Tag Archives: 1st Amendment

1st Amendment Bites BOP – Update for April 17, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DC COURT RULES PRISON REFORM ADVOCATE CAN SUE BOP OVER EMAIL BLOCK

Prison reform advocate Pamela Bailey and her More Than Our Crimes foundation may proceed with her claim that a Bureau of Prisons Trulincs email block on her communications with prisoners violates her 1st Amendment rights.

1stAmendment250306U.S. District Judge Paul L. Friedman granted the BOP’s motion to dismiss 1st Amendment retaliation claims but said Bailey could go forward with her claims on violation of her 1st Amendment free speech and 5th Amendment due process rights.

Bailey sued last April, claiming that seven BOP facilities – FCI Ray Brook, USP Big Sandy, FCI Hazelton, USP Marion, FCI Pekin, FCI Florence and USP Beaumont – blocked her messaging access beginning in 2022. The only reason ever given to her was that some inmates had added her to their approved list of contacts without her full, correct name being stated.

The government has since argued that Bailey was helping inmates pass messages on to other inmates. Unimpressed with this argument, Judge Friedman last June granted a preliminary injunction, ordering “that the BOP restore Ms. Bailey’s TRULINCS access” at the seven facilities.

freespeech221213“In order to ensure that Ms. Bailey’s TRULINCS access is not unconstitutionally blocked during the pendency of this suit,” Judge Friedman wrote, “the Court will also prohibit the BOP from blocking Ms. Bailey’s TRULINCS communication with inmates at those facilities, absent a specific, factual determination of misconduct by Ms. Bailey or the inmate that is timely communicated Ms. Bailey in writing.”

More than Our Crimes states on its website that it “amplifies the voices of the nearly 200,000 Americans in federal prison — many of them people of color. While they were once convicted of serious crimes, our members are ready for a second chance to live freely and contribute to their families and society. Meanwhile, we advocate for a humane prison environment that is centered on rehabilitation.”

Opinion (ECF 28), Bailey v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Case No. 1:24-cv-1219 (D.D.C., Apr 11, 2025)

Opinion (ECF 18), Bailey v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Case No. 1:24-cv-1219, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114113 (D.D.C., June 28, 2024)

More Than Our Crimes.org

– Thomas L. Root

8th Circuit Throws Out Jail’s Publication Ban – Update for March 6, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BOGUS BAN TARGETED SOME BUT NOT ALL MASS MEDIA PUBLICATIONS 

1stamend160923An Arkansas county jail refused newspapers, magazines, and personal correspondence other than postcards. The publisher of Prison Legal News sued because it could not send its newspaper, books, and promotional letters to inmates. The district court found that the jail was violating the publisher’s 1st Amendment rights, and the jail appealed.

Last week, the 8th Circuit agreed that the jail’s postcard-only policy violated PLN’s 1st Amendment rights. Weighing the four factors for judging such bans adopted by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, the Circuit found that while the jail’s policy had a valid and rational connection to the jail’s interests in reducing contraband and promoting efficiency, it created a de facto ban on PLN communicating its publications to inmates.

The jail argued its ban was intended to keep out drugs – presumably soaked into the newsprint – but the jail let the local paper in, leaving the appeals court skeptical that printed publications sent to wide audiences could be manipulated easily to deliver drugs to Baxter County inmates.

1stAmendment250306The 8th ruled that accommodating PLN would have no appreciable impact on the jail. The proposed alternative of allowing publisher mailings while restricting other non-legal personal mail to postcarda was a readily available means of permitting PLN to communicate.

Considering the factors, the 8th held that “[i]n light of the restrictiveness of the Jail’s policy barring all publications in contrast to the limited impact accommodating publishers would have, we conclude the postcard-only policy was not reasonably related to its penological goals and was instead an exaggerated response constituting a blanket prohibition” on PLN’s publications. The Circuit upheld an injunction prohibiting the jail from continuing the policy.

Human Rights Defense Center v. Baxter County, Case No. 23-1888, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 4222 (8th Cir. February 24, 2025)

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)

– Thomas L. Root

Keeping Your Eye On The Prize – Update for February 28, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

4TH CIRCUIT SAYS THAT IN A § 2244 INQUIRY, LEAVE THE PREJUDICE FOR LATER

In order to be allowed to file a second-or-successive 28 USC § 2255 habeas corpus motion, a prisoner has to meet some tough “gatekeeping” standards, that newly discovered evidence would have led a jury to find him or her innocent or that the Supreme Court had adopted a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review, that was previously unavailable.”

threaten250228In 2008, Scott Rendelman was convicted for mailing threatening communications under 18 USC § 876. The district court instructed the jury that the government need prove only that a “reasonable person” would find Scott’s communications threatening, and the jury did so. However, 15 years later, the Supreme Court held in Counterman v. Colorado that the 1st Amendment requires the government to prove that the defendant actually had some understanding of his statements’ threatening character.

Scott, who said his many letters to government officials were just intended to show that prison does not rehabilitate people, asked the 4th Circuit for authorization to file a successive 28 USC § 2255 motion based on Counterman. The government agreed that he had satisfied the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h), but it argued that the court should also impose a “plausibility requirement.”

In other words, the government said, even if Counterman had been applied, Scott would have lost his jury trial. The US Attorney called on the Circuit to require Scott to show that constitutional error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict, as required for relief under § 2255.”

eyesonprize250228The 4th refused the government’s demand. “The focus of our inquiry at this stage must always remain on the § 2255(h) gatekeeping standards,” the Circuit wrote. “We’ve already found that Rendelman has satisfied the § 2255(h) gatekeeping requirements. There isn’t an additional plausibility requirement he must meet… Counterman is on point. Rendelman was prosecuted for a true-threat offense. The jury wasn’t instructed that the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he subjectively intended to threaten another, and the government acknowledges that this omission was error… Whether that error warrants relief under § 2255 is a merits question for the district court to decide in the first instance when it considers Rendelman’s § 2255 motion.

In re Rendelman, Case No. 23-257, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 4087 (4th Cir. February 21, 2025)

Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023)

– Thomas L. Root

The Short Rocket – Update for April 12, 2024

rocket-312767We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

Today, some short odds to end the week…

Gun Cases Still Being Decided While Rahimi Await SCOTUS Decision: Holding that the government had not satisfied its burden to justify that 18 USC § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on all felons possessing guns is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,” an Eastern District of Michigan US District Court judge threw out a § 922(g) indictment against Ron Williams in late February.

Meanwhile, a Northern District of Illinois court has dismissed a § 922(g)(5) case against Heriberto Carbajal-Flores for possessing a gun while illegally or unlawfully being in the United States. Heriberto had had two prior motions denied, but the court reversed itself based on the 3rd Circuit’s Range v. AG and 7th Circuit’s Atkinson v. Garland decisions.

The government has appealed both cases.

United States v. Williams, Case No. 23-cr-20201, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30849 (ED Mich., Feb 22, 2024)

United States v. Carbajal-Flores, Case No. 20-cr-00613, 2024U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40974 (N.D.Ill. Mar 8, 2024)

BOP Proposed Social Media Ban Draws Fire: Two civil rights groups blasted the BOP last week for a proposed crackdown on imprisoned peoples’ access to social media—including a possible ban on accounts run by family on the outside. The ACLU and Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University said the proposed procedures would violate the Constitution.

socialmedia240412Inmates’ rights advocacy groups say that the rule would restrict the 1st Amendment rights of not only prisoners but also people not in BOP custody. Ebony Underwood, whose nonprofit We Got Us Now works with the children of incarcerated parents, called the social media proposal “archaic and so inhumane.”

Knight wrote in reply comments:

For the nearly 2 million people who are incarcerated in U.S. jails and prisons, maintaining connection with loved ones and communities is associated with better physical and mental health outcomes, reduced recidivism, and successful reentry into society. Social media is increasingly becoming an important part of that connection. As one formerly incarcerated journalist recently recounted, using social media through his wife allowed him to pursue a writing career, stay in touch with his community, and give him hope of reintegration upon release.

The public comment period closed on April 1. The federal register website shows that the proposed rule received 219 comments, though only 22 have been posted online.

The Appeal, Civil Rights Groups Decry Proposed Federal Prison Social Media Crackdown (April 4, 2024)

Techspot, US prison system proposes total social media ban for inmates, sparking First Amendment concerns (April 2, 2024)

Knight 1st Amendment Institute, Comment re: BOP social media rules (April 1, 2024)

BOP Dumps ACA: After being blasted by the DOJ Inspector General last November for its conflict-riddled relationship with the American Correctional Association, the BOP last week announced that it would not renew its $2.75 million contract with the accreditation organization.

ACAaward240307The ACA, which accredits prisons, first started accrediting BOP facilities in 1980. However, the Bureau said on Monday it has decided to part ways. However, a report issued by the Dept of Justice Inspector General found that instead of providing an independent evaluation of BOP facilities, the ACA “instead relied on the prisons’ own internal reports during reaccreditation reviews.” In other words, as the DOJ put it, “it appears the BOP is, in effect, paying ACA to affirm the BOP’s own findings.”

In an announcement last week, the BOP said it “has decided to explore other options to ensure continued improvement and innovation in correctional standards for the well-being of adults in custody and the FBOP’s workforce. The FBOP remains committed to a rigorous assessment of its policies and practices involving all levels of leadership to inform continuous organizational improvement.”

Law360, BOP Drops Accreditation Org After IG, Sens. Raise Concerns (April 1, 2024)

DOJ Office of Inspector General, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Contract Awarded to the American Correctional Association (Nov 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Sex Offender Reporting Requirement Held Unconstitutional – Update for September 21, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DISTRICT COURT HOLDS SEX OFFENDER INTERNET REPORTING LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL

pornC160829In the pantheon of criminal offenses, none feels seamier or more disgusting than sex offenses. The label covers crimes from groping to rape to possessing child porn, with the offenders routinely not just given long prison sentences but subjected to limitations during and after prison that drug offenders, fraudsters and robbers never experience.

A rudderless young man who robbed a couple of banks and served over a decade in federal prison turned a talent as a “jailhouse lawyer” into a law school degree and admission to the bar. He’s now a celebrated law school professor and was even the subject of a laudatory 60 Minutes story. And he deserves it.

But what if, instead of armed bank robbery, the inmate had downloaded images of naked children engaged in simulated sex.  Just my opinion here, but I suspect the 60 MInutes crew would have stayed home, the State of Washington bar would never have found him to be rehabilitated, and his name would be found on the Internet – along with his address and a warning that he was a sex offender – as a warning to neighbors instead of hagiography. He’d be serving up Slurpees at 7-Eleven instead of training future lawyers at Georgetown.

kporn160124Sex crimes are forever, and the “forever” is untethered to the degree of harm caused to society. Rape and sex abuse are one thing, but as disgusting as I find the idea of looking at (let alone collecting) suggestive images of naked kids, I have trouble with the idea that we can forgive a history of violence but not someone who looked at flickering images on a computer screen.

No crime is as easy to demagogue as is a sex crime. That may be why Congress has found it so easy to rachet up minimum sentences for kiddie porn offenses. The Sentencing Commission has candidly acknowledged that at the direction of Congress, it has amended USSG § 2G2.2 several times, each time recommending harsher penalties. In United States v. Dorvee, the 2nd Circuit noted that the rachet effect persisted despite the Sentencing Commission being

openly opposed [to] these Congressionally directed changes… Speaking broadly, the Commission has also noted that “specific directives to the Commission to amend the guidelines make it difficult to gauge the effectiveness of any particular policy change, or to disentangle the influences of the Commission from those of Congress.”

There’s some evidence that the Congressional view of child porn punishment is at odds with public sentiment. US District Court Judge James Gwin of the Northern District of Ohio, as an experiment, had jurors in his courtroom anonymously note a recommended sentence for people they convicted, He would not look at the recommendations until he had imposed sentence. In one sex offender case, he wrote,

While this case and the jury selected to hear it were unremarkable, the disparity between the punishment that the jury felt [the defendant] should receive and the punishment recommended by the Guidelines was striking. The jurors’ mean recommended sentence was 20 months imprisonment, and the median recommended sentence was 15 months. The Guidelines recommended a sentence between 87 and 108 months. Even the low end of the Guidelines range was almost six times the jurors’ median recommendation.

All of the foregoing gets us to today’s case. Connecticut law requires that after release, convicted sex offenders disclose to police all of their email and social media addresses, as well as other Internet communication identifiers. Jim Cornelio, a released offender, sued in federal court, claiming the disclosure requirement violated his 1st Amendment right to free speech.

sexpornoffender230921Last week, the US District Court for Connecticut agreed. The Court held that by compelling Jim to disclose all of his Internet addresses and identifiers, “the law chills and inhibits his right to speak freely on the Internet and to do so anonymously if he wishes… [Thus], the State must show that the law advances an important government interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free speech. And it must also show that the law does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further the government’s interest.”

The Judge held that the State “has an important government interest in detecting and deterring sex offenders from using the Internet to engage in crime.” However, although the disclosure law has been in place for over 15 years,

the State cannot point to a single example of when its database of sex offenders’ email addresses and other Internet communication identifiers has helped the police detect or solve any crimes. And the State concedes that it has no evidence that requiring sex offenders to disclose their Internet communication identifiers deters them from using the Internet to commit more crimes. Moreover, even if I assumed that the State was able to show that the disclosure law advances an important government interest, the State nonetheless fails to show that the breadth of the disclosure law does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further that interest.

United States v. Dorvee, 604 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2010)
United States Sentencing Commission, The History of the Child Pornography Guidelines (October 2009)

Cornelio v Connecticut, Case No 3:19-cv-1240, 2023 USDist LEXIS 163106 (D.Conn. Sep 14, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court: OK’s Statute Because It Only Prohibits Some Protected Speech – Update for June 26, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS NARROWS REACH OF IMMIGRATION STATUTE IN ORDER TO SAVE IT

The Supreme Court ruled last Friday in United States v. Hansen that 8 USC 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) – which prohibits “encourag[ing] or induc[ing]” illegal immigration – “forbids only the intentional solicitation or facilitation of certain unlawful acts.”

1stamend160923The 9th Circuit had held that the statute was an unconstitutional abridgment of the 1st Amendment because it criminalized “immigration advocacy and other protected speech.” Justice Barrett’s 7-2 opinion ruled that “[t]hat was error.  Properly interpreted, this provision… does not prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected speech — let alone enough to justify throwing out the law’s plainly legitimate sweep.”

A “substantial amount” sounds a lot like a new 1st Amendment test.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, wrote in a dissent that “the majority departs from ordinary principles of statutory interpretation to reach [its] result. Specifically, it rewrites the provision’s text to include elements that Congress once adopted but later removed as part of its incremental expansion of this particular criminal law over the last century. It is neither our job nor our prerogative to retrofit federal statutes in a manner patently inconsistent with Congress’s choices…”

ACLU lawyers who supported Hansen’s appeal said they welcomed the court’s action narrowing the scope of the statute. “The Supreme Court has drastically limited the encouragement provision to apply only to intentional solicitation or facilitation of immigration law violations,” said Esha Bhandari, deputy director of the ACLU’s Speech, Privacy and Technology Project. “As written by Congress, the law has left people wondering what they can safely say on the subject of immigration. Now we expect the government to respect free speech rights and only enforce the law narrowly going forward.”

United States v. Hansen, Case No 22-179, 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2638 (June 23, 2023)

NBC, Supreme Court upholds law against encouraging illegal immigration (June 23, 2023)

Los Angeles Times, ‘Encouraging’ illegal immigration is not protected as free speech, Supreme Court rules (June 23, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

The Short Rocket – Update for January 27, 2023

rocket190620We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

Today, the short rocket – decisions from around the federal circuits…

SOME CASE SHORTS

Timing is Everything: In 2015, Benny Hall pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and using a gun in a crime of violence, (an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offense). After the Supreme Court decided in United States v. Davis that conspiracy to commit a crime of violence was not itself a crime of violence that supported a § 924(c) conviction for using a gun in a crime of violence, Benny filed a 28 U.S.C. §2255 post-conviction motion asking that the § 924(c) be thrown out.

corso170112The government convinced the district court that Benny’s § 924(c) conviction didn’t depend only on the conspiracy, but also on his admissions in open court that established that he had actually attempted to commit the robbery.

‘Gotcha!’ the government cried.

‘Not so fast!’ the 2nd Circuit replied last week. Last summer, the  Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Taylor that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence. The Circuit threw out § 924(c) conviction and the mandatory 10-year add-on sentence it represented.

Hall v. United States, Case No 17-1513, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 1256 (2d Cir., January 19, 2023)
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11th Holds Drug Conspiracy Can’t Lead to Guidelines ‘Career Offender’: Brandon Dupree was convicted of a 21 U.S.C. § 846 drug conspiracy, and was hammered at sentencing as a Guidelines “career offender” (which dramatically increased the advisory sentencing range). An 11th Circuit panel rejected Brandon’s argument that an inchoate offense (that is, a mere plan to commit a crime) does not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of the Guidelines ‘career offender’ enhancement.

brandon230127Last week, the full Circuit sitting en banc said, ‘Let’s go, Brandon,’ and reversed his ‘career offender’ sentence. The 11th ruled that “application of the enhancement turns on whether the ‘instant offense of conviction’ is ‘a controlled substance offense’ [under USSG] 4B1.1(a)… The plain text of 4B1.2(b) unambiguously excludes inchoate crimes. Dupree must be resentenced without application of the career offender enhancement.”

United States v. Dupree, Case No 19-13776, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 1183 (11th Cir., January 18, 2023)
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Channeling Your Inner Habeas: People are always asking why they can’t point out in their 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release motions that their sentences were wrongly calculated, that their lawyers were ineffective imbeciles, that something was very wrong with how they were convicted.

reallawyer170216Mike Escajeda was convicted of selling drugs and carrying a gun. After losing his direct appeal, Mike filed a compassionate release motion, arguing that the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” required by an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release motion were that (1) his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He even admitted in his motion that he had filed for compassionate release because he figured that he could not win relief under § 2255.

Last week, the 5th Circuit ruled that the habeas-channeling rule prevented Mike from raising 2255-type issues in a compassionate release motion. The Circuit said, “Congress provided specific avenues for post-conviction relief that permit prisoners to challenge the legality of their confinement in federal court… The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that by codifying these specific provisions, Congress required prisoners to bring their legality-of-custody challenges under [28 USC 2241, 2244, 2254, and 2255], and prohibited prisoners from bringing such claims under other, more-general statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

[A] prisoner cannot use § 3582(c) to challenge the legality or the duration of his sentence,” the 5th held. “Such arguments can, and hence must, be raised under [the habeas statutes]… Because Escajeda’s claims would have been cognizable under § 2255, they are not cognizable under § 3582(c).”

United States v. Escajeda, Case No 21-50870, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 1041 (5th Cir., January 17, 2023)
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DOJ SORNA Rule Blocked: The U.S. District Court for Central District of California last week issued a preliminary injunction blocking the Dept of Justice’s new Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act rule because it violated due process and the 1st Amendment.

injunction230127The rule requires people who had been convicted of a sex crime to register as sex offenders in their state, even if the sex crime convictions have been expunged and the people are not allowed by the state to register. Because plaintiff John Doe could not register, the DOJ’s rule said that he could be prosecuted at any time, and he would have been forced to prove that registration was impossible — “an affirmative defense,” Doe’s lawyer said, “that turns the presumption of innocence on its head.

The court ruled that it was likely an unconstitutional violation of due process to require anyone to affirmatively prove his innocence when he had never been convicted.

Preliminary injunction, ECF 55, Doe v. DOJ, Case No 5:22-cv-855 (CD Cal., Jan 13, 2023)

Reason, A Federal Judge Says the DOJ’s Sex Offender Registration Rules Violate Due Process by Requiring the Impossible (January 19, 2023)

Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Adds Two Criminal Cases to Docket – Update for December 13, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS GRANTS REVIEW ON TWO CRIMINAL CASES

Last Friday, the Supreme Court agreed to review two federal criminal cases.

In the first case, the Court will consider the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1), which makes it a crime punishable by up to 10 years in prison to encourage or cause unauthorized immigrants to enter or reside in the United States.

freespeech221213Helaman Hansen was convicted for running a program that promised to help adult unauthorized immigrants become US citizens through adoption. On appeal, the 9th Circuit agreed that the statute violated the 1st Amendment because it is so broad that it would also apply to protected speech – for example, voicing support to a young illegal immigrant (OK, “undocumented” is the politically correct term, but then, if the immigrant were not here illegally, we wouldn’t be writing about this) that she not return to, say, Iceland, but instead fight to qualify for DACA is a federal criminal offense under § 1324(a)(1).

Maybe not the best illustration: stopping hordes of blond-haired blue-eyed people sneaking across our undefended borders is not our problem. Some, like a former President, even liked the idea.

Back to Mr. Hansen: The government appealed the 9th Circuit decision invalidating his conviction. 

Last week the Supreme Court granted review.

In a second case, the high court agreed to take an 18 USC § 924(c) case. Section 924(c) mandates a consecutive sentence of a certain minimum term when a gun is possessed or used in a drug trafficking offense or a violent crime.

carriefgun170807Under 18 USC § 3584(a), a district court may impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences unless a statute requires otherwise. Section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) of Title 18 requires consecutive sentences but only for sentences imposed “under this subsection.” Efrain Lora was convicted and sentenced under § 924(j), a different subsection that sets punishments where “a person… in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm.”

Curiously, § 924(c) includes no requirement that the sentence must be consecutive. This suggests that if an offender is going to use a gun in a violent crime, he should be sure to kill someone (and thus get a possibly better sentence).

Lora argued a district court has the discretion to impose concurrent sentences because § 924(j) creates a separate offense not subject to § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).

The 2nd Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court was required to impose consecutive sentences because a § 924(j) counts as being “under” § 924(c).

The 3rd, 4th, 8th and 9th Circuits agree with the 2nd Circuit. The 10th and 11th do not. The question the Supreme Court granted review is whether § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), which provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed… under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment,” is triggered when a defendant is sentenced under § 924(j).

Both cases will be argued this term and decided by the end of June.

United States v. Hansen, Case No. 22-179 (certiorari granted December 9, 2022)

Lora v. United States, Case No 22-49 (certiorari granted December 9, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

The Sheriff Was Making It Up – Update for January 28, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

YOU PUT THE WORDS RIGHT IN MY MOUTH

In October 2018, two Butts County Sheriff’s deputies placed signs in the front yards of all 57 registered sex offenders in the County, warning kids to “STOP” and “NO TRICK-OR-TREAT AT THIS ADDRESS.” When one of the people whose house had the posted sign called the Sheriff, he was told it was a crime to remove it.

trickortreatsign220128

The next year, three of the registered sex offenders sued, seeking a court order prohibiting the Sheriff from placing the signs again. The district court denied the injunction.

Last week, the 11th Circuit reversed, concluding that “the Sheriff’s warning signs are compelled government speech, and their placement violates a homeowner’s First Amendment rights.” The Court noted that First Amendment protection “includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all… The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of individual freedom of mind.”

Where First Amendment rights are implicated, the state has to show it has a “compelling interest” in doing so and that the violation is “narrowly tailored” to achieve that end. Everyone agreed that protecting kids from sex abuse is compelling. But the Sheriff tried to swat a fly with a sledgehammer.

Before placing the signs, the Sheriff didn’t consider whether any of the registrants were classified as likely to recidivate. What’s more, he admitted that in the past six years he’d been Sheriff, he had never had an issue with a registrant having unauthorized contact or reoffending with a minor. The Sheriff could not show the Butts County sex offenders “actually pose a danger to trick-or-treating children or that these signs would serve to prevent such danger.”

trick220128Influencing the decision might have been the Sheriff’s explanation that he had placed the signs because Georgia law forbids registered sex offenders from participating in Halloween. After the warning signs were placed, the Sheriff posted a message on the Department’s Facebook page, along with a picture of the sign, in which he said as much. That was more trick than treat: Georgia law says nothing of the such.

“Assuming that yard signs alerting people to the residences of registered sex offenders on Halloween would prevent the sexual abuse of children (which, we repeat, is not supported by any record evidence),” the Circuit held, “the signs are not tailored narrowly enough.”

The decision against the Sheriff does not seem to have affected his popularity…

sheriffFB220128

McClendon v. Long, Case No. 21-10092, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 1635 (11th Cir., Jan. 19, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

State Can’t Make You Say “Uncle” – Update for October 30, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BRANDED

Remember when you were a kid, and the neighborhood bully would knock you down and push your face into the mud or twist your arm or something until you cried “Uncle”? That is what is known as “compelled speech.

Nine states require sex offenders to carry driver’s licenses emblazoned with some variation of the words “SEX OFFENDER” in bright capital letters across the top of the card. It’s like making the former defendant say “Uncle!” for the rest of his life, every time he writes a check, votes or goes to the doctor (all places we regularly have to show our DLs, at least in Ohio).

brand201031In Louisiana, Tazin Hill had had enough crying “Uncle.” He altered his license to hide the sex-offender label, and he was charged with a felony for doing so. Last week, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that making sex offenders carry the labeled licenses violated the 1st Amendment by compelling them to say something the government ordered them to say, known as “compelled speech.” In this case, the label “SEX OFFENDER” was what the license holders were compelled to say.

The court held the identification card, branded with the words “sex offender” and the person’s “name, picture, address, and other identifying characteristics… is that “readily associated with him” and must be routinely displayed to others. Thus, “the branded identification card is compelled speech, and it is a content-based regulation of speech that consequently must pass strict scrutiny. While the state certainly has a compelling interest in protecting the public and enabling law enforcement to identify a person as a sex offender, Louisiana has not adopted the least restrictive means of doing so. A symbol, code, or a letter designation would inform law enforcement that they are dealing with a sex offender and thereby reduce the unnecessary disclosure to others during everyday tasks… As Louisiana has not used the least restrictive means of advancing its otherwise compelling interest, the branded identification requirement is unconstitutional.”

A state could as easily require people to carry licenses labeled “convicted felon” or “annoying neighbor” or even “leaves toilet seat up.” The mischief a state government can cause once people are being labeled is vast, making this and other similar decisions applicable to everyone, not just people convicted of sex offenses.

Louisiana v Hill, Case No 20-0323, 2020 LA LEXIS 2512 (LA Sup Ct Oct 20, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root