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Last Week’s § 2255 Gleanings – Update for March 4, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

INMATES GO 2-2 ON § 2255 DECISIONS LAST WEEK

The Courts handed federal inmates two 28 USC § 2255 wins and two losses last week.

habeas191211For the uninitiated, habeas corpus (literally, a Latin imperative phrase to “produce the body”) has been around for about 806 years, give or take, ever since a band of angry noblemen forced King John to sign the Magna Carta (the “Great Charter of Liberties”) as an alternative to having his royal butt kicked.

One liberty the noblemen secured was the right not to be locked up without reason. The Magna Carta empowered courts to issue a writ (order) to a jailer to “produce the body” – that is, come to court with a particular prisoner and show why that prisoner’s detention is legal. Habeas corpus has become known as the “Great Writ,” so ingrained in English common law that our constitution simply assumes the right exists. The constitution only references habeas corpus in the negative, by denying the president the right to suspend the writ except in time of war.

Notwithstanding the constitutional origins of habeas corpus, Congress controls how prisoners may exercise their right to seek the writ in the federal courts by statute. For instance, 28 USC § 2244 regulates the filing of habeas corpus petitions for all claims of illegal detention for reasons other than a defect in the conviction or sentence. Section 2255 of Title 18 permits a federal prisoner to file a habeas corpus petition where the claim is that the conviction or sentence is contrary to law.

Every federal prisoner has the right to bring one § 2255 motion, subject to rather strict time limits. Bringing a second such petition is possible under very limited circumstances, with permission first being granted by the Court of Appeals.

Now for the week’s news:

violence181008(1) Dearnta Thomas pled guilty to a substantive RICO offense, and an 18 USC § 924(c) count for using a gun in furtherance of a crime of violence. The predicate “crime of violence” for the § 924 offense was aiding and abetting the commission of a VICAR offense (Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity under 18 USC § 1959), those predicate violent crimes being two Virginia state-law offenses, a conviction for use or display of a firearm in committing a felony and another for “pointing, holding, or brandishing a firearm, air or gas-operated weapon or object similar in appearance.”

After the 2019 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Davis, Dearnta filed for permission under 28 USC § 2244 to bring a successive § 2255. Last week, the 4th Circuit held that Davis announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court and that Dearnta’s argument – that the state convictions were not crimes of violence within the meaning of Davis – stated a plausible claim.

(2) Meanwhile, Travis Harris asked the 5th Circuit for permission to file a successive § 2255 arguing that after Davis, his conviction for using a destructive device during a crime of violence (18 USC § 844(i)), should be thrown out, because the predicate offense – arson – was no longer a crime of violence.

The 5th agreed, holding – as the 4th Circuit has previously said – that Davis was retroactive and that Travis raised a plausible enough claim to go forward.

lawyerjoke180807(3) Things didn’t go so well for Kevin Kelley in the 1st Circuit. Kev figured he had a “gotcha:” it turned out the Assistant U.S. Attorney who had signed Kevin’s indictment had not paid his bar dues. Because F.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) says that an indictment “must be signed by” a government lawyer, and the AUSA’s law license had been suspended for nonpayment of dues, Kevin argued in his § 2255 motion that the bad signature invalidated the indictment and “robbed the district court of jurisdiction to proceed against him.”

Last week, the 1st Circuit rejected Kev’s technicality. “The Supreme Court, after all, has long viewed a government lawyer’s indictment signing as necessary only as evidence of the authenticity of the document,” the Circuit said, and Rule 7’s “intent is for common sense to prevail over technicalities.” Thus, the Circuit said, “it is unsurprising that many courts refuse to stamp ‘invalid’ an indictment signed by a prosecutor with bar-license problems if other evidence shows that the government was backing the prosecution — with some cases explicitly saying that in such a situation, the complaining party cannot prove prejudice.”

Here, the evidence showed the indictment had been approved by the AUSA’s superior, and that was good enough for common sense to prevail, the Court ruled, especially where Kevin could prove he was not harmed by the suspended AUSA working under a nonpayment suspension.

(4) Finally, Greg Olson got a target letter from the U.S. Attorney, telling him he would be indicted, but offering that he could get a lawyer and work out a preindictment deal. Greg and his lawyer worked out a 30-month plea to tax evasion, but the deal foundered when the government refused to provide any discovery. Greg got indicted, hired a different lawyer, but ended up with a 48-month sentence.

target210305Greg filed a § 2255 motion claiming his pre-indictment lawyer screwed up the plea deal. But last week, a 9th Circuit panel shot him down. Precedent in the circuit holds a defendant has no 6th Amendment right to effective counsel before he is a defendant, meaning that a three-judge panel cannot overrule the prior case. Of course, in such cases, if a three-judge panel thinks the precedent is nonsense, it can refer its case to the court en banc, but here, the Circuit said, “In determining whether this is an appropriate case to do so, we must assess whether Olson might prevail if current circuit precedent were to be overruled… The record does not support Olson’s claim that his counsel was ineffective. An en banc ruling would therefore not affect the result.”

In re Thomas, Case No 19-292, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5316 (4th Cir. February 23, 2021)

In re Harris, Case No 19-51045, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5719 (5th Cir. February 25, 2021)

Kelley v. United States, Case No 19-1932, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5646 (1st Cir.  February 25, 2021)

United States v. Olson, Case No 19-16591, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5027 (9th Cir.  February 22, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Hobbs Act “Attempt” Not Crime of Violence, 4th Says – Update for October 16, 2020

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

4TH CIRCUIT CHIPS AWAY AT HOBBS ACT

Ever since the Supreme Court’s United States v. Davis decision a year ago – indeed, even before Davis with Mathis, Descamps and the line of Johnson cases – commentators have been asking “whither violence?”

chip201016OK, maybe nothing that fancy. But appellate courts have traditionally and dismissively held that if a crime is a crime of violence (and here we’re talking about crimes of violence for purposes of apply the 18 USC § 924(c) offense of using or carrying a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence), then any conspiracy or attempt to commit such a crime is necessarily a crime of violence as well.

(A “crime of violence,” for those of you joining us late, is defined in 18 USC § 924(c)(3)(A) as being one that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” Read Davis, and then report back here).

The appellate courts’ formula that an attempt to commit a crime of violence is violent as well has the virtue of being easy to apply, if a little formulaic. And so what if defendants find themselves serving additional mandatory sentences of five, seven, ten or 25 years?

The Supreme Court made it clear in Davis (if not before) that the formula is wrong, at least where conspiracy is concerned. If people possess guns while conspiring to commit a violent crime – say, for example, while practicing to kidnap, try and shoot the governor of Michigan – the conspiracy certainly is punishable, but they cannot get a mandatory additional sentence under § 924(c) while maturing their felonious little plans.

That has left unanswered the question of whether an attempt to commit a crime of violence remains violent itself, even after Davis. Clearly, attempts to commit crimes of violence can carried out without force or threat of force. A carload of armed would-be bank robbers drive up to a bank, but before they can even get out of the car, they are surrounded by the police. Another bank robber approaches the bank’s front door, but an alert employee sees him coming and hits the button that automatically locks the door. The law says that’s an attempted bank robbery: the bad guy intended to rob the bank and carried out at least one significant step toward accomplishing it. But he at no time used force or attempted to do so.

I have written before about how a few district courts have rejected attempts to commit Hobbs Act robberies (18 USC § 1951) as crimes of violence. This week, the 4th Circuit did so, too, a necessary and bold step (in the face of three other circuits – the 7th, the 9th and the 11th – who have gone the other way).

robbery160321The facts were ugly. Justin Taylor – known to his friends as “Mookie” – and a buddy set up a drug buy. Their plan was not to buy weed from the hapless victim, Sylvester, but instead to rob him of his pot. Mookie’s friend brought a gun to the caper, and mishanded it somehow, shooting Sylvester dead. Mookie and his friend ran without taking the marijuana, thus making the Hobbs Act robbery an “attempt” instead of a completed act.

Justin got 20 years for the attempted robbery, and another 10 for firing a gun during the crime. (His friend fired the gun, but Justin was equally liable for that, a legal doctrine we won’t get into now).

After Johnson was decided in 2015, Justin brought a post-conviction motion under 28 USC § 2255, arguing that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence that will support a § 924(c) conviction. He wanted the court to take back the extra 10 years on his sentence.

Earlier this week, the 4th Circuit agreed in a most significant holding.

A Hobbs Act robbery may be accomplished by use of force (I hit you over the head and steal your pot) or a threat of force (I threaten to hit you over the head to make you hand over your pot). The Circuit found this alternative crucial:

[U]nlike substantive Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not invariably require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The Government may obtain a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery by proving that: (1) the defendant specifically intended to commit robbery by means of a threat to use physical force; and (2) the defendant took a substantial step corroborating that intent. The substantial step need not be violent. See United States v. McFadden… (concluding that defendants took a substantial step toward bank robbery where they “discussed their plans,” “reconnoitered the banks in question,” “assembled weapons and disguises,” and “proceeded to the area of the bank”). Where a defendant takes a nonviolent substantial step toward threatening to use physical force — conduct that undoubtedly satisfies the elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery — the defendant has not used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force. Rather, the defendant has merely attempted to threaten to use physical force. The plain text of § 924(c)(3)(A) does not cover such conduct.

violence181008The government argued that the 4th’s approach would mean that no attempt to commit a crime of violence would support a § 924(c) conviction. The Circuit responded that “this simply is not so. Rather, as we have repeatedly held, certain crimes of violence — like Hobbs Act robbery, federal bank robbery, and carjacking — may be committed without the use or attempted use of physical force because they may be committed merely by means of threats,” such as “Hobbs Act robbery, when committed by means of causing fear of injury,” bank robbery and carjacking. “But where a crime of violence requires the use of physical force — as is usually the case — the categorical approach produces the opposite outcome: because the substantive crime of violence invariably involves the use of force, the corresponding attempt to commit that crime necessarily involves the attempted use of force. Such an attempt constitutes a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the force clause in § 924(c)(3).” The appeals court cited murder as such an offense.

This decision could very well set up a Supreme Court challenge, given the split between the 4th Circuit and the 7th, 9th and 11th.

United States v. Taylor, Case No. 19-7616, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 32393 (4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

1st Circuit Gives Pre-Booker Career Offenders Some Relief– Update for October 5, 2020

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NO DEFENDANT LEFT BEHIND

vagueness160110The 2015 Supreme Court decision Johnson v. United States was a landmark, holding that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague. Johnson’s reasoning led to Sessions v. Dimaya (extending Johnson to the criminal code’s general definition of “crime of violence” at 18 USC § 16(b)) and 2019’s United States v. Davis holding extending Johnson to 18 USC § 924(c), the “use or carry a firearm” statute.

But thousands of inmates who were held to be Guidelines “career offenders” because of prior crimes of violence got no relief. A Guidelines “career offender” is very different from an ACCA armed career criminal. A Guidelines career offender is someone with two prior crimes of violence or serious drug convictions (federal or state). If a defendant qualifies as a Guidelines career offender, he or she will be deemed to have the highest possible criminal history score and a Guidelines offense level that ensures a whopping sentencing range.

After Johnson, a number of Guidelines career offenders, whose status had been fixed by including some dubious prior convictions as “violent,” sought the same kind of relief that Johnson afforded armed career criminals. But in 2017 the Supremes said that Johnson did not apply to the Guidelines. Beckles v. United States held that the Guidelines were not subject to the same kind of “vagueness” challenge that worked in Johnson, because the Guidelines did not “fix the permissible range of sentences, but merely guided the exercise of discretion in choosing a sentence within the statutory range.”

This may have been so for people sentenced under the advisory Guidelines. However, back before the 2005 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker, those “advisory” Guidelines were mandatory. They did not guide a judge’s discretion. Instead, the law required a judge to sentence within the applicable Guidelines sentencing range except in very narrow circumstances, and then only if the sentencing court jumped through the many hoops the Guidelines erected.

Robber160229So, how about guys like Tony Shea, who was sentenced after a bank robbery spree as a career offender back in 1998? Tony’s prior crimes of violence were pretty shaky bases for a career offender enhancement (not that Tony didn’t have plenty of problems for his string of armed robberies, but that’s another story). Tony was looking at minimum 430 months under normal Guidelines, nothing to sneeze at, but with the career offender label, Tony’s minimum sentence shot that up to 567 months (that’s 47-plus years, or 330 dog years).

Tony filed a § 2255 motion arguing that because his Guidelines career offender sentence was mandatory, not “advisory,” the Johnson holding should apply to wipe out his career offender status.

Last Monday, the 1st Circuit agreed. The appeals court noted that while Beckles was right that advisory Guidelines guide a judge’s discretion rather than “fix the permissible range of sentences,” the pre-Booker Guidelines did much more than this. The Circuit said “when the pre-Booker Guidelines ‘bound the judge to impose a sentence within’ a prescribed range, as they ordinarily did, they necessarily “fixed the permissible range of sentences” she could impose.”

Judicial despotism... probably not a good thing.
         Judicial despotism… probably not a good thing.

“It’s easy,” the 1st said “to see why vague laws that fix sentences… violate the Due Process Clause. The… rule applied in Booker serves two main functions. First, fair notice: requiring the indictment to allege ‘every fact which is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted… enables the defendant to determine the species of offence with which he is charged in order that he may prepare his defense accordingly…” Second, “the rule also guards against the threat of ‘judicial despotism’ that could arise from ‘arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions,’ by requiring the jury to find each fact the law makes essential to his punishment.”

Only the 11th Circuit has explicitly held that Beckles does not apply to mandatory Guidelines career offender enhancements. The 5th, 8th and 10th Circuits are on the fence. This 1st Circuit decision is the first to emphatically apply Johnson to give relief to people like Tony, who is already well into his third decade of imprisonment.

Shea v. United States, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 30776 (1st Cir., September 28, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

A Short Rocket – Update for March 12, 2020

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WE’VE GOT THE SHORTS…

rocket-312767Arson: In a decision approving filing a second-or-successive 2255 motion, the 6th Circuit last week held that because United States v. Davis is retroactive, a defendant who was convicted of 18 USC 844(i) arson and an 18 USC 924(c) use of a destructive device (a Molotov cocktail) could challenge the 924(c) conviction.

The 6th said the defendant’s “924(c) conviction was premised upon his use of a destructive device in furtherance of the 844(i) offense… The question is whether 844(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another… Arson under 844(i) does not appear to qualify as a crime of violence under 924(c)(3)(A) because it can be committed against “any building… used in interstate or foreign commerce,” including one owned by the arsonist… That means defendant’s 924 conviction must have been based on 924(c)(3)(B), which Davis invalidated…”

In re Franklin, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 6672 (6th Cir. Mar, 3, 2020)

manyguns190423Waiver: The defendant pled guilty to violating 18 USC 924(c) for brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence — theft from a firearms dealer under 18 USC 922(u). He filed a 2255 motion claiming after United States v. Davis, a 922(u) violation no longer counts as a crime of violence. But his plea agreement included the waiver of his right to contest the conviction and sentence “on any ground, including any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the claimed ineffective assistance of counsel relates directly to this waiver or its negotiation, including any appeal… or any post-conviction proceeding, including but not limited to, a proceeding under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255…”

Last week, the 7th Circuit ruled this collateral-attack waiver was valid and barred a Davis challenge to the conviction and sentences.

Oliver v United States, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 6760 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 2020)

Fair Sentencing Act: The Defendants were sentenced for crack offenses under 21 USC 841(b)(1)(A) prior to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. After the First Step Act passed, they applied for sentence reductions. The government; argued they were not eligible because the amounts of crack they were found to have been involved with at sentencing were so great that their sentence exposure did not change.

crackpowder160606The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York last week held that the defendants were eligible. It held that “the weight of authority supports Defendants’ interpretation. “[T]he majority of district court cases in this Circuit” have found “that a defendant is eligible for relief under the First Step Act based upon his offense of conviction, as opposed to his actual conduct… Decisions from other circuits also favor Defendants’ interpretation. See United States v. White, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119164 (S.D. Tex., July 17, 2019) (collecting over 40 cases across the nation that agree with defendants’ interpretation of ‘covered offense’).”

The EDNY court said it “joins the chorus of district courts to hold that eligibility under… the First Step Act is based on the crime of conviction and not a defendant’s actual conduct. Both defendants were convicted of violating 21 USC 841(b)(1)(A), the statutory penalties for which were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. They are both therefore eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act.”

United States v. Pressley, 2020 US Dist. LEXIS 34973 (EDNY Feb 28, 2020)

ACCA Recklessness: The Supreme Court last week granted certiorari to a case asking whether an offense that involves physical force that is used recklessly – that is, conduct undertaken with a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk – is a crime of violence for Armed Career Criminal Act purposes.

A prior case asking the same issue was recently dismissed after the defendant/petitioner died.

Borden v. United States, Case No. 19-5410 (certiorari granted Mar. 2, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Gun Case Misfires, Shoots Government in the Foot – Update for March 3, 2020

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GENERAL VERDICT DOOMS HOBBS ACT CONSPIRACY/ ATTEMPT CONVICTION

Defendant Stacy Berry was found guilty of a using a gun in a crime of violence (an 18 USC § 924(c) offense) based on both an underlying conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act and an attempted Hobbs Act robbery. A § 924(c) violation, of course, carries a mandatory additional sentence of at least five years.

guns200304Time was, the government liked attaching § 924(c) counts to conspiracies, because conspiracies are so long-lived and squishy that essentially, a defendant’s possession of a gun at any time during a months-long or years-long conspiracy was enough to ensure the § 924 conviction. It was may, prove that during a robbery on a particular date and at a particular location, the defendant knew that his accomplice was going to pull his .44 Klutzman and pistol-whip a store clerk.

Prior to the Supreme Court’s United States v. Davis decision in June 2019, courts generally held that if a crime was violent, then, ipso facto, a conspiracy to commit the crime was violent, too, and any attempt to commit the crime had to be violent. That made securing the § 924(c) conviction a cinch.

sowwind200205Sow the wind, reap the whirlwind. Last month, a district court granted the defendant’s post-conviction 28 USC § 2255 motion, because the government had cleverly attached a § 924(c) count to both a Hobbs Act conspiracy and an attempted Hobbs Act robbery. By now, everyone knows that a Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a crime of violence, and courts are coming around to the view that an attempted crime of violence is not necessarily a crime of violence, either.

Stacy argued that neither the conspiracy nor the attempted robbery was a crime of violence. The government argued that while the conspiracy was not, the attempt certainly was.

The district court held that “it need not rule whether attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence… The parties acknowledge that the jury instructions allowed for a conviction on either conspiracy or attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and the jury verdict was a general verdict which does not specify which was the basis of the conviction.” For that reason, the § 924(c) conviction was thrown out.

United States v. Berry, 2020 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 20380 (W.D.Va. Feb 6, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Beginning of the End for Hobbs Act Violence? – Update for February 18, 2020

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ANOTHER DISTRICT COURT HOLDS HOBBS ACT ROBBERY ATTEMPT DOES NOT SUPPORT § 924(C) CONVICTION

hobbsact200218A few weeks ago, I reported that an Eastern District of New York case, United States v. Tucker, held that an attempted Hobbs Act robbery did not support an 18 USC § 924 conviction for using a gun in a crime of violence.

The same reader who brought Tucker to my attention last week pointed me toward a late January Western District of New York decision that granted a 28 USC § 2255 post-conviction motion on the same grounds.

Tom Lofton was in the business of robbing drug dealers. He found that using a gun in his business was an effective way to make his point with his victims, which was that they should hand over their money and drugs. It worked quite well until the Feds caught him in 2004. He was charged with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and two counts of attempted Hobbs Act robberies. He was also charged with three § 924(c) counts, one each attached to the conspiracy and both Hobbs Act attempts. Tom beat one of the § 924(c) counts at trial, but he was convicted on the other two, receiving 180 months for the conspiracy and attempts, but 84 consecutive months for the first § 924(c) and 300 more for the second § 924(c). All told, Tom received a 567-month sentence during which he should rethink his business model.

Robber160229After the Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in United States v. Davis, however, Tom rethought the § 924 convictions as well. He got permission from the Second Circuit to file a second § 2255 motion to attack his two § 924(c) counts as being unsupported by predicate crimes of violence. The government agreed that the first § 924(c), based on the conspiracy count, had to be dismissed, but it argued that the attempt-to-violate-the-Hobbs-Act count remained a crime of violence.

The government’s thinking was quite linear: a Hobbs Act violation is a crime of violence. To be convicted of an “attempt” crime, one must intend to commit the underlying crime and take at least one step toward doing so. Since the defendant intended a crime of violence, the “attempt” crime must be a crime of violence as well.

A few weeks ago, however, Tom’s district court agreed with him, and dismissed both § 924(c) convictions.

The Hobbs Act is violated either by robbery or by extortion. The district court agreed that the Act is divisible between the two offenses, but held that within the definition of Hobbs Act robbery, the statute indivisible. The Act provides that “whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do…” will be punished.

maskgun200218Relying on Tucker, the district court ruled that an attempt to commit a Hobbs Act robbery could not be a crime of violence, because people have been successfully prosecuted in the past for attempted Hobbs Act robbery when no force was ever threatened or used. In one case cited by the court, a defendant was convicted because he had twice “reconnoitered the place contemplated for the commission of the crime and possessed the paraphernalia to be employed in the commission of the crime: loaded sawed-off shotguns, extra shells, a toy revolver, handcuffs, and masks…”

The district court argued that prior decisions in other circuits that agreed with the government’s argument had confused “intent” with “attempt.” Just because a defendant intends to commit an act of violence does not necessarily mean the defendant has actually attempted to do so.

Because a defendant can violate 18 USC § 1951 by intending to commit the crime and taking a step toward completing the offense, even without any force threatened or used, an attempted Hobbs Act violation cannot support a § 924(c) conviction.

Tom’s two § 924(c) offenses were vacated.

United States v. Lofton, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10764 (WDNY, Jan. 22, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Racketeering Conspiracy Held Not to be Crime of Violence – Update for December 30, 2019

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3RD CIRCUIT FINDS A RACKETEERING CONSPIRACY IS NO CRIME OF VIOLENCE

Nelson Quinteros was being deported to his native El Salvador on the grounds that a prior criminal conviction under 18 USC § 1959(a)(6) was a crime of violence, and thus an “aggravated felony” under the immigration laws. (An aggravated felony conviction will get a non-citizen deported).

violent160620Sec. 1959(a)(6), a subsection of an offense entitled “Violent Crimes In Aid of Racketeering,” provides that whoever, for payment or to join or advance in a racketeering enterprise, “murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a dangerous weapon, commits assault resulting in serious bodily injury upon, or threatens to commit a crime of violence against any individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United States, or attempts or conspires so to do, shall be punished… for attempting or conspiring to commit a crime involving maiming, assault with a dangerous weapon, or assault resulting in serious bodily injury…”

Sound violent? Well, yes, rather. But in the weird legal world that “crimes of violence” have inhabited since Curtis Johnson v. United States, back in 2010, sought to define what violence is, what appears to be a violent crime cannot be counted on to necessarily be a “crime of violence” under the statute.

The Board of Immigration Appeals originally held that Nelson’s § 1959(a)(6) conviction was a crime of violence under 18 USC § 16(b), a statute that defined what constituted a crime of violence under the criminal code. However, after the BIA decision on Nelson’s case, the Supreme Court in Sessions v. Dimaya threw out § 16(b) as unconstitutionally vague. That meant that the § 1959(a)(6) offense was no longer a crime of violence unless it could qualify under § 18 USC § 16(a). Last week, the 3rd Circuit ruled that Nelson’s prior conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence under that subsection, either.

violence151213Section 16(a) defines crime of violence as an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, substantially the same definition used in 18 USC § 924(c) and in the Armed Career Criminal Act. “Looking at the least culpable conduct,” the Court wrote (as it must), “an individual could be convicted of conspiracy under 18 USC § 1959(a)(6) without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” What’s more, because a § 1959(a)(6) conviction does not require that a defendant commit any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, the statute could conceivably punish for “evil intent alone.”

In other words, Nelson and his cronies could sit around with a few brewskis talking about how they would later commit bodily mayhem on some old lady crossing the street. That would violate § 1959(a)(6), even if later, on the way to do so, they passed a storefront church and were saved, thus abandoning their lives of sin. The conspiracy offense would still have been committed, but nowhere would they have threatened or committed an act of violence.

religion191230

Nelson’s case was about deportation, but its holding suggests that many of the statutes in Chapter 95 of the criminal code, which includes the Hobbs Act and murder-for-hire, may be vulnerable to a Mathis v. United States-type analysis in the wake of Johnson, Dimaya, and United States v. Davis.

The world of “crimes of violence” keeps getting stranger.

Quinteros v. Attorney General, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 37237 (3rd Cir. Dec.17, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Hobbs Act Violence Finally Questioned, Then The Questioning Questioned – Update for December 18, 2019

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GREAT HOBBS ACT DECISION, BUT NOT SO FAST…

A detailed, well-reasoned 32-page district court decision holding that a Hobbs Act offense is not a crime of violence has been appealed by the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California.

violence180508Two months ago, a district court ruled that the Hobbs Act was not a crime of violence in the wake of Sessions v. Dimaya and United States v. Davis, because an alternate means of committing the crime was to instill “fear of injury, immediate or future” to the person or property of a victim. Fear of future injury to property does not equate to fear of use of physical force against a person, the district court held.

This reasoning, if it spreads, could bring down Hobbs Act offenses as crimes of violence. Apparently, the government fears so, because last week, it appealed the decision to the 9th Circuit. This is not a bad development, because a circuit holding that the Hobbs Act is not a crime of violence would probably force a Supreme Court decision on the issue.

United States v. Chea, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177651 (N.D.Cal., Oct. 2, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Handful of Interesting Criminal Issues at Supreme Court – Update for December 11, 2019

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INTERESTING TIMES AT SUPREME COURT

interesting191212Banister: The Supreme Court last week heard oral arguments in Banister v. Davis, the case that asks whether a motion to amend a judgment denying a 28 USC § 2255 motion under F.R.Civ.P. 59(e) constitutes a second-or-successive § 2255 for which prior permission from the court of appeals is necessary under 28 USC § 2244.

Since the 2005 Gonzalez v. Crosby decision, a F.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion to set aside a § 2255 judgment has almost always been considered a second-or-successive § 2255 motion for which prior permission from the court of appeals is necessary. In the last few years, some courts of appeal have also held that even the lowly F.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion to amend a judgment denying a § 2255 motion, which postpones the deadline for filing a notice of appeal, is a second-or-successive § 2255.

This has created a conundrum for § 2255 movants. If you file a Rule 59(e) motion in a § 2255 case, it delays your deadline for appealing. But if the court treats the 59(e) as a second-or-successive § 2255, it will not delay the appeal deadline. Often, by the time you find out the court is treating it as a second-or-successive, your appeal deadline will likely have passed.

By the end of last week’s argument session, there appeared to be at least six votes for the conclusion that prisoner Greg Banister’s Rule 59(e) motion was not a “second-or-successive” habeas petition. And although that result may not ultimately change the outcome of Greg’s quest for collateral post-conviction relief, it would avoid a significant narrowing of appeal rights for federal post-conviction relief.

Holguin-Hernandez: When a defendant asks for a lower sentence than the judge ultimately imposes, does the defendant have to object to the judge’s sentence after it is announced in order to preserve the issue for appellate review?

kabuki191212It always seemed foolish to me that after vigorously arguing a sentencing issue, only to have the court rule against you, you were compelled to renew your objection after the sentence was imposed. It was sort of kabuki theater that served no purpose other than to create a procedural trap for appellants whose trial lawyers had missed making the magical incantation. F.R.Crim.P. 52(b) provides that an error not brought to the trial court’s attention may be reviewed only for “plain error.” On the other hand, Rule 51(b) explains that a “party may preserve a claim of error by informing the court – when the court ruling is made or sought – of the action the party wishes the court to take.”

Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard argument in Holguin-Hernandez v. United States to resolve a circuit split about exactly how these two rules play out against each other in federal sentencings. Holguin-Hernandez raised several claims under 18 USC § 3553(a) at sentencing, and then then appealed his additional 12-month sentence, arguing that it was unreasonable because it was “greater than necessary to effectuate the sentencing goals of … § 3553(a).” But the 5th Circuit held that because Mr. Holguin-Hernandez “failed to raise his challenges in the district court, our review is for plain error only.”

This might look like simple clear error. After all, Mr. Holguin-Hernandez surely did “raise his challenges” below – the court noted that “there is a circuit split” on the appropriate standard of review. In fact, the 5th Circuit has applied the rule that a defendant must register an objection to a sentence after it is imposed since its 2007 decision in United States v. Peltier.

Arguing for Mr. Holguin-Hernandez, attorney Kendall Turner agreed with my view (not that she cited me or anything, but any time a Supreme Court litigator and I make the same cogent argument, I feel good). She pointed out that Rule 51 plainly “tells parties how to preserve claims of error for appeal,” and “[t]here’s no need to tell the court twice.” There is no “practical merit” to a requirement that the defendant must again say “I object,” and, as Turner noted in rebuttal, the “[n]ine courts of appeals” that do not require a repeated objection “show that the Fifth Circuit’s rule is not necessary to the effective functioning of courts.” She emphasized the government’s agreement with this view, and said that the amicus was “tr[ying] to defend the judgment below on alternative grounds” – grounds that Justice Elena Kagan later pointed out are not “what the question presented is.”

slamdunk191212Post-argument commentators suggest the outcome is pretty cut-and-dried. The issue is not whether Mr. Holguin-Hernandez will carry the day, but rather – as Justice Sotomayor asked – how the Court will write its opinion to provide clear guidance to litigants.

Mojica: I am watching a petition for certiorari that is getting some traction. By now, it is clear that a conspiracy to commit a violent crime is not does not support an 18 USC § 924(c) conviction for use of a gun in a crime of violence. Post-conviction attorney Brandon Sample has filed a petition for certiorari arguing that the Supreme Court should resolve the question of whether aiding and abetting a crime of violence, which can be done without committing an act of violence, will support an 18 USC § 924 conviction.

This case has consequences for the crime of attempting to commit a crime of violence as well, and seems to be a logical extension of the implicit United States v. Davis holding last June that a conspiracy to commit a violent crime is not itself violent.

SCOTUSBlog, Argument analysis: Justices seem likely to side with Texas prisoner in important habeas case (Dec. 6)

SCOTUSBlog, Argument preview: Court likely to rule that a defendant preserves appellate challenge to length of sentence merely by arguing for lower one, but precise wording of opinion will be important (Dec. 11)

Mojica v. United States, Case No. 19-35 (Pet. for Certiorari, filed July 2, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Spray Paint and Violence – What is Physical Force Against Property? – Update for September 11, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

10TH CIRCUIT ADDRESSES WHEN FORCE AGAINST PROPERTY IS VIOLENT

giphyOne twist in 18 USC § 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” is that, unlike 18 USC § 16(b) or the Armed Career Criminal Act, the use of physical force under § 924(c) can be either against a person or his property. For a offense to be a “crime of violence,” it must require violent physical force. But when is force against someone’s property “violent physical force?”

Aaron Bowen was convicted of witness intimidation and brandishing a gun while doing so, in violation of 18 USC § 924. The witness intimidation statute, 18 USC § 1513, required that one retaliate against a witness by causing bodily injury to a person or by damaging the person’s property. Aaron filed a post-conviction motion under 28 USC § 2255 arguing that after Johnson and Davis, witness intimidation was not a crime of violence, and cannot support a § 924(c) conviction.

Last week, the 10th Circuit agreed. It first joined other circuits in holding that Davis is retroactive for § 2255 purposes. Because Davis declared § 924(c)’s residual clause unconstitutional, Aaron’s witness intimidation conviction could only support a § 924(c) conviction if it required violent physical force against a person or property.

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The 10th concluded that one could damage property without using violent physical force. It suggested, for example, that “although spray-painting another’s car damages that person’s property, we cannot conclude that the mere fact that it damages property means that it requires ‘violent force’.” Because the statute was not divisible between injuring people and damaging property, and because damaging property does not require violent force, the statute is not a crime of violence. Thus, Aaron’s § 924(c) conviction was thrown out.

United States v. Bowen, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 26554 (10th Cir. Sept. 3, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root