Tag Archives: retroactivity

Acquitted Conduct No Panacea for Current Prisoners – Update for April 14, 2022

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ACQUITTED CONDUCT AND THE HOPEMONGERS

The House of Representatives’ passage of the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021 (H.R. 1621) ten days ago appears to be chum on the water for some hope-mongering sharks who prey on inmates.

shark170607I already have heard from one person who is busy hiring an outside “research” service to evaluate his case to tell him whether he’ll benefit from the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act. For everyone’s benefit, here are two things to keep in mind.

First, the Act has not passed the Senate. It may. It may not. It may pass, but with different text, and then a conference committee will have to work out compromise text.

Second, the Act will apply to very few cases. It does not necessarily apply to relevant conduct. It does not apply to conduct not mentioned to a jury. If you did not have a jury trial, it does not apply (unless you were acquitted of the same conduct in a prior federal or state trial).

Finally, it is very unlikely that the Act will be retroactively applied to people already sentenced. The bill does not specify that it applies retroactively. Such bills are usually presumed not to be retroactive. Read 1 USC § 109 and Dorsey v. United States before you decide the courts will open their doors to post-conviction motions seeking resentencing because Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act passes.

No reputable legal services company will take any money now to tell you whether you can get any sentencing benefit from the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act. It’s just too premature.

Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021 (HR 1621)

Dorsey v. United States, 567 US 260 (Supreme Ct., 2012)

SPEAKING OF PREMATURE…

George Fower was sentenced to 24 months, but before he self-surrendered to the Bureau of Prisons, he sought compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) on the grounds he was very susceptible to COVID. Because he was not yet in prison, George found the statute’s administrative exhaustion requirement challenging, but he wrote to the warden of the prison to which he was to surrender in a month’s time, and later to the BOP’s Designation and Sentence Computation Center, the Regional Director and the Bureau of Prisons General Counsel.

Thirty days later (while still not in custody), George filed his compassionate release motion. The district court denied it, holding in part that “compassionate relief is not available to a defendant not in custody.”

Last week, the 9th Circuit agreed. It noted that the First Step Act amended the compassionate release statute only to allow the prisoner, rather than requiring BOP, to file the motion. At no time in the history of the “matrix of statutory and other enactments,” the Circuit said, were the BOP’s powers ever extended to grant it jurisdiction over those who had yet to commence their incarceration.

compassion160208It makes sense that the BOP has no place to play in compassionate release prior to a prisoner’s incarceration, the 9th noted. “The statute states that the defendant’s request must be addressed to ‘the warden of defendant’s facility,’ which cannot be known until there has been a designation by the BOP. This is further evidence that the statute contemplates that the defendant must be in a BOP facility before qualifying for compassionate relief.”

The 9th suggests that before a defendant self-surrenders, he or she may ask the district court to delay sentencing or to extend the surrender date.

United States v. Fower, Case No 21-50007, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 8919 (9th Cir., April 4, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Nothing Extraordinary about a 312-Year Robbery Sentence, 3rd Circuit Says – Update for September 8, 2021

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A LARGELY UGLY COMPASSIONATE RELEASE DECISION FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT

guns200304The 3rd Circuit last week joined eight other federal circuits in holding that an inmate-filed compassionate release motion is not limited by the Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.13 policy statement. That was the good news, the only good news.

Eric Andrews is serving a 312-year sentence for a string of armed robberies, with almost all of that time due to stacked 18 USC § 924(c) convictions. If he had been sentenced after passage of the First Step Act, his § 924(c) sentences would have amounted to 91 years, still impressive but possibly a survivable sentence. But because the First Step changes were not retroactive, Rick’s only course was to file a compassionate release motion under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) arguing that his excessive sentence length and the First Step Act changes were the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” supporting grant of the motion.

The district court denied Rick, and last week, the 3rd Circuit agreed.

The appeals court held that “the duration of a lawfully imposed sentence does not create an extraordinary or compelling circumstance… Considering the length of a statutorily mandated sentence as a reason for modifying a sentence would infringe on Congress’s authority to set penalties.”

41475-Forever-Is-A-Long-TimeLikewise, the 3rd ruled, a nonretroactive change to mandatory minimums “cannot be a basis for compassionate release. In passing the First Step Act, Congress specifically decided that the changes to the 924(c) mandatory minimums would not apply to people who had already been sentenced.” Applying rules of statutory construction to the First Step Act, the Circuit said, “we will not construe Congress’s nonretroactivity directive as simultaneously creating an extraordinary and compelling reason for early release. Such an interpretation would sow conflict within the statute… We join the 6th and 7th Circuits in reaching this conclusion.”

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, makes a telling point:

The very first sentence of the Andrews ruling has a Kafka-esque “only in America” quality to it: “Eric Andrews is serving a 312-year sentence for committing a series of armed robberies when he was nineteen.” That a person at age 19 can get a 312-year sentence for a series of robberies strikes me as quite extraordinary and quite compelling, but the district court did not see matters that way. Specifically, as described by the panel opinion, the district court decided that “the duration of Andrews’s sentence and the nonretroactive changes to mandatory minimums could not be extraordinary and compelling as a matter of law.” Of course, there is no statutory text enacted by Congress that sets forth this “as a matter of law.” But the Third Circuit panel here blesses the extra-textual notion that courts can and should invent some new categorical exclusions “as a matter of law” regarding what might qualify as extraordinary and compelling.

noquorum191016The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held the contrary to this opinion, which perhaps puts some wind in Thomas Bryant’s pending petition to the Supreme Court for review of the 11th Circuit’s denial of his compassionate release motion. That petition is ripe for decision at the end of this month at the Supreme Court’s “long conference.” Of course, a reconstituted Sentencing Commission could solve this circuit split by rewriting USSG § 1B1.13, but that would require that the Sentencing Commission first be repopulated with new members. President Biden has thus far shown no more interest than did his predecessor in appointing new members. By December, the Commission will have been without a quorum for three years.

United States v. Andrews, Case No 20-2768, 2021 US App LEXIS 26089 (3d Cir. August 30, 2021)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Third Circuit invents some extra-textual limits on what might permit a sentence reduction under 3582(c)(1)(A) (August 30, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

That ‘Teague’ Thing? We Were Just Kidding – Update for May 25, 2021

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BAD (BUT UNSURPRISING) NEWS ON RETROACTIVITY

sadprison210525How would you like to be convicted of a federal crime with a long sentence, only to have the Supreme Court hold well after the fact that something about your trial was unconstitutional? How would you like that?

That’s an easy one. You would not like to be convicted.  Period. Whether it was done constitutionally or not. No one wants to be convicted. So that was a stupid question.

But over 50,000 people are convicted of federal crimes every year. And they don’t like it, either. They like it even less if, say, if the government grabbed your cellphone location data without a warrant, or you were convicted by a jury vote of 9-2, or the judge jacked up your statutory minimum because he thought your revolver was really a machine gun.

All of those were deemed to be unconstitutional.  The cellphone location data? Carpenter v. United States, 2018. Less-than-unanimous jury? Ramos v. Louisiana, 2020. A nonjury finding jacking your mandatory minimum? Alleyne v. United States, 2013.

The problem is that if your conviction was final before these decisions established that you were constitutionally wronged, you have no right to ask the court for a do-over. That is not unless the decisions are declared to be retroactive, which means that cases like yours that are already final may reopen the issues on collateral review (habeas corpus).

watershed210525Thirty-two years ago, the Supreme Court explained in Teague v. Lane that decisions holding substantive criminal laws to be unconstitutional (such as the Armed Career Criminal Act residual clause in Johnson v. United States) are always retroactive to cases on § 2255 review. However, Teague held, a case in which a criminal procedure was declared unconstitutional (like searches in Carpenter or a less-than-unanimous jury in Ramos) is only retroactive on habeas review only if the new rule was “watershed,” “bedrock” or “essential.”

So what kind of ruling would be “watershed?” Prisoners and defense attorneys have looked for that elusive “watershed” decision for three decades without success. Last week, the Supreme Court heard a case asking whether last year’s Ramos rule on unanimous juries had to be unanimous (a holding which affected Louisiana and Oregon only) was retroactive. The Court ruled 6-3 that Ramos was not a “watershed” rule. More important, the Court gave up pretending that anything could ever be a “watershed” rule.

“This Court has repeatedly stated that a decision announcing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review,” Justice Kavanaugh wrote for the majority. “Indeed, in the 32 years since Teague underscored that principle, this Court has announced many important new rules of criminal procedure. But the Court has not applied any of those new rules retroactively on federal collateral review… And for decades before Teague, the Court also regularly declined to apply new rules retroactively, including on federal collateral review… At this point, some 32 years after Teague, we think the only candid answer is that… no new rules of criminal procedure can satisfy the watershed exception. We cannot responsibly continue to suggest otherwise to litigants and courts… It is time — probably long past time — to make explicit what has become increasingly apparent to bench and bar over the last 32 years: New procedural rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. The watershed exception is moribund.”

squarepeg210525So prisoners, at last, can give up trying to pound round constitutional procedure decisions into Teague’s square holes. The Supreme Court has said what a lot of us suspected ever since Apprendi was declared non-retroactive. Teague’s promise is now and always has been an illusion: there simply are no watershed decisions.

Edwards v. Vannoy, Case No 19-5807, 2021 US LEXIS 2584 (May 17, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

It’s Not a Sentence Until It Is, 6th Circuit Says – Update for December 22, 2020

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DOING IT OVER UNTIL YOU GET IT RIGHT

mulligan190430Mike Henry and an accomplice robbed three banks. In each robbery, Mike’s co-conspirator used a gun. A jury convicted Mike of the three robberies and three counts of using a gun in a crime of violence under 18 USC § 924(c). A § 924(c), you may recall, carries a mandatory sentence of at least five years (more if you brandish it or, God forbid, actually fire it).

In 2013, Mike got 70 months concurrent for the three robberies and 60 months for the first § 924(c) conviction. Because back then, a second or subsequent § 924(c) conviction carried a mandatory sentence of 300 extra months got a total of 600 months (50 years, that is),  for each of the next two § 924(c)s. Mike ended up with a sentence of  730 months (about 61 years in prison).

Mikes’s conviction was reversed because of the intervening Supreme Court decision in Rosemond v United States, which held that an accomplice had to have some level of knowledge that is co-conspirator had a gun. But after retrial, Mike’s sentence got marginally worse, increasing by eight months to 738 months. But while Mike was on appeal the second time, the Supreme Court’s Dean v. United States decision was handed down (holding that judges could adjust the underlying sentence to account for the mandatory § 924(c) sentence), and Mike’s sentence got reversed again in 2018.

By the time Mike was resentenced a second time, the calendar had flipped to 2019, and the First Step Act had passed. First Step Act § 403 amended 18 USC § 924(c) so that subsequent convictions of the statute carried a 300-month mandatory minimum only if the defendant had been previously been convicted of a § 924(c) offense. Which, of course, Mike had not.

Robber160229But First Step was not retroactive. Instead, § 403 applied only to an “offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.” On his latest appeal, Mike argued that First Step § 403 applied to his case, and his sentences for the second and third § 924(c) offenses should have only been 60 months apiece, not 300 months apiece.

Last week, the 6th Circuit agreed. The Court said the plain language of § 403(b) supported its conclusion that the First Step Act applies to defendants whose cases were remanded prior to the First Step Act’s enactment but who were resentenced only after its enactment.  At the time of the First Step Act’s enactment, the Circuit ruled, Mike “did not have ‘a sentence” for the purposes of § 403(b), because his case had been remanded case to the district court for resentencing. “Only when the district court ‘imposed’ Henry’s sentence for his various convictions at his 2019 resentencing did he have a sentence for the purposes of § 403“, the 6th said. “The better reading of ‘a sentence’ requires the defendant to have a valid sentence at the time of the First Step Act’s enactment, not a sentence at some point… Therefore, Henry is eligible for sentencing under First Step Act § 403.”

oldmangrandkids201222This time, some 480 months should come off the sentence, leaving him with a still hefty 250 months (about 21 years). But it leaves Mike with a chance of hugging his grandkids someday.

United States v. Henry, Case 19-2445, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 39799 (6 Cir Dec 18, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Sentencing Sanity the 3rd, 7th Circuits – Update for September 23, 2020

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THREE FIRST STEP/FAIR SENTENCING DECISIONS OF NOTE

Last week was a good one for the First Step Act.

Sentencestack170404Hector Uriante was convicted of running with a gang that kidnapped and robbed drug dealers, including several 18 USC 924(c) counts that got stacked in the pre-First Step days. On the first 924(c) count, he got seven years for brandishing, but the brandishing was found by the judge, not the jury. On direct appeal, the Circuit remanded the case for resentencing because of Alleyne v. United States‘ holding that the jury had to find facts supporting an enhanced mandatory minimum.

The district court resentenced him last year, after First Step passed, but the judge still stacked his 924(c) counts, giving him 25 years for the second one. The district judge held that since Hector was first sentenced before First Step passed, the Act’s ban on stacking 924(c) convictions did not apply.

Last week, the 7th Circuit reversed in an en banc opinion that rejects the 3rd Circuit decision in United States v. Hodge. Because the prior sentence had been vacated, the 7th said, it was a “nullity.” A vacatur “wipes the slate clean,” meaning that at the time First Step passed, Harry was convicted and awaiting sentencing. Congress wrote First Step’s changes in 924(c) stacking to “apply to any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment,” making no distinction between defendants who had never been sentenced and those whose sentence had been vacated fully and who were awaiting the imposition of a new sentence. “In this way,” the Circuit explained, “Congress stanched, to the degree that it could without overturning valid and settled sentences, the mortmain effect of sentencing policies that it considered no longer in the Nation’s best interest. It ensured, moreover, all persons awaiting sentencing on the effective date of the Act would be treated equally, a value long cherished in our law.”

So Hector’s good fortune in getting his sentence overturned under Alleyne, which appears to have saved him two years, in fact reduces his sentence by a full 22 years (two years off the 7-year “brandishing” sentence and a reduction of the second 924(c) sentence from 25 to five years).

conspiracy160606The 7th Circuit last week held that the same rule benefitted Rashod Bethany. Rashod was sentenced for a crack conspiracy in 2013, but later won a § 2255 motion on the grounds his lawyer erred in letting the court use the wrong edition of the Guidelines. He was resentenced after First Step passed, but his sentencing court would not let him benefit from the lower drug mandatory minimums passed in § 401 of the Act.

The 7th said that same rule applied. The § 2255 motion vacated his sentence, so Rashod was in the same position as a defendant who had never been sentenced. The Circuit remanded the case to district cout for a ruling of whether the sentence would have changed if lower mandatory minimums had been applied.

Finally, in the 3rd Circuit, James Easter had filed for a resentencing under First Step § 404, the section that made the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act retroactive. The court decided that James was eligible for a reduction, but denied him one because, the judge concluded, James’s Guidelines range did not change even if the FSA was applied.

James appealed, arguing that a district court had to consider the sentencing factors in 18 USC § 3553(a), not just a mechanistic look at the guidelines. Last week, the 3rd Circuit agreed.

While other circuits generally agree that minimum, a district court may consider the § 3553(a) factors, the 3rd said a judge must do so. “Section 404(b) uses the word ‘impose’ twice, and the first instance clearly refers to the act of imposing the original sentence.” The Circuit ruled. “Because Congress used the same word, we can infer that it conceived of the district court’s role as being the same when it imposes an initial sentence and when it imposes a sentence under the First Step Act. As the text of § 3553(a) makes clear, district courts look to the factors set forth there whenever they impose a sentence on a defendant.”

The 3rd Circuit joins the 4th and 6th Circuits in adopting the rule.

United States v. Uriarte, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 29234 (7th Cir. Sept 15, 2020)
United States v. Bethany, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 29246 (7th Cir. Sept 15, 2020)
United States v. Easter, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 29243 (3d Cir. Sept 15, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Too Many Questions, Too Few Commissioners – Update for October 16, 2019

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DENIAL HIGHLIGHTS JUDICIAL SPLIT ON COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

compassion160208A key provision of the First Step Act allows federal courts to reduce sentences under the so-called compassionate release statutory provisions of 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) – which establishes an ‘extraordinary and compelling” reason standard – without needing a motion from the Bureau of Prisons. Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman said last week in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog that “if applied appropriately and robustly, this provision could and should enable many hundreds (and perhaps many thousands) of federal prisoners to have excessive prison sentences reduced.”

A decision last week in the Southern District of Iowa denying Les Brown compassionate release illustrates the conundrum. Under 28 USC § 994(t), the Sentencing Commission is directed to define “the criteria to be applied and a list of specific extraordinary and compelling examples” for grant of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions. The Commission defined four examples, one medical, one due to age, one due to family circumstances, and one catch-all (that “there exists in the defendant’s case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C)).”

Now the problem: The USSC has not updated its definition since the First Step Act passed. Instead, its policy statement still simply guides the Bureau of Prisons (which has traditionally been very resistant to an Sentencing Commission guidance). The new procedure mandated by the First Step Act calls for new guidance, but the Commission remains mute.

noquorum191016Sadly, there’s a reason for the USSC’s quiescence. The Commission cannot amend its policy statement because the agency lost its quorum last December, about two weeks before First Step passed, and it is still two commissioners short of a quorum. The Trump Administration apparently sees the Commission as a backwater for which no urgency exists in nominating replacement commissioners. For the foreseeable future, the Commission remains impotent, and the compassionate release policy cannot not be updated.

Some district courts have concluded this means the Commission lacks any applicable policy statement dictating when a judge can grant compassionate release. These courts have decided that this means the district judge can consider anything — or at least anything the BOP could have considered (whether it did or not) — when assessing a defendant’s motion.

But others have held that First Step merely lets them grant a motion for compassionate release if the BOP Director could have done the same under the guidelines and the old Program Statement. These courts hold that judges may not stray beyond the four bases listed in USSG §1B1.13.

Sentencestack170404Last week’s ruling by Senior Judge Robert Pratt is a thoughtful opinion about compassionate release, issued in response to defendant Les Brown’s motion to reduce his 510-month sentence. That sentence was pumped up by a 300-month second 18 USC §924(c) sentence, one that could no longer be imposed since passage of the First Step Act. While Judge Pratt finds that “much about Defendant’s situation is extraordinary and compelling,” he concluded “the Court cannot exercise its discretion to grant release at this time.”

The Judge calculated that even if First Step let him retroactively reduce the second § 924(c) sentence from 300 months to 60 months (which the Act doe not permit), Les would still face a total of 210 months in prison. As of now, he has served only 167 months, “a long stretch by any measure, and perhaps more than appropriate for Defendant’s crimes. Regardless, because Defendant would still be in prison under modern law, any sentencing disparity created by § 924(c) stacking does not, at least yet, provide an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ for compassionate release.”

Judge Pratt suggested that Les could come back at 210 months to make his argument. For what it’s worth, I believe that by then, Congress will have revisited the issue and made the § 924(c) sentencing change retroactive, just as it did with the Fair Sentencing Act’s changes to crack minimums.

Prof. Berman complained that “Judge Pratt refuses to use the legal tool available to him to reduce Brown’s sentence, and so Brown is now still slated to serve nearly another 30 years in prison(!) that neither Congress nor any judge views as in any way justified by any sound sentencing purposes.” He is correct. However, until higher courts resolve the conundrum of the missing USSC guidance (or the Commission regains a quorum, and fixes the statement on its own), the present confusion is going to work to the detriment of a lot of inmates.

United States v. Brown, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175424 (SD Iowa Oct. 8, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

4th Circuit Holds Plea Agreement Waiver Does Not Block Johnson/Dimaya/Davis Claims – Update for August 5, 2019

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DODGING THE WAIVER

190805myopiaA type of myopia common among federal defendants filing post-conviction § 2255 motions is understandable: people get so focused on their substantive issues – the prosecutor lied, the defense attorney slept, the judge was inept – that no one ever asks whether some arcane issue of procedure will defeat his or her claim before the merits are ever reached.

One of the first procedural issues I usually worry about is the waiver. Face it, 97% of federal inmates plead guilty, and almost all of them sign some kind of plea agreement. And almost all plea agreements include a waiver section, in which a defendant waives the right to appeal or to collaterally attack (as in, file a § 2255 motion) the conviction or sentence. There is always an exception in the case of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel, but what happens when something like Johnson v. United States or Sessions v. Dimaya or United States v. Davis comes along?

Randall Cornette, convicted of a felon-in-possession charge, challenged his Armed Career Criminal Act sentence. The trial court had relied on some old Georgia burglaries that Randy said could no longer count under Johnson. The government replied that Randy had signed a plea agreement waiver that prevented him from raising a Johnson issue.Waivers160215

Last week, the 4th Circuit ruled that a plea agreement waiver does not prevent a defendant from taking advantage of Supreme Court decisions like Johnson or Davis. The appeals court ruled that an otherwise valid appeal waiver did not bar Randy from now arguing that by imposing a sentence under the unconstitutional residual clause of the ACCA, the district court exceeded its statutory authority to sentence him.

The Court said that an appeal waiver does not preclude a defendant from challenging a sentence “based on a constitutionally impermissible factor” or “a sentence imposed in excess of the maximum penalty provided by statute.” Randy’s sentence challenge is based on the assertion that the district court did not have the statutory authority to impose the sentence under to the residual clause. Because Johnson was made retroactive by the Supreme Court, the Circuit said, “all sentences rendered under the residual clause became unconstitutional. Therefore, Randy’s sentence was imposed in excess of the maximum penalty provided by ACCA.”

The 4th said that this doesn’t mean that a non-retroactive change in the law, like Booker or Alleyne, can be challenged where there is a collateral-attack waiver. But where a Supreme Court case (like Davis, for instance) “announces a substantive rule that applies retroactively, the district court is now deemed to have had no statutory authority to impose [a] sentence,” and a court may review a sentencing challenge “notwithstanding the appeal waiver.”

United States v. Cornette, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 22554 (4th Cir. July 30, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

DOJ Just Trying to be Fair – Update for July 30, 2019

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SOME AUSAS ARGUING AGAINST FSA RETROACTIVE SENTENCES

Inmates filing for retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act to crack sentences imposed before August 2010 have run into a confusing morass of judicial interpretations and U.S. Attorney’s Office positions.

A substantial number (1,610, according to the Dept. of Justice a week ago) have received sentencing reductions. A number of others in a few districts are sitting in limbo, on file for months without action. Still others are like Monae Davis, who walked out of prison March 7 because of the retroactive Fair Sentencing Act (included as Section 403 of the First Step Act) . But as Monae looks for work and re-connects with his family, prosecutors are working to undo the resentencing that shaved six years off his 20-year prison sentence, because the government says the amount of drugs they handled was too large to qualify for a reduced sentence.

smails190730Monae pled guilty to selling 50 grams or more of crack, resulting in his 20-year sentence. Under the retro FSA, that carries a minimum sentence of five years, less than half the time he has already served. But prosecutors say Monae should not get a break, because in his plea deal he admitted to handling between 1.5 kilograms and 4.5 kilograms. That’s too high, even under current law and guidelines, to qualify for a sentence reduction.

DOJ told Reuters last week that it is just trying to ensure that prisoners seeking relief under the First Step Act aren’t treated more leniently than defendants now facing prosecution. DOJ said prosecutors now have a greater incentive than previously to bring charges that more closely reflect the total amount of drugs they believe to be involved. “This is a fairness issue,” a DOJ spokesman said.

Speaking of fairness, Attorney General William Barr announced last Thursday that the BOP would resume executions of inmates sentenced to death in December, with five lethal injections scheduled through the end of January 2020. “The Justice Department upholds the rule of law — and we owe it to the victims and their families to carry forward the sentence imposed by our justice system,” Barr said in a statement.

Reuters, As new U.S. law frees inmates, prosecutors seek to lock some back up (July 23)

Washington Post, Justice Department plans to restart capital punishment after long hiatus (July 25)

9TH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT ELUDING IMMIGRATION ONLY HAPPENS AT PORTS OF ENTRY

Oracio Corrales-Vazquez, a Mexican citizen, walked into the US over the mountains east of Tecate, California. He only made it about four miles into U.S. territory when Customs and Border Patrol picked him up. Oracio was charged with eluding examination or inspection by immigration officers” in violation of 8 USC § 1325(a)(2).

immigrant190730Last week, a 9th Circuit panel reversed his conviction, holding that an alien who crosses into the country at a non-designated time or place is not guilty of a § 1325(a)(2) offense. Rather, to convict a defendant under § 1325(a)(2), the government must prove that the alien’s criminal conduct occurred at a time and place designated for “examination or inspection by immigration officers,” that is, at a port of entry open for inspection.

United States v. Corrales-Vazquez, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 22063 (9th Cir. July 24, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court Davis Decision Declared Retroactive By 11th Circuit – Update for July 29, 2019

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11th CIRCUIT HOLDS DAVIS TO BE RETROACTIVE

I have been asked a lot in the last month whether the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Davis would apply retroactively to convictions for using or carrying a gun during a violent or drug crime (violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) that were already final when the Davis decision was handed down June 24th. While I have always been sure that Davis ought to be retroactive, I was never completely confident that the courts of appeal would agree with me.

retro190729Last Tuesday, the 11th Circuit surprised me in a good way. Faced with a motion for permission to file a second-or-successive § 2255 motion (known as a “2244” because the request is filed under 28 USC § 2244) by a defendant whose § 924(c) conviction was based on a solicitation-to-murder count (and thus was invalid under Davis), the Circuit ruled that Davis is retroactive.

This retroactivity rule is important, because it opens the door for people who have filed 2255 motions already to get permission to file a second one challenging their § 924(c) convictions under the Davis ruling. Davis, you may recall, (1) affirmed that the categorical approach to judging whether a prior conviction was a crime of violence is the appropriate standard, rejecting several circuits’ claims that in a § 924(c) review, the court should look at a defendant’s actual conduct; (2) effectively ruled that conspiracies to commit crimes of violence (as well as solicitations and, quite possibly, attempts and accessories charges) are not crimes of violence; and (3) ruled that the § 924(c) residual clause, like the Armed Career Criminal Act and 18 USC § 16(b) residual clauses, was unconstitutionally vague.

violence160110The 11th Circuit held that Davis met all of the requirements for retroactivity. Davis announced a new substantive rule, because just as Johnson narrowed the scope of the ACCA, Davis narrowed the scope of 924(c) by interpreting the term “crime of violence.” And, the Circuit said, the rule announced in Davis is “new” because it extended Johnson and Dimaya to a new statute and context. “The Supreme Court in Davis restricted for the first time the class of persons § 924(c) could punish,” the appeals court said, “and, thus, the government’s ability to impose punishments on defendants under that statute. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Davis to resolve the circuit split on whether § 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague illustrates that the rule in Davis was not necessarily dictated by precedent or ‘apparent to all reasonable jurists’.”

While the Supreme Court has not held Davis to be retroactive, the 11th said, “the Supreme Court holdings in “multiple cases… necessarily dictates retroactivity of the new rule.” Davis announced a new substantive rule, the 11th held, “and Welch tells us that a new rule such as the one announced in Davis applies retroactively to criminal cases that became final before the new substantive rule was announced.”

Two days later, the 11th Circuit held that another defendant would be allowed to pursue his 924(c) claims under Davis, despite the fact he had tried and failed to do the same under Johnson and Dimaya. The fact that he had previously lost the same issue would not preclude a successive 2255, despite the fact that 11th Circuit precedent in In re Baptiste suggested otherwise. The court said the defendant’s “proposed Davis claim is not barred under In re Baptiste (concluding that a repeat § 2255 claim that was raised and rejected in a prior successive application is barred by [28 USC] 2244(b)(1)).” Although the rationale underlying Johnson and Dimaya on which the defendant’s prior successive applications were based is the same rationale that underlies Davis, his prior losses do not bar him raising the Johnson/Dimaya claim again, because “Davis announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law in its own right, separate and apart from (albeit primarily based on) Johnson and Dimaya.”

knuckles190729Other courts of appeal will have to weigh in on Davis retroactivity for inmates seeking 2244 permission in those circuits, but the 11th position, laid out in a detailed and well-reasoned published opinion, will wield substantial influence on those courts. The 11th, after, is notoriously stingy in granting 2244 motions (it was the circuit that turned down Greg Welch, whose case went on to establish that Johnson was retroactive in Welch v. United States), as well as the appeals court whose Ovalles opinion was directly contrary to what the Supreme Court decided in Davis). That this Circuit has articulated a basis for Davis retroactivity so soon after having its figurative knuckles rapped is a welcome surprise.

In re Hammoud, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 21950 (11th Cir. July 23, 2019)

In re Cannon, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 22238 (11th Cir. July 25. 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

First Step Tidbits – Update for June 5, 2019

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We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

FIRST STEP ROUNDUP

Looking for a Loophole: First Step news from last week: First, a cautionary tale for anyone who thinks there is a magic potion that will make the sentencing changes in the First Step Act retroactive.

loophole190605As with most legislation the First Step Act represents countless compromises. Prominent among those were the deals made on retroactivity. The Act changed 18 USC § 924(c), which punishes people who use a gun in a drug crime or crime of violence with a mandatory consecutive term of five years (if the defendant was just carrying the gun), seven years (if the defendant brandished the gun) or 10 years (if the defendant actually shot it). All of that makes sense. The statute also imposes a mandatory consecutive 25 years on a defendant for a second conviction under 924(c).

The problem was lousy draftsmanship. Congress figured that it you got five years extra for a 924(c) conviction but did not learn your lesson, you ought to get a minimum 25 years on the second conviction. But the provision was written so that any subsequent conviction under 924(c) got you the enhanced time. Say that today you sell some dope on the street corner, with a gun stuffed in your pants. Then, tomorrow you do the same thing. The U.S. Attorney will charge you with two distribution counts and two 924(c) counts, one for each day. Before the First Step Act, you would get a sentence for the drugs, a consecutive five years for today’s 924(c) count, and a consecutive 25 years for tomorrow’s 924(c). That was not the way it was supposed to work, but U.S. Attorneys don’t care what Congress meant. They only care about what Congress wrote.

The First Step Act changed 924(c) to make it clear that the 25 years can be added only if you had already been convicted of the first 924(c) before you committed the second one. Likewise, it changed portions of 21 USC § 841(b)(1) to make the former mandatory life sentence into a 25-year sentence, and the former 20-year sentence into a 15-year sentence. But to sell some of the troglodytes in the Senate (yes, we mean you, Sen. Tom Cotton [R-Alabama]) on supporting First Step, the changes in the mandatory minimums were not made retroactive. Only the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act – which like First Step had the retroactivity taken out in order to rustle up enough support to pass the measure – was made retroactive in First Step.

trog190605Devan Pierson thought he could wriggle through a loophole. He got sentenced to life for a drug distribution case, due to his criminal history and the presence of guns. On appeal, he argued that because the First Step Act had made life sentences into 25-year maximum sentences, his life sentence – which was still on direct review – should be reduced.

Last Friday, the 7th Circuit disagreed. “Subsection 401(c) states that the amendments in that section ‘shall apply to any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.’ In common usage in federal sentencing law, a sentence is “imposed” in the district court… In the First Step Act, Congress chose language that points clearly toward that same result: the date of sentencing in the district court controls application of the new, more lenient terms.”

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Power of the Media: I wrote last week about some district courts holding that reductions in crack sentences under the retroactive Fair Sentencing Act must rely on the “offense controls” theory instead of the “indictment controls” theory. If you are in that kind of fix, it is good to have friends in the media.

In 1994, in the depths of the war on drugs, Sonny Mikell picked up a third federal drug conviction in Florida and was handed a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison. Although he was only found guilty for 50 grams by a jury, the sentencing judge agreed with the presentence report that held him culpable for 290 grams (for sentencing purposes).

When the First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive, Sonny applied for relief. His sentencing judge granted it promptly, sending Sonny home right from the hearing. But the government appealed to the 11th Circuit, apparently intending to argue that the “offense controls” theory (and the 290 grams) should govern.

Stopthedrugwar.org picked up the story, and ran it week. Citizen Truth republished it. The next day, the government dismissed its appeal without explanation. Citizen Truth may not be Kim Kardashian, but it got the job done.

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You’re My Bestie: Finally, the Daily Beast picked up the story of Rufus Rochell, a man from inauspicious circumstances who befriended Conrad Black when the two were together at FCI Coleman. Black, a wealthy Canadian publisher and friend of Trump, was pardoned by the President a few weeks ago.

bff190605Rufus and Conrad both worked in the education department, Rufus as a law clerk and Conrad as a tutor helping inmates study for their GEDs. “They had conversations about history and education. And they found humor in the subtle absurdities of prison life, such as the thunderous rain that fell whenever inmates were asked to report for lawn duty.”

When Conrad was released on bail after a favorable SCOTUS decision, a rumor spread that he had been arrogant and condescending as an inmate. At Conrad’s request, Rufus wrote a letter refuting the claim, and praising his selflessness.

Now that Conrad has been pardoned, Rufus is hoping for a break through the First Step Act or executive clemency, and is looking to Conrad for support. According to the Daily Beast, nothing has yet been forthcoming.

I have heard a lot of guys being released who promised to send friends money, to keep in touch, even get together after it was all over. It does not often happen. You would hope, however, that when someone is powerful, rich and close to power, especially when he himself has been blessed with good luck, such a promise would not be forgotten.

United States v. Pierson, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 16296 (7th Cir. May 31, 2019)

CitizenTruth.org, Why Are Prosecutors Trying to Send a First Step Act Ex-Prisoner Back to Prison? (May 28)

Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Mikell, Case No. 19-11459-G (11th Cir. May 29, 2019)

Daily Beast, Trump Pardoned Billionaire Conrad Black but Left His Prison Buddy Behind

– Thomas L. Root