Tag Archives: 922(g)(1)

Rahimi Making § 922(g) Constitutionality Issue Messier – Update for January 21, 2025

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

RAHIMI ASCENDENT

The Supreme Court’s 2022 New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen decision held that if a gun right (like going armed in public or even possessing one after a felony conviction) was one covered by the 2nd Amendment, the government could deny that right only if it could point to a law or regulation from 235 years ago that did the same.

Given that a federal law denying violent felons the right to have guns was not passed until 1938 – and it wasn’t expanded to all felons until 1968 – it seemed that Bruen was destined to lead to 18 USC § 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession statute, being declared unconstitutional.

whataburger230703But then came Zack Rahimi, whose gun-fueled road rage and general craziness – including opening fire over an alleged fast food joint indignity – led to last summer’s SCOTUS decision that held § 922(g)(8) (which bans gun possession by people under a domestic protection order) was perfectly constitutional. In United States v. Rahimi, the Supremes held that Bruen didn’t mean that the government had to find a 235-year-old law that was a precise fit to § 922(g), provided that “the new law is ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to permit, ‘apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances.’”

Rahimi “has been relatively impotent since the Court handed it down a few months back,” Jake Fogleman wrote in Sunday’s The Reload, but this “relevantly similar” test has now “inspired an appeals court to reverse a sweeping ruling against a federal firearms prohibition.”

The 5th Circuit unanimously upheld 18 USC § 922(n), which bars people under indictment from receiving guns, reversing a WD Texas district court decision handed down after Bruen but before Rahimi. Based on Rahimi’s refinement of the Bruen test, the Circuit ruled in United States v. Quiroz that “the government has met its burden of showing that § 922(n) is relevantly similar to pretrial detention at the founding [of the nation].” The court reasoned that the purpose of § 922(n) (public safety) and the burden it imposes (temporary disarmament) align with the historical justifications and effects of pretrial detention. It observed that many felonies punishable by death at the founding would have resulted in pretrial detention and disarmament, and that § 922(n) imposes a lesser burden by only restricting receipt of new firearms, not possession.

gunknot181009Other constitutional challenges to § 922 had an equally rocky time last week. In United States v. Quailes, the 3d Circuit held that despite its Range v Attorney General decision of a month ago, two defendants charged with § 922(g)(1) violations could be convicted consistent with the 2nd Amendment because they were on state parole when caught with guns and thus had not completed their sentences. The 3d said that “this Nation’s ‘history and tradition’ of ‘disarming convicts who are completing their sentences’ applies with equal force to defendants who are on state supervised release—including a sentence of parole or probation.”

In United States v. Contreras, the defendant had been convicted for being a drug user in possession of a gun (18 USC § 922(g)(3)). He did 24 months and then went on supervised release. While serving his supervised release term, he stupidly posted a picture on social media of himself holding a pistol. The police followed him and got him in a traffic stop with eight ounces of marijuana and the gun.

Last week, the 5th Circuit held that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to defendant Contreras. The 5th compared the felon-in-possession prohibition to § 922(n), which temporarily restricts defendants’ access to guns for public safety reasons and “align[s] with the historical justifications and effects of pretrial detention,” as well as colonial-era laws disarming people who are intoxicated.

“Here,” the Circuit said, “we have Contreras, a felon who after being convicted for being armed while intoxicated and being placed on temporary supervised release, was again found armed while intoxicated, this time while completing the sentence for the first crime… There is no ‘historical twin’ of § 922(g)(1); but that is not what our jurisprudence requires… Instead, “the appropriate analysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.”

Finally, in United States v. Curry, the 5th Circuit last week rejected a claim that the felon-in-possession statute was facially unconstitutional, that is, that it necessarily violated the 2nd Amendment is all cases. This decision was unsurprising in light of Rahimi.

easypeasy230214In his Rahimi dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas predicted that the “relevantly similar” test was overbroad. “Given that imprisonment (which involved disarmament) existed at the founding, the Government can always satisfy this newly minted comparable-burden requirement. That means the Government need only find a historical law with a comparable justification to validate modern disarmament regimes.”

Fogleman wrote that as the result of Rahimi’s “relevantly similar” test is that “a panel from a circuit known for going much [further] than its peers in hewing to a strict interpretation of the Bruen test has now okayed a modern gun law based on loose principles related to detaining suspected criminals at the time of the Founding.”

New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen, 597 US 1 (2022)

United States v. Rahimi, 602 US 680 (2024)

The Reload, Analysis: Rahimi Makes an Impact (January 19, 2025)

United States v. Quiroz, Case No. 22-50834, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 706 (5th Cir. January 13, 2025)

United States v. Quailes, Case No 23-2533, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 1107 (3d Cir. January 17, 2025)

United States v. Contreras, Case No 23-50840, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 701 (5th Cir. January 13, 2025)

United States v. Curry, Case No 22-11084, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 702 (5th Cir. January 13, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

A Good Day At The ‘Range’ – Update for December 27, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

Today marks our 1700th post since our beginning in 2015.1700th-241227

RANGE REDUX

A little more than two years ago, a 3d Circuit panel of three appellate judges held that arch-criminal Bryan Range – a man whose rap sheet included traffic tickets, fishing without a license and a misdemeanor false statement 25 years ago to get food stamps for his hungry family – had no 2nd Amendment right to own a hunting rifle or buy a shotgun.

gun-sw629-241227Cooler heads prevailed. Granting en banc review, the Circuit issued a seminal decision, holding that a prior nonviolent offense qualifyingi under 18 USC § 922(g)(1) to prohibit someone from having a gun violated the 2nd Amendment.

The government sought Supreme Court review, but while the petition was pending, the Supremes handed down United States v Rahimi, a case that held that the temporary disarming of someone under a court-issued domestic protection order could be disarmed without offending the 2nd Amendment. SCOTUS remanded all of the 2nd Amendment challenges on its docket – including the Range decision – for reconsideration in light of Rahimi.

Since then, the 8th Circuit decided that Edell Jackson, a convicted drug dealer, could be disarmed under 18 USC § 922(g)(1) consistent with the 2nd Amendment. The 6th Circuit held in United States v. Williams that a felon with violent offenses in his past was properly subject to 922(g)(1) consistent with the 2nd Amendment (leaving open the question of § 922(g)(1)’s effect on people with nonviolent felonies), and – just last week – the 4th Circuit said that anyone with a felony conviction was outside the protection of the 2nd Amendment.

Now, the en banc 3rd Circuit has delivered for Bryan like Santa on Christmas Eve, holding last Monday that Bryan Range’s right to own a gun remains protected by the 2nd Amendment despite his quarter-century-old fraud offense.

Applying New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen and Rahimi, the en banc Circuit “reject[ed] the Government’s contention that ‘felons are not among “the people” protected by the 2nd Amendment’ [and] that Bryan Range remains among ‘the people’ despite his 1995 false statement conviction. The 3d then rules that

[h]aving determined that Range is one of “the people,” we turn to the easy question: whether § 922(g)(1) regulates 2nd Amendment conduct. It does.

Against this backdrop, it’s important to remember that Range’s crime—making a false statement on an application for food stamps—did not involve a firearm, so there was no criminal instrument to forfeit. And even if there were, government confiscation of the instruments of crime (or a convicted criminal’s entire estate) differs from a status-based lifetime ban on firearm possession. The Government has not cited a single statute or case that precludes a convict who has served his sentence from purchasing the same type of object that he used to commit a crime. Nor has the Government cited forfeiture cases in which the convict was prevented from regaining his possessions, including firearms (unless forfeiture preceded execution). That’s true whether the object forfeited to the government was a firearm used to hunt out of season, a car used to transport cocaine, or a mobile home used as a methamphetamine lab. And of those three, only firearms are mentioned in the Bill of Rights.

For the reasons stated, we hold that the Government has not shown that the principles underlying the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation support depriving Range of his 2nd Amendment right to possess a firearm.

iloveguns221018The Circuit noted that its decision “is a narrow one. Bryan Range challenged the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) only as applied to him given his violation of 62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 481(a).” This suggests that those with prior convictions might have to apply piecemeal for confirmation that their 2nd Amendment rights remain intact.

The 6th Circuit has implied the same, complaining that the defendant – who was arguing in appeal of a § 922(g)(1) conviction that application of the felon-in-possession statute violated the 2nd Amendment – never sought to have his 2nd Amendment rights confirmed until he was caught with a gun.

For now, Range II is a breath of fresh air. The Circuit held resoundingly that Bryan “remains one of ‘the people’ protected by the 2nd Amendment, and his eligibility to lawfully purchase a rifle and a shotgun is protected by his right to keep and bear arms. More than two decades after he was convicted of food-stamp fraud and completed his sentence, he sought protection from prosecution under § 922(g)(1) for any future possession of a firearm. The record contains no evidence that Range poses a physical danger to others. Because the Government has not shown that our Republic has a longstanding history and tradition of depriving people like Range of their firearms, § 922(g)(1) cannot constitutionally strip him of his 2nd Amendment rights.”

Range creates a clear and well-defined circuit split on the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(1). This is probably not the end of the inquiry, although perhaps the Trump Dept of Justice may not share the current administration’s ardor for seeking certiorari on every 922(g)(1) case to come down the pike.

gun160711Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, noted that Bryan’s “case seems particularly sympathetic, as he was convicted nearly three decades ago of only a relatively minor crime. Because this Range ruling creates a clear circuit split on the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) in some settings, I would expect to see an appeal to the Supreme Court by the US Department of Justice. But maybe the new incoming Justice Department officials might not want to test the application and reach of the 2nd Amendment in this particular ‘narrow’ case.”

Range v. AG United States, Case No. 21-2835 (3d Cir. Dec. 23, 2024) 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32560, at *1

Sentencing Law and Policy, En banc Third Circuit again finds federal felon-in-possesion ban unconstitutional as applied to Byran Range (December 23, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

‘Naughty Can Never Be Nice’ for 922(g)(1) Purposes, 4th Circuit Says – Update for December 26, 2024

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4TH CIRCUIT SAYS NO FELON IS ON SANTA’S GOOD LIST FOR 2ND AMENDMENT PROTECTION

Ever since the Supreme Court decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, courts of appeal have been struggling with whether the 2nd Amendment permits some people with prior felonies to possess a gun despite 18 USC § 922(g)(1)’s blanket prohibition against anyone with a felony conviction from having a gun or ammo. The 3rd and 9th Circuits have said some may (although both holdings are being further reviewed in light of United States v. Rahimi), and the 6th has suggested that some felonies are not so dangerous that § 922(g) can apply consistent with the 2nd Amendment.

santagun241226

In Rahimi, the Supreme Court warned against courts holding that some groups categorically are excluded from 2nd Amendment protection. That caution did not deter the 4th Circuit, however. Last week, the 4th ruled that unless “a felony conviction is pardoned or the law defining the crime of conviction is found unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful,” anyone with a felony conviction is excluded from the sweeping definition of “law-abiding” citizen protected by the 2nd Amendment.

respect210812“[T]here is no need for felony-by-felony litigation regarding the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1),” the Circuit ruled last week. “[B]ecause felons, by definition, have ‘demonstrated disrespect for legal norms of society,’ the legislature has determined that ‘the category as a whole present[s] an unacceptable risk of danger if armed.’ That legislative judgment accords with historical tradition regulating non-law-abiding persons and is consistent with the Supreme Court’s repeated instruction that longstanding prohibitions ‘on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, are presumptively lawful.”

The question this decision and the others raise is not whether – but rather when – the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) will be settled by the Supreme Court.

United States v. Hunt, Case No. 22-4525, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32089 (4th Cir., December 18, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Watershed Moment for Felon-in-Possession and 2nd Amendment? – Update for August 27, 2024

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DANGER IS MY BUSINESS

nickdanger220426The 6th Circuit handed down a rather inverted but consequential decision last Friday, holding that 18 USC § 922(g)(1) – the statute that prohibits people convicted of a felony from possessing guns or ammo – was consistent with the 2nd Amendment as applied to Erick Williams, a convicted felon with a colorful and rather high-octane rap sheet.

A quick word about “as applied.”

In constitutional law, a facial challenge is a challenge to a statute in which a plaintiff argues that the law is always unconstitutional no matter how it is employed. A law against criticizing the government would always violate the 1st Amendment, whether used against a Marxist firebrand on a soapbox or that nice 80-year-old lady next door tending her gladiolas who complains that Social Security should do better in sending her checks.

Facial challenges are generally hard to win because, despite Congress’s institutional incompetence, facially unconstitutional statutes rarely make it through the legislative process.

In an “as applied” challenge, on the other hand, a plaintiff argues that a statute is unconstitutional not in every sense but rather only when applied in limited cases. The claim in Batson v. Kentucky, where the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race, did not find that peremptory strikes to eliminate jurors from the pool were unconstitutional in all cases, but were unconstitutional when used to strike jurors because of their race.

Back to the live action: Erick, who had previously been convicted of armed robbery and other offenses but who had served his time, was caught in a traffic stop with a handgun. Convicted of being a felon In possession, he appealed on the ground that § 922(g)(1) was facially unconstitutional in the wake of NY State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.

Applying last June’s US v Rahimi decision (in which the Supreme Court ruled that § 922(g)(8), which denied guns to people subject to domestic protection orders), the Circuit ruled that § 922(g)(1) was not unconstitutional as applied to a guy whose “criminal record shows that he’s dangerous.”

danger210211“Through § 922(g)(1), Congress has decided to enact a class-wide disarmament of felons,” the Circuit wrote. “[T]hat statute is constitutional as it applies to dangerous individuals… Consider William’s criminal record. He has two felony counts of aggravated robbery. Robbery is a common-law crime against the person. What’s more, aggravated robbery is robbery… accomplished with a deadly weapon.” Indeed, Williams robbed two people at gunpoint, stealing cash, a watch, and clothing. That offense alone is sufficient to conclude that Williams, if armed, presents a danger to others or the public. But that’s not all. Williams has also been convicted of attempted murder. And he’s already been convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon. In that case, he agreed to stash a pistol that was used to murder a police officer. The government could’ve pointed to any one of those convictions to demonstrate his dangerousness. Thus, Williams may be constitutionally disarmed through a class-based statute like § 922(g)(1).”

The 6th had “little trouble concluding that Williams is a dangerous felon” and thus, that “the government may, consistent with the 2nd Amendment, punish him for possessing a firearm. And the government may enact this prohibition through a broad, class-wide ban like § 922(g)(1). His as-applied challenge therefore fails.”

The Circuit was rather expansive in its holding, however, providing a roadmap for other people with prior convictions who may nevertheless retain a constitutional right to firearms. The 6th limited its definition of who might be dangerous to those who had “committed a crime against the body of another human being… including (but not limited to) murder, rape, assault, and robbery, or… a crime that inherently poses a significant threat of danger, including (but not limited to) drug trafficking and burglary. An individual in either of those categories will have a very difficult time, to say the least, of showing he is not dangerous.”

In Range v. Atty General, the 3rd Circuit opened the felon-in-possession door a crack. The 6th Circuit has nudged it a bit more by applying Rahimi’s dangerousness analysis to the “as applied” mix. To be sure, the 6th included some provisos.

First, it said that it did not exclude “crimes that pose no threat of physical danger, like mail fraud, tax fraud, or making false statements” from being dangerous, but rather deferred that for another day.

Second, it explained that district courts need not find a “categorical” match to a specific common-law crime to show that a person is dangerous. Instead, district courts “should make fact-specific dangerousness determinations after taking account of the unique circumstances of the individual, including details of his specific conviction” and should consider a defendant’s entire criminal record — not just the specific felony underlying his § 922(g)(1) prosecution.”

Finally, the Circuit was implicitly critical that Erick had not sought a declaratory judgment that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to him before being arrested, holding that “Williams availed himself of his constitutionally required opportunity to show that he is not dangerous – albeit after he violated the law, not before.” Whether a movant’s timing – attacking § 922(g)(1) before an arrest rather than as a defense after an arrest – will matter in the constitutional calculus (and it should not), remains to be seen.

Notguns170330Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, said last Sunday, “By my read, this opinion means that any and every person within the Sixth Circuit criminal charged with illegal firearm possession under 922(g)(1) — and perhaps other federal and state gun control provisions? — can now seek dismissal of that charge by making ‘an individualized showing that he himself is not actually dangerous.’ In addition, I wonder if this Williams opinion might now provide a means for the millions of persons with non-violent felony convictions in the Sixth Circuit to seek a declaratory judgment that they are ‘not actually dangerous’ and thus have a Second Amendment right to possess (and purchase) firearms like all their fellow citizens.”

United States v. Williams, Case No. 23-6115, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21375 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Sixth Circuit panel rules federal prohibition of felon gun possession is “constitutional on its face and as applied to dangerous people” (Aug 25, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Clues to Rahimi Application Pop Up in Circuit 922(g) Decisions – Update for August 5, 2024

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A PAIR OF § 922(g)(1) CASES

gunfight230919I remain convinced that the Supreme Court’s United States v. Rahimi decision — banning gun possession for an individual who has shown himself to be dangerous is historically justified under the Second Amendment — represents a necessary correction to the wild, wild west of gun rights suggested by Justice Thomas’s New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen opinion. In fact, I suspect that Rahimi makes it more likely that people convicted of nonviolent felonies will regain their Second Amendment rights in the next two years.

Two cases decided last week may hint at how courts will approach a post-Rahimi felon-in-possession world.

Carl Langston was convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun under 18 USC § 922(g)(1) after a drunken brawl at a bar. He pled guilty but, on appeal, argued for the first time that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen as applied to him.

Last Friday, the 1st Circuit upheld his conviction. The Circuit applied the F.R.Crim.P. 52(b) plain error standard to review because Carl hadn’t raised the issue in the trial court and found that his argument failed because (1) no prior Supreme Court or 1st Circuit holds that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional “in any of its applications;” and (2) Rahimi “does not compel the conclusion that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to defendants with Hugh’s criminal history.

gun160711In fact, the 1st observed, “rather than compelling the conclusion that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment cases consistently reiterate, albeit in dicta, the presumptive lawfulness of the felon-in-possession statute… The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Rahimi, joined by eight justices, once again identified prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons as ‘presumptively lawful’.”

It’s hard to win a “plain error” appeal, as Carl found out. However, the Circuit conceded that Carl’s appeal

presents a serious constitutional claim that the Supreme Court has not yet resolved. As Langston points out, Rahimi held only that an individual may be temporarily disarmed, consistent with the Second Amendment, if a court has found that the individual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of another. Still, the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly over sixteen years, from [District of Columbia v] Heller to Rahimi, that felon-in-possession laws are presumptively lawful. Thus, on plain-error review, we cannot agree with Carl that the mere fact that the government did not introduce historical evidence to support the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) makes it clear and obvious that his conviction violates the Second Amendment.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Circuit ruled that Dionti Moore, who used his fiancée’s handgun to frighten off intruders at her home while he was on supervised release, had no Second Amendment defense to a § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession conviction.

The Circuit relied on Rahimi’s holding that it had to find that § 922(g)(1), as applied to Dionti, is “relevantly similar to laws that our tradition is understood to permit… [and that] why and how the regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry… In other words, a modern firearms regulation passes constitutional muster only if it is “consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.”

Comparing 18th and 19th-century laws to disarming a convicted felon while on supervised release, the 3rd ruled that “the bottom line is this: during the founding era, forfeiture laws temporarily disarmed citizens who had committed a wide range of crimes… This historical practice of disarming a convict during his sentence — or as part of the process of qualifying for pardon — is like temporarily disarming a convict on supervised release. After all, the defendant receives a term of supervised release thanks to his initial offense, and… it constitutes a part of the final sentence for his crime’” (quoting the Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Haymond). The Circuit concluded that “[c]onsistent with our Nation’s history and tradition of firearms regulation, we hold that convicts may be disarmed while serving their sentences on supervised release.”

Of course, the Court’s focus on “temporarily” disarming and “disarm[ing] while serving their sentences on supervised release” can easily be read to infer that permanently disarming someone with a felony conviction on his record is a different matter altogether.  

gunfreezone170330One would expect nothing less from the Circuit that handed down the en banc Range v. Attorney General decision, which is currently in front of the 3rd Circuit on remand.  Incidentally, supplemental briefs by both Bryan Range and the government were filed last Friday, suggesting a new decision is on the fast track in Philadelphia. There is little doubt that whatever the decision, it will end up again at the Supreme Court.

United States v. Langston, Case No. 23-1337, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19353 (1st Cir. Aug 2, 2024)

United States v. Moore, Case No. 23-1843, 2024 U.S.App. LEXIS 19282 (3d Cir. Aug 2, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Deja Vu for the Second Amendment at the 9th Circuit – Update for July 23, 2024

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9TH CIRCUIT ‘GROUNDHOGS’ DUARTE GUN DECISION

groundhogday240723You may recall that in May, a 9th Circuit three-judge panel held that the 18 USC § 922(g)(1) ban on felons possessing guns was held to violate the Second Amendment rights of a guy convicted of drug trafficking.

Last week, the Circuit withdrew the opinion and set the case for en banc review.

In an unusual and entertaining “dissental” from grant of review, 9th Circuit Judge Lawrence VanDyke wrote,

What would you do if you were stuck in one place and every day was exactly the same, and nothing that you did mattered?’ In the Ninth Circuit, if a panel upholds a party’s Second Amendment rights, it follows automatically that the case will be taken en banc. This case bends to that law. I continue to dissent from this court’s Groundhog Day approach to the Second Amendment.

Judge VanDyke only wrote what everyone already knows to be true. “In this circuit,” he said of the 9th, “you could say that roughly two-fifths of our judges are interested in faithfully applying the totality of the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment precedent when analyzing new issues that have not yet been directly addressed by the Court. The other 17/29ths of our bench is doing its best to avoid the Court’s guidance and subvert its approach to the Second Amendment. That is patently obvious to anyone paying attention. To say it out loud is shocking only because judges rarely say such things out loud….”

Meanwhile, the 8th Circuit last week struck down a Minnesota law preventing 18-to-20-year-olds from carrying handguns in public. The case, Worth v. Jacobson, is noteworthy for its application of United States v. Rahimi: “Minnesota states that from the founding, states have had the power to regulate guns in the hands of irresponsible or dangerous groups, such as 18 to 20-year-olds,” the Circuit wrote. “At the step one ‘plain text’ analysis, a claim that a group is ‘irresponsible’ or ‘dangerous’ does not remove them from the definition of the people.”

groundhogs240723

The 8th ruled that “a legislature’s ability to deem a category of people dangerous based only on belief would subjugate the right to bear arms “in public for self-defense” to “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees,” citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and Rahimi.

The decision leaves little doubt that the 8th sees a ban on the entire category of people once convicted of felonies to be equally untenable under the Second Amendment. What this portends for the inevitable Supreme Court showdown on § 922(g)(1) depends in large part on the Third Circuit in Range and the Ninth’s rewrite of Duarte.

United States v. Duarte, Case No. 22-50048, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17601 (9th Cir., July 17, 2024)

Worth v. Jacobson, Case No. 23-2248, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17347 (8th Cir. July 16, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Supremes Delay The Day of Reckoning for Felon-in-Possession – Update for July 12, 2024

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CAN I CALL ‘EM OR WHAT?

gun160711In the wake of the Rahimi decision holding that the 2nd Amendment does not prevent the Feds from prohibiting people subject to domestic protection orders from having a gun, the Solicitor General filed a surprising request with the Supreme Court that it immediately grant review to a swath of felon-in-possession cases in order to settle the issue of whether 18 USC § 922(g)(1) can be constitutionally applied to a variety of situations and disqualified people.

I jubilantly reported this development and confidently hinted that a new day would soon dawn on the application of a statute responsible for about one-fifth of all federal criminal convictions. Content with my prognosis, I departed for a week in windswept but beautiful Iceland.

I returned to find out that my prediction was (once again) wrong. But then, I had plenty of company, including the SG, who lost her bid for a quick turnaround on felon-in-possession. On July 2, the Supreme Court cleared its plate of five pending § 922(g)(1) petitions for review by GVR, ordering them back to the lower courts to be reheard in light of Rahimi.

This means that the horizon for a definitive decision on the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) is now more like two years than one. The various courts of appeal will have to review the remanded cases through the Rahimi lens, one which permits an expanded view of what historical gun ban precedents are suitable analogues to § 922(g)(1)’s ban on felons possessing guns (which as a blanket prohibition only became law in the 1960s).

She now rests in peace, but was she ever dangerous?
She now rests in peace, but was she ever dangerous?

Rahimi emphasized that laws about general dangerousness could justify § 922(g)(8)’s banning gun possession while under a domestic violence restraining order. The Washington Post, however, complained last Sunday that “experts say the decision was written so narrowly that it does not make clear how to address other clauses of the same federal law… Critics say the Rahimi ruling does not solve the inherent problem created by Bruen — that judges are being asked to evaluate history, based on limited records assembled by dueling teams of lawyers.”

More importantly, Rahimi’s cautionary language that the Court was skeptical of broad categorical bans untethered to findings of dangerousness means that the Range holding that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to a guy who was convicted of a minor food stamp fraud 25 years ago will not change. At the same time, it is hard to believe that the 10th Circuit will not have to reverse its holding that Melynda Vincent – convicted of passing a bad $500 check 15 years ago when she was addicted to drugs but now a respected community leader in developing science-driven drug and criminal justice reform — can be prohibited from owning a gun consistent with the 2nd Amendment.

doggun240213The other cases are closer calls. Can a guy  with prior violent offenses be banned under § 922(g)(1)? How about a guy whose felon-in-possession conviction was in connection with drug trafficking? Both of those issues will have to be addressed by courts of appeal before the issue is ripe for SCOTUS review.

Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman said,

It seems SCOTUS has GVRed all the felon-in-possession cases that the US Solicitor General suggested be taken up right away in light of Rahimi. I am not really surprised the Justices are content to kick federal felon-in-possession cases down the road, but it simply ensures a lot more legal churn in lower courts (and perhaps a lot more people unconstitutionally prosecuted) as the Justice go off on their summer vacation and the rest of us try to read Rahimi tea leaves. There is little doubt in my mind that the Justices will have to resolve the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) sooner or later, but they ultimately get to decide just when and how, while the rest of us deal with the legal uncertainty.

United States v. Rahimi, Case No. 22-915, 602 U.S. —,  219 L.Ed.2d 351 (June 21, 2024)

Garland v. Range, Case No. 23-374, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2917 (July 2, 2024)

Vincent v. Garland, Case No. 23-683, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2931 (July 2, 2024)

The Reload, Analysis: SCOTUS Passes Up Gun Ban Case… For Now (July 5)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Supreme Court grants cert on First Step resentencing, GVRs gun issues, and lots of statements in (final?) order list (July 2)

Washington Post, The Supreme Court upended gun laws nationwide. Mass confusion has followed. (July 7)

– Thomas L. Root

Felon-in-Possession Constitutionality Decision May Be Within ‘Range’ – Update for June 28, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

GOVERNMENT WANTS DEFINITIVE 2ND AMENDMENT FELON-IN-POSSESSION RULING NOW

gunknot181009The pundits sprouted like mushrooms after a rain shower this past week, making all manner of interpretations and predictions on the future of the 2nd Amendment in the wake of the Supreme Court’s United States v. Rahimi decision.

“The Court has endorsed taking guns from convicted felons, a category that now includes Donald Trump,” wrongly declared the New Yorker.

“One of the first things that’s going to happen is that the Supreme Court is going to take up a bunch of lower-court decisions on the 2nd Amendment, vacate them, send them back down for reconsideration in light of Rahimi. So we’re about to get a spate of second bites at the apple from the lower courts trying to apply this,” predicted Slate.

“The majority repeated Heller’s statement that “prohibitions… on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill’ are ‘presumptively lawful’… This suggests that the Court remains generally open to those restrictions… I expect that the Court will send Range back to the 3rd Circuit for further consideration in light of Rahimi; we’ll see what the 3rd Circuit judges say on remand,” UCLA law prof Eugene Volokh wrote in Reason.

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman asked whether, in Rahimi’s wake, Donald Trump (a convicted felon subject to 18 USC 922(g)(1)) or Hunter Biden (a drug abuser when he bought his gun subject to 18 USC 922(g)(3)) can constitutionally be barred from firearm possession:

I do not believe Donald Trump or Hunter Biden “poses a clear threat of physical violence to another,” and § 922(g)(1) notably serves to permanently disarm anyone with a felony conviction. Further, the federal government has, since Bruen, generally argued for the constitutionality of 922(g)(1) based on the notion that only “responsible” individuals have 2nd Amendment rights. The Rahimi court directly and expressly rejected that notion. But still, as we saw before in 2nd Amendment cases like Heller and McDonald, the Court in Rahimi seems to still embrace dicta that can be read to suggest that the very broad criminal prohibition set forth in 18 USC § 922(g)(1) is still constitutional.

William & Mary law professor Kami Chavis wrote, “Although the court upheld Section 922(g)(8)… barriers to other attempts to implement modern gun regulations likely remain.”

iloveguns221018After the pundits all pontificated, the Solicitor General checked in last Monday, filing a surprising supplemental brief in Garland v. Range that asked the Court to quickly grant cert in a “range” of felon-in-possession cases to clarify who it can disarm under § 922(g)(1) consistent with the 2nd Amendment.

Specifically, SG Elizabeth Prelogar has asked SCOTUS to review some or all five separate pending cases dealing with the federal gun ban for felonies of varying severity. She argued that “we believe [the Court] should grant plenary review to resolve Section 922(g)(1)‘s constitutionality… Although this Court’s decision in Rahimi corrects some of the methodological errors made by courts that have held Section 922(g)(1) invalid, it is unlikely to fully resolve the existing conflict.”

The government argues that the conflict is important. Out of about 64,000 criminal cases reported to the Sentencing Commission in Fiscal Year 2022, more than 7,600 were § 922(g)(1) cases, 12% of all federal criminal cases.

It seems that just about everyone expected a spate of GVR orders on pending petitions for cert. (A GVR is a single-sentence order in which the Supreme Court grants certiorari, vacates the appellate court decision, and remands the case for further consideration in light of a new SCOTUS decision, in this case, Rahimi).

The government’s supplemental brief argues that “a GVR order is inappropriate if the delay and further cost entailed in a remand are not justified by the potential benefits of further consideration by the lower court. In our view, that is the case here. Section 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality has divided courts of appeals and district courts. Although this Court’s decision in Rahimi corrects some of the methodological errors made by courts that have held Section 922(g)(1) invalid, it is unlikely to fully resolve the existing conflict. And given the frequency with which the government brings criminal cases under Section 922(g)(1), the substantial costs of prolonging uncertainty about the statute’s constitutionality outweigh any benefits of further percolation. Under these circumstances, the better course would be to grant plenary review now.”

gun160711The government recommends that SCOTUS grant cert on multiple cases to be heard in one ultimate felon-in-possession case, including Doss v. United States (whether applying felon-in-possession is constitutional where the petitioner has “a lengthy criminal record” that “includes over 20 convictions, many of them violent”) and Jackson v. United States (petitioner has “previous felony convictions for non-violent drug crimes”). The government also asked that the Court add to the mix either Range v. Attorney General (3rd Circuit held 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to a man convicted of food-stamp fraud from 25 years before) or Vincent v. United States (10th Circuit held 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to addicted woman convicted of bank fraud 15 years before but now drug-free and running large charity).

As for Range and Vincent, the Government argues that “[g]ranting review in one of those cases would enable this Court to consider Section 922(g)(1)’s application to non-drug, non-violent crimes.”

A statement in the supplemental brief suggests the Government may have concluded that Rahimi means that it cannot win arguing that 922(g)(1) is constitutional in all circumstances. SG Preloger says that granting “review in cases involving different types of predicate felonies” would “enable the Court to consider Section 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality across a range of circumstances that are fully representative of the statute’s applications.”

guns170111If the government were convinced that it can defend 922(g)(1) in all circumstances, it would be happy with certiorari in either Range or Vincent, because winning on either of those cases would establish that 922(g)(1) is constitutional and thus immune to an “as applied” challenge. The fact that the government suggests that the Court hear swath of cases with defendants ranging from saint to sinner implies that the SG has conceded that the “as applied” constitutional line is going to fall somewhere in between Mr. Doss and Ms. Vincent.

Such a conclusion is almost foreordained by the Rahimi court’s warning that its Rahimi ruling is narrow:

Our resolution of Mr. Rahimi’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(8) necessarily leaves open the question whether the statute might be unconstitutional as applied in particular circumstances… We do not decide today whether the government may disarm a person without a judicial finding that he poses a “credible threat” to another’s physical safety… We do not resolve whether the government may disarm an individual permanently… We do not determine whether § 922(g)(8) may be constitutionally enforced against a person who uses a firearm in self-defense… Nor do we purport to approve in advance other laws denying firearms on a categorical basis to any group of persons a legislature happens to deem, as the government puts it, “not ‘responsible.’”

The Court will accept the SG’s invitation, if at all, early next week (although the Solicitor General has substantial influence with the Court). If the Supremes do take the cases, it will move up by at least a year the time we’ll have a definitive ruling on the constitutional limits of the felon-in-possession statute.

United States v. Rahimi, Case No 22-915, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 2714 (June 21, 2024)

United States v. Doss, Case No. 22-3662, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 31748 (8th Cir. Dec. 1, 2023)

United States v. Jackson, 69 F.4th 495 (8th Cir. 2023)

Vincent v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1197 (10th Cir. 2023)

Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023)

Supplemental Brief, Garland v. Range, Case No. 23-374

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)

New Yorker, The Supreme Court Steps Back From the Brink on Guns (June 22, 2024)

Slate, John Roberts Tried to Clean Up Clarence Thomas’ Mess. He May Have Invited More Chaos (June 24, 2024)

Reason, Some Takeaways from Today’s Rahimi 2nd Amendment Opinions (June 21, 2024)

Sentencing Law and Policy, After Rahimi, can Donald Trump legally possess a gun? How about Hunter Biden? (June 24, 2024)

Bloomberg Law, Narrow Gun Opinion Says Law Not in ‘Amber,’ But History Rules (June 25, 2024)

The Reload, DOJ Asks Supreme Court to Resolve Question of Gun Rights for Felons (June 25, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Duck Hunting With Steve Duarte – Update for May 21, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE FUTURE OF GUNS

duckhunting240521I got an email last week from a Georgia friend who’s been home for about eight years from serving a 30-year on a crack conspiracy, asking whether it was true that an appeals court said he could once again own a shotgun and pursue his passion for duck hunting (a passion not shared by the ducks themselves).

I explained that what he had read about, the 9th Circuit’s United States v. Duarte decision, did not necessarily say that and–even if it had–the last word hasn’t yet been written about the 2nd Amendment and 18 USC § 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession statute.

The May 9th Duarte decision had a 3-judge panel split 2-1, with the majority holding that the 2nd Amendment does not necessarily exclude people formerly convicted of felonies: New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen’s “scattered references to ‘law-abiding’ and ‘responsible’ citizens did not implicitly decide the issue in this case., the Court said. In the 2008 District of Columbia v. Heller decision, the Supreme Court made passing reference to the “presumptive[] lawful[ness]” of felon firearm bans, but the Duarte majority said the presumption “will no longer do after Bruen,” given Bruen’s call for a historical analysis and that the “felon firearm ban[] was never an issue the Heller Court purported to resolve.”

Eugene Volokh, a constitutional law professor at UCLA, told Courthouse News Service that Duarte “is a shift in Ninth Circuit law, and it differs from the view adopted by many circuits… However, it’s similar to what the Philadelphia-based 3rd Circuit decided last year in Range v. Attorney General.“

gunknot181009Duarte leaves open the possibility that felons convicted of violent crimes could still be prohibited from owning firearms. What’s more, the government wasted no time, last week filing a Petition for Rehearing En Banc and for Expedited Order Vacating Panel Opinion that asks the 9th Circuit for en banc review of Duarte. Appellant Steve Duarte has been ordered to file an opposition by May 30th.

En banc review may be put on hold pending the Supreme Court decision in the United States v. Rahimi decision, due any time before the end of June. The Rahimi case considers the constitutionality of a law banning gun possession by people subject to domestic violence restraining orders. Volokh said, “The question in Rahimi and the question in this case aren’t identical, but they share considerable similarities.”

gun160711For now, both Range and Duarte are “as applied” cases, not holding that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face, that is, in every circumstance, but rather only “as applied to the one’s own particular conduct.” In Range, the petitioner had been convicted 25 years before on a food-stamp misdemeanor that carried a possible 2-year sentence (and thus fell under § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition). The Duarte majority held that the defendant lacked any violent crime conviction (despite the fact that one of his priors was for fleeing and eluding, which sounds like more than a simple jaywalking to avoid a cop on the same sidewalk Steve was on).

The § 922(g)(1) tide may be turning, but no one should feel as though it’s open season on gun ownership just yet, or–more to the point–that a felon-in-possession conviction is open to a successful constitutional attack.

Reason, Volokh: Ninth Circuit Panel Concludes That Some Felons May Have Second Amendment Rights (May 9, 2024)

Courthouse News Service, 9th Circuit finds that convicted felons also have Second Amendment rights (May 9, 2024)

Ammoland, Court Finds Convicted Felons have Second Amendment Rights (May 15, 2024)

New York Law Review, The Dog That Didn’t Bark Is Rewriting the Second Amendment (May 5, 2024)

ABA Journal, Ban on gun possession by felons is unconstitutional as applied to some offenders, 9th Circuit rules (May 13, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root

Rahimi Could Be Watershed for § 922(g) Felon In Possession – Update for April 15, 2024

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CHRISTMAS SEASON AT THE SUPREME COURT


scotusxmas240415We’re entering what I always think of as Christmas season at the Supreme Court, the final 10 weeks of what is anachronistically called “October Term 2023.”  With 75% of the Court’s term done, only about 24% of its opinions have been issued. That’s common: there’s always a flurry of decisions issued in late April, May and June, with the most controversial decisions saved for last.

The most consequential criminal case yet to be decided, I believe, is United States v. Rahimi. In 2022, the Supreme Court in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen – relying on the Second Amendment – invalidated a New York law that forbade individuals to carry a gun in public unless they could persuade a government official that they faced some extraordinary threat to their personal safety. Applying “originalism,” the judicial philosophy that legal text should be interpreted based on the original understanding at the time of adoption, SCOTUS reasoned that a right reserved to a tiny subset of the population (the right to carry a gun) was an encroachment on a “right of the people” that the Constitution says “shall not be infringed.”

But Bruen reaches further, holding that when defending a law that deprives an individual of the freedom to keep or bear arms, the government must show that the law “is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” The absence of a historical regulation “distinctly similar” to a modern gun-control law is evidence of the modern regulation’s unconstitutionality.

Laws banning all felons from gun possession were not adopted until the 1960s.

In Rahimi, the 5th Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s Bruen decision, holding that 18 USC § 922(g)(8) – which prohibited people subject to domestic violence protection orders from possessing guns – violated the Second Amendment because, at the time the Second Amendment was adopted, no law keeping people subject to a domestic violence protection order was on anyone’s books.

whataburger230703Writing last week in the New York Times, George Mason University law professor Nelson Lund said, “Under Bruen’s originalist test, Rahimi should be an easy case. The government has not informed the Supreme Court of a single pre-20th-century law that punished American citizens, even those who had been convicted of a violent crime, for possessing a gun in their own homes. Not one.”

The problem is that the subject of the Rahimi case, Zackey Rahimi, is an awful defendant. His ex-girlfriend obtained a domestic violence protection order against him on the ground that he had assaulted her, and he has been charged with several crimes involving the misuse of firearms, including shooting up a What-a-Burger when his friend’s credit card was declined.

“If the court pretends that a historical tradition of such laws existed,” Lund wrote, “it will not be faithful either to Bruen’s holding or to the court’s repeated insistence that the right to keep and bear arms is not ‘a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.’”

But following the Bruen precedent could be tough on the Justices, because the outcry of letting the Zack Rahimis of the nation keep their guns will be fierce. Still, Rahimi may have a silver lining for the § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession statute. If Zack wins, that just about guarantees that Garland v. Range – in which the 3rd Circuit ruled that Bruen means that a guy convicted 25 years before of a minor food stamp fraud is allowed to possess a gun – will be upheld. If Zack loses, I suspect SCOTUS will write some “dangerousness” exception into the Bruen standard. Even if that happens, many  § 922(g)(1) defendants will easily jump that hurdle.

toomuchguns240416Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog last week, Ohio State University law prof Doug Berman said, “In the votes and voices of a number of Justices (and others), I sometimes notice that affinity for originalism starts running out of steam when the outcomes start running in concerning directions. Rahimi may prove to be another data point on that front in the coming months.”

United States v. Rahimi, Case No. 22-915 (Supreme Ct, argued November 7, 2023)

New York Times, The Fidelity of ‘Originalist’ Justices Is About to Be Tested (April 9, 2023)

Sentencing Law & Policy, Is Rahimi an “easy case” for any true originalist to rule for the criminal defendant and against the prosecution? (April 10, 2024)

– Thomas L. Root