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5th Circuit Suggests Felon-In-Possession May Sometimes Violate 2nd Amendment – Update for September 23, 2024

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NO GUNS FOR HORSE THIEVES… BUT MAYBE FOR OTHERS

While upholding a felon-in-possession conviction against Ronnie Diaz, the 5th Circuit ruled last week that 18 USC § 922(g)(1) nevertheless may violate the 2nd Amendment in some cases.

grandtheftauth240923

Ron’s conviction was not his first felon-in-possession rodeo. In 2014, he did three years in state prison in 2014 for stealing a car and evading arrest. Four years later, he was caught breaking into a car while carrying a gun and a baggie of meth. He did two years in state for a Texas charge of possessing a firearm as a felon. (Yeah, it’s illegal there, too).

After a November 2020 traffic stop that got kicked up to the Feds, Ron was convicted of 21 USC § 841(a)(1) drug trafficking, an 18 USC 18 USC § 924(c) count for possessing a gun during a drug crime, and a § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession. Ron moved to dismiss the § 922(g)(1) as unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. The district court denied him.

The district court denied Ron’s Bruen motion. Ron appealed, and last week, the 5th Circuit agreed.

Bruen addressed whether a state law severely limiting the right to carry a gun in public violated the 2nd Amendment right to bear arms. When a law limits 2nd Amendment rights, Bruen held, the burden falls on the government to show that the law is “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” This involves addressing “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” In Bruen, the Court held that the plain text of the 2nd Amendment protects the right to bear arms in public for self-defense and that the government had failed to “identify an American tradition” justifying limiting such behavior.

Then in United States v. Rahimi, the Supreme Court last June ruled that 18 USC § 922(g)(8) – that prohibits people under domestic protection orders from having guns – passed the Bruen test. Comparing § 922(g)(8) to colonial “surety and going armed” laws that prohibited people from “riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons to terrify the good people of the land,” the Supreme Court held that § 922(g)(8) was analogous to such laws,  only applied once a court has found that the defendant “represents a credible threat to the physical safety” and only applied only while a restraining order is in place.

Violating the “surety and going armed” laws could result in imprisonment. The 5th said that “if imprisonment was permissible to respond to the use of guns to threaten the physical safety of others, then the lesser restriction of temporary disarmament that § 922(g)(8) imposes is also permissible.”

horsethief240923The 5th noted that “felony” is much too malleable a term to serve as a basis for deciding § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality. Instead, it compared each of Ron’s prior convictions to colonial laws. Stealing a car, the Circuit decided, was analogous to colonial laws against horse thievery, and horse thieves in colonial America “were often subject to the death penalty.” Such laws “establish that our country has a historical tradition of severely punishing people like Diaz who have been convicted of theft,” meaning that a permanent prohibition on possessing guns passes 2nd Amendment muster.

“Taken together,” the Circuit said, “laws authorizing severe punishments for thievery and permanent disarmament in other cases establish that our tradition of firearm regulation supports the application of § 922(g)(1) to Diaz.”

Considering the obverse, the Diaz opinion suggests that other offenses unknown in colonial times – like selling drugs, downloading child porn, securities fraud, or conspiracy to do anything illegal – could not trigger the felon-in-possession statute consistent with the 2nd Amendment. Requiring a court to parse a defendant’s priors in order to convict him of a § 922(g)(1) would make a confusing hash of any felon-in-possession case.

Writing in his Sentencing Policy and Law blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman observed that “the 8th Circuit has categorically rejected 2nd Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1)… whereas the 6th Circuit has upheld this law “as applied to dangerous people.” The 5th Circuit has now upheld the law… based on the fact that there were Founding era laws ‘authorizing severe punishments for thievery and permanent disarmament in other cases’… [T]he fact that three circuits have taken three different approaches to this (frequently litigated) issue is yet another signal that this matter will likely have to be taken up by SCOTUS sooner rather than later.”

United States v. Diaz, Case No. 23-50452, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 23725 (5th Cir., September 18, 2024)

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)

United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 219 L. Ed. 2d 351 (2024)

Sentencing Policy and the Law, Fifth Circuit panel rejects Second Amendment challenge to federal felon in possession for defendant with prior car theft offense (September 20, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Felon-In-Possession 2nd Amendment Challenges Are Trending – Update for September 20, 2024

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922(g) FELON IN POSSESSION CHALLENGES EXPLODE AFTER BRUEN

The Trace reported last week that 55% of over 2,000 federal court decisions citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen over the past two years have challenged the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)’s ban on felons possessing guns and ammo, “making it the single most frequently contested statute by far.”

guns200304The latest example was handed down two days ago in United States v. Diaz. In that case, the 5th Circuit ruled that just being a felon was insufficient to make the application of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) consistent with the Second Amendment. But where the defendant had been convicted of a felony of theft, that “would have led to capital punishment or estate forfeiture” at the time the Second Amendment was ratified, “disarming [the defendant] fits within this tradition of serious and permanent punishment” and is thus constitutionally applied.

I will write more about Diaz on Monday. For now, back to the trendline:

The Trace reported that “at least 30 of the challenges to the felon gun ban have succeeded. While that ratio may seem small, it marks a stark departure from the past, when effectively none succeeded, and it shows that Bruen has cracked the longstanding consensus that people convicted of serious crimes may constitutionally be barred from gun ownership.”

When weighing the felon gun ban, judges have distinguished between violent and nonviolent offenses. But a former prosecutor told The Trace (an unapologetically anti-gun publication), that drawing the line is tough. “Who’s dangerous? What is your definition of dangerous? It’s easier to have a bright line. But that bright line is gone.”

Andrew Willinger, the executive director of the Duke Center for Firearms Law – which disseminates and supports reliable, balanced, and insightful scholarship and programming on firearms law – said it remains unclear whether banning gun possession among entire categories of people, like felons, is constitutional, particularly when their convictions were for nonviolent offenses that posed no obvious danger to the public.

“You’re really talking about categorical group determinations, rather than any kind of individualized finding of a threat of danger,” Willinger said. “And [United States v.] Rahimi doesn’t endorse [categorical prohibitions], but it also doesn’t rule them out, right?”

gun160711No one can know how the Supreme Court will rule when the felon gun ban finally gets to the high court, although no one can doubt that it will. When Justice Amy Coney Barrett was a 7th Circuit judge, she wrote a dissent favoring restoration of gun rights to nonviolent felons. “That is probably the direction that the Supreme Court is headed if and when it takes up these cases,” Willinger said, “which I think it probably has to do at some point in the near future.”

The Trace, More Than a Thousand Felons Have Challenged Their Gun Bans Since the Supreme Court’s Bruen Decision (September 12, 2024)

United States v. Diaz, Case No. 23-50452, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 23725 (5th Cir., September 18, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Open Season on Gun Laws – Update for August 13, 2024

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FURBALL OVER SECOND AMENDMENT CONTINUES

lotsalaw240813As a young pup in law school a half-century ago, I had a contract law professor, Robert J, Nordstrom, who was as theatrical as he was brilliant. One day while discussing an obscure point of contract law, he dramatically waved his arm in the general direction of the law library and said, “Remember, people, there’s enough law in there for everybody.”

I got his point. A canny lawyer could find a decision somewhere in the law books that supported whatever position – however ridiculous – he or she wanted to take. Turns out that the same is true of history.

After New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, lawyers stampeded to the history books to find evidence that the many statutes regulating guns on the federal and state books had 18th and 19th-century precedents. Then, last June’s United States v. Rahimi decision relaxed the Bruen standard a bit, clarifying that the historical regulation didn’t have to be identical, just analogous.

In other words, the history doesn’t have to fit exactly. It just has to sort of fit. What’s more, in the fitting, the courts can draw such conclusions as they wish. The results are a pastiche of contradictions. For instance, AR-15s can be banned in Maryland but not in New Jersey.

In the last two weeks alone

• the 8th Circuit quickly upheld its decision that 18 USC § 922(g)(1) did not violate the 2nd Amendment when applied to a defendant previously convicted of a drug offense. The case had been appealed to the Supreme Court but was remanded for the Circuit to reconsider it in light of Rahimi. The Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court said in District of Columbia v. Heller that nothing has “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” and that neither Bruen nor Rahimi nor historical analysis changed that.

United States v. Jackson, Case No. 22-2870, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19868 (8th Cir., Aug. 8, 2024)

• the 11th Circuit ruled that neither Bruen nor Rahimi “abrogate[d] our previous holding that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the 2nd Amendment because “felons are categorically ‘disqualified’ from representing their 2nd Amendment right under Heller.”

United States v. Lowe, Case No. 22-13251, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19494 (11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024)

minuteman240813• the 4th Circuit upheld Maryland’s ban on “assault weapons,” concluding that guns such as the popular AR-15 platform (perhaps 25 million copies in civilian hands in the United States) are outside 2nd Amendment protection because they are “military-style weapons designed for sustained combat operations that are ill-suited and disproportionate to the need for self-defense.” The Circuit cited Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769) that noted existing prohibitions on “riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, which would terrify the good people of the land.”

Bianchi v. Brown, Case No. 21-1255, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19624 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024)

• on July 30, the US District Court for New Jersey ruled that the state’s AR-15 platform ban violated the 2nd Amendment because the style of rifle is commonly owned throughout the United States and well-adapted for self-defense.

Association of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc., v. Platkin, Case No. 18-10507, 2024 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 134737, (D.N.J., July 30, 2024)

• In the same week, the 4th ruled that 18 USC § 922(k) – which outlaws possession of a gun with an obliterated serial number – did not violate the 2nd Amendment. The Circuit said that because “we cannot fathom any common-sense reason for a law-abiding citizen to want to use a firearm with an obliterated serial number for self-defense, and there is no evidence before us that they are nonetheless commonly lawfully used, we conclude that firearms with obliterated serial numbers are not in common use for a lawful purpose and they therefore fall outside the scope of the 2nd Amendment’s protection.”

United States v. Price, Case No. 22-4609, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19623 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024)

furball240813The more we see the Bruen standard applied, the confusing-er it gets. The Rahimi holding, at least this early in the game, does not seem to have helped a lot.

Professor Nordstrom might have said, “There’s enough history out there for everyone.”

Pick your facts and make your holdings.

– Thomas L. Root

Clues to Rahimi Application Pop Up in Circuit 922(g) Decisions – Update for August 5, 2024

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A PAIR OF § 922(g)(1) CASES

gunfight230919I remain convinced that the Supreme Court’s United States v. Rahimi decision — banning gun possession for an individual who has shown himself to be dangerous is historically justified under the Second Amendment — represents a necessary correction to the wild, wild west of gun rights suggested by Justice Thomas’s New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen opinion. In fact, I suspect that Rahimi makes it more likely that people convicted of nonviolent felonies will regain their Second Amendment rights in the next two years.

Two cases decided last week may hint at how courts will approach a post-Rahimi felon-in-possession world.

Carl Langston was convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun under 18 USC § 922(g)(1) after a drunken brawl at a bar. He pled guilty but, on appeal, argued for the first time that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen as applied to him.

Last Friday, the 1st Circuit upheld his conviction. The Circuit applied the F.R.Crim.P. 52(b) plain error standard to review because Carl hadn’t raised the issue in the trial court and found that his argument failed because (1) no prior Supreme Court or 1st Circuit holds that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional “in any of its applications;” and (2) Rahimi “does not compel the conclusion that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to defendants with Hugh’s criminal history.

gun160711In fact, the 1st observed, “rather than compelling the conclusion that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment cases consistently reiterate, albeit in dicta, the presumptive lawfulness of the felon-in-possession statute… The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Rahimi, joined by eight justices, once again identified prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons as ‘presumptively lawful’.”

It’s hard to win a “plain error” appeal, as Carl found out. However, the Circuit conceded that Carl’s appeal

presents a serious constitutional claim that the Supreme Court has not yet resolved. As Langston points out, Rahimi held only that an individual may be temporarily disarmed, consistent with the Second Amendment, if a court has found that the individual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of another. Still, the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly over sixteen years, from [District of Columbia v] Heller to Rahimi, that felon-in-possession laws are presumptively lawful. Thus, on plain-error review, we cannot agree with Carl that the mere fact that the government did not introduce historical evidence to support the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) makes it clear and obvious that his conviction violates the Second Amendment.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Circuit ruled that Dionti Moore, who used his fiancée’s handgun to frighten off intruders at her home while he was on supervised release, had no Second Amendment defense to a § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession conviction.

The Circuit relied on Rahimi’s holding that it had to find that § 922(g)(1), as applied to Dionti, is “relevantly similar to laws that our tradition is understood to permit… [and that] why and how the regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry… In other words, a modern firearms regulation passes constitutional muster only if it is “consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.”

Comparing 18th and 19th-century laws to disarming a convicted felon while on supervised release, the 3rd ruled that “the bottom line is this: during the founding era, forfeiture laws temporarily disarmed citizens who had committed a wide range of crimes… This historical practice of disarming a convict during his sentence — or as part of the process of qualifying for pardon — is like temporarily disarming a convict on supervised release. After all, the defendant receives a term of supervised release thanks to his initial offense, and… it constitutes a part of the final sentence for his crime’” (quoting the Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Haymond). The Circuit concluded that “[c]onsistent with our Nation’s history and tradition of firearms regulation, we hold that convicts may be disarmed while serving their sentences on supervised release.”

Of course, the Court’s focus on “temporarily” disarming and “disarm[ing] while serving their sentences on supervised release” can easily be read to infer that permanently disarming someone with a felony conviction on his record is a different matter altogether.  

gunfreezone170330One would expect nothing less from the Circuit that handed down the en banc Range v. Attorney General decision, which is currently in front of the 3rd Circuit on remand.  Incidentally, supplemental briefs by both Bryan Range and the government were filed last Friday, suggesting a new decision is on the fast track in Philadelphia. There is little doubt that whatever the decision, it will end up again at the Supreme Court.

United States v. Langston, Case No. 23-1337, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19353 (1st Cir. Aug 2, 2024)

United States v. Moore, Case No. 23-1843, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19282 (3d Cir. Aug 2, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Deja Vu for the Second Amendment at the 9th Circuit – Update for July 23, 2024

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9TH CIRCUIT ‘GROUNDHOGS’ DUARTE GUN DECISION

groundhogday240723You may recall that in May, a 9th Circuit three-judge panel held that the 18 USC § 922(g)(1) ban on felons possessing guns was held to violate the Second Amendment rights of a guy convicted of drug trafficking.

Last week, the Circuit withdrew the opinion and set the case for en banc review.

In an unusual and entertaining “dissental” from grant of review, 9th Circuit Judge Lawrence VanDyke wrote,

What would you do if you were stuck in one place and every day was exactly the same, and nothing that you did mattered?’ In the Ninth Circuit, if a panel upholds a party’s Second Amendment rights, it follows automatically that the case will be taken en banc. This case bends to that law. I continue to dissent from this court’s Groundhog Day approach to the Second Amendment.

Judge VanDyke only wrote what everyone already knows to be true. “In this circuit,” he said of the 9th, “you could say that roughly two-fifths of our judges are interested in faithfully applying the totality of the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment precedent when analyzing new issues that have not yet been directly addressed by the Court. The other 17/29ths of our bench is doing its best to avoid the Court’s guidance and subvert its approach to the Second Amendment. That is patently obvious to anyone paying attention. To say it out loud is shocking only because judges rarely say such things out loud….”

Meanwhile, the 8th Circuit last week struck down a Minnesota law preventing 18-to-20-year-olds from carrying handguns in public. The case, Worth v. Jacobson, is noteworthy for its application of United States v. Rahimi: “Minnesota states that from the founding, states have had the power to regulate guns in the hands of irresponsible or dangerous groups, such as 18 to 20-year-olds,” the Circuit wrote. “At the step one ‘plain text’ analysis, a claim that a group is ‘irresponsible’ or ‘dangerous’ does not remove them from the definition of the people.”

groundhogs240723

The 8th ruled that “a legislature’s ability to deem a category of people dangerous based only on belief would subjugate the right to bear arms “in public for self-defense” to “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees,” citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and Rahimi.

The decision leaves little doubt that the 8th sees a ban on the entire category of people once convicted of felonies to be equally untenable under the Second Amendment. What this portends for the inevitable Supreme Court showdown on § 922(g)(1) depends in large part on the Third Circuit in Range and the Ninth’s rewrite of Duarte.

United States v. Duarte, Case No. 22-50048, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17601 (9th Cir., July 17, 2024)

Worth v. Jacobson, Case No. 23-2248, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17347 (8th Cir. July 16, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Felon-in-Possession Constitutionality Decision May Be Within ‘Range’ – Update for June 28, 2024

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GOVERNMENT WANTS DEFINITIVE 2ND AMENDMENT FELON-IN-POSSESSION RULING NOW

gunknot181009The pundits sprouted like mushrooms after a rain shower this past week, making all manner of interpretations and predictions on the future of the 2nd Amendment in the wake of the Supreme Court’s United States v. Rahimi decision.

“The Court has endorsed taking guns from convicted felons, a category that now includes Donald Trump,” wrongly declared the New Yorker.

“One of the first things that’s going to happen is that the Supreme Court is going to take up a bunch of lower-court decisions on the 2nd Amendment, vacate them, send them back down for reconsideration in light of Rahimi. So we’re about to get a spate of second bites at the apple from the lower courts trying to apply this,” predicted Slate.

“The majority repeated Heller’s statement that “prohibitions… on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill’ are ‘presumptively lawful’… This suggests that the Court remains generally open to those restrictions… I expect that the Court will send Range back to the 3rd Circuit for further consideration in light of Rahimi; we’ll see what the 3rd Circuit judges say on remand,” UCLA law prof Eugene Volokh wrote in Reason.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman asked whether, in Rahimi’s wake, Donald Trump (a convicted felon subject to 18 USC 922(g)(1)) or Hunter Biden (a drug abuser when he bought his gun subject to 18 USC 922(g)(3)) can constitutionally be barred from firearm possession:

I do not believe Donald Trump or Hunter Biden “poses a clear threat of physical violence to another,” and § 922(g)(1) notably serves to permanently disarm anyone with a felony conviction. Further, the federal government has, since Bruen, generally argued for the constitutionality of 922(g)(1) based on the notion that only “responsible” individuals have 2nd Amendment rights. The Rahimi court directly and expressly rejected that notion. But still, as we saw before in 2nd Amendment cases like Heller and McDonald, the Court in Rahimi seems to still embrace dicta that can be read to suggest that the very broad criminal prohibition set forth in 18 USC § 922(g)(1) is still constitutional.

William & Mary law professor Kami Chavis wrote, “Although the court upheld Section 922(g)(8)… barriers to other attempts to implement modern gun regulations likely remain.”

iloveguns221018After the pundits all pontificated, the Solicitor General checked in last Monday, filing a surprising supplemental brief in Garland v. Range that asked the Court to quickly grant cert in a “range” of felon-in-possession cases to clarify who it can disarm under § 922(g)(1) consistent with the 2nd Amendment.

Specifically, SG Elizabeth Prelogar has asked SCOTUS to review some or all five separate pending cases dealing with the federal gun ban for felonies of varying severity. She argued that “we believe [the Court] should grant plenary review to resolve Section 922(g)(1)‘s constitutionality… Although this Court’s decision in Rahimi corrects some of the methodological errors made by courts that have held Section 922(g)(1) invalid, it is unlikely to fully resolve the existing conflict.”

The government argues that the conflict is important. Out of about 64,000 criminal cases reported to the Sentencing Commission in Fiscal Year 2022, more than 7,600 were § 922(g)(1) cases, 12% of all federal criminal cases.

It seems that just about everyone expected a spate of GVR orders on pending petitions for cert. (A GVR is a single-sentence order in which the Supreme Court grants certiorari, vacates the appellate court decision, and remands the case for further consideration in light of a new SCOTUS decision, in this case, Rahimi).

The government’s supplemental brief argues that “a GVR order is inappropriate if the delay and further cost entailed in a remand are not justified by the potential benefits of further consideration by the lower court. In our view, that is the case here. Section 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality has divided courts of appeals and district courts. Although this Court’s decision in Rahimi corrects some of the methodological errors made by courts that have held Section 922(g)(1) invalid, it is unlikely to fully resolve the existing conflict. And given the frequency with which the government brings criminal cases under Section 922(g)(1), the substantial costs of prolonging uncertainty about the statute’s constitutionality outweigh any benefits of further percolation. Under these circumstances, the better course would be to grant plenary review now.”

gun160711The government recommends that SCOTUS grant cert on multiple cases to be heard in one ultimate felon-in-possession case, including Doss v. United States (whether applying felon-in-possession is constitutional where the petitioner has “a lengthy criminal record” that “includes over 20 convictions, many of them violent”) and Jackson v. United States (petitioner has “previous felony convictions for non-violent drug crimes”). The government also asked that the Court add to the mix either Range v. Attorney General (3rd Circuit held 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to a man convicted of food-stamp fraud from 25 years before) or Vincent v. United States (10th Circuit held 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to addicted woman convicted of bank fraud 15 years before but now drug-free and running large charity).

As for Range and Vincent, the Government argues that “[g]ranting review in one of those cases would enable this Court to consider Section 922(g)(1)’s application to non-drug, non-violent crimes.”

A statement in the supplemental brief suggests the Government may have concluded that Rahimi means that it cannot win arguing that 922(g)(1) is constitutional in all circumstances. SG Preloger says that granting “review in cases involving different types of predicate felonies” would “enable the Court to consider Section 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality across a range of circumstances that are fully representative of the statute’s applications.”

guns170111If the government were convinced that it can defend 922(g)(1) in all circumstances, it would be happy with certiorari in either Range or Vincent, because winning on either of those cases would establish that 922(g)(1) is constitutional and thus immune to an “as applied” challenge. The fact that the government suggests that the Court hear swath of cases with defendants ranging from saint to sinner implies that the SG has conceded that the “as applied” constitutional line is going to fall somewhere in between Mr. Doss and Ms. Vincent.

Such a conclusion is almost foreordained by the Rahimi court’s warning that its Rahimi ruling is narrow:

Our resolution of Mr. Rahimi’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(8) necessarily leaves open the question whether the statute might be unconstitutional as applied in particular circumstances… We do not decide today whether the government may disarm a person without a judicial finding that he poses a “credible threat” to another’s physical safety… We do not resolve whether the government may disarm an individual permanently… We do not determine whether § 922(g)(8) may be constitutionally enforced against a person who uses a firearm in self-defense… Nor do we purport to approve in advance other laws denying firearms on a categorical basis to any group of persons a legislature happens to deem, as the government puts it, “not ‘responsible.’”

The Court will accept the SG’s invitation, if at all, early next week (although the Solicitor General has substantial influence with the Court). If the Supremes do take the cases, it will move up by at least a year the time we’ll have a definitive ruling on the constitutional limits of the felon-in-possession statute.

United States v. Rahimi, Case No 22-915, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2714 (June 21, 2024)

United States v. Doss, Case No. 22-3662, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 31748 (8th Cir. Dec. 1, 2023)

United States v. Jackson, 69 F.4th 495 (8th Cir. 2023)

Vincent v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1197 (10th Cir. 2023)

Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023)

Supplemental Brief, Garland v. Range, Case No. 23-374

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)

New Yorker, The Supreme Court Steps Back From the Brink on Guns (June 22, 2024)

Slate, John Roberts Tried to Clean Up Clarence Thomas’ Mess. He May Have Invited More Chaos (June 24, 2024)

Reason, Some Takeaways from Today’s Rahimi 2nd Amendment Opinions (June 21, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, After Rahimi, can Donald Trump legally possess a gun? How about Hunter Biden? (June 24, 2024)

Bloomberg Law, Narrow Gun Opinion Says Law Not in ‘Amber,’ But History Rules (June 25, 2024)

The Reload, DOJ Asks Supreme Court to Resolve Question of Gun Rights for Felons (June 25, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

What Does Rahimi Mean for 922(g)(1) Constitutionality? – Update For June 24, 2024

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WHITHER RAHIMI?

No one who paid any attention to Zackey Rahimi’s case doubted for a moment that the Supreme Court would find a way to uphold the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(8), the subsection of the felon-in-possession statute that prohibited people subject to domestic protection orders (DPO) from possessing guns.

Old Zackey is 87 miles of bad track, a bad boy’s bad boy. He was hit with a DPO for bouncing his girlfriend’s face off his car’s dashboard. After the DPO was issued, Zackey kept harassing her anyway, For good measure, he also shot at another car in an unrelated road rage incident and opened fire at a What-a-Burger when his friend’s credit card was declined. Zack is not a sympathetic defendant.

whataburger230703On Friday, the Supreme Court upheld § 922(g)(8) (at least as it had been applied to Zack), concluding that the nation’s “tradition of firearm regulation allows the Government to disarm individuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety of others.”

The 8-1 majority (Justice Thomas dissenting) observed that “some courts have misunderstood the methodology of our recent Second Amendment cases,” meaning New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The Court cautioned against taking too rigid a view of the historical tradition of gun regulation that Bruen requires to be found in order to hold that a firearm statute is consistent with the Second Amendment. Instead, courts should look at whether the modern law being challenged is “relevantly similar” to historical regulations “in both why and how it burdens the Second Amendment right. Section 922(g)(8) restricts gun use to check demonstrated threats of physical violence, just as the [colonial-era] surety and going armed laws do. Unlike the regulation struck down in Bruen, Section 922(g)(8) does not broadly restrict arms use by the public generally.”

SCOTUS held that courts should focus on the purpose of the regulation and the burden that it places on the Second Amendment right to bear arms. “For example,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “if laws at the founding regulated firearm use to address particular problems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within a permissible category of regulations.”

Zack challenged 922(g)(8)’s facial constitutionality – that is, he argued that the law is always unconstitutional – rather than arguing it was unconstitutional “as applied” to Zack’s situation. That probably was the better of a bad choice, because an “as applied” challenge would have focused on Zack, whose personal history was terrible. The Court, ruling that 922(g)(8) was not facially unconstitutional, had no problem concluding that “Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to the facts of Rahimi’s own case.”

rahimishirt240624The Rahimi majority opinion (before the five concurring opinions and one dissent), ends with before now, “this Court did not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis… of the full scope of the Second Amendment. Nor do we do so today. Rather, we conclude only this: An individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.” (Emphasis added by me).

Ohio State law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Policy and Law blog, observed that the closing ‘only this’ statement “leads me to think that litigation over the Second Amendment is not going to get much easier for lower courts after this ruling.”

The Washington Post said, “The decision was limited in scope, leaving for another day more difficult questions about the viability of other gun-control measures, such as… restrictions on gun possession by nonviolent offenders.” USA Today said the decision doesn’t foreshadow how Rahimi’s more flexible approach in applying history “will be applied to other restrictions such as prohibiting non-violent felons from having guns, according to Joseph Blocher, co-director of the Center for Firearms Law at Duke University School of Law.”

irresponsible240624Rahimi leaves us with almost as many questions about the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) — the actual felon-in-possession subsection — as we had before last Friday’s decision. There are few hints in the opinion, although SCOTUS did unanimously reject the government’s argument that Zack could be deprived of his right to have a gun because he is not a “responsible” citizen.

Arguments that convicted felons are not “responsible” citizens have been government mainstays in contending that § 922(g)(1) is consistent with Bruen. “‘Responsible’,” Roberts wrote, “is a vague term. It is unclear what such a rule would entail, and there is no support for such a rule in the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment cases.”

UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh wrote in Reason that

The majority repeated Heller’s statement that “prohibitions… on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill’ are ‘presumptively lawful’… This suggests that the Court remains generally open to those restrictions, even though it turns out such restrictions actually lack a long historical pedigree.

At the same time, perhaps there is some room after Rahimi for this “presumpti[on]” to be rebutted with regard to people convicted of felonies that don’t suggest a “credible threat to the physical safety of others,” especially if those felonies are part of the well-post-[18th century] increase in the number of nonviolent crimes that are classified as felonies. A few courts have so concluded (to oversimplify slightly); US v Range… is one example. I expect that the Court will send Range back to the 3rd Circuit for further consideration in light of Rahimi; we’ll see what the 3rd Circuit judges say on remand.

violent160620A commentator on the Sentencing Law and Policy site suggested that “in 922(g)(1) cases the court is going to have to draw a line between white-collar offenders who present no danger and felons convicted of assault and felons convicted of drug trafficking (an offense that, in a particular case may not involve violence, but presents an enormous risk of gun violence).”

For now, look to Range and other similar cases to be remanded and for the 9th Circuit to rehear Duarte (for which a petition for rehearing is now pending).

United States v. Rahimi, Case No 22-915, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2714 (June 21, 2024)

SCOTUSBlog, Supreme Court upholds bar on guns under domestic-violence restraining orders (June 21, 2024)

Washington Post, Supreme Court upholds gun ban for domestic violence restraining orders (June 21, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Supreme Court, by an 8-1 vote, rejects Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(8) (June 21, 2024)

Reason, Some Takeaways from Today’s Rahimi Second Amendment Opinions (June 21, 2024)

USA Today, Supreme Court upholds law banning domestic abusers from owning guns (June 21, 2024)

United States v. Duarte, 101 F.4th 657 (9th Cir, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Hallelujah! It’s Blog Post No. 1600 – Update for June 13, 2024

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1600240613For those of you keeping score—and I’m probably the only one—today’s installment is the 1,600th since I began posting news and comment on federal criminal justice issues back in 2015.

It’s probably not significant. If we had a Base 16 number system, it would only be Post 640. But the subject of this blog doesn’t often give us a reason to celebrate, so we had better take our wins where we find them.

SOMETHING IN THE AIR

thunderclap240613If you remember Thunderclap Newman’s single hit “Something in the Air” (1969)—like I do—you’re getting too old. The band was singing about the revolution, which, of course, never arrived, but a lot of us are thinking that something may be in the air about the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute before the month of June comes to a close.

United States v. Rahimi, the decision everyone’s waiting for, doesn’t deal with felon-in-possession at all, but rather subsection 8 of 18 USC § 922(g). That subsection prohibits someone subject to a court-imposed domestic protection order from possessing a gun or ammo. But in the wake of New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, a 2022 SCOTUS decision, it is likely that § 922(g)–which bans a whole list of people from felons to drug users to illegal aliens to people with DPOs from having guns–violates the 2nd Amendment.

That would be good news for Hunter Biden.

nickdanger220426It might be good news for a lot of people. The belief is that the Court will modify Bruen to add some “dangerousness” exception so that people who are proven to be dangerous with a gun can be prohibited. Such a decision would suggest that convicted felons who don’t have a history of dangerousness would not be subject to § 922(g)(1).

Some statutes are unconstitutional on their face, such as one, for example, that made insulting the President a felony. But others are only unconstitutional when applied to certain situations. The § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession was unconstitutional when applied to Bryan Range, who had a single pretty minor food stamp felony that was 25 years old. The same statute might not be unconstitutional if applied to the Unabomber.

Zavien Canada was convicted of a § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession, On appeal, he argued that his “felon-in-possession” offense should be thrown out because § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional. Last week, the 4th Circuit cautiously rejected the argument, noting that there is something in the air.

“The law of the Second Amendment is in flux,” the 4th held, “and courts (including this one) are grappling with many difficult questions in the wake of Bruen. But the facial constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) is not one of them. Indeed, no federal appellate court has held that Section 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional, and we will not be the first.”

gun160711The Circuit went on to suggest that if Zavien had raised an “as applied” challenge—that the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional as applied to his situation—the outcome might have been different: “Our decision is narrow. Because Canada has expressly disclaimed any sort of as-applied challenge, we “may” simply “assume for the sake of argument that there is some room for as-applied challenges” to Section 922(g)(1)…”

Rahimi will not settle the felon-in-possession debate, however the decision goes. However, it is likely to be a nail in the coffin (and a fairly large nail at that) for the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute.

United States v. Canada, Case No. 22-4519, 2024 USApp LEXIS 13271 (4th Cir. June 3, 2024)

New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn, Inc v. Bruen, 597 US 1 (2022).

– Thomas L. Root

Duck Hunting With Steve Duarte – Update for May 21, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE FUTURE OF GUNS

duckhunting240521I got an email last week from a Georgia friend who’s been home for about eight years from serving a 30-year on a crack conspiracy, asking whether it was true that an appeals court said he could once again own a shotgun and pursue his passion for duck hunting (a passion not shared by the ducks themselves).

I explained that what he had read about, the 9th Circuit’s United States v. Duarte decision, did not necessarily say that and–even if it had–the last word hasn’t yet been written about the 2nd Amendment and 18 USC § 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession statute.

The May 9th Duarte decision had a 3-judge panel split 2-1, with the majority holding that the 2nd Amendment does not necessarily exclude people formerly convicted of felonies: New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen’s “scattered references to ‘law-abiding’ and ‘responsible’ citizens did not implicitly decide the issue in this case., the Court said. In the 2008 District of Columbia v. Heller decision, the Supreme Court made passing reference to the “presumptive[] lawful[ness]” of felon firearm bans, but the Duarte majority said the presumption “will no longer do after Bruen,” given Bruen’s call for a historical analysis and that the “felon firearm ban[] was never an issue the Heller Court purported to resolve.”

Eugene Volokh, a constitutional law professor at UCLA, told Courthouse News Service that Duarte “is a shift in Ninth Circuit law, and it differs from the view adopted by many circuits… However, it’s similar to what the Philadelphia-based 3rd Circuit decided last year in Range v. Attorney General.“

gunknot181009Duarte leaves open the possibility that felons convicted of violent crimes could still be prohibited from owning firearms. What’s more, the government wasted no time, last week filing a Petition for Rehearing En Banc and for Expedited Order Vacating Panel Opinion that asks the 9th Circuit for en banc review of Duarte. Appellant Steve Duarte has been ordered to file an opposition by May 30th.

En banc review may be put on hold pending the Supreme Court decision in the United States v. Rahimi decision, due any time before the end of June. The Rahimi case considers the constitutionality of a law banning gun possession by people subject to domestic violence restraining orders. Volokh said, “The question in Rahimi and the question in this case aren’t identical, but they share considerable similarities.”

gun160711For now, both Range and Duarte are “as applied” cases, not holding that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face, that is, in every circumstance, but rather only “as applied to the one’s own particular conduct.” In Range, the petitioner had been convicted 25 years before on a food-stamp misdemeanor that carried a possible 2-year sentence (and thus fell under § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition). The Duarte majority held that the defendant lacked any violent crime conviction (despite the fact that one of his priors was for fleeing and eluding, which sounds like more than a simple jaywalking to avoid a cop on the same sidewalk Steve was on).

The § 922(g)(1) tide may be turning, but no one should feel as though it’s open season on gun ownership just yet, or–more to the point–that a felon-in-possession conviction is open to a successful constitutional attack.

Reason, Volokh: Ninth Circuit Panel Concludes That Some Felons May Have Second Amendment Rights (May 9, 2024)

Courthouse News Service, 9th Circuit finds that convicted felons also have Second Amendment rights (May 9, 2024)

Ammoland, Court Finds Convicted Felons have Second Amendment Rights (May 15, 2024)

New York Law Review, The Dog That Didn’t Bark Is Rewriting the Second Amendment (May 5, 2024)

ABA Journal, Ban on gun possession by felons is unconstitutional as applied to some offenders, 9th Circuit rules (May 13, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Ninth Circuit Says 922(g)(1) Unconstitutional for Nonviolent Felons – Update for May 13, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

9th CIRCUIT HOLDS NONVIOLENT FELONS MAY POSSESS GUNS

A 9th Circuit panel held 2-1 last week that a defendant with five prior nonviolent felony convictions was not subject to 18 USC § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on possessing guns or ammo under the Second Amendment.

In what may be the biggest Second Amendment ruling since the 3rd Circuit’s Range v. Attorney General decision last June, the 9th found that the Supreme Court’s New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen decision of 2022 means that § 922(g)(1)’s application to people with nonviolent felony convictions violates the Constitution.

throwgun240513Steve Duarte had five prior felony convictions for fleeing and eluding, possession of a controlled substance, and California’s own  felon-in-possession law when the police pulled him over for erratic driving. Naturally, Steve fled (it had worked so well for him before), and just as naturally, the police caught him. But before he was finally pulled over, Steve tossed a handgun from the car window.

The police recovered both the gun and Steve. The Feds picked up the case, with Steve being charged federally with § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession. 

Steve went to trial and lost. But after Bruen was decided while his appeal was pending, Steve argued that his conviction was unconstitutional. He maintained that under Bruen, § 922(g)(1) “violates the Second Amendment as applied to him, a non-violent offender who has served his time in prison and reentered society.”

The 9th Circuit rejected its 2010 United States v. Vongxay holding that the Second Amendment doesn’t invalidate laws prohibiting convicted felons from possessing guns: “Vongxay is clearly irreconcilable with Bruen and therefore no longer controls because Vongxay held that § 922(g)(1) comported with the Second Amendment without applying the mode of analysis that Bruen later established and now requires courts to perform. Bruen instructs us to assess all Second Amendment challenges through the dual lenses of text and history….”

kidgun240125Applying Bruen, the 9th held that the handgun was an “arm” and Steve’s reason for carrying it–self-defense–“falls within the Second Amendment’s plain language.” The Circuit rejected the Government’s contention that the Second Amendment’s term “the people” excluded convicted felons “because they are not members of the ‘virtuous’ citizenry… Bruen and District of Columbia v. Heller foreclose that argument because both recognized the ‘strong presumption’ that the text of the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms that belongs to ‘all Americans,’ not an ‘unspecified subset’.”

Once the right is established, Bruen holds, the Government must prove that § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition as applied to the defendant in question “is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the” Second Amendment right. The Government could not show that disarming nonviolent felons had a “well-established and representative historical analogue” that “imposed a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense” that was “comparably justified” as compared to § 922(g)(1)’s “sweeping, no-exception, lifelong ban.”

“We do not base our decision on the notion that felons should not be prohibited from possessing firearms,” the decision noted. “As a matter of policy, 922(g)(1) may make a great deal of sense. But ‘the very enumeration of the Second Amendment right’ in our Constitution ‘takes out of our hands… the power to decide’ for which Americans ‘that right is really worth insisting upon.”

The impact of Duarte may be attenuated, however, because the Supreme Court is expected to issue its decision in United States v. Rahimi sometime in the next six weeks. Rahimi, which focuses on whether §922(g)(8)’s prohibition on people subject to a domestic relations protection order possessing guns is constitutional after Bruen, is widely expected to further define the Second Amendment limits of § 922(g).

gunfreezone170330Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman observed that “[t]he location and timing of this ruling is almost as interesting as its substance. Many hundreds of § 922(g)(1) cases are prosecuted in this big circuit each year, so the echo effects of this ruling could prove profound (though I would guess not that many involve persons with only nonviolent priors). And, we are likely only weeks away from the Supreme Court finally handing down an opinion in the Rahimi case to address the application of Bruen to a different section of § 922(g).

Berman observes:

Most folks reasonably expect the Rahimi ruling to provide more guidance on how the Bruen Second Amendment test is to be applied to broad federal criminal gun control laws. I would expect the coming Rahimi opinion will lead to the 9th Circuit reviewing this important Duarte ruling in some way, though whether that is in the form of en banc review or panel reconsideration might turn on what Rahimi actually says.

United States v. Duarte, Case No 22-50048, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 11323 (9th Cir, May 9, 2024)

New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen, 597 US 1 (2022)

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 US 570 (2008)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Split 9th Circuit panel declares federal felon-in-possession criminal law unconstitutional as applied to non-violent offenders after Bruen (May 10, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root