8th Circuit Holds Sex Offenders Don’t Need to Self-Shame on Halloween – Update for January 9, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

HERE’S SOME CANDY, LITTLE GIRL…

In the universe of criminal offenses, there is no category more reviled than that of sex offender. It’s a broad category – covering every crime from looking at kiddie porn downloaded from the Internet to statutory rape to horrific physical abuse of a baby – but the “sex offender” label is enough for most people to generate loathing and repugnance not just at the offense but at the offender.

And no offense is easier for a politician to demagogue. I know of prisoners – adults who are first-time offenders – serving 50-year sentences for child porn crimes that involved no physical contact whatsoever. Say what you want, in a system where the average federal sentence for murder is about 25 years, the time meted out in the federal system for child sex offenses redefines “Draconian,” suggesting that defendants would do better murdering their victims than sexually abusing them. (Neither is a good idea, but the inversion between the average sentence for taking a life and for producing a disgusting video is puzzling).

Every few months, I will have some inmate serving a horrific sentence for child porn ask when Congress is going to do something to reduce his (or occasionally, her) sentence. My answer’s always the same: no legislator ever lost an election by being too hard on kiddie porn. I know of about 538 elected people on Capitol Hill who would swim drunk and naked in the Tidal Basin with the “Argentine Firecracker” before signing on to a bill that injected any sense into sex offender sentences.

For such offenders, the punishment never ends. Thomas Sanderson knows that. Come every October, Sanderson and his family have always set up large, elaborate Halloween displays involving decorations, sound effects, and fog machines. You know the type: 15-foot skeletons, big blow-up ornaments, orange lights… the works. As a district court judge described it, the Halloween Sandersons regularly were “throwing large parties, hosting a bonfire, handing out candy to children outside, decorating [their] residence, and keeping… lights on.”

In 2006, Tom was convicted of sodomy with a 16-year-old female friend of the family. Section 566.010 of the Missouri Revised Statutes defines sodomy as “deviant sexual misconduct.” What is “deviant sexual misconduct” in Missouri is quite broad, including virtually any offense where penetration does not occur, even just getting “handsy” with the crotch of the victim. Not to discount the mental trauma that such conduct may inflict on the victim, but being convicted of sodomy in Missouri is something much less than its Biblical definition.

No matter. Tom was labeled a sex offender who was required to register annually with the authorities. Plus, while he was locked up, Missouri passed the so-called Halloween Statute in 2008 (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 589.426)

The statute restricts registered sex offenders from participating in Halloween, requiring  them on October 31st to

(1) Avoid all Halloween-related contact with children;

(2) Remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be elsewhere for just cause, including but not limited to employment or medical emergencies;

(3) Post a sign at his or her residence stating, “No candy or treats at this residence;” and

(4) Leave all outside lights off during the evening hours after 5 p.m.

When Tom was released, he asked the local police whether he was required to comply with the Halloween statute, given that he had been convicted well before the law was enacted. The police assured him that he had been “grandfathered in” and thus could continue participating in Halloween festivities (which, as we shall see, is a great cautionary tale illustrating why you should never accept legal advice from a cop).

For the next 14 years, Tom’s Halloween displays didn’t just continue, they grew more extravagant with each year. But in 2022, although Tom had never been accused of any further sexual misconduct, some neighborhood Karen complained that Tim was having innocent fun by participating in Halloween.  Consequently, Tom was arrested, charged, and convicted for violating the Halloween statute (a crime for which he got probation).

Tom brought a facial challenge to the Halloween statute under the 1st Amendment, specifically arguing that subsection 3 — the sign mandate — unconstitutionally compelled speech from all Missouri registered sex offenders. After a bench trial, the district court found the sign mandate unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction preventing the State from enforcing it anywhere in Missouri.

Missouri appealed.

Last week, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the sign requirement cannot survive the “strict scrutiny” required by constitutional law and thus violates the 1st Amendment.

The government can restrict private speech – and even force people to say things they don’t want to (“compelled speech”) – when it can establish a compelling state interest in preventing the harm that the restriction addresses and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to address that harm. Here, the Circuit ruled that

the sign mandate is not merely incidental to conduct: it explicitly requires registrants to post a sign bearing a specific message. True, the other three provisions of the Halloween statute regulate a registrant’s conduct. But the sign mandate requires only speech (the posting of a sign with the government’s message), not any other related conduct. In fact, it requires verbatim speech… Because the sign mandate (1) explicitly requires registrants to speak the government’s message in the form of a sign at their residence, and (2) dictates specifically what that sign must say, it compels speech.

Missouri argued that the sign requirement served a compelling state interest by making it easier for police officers to “be able to ensure that there is compliancy” without getting out of their cruisers, thus making enforcement of the Halloween statute more efficient, and providing “an extra layer of protection for children.” However, Missouri conceded that there was no requirement that the sign be put in front of the house instead of the rear (or even posted in the resident’s kitchen) and even if the sign were on a Post-It note, it would be in “compliancy” if it had the right wording. (Making up words is not a state felony, but it should be – a topic for another time).

The 8th held that while Missouri argued it had a compelling interest by demonstrating that Halloween presented unique risks for “grooming” children that could lead to future abuse, it “could not provide any evidence for the claim that signs provide any additional protection beyond the other restrictions imposed on registrants in the Halloween statute. There was no evidence to support the idea that children would be at risk if there was no sign, so long as the registrant complied with the remaining provisions of the statute (i.e., remaining inside the residence, not giving candy to or otherwise engaging with children, and leaving lights off). In other words, nothing in the record indicates that a child knocking on a door that no one opens presents a risk to that child.”

What was more, the Circuit ruled, while

[w]e agree with the State that narrow tailoring does not require “perfect” tailoring. Here, however, there is insufficient evidence to support the State’s assertion that the sign mandate is the least restrictive means of achieving its goals. The record does not support the claim that, despite the remaining provisions of the Halloween statute, the sign mandate is necessary to further the government’s compelling interest in protecting children on Halloween. Accordingly, the sign mandate burdens more speech than necessary and fails strict scrutiny.

Missouri, in true “smear the defendant” fashion, tried to offer testimony from the victim, then 16 years old but now in her 30s, and from its expert – who had never met Tom – about Tom’s “dangerousness.” One can fairly ask whether the 20 years that passed since Tom’s offense and Halloween 2024 didn’t suggest that maybe he was rehabilitated (especially since he had celebrated Halloween in his usual overblown fashion for 14 years without any suggestion of sexual misconduct).

The 8th, however, said that Tom’s record didn’t matter: “[E]ven if the evidence had been admitted, it would not have affected the verdict. That is because any evidence of Sanderson’s dangerousness—either from [the 2006 victim] or from the State’s expert, who never met or conducted an evaluation of Sanderson—would have supported only the compelling interest prong of the legal analysis. But, as discussed, the sign mandate failed strict scrutiny on the second prong: whether it was narrowly tailored. Nothing about the unique risks posed by Sanderson—or any other registrant for that matter—would have overcome the sign mandate’s tailoring deficiency.”

Sanderson v. Hanaway, Case Nos. 24-3120, 24-3204, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 3, at *11-12 (8th Cir. Jan. 2, 2026)

~ Thomas  L. Root

No One’s Pardoning Trump’s Use of Pardon Power – Update for January 8, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

NO ONE’S HAPPY ABOUT PRESIDENT TRUMP’S EPIC CLEMENCY PARADE

If there is a unifying thread of reaction to President Trump’s unprecedented train of pardons and commutations in 2025, it’s one of disquiet.

Trump granted clemency this year to over 1,600 people. The biggest tranche was the first one – 1500-plus people getting clemency (14 just commutations, the rest pardons) for the January 6, 2021, riot. Since then, he has commuted another 13 sentences and pardoned 72 others. For a range of figures, Trump said he viewed them as victims of an unfair justice system. Some were tied to his newfound interest in cryptocurrency or shared in his 2020 election grievances, while another (a Texas developer involved in bid-rigging) was simply brought up to Trump during a round of golf with a Republican buddy.

Twenty of the pardons went to businessmen, 16 to politicians, five to celebrities, 24 to anti-abortion activists, and 12 to people convicted of other non-drug offenses.  Only eight were for drug crimes, and those included the guy who started the Silk Road deep-web drug bazaar and a former Honduran president.

More than half of the acts of clemency for named individuals relate to prosecutions pursued by the Biden Dept of Justice — in addition to the Jan 6 cases.

Even Fox News was critical, saying, “While presidents of both parties have long used their pardon power in controversial ways, Trump’s clemency activity in 2025 stood out for its volume and for the deal-making style that has been a defining feature of his approach to power.” Fox listed Trump’s most controversial clemencies as including the Jan 6 rioters, Texas congressman Henry Cuellar (bribery charges, not yet to trial), the Chrisleys, former congressman George Santos (widespread fraud), and former Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernandez (serving a 45-year sentence for the same charges just made this past weekend against Nicholas Maduro and his wife).

Attorney Mitch Jackson, writing on Substack, said Trump had “corruptly commodified one of the most potent parts of the presidency and turned it into a product to be sold to the highest bidder.”

The scheme works like this: People seeking clemency pay about $1 million to hire well-placed lobbyists within the administration who then work to secure a pardon from Trump. If those pardons are successful, the person receiving clemency may also pay a six-to-seven-figure “success fee” after the president signs the paperwork guaranteeing their release, according to the essay.

In one instance, Donald Trump, Jr., introduced a lobbyist named Ches McDowell to the president while McDowell was seeking a pardon for Changpeng Zhao, the billionaire founder of Binance. Binance reportedly paid $800,000 to McDowell for the work and then offered a success fee of more than $5 million once Zhao was freed.

Trump pardoned Zhao, who had been convicted of money laundering, last October. Whether a success fee was paid, and if so for how much, has not been reported. However, Rep Maxine Waters (D-CA) claimed that Zhao “spent months lobbying Trump and his family while funneling billions into Trump’s personal crypto company,” World Liberty Financial. Reports indicate Binance parked $2 billion in WLFI’s stablecoin, generating about $80-87 million annually. The Trump family owns 60% of WLFI, meaning that Binance’s deposit meant the family could receive $48-52 million in passive income.

Jackson wrote:

In Donald Trump’s Washington, freedom has a price tag. The presidential pardon, one of the most serious powers granted by the Constitution, now looks like a product on a shelf. Picture what this means in real life. If you or someone you love faced an unjust sentence, would you have a million dollars for a broker. Most families do not. Your petition would sit in a stack, waiting for a formal review that can take years. Meanwhile, a billionaire pays for a direct line, and the request reaches the President through a family member at a ceremony. The system looks less like equal justice and more like a private club with a cover charge.

A cottage industry has arisen of lobbyists seeking clemency for a wide variety of clients. David Schoen, one of Trump’s former impeachment lawyers is following the same pardon playbook that has rewarded allies of the president and been driven by a desire for political retribution.

Schoen is representing two mobsters who were sentenced to life in 1992. In a Christmas Eve letter to Trump, Schoen sought clemency by arguing that they had been unfairly convicted by prosecutor Andrew Weissmann—a foe of Trump’s who led FBI director Robert Mueller’s special counsel team that investigated Russian interference in the 2016 election.

Wall Street Journal, A Visual Breakdown of Trump’s Pardon Spree (December 10, 2025)

Raw Story, ‘Disturbing’: Lawyer exposes how Trump shredded a ‘core promise’ of American law (December 28, 2025)

Benzinga, Trump Pardoned 3 Crypto Felons In 10 Months—Here’s What Each One Cost (January 2, 2026)

Fox News, Deal-making clemency: Inside Trump’s most disputed pardons of 2025 (December 30, 2025)

Free Press, Ex-Trump Lawyer Lobbies to Free Mobsters Prosecuted by an Enemy of the President (December 31, 2025)

~ Thomas  L. Root

A Compassionate Release Win for Commutees – Update for January 6, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

COMMUTATION DOESN’T NEGATE COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

In 2012, Jonathan Wright was sentenced to life imprisonment after a federal drug conviction. In 2024, he filed an 18 USC § 3582(c)(1) compassionate release motion based on First Step Act changes in 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A)  mandatory minimum sentences.

The district court reduced Jon’s sentence to 420 months followed by 10 years of supervised release but never addressed Jon’s argument that his prior Arkansas convictions no longer qualified as predicate offenses for his sentence enhancement.

Jon appealed, arguing that the district court should have reduced his sentence even more. While the appeal was pending, President Joe Biden commuted Jon’s sentence to 330 months last January.

The government argued that Biden’s commutation should moot Jon’s appeal, and even if it didn’t, the Arkansas statute’s overly broad definition of controlled substance should nevertheless be read to be consistent with federal law.

Last week, the 8th Circuit gave Jon a late stocking stuffer.

Although the Circuits are split on the question, the 8th ruled that Biden’s commutation did not moot Jon’s compassionate release motion. The President’s power to commute criminal sentences derives from the Constitution – the Article II power to “grant Reprieves and Pardons.” “A commuted sentence,” the Circuit held, “does not become ‘an executive sentence in full’ but instead remains a judicial sentence – but one that the executive will only enforce to a limited extent.

As for Jon’s prior convictions under Arkansas § 5-64-401, the 8th observed that the statute incorporated a state Dept of Health regulation that defined a “narcotic drug” to include all cocaine isomers, while federal felony drug offenses encompass only optical and geometric cocaine isomers. Circuit precedent holds that a state drug statute that criminalizes even “one additional isomer” of cocaine beyond what the federal statute proscribes cannot produce a predicate felony drug offense for federal sentencing purposes.

The Circuit ruled that the district court’s decision to not consider that Jon’s priors no longer counted under § 841(b)(1)(A) when ruling on his compassionate release motion “was based on an erroneous legal conclusion and accordingly was an abuse of discretion.” When resentencing Jon on remand, the 8th directed, the “district court is required only to considerthat Jon ‘s prior convictions no longer qualify as predicate offenses for his sentence enhancement. The district court is not required to accept this point as a reason to further reduce Jon’s sentence.”

This opinion is significant, ruling in essence that at least in the 8th Circuit, changes in the law creating gross disparities between the existing sentence and the sentence if imposed today have a substantial role in the compassionate release calculus.

United States v. Wright, Case No. 24-2057, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33882 (8th Cir. December 30, 2025)

~ Thomas  L. Root

March Will Bring Cherry Blossoms and Supreme Court Arguments – Update for January 5, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SCOTUS SCHEDULES ARGUMENT ON TWO CRIMINAL CASES OF NOTE

The Supreme Court has issued its February oral argument schedule, including two cases of substantial interest to federal defendants and prisoners.

The two arguments actually fall the first week of March, not in February… but then this is the Supreme Court, where the last week of next June will still be “October Term 2025.” Nevertheless, we can be confident that before the cherry blossoms bloom along the Tidal Basin, we may have some idea of the high court’s thinking on two consequential criminal cases now before it.

The cases:  First, the one not getting much press but arguably the more important of the two is Hunter v. United States, a case that asks whether a federal appeals court properly dismissed a Texas man’s appeal of a mandatory-medication condition when he had waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement, but the judge who imposed the condition told him that he had a right to appeal.

The importance is this: Something like 94% of federal criminal cases end in guilty pleas, and virtually all of those pleas are entered pursuant to a written plea agreement between the defendant and the government. And virtually all of those agreements have the defendant agreeing to waive his or her rights to appeal, to file post-conviction attacks on their conviction and sentences, and to give up other rights – such as to seek compassionate release or even bring a Freedom of Information Act request for records from the government.

The Hunter issues before the Supreme Court include what, if any, are the permissible exceptions to waiver in a plea agreement, now generally recognized as only being claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. A second issue is whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he or she has a right to appeal and the government does not object.

The Supreme Court case getting more attention is United States v. Hemani, in which the government is challenging a 5th Circuit ruling that 18 USC § 922(g)(3) – that prohibits an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance from possessing a gun – violates the 2nd Amendment as applied to the defendant. Mr. Hemani was a regular marijuana user but was not high while in physical possession of his handgun.`

Law Professor Joel Johnson, a former Supreme Court litigator with the Dept of Justice, recently argued in a SCOTUSBlog post that the Supreme Court could easily dispose of the Hemani case by relying on the rule of lenity instead of the 2ndAmendment. He said, “If the court decides that the law applies only to people who are armed while intoxicated, the 2nd Amendment concerns largely vanish. There is stronger historical support for disarming someone who is high – and thus not of sound mind – than there is for disarming someone who happened to smoke a joint last weekend but is no longer impaired.”

Also in a SCOTUSBlog post, NYU Law Professor Danial Harawa argued for a revival of the rule of lenity:

Congress has enacted thousands of criminal laws, many written broadly and enforced aggressively. With an overly bloated criminal code, lenity should function as a meaningful check – a reminder that punishment must rest on clear legislative authorization… At bottom, the rule of lenity is about who bears the risk of uncertainty in the criminal law. For most of the court’s history, that risk fell on the government. When Congress failed to speak clearly, defendants were entitled to the benefit of the doubt. If it wanted, Congress could rewrite the law to clarify its reach. There is no cost for congressional imprecision, however, and thus no real need for Congress to legislate carefully and clearly. When lenity is weakened, the cost of ambiguity shifts from the government to defendants, and the result is more defendants. Given the pedigree and importance of this rule, the Supreme Court needs to resolve when the rule applies sooner rather than later.

Second Amendment advocates and scholars hope that Hemeni will advance the 2nd Amendment debate begun by Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi. But even if it does not, it may provide some enduring guidance on the rule of lenity, an issue of less sexiness but perhaps more import to criminal law.

SCOTUSblog, Court announces it will hear case on gun rights among several others in February sitting  (January 2, 2026)

Hunter v. United States, Case No. 24-1063 (oral argument set for March 3, 2026)

United States v. Hemani, Case No, 24-1234 (oral argument set for March 2, 2026)

SCOTUSblog, An off-ramp for the court’s next big gun case (December 18, 2025)

SCOTUSblog, Reviving Lenity (December 26, 2025)

~ Thomas  L. Root

Another Circuit Invalidates Felon-in-Possession in Nonviolent Case – Updatebfor January 2, 2026

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

5TH CIRCUIT HOLDS 922(g)(1) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO NONVIOLENT FELON

Ed Cockerham pled guilty for the Mississippi felony of failing to pay child support. He was sentenced to five years of probation, but he could have gotten up to five years in prison. He got his child support paid and was released from probation.

Subsequently, he was caught in possession of a gun, which put him in violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1) based solely on the child support conviction. The district court refused to hold that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to his case. Ed appealed.

Two weeks ago, the 11th Circuit held that § 922(g)(1) violated the 2nd Amendment as applied to Ed’s Case. The Circuit observed that “historical tradition unquestionably permits the Government to disarm violent criminals… [but] history does not support the proposition that felons lose their 2nd Amendment rights solely because of their status as felons.”

In Ed’s case, he had fully paid the child support debt for which he was convicted at the time he was found in possession of a firearm. “So there’s no historical justification to disarm him at that moment,” the 5th ruled, “never mind for the rest of his life.” While other evidence suggested that Ed might be violent (he had been arrested for assault in the past), the Circuit said the 5th Circuit focuses “on the nature of the predicate offense rather than on the defendant’s broader criminal history or individual characteristics.”

The holding is consistent with the 3rd Circuit’s holding in Range v. Attorney General and the 6th Circuit’s United States v. Williams holding.  It is diametrically opposed to decisions of the 8th, 9th and 10th Circuits. The 10th Circuit case – Vincent v. United States – is on its third Supreme Court relist

United States v. Cockerham, Case No. 24-60401, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33001 (5th Cir., December 17, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

Incarceration Ain’t Cheap- Update for December 31, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

PAY THE MAN, SHIRLEY (ONCE AGAIN)

I am shamelessly reusing Norman Chad’s homage to sportswriter Shirley Povich for another week.

Two weeks ago, the Bureau of Prisons printed the Annual COIF (Cost of Incarceration Fee) in the Federal Register.  This annual ritual reports on how much it costs the BOP (using whatever voodoo accounting the government may command that can figure for sunk costs of facilities) to lock someone up for a year.  The number assumes that keeping someone in the FCI Florence Supermax costs the same as keeping a prisoner at a camp, but imperfect data is probably better than no data at all.

The BOP reported that “[b]ased on FY 2024 data, the average annual COIF for a Federal inmate housed in a Bureau or non-Bureau facility in FY 2024 was $47,162 ($129.21 per day). The average annual COIF for a Federal inmate housed in a Residential Reentry Center for FY 2024 was $43,703 ($119.73 per day). (Please note: There were 366 days in FY 2024.)”

The COIF never accounts for the cost of home confinement. The best number available is from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts: home confinement supervision costs $4,742 a year ($12.96 in FY 2024).

BOP, Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration Fee (COIF) (December 15, 2025)

Administrative Office of US Courts, The Public Costs of Supervision Versus Detention (June 5, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

We Know Who Runs The Courtroom (And It’s Not the Judge) – Update for December 30, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DOING A DAY FOR DAY
This is not Erika. And carrying a gun is not this sexy.

Erika Day had a night job selling methamphetamine. Unfortunately for her, one of her accessories was a handgun. Carrying guns can be dangerous for drug dealers, not so much because they shoot people as because they cause self-inflicted legal wounds: possessing a Glock during a drug deal carries a mandatory additional sentence of at least five years under 18 USC § 924(c), more if you “brandish” it and even more if you fire it.

Erika was charged with possession with intent to distribute meth under 21 USC § 841 and an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)  offense. The § 841 offense carried a minimum sentence of five years, and the § 924(c) gun offense added another five. At that point, Erika made the prudent choice to cooperate with the government.

Under 18 USC § 3553(e), the government can reward a cooperator with a motion to the court to depart – that, ignore – from a statutorily-mandated sentence for substantial assistance.  In Erika’s case, the U.S. Attorney moved to depart below the statutory minimum for the meth offense but not for the gun offense. The district court granted the motion but sentenced Erika below the statutory minimum for both offenses, time served on the § 841 count and a single day on the Count 2 gun charge. The Government, arguing that she had to get at least five years on the § 841 count, appealed.

Last week, the 11th Circuit agreed with the U.S. Attorney. The Circuit said that § 3553(e) is clear: such a motion is count-specific. A motion that authorizes departure below the statutory minimum for one count does not permit a district court to go below the mandatory minimum on another count unless the government’s motion expressly extends to that separate count.

“Subsection (e) uses the singular when allowing a district court to depart below “a level established by statute as a minimum sentence,” the 11th wrote. “Although district courts often pronounce multiple sentences as an aggregate for administrative purposes, each offense still carries a separate sentence. Because subsection (e) applies to ‘a minimum sentence,’ not the aggregate of multiple sentences, a motion for departure on one sentence does not apply to other sentences.”

Because the government did not move to depart below the statutory minimum for count two, the Circuit held, the district court lacked the authority to do so independently.

One judge on the panel, Embry Kidd, concurred in an opinion that explained a lot. On pretrial release, Erika completed an arduous drug rehabilitation and excelled so in the program that the provider hired her as a mentor. She maintained two jobs, paid off her fines, obtained a driver’s license for the first time in twelve years, purchased a vehicle, secured stable housing, and repaired her relationship with her daughters.

“It is not often that a district court has the benefit of seeing what a defendant would do if given a second chance,” Judge Kidd wrote. “Normally, the court just hopes for the best. But here, due to Day’s cooperation with the government, the district court was able to observe Day’s rehabilitative actions over the course of two years… But that does not matter. By statute, only one person’s opinion mattered that day… Under the sentencing regime that Congress has established for consideration of assistance to the government… the United States Attorney had all the cards. Only she could allow the district court to impose the sentence that the court considered to be the most just. But she refused, and today’s opinion affirms that she had the power to do so.”

United States v. Day, Case No. 24-13312, 2025 U.S.App. LEXIS 33634 (11th Cir. Dec 23, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

A Year of Presidential Clemencies Bring Little Hope for Federal Prisoners- Update for December 29, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

CLEMENCY YEAR IN REVIEW

The conservative Washington Examiner last week reviewed President Trump’s unprecedented first-year clemency record of more than 1,600 people. The report was not favorable.

The lesson from over 11 months of Trump’s pardons and commutations is clear: if you don’t have rich parents, a MAGA flag and hat, or a means of enriching the Trump family, your odds of clemency rival those of winning the Powerball.

“On his first day back in office, Trump issued sweeping pardons for those tied to the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol,” the Examiner wrote. “In November, he also moved preemptively to pardon several political allies, including Rudy Giuliani, former chief of staff Mark Meadows, and attorneys Sidney Powell and John Eastman, even though none were facing federal criminal charges at the time.”

The Examiner then listed Trump’s five most controversial clemency actions. Top of its list was the clemency for drug black market operator Ross Ulbricht last February, whom Trump promised to pardon when he pitched the Libertarian Party convention in 2024 for political support. Trump paid off within a month of taking office.

Second on the list was the pardon of Changpeng Zhao, founder of Binance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange. Zhao was sentenced to four months in prison in April 2024 after pleading guilty to money laundering. Zhao and Binance have been key supporters of the Trump family’s crypto enterprises.

Third was former congressman George Santos, a serial liar sentenced in April to seven years in federal prison after pleading guilty to fraud and identity theft. Santos served about four months in a camp before being pardoned. The Examiner also cited this month’s pardon of former Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernandez, who had been serving a 45-year sentence at USP Hazelton for a massive drug trafficking operation that moved more than 400 tons of cocaine into the United States. Reports at the time suggested Trump sought to influence the Honduran presidential election, going on at the time.

For the final pardon on its “top five” list the Examiner noted this month’s pardon of Rep Henry Cuellar (D-TX), charged but not yet convicted of bribery and money laundering. In a Truth Social post, Trump said he never spoke to Cuellar or anyone in his family, but he felt good about “fighting for a family that was tormented by very sick and deranged people – They were treated sooo BADLY!” Of course, Cuellar is a Democrat, which makes it unlikely that a Biden Administration Dept of Justice would have targeted him unfairly.

Ironically, Trump responded in fury a few days after the pardon, as Cuellar filed to run again as a Democrat rather than turning Republican out of “loyalty” to the President.

The Washington Post reported that at least 20 people who have received clemency from Trump so far this year were also forgiven of restitution totaling tens of millions of dollars. For some, restitution was more onerous than the sentence. Paul Walczak, a health care executive convicted of willfully failing to pay over $4 million in taxes withheld from his employees and willfully failing to file individual tax returns, was sentenced in April to 18 months in prison. He was pardoned before serving a day, wiping out his $4 million restitution obligation to the IRS.

The common thread connecting almost all of Trump’s clemencies is that the beneficiaries had committed offenses with political import, had money ties to Trump or were supporters of the President.  The Jan 6 rioters fell into the first category. Walczak’s pardon came after his mother had raised millions of dollars for Trump’s campaigns and was involved in an effort to sabotage President Biden’s 2020 campaign by publicizing the addiction diary of his daughter Ashley, an episode that The New York Times said “drew law enforcement scrutiny.”

Trevor Milton, convicted of lying to investors to pump the stock of his company, electric vehicle maker Nikola, was sentenced to four years in prison and over $600 million  In discussing the pardon, which left investors high and dry, In describing his decision to pardon Milton, Trump said, “And they say the thing that he did wrong was he was one of the first people that supported a gentleman named Donald Trump for president. He supported Trump. He liked Trump.”

The transactional nature of Trump’s presidency was brought home a few weeks ago in an unusual quid pro quo raised in a video last week by former Pardon Attorney Elizabeth Oyer. You may recall that the Obama Administration brought a sprawling fraud case against FIFA and over 30 other defendants. The remnants of that case are now in front of the Supreme Court in petitions for certiorari brought by two defendants.

Earlier this month, world soccer organization FIFA announced a new “peace prize” that would be bestowed on a recipient who has taken “exceptional and extraordinary actions for peace and by doing so have united people across the world.” The inaugural FIFA “Peace Prize,” unsurprisingly, was awarded to President Trump on December 5.

Four days later, the DOJ filed a F.R.Crim.P. 48 motion to dismiss the indictment “in the interests of justice.”   In a Facebook post, Oyer reported that the dismissal came over the objection of the line prosecutor who had obtained the convictions.  She said, “This is a huge deal because it could also unravel dozens of other convictions of soccer officials and sports executives. It could also mean that the government has to return hundreds of millions of dollars in penalties paid by these people. It’s also a big deal because it’s an example of corruption at work. In Trump’s America, justice can be bought: all it takes is a shiny object or a large check.”

Washington Examiner, Trump’s five most controversial pardons of 2025 (December 25, 2025)

Washington Post, Trump’s pardons wipe out payments to defrauded victims (December 19, 2025)

New York Times, Trump Pardoned Tax Cheat After Mother Attended $1 Million Dinner (May 27, 2025)

CNN, What is the FIFA Peace Prize and why did Donald Trump win? (December 5, 2025)

Facebook, Days after FIFA gave him a medal, Trump’s DOJ started dismantling a major corruption prosecution (December 22, 2025)

~ Thomas L. Root

Something for the Ladies – Update for December 26, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THE WOMEN ARE RESTLESS…

More Dublin Lawsuits Expected:  Nearly 300 women who were incarcerated at the now-closed FCI Dublin prison are expected to file sexual assault claims against the Bureau of Prisons, after 103 women won an unprecedented $116 million from the agency exactly one year ago

AUSA Jevechius Bernardoni told US District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers (ED Cal.) last week that the BOP expects a Round 2 “total of 280 cases” to be filed within the next six months against the agency and individual correctional officers, bringing the total of Dublin sex abuse cases to nearly 400.

Deborah Golden, an attorney representing dozens of the women claiming abuse at FCI Dublin, said, “There could even be a Round 3.” Then-BOP Director Colette Peters ordered FCI Dublin closed and the inmates moved to other facilities in April 2024, expressing frustration at the BOP’s inability to change the abusive nature of the facility.

KTVU-TV, FCI Dublin: Nearly 300 more women expected to file sex assault claims vs. BOP (December 17, 2025)

Associated Press, US to pay nearly $116M to settle lawsuits over rampant sexual abuse at California women’s prison (December 17, 2024)

FMC Carswell Prisoners Missing Dialysis, Report Alleges:  Women prisoners at FMC Carswell allege in court filings, medical records, expert reviews and interviews that the Bureau of Prisons is providing inadequate dialysis care, putting their lives and health at risk, according to the Marshall Project. 

Carswell is the BOP’s only women’s medical center and its only facility providing in-patient dialysis for women.

Lawyers, doctors, former prison officials and incarcerated women describe missed or shortened dialysis treatments, broken or poorly maintained machines, water system failures, inadequate patient education and serious infection risks. Medical experts who reviewed the allegations said the conditions described could be preventable and potentially fatal.

Despite these concerns, the complaints allege, the BOP operates with little external oversight of its medical care. The Marshall Project said that judges overseeing compassionate release requests have said they lack authority to intervene broadly even when testimony raises significant concerns.

The Marshall Project, Women Are Sent to This Federal Prison for Dialysis. They Say It’s Killing Them. (December 16, 2025)

~ Thomas  L. Root

Pot Good, Fentanyl Very Bad – Update for December 23, 2025

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

TRUMP DOES THE ‘WEAVE’ ON DRUG CRIMES

President Trump is proud of “the weave,” that oratorical puzzlement that sounds to some like Grandpa forgot to take his meds. Last week, Trump tried it on drug policy.

On Monday, Trump signed an executive order declaring fentanyl and its precursors  as “weapons of mass destruction.” Three days later, he signed another order directing federal agencies to reschedule marijuana as a Schedule III rather than Schedule I.

The fentanyl executive order instructs federal agencies, including the Depts of Justice, State, Treasury and Defense, to pursue fentanyl-related crimes more aggressively and to explore military cooperation with civilian law enforcement.

The Atlantic last week reported that while the

WMD designation may not have immediate legal implications for Trump’s military powers, it could potentially change how domestic drug cases are prosecuted. The use of a WMD against people or property in the U.S. carries a maximum sentence of life in prison; if someone dies, prosecutors can argue for the death penalty… That could impose a life sentence on any person who uses drugs laced with illicitly manufactured fentanyl, or anyone who gives drugs laced with illicitly manufactured fentanyl to their friend. As of now, the Trump administration has offered no guidance on how this might play out.

Earlier this year, Attorney General Pam Bondi claimed that the Trump administration’s fentanyl seizures had saved the lives of 258 million Americans — three-quarters of the population of the entire country. However, in September, Trump claimed that “300 million people died … from drugs” in 2024, which would be almost the entire US population, and about five times as many people as died that year from anything anywhere in the world. In fact, CDC numbers show that fentanyl was involved in 42,233 deaths between April 2024 and April 2025.

Drug defendants with fentanyl in their cases probably should not expect any break from this Administration any time soon.

A different story has played out on marijuana, although Trump’s executive order issued last Thursday on weed changes more for the cannabis industry’s bottom line than the architecture of prohibition.

Under the Controlled Substances Act, marijuana is currently placed in Schedule I, a category reserved for substances deemed to have “no currently accepted medical use.” That’s the most restrictive controlled substance category — more serious than where fentanyl is scheduled — and clearly at odds with at least 40 states that have legalized medical marijuana.

Trump’s executive order on Thursday prompts the Justice Department to hasten the rescheduling of marijuana as a Schedule III drug, alongside common prescription medications like Tylenol with codeine.

The Biden administration began rescheduling in the fall of 2022, but left the matter unfinished despite its promise to get it done. Trump’s order — which directs Attorney General Pam Bondi to hasten the process of loosening federal restrictions but does not include a timeline — comes after an intensive lobbying campaign from cannabis business interests.

Although the Wall Street Journal complained that by his executive order, Trump is going “for the Stoner Vote,” the President was lobbied hard by the commercial cannabis industry for the change, due to the banking and tax relief such a reclassification will bring to the business. “I’ve never been inundated by so many people as I have about this particular reclassification,” Trump said.

While Schedule III drugs can legally be prescribed, they still require Food and Drug Administration approval, which marijuana lacks. While, in theory, the order could reduce or eliminate some federal criminal penalties, statutory mandatory minimums would remain unchanged unless Congress amends 21 USC §§ 841 and 960. It is possible that some Sentencing Guidelines would change, but any such modification is several years off and would have to undergo an additional proceeding to become retroactive.

Even under §§ 841 and 960 as now written, federal prosecutors have not prioritized marijuana cases in recent years, especially regarding state-level approved marijuana commerce. As of January 2022, no one in federal prison was doing time solely for simple marijuana possession. Marijuana trafficking cases are down 58% since 2020, according to the U.S. Sentencing Commission.

What might this mean for 18 USC § 922(g)(3), which prohibits users of unlawful drugs from possessing guns? One firearms trade group has reminded its members that “state legalization of marijuana similarly has no effect on legality under 18 USC § 922(g)(3), and possession by a purchaser of a state medical marijuana card should be taken as evidence of unlawful use.”

What’s more, Trump taking a more accepting stance toward marijuana could prompt Congress to revisit the Controlled Substances Act, either by amending it to exempt state-level marijuana legalization regimes or by de-scheduling the drug from federal regulation altogether.

Trump’s order could also impact United States v. Hemani, currently pending in the Supreme Court. Hemani was convicted of a § 922(g)(3) offense, and SCOTUS has been asked to rule on whether disarming marijuana users complies with the 2nd Amendment. A decision is expected by June 2026.

Executive Order, Designating Fentanyl As A Weapon Of Mass Destruction (December 15, 2025)

Executive Order, Increasing Medical Marijuana and Cannabidiol Research (December 18, 2025)

The Atlantic, The New ‘Weapon of Mass Destruction’ (December 16, 2025)

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Provisional Drug Overdose Death Counts (September 17, 2025)

U.S. Sentencing Commission, Quick Facts – Marijuana Trafficking (FY 2024) (May 2025)

Roll Call, Press Gaggle: Donald Trump Speaks to Reporters Before Air Force One Departure – September 14, 2025 

The Hill, Trump signs executive order to expedite marijuana rescheduling (December 18, 2025)

CNN, Trump signs executive order expediting marijuana reclassification after lobbying from cannabis industry (December 18, 2025)

The Reload, Analysis: Trump’s Marijuana Moves Unlikely to Immediately Impact Gun Owners (December 21, 2025)

~ Thomas  L. Root