Tag Archives: 1st Amendment

8th Circuit Holds Sex Offenders Don’t Need to Self-Shame on Halloween – Update for January 9, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HERE’S SOME CANDY, LITTLE GIRL…

In the universe of criminal offenses, there is no category more reviled than that of sex offender. It’s a broad category – covering every crime from looking at kiddie porn downloaded from the Internet to statutory rape to horrific physical abuse of a baby – but the “sex offender” label is enough for most people to generate loathing and repugnance not just at the offense but at the offender.

And no offense is easier for a politician to demagogue. I know of prisoners – adults who are first-time offenders – serving 50-year sentences for child porn crimes that involved no physical contact whatsoever. Say what you want, in a system where the average federal sentence for murder is about 25 years, the time meted out in the federal system for child sex offenses redefines “Draconian,” suggesting that defendants would do better murdering their victims than sexually abusing them. (Neither is a good idea, but the inversion between the average sentence for taking a life and for producing a disgusting video is puzzling).

Every few months, I will have some inmate serving a horrific sentence for child porn ask when Congress is going to do something to reduce his (or occasionally, her) sentence. My answer’s always the same: no legislator ever lost an election by being too hard on kiddie porn. I know of about 538 elected people on Capitol Hill who would swim drunk and naked in the Tidal Basin with the “Argentine Firecracker” before signing on to a bill that injected any sense into sex offender sentences.

For such offenders, the punishment never ends. Thomas Sanderson knows that. Come every October, Sanderson and his family have always set up large, elaborate Halloween displays involving decorations, sound effects, and fog machines. You know the type: 15-foot skeletons, big blow-up ornaments, orange lights… the works. As a district court judge described it, the Halloween Sandersons regularly were “throwing large parties, hosting a bonfire, handing out candy to children outside, decorating [their] residence, and keeping… lights on.”

In 2006, Tom was convicted of sodomy with a 16-year-old female friend of the family. Section 566.010 of the Missouri Revised Statutes defines sodomy as “deviant sexual misconduct.” What is “deviant sexual misconduct” in Missouri is quite broad, including virtually any offense where penetration does not occur, even just getting “handsy” with the crotch of the victim. Not to discount the mental trauma that such conduct may inflict on the victim, but being convicted of sodomy in Missouri is something much less than its Biblical definition.

No matter. Tom was labeled a sex offender who was required to register annually with the authorities. Plus, while he was locked up, Missouri passed the so-called Halloween Statute in 2008 (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 589.426)

The statute restricts registered sex offenders from participating in Halloween, requiring  them on October 31st to

(1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children;

(2) Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to employment or medical emergencies;

(3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence;” and

(4) Leave all outside lights off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.

When Tom was released, he asked the local police whether he was required to comply with the Halloween statute, given that he had been convicted well before the law was enacted. The police assured him that he had been “grandfathered in” and thus could continue participating in Halloween festivities (which, as we shall see, is a great cautionary tale illustrating why you should never accept legal advice from a cop).

For the next 14 years, Tom’s Halloween displays didn’t just continue, they grew more extravagant with each year. But in 2022, although Tom had never been accused of any further sexual misconduct, some neighborhood Karen complained that Tim was having innocent fun by participating in Halloween.  Consequently, Tom was arrested, charged, and convicted for violating the Halloween statute (a crime for which he got probation).

Tom brought a facial challenge to the Halloween statute under the 1st Amendment, specifically arguing that subsection 3 — the sign mandate — unconstitutionally compelled speech from all Missouri registered sex offenders. After a bench trial, the district court found the sign mandate unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction preventing the State from enforcing it anywhere in Missouri.

Missouri appealed.

Last week, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the sign requirement cannot survive the “strict scrutiny” required by constitutional law and thus violates the 1st Amendment.

The government can restrict private speech – and even force people to say things they don’t want to (“compelled speech”) – when it can establish a compelling state interest in preventing the harm that the restriction addresses and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to address that harm. Here, the Circuit ruled that

the sign mandate is not merely incidental to conduct: it explicitly requires registrants to post a sign bearing a specific message. True, the other three provisions of the Halloween statute regulate a registrant’s conduct. But the sign mandate requires only speech (the posting of a sign with the government’s message), not any other related conduct. In fact, it requires verbatim speech… Because the sign mandate (1) explicitly requires registrants to speak the government’s message in the form of a sign at their residence, and (2) dictates specifically what that sign must say, it compels speech.

Missouri argued that the sign requirement served a compelling state interest by making it easier for police officers to “be able to ensure that there is compliancy” without getting out of their cruisers, thus making enforcement of the Halloween statute more efficient, and providing “an extra layer of protection for children.” However, Missouri conceded that there was no requirement that the sign be put in front of the house instead of the rear (or even posted in the resident’s kitchen) and even if the sign were on a Post-It note, it would be in “compliancy” if it had the right wording. (Making up words is not a state felony, but it should be – a topic for another time).

The 8th held that while Missouri argued it had a compelling interest by demonstrating that Halloween presented unique risks for “grooming” children that could lead to future abuse, it “could not provide any evidence for the claim that signs provide any additional protection beyond the other restrictions imposed on registrants in the Halloween statute. There was no evidence to support the idea that children would be at risk if there was no sign, so long as the registrant complied with the remaining provisions of the statute (i.e., remaining inside the residence, not giving candy to or otherwise engaging with children, and leaving lights off). In other words, nothing in the record indicates that a child knocking on a door that no one opens presents a risk to that child.”

What was more, the Circuit ruled, while

[w]e agree with the State that narrow tailoring does not require “perfect” tailoring. Here, however, there is insufficient evidence to support the State’s assertion that the sign mandate is the least restrictive means of achieving its goals. The record does not support the claim that, despite the remaining provisions of the Halloween statute, the sign mandate is necessary to further the government’s compelling interest in protecting children on Halloween. Accordingly, the sign mandate burdens more speech than necessary and fails strict scrutiny.

Missouri, in true “smear the defendant” fashion, tried to offer testimony from the victim, then 16 years old but now in her 30s, and from its expert – who had never met Tom – about Tom’s “dangerousness.” One can fairly ask whether the 20 years that passed since Tom’s offense and Halloween 2024 didn’t suggest that maybe he was rehabilitated (especially since he had celebrated Halloween in his usual overblown fashion for 14 years without any suggestion of sexual misconduct).

The 8th, however, said that Tom’s record didn’t matter: “[E]ven if the evidence had been admitted, it would not have affected the verdict. That is because any evidence of Sanderson’s dangerousness—either from [the 2006 victim] or from the State’s expert, who never met or conducted an evaluation of Sanderson—would have supported only the compelling interest prong of the legal analysis. But, as discussed, the sign mandate failed strict scrutiny on the second prong: whether it was narrowly tailored. Nothing about the unique risks posed by Sanderson—or any other registrant for that matter—would have overcome the sign mandate’s tailoring deficiency.”

Sanderson v. Hanaway, Case Nos. 24-3120, 24-3204, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 3, at *11-12 (8th Cir. Jan. 2, 2026)

~ Thomas  L. Root

3rd Circuit Gives Amateur Inmate Litigant a Mulligan – Update for November 7, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DO-OVER

Thomas Petoff, a federal prisoner confined to a wheelchair, filed an administrative remedy after he was denied a wheelchair cushion. He said that in retaliation, he was thrown in the Special Housing Unit (SHU), had his wheelchair confiscated, suffered assaults and humiliating treatment, was denied food (including his “religious diet”), medical care, recreation, and law library access, and ultimately lost good-time credits and was fined. He sued.

He threw every claim the jailhouse lawyers in the prison library told him to throw at the defendant. It was a hodgepodge of high-falutin’ legalese used by someone who had no idea what he was doing.

The district court construed Tom’s pro se complaint as raising 1st, 5th, and 8th Amendment claims under Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. That wasn’t enough to keep the case from being dismissed with prejudice. For good measure, the Court said Tom’s complaint was barred by Heck v. Humphrey to the extent that his claims undermined disciplinary sanctions.

It was kind of a ‘get out and don’t come back’ dismissal.

Last week, the 3rd Circuit largely agreed on the Bivens and Heck analyses, but held that pro se litigants must be given an opportunity to amend to pursue non-futile statutory theories—here, the Rehabilitation Act and Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

As for the Bivens claim, the Circuit ruled that Tom’s allegations failed in light of the Supreme Court’s decision last summer in Goldey v. Fields, that foreclosed Bivens actions for 8th Amendment excessive force claims.

To the extent that Tom’s claims might call into question the validity of the disciplinary proceeding findings that he had violated prison rules, the 3rd said those claims are barred by the Heck v. Humphrey favorable-termination rule. That rule holds that to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged, declared invalid by a state court, or called into question by a federal court on habeas corpus.

However, the Circuit said, Tom got a mulligan on some of his claims. The 3rd said that the district court failed to address Tom’s Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act claim, as well as his later-clarified RFRA “religious diet” claim. Although Tom did not plead those claims very well, the 3rd said that an amendment cleaning up those claims would not necessarily have been futile. It remanded Tom’s suit to the district court to give him a fair chance to amend.

Petoff v. Delmonico, Case No. 24-2933, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 27737 (3d Cir. October 23, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

1st Amendment Bites BOP – Update for April 17, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DC COURT RULES PRISON REFORM ADVOCATE CAN SUE BOP OVER EMAIL BLOCK

Prison reform advocate Pamela Bailey and her More Than Our Crimes foundation may proceed with her claim that a Bureau of Prisons Trulincs email block on her communications with prisoners violates her 1st Amendment rights.

1stAmendment250306U.S. District Judge Paul L. Friedman granted the BOP’s motion to dismiss 1st Amendment retaliation claims but said Bailey could go forward with her claims on violation of her 1st Amendment free speech and 5th Amendment due process rights.

Bailey sued last April, claiming that seven BOP facilities – FCI Ray Brook, USP Big Sandy, FCI Hazelton, USP Marion, FCI Pekin, FCI Florence and USP Beaumont – blocked her messaging access beginning in 2022. The only reason ever given to her was that some inmates had added her to their approved list of contacts without her full, correct name being stated.

The government has since argued that Bailey was helping inmates pass messages on to other inmates. Unimpressed with this argument, Judge Friedman last June granted a preliminary injunction, ordering “that the BOP restore Ms. Bailey’s TRULINCS access” at the seven facilities.

freespeech221213“In order to ensure that Ms. Bailey’s TRULINCS access is not unconstitutionally blocked during the pendency of this suit,” Judge Friedman wrote, “the Court will also prohibit the BOP from blocking Ms. Bailey’s TRULINCS communication with inmates at those facilities, absent a specific, factual determination of misconduct by Ms. Bailey or the inmate that is timely communicated Ms. Bailey in writing.”

More than Our Crimes states on its website that it “amplifies the voices of the nearly 200,000 Americans in federal prison — many of them people of color. While they were once convicted of serious crimes, our members are ready for a second chance to live freely and contribute to their families and society. Meanwhile, we advocate for a humane prison environment that is centered on rehabilitation.”

Opinion (ECF 28), Bailey v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Case No. 1:24-cv-1219 (D.D.C., Apr 11, 2025)

Opinion (ECF 18), Bailey v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Case No. 1:24-cv-1219, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114113 (D.D.C., June 28, 2024)

More Than Our Crimes.org

– Thomas L. Root

8th Circuit Throws Out Jail’s Publication Ban – Update for March 6, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BOGUS BAN TARGETED SOME BUT NOT ALL MASS MEDIA PUBLICATIONS 

1stamend160923An Arkansas county jail refused newspapers, magazines, and personal correspondence other than postcards. The publisher of Prison Legal News sued because it could not send its newspaper, books, and promotional letters to inmates. The district court found that the jail was violating the publisher’s 1st Amendment rights, and the jail appealed.

Last week, the 8th Circuit agreed that the jail’s postcard-only policy violated PLN’s 1st Amendment rights. Weighing the four factors for judging such bans adopted by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, the Circuit found that while the jail’s policy had a valid and rational connection to the jail’s interests in reducing contraband and promoting efficiency, it created a de facto ban on PLN communicating its publications to inmates.

The jail argued its ban was intended to keep out drugs – presumably soaked into the newsprint – but the jail let the local paper in, leaving the appeals court skeptical that printed publications sent to wide audiences could be manipulated easily to deliver drugs to Baxter County inmates.

1stAmendment250306The 8th ruled that accommodating PLN would have no appreciable impact on the jail. The proposed alternative of allowing publisher mailings while restricting other non-legal personal mail to postcarda was a readily available means of permitting PLN to communicate.

Considering the factors, the 8th held that “[i]n light of the restrictiveness of the Jail’s policy barring all publications in contrast to the limited impact accommodating publishers would have, we conclude the postcard-only policy was not reasonably related to its penological goals and was instead an exaggerated response constituting a blanket prohibition” on PLN’s publications. The Circuit upheld an injunction prohibiting the jail from continuing the policy.

Human Rights Defense Center v. Baxter County, Case No. 23-1888, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 4222 (8th Cir. February 24, 2025)

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)

– Thomas L. Root

Keeping Your Eye On The Prize – Update for February 28, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

4TH CIRCUIT SAYS THAT IN A § 2244 INQUIRY, LEAVE THE PREJUDICE FOR LATER

In order to be allowed to file a second-or-successive 28 USC § 2255 habeas corpus motion, a prisoner has to meet some tough “gatekeeping” standards, that newly discovered evidence would have led a jury to find him or her innocent or that the Supreme Court had adopted a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review, that was previously unavailable.”

threaten250228In 2008, Scott Rendelman was convicted for mailing threatening communications under 18 USC § 876. The district court instructed the jury that the government need prove only that a “reasonable person” would find Scott’s communications threatening, and the jury did so. However, 15 years later, the Supreme Court held in Counterman v. Colorado that the 1st Amendment requires the government to prove that the defendant actually had some understanding of his statements’ threatening character.

Scott, who said his many letters to government officials were just intended to show that prison does not rehabilitate people, asked the 4th Circuit for authorization to file a successive 28 USC § 2255 motion based on Counterman. The government agreed that he had satisfied the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h), but it argued that the court should also impose a “plausibility requirement.”

In other words, the government said, even if Counterman had been applied, Scott would have lost his jury trial. The US Attorney called on the Circuit to require Scott to show that constitutional error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict, as required for relief under § 2255.”

eyesonprize250228The 4th refused the government’s demand. “The focus of our inquiry at this stage must always remain on the § 2255(h) gatekeeping standards,” the Circuit wrote. “We’ve already found that Rendelman has satisfied the § 2255(h) gatekeeping requirements. There isn’t an additional plausibility requirement he must meet… Counterman is on point. Rendelman was prosecuted for a true-threat offense. The jury wasn’t instructed that the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he subjectively intended to threaten another, and the government acknowledges that this omission was error… Whether that error warrants relief under § 2255 is a merits question for the district court to decide in the first instance when it considers Rendelman’s § 2255 motion.

In re Rendelman, Case No. 23-257, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 4087 (4th Cir. February 21, 2025)

Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023)

– Thomas L. Root

The Short Rocket – Update for April 12, 2024

rocket-312767We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

Today, some short odds to end the week…

Gun Cases Still Being Decided While Rahimi Await SCOTUS Decision: Holding that the government had not satisfied its burden to justify that 18 USC § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on all felons possessing guns is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,” an Eastern District of Michigan US District Court judge threw out a § 922(g) indictment against Ron Williams in late February.

Meanwhile, a Northern District of Illinois court has dismissed a § 922(g)(5) case against Heriberto Carbajal-Flores for possessing a gun while illegally or unlawfully being in the United States. Heriberto had had two prior motions denied, but the court reversed itself based on the 3rd Circuit’s Range v. AG and 7th Circuit’s Atkinson v. Garland decisions.

The government has appealed both cases.

United States v. Williams, Case No. 23-cr-20201, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30849 (ED Mich., Feb 22, 2024)

United States v. Carbajal-Flores, Case No. 20-cr-00613, 2024U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40974 (N.D.Ill. Mar 8, 2024)

BOP Proposed Social Media Ban Draws Fire: Two civil rights groups blasted the BOP last week for a proposed crackdown on imprisoned peoples’ access to social media—including a possible ban on accounts run by family on the outside. The ACLU and Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University said the proposed procedures would violate the Constitution.

socialmedia240412Inmates’ rights advocacy groups say that the rule would restrict the 1st Amendment rights of not only prisoners but also people not in BOP custody. Ebony Underwood, whose nonprofit We Got Us Now works with the children of incarcerated parents, called the social media proposal “archaic and so inhumane.”

Knight wrote in reply comments:

For the nearly 2 million people who are incarcerated in U.S. jails and prisons, maintaining connection with loved ones and communities is associated with better physical and mental health outcomes, reduced recidivism, and successful reentry into society. Social media is increasingly becoming an important part of that connection. As one formerly incarcerated journalist recently recounted, using social media through his wife allowed him to pursue a writing career, stay in touch with his community, and give him hope of reintegration upon release.

The public comment period closed on April 1. The federal register website shows that the proposed rule received 219 comments, though only 22 have been posted online.

The Appeal, Civil Rights Groups Decry Proposed Federal Prison Social Media Crackdown (April 4, 2024)

Techspot, US prison system proposes total social media ban for inmates, sparking First Amendment concerns (April 2, 2024)

Knight 1st Amendment Institute, Comment re: BOP social media rules (April 1, 2024)

BOP Dumps ACA: After being blasted by the DOJ Inspector General last November for its conflict-riddled relationship with the American Correctional Association, the BOP last week announced that it would not renew its $2.75 million contract with the accreditation organization.

ACAaward240307The ACA, which accredits prisons, first started accrediting BOP facilities in 1980. However, the Bureau said on Monday it has decided to part ways. However, a report issued by the Dept of Justice Inspector General found that instead of providing an independent evaluation of BOP facilities, the ACA “instead relied on the prisons’ own internal reports during reaccreditation reviews.” In other words, as the DOJ put it, “it appears the BOP is, in effect, paying ACA to affirm the BOP’s own findings.”

In an announcement last week, the BOP said it “has decided to explore other options to ensure continued improvement and innovation in correctional standards for the well-being of adults in custody and the FBOP’s workforce. The FBOP remains committed to a rigorous assessment of its policies and practices involving all levels of leadership to inform continuous organizational improvement.”

Law360, BOP Drops Accreditation Org After IG, Sens. Raise Concerns (April 1, 2024)

DOJ Office of Inspector General, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Contract Awarded to the American Correctional Association (Nov 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Sex Offender Reporting Requirement Held Unconstitutional – Update for September 21, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DISTRICT COURT HOLDS SEX OFFENDER INTERNET REPORTING LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL

pornC160829In the pantheon of criminal offenses, none feels seamier or more disgusting than sex offenses. The label covers crimes from groping to rape to possessing child porn, with the offenders routinely not just given long prison sentences but subjected to limitations during and after prison that drug offenders, fraudsters and robbers never experience.

A rudderless young man who robbed a couple of banks and served over a decade in federal prison turned a talent as a “jailhouse lawyer” into a law school degree and admission to the bar. He’s now a celebrated law school professor and was even the subject of a laudatory 60 Minutes story. And he deserves it.

But what if, instead of armed bank robbery, the inmate had downloaded images of naked children engaged in simulated sex.  Just my opinion here, but I suspect the 60 MInutes crew would have stayed home, the State of Washington bar would never have found him to be rehabilitated, and his name would be found on the Internet – along with his address and a warning that he was a sex offender – as a warning to neighbors instead of hagiography. He’d be serving up Slurpees at 7-Eleven instead of training future lawyers at Georgetown.

kporn160124Sex crimes are forever, and the “forever” is untethered to the degree of harm caused to society. Rape and sex abuse are one thing, but as disgusting as I find the idea of looking at (let alone collecting) suggestive images of naked kids, I have trouble with the idea that we can forgive a history of violence but not someone who looked at flickering images on a computer screen.

No crime is as easy to demagogue as is a sex crime. That may be why Congress has found it so easy to rachet up minimum sentences for kiddie porn offenses. The Sentencing Commission has candidly acknowledged that at the direction of Congress, it has amended USSG § 2G2.2 several times, each time recommending harsher penalties. In United States v. Dorvee, the 2nd Circuit noted that the rachet effect persisted despite the Sentencing Commission being

openly opposed [to] these Congressionally directed changes… Speaking broadly, the Commission has also noted that “specific directives to the Commission to amend the guidelines make it difficult to gauge the effectiveness of any particular policy change, or to disentangle the influences of the Commission from those of Congress.”

There’s some evidence that the Congressional view of child porn punishment is at odds with public sentiment. US District Court Judge James Gwin of the Northern District of Ohio, as an experiment, had jurors in his courtroom anonymously note a recommended sentence for people they convicted, He would not look at the recommendations until he had imposed sentence. In one sex offender case, he wrote,

While this case and the jury selected to hear it were unremarkable, the disparity between the punishment that the jury felt [the defendant] should receive and the punishment recommended by the Guidelines was striking. The jurors’ mean recommended sentence was 20 months imprisonment, and the median recommended sentence was 15 months. The Guidelines recommended a sentence between 87 and 108 months. Even the low end of the Guidelines range was almost six times the jurors’ median recommendation.

All of the foregoing gets us to today’s case. Connecticut law requires that after release, convicted sex offenders disclose to police all of their email and social media addresses, as well as other Internet communication identifiers. Jim Cornelio, a released offender, sued in federal court, claiming the disclosure requirement violated his 1st Amendment right to free speech.

sexpornoffender230921Last week, the US District Court for Connecticut agreed. The Court held that by compelling Jim to disclose all of his Internet addresses and identifiers, “the law chills and inhibits his right to speak freely on the Internet and to do so anonymously if he wishes… [Thus], the State must show that the law advances an important government interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free speech. And it must also show that the law does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further the government’s interest.”

The Judge held that the State “has an important government interest in detecting and deterring sex offenders from using the Internet to engage in crime.” However, although the disclosure law has been in place for over 15 years,

the State cannot point to a single example of when its database of sex offenders’ email addresses and other Internet communication identifiers has helped the police detect or solve any crimes. And the State concedes that it has no evidence that requiring sex offenders to disclose their Internet communication identifiers deters them from using the Internet to commit more crimes. Moreover, even if I assumed that the State was able to show that the disclosure law advances an important government interest, the State nonetheless fails to show that the breadth of the disclosure law does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further that interest.

United States v. Dorvee, 604 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2010)
United States Sentencing Commission, The History of the Child Pornography Guidelines (October 2009)

Cornelio v Connecticut, Case No 3:19-cv-1240, 2023 USDist LEXIS 163106 (D.Conn. Sep 14, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court: OK’s Statute Because It Only Prohibits Some Protected Speech – Update for June 26, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS NARROWS REACH OF IMMIGRATION STATUTE IN ORDER TO SAVE IT

The Supreme Court ruled last Friday in United States v. Hansen that 8 USC 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) – which prohibits “encourag[ing] or induc[ing]” illegal immigration – “forbids only the intentional solicitation or facilitation of certain unlawful acts.”

1stamend160923The 9th Circuit had held that the statute was an unconstitutional abridgment of the 1st Amendment because it criminalized “immigration advocacy and other protected speech.” Justice Barrett’s 7-2 opinion ruled that “[t]hat was error.  Properly interpreted, this provision… does not prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected speech — let alone enough to justify throwing out the law’s plainly legitimate sweep.”

A “substantial amount” sounds a lot like a new 1st Amendment test.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, wrote in a dissent that “the majority departs from ordinary principles of statutory interpretation to reach [its] result. Specifically, it rewrites the provision’s text to include elements that Congress once adopted but later removed as part of its incremental expansion of this particular criminal law over the last century. It is neither our job nor our prerogative to retrofit federal statutes in a manner patently inconsistent with Congress’s choices…”

ACLU lawyers who supported Hansen’s appeal said they welcomed the court’s action narrowing the scope of the statute. “The Supreme Court has drastically limited the encouragement provision to apply only to intentional solicitation or facilitation of immigration law violations,” said Esha Bhandari, deputy director of the ACLU’s Speech, Privacy and Technology Project. “As written by Congress, the law has left people wondering what they can safely say on the subject of immigration. Now we expect the government to respect free speech rights and only enforce the law narrowly going forward.”

United States v. Hansen, Case No 22-179, 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2638 (June 23, 2023)

NBC, Supreme Court upholds law against encouraging illegal immigration (June 23, 2023)

Los Angeles Times, ‘Encouraging’ illegal immigration is not protected as free speech, Supreme Court rules (June 23, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

The Short Rocket – Update for January 27, 2023

rocket190620We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

Today, the short rocket – decisions from around the federal circuits…

SOME CASE SHORTS

Timing is Everything: In 2015, Benny Hall pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and using a gun in a crime of violence, (an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offense). After the Supreme Court decided in United States v. Davis that conspiracy to commit a crime of violence was not itself a crime of violence that supported a § 924(c) conviction for using a gun in a crime of violence, Benny filed a 28 U.S.C. §2255 post-conviction motion asking that the § 924(c) be thrown out.

corso170112The government convinced the district court that Benny’s § 924(c) conviction didn’t depend only on the conspiracy, but also on his admissions in open court that established that he had actually attempted to commit the robbery.

‘Gotcha!’ the government cried.

‘Not so fast!’ the 2nd Circuit replied last week. Last summer, the  Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Taylor that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence. The Circuit threw out § 924(c) conviction and the mandatory 10-year add-on sentence it represented.

Hall v. United States, Case No 17-1513, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 1256 (2d Cir., January 19, 2023)
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11th Holds Drug Conspiracy Can’t Lead to Guidelines ‘Career Offender’: Brandon Dupree was convicted of a 21 U.S.C. § 846 drug conspiracy, and was hammered at sentencing as a Guidelines “career offender” (which dramatically increased the advisory sentencing range). An 11th Circuit panel rejected Brandon’s argument that an inchoate offense (that is, a mere plan to commit a crime) does not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of the Guidelines ‘career offender’ enhancement.

brandon230127Last week, the full Circuit sitting en banc said, ‘Let’s go, Brandon,’ and reversed his ‘career offender’ sentence. The 11th ruled that “application of the enhancement turns on whether the ‘instant offense of conviction’ is ‘a controlled substance offense’ [under USSG] 4B1.1(a)… The plain text of 4B1.2(b) unambiguously excludes inchoate crimes. Dupree must be resentenced without application of the career offender enhancement.”

United States v. Dupree, Case No 19-13776, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 1183 (11th Cir., January 18, 2023)
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Channeling Your Inner Habeas: People are always asking why they can’t point out in their 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release motions that their sentences were wrongly calculated, that their lawyers were ineffective imbeciles, that something was very wrong with how they were convicted.

reallawyer170216Mike Escajeda was convicted of selling drugs and carrying a gun. After losing his direct appeal, Mike filed a compassionate release motion, arguing that the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” required by an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release motion were that (1) his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He even admitted in his motion that he had filed for compassionate release because he figured that he could not win relief under § 2255.

Last week, the 5th Circuit ruled that the habeas-channeling rule prevented Mike from raising 2255-type issues in a compassionate release motion. The Circuit said, “Congress provided specific avenues for post-conviction relief that permit prisoners to challenge the legality of their confinement in federal court… The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that by codifying these specific provisions, Congress required prisoners to bring their legality-of-custody challenges under [28 USC 2241, 2244, 2254, and 2255], and prohibited prisoners from bringing such claims under other, more-general statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

[A] prisoner cannot use § 3582(c) to challenge the legality or the duration of his sentence,” the 5th held. “Such arguments can, and hence must, be raised under [the habeas statutes]… Because Escajeda’s claims would have been cognizable under § 2255, they are not cognizable under § 3582(c).”

United States v. Escajeda, Case No 21-50870, 2023 U.S.App. LEXIS 1041 (5th Cir., January 17, 2023)
rocket190620

DOJ SORNA Rule Blocked: The U.S. District Court for Central District of California last week issued a preliminary injunction blocking the Dept of Justice’s new Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act rule because it violated due process and the 1st Amendment.

injunction230127The rule requires people who had been convicted of a sex crime to register as sex offenders in their state, even if the sex crime convictions have been expunged and the people are not allowed by the state to register. Because plaintiff John Doe could not register, the DOJ’s rule said that he could be prosecuted at any time, and he would have been forced to prove that registration was impossible — “an affirmative defense,” Doe’s lawyer said, “that turns the presumption of innocence on its head.

The court ruled that it was likely an unconstitutional violation of due process to require anyone to affirmatively prove his innocence when he had never been convicted.

Preliminary injunction, ECF 55, Doe v. DOJ, Case No 5:22-cv-855 (CD Cal., Jan 13, 2023)

Reason, A Federal Judge Says the DOJ’s Sex Offender Registration Rules Violate Due Process by Requiring the Impossible (January 19, 2023)

Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Adds Two Criminal Cases to Docket – Update for December 13, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS GRANTS REVIEW ON TWO CRIMINAL CASES

Last Friday, the Supreme Court agreed to review two federal criminal cases.

In the first case, the Court will consider the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1), which makes it a crime punishable by up to 10 years in prison to encourage or cause unauthorized immigrants to enter or reside in the United States.

freespeech221213Helaman Hansen was convicted for running a program that promised to help adult unauthorized immigrants become US citizens through adoption. On appeal, the 9th Circuit agreed that the statute violated the 1st Amendment because it is so broad that it would also apply to protected speech – for example, voicing support to a young illegal immigrant (OK, “undocumented” is the politically correct term, but then, if the immigrant were not here illegally, we wouldn’t be writing about this) that she not return to, say, Iceland, but instead fight to qualify for DACA is a federal criminal offense under § 1324(a)(1).

Maybe not the best illustration: stopping hordes of blond-haired blue-eyed people sneaking across our undefended borders is not our problem. Some, like a former President, even liked the idea.

Back to Mr. Hansen: The government appealed the 9th Circuit decision invalidating his conviction. 

Last week the Supreme Court granted review.

In a second case, the high court agreed to take an 18 USC § 924(c) case. Section 924(c) mandates a consecutive sentence of a certain minimum term when a gun is possessed or used in a drug trafficking offense or a violent crime.

carriefgun170807Under 18 USC § 3584(a), a district court may impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences unless a statute requires otherwise. Section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) of Title 18 requires consecutive sentences but only for sentences imposed “under this subsection.” Efrain Lora was convicted and sentenced under § 924(j), a different subsection that sets punishments where “a person… in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm.”

Curiously, § 924(c) includes no requirement that the sentence must be consecutive. This suggests that if an offender is going to use a gun in a violent crime, he should be sure to kill someone (and thus get a possibly better sentence).

Lora argued a district court has the discretion to impose concurrent sentences because § 924(j) creates a separate offense not subject to § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii).

The 2nd Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court was required to impose consecutive sentences because a § 924(j) counts as being “under” § 924(c).

The 3rd, 4th, 8th and 9th Circuits agree with the 2nd Circuit. The 10th and 11th do not. The question the Supreme Court granted review is whether § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), which provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed… under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment,” is triggered when a defendant is sentenced under § 924(j).

Both cases will be argued this term and decided by the end of June.

United States v. Hansen, Case No. 22-179 (certiorari granted December 9, 2022)

Lora v. United States, Case No 22-49 (certiorari granted December 9, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root