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Unintended Consequences for a Meritorious Sentencing Commission Proposal – Update for February 21, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE NAVARRO CONUNDRUM

Sharp-eyed reader Drew wrote last week to ask about the United States Sentencing Commission’s proposal to change the supervised release guidelines.

supervisedleash181107Supervised release – a term of post-incarceration control over a former prisoner by the US Probation Office during which the ex-inmate can be sent back to prison for violations of a whole list of conditions – is imposed as a part of nearly every sentence, despite the fact that “it is required in fewer than half of federal cases,” according to one federal judge. No one subjected to it especially likes it, which is why many have cheered the Sentencing Commission’s proposal to reduce its usage.

The proposed amendment now being considered would amend USSG § 5D1.1 to remove the requirement that a court reflexively impose a term of supervised release whenever a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is imposed, so a court would be required to impose supervised release only when required by statute. For cases in which the decision to impose supervised release is discretionary, the court would be directed to impose it “when warranted by an individualized assessment of the need for supervision,” which the court would be expected to explain on the record.

Who could possibly complain about avoiding a term of supervised release, a period of post-incarceration control that, by some accounts, violates one-third of the people subjected to it?

Remember Peter Navarro, once a confidante of first-term President Trump and currently his Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing? Petey suffered hideously as a federal prisoner for four whole months at FCI Miami in between his last and current White House gigs, doing time after being convicted of contempt of Congress.

You’re wondering, of course, who could possibly hold Congress in contempt?  Besides almost all of America, that is? Well, Pete did by refusing to testify before the House January 6th Committee.  He was sentenced to four whole months of incarceration. Last summer, as his endless sentence drew to a close, Pete petitioned his sentencing court for compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A), asking not that his sentence be cut but instead that the court add a few days of supervised release.

It was subtraction by addition. Pete wanted a few days of supervised release added to his sentence because of a quirk in the First Step Act. Under the Act, FSA credits – time credits that are earned for successful completion of programming intended to reduce recidivism – can be used for early release or halfway house/home confinement benefits. The Bureau of Prisons credits the initial FSA credits a prisoner earns to decrease the length of his or her sentence by up to a year under 18 USC § 3624(g)(3), but only if the prisoner has had a term of supervised release imposed as part of his sentence.

magahat250221Generally, the supervised release condition has not been a problem for prisoners because courts hand out supervised release like red MAGA caps at a Trump rally. However, a few sentences don’t have supervised release added to the tag end, such as very short ones or cases where an alien will be deported at the end of his term.

That happened to Pete, whose court imposed a four-month prison sentence without any supervised release afterward. This left Pete unable to use any of the 14-odd days of FSA credit he had earned to go home a couple of weeks early.

Pete’s creative legal team filed for the sentence non-reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A), asking that the sentence be modified to add a little supervised release after Mr. Navarro’s four months in hell ended. The court didn’t bite, holding that the sine qua non of a sentence reduction motion was a request for an actual sentence reduction. Pete had asked for a sentence increase, and that could not be granted.

As a result, Pete barely made it out of his personal Devil’s Island in time to be flown by private jet to the Republican Convention in Milwaukee. (Incidentally, he emerged from prison as a dedicated BOP reformer, but that commitment seems to have waned since he made it back to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW).

The Navarro episode illustrated Drew’s question: If supervised release were to be no longer imposed for many offenses, would that not also hobble a prisoner’s ability to earn the up-to-one-year-off that § 3624(g)(3) offers? Darn right – just ask President Trump’s Special Counselor on Trade and Manufacturing. Is this the USSC sneakily trying to take benefits away from some prisoners? Might the result of the proposed amendment’s adoption be a repeat of year-and-a-day sentences where judges impose a day of supervised release in order to allow defendants the full benefit of their FSA credits?

I suspect the Commission simply has not focused on the effect that its proposal would have on prisoners using FSA credits for shorter sentences under 18 USC § 3624(g)(3). The arcane FSA credit regime is not a matter that’s necessarily in the Sentencing Commission’s wheelhouse. The USSC’s proposal to encourage more judicious imposition of supervised release terms is generally laudable: it conserves US Probation Office resources to be spent on people who really need the post-prison supervision while will improve – rather than limit – rehabilitation for many.

adultsupervision240711(Examples: I had a fellow on supervised release tell me last week that a major trucking firm had been happy to hire him as a long-haul trucker despite his 20 years served for a drug offense until it learned he was still on supervised release. The company told him it could not hire him as long as he was on a US Probation Office tether but to call them the second he was done with supervised release, whereupon they’d be glad to put him in one of their rigs. I had another guy tell me that he couldn’t get life insurance to protect his wife and kids until he was off supervised release. Neither of these limitations helps a former prisoner re-integrate.)

We’ll have to see whether USSC tweaks its proposal to account for the unforeseen Navarro consequence when the final amendment package is adopted in April.

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines for United States Courts, 90 FR 8968 (February 4, 2025)

United States v. Thomas, 346 FSupp3d 326 (EDNY 2018)

Order, United States v. Navarro, ECF 176, Case No 22-cr-0200 (DDC, May 15, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

A No-BS Zone About The President and The BOP – Update for February 20, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

GIVE ‘EM HELL, HARRY

Legend has it that President Harry Truman was giving a speech when an enthusiastic supporter shouted, “Give ‘em hell, Harry!” The President replied, “I don’t give them hell. I just tell the truth about them, and they think it’s hell.”

I got an email from a reader who said, “We appreciate your work on the news letters. but a LOT!!! of us are Trump fans. We don’t want to listen (read) liberal bs about our president.”

noBS190509No BS, no hell, just the facts:

President Trump’s new attorney general, Pam Bondi, issued as memo her first day in office outlining general policy regarding charging, plea negotiations, and sentencing for prosecutors. She directs that in federal criminal cases, prosecutors “should charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense. The most serious offenses are those punishable by death, or those with the most significant mandatory minimum sentences (including under the Armed Career Criminal Act and 21 USC § 851) and the most substantial recommendation under the Sentencing Guidelines.”

Last Friday, Bondi reversed a Biden administration decision, ordering the transfer of George Hanson, a federal inmate to Oklahoma so he can be executed, following through on Trump’s executive order to more actively support the death penalty.

death200623Bondi directed the Bureau of Prisons to transfer an inmate serving a life sentence at USP Pollock who is also under a state death sentence for a different crime. Oklahoma asked for the transfer several years ago, but the Biden Administration refused. Oklahoma wants the transfer to be done quickly so that it can kill him in its May execution cycle.

ABC reported on Friday that it obtained a memorandum of understanding between the BOP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement that despite chronic staffing shortages to manage its existing population, the Bureau will house ICE detainees at FDCs in Philadelphia, and at Atlanta, Leavenworth and Berlin FCIs.

KQED reported last Friday that ICE officials and BOP national and regional staff inspected FCI Dublin – a women’s prison that closed last April due to a staff-on-inmate sexual abuse scandal – to determine its availability to hold immigrant detainees.

privateprisons180131“With the contract that ICE and BOP have entered into and the needed bed space…and then their assessments — them coming to the facility and doing these assessments — my opinion would be the indication is absolutely there that this is potentially going to be converted to an ICE facility,” said John Kostelnik, western regional vice president for the AFGE Council of Prison Locals No. 33. “There’s a lot of unofficial notice from agency officials and others that are telling us that this is what is happening.”

I received reports from several people last week that the BOP has returned all non-citizens in halfway house or on home confinement pursuant to FSA credits to secure custody. The reports came from several different parts of the country and appear reliable, but they are not officially confirmed.

In a press release and earnings call last week, CoreCivic’s CEO told investors that the company – which has contracts to detain people for ICE in its private prisons, expects a massive increase in the number of people it will be holding. The company also expects growth from BOP contracts. Trump has allowed the BOP to again contract with private prison operators after Biden canceled BOP private prison contracts in 2021.

Finally, the BOP issued a press release confirming that because of Trump’s January 20 Executive Order directing agencies to remove content related to gender ideology from their publications — “some content on our public website (www.bop.gov) is temporarily unavailable as we work to fully implement the Executive Order.” For the last four weeks, the BOP’s extensive online library of program statements has been unavailable.

Attorney General, General Policy Regarding Charging, Plea Negotiations, and Sentencing (February 5, 2025)

Associated Press, Bondi orders federal inmate transferred to Oklahoma for execution (February 14, 2025)

ABC News, Males detained by ICE to be housed in federal prisons, new memo says (February 14, 2025)

BOP, Agency Complies with Executive Order (February 11, 2025)

KQED, ICE Weighs Turning FCI Dublin Into Detention Center, Union Leaders Say (February 14, 2025)

Arizona Republic, Private prison company CoreCivic anticipates ‘growth opportunities’ under Donald Trump (February 11, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

St. Vincent Must Remain Unarmed, 10th Says – Update for February 18, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ADDING TO THE 922(g)(1) MAYHEM…

melyndavincent250218You may remember Melynda Vincent, a woman convicted of bank fraud 15 years ago for writing some bad checks while in the throes of drug addiction. Since then, Melynda cleaned up, graduated from a drug treatment program, earned an undergraduate degree and two graduate degrees, and founded the Utah Harm Reduction Coalition – a nonprofit organization for drug treatment and criminal-justice reform – and a mental health counseling service, Life Changes Counseling.

She’s a poster child for rehabilitation. No, more than that, maybe for sainthood, someone who turned a horrific past and debilitating addiction into something that will benefit countless people (and make society safer).  A therapist who has ‘walked the walk’ the people she counsels are on right now.

In 2021, Melynda sued to be allowed to own a gun. No matter that she might be a saint. The 10th Circuit held that 18 USC § 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession prohibition on gun possession was constitutional as applied to her. After all, she was a felon and that was the end of the story.

At the time, Melynda took her argument to the Supreme Court. SCOTUS sat on her petition for certiorari (along with the government’s request that the high court review the 3d Circuit’s Range decision), and then finally GVR’d her, sending the case back to the 10th for reconsideration in light of United States v. Rahimi.

‘Hint, hint,’ SCOTUS seemed to be saying to the Circuit, ‘take a look at her ‘dangerousness’ before you rubber-stamp a denial based on pre-Rahimi law.

Last week, the 10th ignored the hint. It held that despite New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen and despite Rahimi, its 2009 decision in United States v. McCane that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional when applied to any felon in any situation was still good law. The Circuit relied “on the Supreme Court’s 2008 statement in District of Columbia v. Heller that it was not ‘cast[ing] doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons’” and Rahimi’s recognition of “the presumptive lawfulness of these longstanding prohibitions,” quoting Heller.

“Longstanding?” Prior to 1961, no federal law would have prohibited someone in Melynda’s situation from possessing guns. As the first Range opinion noted, “modern laws have no longstanding analogue in or national history and tradition of firearm regulation.”

The 10th noted that the 4th, the 8th and the 11th Circuits also “have held that Rahimi doesn’t abrogate their earlier precedents upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).”

stvincentB250218Melynda is as sympathetic a felon-in-possession petitioner as anyone could find, maybe even more so than Bryan Range (who, after all, had one ticket for fishing without a license ticket in the 25 years since his food stamp conviction). If § 922(g)(1)‘s felon-in-possession prohibition does not violate the 2nd Amendment as applied to St. Melynda Vincent, the “presumptive lawfulness of these longstanding prohibitions” must be an irrebutable one.

Expect Melynda’s request for Supreme Court review to drop onto the SCOTUS docket before Memorial Day.

Vincent v. Bondi, Case No 21-4121, 2025 USAppLEXIS 3179 (10th Cir. Feb 11, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

Dangerousness (and More) and 922(g) Constitutionality – Update for February 14, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

3RD CIRCUIT’S TROUBLING SUGGESTIONS ON 922(g)(1)

Following its en banc Range v Attorney General II decision– that the 18 USC 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession (F-I-P) statute violates the 2nd Amendment where it prohibits a person with a single disqualifying but nonviolent fraud conviction 25 years before from owning a gun – the 3d Circuit earlier this week remanded a similar case for the trial court to inquire into whether the petitioner had a history of dangerousness.

dice161221Restaurateur George Pitsilides’ hobby is high-stakes poker, an avocation that extended into sports betting and hosting illegal poker tournaments. He was convicted 25 years ago of placing sports bets with a Pennsylvania bookie – law-breaking that must seem quaint to anyone watching Eli and Peyton Manning on the Fanduel ad during the Superbowl – conduct that disqualifies him from gun possession under the F-I-P statute.

In 2019, he sued the government for the right to own a gun, arguing among other things that the F-I-P statute violated the 2nd Amendment as applied to his situation. While the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court handed down decisions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, cases “which effected a sea change in 2nd Amendment law,” as the 3rd Circuity put it, and required that a record be made of George’s “dangerousness.”

nickdanger220426The Circuit held that while Rahimi and Range II “did not purport to comprehensively define the metes and bounds of justifiable burdens on the 2nd Amendment right, they do, at a minimum, show that disarmament is justified as long as a felon continues to “present a special danger of misusing firearms… in other words, when he would likely pose a physical danger to others if armed.” The appellate court observed that

[a]s evidenced by our opinion in Range II, the determination that a felon does not currently present a special danger of misusing firearms may depend on more than just the nature of his prior felony…. [W]e agree with the 6th Circuit: Courts adjudicating as-applied challenges to 922(g)(1) must consider a convict’s entire criminal history and post-conviction conduct indicative of dangerousness, along with his predicate offense and the conduct giving rise to that conviction, to evaluate whether he meets the threshold for continued disarmament. As Range II illustrated, consideration of intervening conduct plays a crucial role in determining whether application of 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the 2nd Amendment… Indeed, such conduct may be highly probative of whether an individual likely poses an increased risk of “physical danger to others” if armed.

The Circuit ruled that “while bookmaking and pool selling offenses may not involve inherently violent conduct, they may nonetheless, depending on the context and circumstances, involve conduct that endangers the physical safety of others. That assessment necessarily requires individualized factual findings.”

So what is so troubling about this ruling? A couple of things. First, the Pitsilides court described the en banc Range II decision as turning on several factors, including having “lived an essentially law-abiding life since” the 25-year-old crime, had no history of violence, “had never knowingly violated 922(g)(1)’s prohibition while subject to it, posed no risk of danger to the public, and then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking authorization to bear arms prospectively.” The holding suggests that whether the F-I-P statute can constitutionally be applied to a defendant depends on him or her first seeking government permission (in the form of a declaratory ruling) before possessing a gun.

f**kdraft250214Imagine this standard being applied to free speech: A state law making the wearing clothing emblazoned with the phrase “f**ck the draft” a crime because of the exhibition of an obscene word would violate the 1st Amendment only if the wearer had not violated the unconstitutional statute to begin with and had won a judicial holding that the statute was unconstitutional before donning the offending shirt. (The shirt was the featured garb in Cohen v. California).

The second problem is with the squishiness of the term “dangerousness.” As Ohio State law professor Doug Berman aptly described the issue in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog earlier this week:

I have dozens of questions about how a “dangerousness” standard is to apply in the 2nd Amendment context, and I will flag just a few here.

For starters, there are many folks who were clearly dangerous, and were convicted of possibly dangerous crimes in their twenties, who thereafter mature and are no clearly longer dangerous years later. Do these folks have 2nd Amendment rights? More broadly, data show that women as a class are much less likely to commit violent crimes than men, so does this suggest women with criminal records are more likely to have 2nd Amendment rights than men because they are, generally speaking, less dangerous? And, procedurally, who has burden on the issue of “dangerousness” in civil and criminal cases? I assume Pitsilides will have to prove by a preponderance that he is not dangerous in this civil case that he brought, but does the Government now need to prove dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt in every 18 USC 922(g) criminal prosecution?

The F-I-P “as applied” 2nd Amendment battle is just warming up.

Pitsilides v. Barr, Case No. 21-3320, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3007 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2025)

Sentencing Policy and Law, Third Circuit panel states “Second Amendment’s touchstone is dangerousness” when remanding rights claim by person with multiple gambling-related offenses (February 12, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

News Notes from President Trump’s BOP – Update for February 11, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

A SHORT ROCKET FROM THE BOP

rocket190620A few news briefs from the federal prison system…

You’re Not Dead, But You May Wish You Were: Last week, new Attorney General Pam Bondi ordered the Bureau of Prisons to implement what will likely be harsher conditions for the 37 inmates whose death penalties were commuted by President Biden, ordering the agency to adjust their prison conditions so they are “consistent with the security risks those inmates present.”

Because the BOP already places inmates in facilities consistent with the “security risks those inmates present,” the order is undoubtedly a dog whistle directing the BOP to place the prisoners “in conditions consistent with the monstrosity of their crimes and the threats they pose,” the punitive language in President Trump’s Executive Order on the death penalty.

flagdetentioncamp250211Welcome, New Detainees: Government Executive reports that the BOP will be housing thousands of immigrants detained by the Homeland Security at prisons in detention centers in Miami, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, as well as at USP Atlanta, USP Leavenworth and FCI Berlin. The immigrants will be held in BOP facilities so the agency can “continue to support our law enforcement partners to fulfill the administration’s policy objectives,” Scott Taylor, an agency spokesman, said.

The Trump administration briefly held ICE detainees in federal prisons in 2018 but stopped after the American Civil Liberties Union successfully sued to force the BOP to give the detainees access to counsel and outside communications.

“Bureau employees questioned the morality and legality of their new responsibilities and said their prior experience housing detainees in Trump’s first term was a ‘disaster,’” Govt Executive reported. “Our mandate is federal pretrial or sentenced inmates,” a Miami-based CO whose facility is expecting as many as 500 detainees. “What legal jurisdiction do I have with someone [detained by] ICE?”

Another Week, Another TRO: Last week, we reported that a Massachusetts federal court had issued a temporary restraining order against the BOP’s announced plan to transfer all biological men to men’s prisons and biological women to women’s facilities. We noted that a similar suit to block the transfers had been brought by three unnamed transgender men-to-women prisoners in the US District Court for the District of Columbia.

LamberthTRO250211Judge Royce C. Lamberth (a respected and crusty jurist who has been on the federal bench since President Reagan appointed him 37 years ago) issued a temporary restraining order last week that “temporarily enjoined and restrained” the Dept of Justice” from implementing Sections 4(a) and 4(c) of Executive Order 14168, pending further Order of this Court” and required the BOP to “maintain and continue the plaintiffs’ housing status and medical care as they existed immediately prior to January 20, 2025.”

The Order said that three transgender prisoners who brought a suit to stop the order had “straightforwardly demonstrated that irreparable harm will follow” if their request for a restraining order were to be denied.

Clothes Make The Transgender Man-to-Woman: Meanwhile, a BOP policy issued early last week requiring transgender men-to-women in male prisons to hand over any female-identifying clothing and personal care products is “on hold at at least one federal prison in Texas,” according to NPR.

flipflop170920NPR had obtained a copy of a February 3 clothing policy – that a BOP employee said had been issued nationwide – directing inmates at FCI Seagoville, a low-security men’s institution near Dallas to turn in such items. But later in the week, NPR said, transgender inmates “whose clothes were taken away later learned the items would be returned” and “[m]ost had their things again as of Friday, according to [an unidentified] inmate who spoke to NPR.”

NPR said its BOP employee source reported that “prison officials are being told that clear directives on policy changes involving trans inmates will come directly” from DOJ and for now plans are “on hold.”

Politico, Pam Bondi issued a flurry of orders on Day 1 as Trump’s attorney general (February 5, 2025)

Government Executive, Federal prisons to house ICE detainees as Trump furthers immigration crackdown (February 7, 2025)

New York Times, Judge Blocks Trump Effort to Move Trans Women to Men’s Prisons (February 4, 2025)

Order, Doe v. McHenry, ECF 23, Case No. 1:25-cv-286 (DC, February 4, 2025)

NPR, ‘Everything is changing every minute’: New prison rules for trans women on hold (February 7, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

Trump Executive Order Hints At Felon-In-Possession About Face – Update for February 10, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

PRESIDENT (AND FELON) TRUMP MAY CARE ABOUT § 922(g)(1)

OK, President Trump is a convicted felon. But millions of Americans know how easy it is to end up with that label.

Because Trump is now a guy surrounded by men and women with guns but not himself allowed to touch one due to 18 USC § 922(g)(1) – the felon-in-possession statute – I have been speculating for a few months about whether his personal stake in being able to again pack his personalized “Trump .45” Glock would cause him to do something about the issue of F-I-P constitutionality.

Trumpgun250113The 3d Circuit has underscored its view that § 922(g)(1) can be unconstitutional as applied to a nonviolent felon (Range v. Attorney General) and the 6th Circuit has hinted that it feels the same (United States v. Williams). The 9th Circuit said as much in United States v. Duarte, but that holding is on en banc review and probably won’t survive. Some other circuits have gone the other way.

After New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, there’s been little doubt that the “as applied” 2nd Amendment question that swirling around the F-I-P statute will reach the Supreme Court sooner rather than later. Likewise, the Dept of Justice’s intractable opposition to any loosening of gun restrictions has been a feature of every court challenge of § 922(g), not just F-I-P but also drug user in possession, person-under-indictment in possession and domestic abuser-in-possession.

trumpglock45250210Last Friday, Trump issued an executive order that strongly hints that the DOJ will soon be changing its views. The EO directed Pam Bondi, the new Attorney General, to “examine all orders, regulations, guidance, plans, international agreements, and other actions of executive departments and agencies (agencies) to assess any ongoing infringements of the 2nd Amendment rights of our citizens and present a proposed plan of action to the President… to protect the 2nd Amendment rights of all Americans.” The EO specifically orders her to review “[t]he positions taken by the United States in any and all ongoing and potential litigation that affects or could affect the ability of Americans to exercise their 2nd Amendment rights.”

This does not mean that the DOJ will drop its opposition to any or all of the varied “prohibited person in possession” issue raised by § 922(g), even whether F-I-P is constitutional as applied to a nonviolent defendant whose convictions are a quarter century old like Bryan Range. But it is a clear signal that the next SCOTUS § 922(g) case may feature a much kinder, gentler DOJ that we’ve seen so far.

White House, Executive Order: Protecting Second Amendment Rights (February 7, 2024)

Range v. Attorney General, 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024)

United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024)

United States v. Duarte, 108 F.4th 786 (9th Cir. 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

US District Court Rules Guideline 1B1.13(b)(6) Exceeds Commission Authority – Update for February 7, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

WHAT CONGRESS HAS ORDAINED, LET NO SENTENCING COMMISSION PUT ASUNDER

exceedsauthority250207Compassionate release took it on the chin again in the 11th Circuit this week, as a Southern District of Florida district court ruled yesterday in a lengthy opinion that the United States Sentencing Commission lacked the authority to rule that a nonretroactive change in the law could provide a basis to reduce the length of a grossly over-length sentence that was proper when imposed but would be improper under current law.

A little background: Under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1), a federal prisoner is entitled to ask the sentencing court to reduce his or her sentence. An inmate seeking such a reduction (commonly if imprecisely known as “compassionate release”) must show that “extraordinary and compelling” reasons exist for grant of the reduction. What constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling” reason is defined in the first instance by United States Sentencing Commission.

(The prisoner also must show that the reduction being sought takes into consideration (whatever that means) the sentencing factors of 18 USC § 3553(a), but we can discuss that issue another day).

When the Sentencing Commission adopted a new policy statement on sentence reduction motions 15 months ago, it provided a laundry list of circumstances that qualify in Guideline § 1B1.13(b). The most contentious item on the list is Item (b)(6), a provision that a “change in the law” can sometimes provide a basis for a reduction.

stash171031Gilberto Chineag was sentenced to life in prison after being ensnared in a “stash house sting” some 25 years ago. Two prior state drug convictions – which Gil possessed – were all that were required under 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A) to require the court to lock Gil away for the rest of his natural life.

A quarter century later or so, Gil asked his court to reduce his sentence to time served, arguing that the First Step Act’s (FSA’s) change in § 841(b)(1)(A) left his sentence at 21 to 27 years instead of life and thus qualified under Guideline 1B1.13(b)(6) as an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. In a 40-page opinion issued yesterday, Judge Rodolfo Ruiz II disagreed, holding that the Sentencing Commission lacked the power to declare that a change in the law that Congress did not make retroactive could ever be an “extraordinary and compelling” reason under § 3582(c)(1)(A) for a sentence reduction.

While Congress never exactly denied the Sentencing Commission the right to rely on a change in the law as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason, it did say in the FSA that the amendments to § 841(b)(1)(A) “shall apply to any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.” Judge Ruiz reasonably read this provision as excluding application to offenses like Gil’s that had been sentenced years before the FSA was adopted.

Judge Ruiz held adoption of 1B1.13(b)(6)

exceeds the scope of the Commission’s delegated authority in allowing courts to consider expressly nonretroactive changes in law, like section 401(a) of the FSA, as ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ for a sentence reduction… The Court does not doubt the well-intentioned policy rationale that led the Commission to promulgate this Policy Statement. And the Court recognizes the hard work undertaken by the Commission to cabin the terms of section 1B1.13(b)(6)… A court may consider a change in law only if (1) the defendant has served at least ten years of their sentence; (2) there would be a “gross disparity” between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed after the change in law came into effect; and (3) individualized circumstances demand it. This clearly evinces a good-faith effort on the Commission’s part to narrowly tailor the class of defendants who would be eligible for a sentence reduction. But a textual good policy cannot overcome clear text. If a statute, like section 401(a) of the First Step Act, is clearly nonretroactive, it cannot be rendered retroactive by simply adding the label “extraordinary and compelling.

finalityisexplained250207The court observed that “Congress did not vitiate prior law or cast doubt on the thousands of lawful, final sentences that had been previously established pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A),” but rather only concluded that the policy underlying high mandatory minimum sentences in to § 841(b)(1)(A) should be reduced. “The Court presumes that Congress says what it means and means what it says,” Judge Ruiz wrote, “And if Congress explicitly chooses to make a statute nonretroactive, it would be truly abnormal and extraordinary—in every sense of the word—for a court to poke around that statute to find imaginary exceptions.”

This decision is only a district court opinion, not binding on any other court. But its detail and scholarship – as well as other court’s opinions as to the efficacy of Guideline 1B1.13(b)(6) – suggest that this issue will not be settled short of the Supreme Court.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing yesterday in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, questioned Judge Ruiz’s conclusion that Congress did not intend that the Commission let nonretroactive sentencing law changes sometimes trigger review of a harsh sentence. He wrote that “[i]t makes perfect sentence to me that Congress would conclude, when passing major sentencing reductions in the First Step Act, that it ought not give thousands of defendants an unlimited, complete, broad legal right to retroactive sentence reductions (which in many cases might require plenary resentencings), but still would want the expert sentencing agency to set the terms of possible case-by-case sentence reductions attentive to the significant statutory changes it had just enacted.”

United States v. Chineag, Case No. 1:01-cr-607 (S.D. Fla. February 6, 2025)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Notable lengthy new district court opinion rules US Sentencing Commission lacked authority to authorize sentence reduction based in part on “changes in law” (February 6, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

‘I Did It Before and I’ll Do It Again’ – Update for February 6,2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

I SAY ‘TO-MA-TO,’ YOU SAY ‘TO-MAH-TO’… IT DOESN’T MATTER

The dark side of United States v. Booker – the 20-year-old Supreme Court case that held the Sentencing Guidelines must be advisory and not mandatory – is the untethering of federal district court judges to sentence as they see fit.

At first blush, that sounds like a feature and not a bug. However, a pair of cases handed down this week shows that it can lead to disparate and sometimes unreasonable results.

walmart250206

Alexander Olson, a man easily led by others, was one of eight political wackadoodles who thought that setting fire to four Walmart stores would force the company to pay employees more, feed the homeless, limit executive pay and adopt an additional slate of progressive wish-list policies.

(In fairness, my wife was tempted to torch our local Walmart yesterday over $6.00-a-dozen eggs, but no jury of Walmart shoppers would ever convict her for that).

Alex and his fellow travelers were charged with conspiracy to commit arson in violation of 18 USC § 844(n). He pled guilty, with sentencing guidelines working out to 41-51 months, and a statutory sentencing mandatory minimum of 60 months (which by law, became the minimum and maximum of Alex’s Guidelines range). But at sentencing, the judge decided an upward variance to 180 months (15 years) was appropriate, despite the fact Alex was not the ringleader and evidence showed he suffered from prior psychological abuse that made him easily led by males from whom he craved validation.

The 180-month sentence was 60 months shy of that statute’s maximum 240 months, and the judge paid lip service to the 18 USC § 3553(a) sentencing factors even while discounting the mitigating evidence that didn’t fit with the court’s worldview.

judge160222The court called the sentence of three times Alex’s Guideline range an upward variance, but later in its written explanation of reasons, referred to it as a departure.

A variance and a departure both result in a sentence outside the advisory guidelines range but reach that result in different ways. A variance occurs when a court determines that a guidelines sentence will not adequately further the purposes reflected in 18 USC § 3553(a). A departure refers to non-Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines departure provisions set out in USSG Chapter 5K. Advance notice to the parties is generally required for a departure but not for a variance.

Significantly, the court said, “I find the advisory guidelines range is not appropriate to the facts and circumstances of this case, and the sentence here, whether an upward departure or a variance, I find appropriate.”

The 11th Circuit this week said it may have been a variance, may have been a departure, but the distinction did not matter because the district court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of which it was and the sentence – which was well below the statutory maximum – was substantively reasonable. “Under those circumstances, any error in the court’s application of a guidelines issue,” the 11th said, “including a departure issue, is harmless.”

hobbsact200218In the 7th Circuit, a different take on the same issue: Chris Easterling tried to rob a Walgreens store by pulling a gun and telling the cashier, “Let’s get this going, babe.” She was uninterested in getting whatever he had in mind going, fleeing instead. Chris couldn’t open the register himself, so he left to enjoy a few more minutes of freedom before being charged with attempted 18 USC § 1951 Hobbs Act robbery and an 18 USC § 924(c) count for using the gun (among other offenses).

Chris pled guilty, with a Guidelines advisory range of 57 to 71 months in prison for the Hobbs Act violation and a consecutive mandatory 84 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to the Hobbs Act sentence (for a total range of 141-155 months).

At sentencing, the court sentenced Chris to 239 months, 155 months for the Hobbs Act robbery and a consecutive 84 months for the § 924(c), a sentence 54% higher than the high end of his advisory sentencing range just one month shy of the 240-month statutory maximum sentence for Hobbs Act robbery. The court said Chris’s conduct and his “persistent and repeated history of violence” called for a “significant sentence” to protect the public.

The Supreme Court then decided in United States v. Taylor that attempted Hobbs Act robbery – which is what Chris was convicted of – could not support a § 924(c) count because it was not categorically a crime of violence. But when Chris went back for resentencing without the consecutive 84-month sentence (new sentencing range of 84-105 months), the district court again slapped the 239-month sentence on him, saying that “nothing had changed” in Chris’s history or the nature of the offense.

Chris appealed that sentence, too. While the appeal was pending, the Sentencing Commission changed its criminal history Guidelines in a way that would reduce Chris’s category by one level and drop his new sentencing range to 70-87 months. The government argued that the case should not be remanded for resentencing again, because the district court had checked a box on the Statement of Reasons form that every court must submit after a criminal sentence that says: “In the event the guideline determination(s) made in this case are found to be incorrect, the court would impose a sentence identical to that imposed in this case.”

Not good enough, the 7th said this week. “Putting aside the fact that the district court could not grapple with a Guidelines amendment that did not exist yet, this checked box is insufficient to prevent remand. We have previously held that a bare, boilerplate assertion – a conclusory comment tossed in for good measure – will not ordinarily suffice to hold a Guidelines error harmless.”

hammertime200818The Circuit ruled, “We require a district court to assure us that it would impose the same sentence again by specifically addressing the contested issue… Here, the court was unable to do so. We will not presume that a district court is so intransient that nothing the Commission does and no possible change to the Guidelines could sway its prior decision.”

United States v. Olson, Case No. 23-11939, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2351 (11th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025)

United States v. Easterling, Case No. 23-1143, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 2376 (7th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

Biden Drug Clemencies Were Sloppy, DOJ and Courts Say – Update for February 5, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BIDEN DRUG COMMUTATIONS ANGER DOJ PARDON ATTORNEY

On his final Friday in office, President Joe Biden commuted the sentences of nearly 2,500 inmates serving lengthy prison terms, saying he wanted to return people serving disproportionately long sentences for nonviolent drug offenses to their communities.

Last Sunday, the Wall Street Journal reported that only 258 of those receiving commutations, about 10% of the total, had been recommended by Dept of Justice Pardon Attorney Elizabeth Oyer.

oyer250205Biden’s list included “individuals with violent backgrounds who otherwise wouldn’t meet the department’s standards for recommendation for receipt of clemency,” according to a January 18th internal DOJ email written by Oyer to dismayed and angry DOJ colleagues. “While I am a strong believer in the possibility of second chances through clemency, the process by which yesterday’s action was carried out was not what we had hoped and advocated for,” Oyer wrote in the email – labeled “confidential and law enforcement sensitive” – that was leaked to the Wall Street Journal. She added: “I understand that some of the clemency grants are very upsetting.”

The Journal reported that the 2,490 names were compiled by a team of about a half-dozen lawyers from the White House Counsel’s Office, offenders selected primarily because they had been sentenced for trafficking in crack cocaine rather than powder cocaine. Federal law considers one gram of crack to equal 18 grams of powder – despite the fact that the stoichiometry for conversion of powder to crack is about 1.12:1 – and that 18:1 ratio was a reduction from a 100:1 powder-to-crack ratio that existed prior to the Fair Sentencing Act being passed in 2010.

crack-coke200804The effect of the legislatively imposed ratio has been that prior to 2010, crack sentences were about two-thirds longer than powder sentences (when adjusted for other factors). The Fair Sentencing Act, while ameliorating the disparity, neither reached the 1:1 ratio some critics sought nor retroactively corrected sentences already imposed when it was passed. Not until the First Step Act was passed in 2018 was a mechanism established that permitted people serving time for crack offenses to seek retroactive application. While the Sentencing Commission has not reported how many retroactive application requests were granted, courts granted a 2014 Guidelines 2-level retroactive amendment to only about 55% of the people applying for it.

Biden wanted to make a splash on his way out of office, perhaps to help erase his history as the architect of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. He directed his White House team to rule out individuals at high risk for recidivism and people who had used a gun in connection with their drug crimes “or engaged in other egregious conduct including the selling of drugs near a school,” according to the Journal.

Oyer’s email said that the DOJ’s input was minimal. “This action was not carried out in consultation with the Office of the Pardon Attorney and there was little coordination with the Department,” she wrote. She said the White House included commutation for people who DOJ specifically rejected while omitting hundreds of people who DOJ recommended.

A perfect example: In a highly unusual decision from US District Court Judge Gary Brown last week, the Eastern District of New York jurist ordered one of the defendants whose sentence was commuted in the January 17th order to be brought before the court when he is released next month to have his conditions of supervised release thoroughly repeated to him.

badboy200219Carl Andrews, according to the courts that have heard his cases, was a bad dude. When brought up on the charges for which he is now doing time, Carl already had 17 prior convictions for assault, larceny, resisting arrest, criminal contempt and drug possession, In his current case, he was first charged with “sex trafficking by force, fraud or coercion” and only later had crack distribution counts added.

The Court noted that if Carl had been “convicted of the sex trafficking charges, he would have faced a fifteen-year mandatory minimum. The Government, however, was willing to accept the sentence imposed—approximately nine and a half years—in satisfaction of all charges, even though the sex trafficking charges appeared readily provable. Thus, Mr. Andrews received a sentence lower than that required by current law.”

violent160620Judge Brown’s court had found previously that Carl “used his access to crack cocaine to exploit one victim’s addiction to further profiteer from prostitution activities,” a determination that the Second Circuit upheld on appeal. Judge Brown wrote, “Additionally, the victim credibly testified that, on multiple occasions, the defendant threatened violence to ensure her continued participation in the defendant’s exploitation. Moreover, he used other coercive techniques, including, as [a] judge in the Southern District noted, ‘exploit[ing] her addiction and poverty and emotional fragility to induce her to sell her body for profit’. Thus, the charges and evidence against this defendant involved far more than non-violent drug violations.”

Judge Brown clearly found Biden’s grant of clemency to Carl inexplicable:

While history may judge the wisdom of these actions, this Court may not. However, this case, and others like it, spotlight the problems that invariably arise when a president’s unreviewable pardon authority is deployed impetuously, resulting in careless execution of the president’s directives.

In this matter—involving sex trafficking, narcotics distribution and perjury—the grant of executive clemency seems inconsistent with its purported rational[e]. This Court must abide by this action, while exercising its responsibility regarding the vestige of the sentence imposed, i.e., oversight of the defendant during a four-year period of supervised release.

*     *     *

Given this record, it is hard to classify the defendant as a “deserving individual…” Certainly, the traditionally rigorous review process would have revealed these facts, and even an abbreviated procedure would have counseled against the exercise of the former President’s pardon authority in this case—and others like it.”

angryjudge190822Judge Brown believes that “in light of the commutation of his sentence, the defendant should be reacquainted with the conditions of supervised release.” One would like to be a fly on the wall in that courtroom when Carl is hauled in front of Judge Brown next month for an ear full of what the Judge thinks of his release after fewer than five years in prison on a 9-½ year sentence.

Wall Street Journal: Biden Commutations Angered His Own Justice Department (February 2, 2025)

United States v. Andrews, Case No. 20-CR-546, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15067 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

Boys Might Still Be Girls – Update for February 3, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TRANSGENDERISM ISN’T DONE GASPING

corso170112Last Thursday, I wrote the obituary for the Federal Bureau of Prisons transgender policy. As Lee Corso (whose prognostications haven’t been so hot lately, having picked Texas over Ohio State in the CFP semifinal and Notre Dame over the Buckeyes in the championship game) might correctly say, “Not so fast, my friend”).

Only a few hours after my post, a federal district court in Massachusetts unsealed a case filed the prior Sunday and issued a temporary restraining order on behalf of an unnamed transgender male-to-female inmate ordering the BOP not to move the plaintiff to a male prison or deny him access to transitioning drugs and surgery.

The plaintiff claimed the impending transfer to a men’s prison violates the 8th Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and deprives him of transitioning healthcare in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

At the same time, three transgender male-to-female federal prisoners sued last Thursday in Washington, D.C., to block Trump’s order. Their attorneys said they had all been placed in their facilities’ Special Housing Units (“SHUs”) in preparation for transfer to a male prison but had later been returned to general population, although they have been warned they still face imminent transfer.

angrytrump191003The complaint argues Trump’s order was driven by “hostility towards transgender people.” President Trump hostile toward a particular group of people? Hard to imagine…

In my prior post, I noted that on January 25, 2025, the BOP reported having 1,529 male prisoners claiming to be transgender females and 744 female prisoners claiming to be transgender males. Lucky I checked when I did: that information, however, was purged from the BOP website last Friday, along with any use of the g-word (gender). The BOP web page originally titled “Inmate Gender” was relabeled “Inmate Sex” on Friday.

Meanwhile, the parties in the Fleming v. Pistro litigation asked for and got more time to set out their position on whether the case was mooted by Trump’s order.  At the same time, a transgender male-to-female inmate – one Peter Langen (who now goes by the name “Donna”) – moved to intervene in the Fleming litigation. Langen complained that Rhonda Fleming

has already filed a similar case against transgender prisoners herself and by proxy. The Movant is being unduley burndened [sic] by this Plaintiff once more, it is only fair to allow the Movant a seat at the table when issues that directly impact’ her and other similarly situated Movants.

The Movant as a prisoner in the same prison system that the plaintiff was in (Plaintiff now resides in a Halfway house) and as a person who has been falsely accused of misconduct by this Plaintiff I am in a unique position to give input to this Court as a trier of the facts in this case.

denied190109The Court was not impressed, denying the motion in a terse order holding that the 11th-hour (maybe 12th hour) motion arrived after he had decided the case: The Court ruled that the “case applied only “to Ms. Fleming. Accordingly, Ms. Langan has no right to intervene. Likewise, permissive intervention is also inappropriate, especially given that this Court has already entered judgment.”

Order Following Bench Trial (ECF 176), Fleming v. Pistro, Case No. 4:21-cv-325 (January 17, 2025)

Order Denying Motion to Intervene (ECF 180), Fleming v. Pistro, Case No. 4:21-cv-325 (January 28, 2025)

White House, Defending Women from Gender Ideology and Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government (January 20, 2025)

Reuters, Transgender inmate sues over Trump’s order curtailing LGBT rights (January 27, 2025)

WUSA-TV, Transgender inmates sue to block Trump order that would force move to men’s prison (January 31, 2025)

Associated Press, Health Data and Entire Web Pages are Wiped From Federal Websites (January 31, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root