We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.
A PAIR OF § 922(g)(1) CASES
I remain convinced that the Supreme Court’s United States v. Rahimi decision — banning gun possession for an individual who has shown himself to be dangerous is historically justified under the Second Amendment — represents a necessary correction to the wild, wild west of gun rights suggested by Justice Thomas’s New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen opinion. In fact, I suspect that Rahimi makes it more likely that people convicted of nonviolent felonies will regain their Second Amendment rights in the next two years.
Two cases decided last week may hint at how courts will approach a post-Rahimi felon-in-possession world.
Carl Langston was convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun under 18 USC § 922(g)(1) after a drunken brawl at a bar. He pled guilty but, on appeal, argued for the first time that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen as applied to him.
Last Friday, the 1st Circuit upheld his conviction. The Circuit applied the F.R.Crim.P. 52(b) plain error standard to review because Carl hadn’t raised the issue in the trial court and found that his argument failed because (1) no prior Supreme Court or 1st Circuit holds that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional “in any of its applications;” and (2) Rahimi “does not compel the conclusion that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to defendants with Hugh’s criminal history.
In fact, the 1st observed, “rather than compelling the conclusion that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment cases consistently reiterate, albeit in dicta, the presumptive lawfulness of the felon-in-possession statute… The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Rahimi, joined by eight justices, once again identified prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons as ‘presumptively lawful’.”
It’s hard to win a “plain error” appeal, as Carl found out. However, the Circuit conceded that Carl’s appeal
presents a serious constitutional claim that the Supreme Court has not yet resolved. As Langston points out, Rahimi held only that an individual may be temporarily disarmed, consistent with the Second Amendment, if a court has found that the individual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of another. Still, the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly over sixteen years, from [District of Columbia v] Heller to Rahimi, that felon-in-possession laws are presumptively lawful. Thus, on plain-error review, we cannot agree with Carl that the mere fact that the government did not introduce historical evidence to support the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) makes it clear and obvious that his conviction violates the Second Amendment.
Meanwhile, the 3rd Circuit ruled that Dionti Moore, who used his fiancée’s handgun to frighten off intruders at her home while he was on supervised release, had no Second Amendment defense to a § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession conviction.
The Circuit relied on Rahimi’s holding that it had to find that § 922(g)(1), as applied to Dionti, is “relevantly similar to laws that our tradition is understood to permit… [and that] why and how the regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry… In other words, a modern firearms regulation passes constitutional muster only if it is “consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.”
Comparing 18th and 19th-century laws to disarming a convicted felon while on supervised release, the 3rd ruled that “the bottom line is this: during the founding era, forfeiture laws temporarily disarmed citizens who had committed a wide range of crimes… This historical practice of disarming a convict during his sentence — or as part of the process of qualifying for pardon — is like temporarily disarming a convict on supervised release. After all, the defendant receives a term of supervised release thanks to his initial offense, and… it constitutes a part of the final sentence for his crime’” (quoting the Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Haymond). The Circuit concluded that “[c]onsistent with our Nation’s history and tradition of firearms regulation, we hold that convicts may be disarmed while serving their sentences on supervised release.”
Of course, the Court’s focus on “temporarily” disarming and “disarm[ing] while serving their sentences on supervised release” can easily be read to infer that permanently disarming someone with a felony conviction on his record is a different matter altogether.
One would expect nothing less from the Circuit that handed down the en banc Range v. Attorney General decision, which is currently in front of the 3rd Circuit on remand. Incidentally, supplemental briefs by both Bryan Range and the government were filed last Friday, suggesting a new decision is on the fast track in Philadelphia. There is little doubt that whatever the decision, it will end up again at the Supreme Court.
United States v. Langston, Case No. 23-1337, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19353 (1st Cir. Aug 2, 2024)
United States v. Moore, Case No. 23-1843, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19282 (3d Cir. Aug 2, 2024)
– Thomas L. Root
The BOP probably doesn’t like that big white bear, the fact that it is required to deliver on RRC placement despite the agency’s utter failure over five years to ensure that there was enough RRC space. But as Dostoevsky or Tolstoy (or both) figured out, just because you can force yourself to not think about it doesn’t mean it isn’t there.