGH

oneshot201029You pretty much only get one shot trying to convince your judge you were wrongly convicted in a habeas corpus motion under 28 USC § 2255 (except for a few circumstances not relevant here). But how about the “saving clause” in § 2255(e) which lets an inmate use another route to file habeas corpus when a § 2255 petition “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention?”

Roberto Beras, convicted of using his check cashing/money transfer business to launder millions in drug proceeds, figured § 2255(e) meant he could file a § 2241 petition for habeas corpus if the § 2255 no longer worked (because it had already been filed and denied in the 2nd Circuit, and two requests to file successive § 2255s denied as well).

Roberto figured the Supreme Court’s 2008 Cuellar v. United States decision was his ticket home. So even while his § 2255 motion was pending in New York, Roberto was filing § 2241 habeas corpus motions wherever he happened to be. In two petitions filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, he claimed he was innocent under the Cuellar statutory interpretation decision, but the Northern District court disagreed, finding Roberto would have been found guilty even under Cuellar. When Roberto was transferred to a facility in the Western District of Louisiana, he filed the same claim again.

Last week, the 5th Circuit threw out Roberto’s latest § 2241 petition as an “abuse of the writ.”

The § 2255(e) “saving clause” permits an inmate to file a 28 USC § 2241 petition based on new interpretations of federal statutes – like Cuellar – when the claim was previously “foreclosed by circuit law at the time when it should have been raised” and when the “retroactively applicable decision establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense.” But, the Circuit said, that wasn’t the issue here. Instead, Roberto’s § 2241 should be dismissed as “an abuse of the writ of habeas corpus.”

2255(e)filings201029“Abuse of the writ” is a common-law based “body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions.” Under 28 USC § 2244(a), the Circuit held, it can dismiss a successive habeas application as an “abuse of the writ” where the movant raises a claim in a subsequent petition that either was raised or could have been raised in an earlier petition.

The 5th said Roberto “has filed claims in at least four circuits and for nearly twenty years. To allow him to repeat the same claim – heard and denied by another circuit – would be to condone forum-shopping… Perpetual disrespect for the finality of convictions disparages the entire criminal justice system.”

Beras v. Johnson, Case No. 18-30684, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 33058 (5th Cir Oct 20, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Ain’t Over Till It’s Over, DC Circuit Rules on 2255 – Update for October 27, 2020

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WAS IT OVER WHEN THE GERMANS BOMBED PEARL HARBOR?

“Hell, no!” Animal House’s Bluto Blutarsky shouted. He could have been arguing about the mess a district court made of deciding only part of Floyd Clark’s  motion.

bluto201027Floyd was convicted of kidnapping and beating a man. After hewas convicted, the victim recanted his testimony identifying Floyd as his assailant. Floyd filed a 28 USC § 2255 motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, denial of his due process rights (based on the recantation) and a claim that his 18 USC § 924(c) use-of-a-gun conviction should be thrown out, based on Johnson v. United States.

The district court denied all of Floyd’s issues except for the § 924(c) claim. The district judge deferred judgment on the gun argument, saying his opinion “resolves three of Mr. Clark’s claims but leaves the § 2255 motion open until the Court is able to resolve his fourth claim,” because United States v. Davis was pending in the Supreme Court. Floyd appealed the denied claims.

Last week, the DC Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because Floyd’s district court denial was not final. “Because it leaves Clark’s 924(c) claim pending,” the Circuit ruled, “the district court’s order appears nonfinal on its face. A judgment is typically final only when the whole case is complete… We consider an order ‘final’ if it ‘terminates’ the case and leaves nothing for the court but [to] execute the judgment. This final-judgment rule — derived from the common law and codified since the First Congress — has long promoted efficient judicial administration by avoiding the delay and expense of piecemeal appeals.”

It isn’t uncommon for district court § 2255 denials to omit deciding a claim, especially where the inmate’s petition raises a lot of grounds. This decision suggests prisoners should be assertive when a district court opinion purports to resolve a § 2255 petition without deciding every issues raised.

United States v Clark, Case No 19-3040, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 32644 (DC Cir Oct 16, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Procedure Matters on a 2241 Motion, 4th Circuit Says – Update for September 4, 2020

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JUST BECAUSE A 2255 WON’T WORK DOESN’T MEAN A 2241 WILL

A military aphorism credited to more than one general (the oldest of whom was General Omar Bradley) is “amateurs talk strategy, but professionals talk logistics.” A post-conviction adjunct might be, “clients talk substantive issues, but lawyers talk procedure.”

nuns200903What we mean is in post-conviction proceedings on federal convictions, the best case on the planet (imagine a newly-discovered busload of nuns who all swear they saw you helping your mother weed her garden 50 miles from the back that was being robbed at the same time) does not help you if you have no procedural course for getting back into court. And the procedural snares of 28 USC § 2255 are many and varied.

Lee Farkas was charged with various white-collar fraud offenses, and the government got court permission to freeze all of his considerable assets before trial. The purported reason is to be sure there is enough money to pay criminal forfeiture and restitution if the government wins, but the real reason, of course, is that it hamstrings the defendant, making it impossible to afford a defense that might level the playing field with the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

And it worked (for awhile). Lee had a lot of trouble affording the lawyers he needed. The result showed it: Lee was convicted, and got 360 months in prison.

A few years later, after Lee had filed and lost a 28 USC § 2255 motion, the Supreme Court ruled in Luis v. United States that freezing all of a defendant’s innocent assets violated the 6th Amendment. Based on that decision, the 4th Circuit ruled that criminal forfeiture statutes could not reach assets that might be substituted for forfeitable assets if the defendant lost.

Based on these decisions, Lee filed a 28 USC § 2241 petition for habeas corpus, arguing that under the 28 USC § 2255(e) savings clause, he could use the § 2241 to demand a new trial, because the seizure had violated the 6th Amendment and statute. Last week, the 4th Circuit shot him down.

"Actual innocence" is important for procedural reasons as well as substantive ones...
“Actual innocence” is important for procedural reasons as well as substantive ones…

The Circuit followed its three-part test defining the “limited circumstances” under which § 2255 will be “inadequate to test the legality of the prisoner’s detention.” First, at the time of conviction, the settled law of the Circuit or the Supreme Court must have established the conviction’s legality. Second, after the prisoner’s direct appeal and previous § 2255 motion, the substantive law must have changed so that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is no longer criminal or the sentence is illegally extended. And third, the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h) because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.

The 4th said a constitutional issue can never be heard on a § 2241 motion, because a § 2255 motion is intended for adjudicating such claims. What’s more, Lee was not claiming that he was actually innocent of the offense or sentence, but rather that taking his money was a fundamental defect in the proceeding. That is not good enough for a § 2241, the Circuit said.

Farkas v. Warden, Case No. 19-6347, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 27233 (4th Cir. Aug. 26, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Sotomayor Unhappy With 11th Circuit’s Need for Speed – Update for June 16, 2020

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JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR WOODSHEDS 11th CIRCUIT ON § 2244 OPINIONS

Alone among the federal circuit courts of appeal, the 11th has a practice of publishing its decisions on inmates’ 28 USC § 2244 motions seeking the right to bring a second-or-successive § 2255 motion.

oneanddone200616A little background: Every convicted defendant has the right to file one motion to set aside the conviction or sentence under 28 USC § 2255, the federal statute that controls how a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging convictions is brought in the federal system. The filing is subject to strict time limits, and once an inmate files a § 2255 motion and has that motion decided on the merits, he or she cannot bring another unless some tough-to-get permission is first granted by a federal court of appeals.  Like March Madness, this freedom tourney is “one and done.”

To get that permission, a defendant files a motion under 28 USC § 2244 for permission to file a second-or-successive § 2255. Permission is only granted in limited, well-defined circumstances. The § 2244 proceeding is a quickie: the appellate court is to decide the motion in 30 days, leaving the court little time to consider a complex inmate application. The government rarely is permitted to file an opposition to the request. Any denial of an inmate’s § 2244 motion cannot be appealed, reconsidered or taken to the Supreme Court. What is more, the appeals court has to decide it within 30 days of filing, 

Some circuits make it even tougher. In the 11th Circuit, an applicant must confine his or her entire legal argument to a single-page form. To make matters worse, the 11th Circuit publishes its decisions on § 2244 motions.

speeddating200616“Publishes its decisions?” you ask. “How can that be a bad thing? Doesn’t it help future filers by explaining the Court’s position on the issues that may be raised?”

That is true, but the problem is that the courts publish everything, as long as “publish” has a small “p.” When a court Publishes a case with a capital “P,” that means that the case becomes precedent. All district courts in the circuit must follow the precedent, and the court of appeals itself cannot reverse or abandon the precedent unless the court does so in an en banc proceeding. What’s more, the holdings don’t just bind § 2244 filers. They will bind future litigants on direct appeal as well.

(By the way, I use the capital “P”/small “p” for illustration only.  It is not a term of art in law).

Thus, published decisions that are binding on future litigants (including those on direct appeal) are being decided on the sketchiest of records, in a judicial version of “speed dating.”

Last week, Justice Sonia Sotomayor issued a rare concurring statement in a decision denying certiorari to an appellant who had been bound by an 11th Circuit § 2244 denial. Michael St. Hubert argued on appeal that his Hobbs Act robberies were not “crimes of violence” that could support convictions under 18 USC § 924(c) for using a gun during their commission. The issue is quite a live one after last summer’s United States v. Davis. But Mike and several other defendants were shut out by the Circuit because it had already settled the question they raised in its § 2244 proved.

25words200616Justice Sotomayor suggested that the appellate court’s § 2244 practice “raises a question whether the Eleventh Circuit’s process is consistent with due process.” She wrote, “In sum, the Eleventh Circuit represents the ‘worst of three worlds.’ It “publishes the most orders, adheres to a tight timeline that the other circuits have disclaimed,” and “does not ever hear from the government before making its decision.” In this context, important statutory and constitutional questions are decided (for all future litigants) on the basis of fewer than 100 words of argument.”

The Justice urged the 11th Circuit to adopt procedures that “better accord with basic fairness—and would ensure that those like [this defendant] would not spend several more years in prison because of artificially imposed limitations like 100 words of argument.”

United States v. St. Hubert, 2020 US LEXIS 3146 (Supreme Ct. June 8, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Melon Thumping at the Supreme Court – Update for April 2, 2020

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SCOTUS PUNTS ON SUCCESSIVE 2255 MOTION CASE

thumpmelon200402The Supreme Court last week refused to hear a challenge to 28 USC § 2244, the statute governing when prisoners should be permitted to file a second or successive habeas corpus motion under 28 USC § 2254 (for state prisoners) or 28 USC § 2255 (for federal prisoners). The denial is noteworthy for Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s published statement that the high court should settle a circuit split on the issue the next time a similar case comes before it.

Section 2244 states that a second or successive habeas corpus application filed under § 2254 must be dismissed unless it meets one of two very narrow exceptions, being based on a new Supreme Court retroactive constitutional ruling or on newly-discovered facts that just about guarantee the petitioner would have been acquitted by a jury. Like the Biblical eye-of-the-needle, it’s a pretty tight standard to squeeze through.

Although § 2244 by its express terms applies to § 2254 motions, federal appellate courts have traditionally interpreted the provision to apply to § 2255 motions as well.

Ed Avery filed a successive § 2255 motion, but the district court dismissed it based on his failure to get appellate court permission to file under 28 USC § 2244. He appealed to the 6th Circuit, which upheld the dismissal in an unpublished opinion. Six federal courts have ruled that the § 2244 dismissal statute applies to § 2255 motions. But last fall, the 6th Circuit flipped on the issue, holding in a published opinion that § 2244 clearly did not apply to a § 2255 motion.

In the appellate court world, a published opinion becomes precedent that binds all courts, even three-judge panels on the Court of Appeals. An unpublished opinion, along with about $5.00, will get you a venti latte at Starbucks. Ed, no latte drinker, wanted the published opinion to apply to his case, too. Having no other avenue, he went to the Supreme Court.

ventilatte200402An influential Washington, D.C., law firm took up the battle for Ed, arguing in a petition for writ of cert that the 6th Circuit’s published contrary ruling created a circuit split that called for resolution. He faced no pushback: the government had already filed a brief in the 6th Circuit saying it agreed that 28 USC § 2244 does not apply to § 2255 motions.

Predicting what cases the Supreme Court will decide to hear is more of an art than a science. The issue can be one the Court would like to decide, but it may still decline to review a case if the justices don’t think the facts of the case are quite right. It’s kind of like thumping melons in the produce section to decide which one is ready to eat. As you get better at it, you can find a good one more often. But in the end, it’s still how you hear the “thump” on any given day.

The Supremes decided for whatever reason that Ed’s case was not the right one to review in order to resolve the circuit split. Nevertheless, Justice Kavanaugh noted in a separate statement (which in itself is unusual on a denial of certiorari) that “[i]mportantly, the United States now agrees with the Sixth Circuit that ‘Section 2244(b)(1) does not apply to Section 2255 motions’ and that the contrary view is ‘inconsistent with the text of Section 2244.’ In other words, the Government now disagrees with the rulings of the six Courts of Appeals that had previously decided the issue in the Government’s favor. In a future case, I would grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split on this question of federal law.”

Avery v. United States, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 1651 (certiorari denied March 23, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root