Tag Archives: retroactivity

Vacation’s Over, Back to Work – LISA Update for July 31, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

OCCASIONALLY (BUT RARELY) I’M RIGHT

I am back from a week in the wilds with three wild grandchildren, a great vacation marred only by the LISA site crashing for five days. Did I remember to publicly thank LISA’s website provider for its alacrity in fixing the problem?

No, I did not forget to My omission was quite deliberate.

Now back to work: I have been predicting for weeks that the US Sentencing Commission will probably make the new Sentencing Guidelines §§4A1.1(e) and 4C1.1 retroactive sometime in August.

Amended §4A1.1(e) abolishes “status points” from Guidelines criminal history, while §4C1.1 reduces the Guidelines offense level for some people with zero criminal history points.

iamright230731Last Thursday, the USSC announced a public meeting will be held on August 24, and that the meeting will include as an agenda item a “possible vote on retroactivity of Parts A and B of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment.”

For the uninitiated, “Parts A and B of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment” are the zero-point and status-point changes we’re talking about.

If the vote is favorable, then people will likely be able to apply for 18 USC § 3582(c)(2)/USSG § 1B1.10 retroactivity at the end of February 2024.

Of course, Congress could veto the proposed amendment. However, half of the 6-month review period for the 2023 amendments has already passed, and Congress is on vacation until the week after Labor Day. With an appropriations bill deadline at the end of September and reams of unfinished business, the chance both the House and the Senate will veto any part of the 2023 Amendments before the November 1 effective date is remote.

The same is probably true for the 6-month review period on retroactivity.

US Sentencing Commission, Public Meeting – August 24, 2023 (July 27, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Mr. Explainer Here: All About Guidelines Retroactivity – Update for July 20, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

MR. EXPLAINER TACKLES RETROACTIVE GUIDELINES

USSC160729The good news is that the U.S. Sentencing Commission is likely to approve a proposal that two Guidelines changes it adopted in April should be retroactive for people already sentenced.

The better news is that Congress seems too busy to try to gin up a veto of any of the provisions approved by the USSC and submitted to the legislators for review.

Today’s guest is Mr. Explainer, who is here to guide us through the fine print of getting retroactive application of the two changes:

• First, no one can file a motion for retroactive application of the two Guidelines changes until six months pass from the time the USSC sends the proposed retroactivity order to Congress. That means that all of the inmates doing a happy dance in anticipation of November 1, 2023, will have to wait at least until Punxatawny Phil sees his shadow.

• Second, the two changes have conditions attached:

(a) The zero-point change in the Guidelines (new USSG § 4C1.1) says that defendants are eligible for a 2-level reduction in their Total Offense Level (usually good for a two-sentencing range reduction) if they had zero criminal history points and meet all of the following conditions:

(1) had no adjustment under § 3A1.4 (Terrorism);

(2) did not use violence or credible threats of violence in connection with the offense;

(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury;

(4) the offense is not a sex offense;

(5) the defendant did not personally cause substantial financial hardship;

(6)  no gun was involved in connection with the offense;

(7) the offense did not involve individual rights under § 2H1.1;

(8) had no adjustment under § 3A1.1 for a hate crime or vulnerable victim or  § 3A1.5 for a serious human rights offense; and

(9) had no adjustment under § 3B1.1 for role in the offense and was not engaged in a 21 USC § 848 continuing criminal enterprise.

(b) The change in § 4A1.1(e) – the so-called status point enhancement – says only that one point is added if the defendant already has 7 or more criminal history points and “committed any part of the instant offense (i.e., any relevant conduct) while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.”

fineprint180308• The USSC staff has figured that about 11,500 BOP prisoners with status points would have a lower guideline range under a retroactive § 4A1.1(e). The current average sentence for that group is 120 months and would probably fall by an average of 14 months.

About 7,300 eligible prisoners with zero criminal history points would be eligible for a lower guideline range if the zero-point amendment becomes retroactive. The current average sentence of 85 months could fall to an average of 70 months.

• The reduction – done under 18 USC § 3582(c)(2) – is a two-step process described in USSC § 1B1.10.

(a) First, the court determines whether the prisoner is eligible. For a zero-point reduction, the court would have to find that the prisoner (1) had no criminal history points; (2) had none of the other enhancements in his case or guns or sex charges, or threats of violence or leader/organizer enhancements or any of the other factors listed in § 4C1.1. Then, the court would have to find that granting the two-level reduction would result in a sentencing range with a bottom number lower than his or her current sentence.

If your guidelines were 97-121 months, but the court varied downward to 78 months for any reason other than cooperation, you would not be eligible because reducing your points by two levels would put you in a 78-97 month range, and you are already at the bottom of that range. Special rules apply if you got a § 5K1.1 reduction for cooperation, but people sentenced under their sentencing ranges for reasons other than cooperation may not be eligible.

(b) To benefit from the status point reduction, the decrease in criminal history points is more problematic. If you have 4, 5, or 6 criminal history points, you are in Criminal History Category III. If two of those points are status points, they would disappear. Going from 5 points to 3 or 4 points to 2 would drop you into Criminal History Category II. If your prior sentencing range had been 70-87 months, your new range would be 68-78 months, and you would be eligible.

But if you had 6 criminal history points, you would only drop to 4 points, and you would still be in Criminal History Category III. No reduction in criminal history, no decrease in sentencing range, and thus no eligibility.

• Once you’re found to be eligible, your judge has just about total discretion whether to give you all of the reduction you’re entitled to, some of it, or none of it. You cannot get more than the bottom of your amended sentencing range, and the court cannot consider any other issues in your sentence than the retroactive adjustment.

usscretro230406Convincing the court that you should get the full benefit of your reduction is best done with letters of support from the community, a good discipline record and a history of successful programming. Showing the court that you have been rehabilitated to the point that the reduction has been earned is a good idea.

There’s a good reason that the retroactivity – if it is adopted – will end up benefitting no more than 12% of the BOP population. It is not easy to show eligibility and even tougher to prove that the court should use its discretion to give you the credit.

USSC, Retroactivity Impact Analysis of Parts A and B of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment (May 15, 2023)

USSC, Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts (May 3, 2023)

USSC § 1B1.10, Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as a Result of Amended Guideline Range (Policy Statement)

– Thomas L. Root

USSC Retro Inquiry Gets a Boost – Update for May 26, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

SENTENCING COMMISSION ANALYZES EFFECT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RETROACTIVITY

retro160110When it adopted proposed Guidelines amendments last month, the Sentencing Commission asked whether two of them – the new USSG § 4C1.1 that would provide a 2-level reduction to people with non-violent non-sex offenses with zero criminal points and the abandonment of extra criminal history points (called “status points”) applied to people who were on probation, parole or supervised release when they committed their current offense (and thus should have really known better) – should be retroactive.

Any change in the Sentencing Guidelines does not benefit people who have been sentenced before the change was effective unless the Sentencing Commission – in a separate proceeding – determines that the change should be retroactive. If it does, those already sentenced may petition their sentencing judges to resentence them as though the new Guideline applied to their sentence.

It doesn’t happen often: the last retroactive Guidelines change that was declared to be retroactive was the 2014 across-the-board 2-level reduction in the drug quantity tables of USSG § 2D1.1. That change, to pick an illustration, reduced the offense level of someone who sold a kilo of cocaine from 26 to 24. If the defendant had no prior criminal convictions and no other aggravating factors (such as stupidly having a gun), his or her advisory sentencing range would have dropped a year, from 63 to 51 months).

manyaslip230526There are many a slip ‘twixt cup and lip, of course: the Guidelines reduction must have reduced the sentencing range: a veteran criminal with the top level of criminal history and an offense level of 39 might see her level fall to 37, but the advisory sentencing range would still start at 360 months. And if all of the eligibility hurdles are crossed, the sentencing judge may still decide the defendant’s a bad dude and decline any reduction. But still, for those who are eligible, a Guidelines reduction that goes retroactive provides hope.

Currently, the Commission is taking public comment on the wisdom of letting people benefit from retroactivity of the very wise changes proposed for criminal history scoring. That comment period ends June 23. After that, the USSC will decide whether to add the § 4C1.1 amendment to the retroactivity list. If it does, Congress will get 6 months to decide whether to veto it.

If retroactivity is adopted and gets past Congress, prisoners will be able to apply for a reduction under 18 USC § 3582(c)(2) and USSG § 1B1.10 (the statute and guideline, respectively, that govern the process).

Two issues that always arise are whether the retroactivity would create a flood of court filings that would gum up the federal courts, and exactly how many people might benefit. Last week, the USSC staff issued a study that gives the retroactive argument a boost.

releaseme211231The staff estimated that 11,500 BOP prisoners with status points would have a lower guideline range if the abandonment of status points becomes retroactive. The current average sentence for that group is 120 months and would probably fall by an average of 14 months.

The report also figures that about 7,300 eligible prisoners with zero criminal history points would have a lower guideline range if the zero-point Guidelines change becomes effective. The current average sentence of 85 months could fall to an average of 70 months.

Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman said, “Putting these particulars together in a very rough way, it seems that the USSC is estimating that just under 19,000 thousand current federal prisoners would be able to get just under 1.2 years off their sentences if these new criminal history amendments are made retroactive. That adds up to a total of about 23,000 prison years saved were these new guideline amendments made retroactive and these estimated impacts become reality.”

USSC, Retroactivity Impact Analysis of Parts A and B of the 2023 Criminal History Amendment (May 15, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, US Sentencing Commission publishes detailed retroactivity analysis for its amendments to federal guidelines’ criminal history rules (May 15, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Three First Step Reform Retread Bills Introduced – Update for April 24, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN

deja171017Senate Majority Whip Richard Durbin (D-IL), chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA) last Wednesday reintroduced three of the biggest criminal justice of the last Congress, reform bills that made it out of Senate committee but never got voted on in 2021-2022.

Yogi Berra might say, “It’s déjà vu all over again.”

Durbin and Grassley sponsored First Step five years ago. Now, they have reintroduced the First Step Implementation Act (FSIA) (S. 1251) and Safer Detention Act (S.1248) – both of which were approved by the Committee in 2021 but did not pass the Senate the last Congress – as well as rolled out the Terry Technical Correction Act (S. 1247).

The FSIA would allow courts to apply First Step sentencing reform provisions to reduce sentences imposed prior to First Step’s December 2018 enactment and broaden the drug safety valve (18 USC § 3553(f)) to allow courts to sentence below a mandatory minimum for nonviolent controlled substance offenses, if the court finds the defendant’s criminal history over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal record and the likelihood of recidivism.

The Safer Detention Act of 2023 would reform the Elderly Home Detention Pilot Program (34 USC § 60541(g)(5)) by clarifying that the time served required for the Program should be calculated based on an inmate’s net sentence – including reductions for good conduct time credits; lowering eligibility to include nonviolent offenders who have served at least 50% (instead of 66.7%) of their terms; and making D.C. Code offenders in BOP custody eligible for the Elderly Home Detention Pilot Program. The bill would also make federal prisoners sentenced before November 1, 1987 eligible for compassionate release.

jordan230425The Terry Technical Corrections Act (S. 1247) broadens the scope of crack cocaine offenders who are eligible for a retroactive sentencing reduction under the First Step Act of 2018. The First Step Act authorized sentencing reductions for crack cocaine offenders convicted and sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act became effective, as long as their conduct triggered a mandatory minimum sentence. This bill extends eligibility for the retroactive sentencing reduction to all crack cocaine offenders sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act became effective, including low-level offenders whose conduct did not trigger a mandatory minimum sentence.

Remember that this same trio of modest proposals did not pass even when the Democrats ran the House, the Senate and the White House. Now, the Republicans run the House, with Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH) chairing a House Judiciary Committee more interested in attacking Democrats for being soft on crime and hard on former President Trump than it is in addressing criminal justice reform.

Writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog last Thursday, Ohio State University law prof Doug Berman said, “For a wide variety of reasons, I am not at all hopeful that any form of federal sentencing reform will be enacted in the current Congress. But I was still pleased to learn… that a pair of notable Senators are still seeking to advance some notable (previously stalled) sentencing bills.”

underthesun230424

Kohelet was an old and wise guy when he reputedly wrote the Book of Ecclesiastes. If he were still writing, it would be about these three bills.  Nothing new under the sun, indeed, as will probably be the fate of these three – demise in December 2024, just as the last three died at the end of 2022. At that time, we will be writing of the FSIASafer Detention Act and Terry Technical Correction Act, “Vanity of vanities! All is futile! What profit hath a man for all his toil, in which he toils under the sun?”

Reintroduction of the three measures last week came as The Crime Report complained that “after four years, the impact of the First Step Act has been mixed… In March 2022 that there were 208,000 inmates in federal prisons and jails. But only 5,000 inmates… have been released through one or more provisions of the FSA.”

The Crime Report concluded

The sheer number of reforms in the FSA that are the antithesis to the Nixon-era ‘lock-‘em-up-and-throw-away-the-key’ penal philosophy of both the Bureau of Prisons and the US Sentencing Commission make it exceedingly difficult to have the promise of the FSA fulfilled. The very magnitude of the law and its stated objectives, which include reducing recidivism and improving conditions in federal prisons, has resulted in less than what was initially promised by the supporters of FSA.

First Step Implementation Act (S.1251)

Safer Detention Act of 2023 (S.1248)

Terry Technical Corrections Act (S.1247)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Senators Durbin and Grassley introduce again set of First Step follow-up bills (April 20, 2023)

The Crime Report, The Promises Of Federal Criminal Justice Reform: Shortcomings of the First Step Act (April 17, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Guidelines Criminal History Changes To Benefit Some – Update for April 21, 2023

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

EXPLAINER: CRIMINAL HISTORY RETROACTIVITY

explain230420I don’t usually write this kind of thing, but I am getting a lot of questions about the possibly retroactive changes in the criminal history Guidelines.

Earlier this month, the United States Sentencing Commission proposed two Sentencing Guidelines changes benefitting people at both ends of the criminal history spectrum.  Because these changes might become retroactive, many prisoners wonder what might be in it for them.  So here goes:

A sentencing range for a Federal defendant is determined on a table found in Section 5 of the Sentencing Guidelines. A defendant’s offense level – specific to the offense of conviction and usually fortified with several enhancements for leadership, weapon, sophisticated planning and the like – is calculated.  Then, the court takes a dive into the defendant’s criminal history, assigning points to prior offenses depending on severity, status at the time of the offense, and the like.

Those two rankings are applied to the Sentencing Table, with the Total Offense Level being the ordinant and the Criminal History Category (from I to VI) being the abscissa.

zeropoints230420When Zero is Hero: Anyone with zero or one criminal history points falls in Criminal History I. But believing someone who absolutely no prior criminal history points is a special breed of virgin, the Commission has proposed USSG § 4C1.1. This Guideline would provide a 2-level decrease in the Total Offense Level for people with zero points.

Caution: the draft has more holes than a prairie dog village. The two-level decrease would only apply when the defendant did

(1) not receive any criminal history points;

(2) not receive a terrorism adjustment under 3A1.4;

(3) not use violence or threats of violence in the offense;

(4) not commit an offense resulting in death or serious bodily injury, or a sex offense;

(5) not personally cause substantial financial hardship;

(6) not possess of a gun or other dangerous weapon, or get someone else to do so);

(7) not commit an offense involving individual rights, a hate crime, or serious human rights offense); or

(8) not receive a USSG § 3B1.1 role adjustment and was not engaged in a 21 USC § 848 continuing criminal enterprise.

As an example, a defendant with no criminal history points who was convicted of selling a pound of cocaine might have a Total Offense Level of 22.  As a Criminal History Category I, she would have an advisory sentencing range of 41-51 months.  But if she had been a cheerleader and churchgoer before her unfortunate descent into drug-dealing – with zero prior criminal history points – her Total Offense Level would fall by two.  Her sentencing range would then be 33-41 months, not exactly probation, but eight months less is eight months less.

lesson230420Status Seekers:  The status point change is easier. Currently, § 4A1.1(d) of the Guidelines currently adds two criminal history points “if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.”

Makes sense. Prison is supposed to teach inmates a lesson, which is (among othert things) ‘don’t break the law‘. Hitting recently-released people with extra status points because they didn’t read the memo (the one that said ‘go forth and break the law no more’). Nevertheless, the Commission has found that its research showed the status points have no effect

Now, the Guidelines will only add a single point if a defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence – including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status – and already has seven criminal history points before the status point is added.

retro160110Going Retro: The USSC has sought comment on whether it should make the key parts of its new criminal history amendment “available for retroactive application.” If it becomes retroactive and Congress does not veto the change, people who were “crim zeros” or who had status points could file for benefit probably starting in early 2024.

Just note that unless application of the Guidelines change reduces a defendant;s Guidelines sentencing range, he or she can get no benefit from it. Read up on Guideline § 1B1.10 for how this works.

USSC, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (Preliminary) (April 5, 2023)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Highlighting US Sentencing Commission’s significant amendments to federal guidelines’ criminal history rules (April 9, 2023)

– Thomas L. Root

Acquitted Conduct No Panacea for Current Prisoners – Update for April 14, 2022

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

ACQUITTED CONDUCT AND THE HOPEMONGERS

The House of Representatives’ passage of the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021 (H.R. 1621) ten days ago appears to be chum on the water for some hope-mongering sharks who prey on inmates.

shark170607I already have heard from one person who is busy hiring an outside “research” service to evaluate his case to tell him whether he’ll benefit from the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act. For everyone’s benefit, here are two things to keep in mind.

First, the Act has not passed the Senate. It may. It may not. It may pass, but with different text, and then a conference committee will have to work out compromise text.

Second, the Act will apply to very few cases. It does not necessarily apply to relevant conduct. It does not apply to conduct not mentioned to a jury. If you did not have a jury trial, it does not apply (unless you were acquitted of the same conduct in a prior federal or state trial).

Finally, it is very unlikely that the Act will be retroactively applied to people already sentenced. The bill does not specify that it applies retroactively. Such bills are usually presumed not to be retroactive. Read 1 USC § 109 and Dorsey v. United States before you decide the courts will open their doors to post-conviction motions seeking resentencing because Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act passes.

No reputable legal services company will take any money now to tell you whether you can get any sentencing benefit from the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act. It’s just too premature.

Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act of 2021 (HR 1621)

Dorsey v. United States, 567 US 260 (Supreme Ct., 2012)

SPEAKING OF PREMATURE…

George Fower was sentenced to 24 months, but before he self-surrendered to the Bureau of Prisons, he sought compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) on the grounds he was very susceptible to COVID. Because he was not yet in prison, George found the statute’s administrative exhaustion requirement challenging, but he wrote to the warden of the prison to which he was to surrender in a month’s time, and later to the BOP’s Designation and Sentence Computation Center, the Regional Director and the Bureau of Prisons General Counsel.

Thirty days later (while still not in custody), George filed his compassionate release motion. The district court denied it, holding in part that “compassionate relief is not available to a defendant not in custody.”

Last week, the 9th Circuit agreed. It noted that the First Step Act amended the compassionate release statute only to allow the prisoner, rather than requiring BOP, to file the motion. At no time in the history of the “matrix of statutory and other enactments,” the Circuit said, were the BOP’s powers ever extended to grant it jurisdiction over those who had yet to commence their incarceration.

compassion160208It makes sense that the BOP has no place to play in compassionate release prior to a prisoner’s incarceration, the 9th noted. “The statute states that the defendant’s request must be addressed to ‘the warden of defendant’s facility,’ which cannot be known until there has been a designation by the BOP. This is further evidence that the statute contemplates that the defendant must be in a BOP facility before qualifying for compassionate relief.”

The 9th suggests that before a defendant self-surrenders, he or she may ask the district court to delay sentencing or to extend the surrender date.

United States v. Fower, Case No 21-50007, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 8919 (9th Cir., April 4, 2022)

– Thomas L. Root

Nothing Extraordinary about a 312-Year Robbery Sentence, 3rd Circuit Says – Update for September 8, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

A LARGELY UGLY COMPASSIONATE RELEASE DECISION FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT

guns200304The 3rd Circuit last week joined eight other federal circuits in holding that an inmate-filed compassionate release motion is not limited by the Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.13 policy statement. That was the good news, the only good news.

Eric Andrews is serving a 312-year sentence for a string of armed robberies, with almost all of that time due to stacked 18 USC § 924(c) convictions. If he had been sentenced after passage of the First Step Act, his § 924(c) sentences would have amounted to 91 years, still impressive but possibly a survivable sentence. But because the First Step changes were not retroactive, Rick’s only course was to file a compassionate release motion under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) arguing that his excessive sentence length and the First Step Act changes were the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” supporting grant of the motion.

The district court denied Rick, and last week, the 3rd Circuit agreed.

The appeals court held that “the duration of a lawfully imposed sentence does not create an extraordinary or compelling circumstance… Considering the length of a statutorily mandated sentence as a reason for modifying a sentence would infringe on Congress’s authority to set penalties.”

41475-Forever-Is-A-Long-TimeLikewise, the 3rd ruled, a nonretroactive change to mandatory minimums “cannot be a basis for compassionate release. In passing the First Step Act, Congress specifically decided that the changes to the 924(c) mandatory minimums would not apply to people who had already been sentenced.” Applying rules of statutory construction to the First Step Act, the Circuit said, “we will not construe Congress’s nonretroactivity directive as simultaneously creating an extraordinary and compelling reason for early release. Such an interpretation would sow conflict within the statute… We join the 6th and 7th Circuits in reaching this conclusion.”

Ohio State University law professor Doug Berman, writing in his Sentencing Law and Policy blog, makes a telling point:

The very first sentence of the Andrews ruling has a Kafka-esque “only in America” quality to it: “Eric Andrews is serving a 312-year sentence for committing a series of armed robberies when he was nineteen.” That a person at age 19 can get a 312-year sentence for a series of robberies strikes me as quite extraordinary and quite compelling, but the district court did not see matters that way. Specifically, as described by the panel opinion, the district court decided that “the duration of Andrews’s sentence and the nonretroactive changes to mandatory minimums could not be extraordinary and compelling as a matter of law.” Of course, there is no statutory text enacted by Congress that sets forth this “as a matter of law.” But the Third Circuit panel here blesses the extra-textual notion that courts can and should invent some new categorical exclusions “as a matter of law” regarding what might qualify as extraordinary and compelling.

noquorum191016The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held the contrary to this opinion, which perhaps puts some wind in Thomas Bryant’s pending petition to the Supreme Court for review of the 11th Circuit’s denial of his compassionate release motion. That petition is ripe for decision at the end of this month at the Supreme Court’s “long conference.” Of course, a reconstituted Sentencing Commission could solve this circuit split by rewriting USSG § 1B1.13, but that would require that the Sentencing Commission first be repopulated with new members. President Biden has thus far shown no more interest than did his predecessor in appointing new members. By December, the Commission will have been without a quorum for three years.

United States v. Andrews, Case No 20-2768, 2021 US App LEXIS 26089 (3d Cir. August 30, 2021)

Sentencing Law and Policy, Third Circuit invents some extra-textual limits on what might permit a sentence reduction under 3582(c)(1)(A) (August 30, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

That ‘Teague’ Thing? We Were Just Kidding – Update for May 25, 2021

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

BAD (BUT UNSURPRISING) NEWS ON RETROACTIVITY

sadprison210525How would you like to be convicted of a federal crime with a long sentence, only to have the Supreme Court hold well after the fact that something about your trial was unconstitutional? How would you like that?

That’s an easy one. You would not like to be convicted.  Period. Whether it was done constitutionally or not. No one wants to be convicted. So that was a stupid question.

But over 50,000 people are convicted of federal crimes every year. And they don’t like it, either. They like it even less if, say, if the government grabbed your cellphone location data without a warrant, or you were convicted by a jury vote of 9-2, or the judge jacked up your statutory minimum because he thought your revolver was really a machine gun.

All of those were deemed to be unconstitutional.  The cellphone location data? Carpenter v. United States, 2018. Less-than-unanimous jury? Ramos v. Louisiana, 2020. A nonjury finding jacking your mandatory minimum? Alleyne v. United States, 2013.

The problem is that if your conviction was final before these decisions established that you were constitutionally wronged, you have no right to ask the court for a do-over. That is not unless the decisions are declared to be retroactive, which means that cases like yours that are already final may reopen the issues on collateral review (habeas corpus).

watershed210525Thirty-two years ago, the Supreme Court explained in Teague v. Lane that decisions holding substantive criminal laws to be unconstitutional (such as the Armed Career Criminal Act residual clause in Johnson v. United States) are always retroactive to cases on § 2255 review. However, Teague held, a case in which a criminal procedure was declared unconstitutional (like searches in Carpenter or a less-than-unanimous jury in Ramos) is only retroactive on habeas review only if the new rule was “watershed,” “bedrock” or “essential.”

So what kind of ruling would be “watershed?” Prisoners and defense attorneys have looked for that elusive “watershed” decision for three decades without success. Last week, the Supreme Court heard a case asking whether last year’s Ramos rule on unanimous juries had to be unanimous (a holding which affected Louisiana and Oregon only) was retroactive. The Court ruled 6-3 that Ramos was not a “watershed” rule. More important, the Court gave up pretending that anything could ever be a “watershed” rule.

“This Court has repeatedly stated that a decision announcing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review,” Justice Kavanaugh wrote for the majority. “Indeed, in the 32 years since Teague underscored that principle, this Court has announced many important new rules of criminal procedure. But the Court has not applied any of those new rules retroactively on federal collateral review… And for decades before Teague, the Court also regularly declined to apply new rules retroactively, including on federal collateral review… At this point, some 32 years after Teague, we think the only candid answer is that… no new rules of criminal procedure can satisfy the watershed exception. We cannot responsibly continue to suggest otherwise to litigants and courts… It is time — probably long past time — to make explicit what has become increasingly apparent to bench and bar over the last 32 years: New procedural rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. The watershed exception is moribund.”

squarepeg210525So prisoners, at last, can give up trying to pound round constitutional procedure decisions into Teague’s square holes. The Supreme Court has said what a lot of us suspected ever since Apprendi was declared non-retroactive. Teague’s promise is now and always has been an illusion: there simply are no watershed decisions.

Edwards v. Vannoy, Case No 19-5807, 2021 US LEXIS 2584 (May 17, 2021)

– Thomas L. Root

It’s Not a Sentence Until It Is, 6th Circuit Says – Update for December 22, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

DOING IT OVER UNTIL YOU GET IT RIGHT

mulligan190430Mike Henry and an accomplice robbed three banks. In each robbery, Mike’s co-conspirator used a gun. A jury convicted Mike of the three robberies and three counts of using a gun in a crime of violence under 18 USC § 924(c). A § 924(c), you may recall, carries a mandatory sentence of at least five years (more if you brandish it or, God forbid, actually fire it).

In 2013, Mike got 70 months concurrent for the three robberies and 60 months for the first § 924(c) conviction. Because back then, a second or subsequent § 924(c) conviction carried a mandatory sentence of 300 extra months got a total of 600 months (50 years, that is),  for each of the next two § 924(c)s. Mike ended up with a sentence of  730 months (about 61 years in prison).

Mikes’s conviction was reversed because of the intervening Supreme Court decision in Rosemond v United States, which held that an accomplice had to have some level of knowledge that is co-conspirator had a gun. But after retrial, Mike’s sentence got marginally worse, increasing by eight months to 738 months. But while Mike was on appeal the second time, the Supreme Court’s Dean v. United States decision was handed down (holding that judges could adjust the underlying sentence to account for the mandatory § 924(c) sentence), and Mike’s sentence got reversed again in 2018.

By the time Mike was resentenced a second time, the calendar had flipped to 2019, and the First Step Act had passed. First Step Act § 403 amended 18 USC § 924(c) so that subsequent convictions of the statute carried a 300-month mandatory minimum only if the defendant had been previously been convicted of a § 924(c) offense. Which, of course, Mike had not.

Robber160229But First Step was not retroactive. Instead, § 403 applied only to an “offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.” On his latest appeal, Mike argued that First Step § 403 applied to his case, and his sentences for the second and third § 924(c) offenses should have only been 60 months apiece, not 300 months apiece.

Last week, the 6th Circuit agreed. The Court said the plain language of § 403(b) supported its conclusion that the First Step Act applies to defendants whose cases were remanded prior to the First Step Act’s enactment but who were resentenced only after its enactment.  At the time of the First Step Act’s enactment, the Circuit ruled, Mike “did not have ‘a sentence” for the purposes of § 403(b), because his case had been remanded case to the district court for resentencing. “Only when the district court ‘imposed’ Henry’s sentence for his various convictions at his 2019 resentencing did he have a sentence for the purposes of § 403“, the 6th said. “The better reading of ‘a sentence’ requires the defendant to have a valid sentence at the time of the First Step Act’s enactment, not a sentence at some point… Therefore, Henry is eligible for sentencing under First Step Act § 403.

oldmangrandkids201222This time, some 480 months should come off the sentence, leaving him with a still hefty 250 months (about 21 years). But it leaves Mike with a chance of hugging his grandkids someday.

United States v. Henry, Case 19-2445, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 39799 (6 Cir Dec 18, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root

Sentencing Sanity the 3rd, 7th Circuits – Update for September 23, 2020

We post news and comment on federal criminal justice issues, focused primarily on trial and post-conviction matters, legislative initiatives, and sentencing issues.

THREE FIRST STEP/FAIR SENTENCING DECISIONS OF NOTE

Last week was a good one for the First Step Act.

Sentencestack170404Hector Uriante was convicted of running with a gang that kidnapped and robbed drug dealers, including several 18 USC 924(c) counts that got stacked in the pre-First Step days. On the first 924(c) count, he got seven years for brandishing, but the brandishing was found by the judge, not the jury. On direct appeal, the Circuit remanded the case for resentencing because of Alleyne v. United States‘ holding that the jury had to find facts supporting an enhanced mandatory minimum.

The district court resentenced him last year, after First Step passed, but the judge still stacked his 924(c) counts, giving him 25 years for the second one. The district judge held that since Hector was first sentenced before First Step passed, the Act’s ban on stacking 924(c) convictions did not apply.

Last week, the 7th Circuit reversed in an en banc opinion that rejects the 3rd Circuit decision in United States v. Hodge. Because the prior sentence had been vacated, the 7th said, it was a “nullity.” A vacatur “wipes the slate clean,” meaning that at the time First Step passed, Harry was convicted and awaiting sentencing. Congress wrote First Step’s changes in 924(c) stacking to “apply to any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment,” making no distinction between defendants who had never been sentenced and those whose sentence had been vacated fully and who were awaiting the imposition of a new sentence. “In this way,” the Circuit explained, “Congress stanched, to the degree that it could without overturning valid and settled sentences, the mortmain effect of sentencing policies that it considered no longer in the Nation’s best interest. It ensured, moreover, all persons awaiting sentencing on the effective date of the Act would be treated equally, a value long cherished in our law.”

So Hector’s good fortune in getting his sentence overturned under Alleyne, which appears to have saved him two years, in fact reduces his sentence by a full 22 years (two years off the 7-year “brandishing” sentence and a reduction of the second 924(c) sentence from 25 to five years).

conspiracy160606The 7th Circuit last week held that the same rule benefitted Rashod Bethany. Rashod was sentenced for a crack conspiracy in 2013, but later won a § 2255 motion on the grounds his lawyer erred in letting the court use the wrong edition of the Guidelines. He was resentenced after First Step passed, but his sentencing court would not let him benefit from the lower drug mandatory minimums passed in § 401 of the Act.

The 7th said that same rule applied. The § 2255 motion vacated his sentence, so Rashod was in the same position as a defendant who had never been sentenced. The Circuit remanded the case to district cout for a ruling of whether the sentence would have changed if lower mandatory minimums had been applied.

Finally, in the 3rd Circuit, James Easter had filed for a resentencing under First Step § 404, the section that made the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act retroactive. The court decided that James was eligible for a reduction, but denied him one because, the judge concluded, James’s Guidelines range did not change even if the FSA was applied.

James appealed, arguing that a district court had to consider the sentencing factors in 18 USC § 3553(a), not just a mechanistic look at the guidelines. Last week, the 3rd Circuit agreed.

While other circuits generally agree that minimum, a district court may consider the § 3553(a) factors, the 3rd said a judge must do so. “Section 404(b) uses the word ‘impose’ twice, and the first instance clearly refers to the act of imposing the original sentence.” The Circuit ruled. “Because Congress used the same word, we can infer that it conceived of the district court’s role as being the same when it imposes an initial sentence and when it imposes a sentence under the First Step Act. As the text of § 3553(a) makes clear, district courts look to the factors set forth there whenever they impose a sentence on a defendant.”

The 3rd Circuit joins the 4th and 6th Circuits in adopting the rule.

United States v. Uriarte, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 29234 (7th Cir. Sept 15, 2020)
United States v. Bethany, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 29246 (7th Cir. Sept 15, 2020)
United States v. Easter, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 29243 (3d Cir. Sept 15, 2020)

– Thomas L. Root