Tag Archives: felon-in-possession

District Court Decision Questions Everything in 18 USC § 922 – Update for September 26, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BEGINNING OF THE END FOR 18 USC 922?

Notguns170330A remarkable district court decision from Western District of Texas last week held that 18 USC § 922(n), a subsection that prohibits people who are under indictment  from possessing guns or ammunition that have traveled in interstate commerce, is unconstitutional.

District Judge David Counts dismissed an 18 USC § 922(n) charge against Jose Quiroz, who was facing a Texas burglary indictment when he tried to buy a .22-caliber version of the Colt Model 1911 handgun.

In a 25-page opinion filed in Pecos, Texas, Counts ruled that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s June decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, despite “valid public policy and safety concerns,” the statute had to be considered under a historical analysis alone. He held that “[a]lthough not exhaustive, the Court’s historical survey finds little evidence that § 922(n) — which prohibits those under felony indictment from obtaining a firearm — aligns with this Nation’s historical tradition. As a result, this Court holds that § 922(n) is unconstitutional.”

gun160711The Court said that the “Second Amendment is not a ‘second class right.’ No longer can courts balance away a constitutional right. After Bruen, the Government must prove that laws regulating conduct covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text align with this Nation’s historical tradition.”

What makes the decision interesting is not just the detailed historical analysis that argues against the constitutionality of § 992(n). In addition, the decision casts substantial doubt on whether 18 USC § 922(g) – which prohibits people convicted of felonies from possessing guns or ammo – is still constitutional in light of Bruen.

Bruen held that “when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government… must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms….”

manyguns190423Judge Counts reviewed the history of laws prohibiting felons from possessing guns: “By the mid-1920s, only six states had laws banning concealed carry by someone convicted of a crime involving a concealed weapon. And zero states banned possession of long guns based on a prior conviction… Whether this Nation has a history of disarming felons is arguably unclear—it certainly isn’t clearly “longstanding.” And what’s even more unclear—and still unproven—is a historical justification for disarming those indicted, but not yet convicted, of any crime.”

The Quiroz opinion is only a district court holding and is not binding precedent on other courts (even in its home 5th Circuit). However, the decision is written with detail that is extraordinary for a district court case and may have a lot of persuasive authority for other district courts (and even courts of appeal). The case also suggests that Bruen, only three months old, could have a major effect on 18 USC § 922.

Even before Bruen, Supreme Court Justice Amy Barrett – when she was still on the 7th Circuit – argued in her dissent in Kanter v. Barr that the felon-in-possession statute could not constitutionally applied to people with nonviolent felony convictions:

History is consistent with common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns. But that power extends only to people who are dangerous. Founding-era legislatures did not strip felons of the right to bear arms simply because of their status as felons… In 1791 — and for well more than a century afterward — legislatures disqualified categories of people from the right to bear arms only when they judged that doing so was necessary to protect the public safety.

Anyone filing direct appeals or post-conviction motions in cases where they were convicted of 18 USC § 922 offenses should seriously consider raising a constitutionality issue in light of Bruen.

United States v. Quiroz, Case No 22-cr-00104, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168329 (W.D.Tex., September 19, 2022)

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (2022)

Associated Press, Judge holds gun ban for felony defendants unconstitutional (September 19, 2022)

Sentencing Law and Policy, District Court declares § 922(n), which criminalizes a person under indictment from receiving a firearm, to be unconstitutional (September 20, 2022)

Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir., 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

A Moment in Time: Wooden Redefines ‘Occasions’ – Update for March 17, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE OCCASIONAL CRIME

As I reported last week, on March 7, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed a sentence in the case of Dale Wooden, a man who had received an Armed Career Criminal Act-enhanced 15-year sentence for having committed ten prior burglaries. He had broken into a self-storage building and burgled ten separate units all in one hour’s work.

May you rest in peace, Betty... stealing America's hearts did not make you ACCA-qualified.
May you rest in peace, Betty… stealing America’s hearts did not make you ACCA-qualified.

The ACCA is a penalty statute. If someone possesses a firearm or ammunition while being prohibited from doing so – 18 USC § 922(g) includes prior felony convictions, being a fugitive, using controlled substances, even having a dishonorable discharge, and a host of other prohibitions – the penalty is up to ten years in prison. But if the defendant has been convicted of three violent felonies or serious drug offenses, and those three offenses were committed on “occasions different from one another,” the penalty jumps to a minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life without parole. Rather harsh…

Dale only had one wild night in a storage facility, when he broke through flimsy drywall walls separating individual storage units and took what he could find. But the state charged him with ten burglaries, which are considered to be violent crimes. Many years later, when a police officer who had stopped by Dale’s house saw a gun in plain sight, Dale was charged as a felon-in-possession. An enterprising U.S. Attorney figured that the ten burglaries had been committed on “occasions different from one another,” because, after all, you can only burgle one storage unit at a time. And that is how Dale became an armed career criminal.

Whether the occasions really were different from one another was the question that made it to the Supreme Court. Interpreting the ACCA’s “on occasions different from one another” language, all nine justices agreed that Dale’s ten burglaries occurred during the same “occasion.” Writing for the court, Justice Kagan first explained that according to its ordinary meaning, an occasion is “essentially an episode or event. If one learned about Wooden’s burglary spree,” Kagan explained, “they would say: ‘On one occasion, Wooden burglarized ten units in a storage facility.’ A person would not say: ‘On ten occasions, Wooden burglarized a unit in the facility.’ Nor would the average person describe Wooden breaking into each separate unit as its own independent occasion. Indeed, one need only turn to the dictionary to confirm this to be true, as the word occasion ‘commonly refers to an event, occurrence, happening, or episode’.”

If the Hamburglar stole them on successive days...
If the Hamburglar stole them on successive days…

Kagan ruled that “by treating each temporally distinct offense as its own occasion,” the government’s interpretation of the word “occasion” essentially collapses “two separate statutory conditions.” Kagan noted that the history of the “occasions” clause supports this interpretation. Congress amended ACCA to include the clause in order to write the Solicitor General’s position in United States v. Petty into law. In Petty, the Solicitor General admitted to the Supreme Court that the ACCA should be triggered only when a person’s prior convictions result from “multiple criminal episodes” even though such a requirement was not founded in ACCA’s text. Kagan explained that Congress amended ACCA to include the “separate occasions” requirement.

Recognizing that courts may struggle to define “separate occasions,” Kagan suggested standards: If offenses are committed “close in time,” they “will often count as part of one occasion; not so offenses separate by substantial gaps in time or significant intervening events.” She explained that in defining an occasion, “proximity of location is also important; the further away crimes take place, the less likely they are components of the same criminal event.” Finally, Kagan noted that “the character and relationship of the offenses may make a difference: The more similar or intertwined the conduct giving rise to the offenses… the more apt they are to compose one occasion.” She said that “applying this approach” will usually “be straightforward and intuitive.

Justices Gorsuch and Sotomayor were unsure how straightforward Kagan’s approach would be, given that different people may have “different intuitions about the same set of facts.” A multifactor balancing test, he wrote, did not give lower courts adequate guidance. “Imagine a defendant who sells drugs to the same undercover police officer twice at the same street corner one hour apart,” he wrote. “Do the sales take place on the same occasion or different ones?”

burglthree160124Gorsuch added that Kagan’s factors did not conclusively answer the question presented in the Wooden case. “When it comes to location, each storage unit had its own number and space, each burglary infringed on a different person’s property, and Mr. Wooden had to break through a new wall to enter each one,” Justice Gorsuch wrote. “Suppose this case involved not adjacent storage units but adjacent townhomes or adjacent stores in a mall. If Mr. Wooden had torn through the walls separating them, would we really say his crimes occurred at the same location?”

In Gorsuch’s view, the rule of lenity – the principle that courts should resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of criminal defendants – should come into play when courts struggle to decide whether crimes were committed as part of a single “occasion.”

Because Wooden’s decision interprets a statute, inmates in many circuits will be able to retroactively apply the decision to their ACCA convictions under the 28 USC § 2255(e) saving clause. It seems likely that the courts will struggle in applying the standards to the movant’s respective facts. Dale Wooden’s case seemed almost nonsensical. But what about (all too common) the guy who sold cocaine on a street corner for three successive days, and was convicted of three state-court distribution counts? Were those the same occasion? Or robs three banks in a week-long drug-addled frenzy?

The lawyers will be busy…

Wooden v. United States, Case No 20-5279, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 1421 (Mar 7, 2022)

SCOTUSBlog, Perhaps defining an “occasion” is not so difficult after all (March 8, 2022)

New York Times, Supreme Court Says 10 Burglaries Can Count as One Offense (March 7, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Buyer’s Remorse At SCOTUS Over Rehaif? – Update for April 29, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

YOU’LL NEVER FORGET YOUR FIRST FELONY

Robber160229The Supreme Court heard oral arguments last week in United States v. Gary and Greer v. United States, two cases that would dramatically increase the benefits to defendants flowing from Rehaif v. United States.

But the devil’s in the details, and the prospects for neither one looks good. While it’s dangerous to predict the outcome of a case based on what you hear at oral argument, the Supremes seemed skeptical of the relief the defendants were urging and perhaps just a little uneasy over the genie that Rehaif let out of the bottle.

Mike Gary pled guilty to an 18 USC 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession charge. After Rehaif held that a defendant had to actually know that he or she fell within a class that was prohibited from having a gun, the 4th Circuit held that the district court’s failure to tell Mike that the government had to prove he knew he was a felon at the time he possessed the weapon was a “structural” error, and therefore his conviction had to be vacated whether or not the error made any difference in the proceeding’s outcome.

In the second case, Greg Greer was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession. After Rehaif, the 11th Circuit reaffirmed his conviction on the ground that, according to his presentence report (which was not part of the evidence at trial), Greg had previously been convicted of five felonies and had served more than a year in prison. Therefore, the court reasoned, it wouldn’t have made any difference if his jury had been properly instructed about the government’s obligations, because if Rehaif had been the law, the government would easily have shown that Greg knew he was a prohibited felon. At the Supreme Court, Greg was arguing that the appellate court should have limited itself to the evidence in front of the jury (which of course contained nothing about Greg’s checkered past).

The justices were overtly skeptical of Greg’s argument. Justice Thomas asked, “Do you have any doubt in this case that the government would have preferred to introduce the evidence that you say is lacking here?… Your approach would put someone who stipulates in a better position than someone who actually went to trial.”

breyeradrift210429Justice Breyer, who wrote Rehaif, seemed to be looking for a way to limit any further fallout from the decision. “Why only look at the trial record?” he asked, before posing a number of hypotheticals. “There could have been something that happened before the trial [that is] an error,” the justice noted. “There could be something on the list of witnesses, there could be a limitation on what’s asked,” Breyer continued. “The possibilities are endless. So where does this idea come from you can only look at certain things?” he asked. “I’m totally at sea as to why or how to draw some line.”

The justices seemed similarly skeptical of Mike Gary’s case, with many noting that it could have widespread effects on existing convictions. Speaking about the proposition that an individual’s felony status “is not the kind of thing that one forgets,” Justice Kavanaugh said, “from that premise it seems odd to throw out all of the convictions” and asked Mike’s lawyer if he believed that premise to be true.

judgedefendant210429“The question shouldn’t be whether defendants are typically aware of the element or the element is typically satisfied,” Gary’s counsel replied. “The question should be whether the defendant when he pleads guilty understood that that was part of the charge and therefore was given an opportunity to exercise his own free will.”

Both cases will be decided by the end of June.

SCOTUSBlog, Justices wrestle with procedural issues stemming from their own federal criminal-law decision (April 21, 2021)

Law & Crime, SCOTUS Seems to Have Heeded Justice Alito’s Warning, Appears Unlikely to Reverse Gun Convictions (April 20, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

7th Circuit OKs Rehaif Relief Where Issue Is “Complex” – Update for July 6, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

AIN’T SEEN NUTHIN’ YET

guns200304With the exception of the Fourth Circuit (which is a story for another time), courts of appeal agree that people convicted of being “prohibited persons” in possession of a gun have to meet the F.R.Crim.P. 52(b) “plain error” standard to raise the Supreme Court’s Rehaif case on appeal where they did not do so at trial.

That’s pretty relevant, because until Rehaif was handed down a year ago, no one was raising the issue at trial.

“Plain error” means you have to show that the trial court erred, that the error was plain (or obvious), that it affects your substantial rights, and that the error seriously affects the integrity of the justice system. In Rehaif cases, this means that the defendant had to show that there was a reasonable probability he or she would not have entered a guilty plea or been convicted if the error had not occurred.

To do this, the courts look at how likely it was the defendant would have known he or she belonged to a class of people not allowed to have guns. Sometimes that’s pretty easy to figure out: the defendant knew he or she had previously served more than a year for some prior crime. In that case, it’s hard for a defendant to argue he did not know that he had been convicted of a crime carrying a sentence of more than a year.

But what if the prohibited class the defendant belongs to is not all that clear? Bob Triggs’ kid made some stupid social media posts that suggested shooting up his school, so the police checked to be sure the boy had no access to firearms. In the process, they found that Bob – who had a few hunting rifles – had a 10-year old domestic battery misdemeanor. A conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is as disqualifying for gun possession as a prior felony under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).

manyguns190423Bob said he had no idea he couldn’t have a gun, and he surrendered the rifles to the police. They turned it over to the U.S. Attorney (who rarely sees a case unworthy of throwing the might of the United States government at the hapless defendant), and Bob got indicted for a § 922(g) offense.

(In another world, the cops would have said, “Gee, Bob, now you know you can’t have guns,” and would have turned his rifles over to  the someone to sell them and given Bob the proceeds. But this is America, the world’s leading incarcerator of citizens. We just had to prosecute this hapless guy).

After Bob got convicted, Rehaif – which held that a defendant had to know that he or she was a member of a group prohibited from possessing a gun – was decided, and Bob raised it on appeal under the “plain error” standard. The 7th Circuit agreed the district court’s conviction of Bob without proof he knew he was in a prohibited class was an error, and it was pretty obvious.

The Circuit said to establish prejudice from the Rehaif error, Bob had to show a “reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of the government’s burden to prove” he knew of the error.

“Many prosecutions under § 922(g) involve violations of… the felon-dispossession provision, which prohibits firearm possession by any person ‘who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,’ the 7th said. “Under this simple definition, a defendant will have difficulty establishing prejudice from a Rehaif error because the new knowledge element is quite easy to prove, especially when the defendant previously served more than a year in prison… A defendant in that situation ‘will face an uphill battle to show that a Rehaif error in a guilty plea affected his substantial rights’ because the new understanding of the knowledge element doesn’t materially change the guilty-plea calculus.”

guns170111But what constitutes a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, the Circuit ruled, is a very complex thing. “Given the comparative complexity of this definition,” the 7th Circuit said, “the guilty-plea calculus changes. Rehaif improves Triggs’s trial prospects, giving him at least a plausible argument that he was unaware that his 2008 battery conviction is a crime of this nature.”

The 7th Circuit may yet rue the day it held that 922(g)’s complexity gave a defendant a plausible reason to believe he was allowed to own guns. The definition of “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” seems pretty straightforward until one reads the pretzel-like definition set out in 18 USC § 921(a)(20). It turns out that sometimes a crime is not a “crime” and a two-year sentence does not exceed one year, and other state laws having nothing to do with disqualifying crime turn it into an offense that doesn’t count.

So the 7th says that § 922(g)(9)’s complicated? You ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

United States v. Triggs, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 20542 (7th Cir. July 1, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

4th Holds Defendant Has Right to Know About ACCA Sentence at Guilty Plea – Update for January 21, 2020

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4TH CIRCUIT HOLDS LIKELY ACCA SENTENCE MUST BE MENTIONED AT PLEA HEARING

A week ago last Friday, the 4th Circuit ruled that a defendant in a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm case (18 USC § 922(g)(1)) must be told of the risk that he or she will receive a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (18 USC § 924(e)) at the time the guilty plea is entered.

guilty170417Anyone is entitled to plead guilty, and a lot of people do. In fact, something like 97% of all federal defendants enter guilty pleas. That could be because of the superior law enforcement work done in ensuring that only guilty people ever get indicted. Of course, it could be that the system is rigged so that most of the time, the only rational course for a defendant to pursue is to admit to whatever the government has charged him or her with, in order to save a spouse from indictment, to secure a sentence that offers some chance of release in a reasonable time frame, or just to get out of jail and into a prison setting which is sweeter than county lockup.

Nevertheless, when a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she gives up a panoply of constitutional rights, such as right to a trial by jury, a right to confront the accusers, the right to present evidence, the right to be found guilty only beyond a reasonable doubt. For that reason, due process and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that a guilty plea be entered with the defendant aware of those rights, aware of the contents of any written plea agreement, and aware of the maximum penalty he or she faces.

changeofplea170616Jesmene Lockhart pled guilty without a plea agreement to a single § 922(g)(1) count. During a Rule 11 change-of-plea hearing (which is a lengthy formal proceeding at which the defendant changes the “not guilty” plea into a “guilty” plea), the magistrate judge asked the government to “summarize the charge and the penalty.” The government said the “maximum penalty” Jesmene faced was 10 years.

This was technically correct: at that time, everyone was reading the sentencing statute, 18 USC § 924(a)(2), which specified a maximum sentence of 10 years. No one was considering whether Jesmene had prior convictions that might result in his getting a 15-year mandatory minimum ACCA sentence under § 924(e).

But as the parties prepared for sentencing, the presentence report writer uncovered Jesmene’s prior convictions, and noticed the parties that he was eligible for the ACCA 14-year mandatory minimum sentence. Jesmene fought the ACCA designation, arguing that the convictions were too remote (he had been 16 years old), too close in time to one another, and statutorily exempt. Nothing worked.

What Jesmene did not try to do was to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds it was not knowing and voluntary, because has was not told he could get an ACCA sentence. On appeal, even under the tougher “plain error” standard (because his trial court lawyer had not raised the issue), Jesmene claimed his guilty plea was involuntary because he had not been told about the possible ACCA sentence. He contended the benefit he gained from pleading guilty – a reduction from the bottom of his ACCA guideline range of 188 months to 180 months – was “so small as to be virtually non-existent.” Had he known about the risk of an ACCA sentence and how little a plea deal would help him, Jesmene contended, he would have had strong incentive to go to trial to try to avoid the 15-year ACCA sentence altogether.

plea161116In a January 10 en banc opinion, the 4th Circuit held that Jesmene had met the plain error standard: the failure to inform him of the ACCA sentence at the change-of-plea was an error, it was plain, it affected his substantial rights, and “the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The Circuit cited national statistics that felon-in-possession defendants only go to trial 3% of the time, but ACCA defendants choose trial 13.5% of the time, and noted that the difference in Jesmene’s guidelines as a non-ACCA defendant and under the ACCA was 125 months. Plus, his very old criminal history (three burglaries within a short time span when he was 16 years old) suggested that Jesmene, being unaware of the ACCA risk, would reasonably have expected to be sentenced at the bottom of his 46-57 month advisory guideline range. By contrast, the only benefit he got from pleading guilty to an ACCA was an 8-month break for acceptance of responsibility.

The 4th said, “the magistrate judge’s failure to inform Lockhart of the correct sentencing range was an obvious and significant mistake. Such an error undermines the very purpose of Rule 11 that a defendant be fully informed of the nature of the charges against him and of the consequences of his guilty plea… As a result of this error,  Lockhart had every reason to think after the plea hearing that he would receive a sentence within the stated statutory range of between zero and 120 months’ imprisonment…”

United States v. Lockhart, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 822 (4th Cir. Jan 10, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Correcting Your Sentence After Courts Admit a Mistake Gets Harder – Update for January 14, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

6TH CIRCUIT REFUSES § 2241 MOTION ON CIRCUIT SENTENCING STATUTE REINTERPRETATIONS

habeasB191211Since the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, post-conviction habeas corpus motions brought under 28 USC § 2255 have pretty much been one-to-a-customer. A prisoner is entitled to file a second § 2255 motion only where the Supreme Court had issued a constitutional ruling made retroactive (such as 2015’s Johnson v. United States) or where prisoners discover new compelling evidence that they are actually innocent of the offense of conviction.

But § 2255 has a “savings” clause in subsection (e), that lets a prisoner file a classic habeas corpus action under 28 USC § 2241 if the  § 2255 remedy is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Supreme Court held in the 1997 Bousley v. United States decision that if there is a change in statutory interpretation (but not a constitutional violation) that makes a prisoner actually innocent of the crime of conviction, the § 2255(e) “savings” clause applies.

magnacarta200116

For those who came in late: Section 2241 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code establishes procedures for petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus. It establishes the rules for exercising that ancient (think Magna Carta) right to petition the courts whenever one is being detained (jailed or imprisoned) unconstitutionally or contrary to law. It may be the most valuable right anyone has anywhere (that’s why they call it “the Great Writ“).

But when the writ of habeas corpus is aimed not at the jailer, but instead at the constitutionality of the federal court proceeding that got you to prison in the first place, Congress wrote a separate statute – 28 USC § 2255 – to govern those proceedings. A third section, 28 USC § 2254, addresses procedures for state prisoners who have exhausted their habeas rights in state court, and have to head off to federal court.

manyguns190423Now, back to the live action… Just about every federal prisoner files his or her one-and-only § 2255 motion. You have a year from the time your conviction is final, so it is very much a use-it-or-lose-it proposition. But what if (as often happens) you discover something new that could get you released, but the discovery comes after the year passes? Take our hypothetical defendant, Smith N. Wesson. Unsurprisingly, Smith was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 USC § 922(g), despite the fact that he did not know that his prior state conviction was a felony as opposed to a misdemeanor. A felony made him ineligible to possess a gun, a misdemeanor did not. Smith’s lack of knowledge that he was breaking the law made no difference: he would have nonetheless have been guilty. Up until last June, it was not necessary that Smith know he was prohibited from possessing a gun. He only had to know that thing he was carrying was a gun rather than, say, a toaster. And if our man Smith knew anything, he knew guns.

But in June 2019, the Supreme Court threw Smith a bone. It held in Rehaif v. United States that a § 922(g) defendant had to know that he or she was in a class of people prohibited from possessing firearms. After Rehaif, Smith would not be guilty of the crime.

Rehaif was not a decision on the constitutionality of 18 USC § 922(g). Instead, it was just an interpretation of what the statute said. What it had always said, the Supremes said, but none of the courts of appeal had ever under understood that.

gunknot181009But Rehaif put Smith in a quandary: although he was as innocent as a lamb, Smith had already used his § 2255 rights several years before, and he thus could not file a second § 2255 unless he met the narrow criteria. And he definitely did not. But he could file a § 2241 petition, because the § 2255(e) savings clause applies.

Most circuits (not the 10th and 11th) hold that even where a later Supreme Court decision affects only a prisoner’s sentence, not just the prisoner’s conviction, he or she may file a § 2241 petition to get relief. The 4th Circuit has gone further: in the 2018 United States v Wheeler decision, the 4th said that prisoners barred from filing a second § 2255 motion may seek habeas relief under 28 USC § 2241 based on new statutory interpretation decisions from circuit courts of appeal, not just the Supreme Court.

All of which brings us to today’s case. Ramon Hueros got a drug distribution sentence under 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A), the mandatory minimum time for which was doubled from 10 to 20 years because he had been previously convicted of two state drug convictions. After a 9th Circuit and 4th Circuit decision held those prior state convictions were not really felonies at all (which meant Ramon should never have gotten a 240-month minimum federal sentence), he filed for relief. He had previously filed and lost a § 2255 motion, so he filed a § 2241 petition for habeas corpus under the “savings” clause.

limitone170912Last week, the 6th Circuit ruled 2-1 that Ramon was not entitled to use the § 2255(e) savings clause (and thus, file a 2241 motion) based on a new court of appeals decision changing statutory interpretation. “Although the 4th Circuit has blessed an identical request [in the 2018 decision, United States v. Wheeler], we must respectfully decline. Among our reasons: Congress allowed prisoners to file a second § 2255 motion only if the Supreme Court adopts a new rule of constitutional law… We would write this limit out of the statute if we held that new rules from the circuit courts (whether of statutory or constitutional law) could render 2255 inadequate or ineffective and trigger the right to a second round of litigation under 2241.”

The Circuit said a § 2255 remedy is not ineffective unless a prisoner identifies a new Supreme Court decision – not just a circuit court decision – reinterpreting a statute. The AEDPA history, as well as the practical effects of holding otherwise – such as gutting the efficacy of the § 2255(f) time requirements – suggest that circuit court statutory rulings should not fall under the § 2255(e) savings clause.

This may finally be the savings clause decision that makes it to the Supreme Court, where the Court will impose national uniformity on use of the clause to bring 2241 challenges where statutes are reinterpreted to make what was once illegal now legal.

Hueso v. Barnhart, 2020 U.S.App. LEXIS 618 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

You’re Not Exactly a Felon Yet – Update for September 30, 2019

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CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE NOT A CONVICTION

Tyrius Smith had a prior North Carolina case in which he had pled guilty, and then been “conditionally discharged.” But when he was caught with a gun, the Federal district judge called his prior a felony, and Ty was convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun in violation of 18 USC § 922(g).

manyguns190423Last week, the 4th Circuit reversed his conviction. “While there is no doubt that Ty possessed a firearm,” the 4th said, “we must decide whether he was a felon under federal law. Answering that question is surprisingly difficult. Federal law treats someone as a felon if “convicted” of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. But what exactly counts as a ‘conviction’? In some cases the answer seems easy — for example, where a federal judge imposes a sentence after a jury has found the defendant guilty. In other cases it is hard; this is one of them.”

The North Carolina judge, after Ty’s guilty plea, imposed a “conditional discharge” as allowed by state law. This meant that without entering a judgment of guilt,” the court “deferred further proceedings and placed the person on probation… for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate the defendant’s good conduct.” If Ty fulfilled his probation conditions, the guilty plea would be withdrawn and the case dismissed.

Alas, Ty did not fulfill the conditions. Instead, he was caught with some guns, and his probation was violated by North Carolina. But before the conditional discharge could be withdrawn and he could be convicted in the state, the Feds charged him with the § 922(g).

The North Carolina felon-in-possession law defines “conviction” as “a final judgment in any case in which felony punishment, or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year… is authorized, without regard to the plea entered or to the sentence imposed.” Ty’s guilty pla and conditional discharge — as required by statute — was done without entering a judgment of guilt.” And without entry of a judgment, the 4th Circuit said, “and until the anticipated further proceedings” take place, the conditional discharge does not lead to a final judgment.”toughluck180419

So Ty dodged his Federal case. But he still has some ‘splainin’ to do to his North Carolina judge, and the smart money suggests that the state court is going to take the botched federal prosecution into account when it slams old Ty with time in state prison.

United States v. Smith, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 29218 (4th Cir. Sept. 27, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

He Might Have Known About the Felon-Gun Thing – Update for September 13, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SOME THINGS PROVE THEMSELVES

resipsa190913There’s a doctrine we all had to learn in first-year law school torts class known as “res ipsa loquitur.” That’s Latin (which the law uses a lot because when things are obscure, you can charge clients more when you have to explain them), and translates as “the thing speaks for itself.”

In last June’s Rehaif v. United States decision, the Supreme Court explained the elements that the government has to prove for a felon-in-possession conviction under 18 USC § 922(g)(1), elements which everyone had been getting wrong for years. Samir Benamor was on direct appeal of his felon-in-possession conviction when he raised the Rehaif argument, maintaining that the government had not proven that he knew he was a felon prohibited from possessing firearms.

Because Sammy had not raised the issue in the trial court, the 9th Circuit ruled he had to show plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). I seriously doubt the Circuit was right about applying Rule 52(b), but it did, and it concluded that Sam was out of luck.

There was no doubt that the district court plainly erred by not instructing the jury that it had to find that Sammy knew he was a felon ineligible to possess a firearm. But the “plain error” standard also requires proof that but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. One of Sammy’s priors was for being a felon in possession of a gun. The Court sort of thought that that conviction spoke for itself.

gunb160201The 9th Circuit said, “At a minimum, the prior conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had the knowledge required by Rehaif and that any error in not instructing the jury to make such a finding did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial.”

Yeah, you’d think that having been convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun once before would have alerted Sammy that he was a convicted felon prohibited from having a gun. As the law might say, that “res” probably “ipsa loquiturs.”

United States v. Benamor, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 26793 (9th Cir. Sept. 5, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS Rules 922(g) Requires “Knowledge” – Update for June 24, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

KNOWNOTHING-ISM

In a decision that could be seismic for people convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the Supreme Court last Friday ruled that it’s not enough to know that thing stuck in your pants is a gun. You have to know that you are part of a group the law says should not possess a gun. And, for that matter, you have to know you possess a firearm or ammo.

carriefgun170807Hamid Rehaif was in the country on a student visa that required him to be enrolled in college. He dropped out of school, but stuck around Florida to soak up the sun and fun. When ICE finally caught up to him, agents found him in possession of a half box of ammunition. Hamid had not really picked up on the “right to remain silent” thing, so he readily admitted going to a gun range. He was prosecuted for being illegally in possession of a firearm and ammo.

Under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), it is unlawful for a convicted felon to possess a firearm or ammunition. But that’s only subsection (g)(1). There are eight other subsections as well, categories that include fugitives, people under indictment, people convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, people who have been found by courts to be mentally incompetent, illegal aliens, stalkers… there’s a long list.

The government has always gotten away with proving that a defendant had a gun or ammo, and that he or she was a felon or something else on the list. The defendant had to know that that thing he had stuffed in his waistband was a gun. Beyond that, there was no knowledge requirement. A defendant who claimed not to know that he or she was in a prohibited class was just plain out of luck. What the defendant knew or did not know simply was irrelevant. That’s what happened to Hamid. He was fine busting a few caps at the gun range as long as he was in school (and thus compliant with the terms of his student visa). But as soon as he dropped out, his visa automatically expired, and his antics at the gun range became illegal. The district court, and the 11th Circuit, agreed (as did every circuit court in America) that Hamid’s awareness that he should limit his firearms training to Nerf weapons.

rangeThat has now changed. The Supreme Court ruled that in a prosecution under 18 USC 922(g) and 924(a)(2) (they go together), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he or she possessed a firearm and that the defendant knew he or she knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.

Whether a criminal statute requires the government to prove that the defendant acted knowingly, the Court said, is a question of congressional intent. There is a longstanding presumption that Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding “each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” This is normally characterized as a “presumption in favor of scienter.”

In 922(g) and 924(a)(2), Justice Breyer wrote for the 7-2 decision, the statutory text supports the presumption. It specifies that a defendant commits a crime if he or she “knowingly” violates § 922(g), which makes possession of a firearm unlawful when the following elements are satisfied: (1) a status element; (2) a possession element (to “possess”); (3) a jurisdictional element (“in or affecting commerce”); and (4) a firearm element (a “firearm or ammunition”). Aside from the jurisdictional element, the Court said, § 922(g)’s text “simply lists the elements that make a defendant’s behavior criminal. The term ‘knowingly’ is normally read ‘as applying to all the subsequently listed elements of the crime.’ And the ‘knowingly’ requirement clearly applies to 922(g)’s possession element, which follows the status element in the statutory text. There is no basis for interpreting ‘knowingly’ as applying to the second 922(g) element but not the first.

innocent161024What does this mean for the many felons-in-possession now in the system? It could be Bailey v. United States all over again, as people head back to court on 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petitions (where those are allowed) arguing that under the new statutory interpretation, they are actually innocent.

Justice Alito wrote a detailed and blistering dissent. He warned that the decision’s

practical effects will be far reaching and cannot be ignored. Tens of thousands of prisoners are currently serving sentences for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). It is true that many pleaded guilty, and for most direct review is over. Nevertheless, every one of those prisoners will be able to seek relief by one route or another. Those for whom direct review has not ended will likely be entitled to a new trial. Others may move to have their convictions vacated under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and those within the statute of limitations will be entitled to relief if they can show that they are actually innocent of violating § 922(g), which will be the case if they did not know that they fell into one of the categories of persons to whom the offense applies… This will create a substantial burden on lower courts, who are once again left to clean up the mess the Court leaves in its wake as it moves on to the next statute in need of ‘fixing’.

Watch that space. This could be very interesting.

Rehaif v. United States, Case No. 17-9560 (Supreme Court, June 21, 2019)

– Thomas L. Root

Supreme Court 922(g) Case May Hold Unintended Consequence for Felons with Guns – Update for April 29, 2019

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SLEEPER

An oral argument last Tuesday in Rehaif v. United States took a surprising turn, and could make a Supreme Court decision in the case the “sleeper” of the Court’s 2018-2019 term.

gunknot181009Refresher first: Federal law prohibits a long list of people from possessing guns or ammunition. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), bans ownership by people charged with felonies, people convicted of felonies, people who have been certified as crazy, people who beat their spouses, people subject to protection orders, people who do drugs, people who are here illegally, and so on and so on.

The statute (922(g)) is colloquially known as the “felon-in-possession” statute, although its reach is much broader than that. Read the statute to figure out where you fit.

A quirk of the felon-in-possession statute is that it provides no punishment. Rather, punishment is meted out by another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), which specifies a 10-year sentence for people who “knowingly” violate 922(g).

But “knowingly” what? Do you have to know it is a gun? Or a round of ammo? Do you have to know you are a felon or a drug abuser or here illegally? Do you have to know you are possessing it? Up to now, the statute was interpreted by the courts as requiring only that you know that it’s a firearm or ammunition.

Which brings us to the unluckiest hedonist in America, Hamid Rehaif. Hammy came to the US to attend college. Under immigration law, he retained his student-visa status only as long as he remained enrolled as a full-time student. But when he got here, he discovered that the non-classroom parts of college were more fun, the bars, the tailgating, the frat parties, all of the stuff that has conspired to place less of a workload on college students than on eighth graders.

Naturally, Hammy flunked out. But he had so much fun doing it that he couldn’t give it up. Instead of returning to his mother country with his academic tail between his legs, Hammy stayed in America. In Florida, actually, and who could blame him?

florida190429But events conspired against him. One day he went to a shooting range, rented a Glock .40 cal. pistol (is this a great country or what?), and happily blasted away at targets for an hour or so.  A few weeks later, some solid citizen reported Hamid, because she had seen him skulking around an apartment building (he lived there, but then, he is Middle Eastern, so of course he must be a terrorist). The FBI came by to talk to him, and Hammy – who had been at a party instead of an American government class, and thus did not know about the “right to remain silent” part of the Constitution – mentioned at one point in the interview that he had been shooting a few weeks before.

Like I used to tell my clients, remaining silent is not just a  right – it’s a whopping’ good idea. Hamid was charged as an unlawful alien in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). Of course, he was convicted, despite the fact Hammy argued he did not know he was in the country illegally. The trial court said that did not matter. The only “knowledge” provision of 922(g) that mattered was that he knew he possessed a gun, even just for an hour.

knowledge190429The question of whether “knowingly” meant a defendant had to be aware of his or her status (felon, spouse-beater, drug-abuser, illegal-alien, whatever) in order to violate 922(g). At oral argument last week, the Supreme Court justices quickly saw the slippery slope: if they rule that the government must prove an unauthorized immigrant with a firearm knew he was in the country illegally, that ruling will necessarily mean it will have to prove that a felon with a firearm knows he or she is a felon.

If Hamid’s conviction is reversed, the practical consequences could be huge. Only Justice Alito seemed to accept the current view that a defendant need not know his or her status to violate the statute.

Justice Ginsburg wondered what would happen if the Court ruled that status under 922(g) requires knowledge: “How many people who have been convicted under felon-in-possession charges could now say, well, the Supreme Court has said… I can’t be convicted of [the] crime I was convicted of, so I want to get out. I want habeas.” The government’s lawyer responded that “under Bousley v. United States, the defendant would have to show on collateral review that he was actually innocent, meaning he actually did not know about his status.”

It is tricky to predict a Supreme Court case’s outcome from oral argument, but the headcount strongly suggests Hamid will win. If the Supremes’ decision holds that knowledge of felon (or illegal immigrant) status is an element of a 922(g) offense, a flood of actual-innocence 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petitions is sure to follow. That would make Rehaif the “sleeper” decision of the year.

Rehaif v. United States, Case No. 17-9560 (Supreme Court, decision by June 30, 2019)

SCOTUSBlog.com, Argument analysis: Court leaning toward requiring the government to prove that a felon in possession knew he was a felon (Apr. 24)

– Thomas L. Root