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Supreme Court Decides What Congress Really Meant on Safety Valve – Update for March 19, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

A CONSPIRACY OF DUNCES…
This website was down all day yesterday due to a dark conspiracy of the people at Bluehost, LISA’s web provider, who decided to all become incompetent at once. Not really. Incompetence has been Bluehost’s theme for years…

TEXTUALISM TAKES IT ON THE CHIN

The Supreme Court on Friday narrowly interpreted 18 USC § 3553(f), the “safety valve” provision that was rewritten as part of the First Step Act, to “den[y] thousands of inmates a chance of seeking a shorter sentence,” according to NBC News.

caterpillar240319Many Supreme Court observers believed the Court would approach Friday’s case – Pulsifer v. United States – textually. “Textualism” is the interpretation of the law based exclusively on the ordinary meaning of the legal text. You know, like “and” means “and” and not “or.”  But the Court surprised the parties and observers in more ways than one.

Justice Elana Kagan’s opinion at first blush seems to be something only your high school English teacher could love. The case concerned the “safety valve” provision, which exempts some drug defendants from mandatory minimum sentences if they meet a list of conditions. One of those (3553(f)(1)) says the defendant can’t have “more than 4 criminal history points… a prior 3-point offense… AND a prior 2-point violent offense…” (I emphasized “AND” for reasons that will become apparent).

Mark Pulsifer had a prior 3-point felony, so his sentencing judge said he was ineligible for the safety valve. Mark, however, argued that the way (f)(1) is written, a defendant is ineligible only if he fails all three conditions. That is, Mark said, he was qualified for the safety valve unless he had all three of “more than 4 criminal history points AND a prior 3-point offense AND a prior 2-point violent offense.

grammar240319The Court’s lengthy ruling was little more than an English grammar lesson. In a decision surprising for scrambling ideological alliances on the Court, liberal Justice Kagan wrote for a 6-3 majority made up of traditionally conservative justices, while conservative Neil Gorsuch was joined by two traditionally liberal justices, Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson. The holding essentially holds that in the case of the safety valve, “and” means “or.”

SCOTUSBlog.com reported that

Kagan’s acceptance of the government’s argument relies squarely on a problem of superfluity.” The opinion focused on the fact that under Pulsifer’s reading of the provision, to be ineligible a defendant would have to have a prior 3-point conviction and a prior 2-point conviction. If that were so, the first requirement – that he or she have more than 4 points – was meaningless because to meet conditions two AND three, the defendant would already have to have 5 points. “In addressing eligibility for sentencing relief, Congress specified three particular features of a defendant’s criminal history — A, B, and C,” Kagan wrote. “It would not have done so if A had no possible effect. It would then have enacted: B and C. But while that is the paragraph Pulsifer’s reading produces, it is not the paragraph Congress wrote… [I]f a defendant has a three-point offense under Subparagraph B and a two-point offense under Subparagraph C he will always have more than four criminal-history points under Subparagraph A.

In other words, if reading the plain text of a statute yields a result that seems at odds with what Congress must have intended, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of what Congress must have intended prevails.

To prove her grammatical point, Kagan cites both The Very Hungry Caterpillar and Article III of the Constitution. She notes that Article III extends the “judicial Power… to all Cases… arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties.” This, she says, plainly applies to cases arising under any one of the three listed bodies of law but does not require that the cases arise under ALL three.

and-or240319In his dissent, Gorsuch complained that the decision significantly limits the goals of the First Step Act. “Adopting the government’s preferred interpretation guarantees that thousands more people in the federal criminal justice system will be denied a chance—just a chance—at an individualized sentence. For them, the First Step Act offers no hope. Nor, it seems, is there any rule of statutory interpretation the government won’t set aside to reach that result,” Gorsuch wrote. “Ordinary meaning is its first victim. Contextual clues follow. Our traditional practice of construing penal laws strictly falls by the wayside too. Replacing all that are policy concerns we have no business considering.”

Besides dramatically limiting those eligible for a safety valve non-mandatory drug sentence, Friday’s decision dashes the hope of some seeking a zero-point retroactive Guidelines 4C.1 2-level reduction. One of the conditions to qualify for that reduction is that a “defendant did not receive an adjustment under 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 USC 848.” Some read this as being that a defendant has to have both a 3B1.1 aggravating role AND a 21 USC 848 conviction. Other courts have read this as disqualifying all defendants having either a 3B1.1 enhancement OR an 848 conviction.

The decision stamps “denied” on the 5 pct of defendants annually getting a USSC § 3B1.1 leader/organizer/manager/supervisor enhancement.

Writing in his Sentencing Policy and Law blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman observed that the Pulsifer “serves as still more evidence that SCOTUS is no longer one of the most pro-defendant sentencing appeals courts. I got in the habit of making this point for a number of years following the Apprendi/Blakely/Booker line of rulings during a time when most federal circuit courts were often consistently more pro-government on sentencing issues than SCOTUS… But we are clearly in a different time with different Justices having different perspectives on these kinds of sentencing matters.”

Pulsifer v US, Case No 22-340, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 1215 (March 15, 2024)

Reuters, US Supreme Court says thousands of drug offenders can’t seek shorter sentences (March 15, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, In notable 6-3 split, SCOTUS rules in Pulsifer that “and” means “or” for application of First Step safety valve (March 15, 2024)

SCOTUSBlog.com, Supreme Court limits “safety valve” in federal sentencing law (March 15, 2024)

NBC, Supreme Court denies ‘thousands’ of inmates a chance at shorter sentences (March 15, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Teeing Up Some Significant Criminal Law Decisions – Update for January 15, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREMES’ JANUARY LOOKING CONSEQUENTIAL FOR CRIM LAW HOLDINGS

alicewordsmeanhumpty231122The first argument of the current Supreme Court term last October, Pulsifer v. United States, ought to be yielding an opinion in the next few weeks. The First Step Act “safety valve” case – that considers whether “and” means “and” or simply “or” – has increased importance for a lot of people who might otherwise qualify for the zero-point sentence reduction under the new USSG § 4C1.1.

A condition of § 4C1.1 is that “the defendant did not receive an adjustment under § 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise…” So does that mean the defendant is qualified unless he has a § 3B1.1 adjustment AND a CCE conviction? Or is he disqualified if he has a § 3B1.1 OR a CCE violation? There are a lot of § 3B1.1 enhancements out there, but not nearly as many CCE convictions.

Even without the § 4C1.1 angle, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman said last week in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog that Pulsifer may “prove to be the most interesting and impactful sentencing case from the current SCOTUS Term.”

Meanwhile, other interesting Supreme Court developments are happening largely unseen. Last November, the Court granted review in Erlinger v. United States, a case which asks whether the Constitution requires that a jury (instead of the judge) find beyond a reasonable doubt that an Armed Career Criminal Act defendant’s three predicate offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another.”

May you rest in peace, Betty... stealing America's hearts did not make you ACCA-qualified.
May you rest in peace, Betty… stealing America’s hearts did not make you ACCA-qualified.

(The ACCA, for those who got here late, is a sentencing enhancement contained in 18 USC § 924(e)(2) which provides that the punishment for a felon-in-possession conviction under 18 USC § 922(g) begins with a mandatory 15 years and goes to life imprisonment if the defendant has three prior convictions for serious drug offenses or crimes of violence committed on occasions different from one another. Erlinger explores the collision of those elements with the 6th Amendment: can a judge find the ACCA applies to a felon-in-possession by a simple preponderance of the evidence, or must those elements be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt?)

The curious development in Erlinger is that both the Solicitor General and defendant Erlinger agree that after the Supreme Court adopted the current “standard for determining whether offenses occurred on different occasions [set forth] in Wooden v. United States” in 2022, the issue of whether the predicates were “committed on occasions different from one another” implicates a defendant’s Apprendi v. New Jersey rights to have facts that raise the statutory minimum and maximum must be decided beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.

When both parties in a Supreme Court case agree on how the case should come out, the Court appoints a lawyer to argue the other side. SCOTUS has appointed one in this case, who will file a brief next month opposing the briefs Erlinger and DOJ have already filed.

Erlinger is important not only for the ACCA issue presented but because some on the Court have argued that where an enhanced penalty (like 21 USC § 851 drug enhancements) requires a showing of a prior conviction, due process requires that the fact of the conviction be decided by a jury. The Supremes ruled the other way in the 1998 Almendarez-Torres v. United States decision, a holding that was unaffected by the subsequent Apprendi ruling. Justice Clarence Thomas especially has criticized Almendarez-Torres, believing it is wrong, and the fact of prior convictions should be a jury question. Erlinger may give a holding that is expansive enough to address the Almendarez-Torres holding.

expert160905Last week, the Court heard argument in Smith v. Arizona, addressing whether a defendant’s 6th Amendment right to confront witnesses means that the lab expert who prepared a report on drug purity must be put on the stand to verify the report. Many courts currently permit another expert who did not conduct the test to testify as to drug purity based on the report’s findings.

The  Court seemed sympathetic to Jason Smith, an Arizona prisoner who contends that the expert’s testimony – based on a drug purity test performed by someone who wasn’t present to testify – contravened the 6th Amendment’s confrontation clause, which gives defendants in criminal cases the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.”

Finally, the Court will hear the argument tomorrow in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the case that could end Chevron deference – the notion that courts must defer to agency interpretation of statutes and rules. A change in Chevron deference could affect the Sentencing Guidelines, court deference to agency interpretation of gun laws, and court deference to BOP policies, among other changes.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Top side SCOTUS brief now files in Erlinger v. US, the case considering Apprendi’s application to part of ACCA (January 9, 2024)

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)

Erlinger v. United States, Case No. 23-370 (S.Ct., awaiting decision)

Smith v. Arizona, Case No. 22-899 (S.Ct., argued January 10, 2024)

SCOTUSBlog, Court appears to favor Arizona man’s confrontation clause claim (January 10, 2024)

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, Case No. 22-451 (S.Ct., awaiting argument)

– Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS Tackles the ‘And/Or’ Debate in Pulsifer Case – Update for October 6, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREMES HEAR ORAL ARGUMENT ON DRUG SENTENCING “SAFETY VALVE”

The Supreme Court opened its nine-month term last Monday hearing oral argument on the meaning of a First Step Act amendment to 18 USC § 3553(f), a subsection known as the “safety valve.”

Under the “safety valve” provision, judges could disregard mandatory minimum sentences for people convicted of certain nonviolent drug offenses who had limited criminal history and met a few other conditions.

andor210524At issue is how to interpret a part of the law that determines who is eligible for this provision, which could potentially lead to a shorter sentence. Three requirements under the provision involve prior criminal history, and the court is being asked to decide whether people no longer qualify if they meet one of these criteria — or if they must meet all three.

Mark Pulsifer pled guilty to one count of distributing 50 grams of methamphetamine and then sought application of the “safety valve.” To be eligible, a defendant cannot have “(A) more than 4 criminal history points… (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.”

At issue is whether “and” means “and.”

The government argues that “and” means “or,” so defendants are ineligible if they fail any of the three subparts. “It joins together three independently disqualifying conditions by distributing the phrase ‘does not have.’ That’s the only interpretation that avoids rendering the first subparagraph entirely redundant,” the Solicitor General’s attorney told the justices.

Pulsifer’s lawyer disagreed. “Letting the government get to ‘or’ when Congress said ‘and’ would encourage Congress to be sloppy with the most basic English words, leaving square corners far behind, and in the criminal context, where fairness matters most. The Court should hold Congress to what it wrote.”

words221110At oral argument, the justices spent most of their time parsing the grammar and conjunctions, trying to determine whether § 3553(f) uses the word “and” to join three eligibility criteria together or distributively across three independently disqualifying criteria. The government’s lawyer often appealed to a canon of construction rooted in “common sense,” a suggestion not that well received. “I don’t know that canon, but I guess it’s a good one,” Justice Neil Gorsuch quipped.

Pulsifer’s lawyer rejected it as well: “The government focuses a lot on common sense, but it’s common sense that if Congress wanted to say “or,” it would have said “or,” he contended. “It knew how to do that in other parts of this very sentence, of § 3553(f). The — Congress’s own drafting manual says to do so, and that would be the ordinary meaning — that would be the ordinary term to use in order to express the meaning that the government attributes to this statute.”

The court’s ruling may affect thousands of defendants with pending cases and those in federal prison. And how to read an ambiguous “and” may become important to a lot of zero-point people pretty soon, too.

zeropoints230420The Sentencing Commission’s retroactive zero-point amendment (USSG 4C1.1) goes into effect in a month. Section 4C1.1(a)(1) directs that an eligible defendant is one who “did not receive an adjustment under 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 USC § 848.” Does this mean that no one with a 3B1.1 enhancement or who was convicted of a 21 USC § 848 continuing criminal enterprise is eligible? Or does it mean that you must have both a 21 USC § 848 conviction and a § 3B1.1 enhancement to be disqualified?

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman wrote in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog that he suspected Pulsifer

will end up with a 5-4 vote in favor of the government’s proposed statutory interpretation that would restrict the reach of the First Step Act’s expansion of the statutory safety valve exception to drug mandatory minimum sentencing terms. But I would not entirely discount the possibility that the four Justices who seemed most favorable toward the defendant’s reading, particularly Justices Gorsuch and Jackson, might find a way to peel off a key fifth vote (especially since the Chief was pretty quiet throughout and Justice Kagan hinted toward the end that she might be less sure than she seemed at the outset).

Berman anticipates a decision in winter 2024, although he offers the chance that “this one might take quite a while if lots of Justices decide to write on lots of broader statutory interpretation topics (like the reach of the rule of lenity and/or the use of legislative history and/or corpus linguistics).”

New York Times, On First Day of New Term, Supreme Court Hears Debate Over First Step Act (October 2, 2023)

The Hill, Supreme Court opens term with case on prison terms for drug offenders (October 2, 2023)

Slate: The Supreme Court’s Oddest Pairing Comes Out Swinging on Behalf of Criminal Defendants (October 2, 2023)

Transcript of Oral Argument, Pulsifer v. United States, Case No. 22-340 (October 2, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Rounding up some accounts of lengthy SCOTUS oral argument in Pulsifer safety valve case (October 3, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS Hears Argument Over Meaning of “And” in First Step Act – Update for October 2, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREMES OPEN NEW COURT YEAR TODAY WITH ENGLISH LESSON

The Supreme Court opens its new 9-month term today with arguments in a case that considers what the meaning of the word “and” is in a provision of the First Step Act, an esoteric English lesson with real-world impact for thousands of federal prisoners.

meaningofisis231003Not since Bill Clinton told questioners that “it depends on what the meaning of ‘is’ is” has a simple word prompted such a dispute. What the justices decide could affect thousands of federal drug sentences each year. What’s more, it could affect thousands more seeking a retroactive zero-point reduction under the Guidelines.

First Step amended the 18 USC § 3553(f) “safety valve” that allows certain nonviolent drug offenders who plead guilty to avoid mandatory minimum sentences based in large part on their lack of significant criminal history. The statute says may qualify if he or she doesn’t have more than 4 criminal history points, a prior 3-point offense and a prior two-point violent offense.

The issue is whether having (1) more than four criminal history points, OR (2) a prior three-point offense OR (3) a prior two-point violent offense, will disqualify you, or whether you have to have (1) more than four criminal history points, AND (2) a prior three-point offense AND (3) a prior two-point violent offense – that is, all three to be disqualified. The courts of appeal are split, and thus, the Supreme Court has stepped in to settle the dispute.

confused230113The case, Pulsifer v. United States, is more than an exercise in sentence diagramming, a dubious talent I mastered and then forgot more than a half-century ago. Nearly 6,000 people convicted of drug trafficking in 2021 alone might be eligible for reduced sentences, according to the Sentencing Commission, if the Supremes agree that a defendant has to have all three to be disqualified. Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman told AP that more than 10,000 people sentenced since First Step took effect could be affected. He said Congress wrote the § 3553(f)(1) subsection in the negative so that a judge can exercise discretion in sentencing if a defendant “does not have” three sorts of criminal history.

In today’s Supreme Court case, Petitioner Mark Pulsifer argues that he has to have four criminal history points which include both a prior 3-point offense and a 2-point violent offense in order to lose the benefit of the safety valve. The government says just one of the three conditions – 4 points or a 3-point prior or a 2-point violent crime – is enough.

Berman told AP the language of the statute favors a broad reading favoring defendants. “But the concern about the broad reading is that it basically covers everybody. I think it’s right that that wasn’t Congress’ intent,” Berman said, echoing arguments made by judges who sided with prosecutors.

AP observes that Congressional intent may not matter: “On a court in which several justices across the ideological spectrum say they are guided by the words Congress chooses, with less regard for congressional intent, that might be enough to favor defendants.”

ambiguity221128How to read an ambiguous “and” may be important to a lot of zero-point people pretty soon. The Sentencing Commission’s retroactive zero-point amendment (USSG 4C1.1) goes into effect in a month. Sec 4C1.1(a)(1) directs that an eligible defendant is one who “did not receive an adjustment under § 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 USC § 848.” Does this mean that no one with a § 3B1.1 enhancement or who was convicted of an 848 continuing criminal enterprise is eligible? Or does it mean that you must have both an 848 conviction and a 3B1.1 enhancement to be disqualified?

That all depends on the meaning of “and.”

Pulsifer v United States, Case No. 21-1609 (Supreme Court, Oral Argument October 2, 2023)

Forbes, Why Thousands Of Prisoners Could Be Spared Because Of A Supreme Court Case Over The Word ‘And’ (September 25, 2023)

AP News, The Supreme Court will hear a case with a lot of ‘buts’ & ‘ifs’ over the meaning of ‘and’ (September 24, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root