Tag Archives: fair sentencing act

Freaky Friday – Update for November 12, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NEWS OF THE WEIRD

What’s Done is Done: In the 1st Circuit, Junito Melendez was denied a First Step Act § 404 sentence reduction under the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA). Junito finished his prison sentence in 2007 and got off supervised release three years later. Unfortunately, after ten years as a free man, he is now facing a new drug conspiracy charge.

goingback211112Therein lies the problem. Junito was released from his prior 109-month sentence within 15 years of the current conspiracy charge, so he faces a mandatory 10-year minimum sentence under 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(B). But if the prior sentence were to be changed consistent with the FSA, his release date would have been much earlier, and it would thus have fallen well more than 15 years before the current case. Had that been the case, he’d be facing no mandatory minimum now.

The 1st Circuit turned him down, holding that the word “release” in 21 USC § 802(57), which defines a “serious drug felony,” focuses on the “historical facts of a defendant’s sentence when determining whether § 802(57)‘s definition is met.” Regardless of what a different, shorter sentence might have yielded, the historical fact is that Junito was released in 2007. What’s more, the Circuit said, “Congress used the phrase ‘serious drug felony’ in the statute, signaling its intent for the backward-looking language of § 802(57)… to apply to the 10-year mandatory minimum.”

There just ain’t no shortening a sentence that’s already completely in the past tense.

I Should Have Been Watching Him While He Was Watching Me: Jason Sheppard, on supervised release after a drug sentence, discovered that his girlfriend had developed a cozy “personal relationship” with his probation officer, one Jeff Sciarrino. That’s one way to keep tabs on your supervisee, we suppose.

[Read the salacious details here]

Needless to say, the discovery did not enhance Jason’s relationship with his girlfriend. They broke up over her cheatin’ heart.

breakingup211112In his grief, Jason moved for early termination of supervised release under 18 USC § 3583(e), arguing that the breakup “was negatively impacting his rehabilitation, thereby undermining any utility in continued supervision.” Jason made the rather obvious claim to the district court that “the probation officer was never concerned with [his] rehabilitation and appears to use his position for his own personal interests.”

The district court denied Jason’s motion, and last week the 3rd Circuit agreed. It held the District Court acted within its discretion to conclude that  Probation Officer Sciarrino’s amorous misconduct “has little to do with whether Sheppard should continue under the supervision of a different officer.”

The Circuit criticized the District Court, however, for holding that the PO’s misconduct “actually undermines” Jason’s motion for early termination, because the upset may interfere with Jason’s mental health treatment.” The Circuit said, “the District Court’s order includes an inference that Sheppard is responsible not only for his own conduct, but also must shoulder any and all negative repercussions from the misconduct of his probation officer. This inference is improper… when evaluating a motion for early termination, a district court, particularly in the absence of holding an evidentiary hearing, may not impute a probation officer’s alleged improper actions to a defendant serving a term of supervised release, so as to justify continued (or additional) rehabilitative oversight.”

Nevertheless, the Court was not very happy with the U.S. Probation Office:

A probation officer’s communications of such a “personal” nature with an assigned defendant’s significant other are not only entirely inappropriate and unprofessional, but they also undermine the primary objective of supervised release – i.e., “to facilitate the integration of offenders back into the community rather than to punish them.” It also challenges the role of probation officers as trusted government officials who, in performing their duties, are “supposed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer…” In Sheppard’s case, his probation officer implicated Sheppard’s personal life in his own — and to such a degree that, according to Sheppard, it caused him to break up with his live-in girlfriend, with whom he considered to be in a “lifelong commitment.” If this is not the antithesis to assisting Sheppard in transitioning back into the community, and having his “welfare” in mind, we do not know what is.
supervisedleash181107In all candor, I am constrained to note that even when Probation Officers act appropriately, they provide little benefit to supervisees beyond what Probation Officer Lothario provided to Jason. Supervised release is largely a snare for the unwary supervisee, with a sorry record of violating about one of three post-release folks entrusted to the Probation Office’s care.

United States v. Melendez, Case No 20-1575, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 31858 (1st Cir., October 22, 2021)

United States v. Sheppard, Case No 20-3088, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 32722 (3d Cir., November 3, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Hey, Bud, Look What the House Judiciary Committee Lit Up – Update for October 8, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BUT WAIT, THERE’S MORE…

marijuanahell190918We reported last Friday on the House passage of the EQUAL Act. In our glee over the potential redress of the racially disparate crack-to-powder laws, we overlooked the House Judiciary Committee’s approval of the Marijuana Opportunity, Reinvestment and Expungement (MORE) Act, H.R. 3617, on a 26-15 vote.

All Democrats on the Committee supported the bill while all but two Republicans opposed it.

Among other measures, the bill removes marijuana from the Controlled Substances Act, changes that “are retroactive and shall apply to any offense committed, case pending, conviction entered, and, in the case of a juvenile, any offense committed, case pending, or adjudication of juvenile delinquency entered before, on, or after the date of enactment of this Act.

The bill still has to be approved by the House, as well as facing an uphill fight in the evenly-divided Senate. There is no timeline for full House or Senate action.

crackpowder160606Meanwhile, Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL), Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA), and others last week introduced the Terry Technical Correction Act, which clarifies that individuals convicted of the lowest level crack offenses before the Fair Sentencing Act passed can apply for its retroactive application under Section 404 of the First Step Act. The same bill was introduced simultaneously in the House by bipartisan cosponsors led by Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) and Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX).

The bill seeks to amend the text of First Step Section 404 to make people sentenced for crack offenses prior to the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act eligible for sentence reductions even where they were sentenced under 21 USC 841(b))(1)(C), which has no mandatory minimum sentence, thereby undoing the Supreme Court’s Terry v. United States decision of last June. The bill has not yet been scheduled for a committee hearing.

House Judiciary Committee, Chairman Nadler Statement for the Markup of H.R. 3617, the MORE Act of 2021 (September 30, 2021)

H.R. 3617, MORE Act of 2021

Press Release, Senators Introduce Legislation to Correct Scotus Ruling on Retroactivity of Crack Cocaine Sentencing Reform (October 1, 2021)

House Judiciary Committee, Bipartisan Judiciary Committee Members Introduce Legislation to Clarify Retroactivity of Crack Cocaine Sentencing Reform (October 1, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Happy New Year! – Update for October 4, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

WE’RE BA-A-A-CK…

happynewyear211004… the nine Supreme Court justices will say this morning, the first Monday in October and the first day of the Court’s new year. The high court begins its new term – which lasts until June 30, 2022 but is known as “October Term 2021” – with hearing arguments on one federal criminal issue and granting review to another.

First, the grant of certiorari. Last week at its annual “long conference,” where the Court disposed of over 1,200 petitions seeking review of lower court decisions, the Supremes granted review to a First Step Act case. Back when Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to reduce the disparity crack and powder cocaine sentences, it did not make the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive to the thousands of crack sentences already imposed.

In Section 404 of the 2018 First Step Act, Congress granted retroactivity at the discretion of the defendant’s sentencing judge, but did not specify any standards for the judge to apply in deciding whether to reduce a sentence. The question raised in Concepcion v. United States is whether, when a court is deciding whether to resentence a defendant under the Fair Sentencing Act, the court must or may consider intervening developments (such as prison record or rehabilitation efforts), or whether such developments only come into play (if at all) only after courts conclude that a sentence reduction is appropriate.

FSAsplit190826

The 3rd, 4th, 10th, and DC circuits have held that district courts must consider all subsequent facts, and not just the changes to statutory penalties, when conducting Fair Sentencing Act resentencings. But in the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th and 8th circuits are only required to adopt the revised statutory maximum and minimum sentences for crack cocaine spelled out in the Fair Sentencing Act. In the 5th, 9th, and 11th circuits, district courts are prohibited from considering any intervening case law or updated sentencing guidelines, and are not required to consider any post-sentencing facts during resentencings.

Don’t expect a decision before June 2022.

Now, for today’s argument. The Supreme Court will begin its term hearing argument in Wooden v United States. Defendant Wooden broke into a storage facility and stole from 10 separate storage units many years ago. When he was found in possession of a gun years later, the district court sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal Act to 15 years, because it found that he committed three violent offenses – the breaking into the 10 storage units – “on occasions different from one another.” The Court of Appeals agreed, arguing that the crimes were committed on separate “occasions” because “Wooden could not be in two (let alone ten) of [the storage units] at once.”

BettyWhiteACCA180503This has long been the worst aspect of the ACCA, itself as well-meaning but lousy law. A number of circuits hold that crimes are committed on different “occasions” for ACCA purposes when they are committed “successively rather than simultaneously.” Other circuits, however, looked beyond temporality and instead considered whether the crimes were committed under sufficiently different circumstances.

The Supreme Court will resolve the Circuit split. A decision is expected early next year, and – if the Court agrees defendant Wooden, a number of people serving ACCA sentences may be filing 28 USC § 2255 or 28 USC § 2241 petitions seeking reduced sentences.

Wooden v. United States, Case No. 20-5279 (Supreme Ct., argued Oct 4, 2021)

Concepcion v. United States, Case No. 20-1650 (Supreme Ct., certiorari granted Sep 30, 2021)

Law360, Supreme Court Will Seek To Solve Crack Resentencing Puzzle (September 30, 2021)

SCOTUSBlog.com, What’s an “occasion”? Scope of Armed Career Criminal Act depends on the answer. (October 1, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Two Circuits Liberalize Fair Sentencing Act Reductions – Update for August 24, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TWO FAIR SENTENCING ACT CASES GO FOR THE PRISONERS

Last week saw two unsurprising but welcome Fair Sentencing Act decisions.

In the 11th Circuit, Tony Gonzalez was serving a 51-month supervised release sentence. Originally convicted in 2005, Tony served 76 months for a crack cocaine conviction. Released in 2015, he got tripped up on substance abuse during his supervised release term and was sent back to prison.

addiction210825Tony filed for a Fair Sentencing Act retroactive sentence reduction based on § 404 of the First Step Act. His district court denied him for a couple of reasons, one of which was that he wasn’t currently serving a sentence for crack cocaine, but instead for violating his supervised release.

Last week, the 11th joined the 4th and 6th Circuits “in holding that a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 404(b) of the First Step Act when the underlying crime is a covered offense within the meaning of the Act… Thus, the district court had the authority to consider his motion for a sentence reduction just as if he were serving the original custodial sentence. So Mr. Gonzalez is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act.”

Meanwhile, in the 8th Circuit, Jack Robinson – who was doing life for a crack offense in which he had been tagged for over 2 kilos of crack – had been denied a Fair Sentencing Act reduction by his district court. The district judge ruled that “Robinson would have been subject to the same mandatory life sentence had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect at the time he committed the covered offense… because the revised version of § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) provided for a mandatory life sentence if the defendant was convicted for 280 grams or more of crack cocaine and had two or more prior felony drug offense convictions,” and thus reasoned that the court was deprived “of the discretion to reduce Robinson’s sentence under the First Step Act.”

Last week, the 8th Circuit reversed. “This reasoning is contrary to the principle that the First Step Act applies to offenses, not conduct,” the Circuit said, meaning that Jack’s statutory “sentencing range under the First Step Act is dictated by the movant’s offense of conviction, not his relevant underlying conduct… Therefore, Jack’s offense of conviction — not the underlying drug quantity — determines his applicable statutory sentencing range.

life161207At his initial sentencing, Jack faced a mandatory term of life imprisonment because he was convicted and sentenced for conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of crack and because he had two prior drug felonies. “Under the Fair Sentencing Act,” the Circuit said, “the statutory sentencing range for his conspiracy to distribute 28 grams or more of crack cocaine, including his prior convictions, is now not less than 10 years and not more than life. Thus, the district court erred as a matter of law when it relied on the sentencing court’s drug quantity finding of 2.35 kilograms of crack cocaine to determine Jack’s applicable statutory sentencing range under the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act.

United States v. Gonzalez, Case No 19-14381, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 24765 (11th Cir., August 19, 2021)

United States v. Robinson, Case No 20-1947, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 24603 (8th Cir., August 18, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

You Can’t Imagine What Never Was in Sec. 404 Resentencing, 10th Says – Update for July 1, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

COULDA, WOULDA, SHOULDA

JCoulda210701ason Broadway got caught with 488 grams of crack in 2007. He was indicted for having more than 50 grams (which triggered a 10-year statutory minimum under 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A)) and admitted to the full 48 grams in a plea deal. He got 262 months under the then-applicable Guidelines.

As you recall, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the disparity between crack and powder from a 100:1 ratio to 18:1, making the difference in sentences imposed based on the amount of drug at issue much less. But it was not until the First Step Act passed in 2018 that the Fair Sentencing Act changes could be applied retroactively to people like Jason, who had been sentenced prior to 2010.

Jason applied for a sentence reduction under First Step Section 404, arguing that his statutory mandatory minimum sentence had been reduced by the Fair Sentencing Act. But the district court turned him down, pointing out the government could have indicted him for 488 grams but did not, and he probably would have admitted to all those drugs anyway, and a jury should have convicted him if he had gone to trial (which he did not), and because Jason was a career offender, his Guideline max of “life” would not have changed.

Jason was denied on a “coulda, woulda, shoulda” analysis.

Last week, the 10th Circuit reversed. The Circuit that for the district judge to reach his conclusion, he had to assume that if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect, Jason would have been indicted for more than 280 grams (the new cutoff for the 10-year minimum sentence), and if he had been indicted for more than 280 grams he would have pled to it, and if he had pled to it he would not have made a sentencing objection to the 488 grams the government said he had possessed.

lookback210701“To impose a reduced sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time the offense was committed is inherently backward-looking,” the 10th held, “but it should not require the amount of speculation necessitated by looking to a defendant’s underlying conduct, even if stipulated. Courts are not time machines which can alter the past and see how a case would have played out had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect. We doubt Congress would have imposed such a futile role for us.”

Thus, the Circuit ruled, the District Court had to consider the statutory minimum attached to the offense of conviction (more than 50 grams) – not what could have been but never was – and should calculate Jason’s corrected Guidelines range after the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act before considering whether the sentencing factors of 18 USC § 3553(a) argued against a reduction.

United States v. Broadway, Case No. 20-1034, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 18506 (10th Cir., June 22, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS to Congress: ‘Say What You Mean’ – Update for June 21, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TERRY V. UNITED STATES: ‘OH, THAT’S BAD! NO, THAT’S GOOD…’

If you remember Sam the Sham and the Pharaohs, you probably have a Medicare card in your wallet. After “Wooly Bully,” Sam and band – traveling around in a 1952 packard hearse – recorded a few other hits, the last of which was the rather confusing 1973 balled “Oh That’s Good, No That’s Bad.”

samsham210618The plot – such as it is – had Sam describing a series of events in his love life, each one sounding either like a victory that was actually a defeat or a defeat that was actually a victory. Such could be the story of this week’s Supreme Court decision in Terry v. United States, in which the petitioner – sentenced for a crack offense prior to the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act – argued that his 21 USC 841(b))(1)(C) sentence was covered by Section 404 of the First Step Act, and that he was thus entitled to be resentenced.

A quick review: drug sentences are imposed under 21 USC 841(b)(1). The worst sentences – based on quantity of drugs involved – are imposed by § 841(b)(1)(A). Lesser quantities are punished by § 841(b)(1)(B). If the indictment does not specify any minimum quantity of drugs sold, the sentence is imposed by § 841(b)(1)(C). Not surprisingly, the (b)(1)(A) sentences are the harshest, starting at a mandatory minimum of 10 years and increasing based on the number of prior drug and violent crimes committed or other factors (such as if a drug user died from drugs you provided).

Before 2010, crack cocaine was assessed for sentencing purposes at 100 times the weight of powder. That meant that 10 grams of crack (about two teaspoons) was sentenced as if it were 2.2 lbs (a kilo) of powder cocaine. The ratio was Congress’s knee-jerk reaction to the early 90s belief that crack was a powerful scourge destroying our inner cities. Of course, the fact that it was mostly sold in the inner cities led to most of the defendants who were hammered by incredibly long sentences were black.

crack-coke200804

The Fair Sentencing Act recognized the disparate impact of the 100:1 ratio by reducing it to a mere 18:1 (proponents wanted a 1:1 ratio, but compromised to gain enough Senate support for passage). The FSA modified the amounts of crack needed to trigger the mandatory minimums in § 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B) accordingly. Where a mere 5 grams (one teaspoon) of crack would buy a defendant a minimum five years, now that mandatory sentence required 28 grams. The prior 50-gram minimum for a (b)(1)(A) sentence became 280 grams.

At the same time, the FSA was made to be prospective only (not retroactive) to secure enough Republican votes to pass.

Eight years later, First Step § 404 corrected the non-retroactivity, making anyone who, before August 2010, had “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.” As of last month, over 3,700 prisoners have won reduced sentences from application of First Step § 404.

teaspoon210618That brings us to the strange case of Taharick Terry. in 2008, Tarahrick, then in his early 20s, was arrested in Florida for carrying just under 4 grams of crack cocaine. He was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), which carried no mandatory minimum, because the crack he possessed didn’t make the then-applicable § (b)(1)(B) 5-year mandatory minimum. But while he had no statutory minimum, he did have enough priors to qualify as a “career offender” under the Sentencing Guidelines. As a “career offender,” Taharick was hammered with a maximum Criminal History Category and offense level, yielding a 188-month sentence.

Taharick applied for § 404 relief, but his district judge turned him down. Taharick’s offense did not carry a “statutory penalt[y] which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.” Before the FSA, the mandatory minimum for a § (b)(1)(C) was zero. After the FSA, it remained zero. Therefore, the district court ruled, Taharick was not entitled to use § 404 for resentencing.

badgood210618Just as briefs on Terry were due in the Supreme Court last March, the Biden Justice Department surprised the Supreme Court by announcing that it would no longer defend the district court’s holding that Taharick could not get resentenced under § 404. The Supremes had to scramble, quickly appointing a private lawyer to argue the government’s former position. Dozens of amicus briefs arguing for Taharick’s relief – including one by Senators Richard Durbin, Charles Grassley, Cory Booker, and Mike Lee – opposed the district court’s narrow reading of the statute.

Sam the Sham might have crooned, “Oh, that’s good!”  After all of that, how could Taharick possibly lose? 

This is how: Earlier this week, the Supremes ruled 9-0 that the statute says what it says. The Court held that the language under which Taharick was sentenced was not modified by the sentencing-reform statutes. Although the change to levels above (b)(1)(C) would suggest that the punishment of lower amounts of drugs should also be read differently, the low-level provisions were not “modified.” The district court read it exactly the way Congress wrote it. And that was that.

Sam might croon, “Oh, that’s bad.”

But the decision was fascinating because of the Justices’ dueling histories of the law. Justice Clarence Thomas, who wrote the opinion, presented one that noted how even Black leaders were in favor of harsh crack laws when the 100:1 ratio was enacted. Concurring Justice Sonia Sotomayor focused more on the unfulfilled social-program support that was to be the carrot that came with the 100:1 stick.

Justices arguing racial justice? “Oh, that’s good.”

mob210618If you believe popular media coverage of the Terry decision – which I think was preordained by a common-sense reading of § 404 – you would conclude that the decision was a social disaster wrought by racist Justices. “Supreme Court ruling on crack sentences ‘a shocking loss,’ drug reform advocates say,” NBC howled. “SCOTUS deals a gutting blow to federal criminal justice reform,” The Week moaned. Even Reuters signaled its disapproval that the chary Supreme Court did not elect to help out defendants (as though it were a legislature and not a court): “U.S. Supreme Court declines to expand crack cocaine reforms.”

But the Terry decision’s unanimity suggests that nonpartisan judging rather than motivated interpretations underlay the decision. If Congress meant to reach (b)(1)(C) cases, it should say what it means. It did not do so. Lousy draftsmanship? Perhaps just the rush to get First Step passed in the final hours of the 115th Congress? Those were hectic times. The logical inference is that Congress failed. And that’s bad.

But maybe the Terry decision’s good. Already, commentators are arguing that Terry should spur Congress to get down to passing significant criminal justice reform. The Supremes handed the Biden Administration a “humiliating loss” after the DOJ’s 11th-hour flip-flop. Sens. Durbin and Grassley cannot be happy that their position was summarily rejected. Reps. Cori Bush (D-Mo.) and Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-N.J.) announced this week that they will introduce the Drug Policy Reform Act, which would decriminalize all drugs, expunge existing records and allow for re-sentencing, and invest in health-centered measures to take on drug addiction.

victorydefeat210618If Taharick Terry had won, the victory would have little impact. He gets out of prison in three months anyway. Most (b)(1)(C) crack cases from before 2010 benefitted from two 2-level retroactive reductions approved by the Sentencing Commission in 2011 and 2014. Most (b)(1)(C) defendants – even career offenders like Taharick, who could not get any 2-level reduction – have completed their sentences by now. And Terry would have had no effect on any sentences imposed after August 2010.

But the Terry loss – in an era of racial justice reckoning – is coming to be seen as a wake-up call for Congress to get serious on criminal justice reform. The Supreme Court will not clean up the mess Congress made in the drug war. It will not clean up poorly-drafted First Step language. That’s up to Congress, and maybe now, Congress knows it.

“Oh, that’s good.”

Terry v United States, Case No. 20-5904, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 3111 (June 14, 2021)

US Sentencing Commission, First Step Act of 2018 Resentencing Provisions Retroactivity Data Report (May 2021)

NBC, Supreme Court ruling on crack sentences ‘a shocking loss,’ drug reform advocates say (June 15)

The Week, SCOTUS deals a gutting blow to federal criminal justice reform (June 14)

Reuters, U.S. Supreme Court declines to expand crack cocaine reforms (June 14)

– Thomas L. Root

Judicial Odds and Ends – Update for June 3, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

AN ANNIVERSARY OF A MYSTERIOUS DEATH… AND A COUPLE OF CASE SHORTS

odetobilliejoe210603We have a couple of notable decisions from last week for this, the traditional day we all commemorate the untimely death by suicide of Billie Joe McAllister, the 1967 first-person ballad sung by Bobbie Gentry. As Bobbie began the song, “It was the third of June, just  sleepy, dusty delta day…”

As The Independent reported in 2017, the reason for Billie Joe’s mythical death remains a mystery: “Fifty years on we’re no wiser as to why Billie Joe did what he did and in the context of the song and Gentry’s intentions, that’s just as it should be.”

Let’s try to demystify some gleanings from last week’s federal appellate decisions:

The Eighth Joins the Party: The 8th Circuit joined other circuits that have ruled on this issue, holding last week that two brothers whose cases involved the distribution of both crack and powder were eligible for the retroactive Fair Sentencing Act reduction authorized by the First Step Act, despite the fact that the powder cocaine in their cases was such that the Fair Sentencing Act did not lower their Guidelines ranges.

The Circuit ruled that Sec 404(a) of the First Step Act says that covered offenses are those whose penalties “were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act.” Their crack penalties were reduced, even if the brothers “ultimately would be subject to the same statutory sentencing range as a consequence of” the powder cocaine. Thus, the sentencing judge now had to decide whether they should be granted a lower sentence.

The Eleventh Goes Its Own Way (Again): A week or so ago, I reported on United States v. Lopez, a 9th Circuit case that interpreted the First Step Act to dramatically expand the application of the drug offense safety valve set out in 18 USC § 3553(f).

goyourownway210603The 11th Circuit (who else) has helpfully provided an opinion going absolutely the opposite direction. Julian Garcon got the safety valve when sentenced for cocaine distribution, because he didn’t meet all three subsections of the law required to be disqualified. The government appealed, arguing that the word “and” in the statute really meant “or.”

Who would be twisted enough to think that? The 11th Circuit, that’s who. The panel held that “based on the text and structure of § 3553(f)(1), the “and” is disjunctive. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing…”

Ohio State University law prof Doug Berman said last week in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog that the case “produced a crisp circuit split on the proper interpretation of a key provision of the First Step Act on a matter that impacts many hundreds of federal drug cases every month… It is surely only a matter of time before other circuits weigh in on this important issue, and I assume this split will be deepened in the coming months and that the Supreme Court will have to take cert.”

United States v. Spencer, Case No 19-2685, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 15862 (8th Cir, May 27, 2021)

United States v. Garcon, Case No 19-14650, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 14683 (11th Cir, May 18, 2021)

Sentencing Law and Policy, In contrast to Ninth Circuit panel, Eleventh Circuit panel gives narrow reading to FIRST-STEP-amended mandatory-minimum safety valve provision (May 27)

– Thomas L. Root

11th Circuit Does Addition by Subtraction on First Step Crack Resentencing – Update for May 17, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SECTION 404 – WHERE LESS IS LESS, EVEN WHEN IT’S MORE

numbersA lot of times, prisoners – who are rightly focused on the substance of their claims – skip over the finer points of procedure. After all, procedure is kind of boring. But paying attention can bring dividends, or – as the old proverb goes – “God is in the details.”

Ask Nolan Edwards. He was doing life for a crack offense when the First Step Act passed, letting him seek retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. First Step Act § 404(b) provides that the court that originally sentenced a defendant for a crack offense may, when certain conditions are met, “impose a reduced sentence.” Meanwhile, 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(B) (the section many § 404 motions cite), is similar but not identical. It authorizes a district court to “modify an imposed term of imprisonment to the extent otherwise permitted by statute…”

Nolan filed a motion under First Step Act § 404 and § 3582(c)(1)(B). The district court reduced his sentence to time served, but concluded the First Step Act required it to impose an 8-year supervised release term. Nolan appealed the supervised release term, arguing that § 404 only empowers a court to subtract from a sentence, not add to one.

Last week, the 11th Circuit agreed. A § 404 motion “is self-contained and self-executing,” the Circuit said, and does not need to rely on 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(b) to be granted. Therefore, a district court is entitled only to reduce a prisoner’s overall sentence pursuant to a § 404 motion.

goddetails210517But that didn’t help Nolan. The 11th said that the focus was on the overall sentence, not just the components. So if the “unitary” sentence – imprisonment and supervised release considered together – was reduced, First Step Act § 404’s requirements were met. Here, Nolan’s life sentence was cut to 260 months and eight years of supervised release. That was clearly a reduced sentence, the Circuit said, despite the fact supervised release went from zero to 8 years.

United States v. Edwards, Case No. 19-13366, 2021 U.S.App. LEXIS 14140 (11th Cir., May 13, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

Government Cries ‘Uncle’ on Fair Sentencing Act Retroactivity – Update for March 22, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

A MOST SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION

Last week, the Biden Dept of Justice told the Supreme Court that it would no longer argue that the § 404 of the First Step Act – the provision that made the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) retroactive, thus letting people given draconian sentences prior to that date a chance to bring their prison terms more in line with powder cocaine sentences – did not apply to people who did not fall under a mandatory minimum at their pre-2010 sentencing.

crackpowder191216

At first blush, it sounds rather arcane. Section 404 permitted anyone with a “covered offense” to apply to his or her sentencing judge for a sentence reduction. A “covered offense” is defined in § 404(a) as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.” The Act lowered the ratio of crack-to-powder from 100:1 – which punished 5 grams of crack as though it were 500 grams (over a pound) of powder – to 18:1. This had the effect of requiring a defendant to have 28 grams of crack (instead of 5 grams) before the five-year mandatory minimum sentence of 21 USC 841(b)(1)(B) would apply, and 28 grams of crack before the 10-year mandatory minimum in 21 USC 841(b)(1)(A) would apply.

Essentially, the drug distribution penalties are hierarchical. The people with the most drug are sentenced under 21 USC 841(b)(1)(A), with penalties starting at 10 years and going up. The people with a lesser amount are punished under 21 USC 841(b)(1)(B), with penalties starting at five years. People convicted of having amounts less than the minimum needed for (b)(1)(B) – which is 28 grams for crack under the FSA – are punished under 21 USC 841(b)(1)(C), where the penalties start at zero.

A number of judicial circuits have ruled on whether a person with a pre-2010 (b)(1)(C) sentence had a “covered offense” under § 404. After all, the reasoning went, the FSA did not change the pre-2010 mandatory minimum, which was zero before the FSA and zero after. Unsurprisingly, the DOJ has fought hammer-and-tong against any (b)(1)(C) defendant getting resentenced under the FSA, and it so far has won in four circuits but lost in three.

crackpowder160606Now for Terry: In Terry v. United States, the Supremes are to weigh in on the issue, whether defendants sentenced for low-level crack-cocaine offenses under (b)(1)(C) before the FSA are eligible for resentencing under First Step. This is important for those defendants, because on resentencing, the courts are not bound to merely adjusting the sentence to reflect the FSA. Instead, they can consider post-sentence conduct and rehabilitation, and vary downward rather freely. Even if this were not so, most of those (b)(1)(C) people are nearing the end of their sentences.

The Trump DOJ consistently took positions to limit § 404 crack retroactivity as much as possible, and argued in Terry that unless a defendant had a mandatory minimum, § 404 did not apply. But in a letter to the Supreme Court last week, the DOJ said that following the change in Administration, it “began a process of reviewing the government’s interpretation of Section 404 of the First Step Act. As a result of that review, the Department of Justice has concluded that petitioner’s conviction is a “covered offense” under Section 404, that petitioner is entitled to request a reduced sentence, and that the court of appeals erred in concluding otherwise.”

The letter was filed on the day the Government’s brief was due. The petitioner filed an immediate response, criticizing DOJ for waiting to the last minute and urging the Court to decide the case without any further delay. DOJ, exhibiting the heart of a bureaucrat, noted,

According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, petitioner is scheduled to complete the remainder of his term of imprisonment, which he will serve almost entirely on home confinement, on September 22, 2021… Were the case not to be decided before September 22, a question of mootness would arise that would need to be addressed before any decision on the merits.

wrong210322Of course, not a word about Tarahrick Terry, whose paltry 3.9 grams of crack netted him a sentence that – had the district court been told by the government that the FSA applied – would have gotten a reduction which nationally was averaging 26%. In other words, Tarahrick and the kids would have been coloring Easter eggs at home two years ago.

The Supreme Court is unwilling to delay a decision on relief for Tarahrick until it no longer matters. Last Friday, it appointed a lawyer to argue the position abandoned by the government (which is common practice when the government refuses to defend a case). Argument had been set for April. The Court postponed that but still promised a decision by the end of June.

The Terry case has drawn a lot of interest. Senators Richard Durbin, Charles Grassley, Cory Booker, and Mike Lee also filed a joint brief, as have several major think tanks and advocacy organizations spanning the spectrum from the American Civil Liberties Union to the American Conservative Union. Groups of retired federal judges, former federal prosecutors, and defense lawyers, have filed as well. None of the amici favors the government.

hope160620The DOJ confession of error is interesting for another reason more based in policy. It is still too early for any comprehensive Biden criminal justice reform legislation to have been introduced in Congress, but the DOJ letter strongly indicates interest at high levels of the Administration to favor maximizing current statutes to reduce federal sentences. Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman said last week the DOJ letter “is big news that the new Administration is open to a broader application of the First Step Act here, and I am hopeful that this kind of Justice Department new thinking may end up being applied in a whole host of other sentencing settings.”

Such as maybe a legislative push for criminal justice reform, perhaps?

Reuters, Biden reverses course in U.S. Supreme Court drug sentencing case (March 15, 2021)

DOJ, Letter to Supreme Court in Case No 20-5904 (March 15, 2021)

Federal Public Defender, Letter to Supreme Court in Case No 20-5904 (March 15, 2021)

Washington Standard, Coalition Calls For Reform Of Drug Laws That Delivered Harsher Prison Sentences By 100–1 Ratio To Minorities For Low-Level Offenses (March 13, 2021)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Acting SG tells SCOTUS that new administration now supports broad application of crack retroactivity provision of FIRST STEP Act in Terry (March 15, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

SCOTUS Bulks Up on Criminal Cases – Update for January 15, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SUPREME COURT GRANTS CERT ON THREE FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES

The Supreme Court last week added three federal criminal questions to its docket.

crack-coke200804In Terry v. United States, the justices agreed to hear a technical sentencing issue with significant implications for thousands of inmates: whether defendants who were sentenced for low-level crack-cocaine offenses under 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(C) before Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 are eligible for resentencing under the First Step Act of 2018.

Lower courts are divided on this question; as a result, one party argued, Supreme Court review is necessary “to prevent thousands of predominately Black defendants from being forced to spend years longer in prison than identically situated defendants” elsewhere in the country “and to ensure that Congress’s goal of alleviating the racial disparities in sentencing caused by the 1986 law’s harsh sentencing regime is realized.”

In Greer v. United States, the Court will consider whether, when applying plain-error review based on an intervening decision of the Supreme Court, a court of appeals can look at matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights or affected the trial’s fairness, integrity or public reputation.

structuralerror210115Finally, one that everyone expected: the Court granted the government certiorari in United States v. Gary, to determine whether the 4th Circuit is right that a Rehaif v. United States error is structural, meaning that a defendant does not have to prove that he or she was prejudiced by the court’s failure to instruct on all elements of the 18 USC § 922(g) felon-in-possession offense.

Terry v. United States, Case No 20-5904 (certiorari granted January 8, 2021)

Greer v. United States, Case No 19-8709 (certiorari granted January 8, 2021)

United States v. Gary, Case No 20-444 (certiorari granted January 8, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root