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SCOTUS Oral Argument Lacks Compassion for Compassionate Release Cases – Update for November 17, 2025

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ARE YOU DISRESPECTING ME?

An uncomfortable number of Supreme Court justices last Wednesday questioned whether the United States Sentencing Commission overstepped its authority when it amended USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) to hold that changes in mandatory minimum laws – even when not retroactive – and concerns about actual innocence could be part of a court’s consideration when weighing an 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release motion.

I learned as a young lawyer (many years ago) that trying to predict the outcome of an appellate case based on the oral argument was a fool’s errand. Still, the nearly three hours of argument last Wednesday on what should be or should not be extraordinary and compelling reasons judges must consider in granting § 3582(c) sentence reductions provided little reason for optimism.

The issue was whether extraordinary and compelling reasons include factors like trial errors or nonretroactive changes in the law.  Lawyers for Daniel Rutherford and John Carter, two inmates seeking such sentence reductions, argued that the Commission was within its legal authority to say that courts could consider whether the First Step Act’s nonretroactive changes to gun and drug mandatory minimums would have resulted in lesser sentences in their cases.

In a third case, Fernandez v. United States, a district court had granted Joe Fernandez compassionate release in part because the judge felt “disquiet” about the conviction due to questions about whether the witness who had fingered Joe had lied to save his own skin. The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the compassionate release, arguing that Joe’s innocence claim should have been brought up in a 28 USC § 2255 habeas challenge instead.

A § 3582(c)(1) sentence reduction, known a little inaccurately as “compassionate release,” permits courts to reduce criminal sentences in certain cases. Before 2018, the Bureau of Prisons was the only entity that could file a motion for such consideration, but the First Step Act eliminated that requirement. The Sentencing Commission is charged by 28 USC § 994(t) with the responsibility for defining what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason, and has expanded such to include medical conditions, family circumstances and age. The compassionate release guideline amendment in November 2023 adopted a broader view of compassionate release factors that included changes in the law that would have made a prisoner’s sentence much shorter if those changes had been in force when he got sentenced.

During Wednesday’s arguments, the only Justice of the nine expressing sympathy for Rutherford, Carter, and Fernandez was Ketanji Brown Jackson. All of the others seemed concerned that the changes in USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) thwarted Congress’s will, would result in a flood of compassionate release motions, and would permit an end-run on § 2255.

Jackson maintained that the § 2255 and compassionate release considerations were not mutually exclusive. Instead, Jackson said compassionate release was intended to work as a safety valve.

“The question is, ‘safety valve for what?” Justice Elana Kagan countered. “Not every safety valve is a safety valve for everything.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor said a district judge’s doubts about a jury verdict shouldn’t be used as a factor in compassionate release claims. “It happens to every district court judge,” she said. “There’s a case where you really struggle, but can we, in the facts of this case, denote that that is an extraordinary circumstance?”

Justice Neil Gorsuch contended that the judge’s own feelings, even if reasonable, should have nothing to do with the defendant’s circumstances for compassionate release. “I thought, in our legal system, the jury’s verdict on the facts is not something a court can impeach unless it’s clearly erroneous,” Gorsuch said. He suggested that the Commission had been “disrespectful” by substituting its own position on retroactivity for Congress’s.

In the Fernandez case, the Court appeared uneasy with allowing judges to consider factors that also fall under the federal habeas statute. Kagan said that habeas claims face harsh limitations and questioned whether inmates might use compassionate release as an end-run around those prohibitions.

Justice Samuel Alito observed, “The First Step Act was obviously heavily negotiated… and retroactivity is, of course, always a key element in the negotiations. Congress specifically says this is not going to be retroactive to those cases where sentences have already been imposed. And then the [Sentencing] Commission, though, then comes in and says we’re now going to give a second look for district judges to revisit those sentences…”

Justice Amy Coney Barrett asked whether a judge’s disagreement with the mandatory minimums could be enough justification for a compassionate release grant. David Frederick of Kellogg Hansen Todd Figel & Frederick PLLC, representing Rutherford, replied that even if a judge thinks a sentence is too harsh or if it would have been lower after the sentencing reforms, the Sentencing Commission’s guidelines require other factors, like a prisoner’s age, health and family situation, to be part of the overall picture.

Chief Justice John Roberts worried that the Sentencing Commission was opening the floodgates to applications for compassionate release. Currently, the 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and D.C. circuits have ruled that the Commission’s interpretation exceeds its authority and is wrong, while the 1st, 4th, 9th and 10th circuits have allowed courts to consider the disparity between pre- and post-First Step Act sentences.

Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman – who filed an amicus brief supporting Rutherford, Carter and Fernandez – was pessimistic about the outcome of the cases:

But the Justices seem poised to concoct some new legal limits on equitable sentence reduction motions, though it remains unclear exactly how they will decide to legislate from the bench in this context. There was some interesting discussion during the Fernandez case about which of various possible restrictions relating to § 2255 that the government wanted the Justices to enact. And in Rutherford/Carter, the Justices expressed in various ways which sentencing statutes they thought might create implicit limits on the bases for sentencing reductions. Just how the Justices decide to act as lawmakers and policymakers in this setting will be interesting to see.

Bloomberg Law observed, “The court’s decisions in the cases could have a chilling or stimulating effect on compassionate release petitions. The Sentencing Commission reports they have increased dramatically since passage of the First Step Act and the pandemic, with more than 3,000 filed across the country last year.”

A decision is not expected until next spring.

Fernandez v. United States, Case No. 24-556 (Supreme Court oral argument November 12, 2025)

Rutherford v. United States, Case No. 24-820 (Supreme Court oral argument November 12, 2025)

Carter v. United States, Case No. 24-860 (Supreme Court oral argument November 12, 2025)

Law360, Justices Hint Early Release Factors ‘Countermand’ Congress (November 12, 2025)

WITN-TV, Supreme Court to weigh limits on compassionate release (November 12, 2025)

Courthouse News Service, Supreme Court disquieted by increased judicial discretion over compassionate release (November 12, 2025)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Justices seem eager to concoct limits on grounds for sentence reductions, but what new policy will they devise?  (November 12, 2025)

Bloomberg Law, Justices Eye Scope of Compassionate Release ‘Safety Valve’  (November 12, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

Innocence, Disparity, and Judge-Made Law on Tap at SCOTUS – Update for November 11, 2025

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

COMPASSIONATE RELEASE WEEK

Tomorrow, federal compassionate release takes center stage as the Supreme Court hears oral argument in Fernandez v. United States and Rutherford v. United States.

What Does Compassion Have to Do With Innocence?      Fernandez asks whether a combination of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may warrant a discretionary sentence reduction under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) can include reasons that might also be a basis for a 28 USC § 2255 motion to vacate a conviction or sentence (such as a complaint that defense counsel failed to raise an obvious Guidelines mistake at sentencing).

I wrote about the Fernandez case when the 2nd Circuit sent the guy back to prison in 2024, and the lengthy fact pattern is worth revisiting. Suffice it to say here that Joe’s district court acknowledged the validity of the jury’s verdict and Joe’s sentence, while nevertheless holding that “jury verdicts, despite being legal, also may be unjust” and concluding that questions about Joe’s innocence, together with the stark disparity between Joe’s sentence and those of his co-defendants, constituted extraordinary and compelling circumstances under § 3582(c)(1)(A) warranting as sentence reduction to time served.

The 2nd Circuit reversed, holding that Joe’s sentencing disparity was not an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence “under the plain meaning of the statute,” and that concerns that Joe might be innocent had to bow to the fact that the post-conviction remedy afforded by 28 USC § 2255 “places explicit restrictions on the timing of a habeas petition and the permissibility of serial petitions… Neither of these restrictions appl[ies] to a § 3582 motion.”

The 5th and 10th Circuits agree with the 2nd  Circuit. The 1st and 9th do not.

That Was Then, This is Now:         Rutherford asks an even more basic question: whether the Sentencing Commission – which was delegated the authority by Congress to define what circumstances are “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1) – can hold that a nonretroactive change in the law (such the First Step Act’s change in 18 USC § 924(c) to eliminate stacking can be a reason for a compassionate release.

Section 403 of the First Step Act of 2018 reduced penalties for some mandatory minimum sentences for using guns in some crimes. The change, however, was not retroactive. Because of the changes, someone sentenced on December 20, 2018, for two counts of carrying a gun while selling marijuana on two different days got a minimum sentence of 30 years. The same sentence imposed two days later would have resulted in a minimum sentence of 10 years.

Under 28 USC § 994(t), the Sentencing Commission is charged by Congress with defining what constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release. Congress placed only one limit on the Commission’s authority: “Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.”

In its 2023 revamping of the compassionate release guideline, the Commission adopted subsection 1B1.13(b)(6), stating that if a defendant had received an unusually long sentence and had served at least 10 years, a change in the law may be considered in determining whether he or she has an extraordinary and compelling reason for a § 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction.

The Rutherford issue, simply enough, is whether the Commission exceeded its authority in making a nonretroactive change in the law a factor to be considered (along with others) in a § 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction.

A RICO Claim?:   Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman noted in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog that an argument in last week’s Supreme Court argument on supervised release (Rico v. United States) goes to the heart of the issues at stake in Rutherford and Fernandez. During the argument, Justice Gorsuch observed that Congress appears to be better situated to resolve the conflict by amending the law, because “the alternative is for us to create a fugitive tolling doctrine pretty whole cloth… And so we’re going to have to come up with a whole common law doctrine here to supplement what the [law] already says.”

   xxxxxxxxxxxxxxNot that RICO…

Berman observed that the Fernandez and Rutherford circuit courts “have been inventing limits on compassionate release motions pretty much out of ‘whole cloth’ and are in the (messy) process of coming up ‘with a whole common law doctrine here to supplement what the [applicable statute] already says.’” Berman argues, “I understand why circuit courts are inclined to invent judge-made limits on compassionate release motions, but that’s not their role in this statutory sentencing context. Congress makes sentencing law based on its policy judgments, and it has also expressly tasked the expert U.S. Sentencing Commission with ‘promulgating general policy statements… [describing] reasons for sentence reduction.’ 28 USC § 994(t). If the government does not like how this law is written or gets applied, it should be making its case for legal change to Congress and/or the Sentencing Commission, not to the Supreme Court.”

Berman noted that in Koon v. United States, the Supreme Court 30 years ago said that “it is inappropriate for circuit judges to be developing a “common law” of sentencing restrictions when that’s a job only for Congress and the Sentencing Commission. That Justice Gorsuch is focused on similar concerns in another statutory sentencing context seems significant.”

Fernandez v. United States, Case No. 24-556 (oral argument Nov 12, 2025)

Rutherford v. United States, Case No. 24-820 (oral argument Nov 12, 2025)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Do Justice Gorsuch’s concerns about judge-made law foreshadow big issue in compassionate release cases? (November 5, 2025)

Koon v. United States, 518 US 81 (1996)

~ Thomas L. Root

A Refreshing Pair of Compassionate Release Rulings – Update for July 15, 2025

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TWO CIRCUITS SHOW SOME COMPASSION

The 1st and 4th Circuits have both issued significant compassionate release decisions in the last two weeks.

Under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1), a sentencing court can grant a sentence reduction – known colloquially if not quite precisely as “compassionate release” – to a federal prisoner if the court finds “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction, the reduction is consistent with Sentencing Commission policies, and that release would be consistent with the sentencing factors listed in 18 USC § 3553(a). Since passage of the First Step Act in 2018, a prisoner may bring a motion for compassionate release himself or herself.

What constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” are defined in the Guidelines at USSG § 1B1.13.

The 4th Circuit ruling first: Richard Smith has served about half of his 504-month crack cocaine conspiracy and stacked 18 USC § 924(c) sentences. He filed for compassionate release, citing his advanced age, poor health, rehabilitation efforts,  and the disparity between his current sentence and the one he would receive for the same conduct if sentenced today.

The district court found that there were “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to grant the compassionate release motion, but in weighing the 18 USC § 3553 factors, the court concluded that “[r]eleasing Smith would not reflect the seriousness of the offense conduct, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, or deter criminal conduct.” The district court noted Dick’s prior state convictions for drugs and domestic battery and complained that the estimated amount of crack cocaine used by the original sentencing judge “was low.” The judge refused to consider the non-retroactive First Step Act amendments to 18 USC § 924(c) and for good measure, said that even if he did consider the changes, “they would not overcome the finding that the § 3553(a) factors weigh against a sentence reduction.”

Last week, the 4th Circuit reversed the district court and remanded with instructions to let Dick go home. First, it held that the sentence disparity created by the First Step Act’s elimination of “stacked” mandatory minimums under § 924(c) can constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reason” under 18 USC  § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (thus suggesting the Sentencing Commission’s compassionate release guideline 1B1.13(b)(6) is lawful). The issue of whether (b)(6) – which authorizes a district court to consider nonretroactive changes in the law as part of an “extraordinary and compelling reason” analysis – exceeds Sentencing Commission authority is currently before the Supreme Court in Rutherford v. United States and will be decided next spring.

Second (and more significant for compassionate release movants), the Circuit concluded that the district court’s rote recitation of § 3553 factors “fail[ed] to recognize that the relevant § 3553(a) factors clearly favor release.” Dick was no recidivism risk, the 4th said, no matter what his criminal history in the last century might have been, due to “his advanced age and serious medical conditions. Smith was 66 years old at the time he filed his renewed motion for compassionate release. He is 71 years old today… Moreover, Smith suffers from black lung disease, an irreversible respiratory impairment resulting from his years as a coal miner. Smith has also been diagnosed with COPD, emphysema, pre-diabetes, a liver cyst, and a heart rhythm disorder. He is totally disabled and a portion of his right lung has been removed.”

Dick only had two minor disciplinary infractions in 20 years, completed dozens of vocational classes and participated in drug treatment programs. He worked his way down from high security to low. “This is not the picture of an unremorseful defendant bent on causing future harm even if he was physically able,” the 4th said.

The Circuit noted that “the district court determined, without elaboration, that a reduced sentence would fail to ‘deter criminal conduct.’ But this ignores that, by the time of his release, Smith will have already served nearly 25 years of his 42-year sentence. The prospect of 25 years of prison time serves as a powerful deterrent against the conduct—which was undoubtedly serious—for which Smith was convicted and sentenced.”

Meanwhile, Edison Burgos filed for compassionate release on the grounds that the BOP was failing to treat his hypertension and obstructive sleep apnea. The district court held that Eddie was getting “adequate medical, dental and psychological care” and denied his motion. Two weeks ago, the 1st Circuit reversed, holding that the district court had “overlooked the undisputed evidence demonstrating that, almost one year after Ed’s sleep apnea diagnosis and despite his ongoing severe hypertension, the BOP had yet to provide him with the established treatment for sleep apnea.”

The BOP argued that the fact that Ed’s medical records show that a “second sleep study was listed as an ‘urgent’ priority…”  was “sufficient evidence that the BOP was adequately treating him for sleep apnea.”  The 1st ripped that fig leaf away:

Even if we overlook that the “urgent” sleep study had yet to be conducted as of Dr. Venuto’s second letter to the court, however, a sleep study is a diagnostic tool: The only treatment for sleep apnea discussed in Burgos-Montes’s medical records is a CPAP machine… Indeed, as we have explained, in April 2022, an outside cardiologist recommended that Burgos-Montes receive a CPAP machine “ASAP” to treat his sleep apnea, without suggesting that additional diagnostic testing was needed. And Dr. Venuto acknowledged that as of July 2022, Burgos-Montes had still not received a CPAP machine.

The Circuit ruled that “the record is clear that nearly a year after Burgos-Montes received a sleep apnea diagnosis, months after a consulting cardiologist recommended that he receive a CPAP machine “ASAP,” and even after his transfer to a higher-level care facility, the BOP had yet to provide Burgos-Montes with a CPAP machine or any other sleep apnea treatment. And there is no dispute that untreated sleep apnea for a patient like Burgos-Montes, who also suffers from severe hypertension, could amount to an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason to grant compassionate release.”

United States v. Smith, Case No. 24-6726, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 16565 (4th Cir. July 7, 2025)

Rutherford v. United States, Case No. 24-820 (cert. granted June 6, 2025)

United States v. Burgos-Montes, Case No. 22-1714, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 16048 (1st Cir. June 30, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

Former BOP Officials Support Supreme Court Compassionate Release Petition – Update for May 29, 2025

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

FORMER BOP OFFICIALS SUPPORT COMPASSIONATE RELEASE CERTIORARI

scotus161130A month ago, I reported that the 6th Circuit ruled that USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6), the compassionate release guideline subsection that lets courts consider overly long sentences that could not be imposed under current law, exceeded the Sentencing Commission’s authority. Several other circuits have held the same, notably the 3rd Circuit in United States v. Rutherford.

Rutherford is now before the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari. The Justices have already relisted the case for more consideration (usually an indication that it is getting a serious look) at tomorrow’s conference.

Evidence of the Court’s interest came in Tuesday’s announcement that the Court would review a related issue, Fernandez v. United States. The issue in that case is whether whether a combination of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” supporting a sentence reduction under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) can include reasons that may also grounds for setting aside a sentence under 28 USC § 2255, the federal habeas corpus statute that can be used to attack the constitutionality of a conviction or sentence.

We'll see about that...
We’ll see about that…

In Fernandez, a district court granted the prisoner a “compassionate release” for reasons that included the court’s belief that there was substantial evidence that he was actually innocent of the murder and that his sentence was disparately long compared to those of his co-defendants (who became informants). The 2nd Circuit reversed (and ordered Joe back to prison), holding that factors that would work for a § 2255 motion could not be relied on for § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release.

The Circuit’s holding was contrary to decisions of the First and Ninth Circuits, which have each held that district courts are not restricted from considering matters under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A) other than the sole restriction – rehabilitation alone cannot support compasionate release – set forth in the law by Congress. The Supreme Court will decide what limits, if any, cabin a judge on what he or she may consider as extraordinary and compassionate reasons for compassionate release.

Fernandez is Rutherford’s spiritual cousin. I would not be surprised to see certiorari granted to Rutherford, and the two cases being combined for argument and decision.

Rutherford is notable for something else: Supporting petitioner Rutherford are amicus briefs, including ones filed by FAMM, six clinical law school professors, and 12 former federal judges. Most interesting may be an amicus brief by former Bureau of Prisons officials (now corrections consultants) represented by civil rights attorney Scott Lewis at Boston firm Anderson & Krieger.

prisonhealth200313Spotlighting the BOP healthcare crisis, the brief argues that expanding access to compassionate release for inmates serving unusually long sentences would benefit the BOP because “aging, unhealthy inmates consume a disproportionate share of BOP’s scarce resources, which has cascading effects on federal prison operations and the safety and security of BOP staff, as well as inmates… [a]nd the thousands of prisoners potentially eligible for compassionate release who are serving ‘unusually long sentence[s]’ with ‘gross disparity…’ are especially likely to become elderly and unhealthy or disabled in prison.”

United States v. Bricker, Case No. 24-3286, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 9538 (6th Cir. April 22, 2025)

Fernandez v. United States, Case No. 24-556 (certiorari granted May 23, 2025)

Rutherford v. United States, Case No. 24-820 (petition for certiorari pending)

Brief of Amici Curiae Former Bureau of Prisons Officials In Support of Petitioner, Rutherford v. United States (filed March 5, 2025)

– Thomas L. Root

6th Circuit Holds Sentencing Commission Went Too Far On Compassionate Release – Update for April 28, 2025

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6TH CIRCUIT STRAINS TO INVALIDATE COMPASSIONATE RELEASE CHANGE-IN-THE-LAW CATEGORY

dontthink220919A three-judge 6th Circuit panel took a wrecking ball to the Sentencing Commission’s compassionate release statute last week, joining the 3rd and 7th Circuits in invalidating the “extraordinary and compelling” reason that the defendant was serving years and years more than Congress now believes he deserves.

The compassionate release statute, 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A), allows a court to reduce a prison sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Congress authorized the Sentencing Commission to define what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason, and the USSC did so in the revised USSG § 1B1.13 adopted in November 2023. The reasons included medical reasons, family circumstances, and prisoner abuse.

The “extraordinary and compelling reason” at issue in last week’s case is set out in USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6). It holds that a nonretroactive change in the law can present a reason warranting a sentence reduction if a prisoner has served at least 10 years of “an unusually long sentence,” and there is a “gross disparity” between the inmate’s sentence and the sentence that would apply if nonretroactive changes in the law since the original sentencing were given retroactive effect. Even then, it’s not automatic. Instead, § 1B1.13(b)(6) directs the court to fully consider “the defendant’s individualized circumstances.”

bunnygun190423The best example of such a sentence is where someone has been convicted of multiple 18 USC § 924(c) sentences for using a gun in drug crimes or crimes of violence. Congress intended that if Donnie Drugseller had been convicted of a § 924(c) and served his mandatory five years, only to get out and do the same thing again, the second § 924(c) would carry a minimum of 25 years. This makes perfect sense: we should learn from our experiences, and that includes Donnie learning that he shouldn’t carry a gun.

Poor drafting, however, resulted in a statute requiring that Donnie, who carried a gun while selling drugs on Monday and did it again on Tuesday, receive two “stacked” § 924(c) counts–one for each day–and be sentenced for 30 years mandatory and consecutive years. That would be five years for Monday’s gun and 25 more years for Tuesday’s.

Congress did not ever intend that, fixing its mistake in a revised § 924(c) included in the First Step Act. Now the statute does what it was always meant to do, applies the 25-year sentence only if Donnie had been convicted of a § 924(c) crime prior to committing the second one. Under the changed law, Donnie’s sentence would have been 10 years (five for Monday and five more for Tuesday).

However, for political reasons, the § 924(c) change was not made retroactive to reach sentences imposed before the First Step Act was passed. In last week’s Bricker decision, the 6th Circuit conceded that this left people like Donnie, who were sentenced before First Step,

serving prison sentences that are much longer than the sentences of new inmates who committed the exact same crimes. Recognizing the unfairness, the Commission decided that the disparity was… a factor worth considering when deciding whether an individual old-timer had an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for early release. That is understandable and even laudable. The question is whether the Commission has the authority to do that under the law, particularly the Constitution.

Back before the 2023 adoption of the new § 1B1.13, the 6th Circuit held in United States v. McCall that “the that the phrase ‘extraordinary and compelling’ in § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is clear and unambiguous” and that nonretroactive legal changes in the law could not be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction:

The Circuit panel held that under the Constitution’s separation of powers, the Commission lacked the “power to overrule a Circuit Court’s interpretation of a statute” or to adopt a policy statement that contradicts a federal statute: “[T]he Commission cannot overrule McCall‘s determination about the plain text of the statute by promulgating a contradictory policy statement… we conclude that the Commission overstepped its authority and issued a policy statement that is plainly unreasonable under the statute and in conflict with the separation of powers. We therefore hold that USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) is invalid.

In her dissent, Judge Stranch vigorously disagreed, arguing that “the majority opinion misapprehends recent Supreme Court precedent on administrative law, misconstrues this court’s opinion in… McCall, and ignores the plain language of several statutes to read constraints into a statutory scheme where none exist.”

badjudge171016Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman blasted the Bricker decision as “another reminder that courts can and often will ignore textualism principles when it leads to a policy outcome that they dislike.” He notes that “the panel majority in Bricker [is] inventing much broader non-textual limits on compassionate release than did the Third Circuit in United States v. Rutherford… That ruling is the subject of a pending cert petition, and Bricker surely increases the odds that cert on this issue will be eventually granted. But… I am quite unsure whether congressional text or judicial policy preferences would ultimately prevail on this matter at SCOTUS.”

United States v. Bricker, Case No. 24-3286, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 9538 (6th Cir. April 22, 2025)

United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048 (6th Cir. 2022)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Deepening circuit splits, divided Sixth Circuit panel decides to “look beyond” statutory text to rewrite compassionate release limits (April 24, 2025)

United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360 (3d Cir. 2024)

– Thomas L. Root