Tag Archives: sentencing commission

Nothing to See Here Anymore,’ BOP Tells Court About FCI Dublin – Update for June 25, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

But first, a mea culpa…

THOSE PESKY DETAILS

embarrassedLast week, I reported on a U.S. Sentencing Commission methamphetamine study that debunked the idea that there was anything special about meth with purity over 90%, despite the fact that 80% plus pure meth comes with much higher Guideline sentencing ranges.

I reported that the study found that meth tested by the government in fiscal year (FY) 2022 averaged over 90% pure with a median purity of 98%, “measurements dramatically higher than just two years before, when meth purity ranged from 10 to 80%.”

An alert reader questioned my data. It turns out he was correct.

According to the DEA, meth purity ranged from 10% to 80% in the year 2000, NOT 2020. My embarrassment at my error tests out at 100% purity, and I thank my reader for pointing out the mistake.

USSC, Methamphetamine Trafficking Offenses In The Federal Criminal Justice System (June 13, 2024)

‘WE BURIED THE DUBLIN PROBLEM, SO LET’S STOP TALKING ABOUT IT,’ BOP TELLS COURT

The Federal Bureau of Prisons has asked the U.S. District Court in Oakland to dismiss a class action lawsuit demanding systemic changes at FCI Dublin as moot, on the grounds that no one is imprisoned there anymore.

“The injunctive claims addressing conditions of confinement at FCI Dublin—a facility where no inmates are confined—must be dismissed as moot,” the motion filed last Tuesday argues. The plaintiff’s money damages claims, consideration of which have been stayed until August, would remain on file.

The suit was filed last August by female inmates, alleging rampant sexual assault and retaliation by Dublin staff. BOP abruptly shut down the facility in April shortly after Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers appointed a special master to oversee changes at the prison.

paniccrowd240625

The BOP’s motion admits that Dublin was in “dire need of immediate change.” The agency said, “Following its own deliberative process, BOP leadership determined that it needed to close FCI Dublin and transfer all female adults in custody (AICs) to other federal facilities. The transfer process was conducted subject to various court orders and in coordination with the Court’s special master. That process is now complete, and the AICs previously confined at Dublin are now at new facilities. If Dublin is eventually reopened, it will not be used to house female AICs again.”

The Court has described the closure of Dublin as “hasty and chaotic” but the BOP claims it “was carefully planned” and that the Court was privately advised a month before the April 15 mass movement.

A group of Congressional representatives is investigating allegations that the transfers were conducted inhumanely.

Motion to Dismiss, California Coalition for Women Prisoners v, BOP, ECF 326, Case No 4:23-cv-4155 (ND Cal, June 18, 2024)

KQED-TV, Biden Administration Seeks to Dismiss Lawsuit Over Bay Area Women’s Prison Abuses (June 18, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Raising the Bar on Methamphetamine Purity – Update for June 18, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING COMMISSION METH STUDY ACKNOWLEDGES REALITY

reeves230706Ever since U.S. District Judge Carlton Reeves (Southern District of Mississippi)—who happens to have a side gig as chairman of the U.S. Sentencing Commission—ruled that these days everybody’s methamphetamine was so pure that the “methamphetamine actual” and “ice” purity enhancement in § 2D1.1 of the Guidelines made no sense, people have been asking me when the USSC is going to catch up with reality and throw out the higher sentencing ranges for 90% pure and higher meth.

I thought that we might have seen it in this year’s proposed amendments, but it didn’t happen. However, a Sentencing Commission study released last week suggests that the Commission may be looking for a change in next year’s amendment cycle.

It’s important, too. Over the past 20 years, meth trafficking offenses have risen by 168%, now accounting for half of all federal drug trafficking cases.

The study found that meth tested in fiscal year (FY) 2022 averaged over 90% pure with a median purity of 98%. Furthermore, the meth was uniformly tested at high purity whether it was classified for sentencing as a meth mixture (91% average purity), meth actual (93%) or ice (98%). These purity averages are dramatically higher than just two years before, back when methamphetamine purity ranged from 10 to 80%.

meth240618Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) and (B)(viii), it takes ten times as much weight of a meth mixture as it does actual meth or ice to trigger mandatory minimum penalties. So let’s say you’re a criminal newbie caught with a pound of meth of average purity. That would be 458 grams. If you are sentenced for 458 grams of “a mixture containing methamphetamine,” your advisory sentencing range would be 78-97 months. But if the government pushes for sentencing your pound as “methamphetamine actual,” you would have a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months with a sentencing range topping out at 135 months.

As the late Johnny Cochrane is reputed to have said (at least by South Park) in his fictional but brilliant Chewbacca defense, “That does not make sense.”

chewbacca240618The Commission can change its Guidelines (and likely will in the next year or two), but altering 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) would require Congressional action.

Meth trafficking sentences averaged 91 months in FY 2022, the longest average among major federal drug trafficking offenses, more than fentanyl (65 months) and heroin (66 months). Meth trafficking offenses carried mandatory minimum penalties more often (74%) than all other drug trafficking offenses (57%).

USSC, Methamphetamine Trafficking Offenses In The Federal Criminal Justice System (June 13, 2024)

United States v. Robinson, Case No. 3:21-cr-00014 (S.D.Miss., December 23, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

USSC Amendments Going Retro? Your Opinion is Wanted – Update for May 6, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

GUIDELINE AMENDMENT RETROACTIVITY COMMENTS OPEN

retro160110The Sentencing Commission published the 2024 proposed Guideline amendments in the Federal Register last Friday, opening up a public comment period on whether certain proposals should be made retroactive.

The publication of the proposed amendments, a required step in their adoption, provides that the proposed changes are intended to become effective November 1, 2024. The statute authorizing the Sentencing Commission (28 USC § 994) gives Congress the right to override some or all of the changes, a power that has almost never been used in the Guidelines’ 28 years of existence.

The proposed retroactivity would apply to the

• the acquitted conduct amendment (USSG § 1B1.3);

• a change to juvenile sentences that eliminates adding 2 points for prior juvenile incarcerations of more than 60 days;

•  a change to §2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(i) to provide that the 4-level enhancement gun serial number obliteration applies only if the serial number has been modified such the original number “is rendered illegible or unrecognizable to the unaided eye;” and

• a change to Commentary in USSG § 2K2.4 to permit grouping of a § 922(g) gun count with a drug-trafficking count where the defendant has a separate 18 USC § 924(c) conviction based on drug trafficking.

retro240506Comments on retroactivity should be filed by June 21, 2024. Written reply comments, which may only respond to issues raised during the original comment period, should be received not later than July 22, 2024.

Comments may be submitted electronically to the Commission or mailed to

US Sentencing Commission
One Columbus Circle NE, Suite 2-500
Washington, DC 20002-8002
Attn: Public Affairs—Issue for Comment on Retroactivity.

Sentencing Guidelines, 89 FR 36853 (May 3)

– Thomas L. Root

“And” Really Does Mean “Or” – Update for April 30, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CLARITY 1, DEFENDANTS 0

When I reported last week on the Sentencing Commission’s amendment proposals for 2024, I failed to mention its proposed change to the new USSG § 4C1.1, the criminal history guideline for the zero-point reduction.

virgin171201Under § 4C1.1, someone with no criminal history points is still Criminal History Category I but gets a 2-level reduction in his or her offense category. The Guideline has a list of conditions: no guns, no sex crime, no violence, and more. Condition 4C1.1(a)(10) requires that “the defendant did not receive an adjustment under 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 USC § 848.”

If you stayed awake in high school English, you will read this as excluding people from the beneficial reduction if they both got a § 3B1.1 aggravating role and were convicted of an 848 continuing criminal enterprise (shorthand for a drug-based racketeering enterprise). That universe would be populated by a pretty small number of people.

The government naturally has argued to courts that the condition doesn’t mean that at all.  Instead, the government says “and” really means “or.”  That is, if you got a 2-level, 3-level or 4-level enhancement for being either a leader or an organizer or a supervisor or a manager of the criminal activity–the so-called aggravating role adjustment–you could not benefit from the zero-point reduction. Likewise, if you were convicted of a § 848 continuing criminal enterprise–regardless of how you might have been scored for a § 3B1.1 leadership enhancement–you were disqualified.

vanishingpt240430The district courts have largely agreed with the government. We should hardly be surprised. About 18,700 people were sentenced for federal drug offenses in Fiscal Year 2023, but a vanishingly few of those (seven defendants) were convicted under the drug kingpin statute (21 USC § 848).  About 6.3% of the 18,700 sentenced prisoners received a § 3B1.1 aggravating role adjustment (just under 1,200 defendants).   As you can imagine, the intersection of the 1,200 people who got aggravating role adjustments and the seven with § 848 convictions amounts to no more than a rounding error.

What’s more, the Supreme Court just interpreted an “‘and’ means ‘or'” case a month ago, and concluded that in the 18 USC 3553(f) drug “safety valve,” similar stilted language to that employed in Condition 4C1.1(a)(10) should be read so that “and” really is disjunctive, meaning “or.”  See Pulsifer v. United States.

Admitting that the current 4C1.1 condition 10 has created “confusion,” the USSC has now proposed breaking condition 10 into two conditions, so it will read:

(10) the defendant did not receive an adjustment under § 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) and;

(11) the defendant was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 USC 848.

and-or240319Like the other proposed amendments, this change is intended to be effective in November.

I apologize for not mentioning this last week. I was too hasty and inattentive.  In this case,  my “and” probably means “or.”

USSC, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (Preliminary) (April 17, 2024)

USSC, FY 2023 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics

Pulsifer v. United States, 144 S.Ct. 718, 218 L,Ed,2d 77, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 1215 (March 15, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Sentencing Commission Announces Slate of Fall Amendments – Update for April 22, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING COMMISSION TAKES A WHACK AT ACQUITTED CONDUCT

The US Sentencing Commission last week adopted a slate of proposed amendments to the Guidelines, finally addressing the acquitted conduct issue that has bedeviled the Commission and Supreme Court for the past two years.

can230407SCOTUS sidestepped the question last year, sitting on 13 certiorari petitions raising the question of whether sentencing for acquitted conduct – that is, conduct for which a defendant has been found not guilty by a jury – is constitutional. At the prodding of the Dept of Justice – which told the Supremes that they should let the Sentencing Commission handle it only to then tell the Sentencing Commission it lacked the power to do so – SCOTUS finally denied the cert petitions last July, with several justices saying they would wait for the Sentencing Commission to address the issue.

The acquitted conduct Guidelines amendment will redefine “relevant conduct” under USSG § 1B1.3 to exclude conduct for which a defendant was acquitted in federal court. Because judges must rely on “relevant conduct” to set the Guidelines sentencing range, the change is significant.

For example, if a defendant is convicted of distributing cocaine but acquitted of selling heroin, the amount of heroin that the government said he had sold currently be factored into his Guidelines range as long as the judge found it more likely than not that he had actually sold it. The proposed amendment would prohibit counting the heroin regardless of whether the judge thought the defendant had done it or not.

“Not guilty means not guilty,” Sentencing Commission Chairman Judge Carlton W. Reeves, who sits on the Southern District of Mississippi bench, said. “By enshrining this basic fact within the federal sentencing guidelines, the Commission is taking an important step to protect the credibility of our courts and criminal justice system.”

reeves230706Commissioners were divided on whether to consider enforcing the acquitted conduct sentencing amendment retroactively. A majority voted to have the USSC staff prepare a retroactivity impact analysis, which is the initial step toward making an amendment retroactive.

Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL), chairman of the Judiciary Committee, said in a press release, applauded the Commission’s vote, noting that it came after he and Sen Charles Grassley (R-IA) introduced the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2023. The legislation would have prohibited judges from using conduct acquitted by a jury. The measure has not gained consideration the full Senate.

The Commission is allowed to grant retroactivity – which lets people already sentenced according to Guidelines that are now being amended go back to court to secure the benefit of the amendment in the form of a reduced sentence – on new defendant-friendly amendments. Ratroactivity on last fall’s criminal history amendments was vigorously opposed by some commissioners and the DOJ, which has an ex officio representative on the Commission. This time around, the Commission is considering whether to make multiple defendant-friendly changes retroactive:

• the acquitted conduct amendment;

• a change to juvenile sentences that eliminates adding 2 points for prior juvenile incarcerations of more than 60 days;

• a change to §2K2.1(b)(4)(B)(i) to provide that the 4-level enhancement gun serial number obliteration applies only if the serial number has been modified such the original number is “is rendered illegible or unrecognizable to the unaided eye;” and

• a change to Commentary in §2K2.4 to permit grouping of 922(g) gun count with drug trafficking count where the defendant has a separate 18 USC 924(c) conviction based on drug trafficking.

During the retroactivity vote, Commissioner Claire Murray – a former Trump administration DOJ official – made the obvious point that judges may also still rely on acquitted conduct at sentencing when considering the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, which courts must consider at sentencing, regardless of the Guidelines advisory sentencing range.

The bad news in the amendments was pretty much expected. For economic crimes, the recommended sentence under the guidelines increases dramatically as the amount of loss resulting from the offense increases.

shakeitoff240423As it is now written, the loss is defined in the Guidelines commentary as the higher of actual loss or intended loss. If you try to steal the Hope Diamond from the Smithsonian (value $250 million) but only get a rhinestone imitation (value $250) because the real one had been rented out to Taylor Swift for the weekend, the Smithsonian’s actual loss would be just a few bucks, but the intended loss would be a quarter billion.

In 2022, the 3rd Circuit held in United States v. Banks that the Commentary expanded the definition of loss beyond the ordinary meaning of “actual loss,” and thus, “intended loss” could not be used to set a defendant’s Guidelines. The new loss amendment moves the commentary section into the actual guideline, making sure that intended loss is included in setting the Guideline sentencing range and allowing the use of gain from the offense as a substitute for loss.

Whether the changes will become retroactive depends in part on USSC data on how many prisoners would be eligible for a reduction. If the number is too high, the Commission becomes concerned that the courts will be overwhelmed with reduction motions.

Finally, unhappy that the Commission last year adopted a new compassionate release guideline and made the criminal history guidelines retroactive on a 4-3 vote, Sen John Kennedy (R-LA) last week introduced the Consensus in Sentencing Act to require that changes to the Guidelines get at least five votes out of the seven Commissioners.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, said it “cannot be pure coincidence” that Kennedy introduced the bill the day before last week’s USSC meeting. The bill stands little chance of passing before Congress expires at the end of the year.

Reuters, US panel prohibits judges from sentencing for ‘acquitted conduct’ (April 17, 2024)

Law360, Sentencing Commission Limits Acquitted Conduct Sentencing (April 17, 2024) 

Press release, Durbin Applauds Sentencing Commission’s Unanimous Vote To Prohibit Acquitted Conduct From Being Used In Sentencing Guidelines (April 18, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Senator Kennedy introduces “Consensus in Sentencing Act” to increase USSC votes needed for guideline amendments (April 16, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

“Their Verdict Didn’t Matter”: Taming the ‘Acquitted Conduct’ Sentencing Monster – Update for March 8, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ACQUITTED CONDUCT ISSUE ARRIVES WITH A LOT OF BAGGAGE

The U.S. Sentencing Commission completed two days of hearings yesterday on what, if anything, it should do to rein in “acquitted conduct” sentencing, the Guidelines- and Supreme Court-sanctioned practice of relying on evidence that a defendant committed a crime even if a jury had found him or her not guilty of that offense.

acquitted240308Jessie Ailsworth knows what that feels like. During this week’s hearings, he told the Commission he felt relieved when he heard the jury return 28 “not guilty” verdicts in his 1996 trial for crack cocaine distribution. But Jessie said “fairness went out the window” when he got hammered with 30 years for the seven counts on which he was found guilty.

The judge based Jessie’s sentence on all of the counts in the indictment, including the 28 acquitted counts.

“I was very angry for a long time,” Jessie told the Commission. “I felt like the system failed me. I really believe that the jury did their best. They took their time, wrote notes, asked questions, and reached their verdicts. But, when I was sentenced, the court sent me to prison based on the jury’s acquittals. I felt like the system didn’t just fail me, it also failed my jury. We all knew what the jury was trying to do, and when I was sentenced, I wondered why we had even spent all those days with the jury, if at the end of it all, their verdict didn’t matter.”

Jessie was one of 15 witnesses testifying over the two days. Others included judges, probation officers and advocates. Judge Deborah Cook of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals drew a distinction between “the important distinction in the proof necessary for convicting versus sentencing… That is, so long as the defendant receives a sentence at or below the statutory maximum set by the jury’s verdict, the district court does not abridge [a] defendant’s right to jury by looking to other facts, including acquitted conduct, when sentencing within that statutory range.”

Proof140424Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Policy and the Law blog yesterday, explained how the question is stickier than either Jessie or Judge Cook might think. Prof Berman wrote that “rights directed at a balanced and thorough process — in other words, rights that support accuracy concerns or that tend to put the prosecution and defense on a more even playing field — do apply at sentencing. Rights that offer the defendant special protections — such as those that automatically resolve errors in the defendant’s favor or primarily protect the defendant’s autonomy — do not apply at sentencing. Framed only a bit differently, one might see concerns for sentencing “accuracy” to be a kind of Crime Control concern, and one that would counsel against preventing judicial consideration of acquitted conduct. But the jury trial right is fundamental to our nation’s vision of Due Process and our commitment to “defendant special protections,” and that’s surely why many are troubled by any judicial sentencing process that functionally disregards a jury’s decision to acquit on certain charges.”

Prof Berman suggests (without endorsing this outcome) that if factual accuracy is paramount at sentencing, the judge will consider acquitted conduct in all its glory. This, of course, is a slippery slope. How about evidence that the judge suppressed and the jury thus never heard? How about proffers (attorneys telling the judge what their witnesses would have said if allowed to testify)?

If due process (protecting a defendant’s rights) is the correct model, then a jury’s acquittal on any particular count is ‘game, set, match’ for sentencing. This is at the expense of accuracy and the core legal principle, first enunciated by Marcus Tullius Cicero two millennia ago, to “let the punishment fit the crime.”

The “due process” model, too, is a slippery slope. After all, “acquitted conduct” sentencing is only a concern in the 2-3% of federal prosecutions that actually go to trial. We’re talking about elephants when the issue should be all animals that are not elephants. For the overwhelming 97% of cases in which the defendant pleads guilty, the Guidelines permit sentencing on “related conduct.” Related conduct can be found by the court only by a fairly squishy “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and the government may meet that standard with hearsay evidence and fuzzy math from witnesses the defendant has no right to confront. In drug and fraud prosecutions especially, where the amount of drugs or amount of loss drives the Guidelines sentencing range, a “due process” model should demand that standards for determining facts at sentencing provide the same “reasonable doubt” and 6th Amendment right of confrontation that a defendant enjoys during the conviction phase.

Prof Berman observed that as he watched the Commission’s hearing “explore[] many of the devilish details, it was clear how acquitted conduct’s intricacies may largely explain why past Commissions have avoided these issues as a policy matter and why the US Supreme Court avoided these issues as a constitutional matter since its 1997 Watts decision.”

can230407Speaking at a symposium at Ohio State last Monday, Judge Carlton Reeves, chairman of the Sentencing Commission, said that the Commission took up acquitted conduct “out of deference to the Supreme Court” after it denied certiorari in McClinton v. United States and said, “Well maybe the Sentencing Commission ought to look at it.”

Earlier, in a Sentencing Commission news release, Judge Reeves said, “When the Supreme Court tells us to address an issue, the commission listens. From continuing the use of acquitted conduct to restricting (or even eliminating) its use in sentencing, all options are on the table.

Sentencing Commission, Public Hearing on Acquitted Conduct (March 6-7)

Sentencing Policy and the Law, USSC hearings on acquitted conduct: the devilish details amid a fundamental criminal process debate (March 6)

Kansas Reflector, Kansas man says prison sentence based on acquitted conduct was ‘ultimate betrayal’ (March 6)

– Thomas L. Root

DOJ Speaks With Forked Tongue… Again – LISA Update for February 4, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

COURTS STARTING TO REJECT DOJ’S ATTACK ON NEW COMPASSIONATE RELEASE GUIDELINE

You may remember the old Dept of Justice bait-and-switch a year ago. DOJ told the Supreme Court that it shouldn’t grant review of acquitted conduct petitions because the Sentencing Commission was going to address the issue. Then, less than a month later, DOJ filed comments telling the Sentencing Commission that it lacked the authority to address acquitted conduct at all.

The DOJ’s at it again. Before the Sentencing Commission adopted a new USSG § 1B1.13 – the compassionate release guideline that became effective last November – there was a circuit split on whether a long sentence that was mandatory before the First Step Act passed but could no longer be imposed after First Step passed could constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction.

(This difference in sentence length depending on when the sentence was imposed is called “temporal disparity”).

Six circuits said temporal disparity could never be extraordinary and compelling. Five circuits said it could. The government opposed certiorari petitions in a number of cases that asked the Supreme Court to resolve the issue. The government told SCOTUS that the issue should be addressed by the Sentencing Commission, not the Court.

Now the Sentencing Commission has addressed it, directing in § 1B1.13(b)(6) that temporal disparity can be extraordinary and compelling if the inmate has done 10 years, if there’s a great sentence disparity, and if the inmate has a good prison record.

thereyougo240205What is the DOJ’s response to that? It has filed oppositions all around the country, arguing that the Sentencing Commission’s (b)(6) guideline exceeded its statutory authority and is invalid. As Ronald Reagan used to say to Jimmy Carter, “There you go again…”

The government’s cookie-cutter oppositions are now being decided. A late November Southern District of Indiana decision in United States v. Jackson held that 7th Circuit precedent holds that the statutory definition of ‘extraordinary’ does not extend to temporal disparity, “which means there is a question about whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority when it added this item to the list of potentially extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction…” But because the defendant didn’t meet the 10-year minimum sentence required for a compassionate release under (b)(6), the court did not rule on its “question.”

In United States v. Carter, an Eastern District of Pennsylvania decision from three weeks ago, the district court ruled that the 3rd Circuit’s 2021 United States v. Andrews decision, which held a change in the law could never be an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release “forecloses Carter’s argument that he is eligible… 1B1.13(b)(6) states that an ‘unusually long sentence’ may be deemed an extraordinary and compelling reason’ warranting compassionate release… That provision… is incompatible with Andrews…”

Two thoughtful decisions issued last week clash with Carter’s holding and Jackson’s implication.

In United States v. Capps, an Eastern District of Missouri court rejected the government’s argument that because First Step did not make changes in 18 USC § 924(c) and 21 USC § 841(b) retroactive, the Sentencing Commission cannot do so, either. “Congress is not shy about placing sentencing modification limits where it deems them appropriate,” the Capps court said. “Congress broadly empowered and directed the Commission to issue binding guidance as to what circumstances qualify for potential reduction. Nothing in the statute’s text prohibits the Commission from considering nonretroactive changes in the law as extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. The absence of any such limitation is telling.”

The best repudiation of the government’s attempt to strip § 1B1.13(b)(6) of legitimacy came last Thursday. In United States v. Padgett, a Northern District of Florida district court ruled that making temporal disparity an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for compassionate release was exactly the kind of decision Congress intended the Commission to make.

toofar240205“The government acknowledges that Congress directed the Commission to address the meaning of extraordinary and compelling,” the district court said. “But the government asserts the Commission went too far, because, the government says, a temporal disparity, no matter how great or how unusual, can never provide an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction.”

The Court ruled:

The very fact that the circuits split on this issue suggests the meaning of ‘extraordinary and compelling’ is not as clear as the government now asserts. Instead, this is precisely the kind of issue Congress called on the Commission to resolve. Indeed, in United States v. Bryant… the 11th Circuit held binding the Sentencing Commission’s prior policy statement on this very issue, emphatically explaining that Congress left it to the Sentencing Commission to define ‘extraordinary and compelling,’ subject only to the requirement that rehabilitation alone is not enough. The Bryant court said relying on the Commission promotes uniformity, thus minimizes unwarranted sentence disparity, and that defining these terms is ‘not a task that the statute allocates to courts… A district court’s job is ‘simply’ to apply the Commission’s policy statements and, as required by the statute, consider the 3553(a) sentencing factors in deciding whether to reduce an eligible defendant’s sentence.

There is little doubt that the government or a defendant will fight this to the Supreme Court. For now, the proper application of the temporal disparity compassionate release guideline will be as random as it ever was before the new § 1B1.13.

United States v. Jackson, 2023 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 208272 (S.D. Ind, November 21, 2023)

United States v. Carter, 2024 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 6504 (E.D. Pa., January 12, 2024)

United States v. Capps, Case No 1:11cr108 (E.D. Mo., January 31, 2024)

United States v. Padgett, Case No 5:06cr13 (N.D. Fla., January 30, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Sentencing Commission Proposes Acquitted Conduct Sentencing Change – Update for December 18, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MOVING RIGHT ALONG…

USSC170511Last Thursday the U.S. Sentencing Commission acted with uncharacteristic alacrity, adopting proposed amendments for the 2024 amendment cycle about a month earlier than has been typical over the past 30 years.

The Commission proposes seven changes in Guideline policy in a 755-page release, the most anticipated of which is the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing.

The Commission proposes adopting one of three acquitted conduct options:

Option 1 would amend § 1B1.3, the “relevant conduct” Guideline, to provide that acquitted conduct is not relevant conduct for determining the guideline range. It would define “acquitted conduct” as conduct constituting an element of a charge of which the defendant has been acquitted by the court, except for conduct establishing the instant offense that was “found by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Option 2 would amend the § 1B1.3 Commentary to provide that a downward departure may be warranted if the use of acquitted conduct has a “disproportionate impact” on the guideline range.

Option 3 would amend USSG § 6A1.3 (which addresses the standard of proof required to resolve Guidelines disputes) to provide that while a “preponderance of the evidence” standard generally is sufficient, acquitted conduct should not be considered unless it is established by clear and convincing evidence.

acquitted230106The Supreme Court last June denied 13 petitions for writ of certiorari related to use of acquitted conduct in sentencing. Four Justices felt the Commission should first address the issue. US District Judge Carlton W. Reeves, chairman of the USSC, said, “When the Supreme Court tells us to address an issue, the Commission listens… [A]ll options are on the table.”

The USSC proposal also addresses counting juvenile convictions for criminal history. The Commission proposed changes that would limit the impact of those convictions on criminal history scoring and expand consideration of a defendant’s youth at sentencing.

One piece of bad news is the Commission’s proposal to undo the effects of the 2019 Supreme Court Kisor v. Willkie decision. A year ago, the 3rd Circuit relied on Kisor in United States v. Banks to hold that the loss enhancement under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1) includes only what was actually lost. The Circuit reasoned that the word “intended” appears only in the 2B1.1 commentary and not in the Guideline itself, and thus “the loss enhancement in the Guideline’s application notes impermissibly expands the word ‘loss’ to include both intended loss and actual loss.”

Sentencing for “intended loss” is the fraud equivalent of “ghost dope“:  Often, “intended loss” is what the government says it is, and that figure shoots the Guidelines sentencing range to the moon.

Banks sparked a debate on how much deference to give the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of its own Guidelines. The 3rd said the USSC lacked authority to use its commentary – which is not subject to Congressional approval before adoption – to expand the meaning of “loss” to include what was intended but did not happen.

loss210312The USSC now intends to short-circuit the Kisor v. Willkie debate (and to kneecap the Banks decision) by moving “intended loss” from the commentary into the text of 2B1.1. Because that amendment will be subject to a possible (but improbable) veto by Congress veto, the Kisor v. Willkie problem with 2B1.1 will melt as fast as snowflakes on a hot stove.

The USSC drew its proposed amendment from policy priorities adopted last August. Not making the final cut were policy priorities on career offender (and not for the first time) and methamphetamine.

The proposed amendments will be open for public comment period until February 22, 2024. A public hearing will occur after that. Final proposed amendments will be sent to Congress by May 1 to become effective next November 1, 2024.

USSC, Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (Preliminary) (December 14, 2023)

USSC, US Sentencing Commission seeks comment on proposals addressing the impact of acquitted conduct, youthful convictions, and other issues (December 14, 2023)

USSC, Public Hearing (December 14, 2023)

USSC, Federal Register Notice of Final 2023-2024 Priorities (August 24, 2023)

United States v. Banks, 55 F.4th 246 (3d Cir. 2022)

Bloomberg Law, Wall Street Fraudsters Rush to Cut Prison Terms With New Ruling (November 1, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Government Seeks to Bushwhack Disparate-Sentence Compassionate Release Guideline – Update for December 11, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TIGER TRIES TO EAT ITS YOUNG

Traditionally, the Department of Justice defends federal statutes and regulations from constitutional attack. In fact, DOJ’s role as watchdog over the sanctity of its statutes and rules is so established that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a private litigant to serve the Attorney General in a lawsuit against another private party if the litigant is claiming that any federal statute is unconstitutional.

tigers231211I have seen cases in the past where the government conceded that the application of a statute was unconstitutional – but usually after the Supreme Court has found the statute itself to violate the Constitution. Good examples abound, such as United States v. Brown, a 2nd Circuit summary order noting that where “the underlying crime of violence was a racketeering conspiracy… [t]he Government concedes that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Davis… requires vacatur of those counts of conviction [under 18 USC 924(c)]”).

But I don’t recall a case where the government has mounted a defense based on the argument that the federal agency rule applicable to the private party’s claim was void as contrary to federal statute. Until now.

To channel Rodney Dangerfield, this is a case of a tiger eating its young.

The new USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) – the Guideline that sets out binding Sentencing Commission policy on 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) “compassionate release” sentencing reductions – holds that where a prisoner has

an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change in the law… may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed…

You may recall that when this provision was adopted by the Commission last April, it generated vigorous debate and passed on a whisker-thin 4-3 vote.

retro160110Now, in United States v. Brand, a compassionate release case in the Northern District of Florida, the government has opposed a prisoner’s request for relief from a sentence of stacked 18 USC § 924(c) convictions by arguing that USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) is an unconstitutional expansion of Sentencing Commission authority because it effectively makes nonretroactive changes in the law retroactive. The thrust of the government’s defense is that Congress did not make changes in 18 USC § 924(c) retroactive when it passed the First Step Act five years ago, that this was a deliberate choice made by Congress, and that the Sentencing Commission’s decision to define the sentence disparity resulting from people sentenced before First Step have dramatically higher stacked 924(c) sentences than people sentenced after First Step as “extraordinary and compelling” is unlawful: “Although Congress has delegated broad authority to the Sentencing Commission, subsection (b)(6) is contrary to the text, structure, and purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(a), and is therefore invalid.”

I think the argument is strained. Besides trying essentially to engraft Administrative Procedure Act standards (see 5 USC § 706, for instance) onto a judicial agency that is not subject to the APA, I think that the biggest hole in the government’s argument is that – unlike other agency rules – under 28 USC § 994(p), Guideline amendments (and an explanation of why they are being proposed) must be submitted to Congress 180 days before effectiveness to give Congress a chance to modify or disapprove the amendments. Congress’s right to modify or disapprove makes it tough to argue, as the government does, that the Commission’s reading of the compassionate release statute “exceeds the gap left by Congress.” If Congress had thought the new § 1B1.13(b)(6) was overreaching, outside the Commission’s authority, or contrary to the non-retroactivity of First Step, it had six months to say so.

The government relies on Mayo Foundation for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, but in that case, the court notes that “the ultimate question is whether Congress would have intended, and expected, courts to treat [the regulation] as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency of ‘gap-filling’ authority.” Here, I think, the existence of the six-month review period and Congress’s election not to modify or veto during that period is more than ample evidence of Congress’s intent.

lincolnfool161125But the real danger in Brand is this: The court denied the prisoner appointment of counsel right about the time the government lodged its novel constitutional claim that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1 requires a party contesting the constitutionality of a federal statute to serve the Attorney General of the United States with notice of the action. Under 28 USC § 2403(a), a court ruling on such a challenge is required to do the same. Upon receiving notice, the Attorney General has a right to intervene as a party in the case and present evidence. Both of these requirements suggest that the government has a compelling interest in defending the sanctity of its rules and statutes.

So what happens when the Attorney General himself contests the lawfulness of a federal regulation, especially where it is a quasi-statute as is a sentencing guideline? Expecting a pro se prisoner to competently defend the lawfulness of a federal rule against the government puts a lot of weight on the shoulders of the inmate. What is more, it is almost certain to result in steamrolling the government’s position into the final order, resulting in the making of a bad ruling out of an unbalanced contest.

Sentencing Commission guideline 1B1.13(b)(6) has the tacit approval of Congress. If any compassionate release defense calls for the appointment of counsel, defending the lawfulness of a properly adopted guideline does.

United States v. Brown, 797 Fed.Appx 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2019)

United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. —, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019)

Gvt Response to Motion for Compassionate Release (ECF 108), United States v. Brand, Case 8:11-cr-380 (N.D.Fl., filed November 17, 2023)

Mayo Foundation for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 US 44 (2011)

– Thomas L. Root

Is DOJ Gunning for New Compassionate Release Guideline? Some Suspect So – Update for October 23, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

RUMORS: WILL DEPT OF JUSTICE GO AFTER NEW COMPASSIONATE RELEASE GUIDELINE?

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote last week in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog that he has “heard talk that, notwithstanding the text of § 994(t), the Justice Department is planning to contest the new [compassionate release] guideline once it becomes effective on November 1.”

rumor231023Prof Berman does not cite his sources, but his credentials as among the premier federal sentencing law experts in the nation suggest that his report should be taken seriously. The Dept of Justice was adamantly opposed to the new USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) – which directs that if a defendant has served at least 10 years of an unusually long sentence, a change in the law (other than a non-retroactive Guideline amendment) “may be considered in determining whether the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant’s individualized circumstances.” In fact, subsection (b)(6) was the cause of the Sentencing Commission’s extended debate and 4-3 vote split on approving 1B1.13.

Any DOJ litigation attack on 1B1.13 makes little sense. Congress has decreed in 28 USC 994(t) that the Sentencing Commission “shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.” What’s more, Congress has built a veto mechanism into the Guidelines, giving legislators 180 days to reject what the USSC does before it becomes effective. It would be tough to argue that § 994(t) and the fact that Congress let the new 1B1.13 go into effect didn’t mean that any DOJ effort to convince a court to invalidate the new Guideline is doomed to failure.

The rumor may be stoked by a USA Today article last week that warned that “new Sentencing Commission guidelines will give [prisoners] a chance for compassionate release. But DOJ threatens to stand in the way.” The authors wrote that

mercy161107[t]he Sentencing Commission’s commonsense expansion of compassionate release makes us hopeful that our federal criminal system can carve out a little space for redemption, mercy and a recognition that we don’t always get it right the first time around. Unfortunately, even with the promise of and need for the commission’s new guidance, the future of compassionate release is uncertain. The Department of Justice has objected to the commission’s recognition that legal changes resulting in an unjust sentence can qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying relief.

The article cites the DOJ’s spirited opposition to what became 1B1.13(b)(6) – the “change in the law” provision” – of the compassionate release Guideline. But nothing in the DOJ’s opposition comments, which it was perfectly entitled to file, suggests that the government will try to get the amendment set aside judicially.

The USA Today article argued that

the commission’s ‘unusually long sentences’ provision is good policy. Far from a get-out-of-jail-free card, as some have suggested, it is instead a narrow recognition that a sentence imposed decades ago may, upon review today, be longer than necessary. The provision applies in limited instances where, among other things, the person has served at least 10 years in prison and there is a ‘gross disparity’ between their sentence and the one likely to be imposed today. Even then, an individual still must demonstrate that they will not pose a danger to the community and that their individualized circumstances weigh in favor of a sentence reduction….

Bottom line: I doubt that DOJ plans any omnibus attack on 1B1.13(b)(6). Rather, I suspect that the USA Today authors are extrapolating from the Department’s negative comments during the Guidelines amendment process.  Nevertheless, no one’s gone broke yet betting that the DOJ will not be both creative and vigorous in fighting to keep people locked up in order to honor a draconian but lawful sentence.

If Professor Berman seems a little alarmist to you, recall Sen. Barry Goldwater’s famous observation that “extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.” For now, I stand with the Professor.

gleesonB160314In other Sentencing Commission news, President Joe Biden last week nominated current federal judge Claria Boom Horn (who sits in both the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky) and retired federal judge John Gleeson to full 6-year terms on the Commission. Both of them – who were filling one-year interim terms on the USSC – are intelligent and thoughtful commissioners. I see Judge Gleeson – author of what came to be known as the “Holloway motion” when he used his legal and persuasive authority to correct a grossly unjust sentence – to be a little better rounded on sentencing policy.

That being said, one only has to remember former Commissioner Judge Danny Reeves, Bill Otis and Judge Henry Hudson to realize that the weakest commissioner on the USSC now (and I do not mean to imply that the weakest commission is either Judge Horn or Judge Gleeson) stands far above the ones President Trump favored but was unsuccessful in placing on the Commission.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Urging the Justice Department to respect the US Sentencing Commission’s new guidelines for compassionate release (October 18, 2023)

USA Today, First Step Act advanced prison reform, but hundreds are still serving unjust sentences (October 18, 2023)

White House, President Biden Names Fortieth Round of Judicial Nominees and Announces Nominees for U.S. Attorney, U.S. Marshal, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission (October 18, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root