All posts by lisa-legalinfo

Senate Leader Pushed on EQUAL Act – Update for August 3, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ADVOCATES DEMAND SCHUMER MOVE ON EQUAL ACT

The New York Daily News last week reported that a coalition of 35 reform groups have delivered a letter to Sen Charles Schumer (D-NY), the Senate majority leader, demanding passage of the EQUAL Act (S.524), the latest iteration of a bill that would equalize the punishments for powder and crack cocaine.

equal220812

Last summer, Schumer made the legislation a priority, but the bill didn’t get a Senate floor vote before the 117th Congress ended. Now, advocates are requesting that Schumer push for the bill once more. The letter demanded action in the summer session, but that session ended last week without action.

“While we appreciate Sen. Schumer’s support for the EQUAL Act, the reality is that Democrats have now controlled the Senate Judiciary [Committee] for three years without advancing any meaningful criminal justice reform,” said Janos Marton, vice president of political strategy for Dream.org. “Now is the time to do that.”

Inimai Chettiar, federal director of Justice Action Network, another signer on the letter, agreed: “This bill needs to move ASAP. Given that Sen. Schumer is the majority leader, he also has the power to put pressure on the Judiciary Committee to have them move this bill,” she said. “It’s been three years that we’ve been waiting.”

crack-coke200804Congress narrowed the disparity between crack and powder with the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010. Prior to the passage of that measure, one gram of crack resulted in the same sentence as 100 grams of powder cocaine. Even after the Fair Sentencing Act became law, an 18:1 ratio remained, meaning that 28 grams of crack resulted in the same punishment as a half kilo of powder. EQUAL would make punishments for crack the same as those for powder cocaine.

New York Daily News, Advocates demand Schumer do more to end crack cocaine sentencing disparity (July 25, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Qui Custodiet? – Update for August 1, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CAESAR’S WIFE

The Romans recognized the problem: “Qui custodiet ipsos custodes?” Roughly translated, “Who will guard the guards?”

Just as Julius Caesar expected his wife Pompeia to be above suspicion of disloyalty and infidelity, we expect our judges to be above suspicion of bias. But, as the Supreme Court has observed, “Bias is easy to attribute to others and difficult to discern in oneself.” Rare is the federal defendant who hasn’t felt like his or her judge is biased.

At least weekly, someone asks me how they can get his or her case assigned to a different judge because “my judge is biased against me.” The plain truth is that winning reassignment of a case to a different judge because of bias “is a serious request rarely made and rarely granted,” as the 2nd Circuit put it last week.

irony230801Everyone knows how hard correctional officers work and how important it is to ensure they have a carefree retirement. For BOP employees, the federal government guarantees a generous and secure sunset for its employees. But state and local COs have to depend on retirement promises made by governments that, unlike Uncle Sam, can’t print money to cover any shortfalls.

The New York City Correctional Officers Benevolent Association collected money from its members to invest in a pension plan. COBA’s executives got bribed into investing $20 million in Platinum Partners, a shaky pension plan that went bankrupt primarily because the pension managers pillaged it for their own benefit.

One of the bit players, defendant Jona Rechnitz, cooperated with the government. In fact, the government said, Jona was “one of the single most important and prolific white collar cooperating witnesses in the recent history of the Southern District of New York.” The government told the court that while Jona knew about the bribes, he “did not appear to know that Platinum was a fraud, or even that it was a bad investment.”

But District Court Alvin Hellerstein ordered changes in Jona’s Presentence Investigation Report, including that he had “had to know” both that Platinum was a “high-risk fund” and that the Fund was “willing to pay a bribe to obtain funds to satisfy a liquidity shortage, thus making it reasonably foreseeable that an investment of pension funds risked the loss of those funds.”

money160118At sentencing, Judge H bumped Jona’s restitution from a proposed $1.2 million to $10 million and sentenced him to 5 months. Before judgment was entered, COBA intervened, asking that restitution be increased to $14.25 million.

While the appeal and COBA’s motion were pending, Jona learned from witnesses who had spoken to Andrew Kaplan – another defendant in the ongoing Platinum prosecutions – that Andy considered Judge Hellerstein to be “like a father” to him, and the judge had even advised Andy as to whether he should accept the government’s plea offer regarding his Platinum-related criminal conduct. The Judge and Andy had also talked about the significant monetary losses associated with the charges against Kaplan, and Kaplan’s feelings towards other Platinum executives.

While COBA’s motion for additional restitution was still pending, Jona asked the Judge to recuse himself to “avoid the appearance of any impropriety and in an abundance of caution.” Jona’s primary concern was that the size of his restitution turned largely on the credibility of his claim that he had believed “in the soundness of Platinum Partners as an investment vehicle,” and that the Judge might have obtained extrajudicial information regarding the case from Andy Kaplan, which Jona would not have had the opportunity to challenge.

cmon161027The Judge turned him down, holding that his relationship with Andy Kaplan and the case pending against Andy were unrelated to the restitution issue involving Jona, in part because “there is no suggestion that [Jona] had any relationship with [Andy].” The Judge denied that he had any extra-record information regarding Jona or Platinum.

While Jona’s appeal was pending, the government told Jona’s lawyer that Judge Hellerstein had phoned the Assistant U.S. Attorney working on the case to ask how much Jona had paid in restitution and to complain that Jona was “sly, cannot be trusted, and use[d] religion as a cloak.” The Judge asked the AUSA “not to speak to [Jona’s] counsel about this…”

Jona argued to the 2nd Circuit that Judge Hellerstein should have recused himself under 28 USC § 455. Last week, the 2nd Circuit agreed.

Under § 455(a), a judge should disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” while § 455(b) requires a judge to recuse or herself in any case where the judge has “a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding,” or where the judge or spouse or someone within the 3rd degree of relationship to either has an interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding or may be a witness.

The Circuit concluded that Judge Hellerstein had crossed the line.

First and foremost, the district judge had a close, near-paternal personal relationship with Kaplan… a person who was directly involved in Jona’s bribery case… The government correctly points out that Kaplan was not one of the most central figures in Jona’s bribe scheme. But Jona’s testimony implicated Kaplan in concealing the Platinum investment from other COBA employees – a circumstance that placed Kaplan squarely in the middle of yet another incidence of wrongdoing at a firm where, through his guilty plea, he had already admitted to participating in a different criminal conspiracy…

The district judge did not merely have a close personal relationship with Kaplan; he advised Kaplan on his criminal case arising out of the Platinum collapse… The district judge’s advisory role is further problematic in light of the restitution question because Kaplan’s and Jona’s interests are plausibly adverse on that issue. COBA, of course, can recover its losses only once, even though two groups – those involved in the bribery scheme and those involved in the fraud – arguably caused them… Because Kaplan is a defendant in the Platinum case, it is possible that he will be ordered to pay restitution… [T]he more COBA recovers from the bribery defendants, the less it will need to recover from the Platinum defendants.

The Circuit concluded that “the judge’s close relationship with Kaplan, his advisory role in Kaplan’s criminal case, and the proximity of the cases (including with respect to restitution) would cause a reasonable person to question the district judge’s impartiality and was sufficient to necessitate recusal under 455(a).”

bias230801But the Circuit wasn’t done: “The district judge’s phone call with the prosecutor here was doubly ill-advised because it was both ex parte and off-the-record,” the panel held, “magnifying the concerns inherent to both types of communications. After all, but for the commendable transparency of the United States Attorney’s Office, Jona would not have learned of this phone call… [T]here is no obvious justification for conducting this particular inquiry ex parte and off-the-record. A public docket entry requiring an update from the parties would have been equally effective to monitor Jona’s restitution payments… And to the extent that the district judge felt the need to emphasize his views on Jona’s allegedly negative qualities, such statements should be reserved for open, on-the-record forums, if shared at all.”

Jona’s case was assigned to a different judge for resentencing.

United States v. Rechnitz, Case No 20-1011-cr, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 19054 (2d Cir. July 26, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Vacation’s Over, Back to Work – LISA Update for July 31, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

OCCASIONALLY (BUT RARELY) I’M RIGHT

I am back from a week in the wilds with three wild grandchildren, a great vacation marred only by the LISA site crashing for five days. Did I remember to publicly thank LISA’s website provider for its alacrity in fixing the problem?

No, I did not forget to My omission was quite deliberate.

Now back to work: I have been predicting for weeks that the US Sentencing Commission will probably make the new Sentencing Guidelines §§4A1.1(e) and 4C1.1 retroactive sometime in August.

Amended §4A1.1(e) abolishes “status points” from Guidelines criminal history, while §4C1.1 reduces the Guidelines offense level for some people with zero criminal history points.

iamright230731Last Thursday, the USSC announced a public meeting will be held on August 24, and that the meeting will include as an agenda item a “possible vote on retroactivity of Parts A and B of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment.”

For the uninitiated, “Parts A and B of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment” are the zero-point and status-point changes we’re talking about.

If the vote is favorable, then people will likely be able to apply for 18 USC § 3582(c)(2)/USSG § 1B1.10 retroactivity at the end of February 2024.

Of course, Congress could veto the proposed amendment. However, half of the 6-month review period for the 2023 amendments has already passed, and Congress is on vacation until the week after Labor Day. With an appropriations bill deadline at the end of September and reams of unfinished business, the chance both the House and the Senate will veto any part of the 2023 Amendments before the November 1 effective date is remote.

The same is probably true for the 6-month review period on retroactivity.

US Sentencing Commission, Public Meeting – August 24, 2023 (July 27, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

We’re Ba-a-a-ck – Update for July 25, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HOBBLED BY TECHNOLOGY AND BUREAUCRATIC INCOMPETENCE

After seven years, over 1,400 posts and (this coming Sunday) our 400th weekly newsletter, our website crashed late last week. Our outstanding web host, which I won’t name but rhymes with “Bluehost,” only required five contacts and 96 hours to restore us.

Makes me proud to have sent the company all that money for so many years…

ALL IN THE FAMILY

Gilbert Bicknell and his son Junior ran a drug distribution business. Nothing wrong with that: Eli Lilly, Abbott Labs, and Pfizer do the same, earning substantial profits for their shareholders.

But Gil and Junior operated on a much smaller and less legal scale. They sold methamphetamines (and not from a licensed pharmacy, either). In July 2020, the police saw the pair passing around meth at a gas station. When the duo left in separate cars, the police gave chase to Junior (who was holding the bag). Gil swerved to cut off the pursuing cruisers to no avail, and both were arrested.

snitchin200309Gil pleaded guilty and, to avoid the 10-year mandatory minimum, gave the authorities a statement to qualify for the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) safety valve, which lets a district court impose a sentence below the otherwise mandatory minimum to low-level drug defendants who “truthfully provide to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” Gil debriefed and then claimed at sentencing that he should receive relief from the 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) 10-year mandatory minimum.

But Gil didn’t reckon on Junior, who cut his own deal and told the government that his dad had been less than candid in his debrief, leaving out a lot of criminal mischief from his admission of wrongdoing. At Dad’s sentencing, Junior testified against his father. Gil got 151 months.

But the government wasn’t without blemish. It signed a written plea agreement with Junior which he agreed to cooperate with the government by providing information about his father’s criminal conduct. But “perhaps owing to a clerical oversight,” the appellate decision helpfully suggests, “the plea agreement itself was not entered into the district court’s docket.” The government never disclosed the agreement to Gil.

At Gil’s sentencing, Junior testified against his father. What’s more, the boy falsely and repeatedly claimed he had entered an “open” plea of guilty – a plea not made pursuant to a plea agreement. The Assistant U.S. Attorney – who was the same one who signed Junior’s plea agreement on behalf of the government – suborned the perjury.

The government also put the case agent who had conducted Gil’s safety-valve proffer on the stand. He testified that based on watching the interview, he thought Gil had “tried to minimize his own criminal conduct and that he generally came across as not credible.”

snitch160802The district court smelled a rat. During a break in the proceedings following Junior’s testimony against his father, the Court managed to locate a copy of the written plea agreement. The judge told the parties what he discovered, but Gil’s lawyer inexplicably did not recall Junior to the stand to confront the boy about his lies.

On appeal, Gil argued that his Brady and Giglio rights had been violated. A couple of days ago, the 7th Circuit agreed, but said “so what?”

In the 1962 Brady v. Maryland decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the government violates a defendant’s 5th Amendment due process rights when it suppresses evidence favorable to the defendant. A decade later, in Giglio v. United States, the Court confirmed that Brady’s disclosure requirement applies to evidence that could be used to impeach a government witness. In order to make a showing that his or her Brady/Giglio rights were violated, “a defendant must show that undisclosed information was ‘material either to guilt or to punishment.’”

The Circuit said, “Brady’s materiality requirement explains the result here. Gilbert Bicknell was left completely in the dark about evidence that would have been useful to impeach a witness who testified against him at sentencing. That evidence would not have affected the outcome of his sentencing, though, so the government’s failure to disclose does not lead to relief under Brady or Giglio.”

The 7th said that Junior’s plea agreement would have been “useful impeachment evidence, as it would have definitively shown that he was co-operating with the government and, in the interest of receiving a reduced sentence, may have had an incentive to slant his testimony. But the fact that Junior testified as a government witness was itself enough to make plain to anyone at the hearing—including Gilbert, his lawyer, and the district court—that he was cooperating with the government. Remember too that Junior admitted his desire for a reduced sentence while on the witness stand.”

The boy’s stated hope for a lesser sentence gave Gil’s lawyer plenty of ammo to cross-examine Junior on his credibility even without the plea agreement. Gil’s lawyer, the Circuit said, “opted not to challenge Junior’s credibility based on the information he had available to him, but his decision not to use that evidence does not make the plea agreement any less cumulative.”

brady160314The case was not a slam-dunk. The 7th Circuit said at the outset: “But make no mistake: the government’s failure to adhere to its disclosure obligation deeply troubles us. It failed to inform a criminal defendant before sentencing that one of the government’s key witnesses—the defendant’s own son—would be testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement. That agreement was a textbook example of Giglio information, and it is very unsettling that more care was not taken to ensure its disclosure before sentencing. Though we must affirm, we do so reluctantly.”

To be sure, Gil has ample basis to question his lawyer’s failure to pursue the blatantly false statements, and he can do so in a 28 USC § 2255 motion. But the Circuit’s ruling glosses over an important question: Junior lied, but so did the Assistant U.S. Attorney. Without penalizing the government for its attempted cheat, the 7th’s decision suggests that there is no downside to the prosecution for getting caught.

United States v. Bicknell, No. 22-2268, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 18300, at *9 (7th Cir. July 19, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Mr. Explainer Here: All About Guidelines Retroactivity – Update for July 20, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MR. EXPLAINER TACKLES RETROACTIVE GUIDELINES

USSC160729The good news is that the U.S. Sentencing Commission is likely to approve a proposal that two Guidelines changes it adopted in April should be retroactive for people already sentenced.

The better news is that Congress seems too busy to try to gin up a veto of any of the provisions approved by the USSC and submitted to the legislators for review.

Today’s guest is Mr. Explainer, who is here to guide us through the fine print of getting retroactive application of the two changes:

• First, no one can file a motion for retroactive application of the two Guidelines changes until six months pass from the time the USSC sends the proposed retroactivity order to Congress. That means that all of the inmates doing a happy dance in anticipation of November 1, 2023, will have to wait at least until Punxatawny Phil sees his shadow.

• Second, the two changes have conditions attached:

(a) The zero-point change in the Guidelines (new USSG § 4C1.1) says that defendants are eligible for a 2-level reduction in their Total Offense Level (usually good for a two-sentencing range reduction) if they had zero criminal history points and meet all of the following conditions:

(1) had no adjustment under § 3A1.4 (Terrorism);

(2) did not use violence or credible threats of violence in connection with the offense;

(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury;

(4) the offense is not a sex offense;

(5) the defendant did not personally cause substantial financial hardship;

(6)  no gun was involved in connection with the offense;

(7) the offense did not involve individual rights under § 2H1.1;

(8) had no adjustment under § 3A1.1 for a hate crime or vulnerable victim or  § 3A1.5 for a serious human rights offense; and

(9) had no adjustment under § 3B1.1 for role in the offense and was not engaged in a 21 USC § 848 continuing criminal enterprise.

(b) The change in § 4A1.1(e) – the so-called status point enhancement – says only that one point is added if the defendant already has 7 or more criminal history points and “committed any part of the instant offense (i.e., any relevant conduct) while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.”

fineprint180308• The USSC staff has figured that about 11,500 BOP prisoners with status points would have a lower guideline range under a retroactive § 4A1.1(e). The current average sentence for that group is 120 months and would probably fall by an average of 14 months.

About 7,300 eligible prisoners with zero criminal history points would be eligible for a lower guideline range if the zero-point amendment becomes retroactive. The current average sentence of 85 months could fall to an average of 70 months.

• The reduction – done under 18 USC § 3582(c)(2) – is a two-step process described in USSC § 1B1.10.

(a) First, the court determines whether the prisoner is eligible. For a zero-point reduction, the court would have to find that the prisoner (1) had no criminal history points; (2) had none of the other enhancements in his case or guns or sex charges, or threats of violence or leader/organizer enhancements or any of the other factors listed in § 4C1.1. Then, the court would have to find that granting the two-level reduction would result in a sentencing range with a bottom number lower than his or her current sentence.

If your guidelines were 97-121 months, but the court varied downward to 78 months for any reason other than cooperation, you would not be eligible because reducing your points by two levels would put you in a 78-97 month range, and you are already at the bottom of that range. Special rules apply if you got a § 5K1.1 reduction for cooperation, but people sentenced under their sentencing ranges for reasons other than cooperation may not be eligible.

(b) To benefit from the status point reduction, the decrease in criminal history points is more problematic. If you have 4, 5, or 6 criminal history points, you are in Criminal History Category III. If two of those points are status points, they would disappear. Going from 5 points to 3 or 4 points to 2 would drop you into Criminal History Category II. If your prior sentencing range had been 70-87 months, your new range would be 68-78 months, and you would be eligible.

But if you had 6 criminal history points, you would only drop to 4 points, and you would still be in Criminal History Category III. No reduction in criminal history, no decrease in sentencing range, and thus no eligibility.

• Once you’re found to be eligible, your judge has just about total discretion whether to give you all of the reduction you’re entitled to, some of it, or none of it. You cannot get more than the bottom of your amended sentencing range, and the court cannot consider any other issues in your sentence than the retroactive adjustment.

usscretro230406Convincing the court that you should get the full benefit of your reduction is best done with letters of support from the community, a good discipline record and a history of successful programming. Showing the court that you have been rehabilitated to the point that the reduction has been earned is a good idea.

There’s a good reason that the retroactivity – if it is adopted – will end up benefitting no more than 12% of the BOP population. It is not easy to show eligibility and even tougher to prove that the court should use its discretion to give you the credit.

USSC, Retroactivity Impact Analysis of Parts A and B of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment (May 15, 2023)

USSC, Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts (May 3, 2023)

USSC § 1B1.10, Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as a Result of Amended Guideline Range (Policy Statement)

– Thomas L. Root

Back To School After a 30-Year Break – Update for July 19, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HEADED PELL MELL FOR A COLLEGE DEGREE

There is no truer lesson in the criminal justice milieu than this: education is the enemy of recidivism.

A BOP release last week trumpeted that “as of July 1, 2023, all provisions of the FAFSA Simplification Act related to incarcerated students are active… Pell Grant[s are] now available to all qualified incarcerated people to further pursue post-secondary education…. While this process must be initiated and managed by the individual postsecondary school, the BOP eagerly awaits the increase in partnership opportunities.”

grad190524There was a time when the BOP and colleges partnered all over the country for in-prison programs.  And it worked. Inmates participating in secondary education programs behaved better and custodial officials viewed them as “easier to manage.”  Programs throughout the United States also reported decreases in recidivism for inmate-students by as much as 57%. One program that once had reported 80% recidivism saw numbers drop to 10% in the early 1980s. Three out of four inmates who received some type of higher education were able to find sustainable employment within the critical first three years after release.

Yet despite decades of effectiveness, prisoner access to Pell Grant aid was revoked in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. At that time, politicians in both major parties portrayed the aid as a handout to the “undeserving.”  The 1994 law reflected public discontent with Pell Grant eligibility for inmates by blocking inmates from receiving higher education financial assistance.

In the final year of Pell Grant eligibility in prisons, inmates accounted for $56 million in funding out of $9.3 billion – six-tenths of one percent – allocated for federal higher education aid. But within Within three years of the passing of the Crime Bill, only eight prison higher education programs were left standing.

It only took three decades, but Pells are back. The Dept of Education estimates that reauthorization could allow about 760,000 additional people to become eligible for Pells through prison education programs when fully implemented.

Colleges are willing partners because the Pell Grants are a fount of money. But inmates will benefit from the education and FSA credits. It should be a win-win.

BOP, Pell Grants Restores Possibilities for Incarcerated People (July 12, 2023)

The Marshall Project, Students Behind Bars Regain Access to College Financial Aid (July 8, 2023)

Washington Post, Educational aid for prisoners works. Yet it’s politically precarious (August 22, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

When Murder Is Nonviolent – Update for July 18, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

IS § 924(c) A VIOLENT CRIME?

I still get questions from people asking whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) remains a “crime of violence.”

The answer is that § 924(c) – which criminalizes the use of a gun during a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense – has never itself been a “crime of violence.”

cmonman230718“C’mon, man!” I hear people out in TV Land saying, “how can using a gun in a crime not be a “crime of violence?”

To you I say, “Welcome to federal criminal law.”

To those prisoners with § 924(c) charges because of an underlying drug offense, violence has nothing to do with nothing. The § 924(c) applies because you had a gun in the closet while you sold meth out of your bedroom. Or because you figured it’d be cool to have a Lorcin .380 stuck in your waistband where its principal threat was to your reproductive organs. You can’t have a gun while you’re selling controlled substances. It’s illegal. (Of course, selling controlled substances is illegal, too, but that’s a topic for another day).

To those people with § 924(c) charges because of an underlying crime of violence, the § 924(c) is not the “crime of violence.” It’s just a conviction resulting from another “crime of violence.”

Section 924(c) does define “crime of violence:” It’s (1) a felony; that is either

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.

violence180508But after a line of Supreme Court decisions from Johnson v. United States through last year’s United States v. Taylor decision, alternate definition (b) has been invalidated as unconstitutionally vague. As a result, conspiracies to murder are not crimes of violence, because you can conspire with your buddies all night without using or threatening someone with the use of force. Attempts to rob a fellow drug dealer are not crimes of violence because you can complete an attempt just by walking up to the victim’s door with a gun in your hand and evil on your mind. In fact, some folks are starting to think that nothing is a “crime of violence” anymore.

Under the circumstances, Tiffany Janis could be forgiven for thinking that her crime wasn’t violent, either. All she did was to come home, catch her cheatin’-heart husband in flagrante delicto, and express her displeasure by shooting him a few times.

Because the domestic discord played out on Indian reservation land, it ended up in federal court, where Tiffany was convicted of 2nd-degree murder and discharging a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence.

In a § 2255 motion, Tiffany argued that her 2nd-degree murder conviction was not a crime of violence, meaning that her § 924(c) conviction had to be vacated.

Tiffany’s murder conviction required that the government show she had killed another person “with malice aforethought.” She argued that killing a person “with malice aforethought” can be done without “us[ing] force against the person or property of another,” as required by § 924(c)(3)(A). Under SCOTUS’s Borden v. United States holding, Tiffany maintained, § 924(c)’s force clause requires “directing or targeting force” at another person or their property. The 8th’s 2nd-degree murder precedent, however, showed that “malice aforethought” can be established without a perp “targeting” force in the way that the force clause, as interpreted by Borden, requires.

The 8th Circuit disagreed, ruling:

Homicides committed with malice aforethought involve the “use of force against the person or property of another,” so 2nd-degree murder is a “crime of violence.” This holding implements the Supreme Court’s command to interpret statutes using not only “the statutory context, structure, history, and purpose,” but also “common sense…”

violent160620“Murder is the ultimate violent crime – irreversible and incomparable in terms of moral depravity,” the Court said. Borden quoted from an opinion by then-Judge Alito holding “the quintessential violent crimes, like murder or rape, involve the intentional use’ of force… Malice aforethought, murder’s defining characteristic, encapsulates the crime’s violent nature.”

Murder is still a crime of violence. Only in federal law could such a question be debatable.

Janis v. United States, Case No. 22-2471, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 16993 (8th Cir. July 6, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Is Senate Fed Up With BOP? – Update for July 13, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ENOUGH IS ENOUGH, SENATORS MAY BE TELLING BOP

Phineas T. Barnum reputedly said, “there’s no such thing as bad publicity.” But P.T. Barnum never served as Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

badpublicity230714It’s been a rough ride. First, the Dept. of Justice Inspector General has issued a scathing report of BOP mismanagement and maladministration that led to the suicide of high-value celebrity prisoner Jeffrey Epstein and the murder of Whitey Bulger. There has been a steady stream of death-of-a-thousand-cuts reports of BOP employees being convicted of everything from inmate sexual abuse to cellphone smuggling to COVID fraud. The Washington Post fumed last week that “regardless of the offense, any unnatural death in custody is a failure of the prison system.”

This week has seen well-loathed U.S. Gymnastics doctor Larry Nassar – serving an endless string of life sentences for an endless string of revolting assaults of women gymnasts – stabbed multiple times at USP Coleman by attackers unknown. BOP employees promptly blamed the attack on a short-staffed facility.

It wasn’t long before the Associated Press reported that Nassar was attacked inside his cell, “a blind spot for prison surveillance cameras that only record common areas and corridors.” The AP said, “In federal prison parlance, because of the lack of video, it is known as an ‘unwitnessed event.’”

It isn’t clear that even full implementation of the Prison Camera Reform Act (Pub.L. 117-321), hardly prevented Capitol Hill from finally having had enough of the BOP follies.

Enough is more than enough. After several half-hearted attempts to address BOP management weaknesses, a bipartisan group of senators yesterday announced the introduction of the Federal Prison Accountability Act of 2023 (no bill number assigned yet), intended to increase oversight at federal prisons.

FPAA would require the president to seek Senate advice and consent when appointing the BOP director, who would be appointed to a single, 10-year term. Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said requiring Senate confirmation of the BOP director would “bring badly needed transparency and accountability to the federal prison system.”

“The Director of the Bureau of Prisons leads thousands of employees and expends a massive budget,” Grassley said in a press release. “It’s a big job with even bigger consequences should mismanagement or abuse weasel its way into the system.”

sexualassault211014It took awhile to get here. Following an 8-month investigation last year that revealed rampant sexual abuse of female prisoners and a failure to prevent recurring sexual abuse, Sen. Jon Ossoff (D-GA) introduced the Federal Prison Oversight Act (S.4988) late last year. The bill – which would have required the DOJ Inspector General to conduct inspections of the BOP’s 122 correctional facilities, provide recommendations to problems and assign each facility a risk score – was window-dressing, a political statement with no chance of passage in the waning days of the 117th Congress.

Three months ago, however, Ossoff introduced a revised version of FPOA (S.1401), with Rep. Lucy McBath (D-GA) filing a companion bill in the House (H.R.3109). The new FPOA would have, among other actions, created a hotline for prisoners to report misconduct.

mismanagement210419Now, three months later, the latest effort to reform federal prisons would subject the BOP director to the same congressional scrutiny as other law enforcement agency chiefs such as the director of the FBI, which Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) said is needed. “The Director of the Bureau of Prisons oversees more than 34,000 employees and a multi-billion dollar budget, and should be subject to Senate review and confirmation as well,” McConnell said.

Grassley introduced FPAA along with McConnell and Sens Kyrsten Sinema (I-AZ), Rand Paul (R-KY), Mike Lee (R-UT), John Cornyn (R-TX), Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Mike Braun (R-IN) and Ossoff. With that kind of legislative horsepower behind it – not to mention black eyes like Jeffrey Epstein, Whitey Bulger and Larry Nasser – it’s safe to predict that Director Colette Peters may be the last BOP Director to not be approved by the Senate.

The Hill, Bipartisan senators introduce bill to increase federal prison oversight (July 13, 2023)

Sen. Charles Grassley, Senators Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Increase Accountability at Federal Prisons (July 13, 2023)

Associated Press, Larry Nassar was stabbed in his cell and the attack was not seen by prison cameras, AP source says (July 11, 2023)

Associated Press, Former federal prison guard sent to prison for violating civil rights of injured inmate (July 11, 2023)

Washington Post, Jeffrey Epstein’s suicide reveals grave failures of U.S. prisons (July 10, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Sisyphus and Marijuana Reform – Update for July 13, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MEANWHILE, CONGRESS IS HARD AT WORK…

Just kidding.

sisyphus230713Sisyphus – who pushed the rock up the hill, for you mythology-challenged readers – was a model of efficiency compared to Congress. That’s generally so, but hardly better illustrated than in the world of marijuana reform.

Marijuana – now known by its preferred pronoun “cannabis” – has nearly reached the top of legislative mountain before. States have OK’d it for medical use and in some places, for recreational toking. I drove through Michigan last weekend, where you can no longer see the forests for the recreational “cannabis” dispensary billboards. But federal recognition of the states’ fait accompli? Not even close.

Forbes last week ran a piece explaining why federal legalization of marijuana (which I figured was a done deal when the 2021 Congress convened) is at least a decade away.

“President Joe Biden isn’t pro-cannabis, nor are any of the other major declared candidates, including former President Donald Trump,” Forbes stated. “Trump said that drug dealers should be executed. Former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, who opposed cannabis legalization during his first bid for president in 2016 and referred to tax revenue from pot sales as “blood money,” said during a town hall on CNN that he would end parts of America’s drug war, but still opposes legalization. Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who is running as a Democrat and got arrested for marijuana and heroin decades ago, said he would decriminalize weed, but he stopped of supporting legalization.”

Forbes recounted that Morgan Paxhia, co-founder of San Francisco-based cannabis investment firm Poseidon, “was lobbying in Washington, D.C. late this spring when he finally accepted that America’s prohibition on pot is not going to end soon. Any hopes that the Biden Administration will remove marijuana from the list of controlled substances is ‘dead in the water,’ according to the politicians and staffers Paxhia met with. “My feeling of federal legalization is that it could be 10 years or more,” Forbes quoted Paxhia as saying.

potbillboard230713However, writing in Marijuana Moment last week, Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-OR) noted that the NCAA Committee on Competitive Safeguards and Medical Aspects of Sports is recommending the removal of marijuana from its list of prohibited substances and that the House has passed legislation to enable state-legal cannabis companies to have banking services seven times. Despite the fact this happened last year, when the Dems controlled the House, Blumenauer hopefully writes, “Perhaps this is the final stretch towards ending the failed war on drugs. If the NCAA is issuing a call for a reasonable, rational drug policy, can Congress be far behind?”

Meanwhile, Robert Wood – writing in The Hill last week – argued that justice demanded that the stalled EQUAL Act be passed. Wood, who won a sentence reduction under First Step Act’s Section 404, which made the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act retroactive, argued that the EQUAL Act’s opponents “often fail to comprehend the human aspect of these unjust sentences. We are talking about individuals who have served 10, 15 or even 20 years in prison, with some serving life sentences. These men and women are not statistics; they are our fellow citizens, who have families and communities to return to… The goal of passing the EQUAL Act and ensuring its retroactivity is to rectify the wrongs committed under an unjust system. By providing these individuals with an opportunity for redemption, we embrace the core principles of fairness, equality and justice. As a nation that prides itself on these values, we must not turn a blind eye to the suffering caused by outdated policies.”

No hearings have been held on EQUAL this year, and I suspect that none will happen. Jacob Sullum noted in Reason last week that “Donald Trump can’t seem to decide whether he wants to execute drug dealers or free them from prison. The former president’s debate with himself reflects a broader clash between Republicans who think tougher criminal penalties are always better and Republicans who understand that justice requires proportionality.”

warondrugs211028Trump, who brutal drug warriors like Rodrigo Duterte, the former president of the Philippines, said last fall that “We’re going to be asking everyone who sells drugs, gets caught selling drugs, to receive the death penalty for their heinous acts.” When he repeated that two weeks ago during a Fox News interview, anchor Bret Baier pointed out that a policy of executing “everyone who sells drugs” was inconsistent with Trump’s record as president, which included passage of First Step and clemency aimed at reducing drug penalties that Trump described as “very unfair.” Baier pointed out that Alice Marie Johnson, a first-time, nonviolent drug offender whom Trump granted a commutation and later a full pardon for her participation in a cocaine conspiracy, would have been “killed under your plan,” Baier noted, “as a drug dealer.”

As long as the presidential campaign, which has over 15 months to go, is focused on crime, expect nothing from Congress.

Forbes, Why National Cannabis Legalization Is Still A Decade Away (June 30, 2023)

Marijuana Moment, If NCAA Can End Marijuana Ban, So Can The Federal Government, Congressman Says (July 3, 2023)

The Hill, Justice for all: It’s time to end the discrimination between crack and cocaine sentencing (July 4, 2023)

Reason, Trump Can’t Decide Whether To Free Drug Dealers or Kill Them: The Former President’s Bloody Rhetoric Undermines His Defense of Sentencing Reform (June 28, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

What’s Old Is New – Update for July 11, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS DENIAL OF ACQUITTED CONDUCT SENTENCING REVIEW MAKES LITTLE SENSE

As everyone knows, on June 30 the Supreme Court finally denied review to a thundering herd of petitions (13 in all) raising the constitutionality of acquitted conduct sentencing. And in so doing, the Court suggests that it’s way behind the times.

acquitted230106Acquitted conduct sentencing is the practice of using a charge of which a defendant was acquitted by a jury to enhance a sentence. The lead petitioner, Dayonta McClinton, was convicted of robbing pharmacies but acquitted of killing one of his fellow robbers in an argument over sharing proceeds. Nevertheless, the judge more than tripled his sentence from a range of 57-71 months to a sentence of 228 months because the murder was “related conduct,” despite the fact a jury said the petitioner was not guilty of killing his co-conspirator.

A careful reading of the statements issued by some Justice on the denial adds equivocation to five months of evasion.

When the Supreme Court denied review, Justice Sotomayor dissented and several other Justices issued statements. Last week, in his Sentencing Policy and the Law blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote at length about the denial of review. “It is quite obvious that objections to the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing raise constitutional issues,” he said. The certiorari petition filed by Dayonta McClinton makes this clear in its Question Presented: “Whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibit a federal court from basing a criminal defendant’s sentence on conduct for which a jury has acquitted the defendant…’ These rights are, as the Court put it in Apprendi, “constitutional protections of surpassing importance” because they define restraints on state powers and processes to impose criminal punishments.”

The statements of Justices Kavanaugh, Gorsuch and Barrett suggested these Justices voted against granting certiorari because the Sentencing Commission was considering new guidelines for acquitted-conduct sentencing. Justice Kavanaugh wrote that it is “appropriate for this Court to wait for the Sentencing Commission’s determination before the Court decides whether to grant certiorari in a case involving the use of acquitted conduct.” But as Berman observes, Kavanaugh

does not explain why it is ‘appropriate’ to leave unresolved a constitutional issue while a federal agency might address a policy issue… The Justices’ statements referencing the USSC do not account in any way for how any ‘Sentencing Commission determination’ would have any impact on the Court’s consideration of ‘constitutional protections of surpassing importance.’

Policy is policy, but constitutionality is fundamental. As Berman notes, whether acquitted conduct sentencing is constitutional has nothing to do with whether the USSC thinks that it makes policy sense to permit acquitted conduct sentencing. Obviously, the USSC once thought so (given that USSG § 1B1.3 relevant conduct sentencing has been a fixture of federal sentencing since 1988). As Berman put it, “How the USSC (or Congress) might choose to regulate sentencing law and process would not and could not resolve the array of constitutional concerns that the Supreme Court was asked to consider in McClinton. Indeed, the USSC and Congress cannot even know the full reach and limits of their powers to set forth rules concerning acquitted-conduct sentencing with constitutional matters unresolved.”

Besides, the USSC and Congress can only speak to acquitted conduct sentencing at federal sentencing, even though over 90% of sentences are handed down by state courts.

wrong160620Berman cites another problem with the Supreme Court’s punt on acquitted conduct sentencing. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent says that “the Sentencing Commission, which is responsible for the Sentencing Guidelines, has announced that it will resolve questions around acquitted conduct sentencing in the coming year.” The Kavanaugh, Gorsuch and Barrett statement says, “The Sentencing Commission is currently considering the issue.”

Neither is correct.

Berman suspects that Sotomayor’s dissent and Kavanaugh’s statement were written months ago, before the Sentencing Commission – which proposed an acquitted conduct sentencing amendment in January – withdrew its acquitted conduct sentencing proposal for further study on April 5th. What’s more, when the Commission released its proposed 2024 amendment cycle priorities last month, acquitted conduct sentencing was conspicuously absent.

“It no longer seems to be accurate to state that the Commission ‘has announced that it will resolve questions around acquitted-conduct sentencing in the coming year’” or that it is currently considering the issue, Berman wrote last week.

The Supremes seem to expect the USSC to assume the burden. The USSC, which is ill-equipped to do so, expects SCOTUS to do its job. Expect nothing from either body on acquitted conduct sentencing: you won’t be disappointed.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Inartful dodgers: constitutional concerns with acquitted conduct that only SCOTUS can address (July 4, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Inartful dodgers: did the Justices write cert denial statements in the acquitted conduct cases months ago? (July 5, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root