All posts by lisa-legalinfo

Trump Supreme Court Appointee Gorsuch May Not Be All ‘Law and Order’ – Update for June 3, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

Last week’s posts were light to the point of being non-existent. I was off watching my oldest graduate from Harvard Business School (after a 13-year stint in Army aviation, most of which was in special operations). Yeah, I’m pretty proud watching my kids accomplish things I never could have done…

But, now, it’s back to work.

JUSTICE GORSUCH HINTS HE MAY NOT BE A “LOCK” VOTE FOR GOVERNMENT

This is the time of year I am usually up to my armpits in Supreme Court decisions. But with only four weeks left (and only four opinion days scheduled), SCOTUS still has 31 cases to decide, including a passel of important criminal decisions. Maybe we’ll see something today…

Meanwhile, the high court’s decision in Nieves v. Bartlett last week (a narrow decision holding that if a cop has probable cause to arrest you, you cannot make a 1st Amendment retaliatory arrest claim) was interesting primarily for a notable voting lineup and multiple separate opinions. Nieves especially provides more evidence that Justice Gorsuch is a sharp critic of the criminal justice system.

policestate190603In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch wrote:

History shows that governments sometimes seek to regulate our lives finely, acutely, thoroughly, and exhaustively. In our own time and place, criminal laws have grown so exuberantly and come to cover so much previously innocent conduct that almost anyone can be arrested for something. If the state could use these laws not for their intended purposes but to silence those who voice unpopular ideas, little would be left of our 1st Amendment liberties, and little would separate us from the tyrannies of the past or the malignant fiefdoms of our own age.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman said in his Sentencing Law and Policy Blog that “the sparring in Nieves now has me even more excited (if that was possible) to see what the Court does in the biggest criminal cases I am watching, especially Gundy and Haymond.”

Nieves v Bartlett, Case No. 17-1174 (May 28, 2019)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Notable comments in notable SCOTUS opinions addressing First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims (May 28, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Fair Sentencing Act Resentencing Takes Ominous Turn – Update for May 28, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS LOOM ON FAIR SENTENCING ACT RESENTENCINGS

A good number of crack defendant resentencings have breezed through district courts since the First Step Act authorized the retroactive application of the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”) to people sentenced for crack prior to August 2010.

The concerns of a few dissident district judges, however, may be gaining traction, jeopardizing future FSA resentencings.

crackpowder160606The problem is this: Just about all of the pre-FSA indictments alleged the defendant had “five or more” or “fifty or more” grams of crack. Back then, five or more bought a defendant a minimum 5 years, while 50 or more was good for a 10-year minimum. But what the indictment alleges is one thing. What the presentencing report says is something else altogether, and the PSR’s amount of drugs (used for setting the Guidelines range) is what the district court usually finds.

On FSA resentencings, some defendants have convinced courts that if the indictment said “five or more grams” of crack, for instance, their sentences should be based on five grams. Some sentences have fallen dramatically as a result.

Dan Blocker argued to his judge that when a defendant seeks an FSA sentence reduction, the relevant question is not how much crack was involved in the offense, but instead only how much was charged in the indictment.

Some other courts have grappled with this argument, but Dan’s court took it by the horns. In an interim decision, the district court complained Dan’s approach – the “indictment-controls” theory – “misreads the statute and is demonstrably inconsistent with Congress’s intent.” The district judge said the First Step Act specified that a sentence reduction is allowed only for a “covered offense,” that is, “a violation of a Federal criminal statute…” Violation of the statute is the criminal conduct, the court said, not the indictment. Thus, the court must follow the offense-controls theory, not the indictment-controls theory.

Comparativecrack190425

The court said the question is what sentence would have been imposed had the FSA been in effect when Dan sold the crack. The answer, the court held, does not turn on what the actual indictment charged, but rather on what it would have charged had the FSA governed the case. The court speculated that if the FSA had been in effect, Count 1 would have charged that the conspiracy involved 280 grams or more, not just 50, and other counts would have charged the higher amounts – 28 grams and 280 grams – listed in the FSA. “The only reason the actual indictment used the lower amounts,” the court said, “was that those were the amounts included in the statute at that time – the indictment tracked the statute.”

The higher amounts might have affected Dan’s decision to plead guilty, the court said, thus requiring a hearing to figure out what Dan might have done in response to what the indictment might have said.

If what the indictment in a pre-August 2010 crack said controlled resentencing, the court complained, “every crack defendant sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act took effect would be eligible for a reduction…” and the First Step Act would “provide a windfall sentence reduction to pre-August 2010 defendants that people sentenced after 2010 would not get. “Congress could not have intended to treat crack defendants this much more favorably than powder defendants.

The so-called offense controls theory will almost certainly be appealed. Major appeals questions about retroactive FSA resentencings, even if resolved in the defendants’ favors, are likely to result in inconsistent circuit decisions, and could tie up resentencings for a year or better.

United States v. Blocker, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79934 (N.D.Fla., Apr. 25, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Dog Bites Man: Congress Expected to Do Nothing on Criminal Justice Reform This Session – Update for May 23, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CONGRESS POISED TO DO NOTHING ON JUSTICE REFORM UNTIL AFTER 2020

The media are already buzzing about the 4,000+ expected releases from federal prison after July 19, when the seven-days-per-year extra good time awarded in the First Step Act is scheduled to be effective.

grid160411The Washington Examiner wrote last week that “Trump’s potentially contradictory impulses for law and order but also second chances face a looming political test when about 4,000 federal inmates are released in July under an expansion of “good time” credit in the First Step Act, which he signed in December. Reform advocates say successful reentry into society for the looming wave must be assured. Otherwise, the reform cause and its political backers, including Trump, could be damaged.”

The immediate release wave had been expected right when the bill passed on Dec. 21. But as the Examiner put it, a “drafting error placed the good time credit expansion — allowing an extra seven days a year — in an unrelated section of the law featuring a seven-month delay.”

mcconnell180219While Congress may be watching to see how the releasees do, it will not be acting on any criminal justice reform itself. It is clear that nothing the Democratic-run House of Representatives may pass is even going to come to a vote in the Senate. In Saturday’s Wall Street Journal, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) made it clear that the Republican-led Senate will block anything Senate or House Democrats want. “Meanwhile, the Democrats are divided,” the Journal said. “House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer tout their legislative agenda, but half or more of their followers would rather rough up President Trump and then impeach him.”

Some of the Democrats running for president are touting criminal justice reforms as part of their platforms, but neither the candidates nor their opponents are interested in seeing anything enacted before the election.

With some of the 25-odd Democrats announced for president including strong criminal justice proposals in their platforms, it is unlikely the Senate would hand any of them a victory by passing any criminal justice reform measure.

Washington Examiner, Trump embrace of criminal reform faces test as 4,000 inmates near release (May 17)

Wall Street Journal, Mitch McConnell on Judges and the ‘Graveyard’ (May 18)

– Thomas L. Root

A Trio of Sentencing Cases – Update for May 22, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

2-0-1 ON SENTENCING ACTIONS LAST WEEK

Three separate proceedings on sentencing or sentence reduction came to our attention last week, unrelated except for the possibilities they represent.

colostomy190523First, Steve Gass asked his court for a compassionate release. While doing 106 months for six bank robberies (Mr. Gass preferred using a note rather than a gun in each of them), Steve was diagnosed with a malignant tumor located in his rectal wall. The tumor was successfully removed, but along with it, he lost his rectum and anus. The procedure left him dependent on a colostomy bag and subject to what the Court euphemistically called “special hygiene requirements” and heightened medical monitoring. (Having had a colostomy bag for six terrible weeks once, I have some sense of those “special” requirements – a gas mask and a gasoline-powered power washer are on the list).

While Steve had beaten the cancer, he argued, his current condition is nevertheless “both serious and difficult to manage in a prison setting, marked neither by enhanced sanitary conditions appropriate for colostomy-dependent patients or heightened monitoring necessary to prevent secondary effects of infection or recurrence of a malignancy.” Clearly, the tumor did not affect Steve’s remarkable capacity for understatement.

The government, being the caring and benevolent organism that it is, argued that Steve had “recovered” from colorectal cancer, so his colostomy condition – which he could and would have to manage for the rest of his life – cannot qualify as the kind of “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a reduction anticipated by 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

compassion160124The district court, recognizing the government’s disingenuous argument for being the same substance that fills Steve’s colostomy bag – ruled that Steve had “shown that his physical and medical condition substantially diminishes his ability to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility. And this is not a condition that [he] will ever recover from — he will be device dependent and subject to enhanced hygiene and monitoring requirements for the rest of his life.” The court, with a gift for understatement the equal of Steve’s, thus held that the permanent colostomy was extraordinary and compelling enough.

Still, the court did not shorten Steve’s sentence. Rather, it creatively resentenced Steve to the time remaining on his sentence, but ordered Steve to home confinement for the remaining 28 months or so he had to serve. The decision showcases how the sentence reduction power can be employed with precision to fashion modifications that address the prisoner’s situation without simply letting recipients out to run amok

*     *     *

gunknot181009In the 6th Circuit, Dave Warren got a statutory maximum 120-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a gun in violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1). Both he and the government sought a sentence somewhere within his 51-63 month Guidelines range. But the judge was convinced that Dave’s criminal history made him “a high risk offender… an individual that must be deterred. 51 to 63 months… considering the danger this individual poses to the community, is nowhere in my view close to what is required.”

Last week, the 6th Circuit reversed the sentence. The appeals court noted that “because the Guidelines already account for a defendant’s criminal history, imposing an extreme variance based on that same criminal history is inconsistent with the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct…”

“We do not mean to imply that only a sentence in or around that range will avoid disparities with other similar defendants,” the Court wrote. “But we do not see how the sentence imposed here avoids them.” Because the district court’s discussion of whether its 120-month sentence avoided unwarranted sentencing disparities depended only on criminal history factors already addressed by the Guidelines, the 6th said, the district court relied “on a problem common to all” defendants within the same criminal history category Dave fell into – that is, that they all have an extensive criminal history – and thus did not provide “a sufficiently compelling reason to justify imposing the greatest possible deviation from the Guidelines-recommended sentence in this case.”

*     *     *

Robber160229Finally, I recently reported on a remarkable “Holloway”-type motion in Chad Marks’ case. Chad was convicted of a couple of bank robberies, but unlike Steve Gass, Chad did carry a gun. Under 18 USC § 924(c), using or carrying a gun during a crime of violence or drug deal adds a mandatory five years onto your sentence. If you are convicted of a second 924(c) offense, the minimum additional sentence is 25 years. Unfortunately, the statute was poorly written, so that if you carry a gun to a bank robbery on Monday, and then do it again on Tuesday, you will be sentenced for the robberies, and then have a mandatory 30 years added to the end of the sentence, five years for Monday’s gun, and 25 years for Tuesday’s gun.

Congress always meant that the second offense’s 25 years should apply only after conviction for the first one, but it did not get around to fixing the statute until last year’s First Step Act adopted Sec. 403. But to satisfy the troglodytes in the Senate (yes, Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Arkansas, I mean you), the change the law was not made retroactive.

grad190524Chad has served 20 years, during which time he has gone from a nihilistic young miscreant to a college-educated inmate teacher and mentor. The federal judge who sentenced Chad 20 years ago recognizes that post-conviction procedure is so restricted that the court can do nothing, but he asked in an order that the U.S. Attorney “carefully consider exercising his discretion to agree to an order vacating one of Marks’ two Section 924(c) convictions. This would eliminate the mandatory 25-year term that is now contrary to the present provisions of the statute.”

Since then, Chad Marks’ appointed counsel has filed a lengthy recitation of the defendant’s extraordinary BOP record. Despite this, and despite the fact that over two months have elapsed since the judge’s request to the U.S. Attorney, the government has not seen fit to say as much as one word about the matter.

Order, United States v. Gass, Case No. 10-60125-CR (SDFL Apr. 30, 2019)

United States v. Warren, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14005 (6th Cir. May 10, 2019)

Order, United States v. Marks, Case No. 03-cr-6033 (WDNY, Mar. 14, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

No Clemency for the Hot Polloi – Update for May 21, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NEW TRUMP PARDONS DO LITTLE TO SPUR CLEMENCY HOPE

clemency170206President Trump last week granted a full pardon to media tycoon Conrad Moffat Black and Patrick Nolan, former Republican leader of the California State Assembly, but there is little in those acts of executive grace to cause prisoners who are not politically connected or are not BBFs with celebrities that Trump will start granting clemency to the thousands whose applications languish on file.

Black, a British citizen, had been the CEO of the publisher of Chicago Sun-Times, The Daily Telegraph and The Jerusalem Post. He was convicted in 2007 on three counts of mail fraud and one count of obstruction of justice. Two fraud counts were later thrown out by the Supreme Court. Black served 37 months in federal prison. Last year wrote a book called Donald J. Trump: A President Like No Other, which some media accounts allege was little more than a hagiography.

Nolan was a California legislative leader who spent years in prison after being convicted in the 1990s, after being secretly recorded accepting checks from an undercover FBI agent. He pled to one count of racketeering and did 25 months. Trump characterized Nolan’s decision to plead guilty as a “difficult” one, which makes him no different from all the other 94% of federal defendants who plead guilty every year.

These pardons do little to encourage federal inmates that Trump will wield his clemency power to benefit prisoners who are not connected. 

pardonme190123The President has pardoned nine people and commuted the sentences of three others since taking office, in a pattern apparently driven by politics, celebrity support and television. The only commutation of someone who was not politically connected was that of Alice Johnson, whose case had been taken to the president by Kim Kardashian West.

A few have complained that the President’s pardons are driven by politics or are “all about him.” This, of course, makes him no different from his predecessors (Obama and Manning, Clinton and Rich).

The President has been rumored to be planning pardons, timed for the Memorial Day weekend, of servicemen who have been accused or convicted of war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan.  However, the opposition to such actions appears to be fierce, and some have suggested that the hue and cry may cause Trump to abandon the plan.

The Hill, Trump pardons media tycoon, former GOP leader of California State Assembly (May 15)

The New York Times, Trump May Be Preparing Pardons for Servicemen Accused of War Crimes (May 18)

The Hill, Here are the 12 pardons or reduced sentences granted by Trump (May 16)

– Thomas L. Root

The “Closer to Home” Illusion – Update for May 20, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BOP DOES NOT HAVE TO WALK 500 MILES

aardvark190520There is not a single inmate in the federal prison system who would not be willing to walk, roll or crawl 500 miles to be home right now. Any no one on the outside is so hard-hearted that he or she cannot concede that housing inmates close enough to family to permit visits does not help with rehabilitation.

For those reasons (if basic humanity were not enough), the First Step Act’s provision directing the Bureau of Prisons to “place the prisoner in a facility as close as practicable to the prisoner’s primary residence, and to the extent practicable, in a facility within 500 driving miles of that residence,” got a lot of coverage when the bill passed last December.

But just as the media buzz that 4,000-plus inmates were going to be dumped on America’s streets the day after the Act passed was wrong, the giddy hopes that inmates were about to be placed near to their families have been tempered by the realities of what the Act says and what the BOP is willing to do.

There is a usually a separation between promise and reality, sometimes a crack and sometimes a chasm. It is probably worthwhile, therefore, to explain just how little Sec. 601 of the First Step Act really promises families and inmates.

Sec. 601 modified 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) to read that the BOP should try to place prisoners within 500 miles of home. That placement, however, is not required. In fact, it is subject to some pretty big exceptions, being subject to

(1)   bed availability,
(2)   the prisoner’s security designation,
(3)   the prisoner’s programmatic needs,
(4)   the prisoner’s mental and medical health needs,
(5) any request made by the prisoner related to faith-based needs,
(6)  recommendations of the sentencing court, and
(7)  “other security concerns of the” BOP.

Number 7 is a doozy. The placement need not violate a rule, or a BOP program statement, or even a local rule adopted by the sending or receiving prison. It just has to be a “concern.” Whatever that is, it is clearly something to be defined by the BOP.

jello190520Prior to the First Step Act, the BOP required that an inmate be at one institution for at least 18 months, and that he or she have 18 months without a disciplinary report (the BOP called it “clear conduct”) before he or she could be considered for a transfer. Often, transfers were denied because the inmate was deemed to need programming available at his or her current location, or occasionally, because the inmate had skills (a welder, for example, or a GED instructor) the current institution believed it needed to retain. When the transfer came (if it did), the inmate seldom ended up at the institution he or she desired.

In the wake of First Step, however, the BOP is still requiring that an inmate be at one institution for at least 18 months, and that he or she have 18 months without a disciplinary report (the BOP called it “clear conduct”) before he or she could be considered for a transfer. The BOP can still deny transfers for programming needs, perceived mental health needs (which, given the state of mental health treatment in the system, is a hoot), and for lack of bed space (which inmates from years past know to be an excuse that means whatever the BOP wants it to mean). Anything not covered by the foregoing can easily fall within the as-amorphous-as-Jello “security concerns” exception.

But they can’t do that, can they? Of course not. The injured inmate can always that the BOP to court…

Not so fast. Sec. 601 of the First Step Act added a free pass to the BOP: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.” So you don’t like what the BOP did? You can’t sue, can’t even bring a habeas corpus action, can’t even get on Judge Judy. The directive of § 601, detailed in its mandate and limitations, is completely undone by the last line of § 601, which tells the BOP, “if you don’t follow the law, no one is allowed to call you on it.”

wendys190520Imagine a football game like that, where one team gets a yellow flag repeatedly, with each penalty being marched off for zero yards. Or, my preferred fantasy, a diet on which if you succumb to Wendy’s Peppercorn Mushroom Melt Triple with a side of Baconator Fries and large Coke, the 2,190 calories you consume would not keep you from dropping a pound a day. Sweet deal for the BOP.

If the BOP could be sued, the results would not be much different. Courts traditionally give substantial deference to the judgments of prison administrators. Even restrictive prison regulations are permissible if they are “‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological interests. The BOP would say that its transfer restrictions – like 18 months of clear conduct – serve a legitimate penological goal. The courts, deferring to the BOP’s interpretation of the revised statute and its flexibility granted therein, would undoubtedly accept that.

chevron190520Finally, even without prison-administration deference, courts generally defer to administrative agencies “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules… and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” This is called “Chevron deference,” and – while opponents hope to see the Supreme Court undo it at some point soon – it would easily apply to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) as to how the BOP measures bed availability, security concerns, programming needs and mental and physical health needs.

So if the BOP ignores the Act’s 500-mile placement requirement, there is no remedy. Even if there were, BOP rules on transfer and the exceptions to closer-to-home would probably be unassailable.

Sec. 601, First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-015, 132 Stat. 5208, 5238 (Dec. 21, 2018)

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)

– Thomas L. Root

If You Want to Go Home, Die Faster – Update for May 16, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CAN’T TEACH AN OLD DOG NEW TRICKS

die190513The Bureau of Prisons has been notorious for refusing to make sentence reduction recommendations to courts because dying inmates seemed to be in pretty good health, and surely able to finish their sentences, no matter what doctors might say. The First Step Act tried to remedy the BOP’s convenient myopia by letting inmates file for sentence reductions with district courts if the BOP refused to do so for them.

You’ll be glad to know that the government remains just as oblivious to medical reality and insensitive to impending death as ever. When Steve Brittner’s BOP doc told him that his Stage IV brain tumor was bad enough to withdraw further treatment and sign him up for hospice care, Steve filed for an 18 USC § 3582(c) sentence reduction so he could die at home.

The government opposed the reduction, arguing Steve did not have a terminal illness within the meaning of the guidelines because his medical records “do not indicate that the tumor has metastasized.” Plus, the government contended, Steve could not show “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances because his medical records did not indicate an inability to care for himself.

Last week, Steve’s district court swept aside the government’s opposition and said Steve could die at home. First, the court said, the Guidelines on sentence reduction do not require that Steve show that his tumor has metastasized for his condition to be terminal. Instead, the guidelines provide a number of examples of medical conditions that would meet the standard for a “terminal illness.”’ A metastatic solid-tumor cancer” is just example.

compassionaterelease190517

Second, to show extraordinary and compelling circumstances, an inmate does not have to show both a terminal illness and inability to care for oneself. “The Government reads a conjunctive requirement into the guideline comment where none occurs,” the district court observed. The Guidelines provide that “extraordinary and compelling” reasons exist “under any of the circumstances set forth below,” of which a terminal condition is one and inability to care for oneself is another.”

“Of importance,” the court wrote, “the treatment options available to Brittner have been exhausted. According to the last treatment note available to the Court, dated November 15, 2018… the plan… was to hold, or discontinue further therapy, and it was recommended to Brittner that he consider comfort measures, specifically hospice, which his treating oncologist “considered very reasonable due to worsening performance status… It is clear from the nature of his disease and his worsening condition as documented above, that Brittner’s prognosis is grim, his disease is terminal, and the length of his life can be measured most likely in weeks, as opposed to months.”

United States v. Brittner, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73653 (D.Mont. May 01, 2019)

Reason.com, A Terminally Ill, Wheelchair-Bound Inmate Applied for Compassionate Release. The Justice Department Argued He Wasn’t Dying Fast Enough to Qualify (May 3)

– Thomas L. Root

Keeping Count – Update for May 15, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING BY THE NUMBERS

The Sentencing Commission Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Report and Sourcebook came out last week. Besides the obvious (which the Annual Report sort of soft-pedaled, that the Commission lacks a quorum, and thus cannot perform its primary duties), the release contains some interesting numbers taken from 2018’s 69,400 district court sentencings. (All years are fiscal years, running from Oct. 1 to Sept. 30):

• The Feds are busier this year than last. The sentencing caseload increased by 3.7% from 2017, the first increase in caseload since 2011.

numbers180327• It’s not what you did, it’s where you’re from, that matters. Immigration crimes replaced drug offenses as the largest single group of offenses. Immigration cases increased from 30.5% in 2017 to 34.4% in 2018, while drug and firearms prosecutions fell.

• Meth is the drug of choice. Methamphetamine offenses, the most common drug type in the federal system, continued to rise (from 30.8% of all drug offenses in 2016 and 34.6% in 2017 to 39.8% in 2018).

• The Guidelines still rule. 75% of federal offenders were sentenced under the Guidelines Manual in 2018. Of those, 51.0% were sentenced within the defendants’ Guidelines sentencing range, an increase of 1.9 points from 2017. The number of defendants getting downward departures for helping the government remained at 10.1%, the same level as 2017.

U.S. Sentencing Commission, FY 2018 Sourcebook (May 8, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

If Not For Supervised Release, What’s Forever For? – Update for May 14, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

FOREVER IS A LONG TIME

41475-Forever-Is-A-Long-TimeKevin Carson was convicted of having hundreds of kiddie porn images on his computers and having sent some such images to young girls. He got a below Guidelines sentence of 240 months and lifetime supervised release, with conditions prohibiting him from using Internet devices without probation office approval and avoiding from any social media.

Kevin appealed the lifetime supervised release term and the computer and social media restrictions. Because his trial lawyer did not object to the supervised release or the conditions (and for that matter, did not even bother filing a sentencing memorandum, something the appellate court noted with disdain), Kevin had to show that the mistakes were plain error that affected his substantial rights (under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)).

computer190514Last week, the 8th Circuit upheld the lifetime supervised release term and the conditions. Kevin complained the trial court did not consider sentencing factors in giving him lifetime supervised release, but the Circuit said a sentencing court’s explanation “may be relatively brief if the district court rests its decision on the Sentencing Commission’s reasoning and decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case.” Here, a Guidelines policy statement provided that if the offense of conviction is a sex offense, “the statutory maximum term of supervised release is recommended.” Thus, Kevin’s lifetime supervised release term “was a straightforward application of this policy.”

As for the computer restrictions, the Court ruled that as long as Kevin  could use computers and social media with Probation Office approval – rather than an outright ban – the condition is not too great a restriction on his freedom. Kevin argued that the social media restriction was unconstitutional under Packingham v North Carolina, but the Circuit said Packingham “invalidated only a post-custodial restriction and expressed concern that the statute applied even to persons who have already served their sentence.” Because Kevin will still be serving a sentence on supervised release for as long as he is able to draw breath, the Court held, he will never finish serving his sentence, and thus, Packingham does not make the district court’s restriction on social media during supervised release plain error.

forever190514The decision is noteworthy for Judge Kelly’s incisive dissent, in which he complains that the district court left the 8th Circuit with no explanation for why it varied downward one-third on the sentence but maxed out the supervised release. The need for individual tailoring of supervised release conditions to offenders is substantial, the Judge said, and the advent of IoT devices like thermostats and doorbells, and Amazon.com, could leave Kevin violating supervised release by turning up the heat.

The Judge underscored the problem with sweeping, blunt supervised release conditions like these: Kevin “was thirty-three at the time of his arrest, and his lifetime term of supervised release could very well last decades. We can only imagine the universe of internet-reliant electronic devices that will pervade everyday life by then. The length and conditions of his supervised release may well be justified, but such punishment deserves, at minimum, some reasoned explanation from the sentencing court.”

United States v. Carson, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14044 (8th Cir. May 10, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

No Running Out the Clock on Supervised Release – Update for May 13, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

FLEEING IN PLACE

emily190513Emily Bernges, my high school Latin teacher, taught us that the Latin verb “fugare” means “to flee,” and is the basis of the English word “fugitive.” Based on that, you might think that to be a fugitive, you have to take flight, or at least do something that seems like running from the law.

Not necessarily, as Phillip Thompson found out. He did some federal time last decade, followed by five years of supervised release. The supervised release was not such a big deal to Phil, because he was deported to his native Jamaica as soon as he was released in 2010. Before he left for the islands, Phil was a told that one condition of his supervised release was that if he came back to the USA, he had to promptly report to his probation officer. Because returning to this country after being deported is a federal crime all by itself, you would think that the last thing Phil would want to do if he sneaked back onto the mainland was report to his PO.

You would be right. Phil returned to the USA in 2012, but got deported again about a month later, well before before his PO found out he had been back. When she did learn of it, she filed a violation petition, but Phil was already back in Jamaica and beyond the reach of the Probation Office. But Phil came back in December 2014, five months before his 5-year supervised release term expired, and this time he stayed. Having the foresight to use an alias and obtain a phony driver’s license, Phil flew under the radar for more than two years, during which time he was busily engaged in organizing large-scale marijuana importation and routing the money through bank accounts back to Jamaica (or so the authorities say).

Phil got arrested in 2017, and after his fingerprints ratted him out, his Probation Officer learned he was back. She amended the pending violation petition, and his supervised release was revoked. Phil challenged the district court’s jurisdiction to even hear his supervised release revocation, because supervised release had expired in June 2015. The district court disagreed, saying under the “fugitive tolling” doctrine, Phil was a fugitive from the time he got back to the USA until he was arrested, and his supervised release stopped running during that time.

Last week, the 4th Circuit agreed. As a general rule, the Court said, a district court’s power to revoke supervised release ends when the supervised release term expires, but the term stops running if the defendant absconds from supervised release and thus becomes a fugitive. Phil argued he was not a fugitive under the fugitive tolling doctrine, because only an active and knowing effort to evade adjudication of a supervised release violation petition is sufficient to trigger the fugitive tolling doctrine. He never knew about the July 2011 petition filed against him because he had been deported two months before.

fugitive190513The 4th disagreed. The fugitive tolling doctrine provides that a supervised release term “is tolled when a defendant absconds from supervision.” That is because Congress intended defendants to serve their full supervised release term, and just as an escaped prisoner’s sentence is not credited for the time the prisoner spends out of custody, a supervised release term should not be credited for the time that a defendant, “by virtue of his own wrongful act,” spends out of supervision. Fugitive tolling, the Court said, “prevents a situation in which we reward an absconder for his misconduct, allowing a fugitive defendant to run out the clock on his release term while refusing to submit to supervision.”

Here, Phil did not just come back to the USA and not report, but he used an alias, got phony ID, and admitted he knew he was supposed to report to the PO if he returned. That was enough to show active measures to hide, and to thus make him an absconder.

United States v. Thompson, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14035 (4th Cir. May 10, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root