Tag Archives: chevron deference

Supreme Court Teeing Up Some Significant Criminal Law Decisions – Update for January 15, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREMES’ JANUARY LOOKING CONSEQUENTIAL FOR CRIM LAW HOLDINGS

alicewordsmeanhumpty231122The first argument of the current Supreme Court term last October, Pulsifer v. United States, ought to be yielding an opinion in the next few weeks. The First Step Act “safety valve” case – that considers whether “and” means “and” or simply “or” – has increased importance for a lot of people who might otherwise qualify for the zero-point sentence reduction under the new USSG § 4C1.1.

A condition of § 4C1.1 is that “the defendant did not receive an adjustment under § 3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise…” So does that mean the defendant is qualified unless he has a § 3B1.1 adjustment AND a CCE conviction? Or is he disqualified if he has a § 3B1.1 OR a CCE violation? There are a lot of § 3B1.1 enhancements out there, but not nearly as many CCE convictions.

Even without the § 4C1.1 angle, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman said last week in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog that Pulsifer may “prove to be the most interesting and impactful sentencing case from the current SCOTUS Term.”

Meanwhile, other interesting Supreme Court developments are happening largely unseen. Last November, the Court granted review in Erlinger v. United States, a case which asks whether the Constitution requires that a jury (instead of the judge) find beyond a reasonable doubt that an Armed Career Criminal Act defendant’s three predicate offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another.”

May you rest in peace, Betty... stealing America's hearts did not make you ACCA-qualified.
May you rest in peace, Betty… stealing America’s hearts did not make you ACCA-qualified.

(The ACCA, for those who got here late, is a sentencing enhancement contained in 18 USC § 924(e)(2) which provides that the punishment for a felon-in-possession conviction under 18 USC § 922(g) begins with a mandatory 15 years and goes to life imprisonment if the defendant has three prior convictions for serious drug offenses or crimes of violence committed on occasions different from one another. Erlinger explores the collision of those elements with the 6th Amendment: can a judge find the ACCA applies to a felon-in-possession by a simple preponderance of the evidence, or must those elements be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt?)

The curious development in Erlinger is that both the Solicitor General and defendant Erlinger agree that after the Supreme Court adopted the current “standard for determining whether offenses occurred on different occasions [set forth] in Wooden v. United States” in 2022, the issue of whether the predicates were “committed on occasions different from one another” implicates a defendant’s Apprendi v. New Jersey rights to have facts that raise the statutory minimum and maximum must be decided beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.

When both parties in a Supreme Court case agree on how the case should come out, the Court appoints a lawyer to argue the other side. SCOTUS has appointed one in this case, who will file a brief next month opposing the briefs Erlinger and DOJ have already filed.

Erlinger is important not only for the ACCA issue presented but because some on the Court have argued that where an enhanced penalty (like 21 USC § 851 drug enhancements) requires a showing of a prior conviction, due process requires that the fact of the conviction be decided by a jury. The Supremes ruled the other way in the 1998 Almendarez-Torres v. United States decision, a holding that was unaffected by the subsequent Apprendi ruling. Justice Clarence Thomas especially has criticized Almendarez-Torres, believing it is wrong, and the fact of prior convictions should be a jury question. Erlinger may give a holding that is expansive enough to address the Almendarez-Torres holding.

expert160905Last week, the Court heard argument in Smith v. Arizona, addressing whether a defendant’s 6th Amendment right to confront witnesses means that the lab expert who prepared a report on drug purity must be put on the stand to verify the report. Many courts currently permit another expert who did not conduct the test to testify as to drug purity based on the report’s findings.

The  Court seemed sympathetic to Jason Smith, an Arizona prisoner who contends that the expert’s testimony – based on a drug purity test performed by someone who wasn’t present to testify – contravened the 6th Amendment’s confrontation clause, which gives defendants in criminal cases the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.”

Finally, the Court will hear the argument tomorrow in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the case that could end Chevron deference – the notion that courts must defer to agency interpretation of statutes and rules. A change in Chevron deference could affect the Sentencing Guidelines, court deference to agency interpretation of gun laws, and court deference to BOP policies, among other changes.

Sentencing Law and Policy, Top side SCOTUS brief now files in Erlinger v. US, the case considering Apprendi’s application to part of ACCA (January 9, 2024)

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)

Erlinger v. United States, Case No. 23-370 (S.Ct., awaiting decision)

Smith v. Arizona, Case No. 22-899 (S.Ct., argued January 10, 2024)

SCOTUSBlog, Court appears to favor Arizona man’s confrontation clause claim (January 10, 2024)

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, Case No. 22-451 (S.Ct., awaiting argument)

– Thomas L. Root

A Year Later, Banks May Have Started What Chevron Could Finish – Update for November 10, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

FRAUD STORM BREWING OVER 3RD CIRCUIT BANKS RULING?

A defense attorney calls it “really a potential sea change in federal sentencing,” Bloomberg Law reported last week.

Fraud170406A year ago, the 3rd Circuit held in United States v. Banks that the loss enhancement under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1) – the linchpin of economic crimes sentencing – is limited to actual loss. Relying on the 2019 Supreme Court Kisor v. Wilkie decision, the 3rd applied the ordinary meaning of “loss” to determine that § 2B1.1 includes only what was lost because the word “intended” is only mentioned in the § 2B1.1 commentary. The Circuit held that “the loss enhancement in the Guideline’s application notes impermissibly expands the word ‘loss’ to include both intended loss and actual loss.”

Bloomberg reported that the ruling has sparked a debate on how much deference to give the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of its own Guidelines, including the loss scale that can dramatically increase the sentencing range in fraud crimes. The Guideline suggests in the commentary using the greater of actual or intended loss when determining sentences. But the 3rd said the USSC lacked authority to expand the meaning of “loss” to include what was intended but did not happen.

“We are getting these absurd results where nonviolent criminals are getting extraordinary sentences,” one defense attorney told Bloomberg.

loss210312Bloomberg said Banks “could significantly reduce prison time for defendants in securities and commodities cases since it is difficult to figure out actual losses in those situations… It could also impact charging decisions, especially in 3rd Circuit territory, where prosecutors may think twice about devoting resources to cases with small actual losses.”

But in the year since Banks was decided, defense attorneys have had limited success using the decision outside of the 3rd Circuit. In December, an Eastern District of _ichigan court in United States v. McKinney sided with the Banks ruling in a case involving a defendant who pleaded guilty to fraud against JPMorgan Chase. The judge reasoned that she didn’t have to defer to the Sentencing Commission because the definition of loss isn’t “genuinely ambiguous.” Later, the 6th Circuit cast some shade on relying on Banks in United States v. Xiaorong You, holding in a trade secrets theft case that “Banks’s attempt to impose a one-size-fits-all definition is not persuasive” and that the Guidelines commentary is entitled to deference.

Two other circuits, the 1st and 4th Circuits, have declined to take a position. In United States v. Limbaugh, the 4th declined to apply F.R.Crim.P. 52(b) “plain error” to an “intended loss” sentence, holding that the Banks holding “is a new and fast-developing area of the law, and as of now, we do not have the kind of robust consensus in other circuits that would allow us to label as “plain” any error committed here.” The 1st Circuit did the same in United States v. Gadson.

The issue is tied up with a 1993 SCOTUS ruling in Stinson v. United States that held Guidelines commentary is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution, violates a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, the applicable Guideline. The 4th, 6th, 9th, and 11th Circuits all agree with the 3rd’s position that the Supreme Court in Kisor v. Willkie replaced Stinson’s highly deferential standard — to guideline commentary, at least — with a less deferential one.

conspiracy160606However, some other circuit courts have taken the opposite view. The 5th Circuit is the latest, ruling in the en banc United States v. Vargas decision that while the Guidelines are silent on the treatment of conspiracies, its commentary includes them and thus subjects a defendant to increased prison time. In deferring to the commentary, the 5th held that it is bound to follow Stinson, “like night follows day.” Under Stinson, the court went on to explain, the commentary is authoritative unless it is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, the applicable guideline.

Some commentators believe the Supreme Court will need to decide the issue. While SCOTUS has not taken up the issue, it will address Chevron deference this term, and the outcome of that could presage, if not settle, the Banks issue.

Bloomberg Law, Wall Street Fraudsters Rush to Cut Prison Terms With New Ruling (November 1, 2023)

United States v. Banks, 55 F.4th 246 (3d Cir, Nov 30, 2022)

United States v. McKinney, 645 F. Supp. 3d 709 (E.D. Mich. 2022)

United States v. Xiaorong You, 74 F.4th 378 (6th Cir. 2023)

United States v. Limbaugh, No. 21-4449, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 317 (4th Cir., Jan. 6, 2023)

United States v. Gadson, 77 F.4th 16 (1st Cir. 2023)

Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 204 L. Ed. 2d 841 (2019)

Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993)

United States v. Vargas, 77 F.3d 673 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc)

Federalist Society, How Much Should Courts Defer to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Commentary? (August 9, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

No Deference to Flawed BOP Time Credits Rule – Update for October 30, 2023

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BOP SMACKED BY CHEVRON BUT STANDS TOUGH ON DENYING FSA BENEFIT

chevron230508Writing in Forbes last week, Walter Pavlo flagged a First Step Act credit benefit that the Bureau of Prisons has been denying to prisoners except where courts order otherwise. With the Supreme Court primed this term to rein in the Chevron deference doctrine – the judicial rule that courts defer to federal agencies’ interpretation of the statutes they administer – the BOP’s denial of FSA credits until an inmate reaches his or her assigned institution is an excellent case of how even Chevron can ban some BOP overreaching.

The FSA provides that a prisoner “who successfully completes evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities, shall earn time credits” according to a set schedule. Under 18 USC 3632(d)(4)(B), otherwise-eligible prisoners cannot earn FSA credits during official detention before the prisoner’s sentence commences under 18 USC 3585(a).” Section 3585(a) says a “term of imprisonment commences on the date the prisoner is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.”

But the BOP puts its own gloss on the statute, directing in 28 CFR 523.42(a) that “an eligible inmate begins earning FSA Time Credits after the inmate’s term of imprisonment commences (the date the inmate arrives or voluntarily surrenders at the designated Bureau facility where the sentence will be served).”

Any prisoner who has spent weeks or months between sentencing and final delivery to his or her designated institution can see that the BOP rule can create months of FSA credit dead time.

Ash Patel filed a petition for habeas corpus seeking FSA credit from his sentencing in September 2020 until he finally reached his designated institution on the other side of the country in April 2023. The BOP argued his FSA credits only started in April 2023, stripping him of 2.5 years of earnings. The agency cited 28 CFR 523.42(a) and urged the Court to apply Chevron deference, accepting its interpretation of when FSA credits start.

ambiguity161130The Court didn’t buy it. “Because Section 523.42(a) sets a timeline that conflicts with an unambiguous statute, it is not entitled to Chevron deference and the Court must give effect to the statutory text,” the judge wrote, citing Huihui v. Derr where the court held that while the prisoner was not eligible “before her sentence commenced, [] under 18 USC 3632(d)(4)(B)(ii), her ineligibility ended the moment she was sentenced… because FDC had already received her in custody.”

Pavlo cites Yufenyuy v. Warden FCI Berlin, perhaps the first decision to refuse to give Chevron deference to the BOP’s incorrect 28 CFR 523.42(a) rule. He rightly complains that perhaps thousands of other prisoners ‘who were sentenced and have months of time in transit getting to their final designated facility… are currently not getting those credits.” Pavlo notes that “prisoners who have a disagreement with the BOP have access to an administrative remedy process to air their grievances. However, those in the chain of command at the BOP who would review those grievances have no authority within the BOP to award these credits as it deviates from the BOP’s own Program Statement, which remains unchanged… Currently, the only solution is for every prisoner who has this situation is to exhaust the administrative remedy process, something that could take 6-9 months, and go to court to find a judge who agrees with [Yufenyuy], which could take months more.”

Exhaustion170327Not necessarily. The Huihui v. Derr Court excused exhaustion because “further pursuit would be a futile gesture because… there is an error in [the BOPs] understanding of when Petitioner can begin earning credits under 18 USC 3632(d)(4)(B) and 3632(a)… The Court thus concludes that any further administrative review would not preclude the need for judicial review. The Court thus excuses Petitioner’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.”

Forbes, Bureau of Prisons’ Dilemma On First Step Act Credits (October 27, 2023)

Patel v. Barron, Case No C23-937, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174601 (WD Wash., September 28, 2023)

Huihui v. Derr, Case No 22-00541, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106532 (D. Hawaii, June 20, 2023)

Yufenyuy v. Warden FCI Berlin, No. 22-CV-443, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40186 (D.NH, March7, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

The “Closer to Home” Illusion – Update for May 20, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BOP DOES NOT HAVE TO WALK 500 MILES

aardvark190520There is not a single inmate in the federal prison system who would not be willing to walk, roll or crawl 500 miles to be home right now. Any no one on the outside is so hard-hearted that he or she cannot concede that housing inmates close enough to family to permit visits does not help with rehabilitation.

For those reasons (if basic humanity were not enough), the First Step Act’s provision directing the Bureau of Prisons to “place the prisoner in a facility as close as practicable to the prisoner’s primary residence, and to the extent practicable, in a facility within 500 driving miles of that residence,” got a lot of coverage when the bill passed last December.

But just as the media buzz that 4,000-plus inmates were going to be dumped on America’s streets the day after the Act passed was wrong, the giddy hopes that inmates were about to be placed near to their families have been tempered by the realities of what the Act says and what the BOP is willing to do.

There is a usually a separation between promise and reality, sometimes a crack and sometimes a chasm. It is probably worthwhile, therefore, to explain just how little Sec. 601 of the First Step Act really promises families and inmates.

Sec. 601 modified 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) to read that the BOP should try to place prisoners within 500 miles of home. That placement, however, is not required. In fact, it is subject to some pretty big exceptions, being subject to

(1)   bed availability,
(2)   the prisoner’s security designation,
(3)   the prisoner’s programmatic needs,
(4)   the prisoner’s mental and medical health needs,
(5) any request made by the prisoner related to faith-based needs,
(6)  recommendations of the sentencing court, and
(7)  “other security concerns of the” BOP.

Number 7 is a doozy. The placement need not violate a rule, or a BOP program statement, or even a local rule adopted by the sending or receiving prison. It just has to be a “concern.” Whatever that is, it is clearly something to be defined by the BOP.

jello190520Prior to the First Step Act, the BOP required that an inmate be at one institution for at least 18 months, and that he or she have 18 months without a disciplinary report (the BOP called it “clear conduct”) before he or she could be considered for a transfer. Often, transfers were denied because the inmate was deemed to need programming available at his or her current location, or occasionally, because the inmate had skills (a welder, for example, or a GED instructor) the current institution believed it needed to retain. When the transfer came (if it did), the inmate seldom ended up at the institution he or she desired.

In the wake of First Step, however, the BOP is still requiring that an inmate be at one institution for at least 18 months, and that he or she have 18 months without a disciplinary report (the BOP called it “clear conduct”) before he or she could be considered for a transfer. The BOP can still deny transfers for programming needs, perceived mental health needs (which, given the state of mental health treatment in the system, is a hoot), and for lack of bed space (which inmates from years past know to be an excuse that means whatever the BOP wants it to mean). Anything not covered by the foregoing can easily fall within the as-amorphous-as-Jello “security concerns” exception.

But they can’t do that, can they? Of course not. The injured inmate can always that the BOP to court…

Not so fast. Sec. 601 of the First Step Act added a free pass to the BOP: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place of imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.” So you don’t like what the BOP did? You can’t sue, can’t even bring a habeas corpus action, can’t even get on Judge Judy. The directive of § 601, detailed in its mandate and limitations, is completely undone by the last line of § 601, which tells the BOP, “if you don’t follow the law, no one is allowed to call you on it.”

wendys190520Imagine a football game like that, where one team gets a yellow flag repeatedly, with each penalty being marched off for zero yards. Or, my preferred fantasy, a diet on which if you succumb to Wendy’s Peppercorn Mushroom Melt Triple with a side of Baconator Fries and large Coke, the 2,190 calories you consume would not keep you from dropping a pound a day. Sweet deal for the BOP.

If the BOP could be sued, the results would not be much different. Courts traditionally give substantial deference to the judgments of prison administrators. Even restrictive prison regulations are permissible if they are “‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological interests. The BOP would say that its transfer restrictions – like 18 months of clear conduct – serve a legitimate penological goal. The courts, deferring to the BOP’s interpretation of the revised statute and its flexibility granted therein, would undoubtedly accept that.

chevron190520Finally, even without prison-administration deference, courts generally defer to administrative agencies “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules… and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” This is called “Chevron deference,” and – while opponents hope to see the Supreme Court undo it at some point soon – it would easily apply to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) as to how the BOP measures bed availability, security concerns, programming needs and mental and physical health needs.

So if the BOP ignores the Act’s 500-mile placement requirement, there is no remedy. Even if there were, BOP rules on transfer and the exceptions to closer-to-home would probably be unassailable.

Sec. 601, First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-015, 132 Stat. 5208, 5238 (Dec. 21, 2018)

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)

– Thomas L. Root