Tag Archives: evidentiary hearing

That’s Amaury! – 6th Says Court Can’t Choose to Believe One Side’s § 2255 Facts Without Hearing – Update for January 13, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

6TH SAYS CLASHING § 2255 AFFIDAVITS REQUIRE A HEARING

When a prisoner files a 28 USC § 2255 post-conviction motion claiming his conviction or sentence was marred by poor lawyering, district courts often manage to find all manner of ways to believe the government’s version over the inmate’s.  Last week, the 6th Circuit offered a rare reminder that this isn’t how it is supposed to work.

facts161228The Assistant U.S. Attorney prosecuting Amaury Villa’s case emailed Amaury’s counsel in January 2016 with an offer to enter into a cooperation agreement. Amaury’s lawyer says he told Amaury about the offer the day it was made. Amaury says that he learned about that offer only years later – after his conviction was final – when he obtained the relevant portion of his lawyer’s case file.

As soon as he got the file, Amaury amended his pending 28 USC § 2255 habeas corpus motion with his own affidavit, claiming his lawyer was ineffective for not disclosing the offer at the time. Not to be outdone, the government filed an affidavit from Amaury’s former lawyer, claiming he had told his client right away about the proposed deal.

justthefacts220810The district court summarily adopted the government’s view of the facts and denied Amaury’s motion to amend as untimely. Last week, the 6th Circuit reversed and ordered an evidentiary hearing.

“When a defendant presents an affidavit concerning a factual narrative of the events that is neither contradicted by the record nor inherently incredible and the government offers nothing more than contrary representations to contradict it,” the Circuit said, “the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.”

In this case, the 6th observed, the record contained conflicting affidavits regarding whether Amaury knew of the government’s offer. Thus, the record before the district court did not “conclusively show” that Amaury was not entitled to relief.

The government met with Amaury in 2016, a meeting his lawyer did not attend because the attorney’s father had passed away the night before. “Although an interpreter was not present at the meeting and (according to Villa) his English was ‘not very good,’” the Circuit said, the AUSA told Amaury that the government wanted him to testify against another defendant (for which Amaury presumably would have gotten credit in the form of a better sentence). The AUSA did not mention a cooperation agreement as such, and the meeting was a short one. Amaury later pled guilty without a plea agreement.

confused230113On appeal, the government argued that based on the AUSA’s comments in the short meeting, Amaury should have been aware there was a cooperation agreement on the table. The Circuit rejected that argument: “During that meeting… the AUSA mentioned neither the cooperation agreement nor anything else about what Villa might receive in return for his testimony. Thus, to discover the AUSA’s earlier offer to Villa’s attorney, Villa himself, in effect, would have needed to commence bargaining with the AUSA — by asking what he might have received in exchange for his testimony… That is too much to ask of an uncounseled defendant conversing in his second language with a federal prosecutor.”

Villa v. United States, Case No. 22-5437, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 12 (6th Cir., January 3, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Stranger in a Strange Land – Update for October 13, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

3RD CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT COLORABLE 2255 CLAIMS DEMAND A HEARING

burr221013Venue isn’t a very big deal in federal civil cases. But venue in a criminal trial – the right to be tried “in the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed” – is a 6th Amendment requirement so basic that it has its own jargon: vicinage.

And that makes sense. Just ask Aaron Burr. He got hauled all the way from Louisiana to stand trial in Richmond, Virginia, far from where the offense occurred and witnesses were located.  

Even now, criminal venue can get short shrift.  I once had a Philadelphia lawyer – who had just left the U.S. Attorney’s office – tell me over coffee that lack of venue in an indictment was no big deal because the issue was easily waived and hardly mattered anyway.  

He was wrong.

Dave and Judy Haisten ran a diversified business, selling misbranded pesticides and animal drugs, as well as a variety of counterfeit goods (which included DVDs). They sold some of the pesticides in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The DVDs, however, were seized by customs officials in Cincinnati en route to the Haistens’ South Carolina home.

Dave and Judy were convicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on 14 charges, including two counts of trafficking in counterfeit DVDs. They each got 12 months’ concurrent imprisonment on the first twelve counts (relating to pesticides and animal drugs). However, Dave got 78 months on the two DVD counts, concurrent with the other 12 counts (for a total sentence of 78 months). Judy got 60 months on her DVD counts, all running concurrently.

The Haistens believed that where the DVDs were concerned, they were strangers to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  They argued that venue for the DVD counts only existed in Ohio – where the shipment was intercepted – or South Carolina, where they kept their stash of counterfeit DVDs. But their trial attorney did not request a jury instruction on improper venue or move for acquittal on the DVD counts for lack of proper venue in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

bartsimpson221013The Haistens ultimately filed a joint § 2255 motion, arguing that their lawyer had been ineffective for failing to challenge venue on the DVD counts. The U.S. Attorney’s opposition to their § 2255 motion followed the typical government script: (1) the lawyer did not screw up; (2) the lawyer’s screw-up was done for strategic reasons; and (3) the lawyer’s screw-up did not prejudice the defendants.

The District Court denied Dave and Judy’s § 2255 motion, holding that any venue argument by their lawyer would have been futile because the government had proved venue for the DVD counts, based on a spreadsheet offered by the government that showed the Haistens had sent five DVDs to customers in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Neither the government nor the district court obtained a declaration from the Haistens’ lawyer as to why he did not argue venue.

Last week, the 3rd Circuit reversed the denial, and sent the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. In so doing, the Court of Appeals provided a refreshing reminder that the standard for entitlement to an evidentiary hearing is to be kept low. 

On appeal, the government finally admitted that there was no venue for the DVD counts, because the seized DVDs at issue in those counts were not actually involved in sales to Eastern District of Pennsylvania customers. It argued nevertheless that their lawyer had a strategic reason for not raising venue, and anyway, Dave and Judy could not prove that their sentences would have changed.

The Circuit admitted that an attorney’s performance is not deficient if it is the product of a strategic litigation choice. But, it noted, “a district court must hold a hearing unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief… If a claim, when taken as true and evaluated in light of the existing record, states a colorable claim for relief… then further factual development in the form of a hearing is required.”

strategy221013The 3rd ruled that “colorable legal merit is distinct from actual merit. The threshold for a habeas petitioner’s claim to be colorable is low. The bottom line is, given the lack of evidence in the record about trial counsel’s strategic reasons for failing to object to improper venue on [the DVD counts], it is inconclusive whether the Haistens’ trial counsel performed deficiently. And while we take no definitive position on the merits of the Haistens’ arguments on the prejudice prong, their theory that they are prejudiced by having additional, improperly imposed felony convictions on their record is not so conclusively meritless as to have justified denying them a hearing.”

United States v. Haisten, Case No 21-1421, 2022 U.S.App.LEXIS 27771 (3d Cir., Oct. 5, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

What Did Counsel Know And When Did He Know It? – Update for March 19, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

WHAT WAS THE LAWYER THINKING? 4TH CIRCUIT REMANDS § 2255 CASE TO FIND OUT

interrog170124James Pressley (aka Bubba, according to the court) was interrogated after an alleged drug buy. He said the interrogation was custodial, and no one read him his rights. The cop said it was a friendly, roadside consensual chat. Whatever it was, Bubba implicated himself and got convicted.

On a post-conviction habeas corpus motion filed pursuant to 28 USC § 2255, Bubba claimed his lawyer rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress his incriminating statements. Bubba said he asked counsel to file such a motion, but counsel never did so. The district court denied Bubba’s § 2255 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court found Bubba admitted that he made the incriminating statements after the government offered potential benefits in exchange for cooperation, the cops told Bubba he was not under arrest, and Bubba voluntarily got into the car with the officers.

Last week, the 4th Circuit reversed. Bubba told a version of the interrogation that was much different from the district court’s. He said the police followed him, threaten to intercept him, surrounded him, and pointed weapons at him. But the § 2255 record did not show whether Bubba ever told his lawyer that. What’s more, while his lawyer provided an affidavit to the court, he did not explain any reasons – strategic or otherwise – for declining to file a motion to suppress.

District courts seldom hold hearings on § 2255 motions, and this case was no exception. The 4th said that here, “the record contains only a sworn statement from Pressley’s brother, who relayed a conversation with counsel in which counsel purportedly stated that he would not seek suppression because Bubba “made the statement on himself” and counsel “did not think [a suppression motion] would do any good…. We thus are left to speculate regarding what information counsel knew about the circumstances of the interrogation, and how he evaluated that information before deciding not to file a motion to suppress.”

thinker210319The Circuit conceded that “under the circumstances presented here, counsel could have made a reasonable and informed legal judgment not to file such a motion, after balancing the likelihood of success on the motion with the risk of requiring Pressley to testify at a suppression hearing.” But without knowing what counsel was thinking, Bubba’s § 2255 motion could neither be granted nor denied. “Without knowing what information was available to counsel at the time, or the tactical considerations that competent counsel would be obliged to consider, we cannot determine whether counsel acted within the wide range of professionally competent assistance when he refused to file a motion to suppress.”

United States v. Pressley, Case No. 19-6222, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 7150 (4th Cir., March 11, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

10th Circuit Says Right to § 2255 Hearing Just Requires Solid Claim, Not An Overwhelming Proof – Update for September 3, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SAYIN’ IT DON’T MAKE IT SO

aintso190903Over 50 years ago, the Supreme Court made it clear in Machibroda v. United States that a hearing should be held whenever a post-conviction motion under 28 USC § 2255 does not “conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”

Yet, § 2255 more than a half century later, hearings remain as rare as hen’s teeth, as district courts routinely contort themselves and the record to deny 2255s based on tissue-thin justifications.

The 10th Circuit last week gave district courts a well-needed wake-up call that a defendant is not proven conclusively wrong simply because a defense lawyer’s affidavit says so.

Larry Herring filed a 2255 claiming his trial attorney had been ineffective for not filing a notice of appeal after Len asked him to do so. His former attorney responded with an affidavit saying that he had told Larry that he did not do appeals, and had given his client a list of lawyers to contact. The lawyer stated emphatically that “I was never asked by Mr. Herring to file an appeal on his behalf.”

Citing that affidavit and arguing that the court told Lenny at sentencing about his appeal rights, the Government argued that Len’s complaint was meritless. The district court agreed.

justsayin190903Last week, the 10th Circuit reversed, reminding courts that attorney affidavits contradicting the defendant do not justify denial: “When a district court refuses to grant an evidentiary hearing,” the Circuit ruled, “first, we ask whether the defendant’s allegations, if proved, would entitle him to relief… Here, we hold that, if true, the facts Herring alleged in his section 2255 motion to support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim would entitle him to relief. Therefore, the record does not ‘conclusively show’ that Herring is entitled to no relief, and, accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve Herring’s section 2255 motion.”

As for the argument that the district court advised Herring of his rights and defense counsel gave him some appellate attorneys’ names (none of whom he ever contacted), the 10th said, “Trial attorneys cannot outsource their constitutional obligation to advise their clients about filing an appeal nor their duty to make a reasonable effort to discover their clients’ wishes. Once the duty to consult is invoked by a defendant expressing interest in appealing, trial attorneys must properly advise their client and assess their client’s wishes before withdrawing from the case.”

Herring v. United States, Case No. 18-4023, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 25759 (10th Cir. Aug. 27, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root